

EEHR

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW
Annually Historical Journal

n. 3/2020

Special issue

THE SOBIESKI FAMILY

HISTORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY

INSIGHTS BETWEEN ROME, WARSAW AND EUROPE

Edited by
Alessandro Boccolini
Francesca Ceci



Director Emeritus:

Gaetano Platania (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Director:

Alessandro Boccolini (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Scientific Board

Irena Vaišvilaitė (Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to UNESCO)

Matteo Sanfilippo (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Rimvydas Petrauskas (Vilnius University)

Raffaele Caldarelli (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Giordano Altarozzi (Petru Maior University of Târgu Mures)

Giovanni Pizzorusso (Università degli Studi Gabriele d'Annunzio, Chieti-Pescara)

Cesare La Mantia (Università di Trieste)

Prokhorov Andrei (Belarusian State University of Minsk)

Olexiy Sokyrrko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv)

Rafał Quirini-Popławski (Jagiellonian University of Kraków)

Francesca De Caprio (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Jarosław Pietrzak (Pedagogical University of Kraków)

Marta Gołąbek (Museum of King John III's Palace at Wilanów – Warsaw)

Language Expert

Sonia Maria Melchiorre (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Editorial Board

Tony Urbani (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Małgorzata Trzeciak Cygan (University of Warsaw)

Giulio Merlani (University of Caen Normandy)



Università degli Studi della Tuscia

Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e
della Polonia Moderna
(Study Center on the Sobieski Age and
of Modern Poland)
www.cespom.eu

Proprietà letteraria riservata. La riproduzione in qualsiasi forma, memorizzazione o trascrizione con qualunque mezzo (elettronico, meccanico, in fotocopia, in disco o in altro modo, compresi cinema, radio, televisione, internet) sono vietate senza l'autorizzazione scritta dell'Editore.

Eastern European History Review è una rivista on-line peer-reviewed con lettori anonimi

Chiuso il 31-12-2020

Impaginazione a cura di: *Fabiana Ceccariglia*

ISBN: 978-88-7853-900-6
ISBN ebook: 978-88-7853-895-5
ISSN: 2612-0402 004

Permalink: <http://hdl.handle.net/2067/42875>

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW
Via Santa Maria in Gradi 4 - 01100 Viterbo
www.easterneuropeanhistory.eu
eehr@unitus.it

Edizioni **SETTE CITTÀ**
Via Mazzini 87 - 01100 Viterbo
t. +39 0761 303020 - info@settecitta.eu

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW

annually historical journal



n. 3/2020

Special Issue

**THE SOBIESKI FAMILY:
History, Culture and Society.
Insights between Rome, Warsaw and Europe.**

Edited by

Alessandro Boccolini and Francesca Ceci



EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: LA RIVISTA

Il Comitato redazionale e scientifico è lieto di presentare al pubblico la rivista scientifica *Eastern European History Review*.

Con un carattere internazionale e interdisciplinare, una cadenza annuale e una fruibilità *open access* la rivista focalizza i propri interessi sulle dinamiche occorse nell'Europa Orientale durante tutta l'età moderna (XIV-XIX). *Eastern European History Review* è espressione del Centro Studi dell'Università della Tuscia CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna) nato nel 1997 per intuizione del Prof. Gaetano Platania, Direttore Emerito della Rivista.

L'iniziativa editoriale che presentiamo nasce dall'evidente mancanza in Italia di una rivista scientifica relativa alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale in Età Moderna, nonostante la penisola abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale per la Storia e la Cultura di una parte integrante del continente, a torto considerata come lontana e periferica.

Consapevoli di questo, il Comitato ha posto quale obiettivo primario della *Eastern European History Review* quello di offrire uno spazio di riflessione e di discussione su temi che appartengono alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale, e insieme alle relazioni - politiche e culturali - che questa vasta area del Vecchio Continente ha avuto con l'occidente d'Europa, e l'Italia in particolare, incoraggiando il dialogo tra studiosi e esperti di settore, e tra differenti approcci della ricerca scientifica.

Il Comitato Redazionale e Scientifico

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: THE JOURNAL

The Editorial and Scientific Board are proud delighted to present the *Eastern European History Review* under the aegis of Sette Città Editore.

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV-XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna - Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997, from an idea of Prof. Gaetano Platania, today Director Emeritus of this journal.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History sciences.

The editorial initiative we present comes from the obvious lack of a journal, in Italy, concerning the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the Modern Age, this despite its fundamental role in the history and culture of that part of the continent, wrongly considered distant and peripheral.

Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Main objective of the journal is to create a space for reflection and discussion on topics pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, but also relations with Continental Europe, encouraging dialogue between scholars and experts in the field, and between different approaches of scientific research.

The Editorial and Scientific Board

SOMMARIO/SUMMARY

Introduzione / Introduction	11
List of Abbreviations	15
Oleksii Sokyрко Jan Sobieski, Ukrainian Cossacks and the strategy of the raid war on the Ottoman border	17
Alessandro Boccolini La Lega Santa del 1684 e l'ambasciata straordinaria di Angelo Morosini alla corte di Jan III Sobieski tratta dalle carte conservate presso l'Archivio di Stato di Venezia	27
Anna Ryszka-Komarnicka <i>Selva di Rime Toscane</i> (BLC, Corsiniana 43 B 13) come testimonianza sconosciuta della glorificazione poetica della vittoria di Vienna (1683)	47
Jerzy Miziołek Il re Giovanni III Sobieski e la Chiesa della <i>Trasfigurazione</i> a Varsavia	59
Konrad Morawski <i>Magistri ex Italia conducti</i> – 17th century stucco decorations at the Wilanów Palace and the phenomena that shaped them	75
Jarosław Pietrzak Katarzyna née Sobieski Radziwiłł interest in the affairs of Papal Court and Roman reality between the years 1678-1691	95
Elisabetta Gnignera L'aristocrazia en déshabillé: le vesti 'a l'anticha' di Maria Casimira Sobieska	111
Francesca De Caprio L'accoglienza di Maria Kazimiera Sobieska a Roma e il precedente di Cristina di Svezia	127
Gaetano Platania Konstanty Sobieski e la sua "puttana" romana	153
Aneta Markuszewska "Ce ne sont plus pour moi des divertissements qui me conviennent". La musica nella vita romana di Maria Casimira, nuove scoperte	171
Fabio Boni <i>Che cosa sia la Cabala et a che sia utile</i> . Un trattato cabalistico all'interno del <i>Libro della Cabala</i> di Maria Sobieska	179

