

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV–XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPOM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History Sciences.

This Special Issue of *Eastern European History Review* deals with the history of diplomacy and its executors – diplomats (ambassadors, legates, nuncios, internuncios, agents and others) – in the seventeenth century's Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

As a state conglomerate culturally and politically, closely connected to Western Europe, and for its specific institutional form of a “noble republic”, the Commonwealth has created, in the field of diplomatic practice, institutions, principles and ceremonies unique in the European context.

The focus of the volume is the historiographic stream of the *New Diplomatic History*, without withdrawing from classic approaches that remain an important field of research.

Tracing the salient moments and facts of the complex history of the seventeenth century of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the volume – with the participation of authors from different parts of Europe and beyond – constitutes an international opportunity to reflect on issues and topics of old and new diplomatic history.

Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (XVII century) constitutes a result of the research activity and scientific collaboration inherent to the project directed by Dr Dorota Gregorowicz *The Holy See and the crisis of sovereignty of John II Casimir Vasa and Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki's election (1660–1669)*, n. 2018/28/C/HS3/00176, financed by the National Science Centre, Poland.

Alessandro Boccolini

In copertina: Roman Postempki, *Jan III podpisuje traktat z Turkami w Żurawnie*, XIX Century (Collection of National Museum in Warsaw)

euro 19,00

ISBN 978-88-7853-940-2



ISSN 2612-0402



EEHR

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW
Annually Historical Journal

n. 4/2021

Special issue

DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMACY

IN THE EARLY MODERN POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH (XVII CENTURY)

Edited by

Dorota Gregorowicz and Alessandro Boccolini



Director Emeritus

Gaetano Platania (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Director

Alessandro Boccolini (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Scientific Board

Irena Vaišvilaitė (Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to UNESCO)

Matteo Sanfilippo (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Rimvydas Petrauskas (Vilnius University)

Raffaele Caldarelli (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Giordano Altarozzi (Petru Maior University of Târgu Mures)

Giovanni Pizzorusso (Università degli Studi Gabriele d'Annunzio, Chieti-Pescara)

Cesare La Mantia (Università di Trieste)

Prokhorov Andrei (Belarusian State University of Minsk)

Olexiy Sokyrko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv)

Rafał Quirini-Popławski (Jagiellonian University of Kraków)

Francesca De Caprio (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Jarosław Pietrzak (Pedagogical University of Kraków)

Marta Gołębek (Museum of King John III's Palace at Wilanów – Warsaw)

Language Expert

Sonia Maria Melchiorre (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Editorial Board

Tony Urbani (Università degli Studi della Toscana)

Małgorzata Trzeciak Cygan (University of Warsaw)

Giulio Merlani (University of Caen Normandy)



Università degli Studi della Toscana

Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna
(Study Center on the Sobieski Age and of Modern Poland)
www.cespom.eu

Proprietà letteraria riservata. La riproduzione in qualsiasi forma, memorizzazione o trascrizione con qualunque mezzo (elettronico, meccanico, in fotocopia, in disco o in altro modo, compresi cinema, radio, televisione, internet) sono vietate senza l'autorizzazione scritta dell'Editore.

Eastern European History Review è una rivista on-line peer-reviewed con lettori anonimi

Chiuso il 31-12-2021

Impaginazione a cura di: *Fabiana Ceccariglia*

ISBN: 978-88-7853-940-2

ISBN ebook: 978-88-7853-941-9

ISSN: 2612-0402 005

Permalink: <http://hdl.handle.net/2067/4631>

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW
Via Santa Maria in Gradi 4 – 01100 Viterbo
www.easterneuropeanhistory.eu
eehr@unitus.it

Edizioni **SETTE CITTA**
Via Mazzini 87 – 01100 Viterbo
t. +39 0761 303020 – info@settecitta.eu

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW

a n n u a l l y h i s t o r i c a l j o u r n a l

~
n. 4/2021
Special Issue

DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMACY IN THE EARLY MODERN POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH (XVII CENTURY)

Edited by

Dorota Gregorowicz and Alessandro Boccolini



EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: LA RIVISTA

Il Comitato redazionale e scientifico è lieto di presentare al pubblico la rivista scientifica *Eastern European History Review*.

