The “Refusal to Deal” Doctrine in the Digital Era
Author(s)
Scorciarini Coppola, Luisa
Date Issued
2025
Type
article
Abstract
The digital revolution is prompting a fundamental reassessment of antitrust rules and their enforcement. Digital markets–characterized by multi-sided
structures, strong network effects, big data, and rapid technological innovation–challenge the effectiveness of traditional antitrust tools, particularly when
dealing with dominant tech platforms. In response, competition authorities are adopting more innovative approaches, including new regulations and evolving
interpretations of existing legal frameworks. Against this backdrop, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Google Android Auto case
ruled that the traditional “Bronner criteria” for imposing a duty to deal may not apply in certain cases. This limits their scope and effectively broadens the
reach of antitrust intervention regarding dominant digital platforms providing third-party services. The CJEU also held that in refusal to deal (RTD) cases
involving interoperability by an app with a dominant digital platform, a precise definition of the product or geographic market may not be necessary
identifying a potential or even hypothetical downstream market may suffice. This judgment is a milestone in an ongoing global debate on RTD doctrine in
digital markets. This article revisits the economic and legal debate on RTD in light of recent developments and offers a critical analysis of the recent CJEU
decision.