Hanna Osiecka-Samsonowicz

Esequie solenni celebrate nel 1743 a Żółkiew per il principe reale Jakub Ludwik Sobieski: il loro contesto artistico e propagandistico

187

Francesca Ceci

Le memorie della famiglia Sobieski nei Musei e negli archivi della Sovrintendenza Capitolina ai Beni Culturali del Comune di Roma (Musei Capitolini, Museo di Roma, Archivio Storico Capitolino)

205

Oleksii Sokyрко**TARAS SHEVCHENKO NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF KYIV, HISTORY DEPARTMENT****JAN SOBIESKI, UKRAINIAN COSSACKS AND THE STRATEGY OF THE RAID WAR ON THE OTTOMAN BORDER****ABSTRACT:**

Coalition wars of European states against the Ottoman Empire of the late XVIIth century were the last period of Turkish expansion to the West Europe. Just then the talent of Jan Sobieski was most discovered as a diplomat and commander. As a military commander, Sobieski had the reputation of a brilliant cavalry general, a master of lightning maneuvers and a raid warfare. This experience was gained in the military campaigns of the 60's and 70's of the XVIIth century against the right-bank Cossacks of Petro Doroshenko. During the time of Jan Sobieski's kingship, relations with the Cossacks have changed. In the Cossacks, the king saw a valuable military potential, relevant in the war against Ottomans. The Left-Bank Cossack Hetmanate became a partner of the Holy League. In the military campaigns of the 80's and 90's of the XVIIth century the Crown Army and the Hetman Samoilovich and Mazepa army conducted a series of raids against the Turks and Tatars in the area between the Dnieper and the Danube. Many of these military operations were organized and conducted under the rules of the steppe war, in which the Ukrainian Cossacks had considerable experience. Comparison of the Raid War of the Crown Troops and the Cossack Army reveals many common features, for example, in the organization and planning of campaigns, scouting etc. In fact, we can talk about the experience of the Raid War, jointly produced at the Ottoman border of the Rzeczpospolita and Cossack Hetmanate in the time of Jan Sobieski.

KEYWORDS: Jan Sobieski; Cossack Hetmanate; Ukrainian Cossacks; Warfare; Ottoman wars.

17


<http://hdl.handle.net/2067/42831>

Coalition wars of European states with the Ottoman Empire became the last phase of Turkish expansion to the West in the late XVIIth century. During this wars the talent of Jan III Sobieski (1629-1696) as a diplomat and military leader was most revealed. The role of the "Lion of Lekhistan" in the defeat of the Ottoman army near Vienna in 1683 is better known to the general public. However, it should not be forgotten that after this defeat the Turks constantly sought revenge and the war continued for more than fifteen years. The Ukrainian Cossacks also played a significant role in them, on which both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Moscow state relied. Cossack regiments, which proved themselves in the wars against the Turks and Tatars in the XVI century, participated in all major or minor campaigns of the "Holy League", formed in 1684. In this article we will try to analyze the experience of using the Cossacks as Sobieski, and his contemporary and partner in the anti-Ottoman coalition of Hetman of the Left Bank of Ukraine Ivan Mazepa (1639-1709).

In the historiography of Sobieski's Cossack policy only in recent years has attracted the attention of researchers who turned to the study of his contacts with the Hetmans of the Right Bank of Ukraine, projects to restore the Cossack army in the 80's of the XVII century¹. But the use of the Cossacks as a military resource in the context of the king's military activities remained behind the scenes (with the exception of works on the disputable issue of Cossack participation in the Battle of Vienna, and raids in Moldavia in 1684-1685)².

1 Taras Chukhlib, "Україна та Польща під час правління короля Яна III Собеського: пошуки втраченого миру" *Український історичний журнал*, n. 1 (2002): 38-52. Zbigniew Hundert, "Projekt organizacji i finansowania *Wojska JKM i Rzplitej Zaporoskiego z 1683 roku*", *Saeculum Christianum*, t. XXXIII (2016): 317-324; Piotr Kroll, "Hetman Jan Sobieski wobec Kozaczyzny w latach 1665-1673", *Biblioteka Epoki Nowożytnej*, n. 2 (2015): 65-90; Janusz Wojtasik, "Kozacy w siłach zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej w wojnie z turekami (1684-1699)", *Rocznik Premyski*, t. XLIII (2007), z. 1: *Historia wojskowości*: 187-196.

2 Taras Chukhlib, *Відень 1683: Україна-Русь у битві за «золоте яблуко» Європи*, (Київ: КЛІО, 2013).

It is important that the Sobieski family had long-standing relations with the Ukrainian Cossacks. Sobieski's father, Jakub, together with the Cossacks took part in the Moscow campaign of 1618, and a few years later in the famous Khotyn war of 1620-1621, Jan Sobieski began his military career by participating in the Zboriv campaign of 1649 against the insurgent Cossacks Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The future Hetman was wounded several times and even lost his older brother Mark, who killed in the unfortunate for the Poles battle of Batog in 1652. So as a soldier and commander Sobieski began to form under the influence of experience gained in wars against the Cossacks and under the strong influence of their military arts³. Later, observations of the tactics and methods of warfare of the Crimean Tatars, who were allies of Khmelnytsky at that time, also became important for him. Commanding first a company ("banner") and later a regiment, Sobieski established himself as a brilliant cavalry commander, a master of rapid maneuvers, and raid war.

