Le prime elezioni per il Parlamento europeo e la partecipazione nazionale: un confronto tra Italia, Francia e Regno Unito
Author(s)
Floris, Doriana
Date Issued
June 6, 2014
Type
Doctoral Thesis
Abstract
Jacques Delors used to talk about European institutions as an O.P.N.I Object
Politique Non Identifié. His opinion appears a compromise between his
interest to protect National rights and the need to give lasting and
autonomous governance to the European integration process.
Actually from the European Community model, two different ways of
thinking the governance derived both influenced by the instability of the
model itself.
The first one aimed at a political union; as Riccardo Perissich says:
“Ai limitati trasferimenti di sovranità già decisi, altri ne sarebbero seguiti, anche se
sempre in modo graduale. Coerentemente con questo approccio, le istituzioni
avrebbero dovuto evolvere verso un modello classico. La Commissione si sarebbe
trasformata in un esecutivo federale; il Consiglio dei ministri in un “Senato degli
Stati”; l’Assemblea parlamentare in un vero Parlamento federale”6.
The second one tried not to neglect the sovereignty principle by transferring
technical and political power according to the Treaties.
This second view increased doubts and mistrust towards the European
Parliament and Commission as well.
European Member States agreed above all with the first view, except for the
France of Charles De Gaulle who was still convinced of his idea of not
giving power to supranational level.
Following the unification between ECSC, EEC and EAEC there was a
single Commission for the whole administrative system while the
Parliament had competence on the European budget; direct election to
European Parliament was referred to as “temporary” in Article 138 of the
European Community Treaty; then the Parliament would plan the way for a
single procedure election regarding all Member States.
Between 1951 and 1976 there were many proposals to define a direct
universal suffrage, but only in 1979 this target was achieved. This result
meant a significant change also for the polical and institutional
6R. Perissich, L’Unione Europea una storia non ufficiale, Milano, Longanesi, 2008, p.54.
communication that became fundamental to reach citizenship during the
election campaign.
In 1974, during the French summit chaired by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,
were both established the European Council and the direct election of the
European Parliament.
The European Parliament finally elected by European citizens would
require an increase in both political and institutional influence.
The direct elections would enhance popular interest in European affairs as
well as raise people’s awareness of the Parliament itself.
This last aspect emphasized the differences between the federalist and the
“gradualist” trend. The first one considered the direct elected Parliament as
a “Congress of European People”, that is to say the constituent power of the
future European Federation.
Many famous people were constantly engaged in the European integration
cause as politicians and intellectuals did by committing themselves to
legitimizing the role of the European Parliament in relation to other
institutions, particularly the European Commission.
Reference can be made to Altiero Spinelli, Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil,
Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac, just to mention some of them.
Members of the European Parliament (MEP’s) began their job by
addressing many issues such as the question of communist nations or
planning for a European TV or preparing a draft for the European
Constitution.
Appointing political celebrities such as Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil,
Willy Brandt was a way to make the propaganda more effective.
The 1979 election campaign as well as the other two following ones was,
however, characterized by arguments too often associated with the national
political discourse. All the information given to European citizens
succeeded in generating interest in supranational reality above all.
The turnout was lower than in national elections and the reason has to be
found in the behaviour of political parties in discussing mostly national
issues aiming at national targets.
In spite of this, the first direct election to the European Parliament gave a
breath of fresh air to the meaning of European democracy.
The newly acquired legitimacy gave the European Parliament the
opportunity to consolidate its power by acting a definite role inside the
European decisional process that was, at that time, nebulous to say the least.
Once the electoral date was scheduled all the national political parties had to
face a challenge that forced them to renew their themes and topics
previously chosen in national campaign.
There was greater awareness of the necessity to broaden the horizon
without loosing contact with voters by looking for similarities in other
European political parties. This is what would allow single ideologies to
merge in a wider context.
We must to consider that between 1975 – 1979 inside the European
Parliament there were representatives of parties sharing outlooks similar to
the national ones, but different ways of thinking made these coalitions too
weak, above all because of the predominant national interests. The primacy
of national parties has always been an obstacle to the autonomy of groups
and federations, neglecting the implementation of European parties.
After the first direct European elections the new MEP’s were a kind of “trait
d’union” with their own electorates, their own party, the European coalition
and the Parliament as well.
The peculiar features of the political-institutional path of the European
Parliament concerning the three countries studied showed differences that
have characterized their participation in European elections.
While Italy and France, founding members of EC, were too busy to deal
with national issues during electoral campaign, the UK was more attentive
to evaluate the benefits of participation and Margaret Thatcher, who was
Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990 was particularly suited for such an
attitude.
While during the first direct election there was a need to bring some new
element in organizing the electoral campaign in order to reach a wider
consensus, the following two elections made political forces more reflective
about the decline in turnout.
Too many national issues made the communication weak, particularly for
the French campaign. What citizens perceived was the little confidence of
political parties and that was the reason for such a large incertitude among
the people.
On the other hand, the Community campaign too showed a partial
efficiency. So what kind of elections are we talking about? Still “second
order” elections? This is not the picture that emerged from my research
conducted on the historical and political fields. Participation is inversely
proportional to the preparatory work, both from a political point of view and
from an administrative-institutional one, which was far superior to any
national suffrage. So, why didn’t voters participate so enthusiastically?