Con un carattere internazionale e interdisciplinare, una cadenza annuale e una fruibilità *open access* la rivista focalizza i propri interessi sulle dinamiche occorse nell'Europa Orientale durante tutta l'età moderna (XIV-XIX). *Eastern European History Review* è espressione del Centro Studi dell'Università della Tuscia CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna) nato nel 1997 per intuizione del Prof. Gaetano Platania, Direttore Emerito della Rivista.

L'iniziativa editoriale che presentiamo nasce dall'evidente mancanza in Italia di una rivista scientifica relativa alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale in Età Moderna, nonostante la penisola abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale per la Storia e la Cultura di una parte integrante del continente, a torto considerata come lontana e periferica.

Consapevoli di questo, il Comitato ha posto quale obiettivo primario della *Eastern European History Review* quello di offrire uno spazio di riflessione e di discussione su temi che appartengono alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale, e insieme alle relazioni - politiche e culturali - che questa vasta area del Vecchio Continente ha avuto con l'occidente d'Europa, e l'Italia in particolare, incoraggiando il dialogo tra studiosi e esperti di settore, e tra differenti approcci della ricerca scientifica.

Il Comitato Redazionale e Scientifico

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: THE JOURNAL

The Editorial and Scientific Board are proud delighted to present the *Eastern European History Review* under the aegis of Sette Città Editore.

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV-XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997, from an idea of Prof. Gaetano Platania, today Director Emeritus of this journal.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History sciences.

The editorial initiative we present comes from the obvious lack of a journal, in Italy, concerning the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the Modern Age, this despite its fundamental role in the history and culture of that part of the continent, wrongly considered distant and peripheral.

Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Main objective of the journal is to create a space for reflection and discussion on topics pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, but also relations with Continental Europe, encouraging dialogue between scholars and experts in the field, and between different approaches of scientific research.

The Editorial and Scientific Board

SOMMARIO/SUMMARY

Dorota Gregorowicz
Introduction

11

TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Dorota Gregorowicz
Diplomacy of the Commonwealth, Diplomacy of the King: the Peculiarity of Foreign Policy Making in the Seventeenth Century Poland-Lithuania.

19

Marius Sirutavičius
Partnership in a Union with Diverging Interests: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Diplomatic Activities at the Turn of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.

35

Henryk Litwin, Paweł Duda
Correspondence of Warsaw Nuncio Antonio Santa Croce with Roman Catholic Bishops from 1629: Frequency, Intensity and Content.

45

Michał Salamonik
News Agents and Postmasters: Background Figures or Active Diplomats?

57

DIPLOMACY AS AN ART OF GREAT POLITICS

Miguel Conde Pazos
Spanish Diplomats in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Thirty Years' War.

67

Ryszard Skowron
Palatinate: the Key to Europe. On the Art of Diplomacy of Władysław IV Vasa.

79

Aleksandra Ziober
The Last Years of the Reign of John Casimir Vasa and Interregnum after his Abdication in the Light of Reports of Francis Sanderson and Robert Yard.

101

Alessandro Boccolini
Diplomacy and Papal Politics during the "Unfortunate" Reign of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki.

111

DIPLOMATIC CEREMONIAL

Marta Szymańska
The Ceremonial of Receiving of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł and his Stay at the Courts of Western Europe as a Royal Envoy during the Journey of Prince Władysław Vasa 1624–1625.