In the following years, Jan Sobieski's combat experience was enriched by his participation in the war with a completely different enemy, the Swedish army of Charles X Gustav. But very soon he returned to Ukraine and took part in the Battle of Chudniv in 1660, the Ukrainian campaign of Jan II Casimir in the Left Bank of Ukraine in 1663-1664⁴. It is important to note that in this period Sobieski first fought not against the Cossacks, but in alliance with them. In particular, during the campaign on the Left Bank, he commanded a large cavalry corps, reinforced by the Cossacks of Hetman Pavlo Teteria, who was to ensure the actions of the main forces of the king from the south⁵. This campaign gave the future Hetman a unique opportunity to study the Cossack tactics of field battles and shunting war from within, laying the foundation for his own military style.

At this time, Sobieski's political career began, and he was appointed the Grand Marshal of the Crown and the Field Hetman of the Crown. In the role of a Field Hetman he first expressed his attitude to the "Cossack problem" in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Realizing all its complexity, Sobieski believed that the liquidation of the Cossacks by force and the destruction of their state threatened the loss of the Polish-Lithuanian state of all Ukraine. The Cossacks were for him not only a valuable military resource in the war with the Moscow state and the Crimea, but also a guarantee of preserving control over Ukrainian lands.

One of Sobieski's first resounding successes as a politician and military leader was the battle of Pidhaitsi on October 6-16, 1667. At that time, the Field Hetman of the Crown was faced with the difficult task of holding back the offensive of the predominant Cossack-Tatar forces on Lviv. At that time, the crown army was much inferior to the enemy, and the Sejm and Senate, awaiting the abdication of King Jan II Casimir, were busy fighting over the upcoming elections, not paying due attention to military problems. Sobieski had very small forces and therefore could not give field battle, which would stop the advance of the enemy into the Commonwealth. In order to slow down the march of the Cossack-Tatar army and gain time for the concentration of his own small forces, the hetman stationed mobile cavalry units in Podillya and western Volhynia, which relied on fortified points and castles of the region⁶. This made it possible to restrain the operational initiative of the enemy, who planned to advance on a wide front with the help of large detachments of Tatar cavalry. In fact, Sobieski used the same tactics against the Tatars and Cossacks, which they themselves followed. This was unexpected and productive, forcing the enemy to direct its offensive in only one direction, favorable to Sobieski. In turn, this course of events allowed him to choose the most convenient place for a decisive battle. It became the castle in Pidhaitsi, which the Poles fortified with two ravelins and artillery. The idea of the battle was based on the principle of active defense and the impossibility for the enemy to use his numerical advantage. The front for the offensive of the Cossack-Tatar army was very narrow and close, not allowing the deployment of the main forces of the cavalry - the main tactical trump card of the Allies. In addition, their positions in the center were cut by several beams, which hindered the

3 Kroll, "Hetman Jan Sobieski", 65-67.

4 Kroll, "Hetman Jan Sobieski", 68-72

5 Kroll, "Hetman Jan Sobieski", 69.

6 Wiesław Majewski, "Podhajce — letnia i jesenna kampania 1677 r.", *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości*, t. VI/1 (Warszawa 1960): 80-84.

offensive and coordination. Attacking the castle of Pidhaitsi, the enemy was drawn into a narrow gorge, falling under heavy fire from Polish cannons and muskets, and suffered extremely heavy losses before reaching the fortress walls. This allowed Sobieski to exhaust the overwhelming forces of the enemy, without introducing into battle their reserves hidden in the castle fortifications⁷. At the decisive moment of the Allied battle, the news of the attack on the Crimea by the Zaporozhian Cossacks reached. The Tatar camp began to collapse and prepare to return to the Crimea. After several more unsuccessful assaults, the Cossack Hetman Petro Doroshenko, convinced of the futility of continuing the battle, announced the beginning of peace talks. As a result, on October 19, 1667, the Pidhaitsi Agreement was concluded, under the terms of which Sobieski obliged the Cossacks to renounce the protectorate of foreign states and remain loyal to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth⁸.

During the reign of Jan Sobieski, his political views and positions on the Cossacks became even stronger. After the forced conclusion of the Truce of Andrusovo of 1667 with Moscow, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth sought to regain control of the Right and Left Bank of Ukraine. But its political position and military capabilities were greatly weakened by the failed war with the Ottoman Empire, as evidenced by the unfavorable Buchach Treaty of 1672, which gave the Turks control over Podolia. It was obvious to Sobieski that the return of lost positions largely depended on the success of the anti-Turkish coalition⁹.

At the same time, the Polish-Lithuanian state had to carefully prepare its financial system and army for separate military operations. In this situation, it was in the Cossacks that the king saw the valuable military potential relevant in the coming war. First of all, it was about attracting to the side of the Polish crown those contingents of Cossacks that survived in the Right Bank Ukraine. Despite the voices of many senators and szlachta from the “war party” who wanted to destroy the Cossack system and subdue Ukraine with an “iron hand”, Sobieski well understood the fallacy of such steps. In the context of the war with Turkey, the use of the military potential of the Cossacks, traditionally prepared for war against the eastern enemy, promised significant benefits. However, in exchange for this the Commonwealth would have to make concessions on the “Cossack problem”.

As King of the Commonwealth, Sobieski at the beginning of his reign sought to establish constructive relations with the leaders of the Cossack formations, appointing in April 1675 the Acting Hetman of the right-bank Cossacks Eustaphii Hogol¹⁰. In the following years, after the resignation of Sobieski's opponent, Cossack Hetman Petro Doroshenko, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth sought to support the Cossacks not as a political state with its own territorial autonomy, but more as mercenaries. But such a course, which did not accept the idea of political Cossack autonomy, could be effective only in the short term.

Already at the coronation Sejm in March 1676, Sobieski declared the importance of recruiting Cossacks for the service of the Commonwealth in the amount of 4,000 people. The future contract of employment (capitulation) was to set out the conditions of their service, salary and material support, the funds for which were planned to be allocated from the taxes of the Jewish community. After the end of the war with the Turks, the Sejm constitution of 1677 introduced the state of the so-called “Conservation of the Zaporozhian Host”, as a result of which the remnants of the Cossack regiments were stationed in Kyiv Polissya, controlled by the Poles¹¹. Together with the crown army, they were to guard the border area around Kyiv, holding outposts in Dymy and Vyshhorod. Than The Cossacks defended Polissya and the Right-Bank Kyiv Region from Tatar raids, as well as reconnaissance raids by the Moscow garrison in Kyiv. But the next war with the Turks, which revived the Cossack service, did not take long.