Many answers are possible because many are the causes of such an odd
behaviour: little attention to European issues, quality of communication,
propaganda too close to the election date, distance between citizens and
istitution, the cultural level of voters, election dates too close to those of
national elections, lack of confidence of the political class were all
contributing factors in low participation. In the middle of this mess the
European citizen becomes the protagonist for the success of such a
performance.
Despite numbers reveal a gradual decline in the ten years examined,
European citizens have not remained indifferent to the changes introduced
by the European integration process.
Many surveys showed that in addition to a percentage of “indifferent” or
“eurosceptical” people, there were citizens who asked for a stronger
Parliament hoping that this result would be reached sooner or later.
The failure to achieve this goal as well as the political events of each nation
have gradually caused an outcry against the vote expressed either in nonvoting
or in negative-vote; these different behaviours show a different way
of participating . The voter who, though informed by the electoral
campaign, decided not to vote or to give a different vote by cancelling his
vote or returning blank−voting ballot, went nevertheless to the polling
station and didn’t stay at home ignoring what was happening.
The unfullfilled hope for an institutional strengthening of the Parliament and
for greater political cohesion of the European Community, due to political
responsibilities, didn’t allow the voter to contribute or protest against the
non-achievement of results.
Citizens’ increased knowledge and involvement did not keep pace with the
participation; some elements of dissatisfaction have characterized the
behaviour of the pro-Europe voter.
The three main groups in which European voters may be included are pro-
Europe, anti-Europe and eurosceptics. Whereas the pro-Europe voters’
expectations have been disappointed, the anti-Europe voters have partially
exercised the right to vote feeding this kind of lists in the European
competition. Eurosceptics, on the other hand were the centerpiece of the
electorate. Being careful observers of which and how many changes have
occurred since 1979, citizens have been able to consolidate their position by
continuing to perceive the Community as still too distant and mostly
uncomfortable if not useless. They have continued their observation by
standing together with those uncertain people who stayed at home.
At this point it appeared inevitable to assess also those elements that
characterized the elections in general.
What attracts people to the polling station is mainly the weight that
elections may have on the governmental changes in their own countries.
The “less at stake” of European elections surely showed one of the reasons
just described. We are therefore facing a different context,
In such ‘marker-setting’ elections, voters have an incentive to behave tactically,
but in a sense of the word ‘tactical’ that is quite different from what we see in
National elections, where large parties are advantaged by their size. In a markersetting
election the tactical situation is instead characterized by an apparent lack of
consequences for the allocation of power, on the one hand, and by the attentiveness
of politicians and media, on the other7.
The lack of consequences on the national level where European elections
are concerned lightened voters by taking away their responsibility in
directing the national political course.
Although in 1979 there was a political activity at the transnational level, the
electorate’s attention was very scarce. The result showed 50% of voters
admitting to their disinformation about the groups that achieved greater
consensus.
7 C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, M. Marsh, What voters teach us about Europe-Wide Elections: what Europe-Wide
Elections teach us about voters, in “Electoral Studies”, vol. 15, n. 2, p. 157.
Another issue is the large success gained by smaller parties; in this case it is
possible to talk about a “punishment vote” against the policy of the national
government.
The three cases studied showed different ways of participating.
Italian and French voters showed a considerable participation according to
their tradition also because in the 1979 – 1989 period there was an
interesting political debate. The Italian “pseudo-compulsory” vote kept the
percentage of voters high, but the outcome showed changing directions
during the above mentioned period. Looking at the outcomes got by the
Front National the French case showed an escalation of the Right next to
to a significant decline of the Communist Party. There was also a substantial
dispersion of voting because of so many rolls, particularly during the 1989
elections.
The British case is a special one for the particular behaviour towards the
European integration process. The Conservative Party wanted to play an
important role in the European context and for this reason European
elections were considered as a way to succeed in it. On the contrary the
Labour Party did not immediately understand the importance of such a
crucial opportunity; the outcome of the 1979 European elections was
disastrous and they met an evident defeat that therefore was useful to
understand many things for future elections.
All three countries have seen the progressive growth of the Green Party.
The present study has paid constant attention to to the political debate in
each country, and to the strategies implemented by the actors, who were
aware from the beginning that the European challenge would engage them
in different ways. It was, moreover, focused on the individual citizen’s
ability to determine the election outcome.
Considering the outcome through the mere numerical data gives a partial
view of the whole context. There are so many aspects that influenced the
decision to vote or not. There was a selection among voters that showed
citizens who desired a more political union operating a political and
institutional strengthening in opposition to those who did not want to engage
themselves in an election without any gain.
An unconvinced political class, questionable information, lack of
knowledge among citizens about the role of the European Parliament have
built a different voter, a more attentive one, with a greater critical sense
towards a newer context different from the national one.
The diverse elements which have emerged from this interdiciplinary study
have led to further insights.
After historical considerations, a sociological analysis has been carried out
on European elections as a whole and their “second order” perception. From
these considerations a new picture has emerged, which is not in absolute
contrast with the interpretation of the raw data. The quality and the quantity
of so many factors allow a more complete picture of the facts, going beyond
the mere participation on which, undoubtedly, the difference with the
national presence is quite evident.
Detailed examination appeared necessary in the light of the tortuous
European building process, in order to take into account as many elements
as possible, not only to justify the results, but rather because, to reflect on
them trying to deploy a polycentric responsibility from the political forces to
the citizens themselves.
Additional information
Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: Società, politica e istituzioni(XIX-XX Secolo)
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