127

- Mariusz Sawicki
The Coronation Parliament of John III Sobieski in French-Language Reports Sent to London. 137
- Ewelina Sikora
Feasting and Fasting in Moscow: Peace Negotiation Between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy as Seen Through Eating and Drinking Customs. 147
- Gaetano Platania
Michał Radziwiłł's Obedience Embassy in the Rome of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi between Diplomacy and Ceremonial. 159
- DIPLOMATS IN ACTION**
- Uladzimir Padalinski
Diplomatic Activity as the Basis of Political Advancement and Material Reward in the Sixteenth-Century Grand Duchy of Lithuania: The Case of Mikhayla Haraburda. 173
- Tetiana Grygorieva
The "Decisive Embassy" of Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski to Constantinople (1622–1623) and European Diplomacy amidst the Thirty Years' War. 185
- Peter P. Bajer
The Career of Jerzy (George) Bennet, the Scottish Agent of the Radziwiłł Family. 199
- Aleksandra Skrzypietz
Between the King's Instructions and the Ambassador's Ambition. Melchior de Polignac's Cooperation with Polish Magnates. 219
- Claudia Curcuruto
Francesco Buonvisi and Opizio Pallavicini. Correspondences and Activities of Two Apostolic Nuncios in the Service of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi (1676–1689). 231
- Mihalik Béla Vilmos
The King's Cousin, the Emperor's Bishop. Christian August of Saxe-Weitz as Mediator between Poland and the Holy See. 249

INTRODUCTION

The crisis of political history, particularly profound since the 1960s and the subsequent cultural turn, has penalised the scientific investigation of “international” relations¹ in the early modern period for many years². Over the last decades, though, there have been several calls for new methodological and conceptual approaches to diplomatic studies, some of them extraordinarily fruitful and inspiring³. Nowadays, as Tracey Sowerby observed, «the *New Diplomatic History*, no longer so new, has become a broad church. It has successfully integrated wider concerns into a field that was once dominated by the study of bureaucracy and foreign policy»⁴. Integrated, but not replaced, which is also essential to emphasise. That is mainly why scholars no longer consider diplomacy and foreign policy making as coterminous, but do assimilate plenty of different aspects diplomatic practice entailed.

One cannot notice that from the point of view of contemporary research on the early modern history of diplomacy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth constitutes an interesting phenomenon that has not been sufficiently developed yet, especially in the international forum of researchers along with their various historiographical traditions. There are still many blank spots in exploring this topic, which remain open to a contemporary historian. This special issue of *Eastern European History Review* seeks to encourage a more profound reflection on particularities and significance of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic practice in the early modern period, especially during the seventeenth century, by conveying into conversation an international set of scholars from Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Australia, interested in various aspects of diplomatic history. By bringing consciousness of diplomatic agency to bear on various areas of cultural and political practice, our authors have pressed their research beyond the horizons of their “national histories” that continue to dominate most treatments of premodernity.

On the threshold of the early modern period, *Rzeczpospolita* found itself among the political entities that adopted the praxis of permanent diplomatic missions exchange very late (only in the eighteenth century), relying on the old system of extraordinary embassies, of medieval provenance. However, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was no exception on a European scale. The general rules for foreign relations’ conduct appeared similar in Portugal, Scotland, Hungary, Scandinavia (Sweden and Denmark), Switzerland, and several German states⁵.

Federico Chabod considered the permanent diplomatic service, next to the professional army and elaborated bureaucratic apparatus, as the basis for the affirmation of the “early modern state”⁶. *Rzeczpospolita* did not possess any of these elements, but can it be denied the character of statehood from a historical point of view⁷? Subsequently, for Matthew Smith Anderson, the history of early

1 I put the word “international” in quotation marks, considering the imperfection of this concept for the analysis of political relations in early modern Europe. Cf. Tracey A. Sowerby, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, *History Compass*, 14, 9 (2016): 444.

2 Stefano Andretta, *L'arte della prudenza. Teorie e prassi della diplomazia nell'Italia del XVI e XVII secolo* (Roma: Bibrink, 2006), 7.