In the spring of 1683, a new project of hiring Cossacks (Comput) was prepared in Warsaw, which provided for the creation of 7 (according to other sources, 4) regiments with a total number of 3,000

7 Majewski, “Podhajce”, 90-92.

8 Jan Perdenia, *Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska*, (Kraków: Universitas, 2000), 129.

9 Janusz Pajewski, *Buńczuk i koncerz. Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich*, (Poznań: De Facto, 2000), 145-146.

10 Mariusz R. Drozdowski, “Rzeczpospolita wobec idei odnowienia Unii Hadziackiej w latach 1660-1682”, *Studia Polsko-Ukraińskie*, n. 2 (2015): 67-68

11 Hundert, “Projekt organizacji i finansowania”, 318.

men. Funds allocated by the Holy See, which took an active part in the diplomatic and financial support of the anti-Turkish coalition, were to be used for its maintenance. The royal treasury also took part in financing the new recruitment, which allowed to increase its number to 3,700 men in 12 regiments. The budget for the annual maintenance of the army was more than 267,000 zlotys, but most of the payments fell only in the second half of 1683, when the Vienna campaign was in culmination¹². Today, the question of the participation of Ukrainian Cossacks in the main battle of Sobieski's military career - the Vienne victory of 1683 - is under discussion. The organizational and financial difficulties did not allow Sobieski to assemble the Cossack corps in a short time¹³ (Krupnytsky p.26; Chukhlib Vienna 1683 p.72-74). His advanced detachment went to Krakow only in September 1683, while the main forces of the crown army were already near Vienna. The rest of the Cossack forces joined him in November, when battles were fought with the remnants of the Ottoman army in Slovakia¹⁴.

On the other hand, the participation of Right-Bank Cossack formations in wrecking campaigns on the Moldavian front, due significant forces of Turks and Tatars were drawn in this direction, remains an indisputable fact. In October 1683, the leader of the Right-Bank Cossacks, Hetman Stefan Kunitsky, raided the Moldavian principality, supporting the pro-Polish Hospodar Yuri Duka. Kunitsky's army, which passed through Podillya, was quickly replenished with many volunteers. This made it possible to attack not only Duka's opponents, but also to strike at the Turkish garrisons of Mogilev-Podilsky, Yampil, and Soroky. In autumn, the Cossack corps, supported by Duka's troops, numbered about 20,000 men. In December of the same year, they managed to defeat the Tatars of Budzhak, whom the Khan sent to help the Turks. The Cossack army, plundering and destroying everything in its path, marched to Kiliya and Izmail, but was forced to stop in the face of the threat of a meeting with the main forces of the Crimean Horde and the Turks returning from Vienna¹⁵.

The Cossack corps was not ready to accept a battle with the main Crimean forces and began to retreat. At that moment, his allies, the Moldavian boyars, left him. Hetman Kunitsky retreated, closing in on the moving Wagenburg, and forcing the Prut, fled to Yass. Despite this finale, the raid itself fulfilled its main task - to break the connection of the Ottoman army near Vienna with the Danube fortresses and the Crimea, as well as completely destroyed the frontline periphery of the Turks. However, Kunitsky's troops, obsessed with looting and persecution of the Tatars, broke away too much from their operational base and risked being cut off from Podillya. A badly organized retreat turned into an escape, and the campaign itself cost Kunitsky a mace: in March 1684 he was killed by the Cossacks and Colonel Andriy Mohyla was elected the new Hetman¹⁶.

After the first successes in the use of the Cossacks in the war, the king found himself in a difficult situation: supporting the existence of Cossack regiments on the Right Bank, he had to take care of the perspective of reintegration of these territories into the Commonwealth, and thus the restoration of crown power provided for the liquidation of the Cossacks. At the Sejm of 1685, he tried to carefully probe the attitude of the nobility of Kyiv and Bratslav voivodships on this issue, hinting that in peacetime Cossack regiments could be located in crown lands, and perhaps for lack of space, and in private noble estates.

The king had to pursue a flexible policy so as not to lose the trust of Cossack commanders and push them to the side of the Turks or Russians, as was once the case with Hetman Doroshenko¹⁷. On the other hand, he felt strong competition from the Left-Bank Hetman Ivan Samoilovich (1672-1687), who sought to regain control of the Right Bank of Ukraine. Not having enough strength for this,

12 Hundert, "Projekt organizacji i finansowania", 321-322.

13 Borys Krupnytskyi, "З історії Правобережжя 1683-1688 рр.", *Праці історично-філологічного товариства в Празі*, Вип.4, (Прага, 1942): 26; Chukhlib, *Відень 1683*, 72-74.

14 Jan Wimmer, *Odsiecz Wiedenska 1683 roku*, (Warszawa: Interpress, 1983), 107.

15 Krupnytskyi, "З історії Правобережжя 1683-1688 рр.", 2-6.

16 Taras Chukhlib, Гетьман С.Куницький у боротьбі правобережної України та Речі Посполитої проти Османської імперії (1683-1684 рр.), *Україна в Центрально-Східній Європі*, Вип.1 (2000): 324-327.

17 Zbigniew Wójcik, "Misja Bazylego Iskrzyckiego do kozaków w roku 1682", in *States, Societies and Cultures East and West. Essays in Honor of Jaroslaw Pelenski*, ed. Janusz Duzinkiewicz, (New York: Ross Pub. Inc., 2004), 1189-1199.

Samoilovich constantly lured the right-bank Cossacks to his service, promising them more payment, estates and positions. Often these actions ended successfully. In the summer of 1684, about 3,000 Cossacks, dissatisfied with the royal salary, left Hetman Andriy Mohyla and moved to the Left Bank of the Dnieper to Samoilovich¹⁸.

Everything worried Sobieski, who sought to maintain the loyalty of the Cossacks to continue the war with the Turks. Going to meet the king's anti-Turkish plans, the Sejm adopted a special constitution "On Securing the Cossack Troops", which confirmed all the old privileges and freedoms of the Cossacks, allowing them to settle around Cherkasy, Korsun and Uman¹⁹. The Vatican allocated 100,000 florins to recruit 3,000 Cossacks. For some time, these measures allowed to change the situation, causing the outflow of Left-Bank Cossacks and Zaporozhian Cossacks to the crown service.

In the post-Viennese period, the king planned a series of military operations aimed at advancing Polish influence in the lower Danube region in order to extend his influence to the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, snatching them from Ottoman protection. Secondly, Sobieski hoped to neutralize the Crimean Khanate, which should stop his active participation in the wars of the Ottoman Empire. Both goals included, in addition to diplomatic measures, direct military actions, the arena of which was to become the Danube and Podillya. Financial and military resources allowed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to conduct two types of military operations here: large-scale campaigns with the participation of the main forces of the Crown Army, as well as small diversion and scouting raids for which the right-bank Cossacks were best provided²⁰. If the preparation of large-scale campaigns took a long time and they were conducted no more than once every three or four years, the raid war in the steppe periphery could continue constantly.

After the unsuccessful finale of the campaign of 1684, most of the Cossack regiments were concentrated on the border - near Medzhibozh and Pokut. In addition, the Cossack infantry, together with the crown troops, served in the garrisons of castles and fortresses in Podolia and the temporarily occupied Moldavian cities²¹.

In 1685, the right-bank Cossacks of Andriy Mohyla took an active part in the campaign of the crown army led by the Great Hetman of the Crown Stanislaw Jablonovsky to Moldova. In particular, they covered the main forces of the army from counterattacks of the Kamenets-Podolsky direction, defeating the Tatar divisions near Zinkov²². At the end of the campaign, 6,000 Cossack corps covered the retreat of Jablonovsky's army to Bukovina, and the rest of the Cossacks repulsed the attacks of the Tatars near Nemyriv²³.

The following year, a campaign in Moldavia, led by Sobieski himself, took place with the participation of right-bank Cossack regiments. Their number continued to grow due to immigrants from the Left Bank Hetmanate. In 1689, the Cossacks successfully repulsed a large Tatar attack on Nemirov, organizing counterattacks on the Turkish fortresses of Ackerman, Kazikermen and Ochakiv. In 1691 they took part in Sobieski's last great campaign in Moldavia. Given the lack of finances, the king allocated funds for the maintenance of the Cossack regiments from his own treasury²⁴. The advanced detachment of Cossacks together with the crown units captured Soroka, but was unable to continue the offensive due to the delay of the rest of the Cossack forces, which were moving very slowly from the Right Bank.

The increase in the number of new Cossack migrants expanded the boundaries of the Cossack settlement to the west of Kyiv Voivodeship and within the boundaries of Volyn to the Sluch River.

18 Patrik Gordon, *Дневник 1684-1689* (Москва: Hayka, 2005), 22-24

19 Wojtasik, "Kozacy w siłach zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej", 188-189.

20 Krupnytskyi, "З історії Правобережжя 1683-1688 pp.", 15-16.

21 Krupnytskyi, "З історії Правобережжя 1683-1688 pp.", 27-28; Wojtasik, "Kozacy w siłach zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej", 190.

22 Witold Wasilewski, *Wyprawa bukowskińska Stanisława Jabłonowskiego w 1685 roku*, (Warszawa: Neriton, 2002), 105-107.

23 Wasilewski, *Wyprawa bukowskińska Stanisława Jabłonowskiego*, 253, 259-261.

24 Wojtasik, "Kozacy w siłach zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej", 192-193.

This self-willed colonization nominated Colonel Semyon Paliy (1640-1710) as its leader, who had more influence and authority than the official head of the “Cossack militia”, Hetman Andriy Mohyla²⁵. After the latter’s death, Paliy refused to obey both the newly appointed Hetman Hryshko and the Grand Hetman of the Crown Yablonovsky. The quantitative growth of the Cossacks, the increase of the territory under their control, complicated their relations with the king and the Sejm, leading already in the 1690s to open confrontation and war. Undoubtedly, these factors eventually made the Cossacks a completely uncontrolled military force, acting solely in their own interests. In turn, this meant that Warsaw could now rely only on the passive participation of the Cossacks in the war, when they simply defended their territories from Tatar invasions, and refuse to involve them in offensive operations outside the Right Bank of Ukraine²⁶.

The victories of the Allies in the “Holy League” brought closer the entry into the war of the Moscow state and its satellite - the Left Bank Cossack Hetmanate. Having concluded the “Eternal Peace” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1686, these countries entered the war against the Ottoman Empire, launching hostilities between the Dnieper and Danube rivers, and later in the Crimea and the Azov Sea. The main burden of these campaigns was borne by the army of the Left Bank Cossack Hetmanate, whose geopolitical location made it an important outpost in the confrontation with the Crimea and Turkey. In contrast to the Right Bank of Ukraine, on the left bank of the Dnieper remained Cossack statehood – the Cossack Hetmanate. The Hetmanate’s army consisted of a Cossack militia of about 30,000 men and 10,000 hired corps, which was divided into cavalry (*Kompaniyski*) and infantry (*Serdiuki*) regiments²⁷.

At the beginning of the war, Moscow planned to organize large-scale campaigns with a large number of artillery and troops, which were to break the defenses of the Crimean Khanate and persuade the Ottomans to peace. However, the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 failed due to planning errors, lack of resources and logistics. This forced the Kremlin to reconsider the strategy of further war, and on the advice of Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709), to blockade and destroy Turkish fortresses on the Dnieper and the Danube²⁸.

Many of these military operations were organized and conducted according to the canons of the steppe war, in which the Ukrainian Cossacks had considerable experience. A comparison of the raid war between the Crown Army and the Cossack Troops reveals many common features, for example, in the organization and planning of campaigns, intelligence, and so on.

Hikes to the Dnieper and Black Sea Turkish fortresses became important events in the history of the left-bank Cossack army. The main method of restraining the enemy forces of the enemy were raids - rapid attacks on strongholds and places of concentration of the enemy, after which the attackers returned to their starting position. These raid (“naskoky” and “pidjizdy”) did not allow the enemy to seize the strategic initiative and concentrate their forces in one direction. A classic example of such raids was the raid on Kazykermen in the summer of 1690. Kazykermen, as the most powerful fortress in the lower of the Dnieper, occupied an exceptionally advantageous position, allowing the Turks to control crossings, raid the Left Bank and more. The city was defended by a stone castle with a strong garrison, 30 cannons and fortifications.

Mazepa expressed his intention to attack Kazykermen in a letter dated June 30, 1690 to the *kompaniysky* colonel Ilya Novitsky. At the same time, the hetman’s staff drew up a special directive - “Information to Sir Ilya Novitsky, Colonel Kompaniysky, how to manage in warfare”. He defined in detail the forces that were part of the raid detachment, the order of their gathering and march. It was planned that “the current

25 Krupnytskyi, “З історії Правобережжя 1683-1688 рр.”, 17-24.

26 Krupnytskyi, “З історії Правобережжя 1683-1688 рр.”, 29-32.

27 Viktor Zaruba, *Українське козацьке військо в російсько-турецьких війнах останньої чверті XVII століття*, (Дніпропетровськ: Ліра ЛТД, 2003); Oleksii Sokyрко, “Військова політика Івана Мазепи кінця XVII ст.”, *Вісник Київського національного університету ім.Т.Шевченка. Серія “Історія”*, Вип.71/72 (2004), 103-108; Oleksii Sokyрко, *Лицарі другого сорту: Наймане військо Лівобережної Гетьманщини 1669-1726 рр.*, (Київ: Темпора, 2006).

28 Taras Chukhlib, *Козаки та яничари: Україна у християнсько-мусульманських війнах 1500-1700 рр.*, (Київ: КЛІО, 2010), 367-370.

campaign of the Kazikermen will be burned and their harvest besurmanian... crushed and trampled to the rest”²⁹. Hetman advised to prepare and lead “that campaign quietly, without announcing to anyone.” The elaboration of the details of the attack was left to the discretion of Novitsky and the commanders of the units that were to take part in the raid. In addition to Novitsky’s regiment, he was accompanied by the *kompaniisky* regiments of Pashkovsky and Kuzmovich, *serdiuky* regiments of Kozhukhovsky, Andrievich, and Yavorsky, registered Cossacks of the Lubny and Pereyaslav regiments, and a total of about 4,000 with 7 guns. They were also to be joined by the right-bank Cossacks Semyon Paliy³⁰.

In subsequent letters (July 9, 11, 16, 18, and 22), Mazepa provided Novitsky with operational guidance, intelligence, and a combat mission. In particular, a letter dated July 11 approved a plan for a direct attack on the fortress. To do this, the raid detachment was divided into 3 parts, one of which (300-400 people) was to seize cattle on pastures outside the city, and the other (2,000 - 2,500 people) - to break into the town and burn it under cover of 1,000 people, which would bind at this time the forces of the enemy garrison³¹. Unfortunately, the sources did not keep any direct information about the course of the campaign. It is known that it began after July 22, and on August 16 Mazepa greeted the colonels with their return, praising them for the fact that they “with their regiments willingly sent a campaign under Kazikermen, and with enemies besurmany sent battle...”³².

The strategy of diversion raids and counter-campaigns, chosen by the Hetman’s board, proved effective in subsequent campaigns. In March 1692, the right-bank and left-bank Cossacks, together with a *kompaniisky* regiment attacked Ochakiv, burned town, and seized large booty. At the end of September 1693, a 7,000 raid Cossacks detachment of Colonel Myrovych and *kompaniisky* regiment of the Colonel Pashkovsky, taking advantage of the fact that the Belgorod horde had marched on the Left Bank, attacked the outskirts of Tyagin³³.

Typical of the tactical skill of the Cossack cavalry is was the raid on Ochakiv in August 1694, in which the Cossacks of the Kyiv, Fastiv, and two *kompaniisky* regiments took part. Approaching the city, units of the Colonels Paliy and Pashkovsky (800 people) were ambushed a few kilometers from the fortress. At this time, another cavalry detachment, setting fire to the steppe, approached Ochakov, provoking his garrison on the outing. Unsuspecting, the Bey of Ochakiv came out of the fortress and attacked the Cossacks, who began to flee, luring the enemy into the steppe. Disoriented by the smokescreen, the Turks surrounded the Paliy and Pashkovsky regiments and were killed. The winners captured 90 prisoners, 3 bunchuks and a large number of cattle³⁴.

Raids on Turkish fortresses were a good school in developing the fighting skills of Cossacks and Mercenary Officers. Depending on the nature and scale of the tasks, cavalry and infantry units (2,000 to 3,000 men) or small divisions (800-1,000 men) were sent on campaigns. Accordingly, their tactics differed: attacks on large fortresses, which involved damage to fortifications and garrisons, were conducted as real battles, with the division of troops into independent units, setting a complex combat mission and organizing interaction between infantry, cavalry and artillery. Conducting such raids developed the initiative of detachment and unit commanders, accustomed them to offensive actions, and developed the ability to make fast and bold attacks.

Registered Cossacks were the main force in repelling Tatar attacks and guarding borders. The role of advanced cover and alert and scouting service belonged to the mercenary regiments, which, unlike the Cossacks, served all year round. However, with the approach of large enemy forces, the defense of strongholds, interception, defeat and pursuit of retreating attackers, was conducted with the participation of the Cossack militia. Each Cossack district regiment had special “servants” - “field

29 Акты, относящиеся к истории Западной России, т. 5 (Санкт-Петербург: 1855), 234.

30 Акты, т. 5, 238-239.

31 Акты, т. 5, 237.

32 Акты, т. 5, 240.

33 Samiilio Velychko, *Літопис*, т.2. (Київ: Дніпро, 1991), 424-426; *Літопис Самовидця* (Київ: Наукова думка, 1971), 153; *Сборник летописей, относящихся к истории Южной и Западной Руси*, (Киев: 1888), 36.

34 *Літопис Самовидця*, 154.

guards” and “chiefs of the gangs”, who were in charge of scouting or special units that moved along the steppe border, chatting on the Tatar chambuls. This system of warning service was based on the defensive lines of fortresses and small fortifications³⁵.

Changing the strategic situation in the late 90's of the XVII century, allowed the Cossack Hetmanate and the Muscovite state to launch a large-scale offensive in the Black Sea region, including the systematic siege of powerful Turkish fortresses, which had previously been raided only³⁶.

The war with the Ottoman Empire was the longest armed conflict in which the troops of the Left Bank Cossack Hetmanate and the right bank “Cossack militia” of Jan Sobieski had to take part. At that time, these troops had almost a century of experience in wars with the Turks and Tatars, their own specific organization, weapons, tactics and experience of military service.

The Cossack cavalry was successfully used by Sobieski to organize reconnaissance, prevention and protection of the main forces. During the battles, she inflicted major attacks, launched counterattacks, persecution, and covered the regrouping of the main forces. In the battles typical of the Eastern European region with the participation of large masses of cavalry, the Cossacks often acted independently, using deceptive maneuvers, ambushes, and so on. But the main form of participation of the Cossacks in the crown army were deep raids in the rear and frontline areas. They diverted significant forces of Turks and Tatars, giving Sobieski the opportunity to have an advantage on other fronts.

However, the Cossack Troops had some lacks. The main ones were related to the militia nature of the service, when each Cossack had to provide himself with weapons, ammunition and equipment. Numerous wars destroyed the economy of right-bank Ukraine, and mobilizations into the Cossack army a huge number of workers from the economy. All this had a negative impact on the property status of the Cossacks, and hence the fighting capacity of the Cossack army as a whole. The problem of the lack of military training of the Cossacks and the low level of discipline was closely connected with this. Taken together, these factors somewhat reduced the combat value of the Cossack troops, and King Sobieski had to take this into account.

Instead, a completely different situation developed in the Left Bank Cossack Hetmanate, which retained the institutions of the classical state and whose army, in addition to the Cossack regiment, also consisted of permanent mercenaries regiments. The army of the left-bank Hetman Mazepa, unlike the Cossacks of Sobieski, could conduct not only auxiliary but also the main fighting in strategically important areas. In addition to the cavalry in this army, in the conditions of constant wars with the Turks and Tatars, the role of the Registered Cossack and mercenary infantry, which was the main part of the Cossack army, increased significantly. Its actions on the battlefield were based on a combination of maneuver and fire under the protection of Wagenburg.

A review of the fighting of the right and left-bank Cossacks in the war of the “Holy League” against the Ottoman Empire shows that it was best provided for raid war. In fact, this experience, developed on the Ottoman border, where the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of Jan III Sobieski and the Cossack Hetmanate of Ivan Mazepa were allies for a long time, will survive and be successful in the next XVIII th century.

35 Vyktor Zaruba, *Украинское казацкое войско в борьбе с турецко-татарской агрессией (последняя четверть XVII в.)*, (Харьков: Основа, 1993), 108.

36 Національна бібліотека України. Інститут рукопису. Ф.VIII. Спр. 228 м (97), Арк. 1142, 1162-1163; Velychko, *Літопис*, 479; Vladym Diadychenko, “Участь українських козацьких полків у азово-дніпровських походах 1695-1696 рр.”, *Наукові записки Інституту історії України АН УРСР*, т. 4 (1952): 162-165; Viacheslav Stanislavskyi, “Участь лівобережного та запорозького козацтва в боротьбі з Османською імперією”, *Україна в Центральній Європі: 3 найдавніших часів до кінця XVIII ст.*, Вип. 5 (2005): 581-596.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akty, odnosiaszchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*, t. 5 (Sankt-Peterburgh: 1855) [*Акты, относящиеся к истории Западной России*, т. 5 (Санкт-Петербург: 1855)].
- Chukhlib Taras, *Viden 1683: Ukraina-Rus u bytvi za «zolote yabluko» Evropy*, (Kyiv: KLIO, 2013). [Чухліб Тарас, *Відень 1683: Україна-Русь у битві за «золоте яблуко» Європи*, (Київ: КЛІО, 2013)].
- Chukhlib Taras, *Kozaky ta ianychary: Ukraina u khrystyiansko-musulmanskykh viinakh 1500-1700 rr.*, (Kyiv: KLIO, 2010) [Чухліб Тарас, *Козаки та яничари: Україна у християнсько-мусульманських війнах 1500-1700 рр.*, (Київ: КЛІО, 2010)].
- Chukhlib Taras, “Ukrainske hetmanstvo u viini yevropeiskoi Sviashchennoi Lihy z Osmanskoiu imperiieiu 1684-1699 rr.”, in *Terra cossacorum: studii z davnoi istorii Ukrainy. Naukovyi zbirnyk na poshanu doktora istorichnykh nauk, profesora Valerii Stepanovycha Stepankova*, ed. Valeriy Smolii (Kyiv, 2007), 233-260. [Чухліб Тарас, “Українське гетьманство у війні європейської Священної Ліги з Османською імперією 1684-1699 рр.”, in *Terra cossacorum: студії з давньої історії України. Науковий збірник на пошану доктора історичних наук, професора Валерія Степановича Степанкова*, Ред. Валерій А. Смолій, (Київ: Ін-т історії України НАН України, 2007), 233-260].
- Chukhlib Taras, “Ukraina ta Polshcha pid chas pravlinnia korolia Yana III Sobesko: poshuky vtrachenoho myru”, *Ukrainskii Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, n. 1 (2002): 38-52 [Чухліб Тарас, “Україна та Польща під час правління короля Яна III Собеського: пошуки втраченого миру”, *Український історичний журнал*, n. 1 (2002): 38-52].
- Chukhlib Taras, “Hetman S.Kunytskyi u borotbi pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy ta Rechi Pospolytoi proty Osmanskoï imperii (1683-1684 rr.)”, *Ukraina v Tsentralno-Skhidnii Evropi*, n.1 (2000): 314-332 [Чухліб Тарас, “Гетьман С.Куницький у боротьбі правобережної України та Речі Посполитої проти Османської імперії (1683-1684 рр.)”, *Україна в Центрально-Східній Європі*, Вип.1 (2000): 314-332].
- Diadychenko Vadym, “Uchast’ ukrains’kykh kozat’skykh polkiv u azovo-dniproviskykh pokhodakh 1695-1696 rr.”, *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu istorii Ukrainy AN URSR*, t. 4 (1952): 158-186 [Дядиченко Вадим, “Участь українських козацьких полків у азово-дніпровських походах 1695-1696 рр.”, *Наукові записки Інституту історії України АН УРСР*, т. 4 (1952): 158-186].
- Drozdowski Mariusz R., “Rzeczypospolita wobec idei odnowienia Unii Hadziackiej w latach 1660-1682”, *Studia Polsko-Ukraińskie*, n.2 (2015): 47-69.
- Gordon Patrik, *Dnevnik 1684-1689* (Moskva: Nauka, 2005). [Гордон Патрик, *Дневник 1684-1689*, (Москва: Наука, 2005)].
- Hundert Zbigniew, “Projekt organizacji i finansowania Wojska JKM i Rzptej Zaporoskiego z 1683 roku”, *Saeculum Christianum*, t.XXIII (2016): 317-324.
- Kroll Piotr, “Hetman Jan Sobieski wobec Kozaczyzny w latach 1665-1673”, *Biblioteka Epoki Nowożytnej*, n. 2 (2015): 65-90.
- Krupnytskyi Borys. “Z istorii Pravoberezhzhia 1683-1688 rr.”, *Pratsi istorichno-filolohichnoho tovarystva v Prazi*, n. 4 (Praha, 1942): 1-32. [Крупницький Борис. “З історії Правобережжя 1683-1688 рр.”, *Праці історично-філологічного товариства в Празі*, Вип. 4 (Прага, 1942): 1-32.]
- Litopys Samovydtisia* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1971). [*Літопис Самовидця* (Київ: Наукова думка, 1971)].
- Majewski Wieslaw, “Podhajce — letnia i jesenna kampania 1677 r.”, *Studia i materialy do historii wojskowości*, t.VI/1 (Warszawa 1960): 47-98.
- Natsionalna biblioteka Ukrainy. Instytut rukopysu. F.VIII. Spr. 228 m (97) [Національна бібліотека України. Інститут рукопису. Ф.VIII. Спр. 228 м (97)].
- Pajewski Janusz, *Buńczuk i koncerz. Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich*, (Poznań: De Facto, 2000)
- Perdenia Jan, *Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska*, (Kraków: Universitas, 2000).
- Sbornik letopisei, odnosiaszchikhsia k istorii Yuzhnoi u Zapadnoi Rusi*, (Kiev: 1888) [*Сборник летописей, относящихся к истории Южной и Западной Руси* (Киев, 1888)].

- Sokyрко Oleksii, *Lytsari druhooho sortu: Naimane viisko Livoberezhnoi Hetmanshchyny 1669-1726 rr.*, (Kyiv: Tempora, 2006). [Сокирко Олексій, *Лицарі другого сорту: Наймане військо Лівобережної Гетьманщини 1669-1726 рр.*, (Київ: Темпора, 2006)].
- Sokyрко Oleksii, "Viis'kova polityka Ivana Mazepy kintsia KhVII st.", *Visnyk Kyivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu im.T.Shevchenka. Seriia "Istoriia"*, п. 71/72 (2004): 103-108. [Сокирко Олексій, "Військова політика Івана Мазепи кінця XVII ст.", *Вісник Київського національного університету ім.Т.Шевченка. Серія "Історія"*, Вип.71/72 (2004): 103-108].
- Stanislavskyi Viacheslav, "Uchast livoberezhnoho ta zaporoz'koho kozatstva v borot'bi z Osmanskoiu imperiieiu", *Ukraina v Tsentralno-Skhidnii Evropi: Z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII st.*, п. 5 (2005): 581-596. [Станіславський В'ячеслав, "Участь лівобережного та запорозького козацтва в боротьбі з Османською імперією", *Україна в Центральній-Східній Європі: З найдавніших часів до кінця XVIII ст.*, Вип. 5 (2005): 581-596].
- Velychko Samiilo, *Litopys*, t. 2 (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1991). [Величко Самійло, *Літопис*, т. 2 (Київ: Дніпро, 1991)].
- Wasilewski Witold, *Wyprawa bukowńska Stanisława Jabłonowskiego w 1685 roku*, (Warszawa: Neriton, 2002).
- Wimmer Jan, *Odsiecz Wiedenska 1683 roku*, (Warszawa: Interpress, 1983).
- Wójcik Zbigniew, "Misja Bazylego Iskrzyckiego do kozaków w roku 1682", in *States, Societies and Cultures East and West. Essays in Honor of Jaroslaw Pelenski*, ed. Janusz Duzinkiewicz, (New York: Ross Pub. Inc., 2004), 1189-1199.
- Wojtasik Janusz, "Kozacy w siłach zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej w wojnie z turkami (1684-1699)", *Rocznik Premyski*, t. XLIII (2007), z. 1: *Historia wojskowości*: 187-196.
- Zaruba Viktor, *Ukrains'ke kozat'ske viis'ko v rosiis'ko-turet'skykh viinakh ostannoi chverti XVII stolittia* (Dnipropetrovs'k: Lira LTD, 2003). [Заруба Віктор, *Українське козацьке військо в російсько-турецьких війнах останньої чверті XVII століття*, (Дніпропетровськ: Ліра ЛТД, 2003)].
- Zaruba Vyktor, *Ukraynskoe kazatskoe voisko v bor'be s turetsko-tatarskoi ahressyei (posledniaia chetvert' XVII v.)*, (Khar'kov: Osnova, 1993). [Заруба Віктор, *Українське казачке войско в боротьбі з турецько-татарською агресією (остання чверть XVII в.)*, (Харьков: Основа, 1993)].