3 Karl W. Schweizer and Matt J. Schumann, “The Revitalisation of Diplomatic History”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 19, 2 (2008): 149-86; John Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe”, *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38, 1 (2008): 1-14; Diana Carrió-Invernizzi, “A New Diplomatic History and the Networks of Spanish Diplomacy in the Baroque Era”, *The International History Review*, 36, 4 (2014): 603-18; Dorothea Nolde, “Was ist Diplomatie und wenn ja, wie viele? Herausforderungen und Perspektiven einer Geschlechtergeschichte der frühneuzeitlichen Diplomatie”, *Historische Anthropologie*, 21, 2 (2013): 180-98.

4 Sowerby, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, 441.

5 Giuseppe Galasso, “Le relazioni internazionali nell’età moderna (secoli XV-XVIII)”, *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 111, 1 (1999): 10.

6 Federico Chabod, *Idea di Europa e politica dell’equilibrio* (Bologna: Mulino, 1995).

7 Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society. A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London-New York: Routledge, 1992), 185-86: «The kingdom of Poland had increased its power and influence by a dynastic union with Lithuania and expansion eastward, and had made itself the principal bulwark of Latin Christendom on the eastern marches. But the heterogeneous population, the dual governmental structure of Poland-Lithuania and the practice of elective monarchy prevented its consolidation into an effective stato». Cf. Jan Sowa, *Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z*

modern diplomacy constituted a slow but increasingly evident evolution towards the system of permanent representation. He considered contacts between polities that failed to conform to that model «less developed ones, [...] where diplomacy was less important and diplomatic organisation more primitive». Anderson believed that from the point of view of diplomatic practice, one could speak of two “separate Europes” and that «between these two Europes there were as yet only slender links»⁸. Nowadays, historiography views the issue of permanent diplomatic posts in a significantly different way. As Riccardo Fubini suggests, the general deficiency of institutionalisation of the then diplomacy makes the equality of residency and modernity dubious⁹. Also, Sowerby appropriately stated that «the exchange of resident ambassadors did not extend across all of Europe. Rather, asymmetrical relations were not uncommon within Europe and continued to be so into the eighteenth century»¹⁰.

Therefore, nothing could be more erroneous than assuming the passivity of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the “international” arena of early modern Europe. The young Polish Vasa dynasty, the more as it functioned within the elective monarchy, manifested a strong need to affirm its position on the European forum. Moreover, the necessity to maintain intensive contacts with foreign partners was caused by the continuous involvement of *Rzeczpospolita* in armed conflicts on various fronts. Due to its geopolitical position, the vastness of the territory and the leading role for the implementation of the Catholic Reform, Poland-Lithuania occupied a distinctive part in the entire system of “international” relations of early modern Europe. All the more so, its specific tradition and political practice concerning the implementation of foreign policy, conducting diplomatic activity outside its borders, as well as accepting foreign legations *in loco*, requires further attention of contemporary historiography.

The special issue of *Eastern European History Review*, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (XVII century)*, opens with a group of articles regarding some general institutional and technical aspects of the functioning of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service.

Dorota Gregorowicz (*Diplomacy of the Commonwealth, Diplomacy of the King: the Peculiarity of Foreign Policy Making in the Seventeenth Century Poland-Lithuania*) deals with the topicality of research on the history of diplomacy in the early modern Poland-Lithuania, in the context of scant development of permanent diplomatic missions. The article presents considerations on the subjectivity of the *ius legationis* in *Rzeczpospolita*. Gregorowicz reflects on the competencies of the monarch and of the Commonwealth (personified in the *sejm* and Senate councils) in this matter. To this end, she primarily analyses the content of the sixteenth – and seventeenth-century parliamentary constitutions regarding the conduct of foreign policy. Moreover, the article refers to political practice as a determining factor for the legal structure of Poland-Lithuania.

The Union of Lublin (1569), as the basis for the execution of a joint diplomatic activity of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, is analysed by Marius Sirutavičius (*Partnership in a Union with Diverging Interests: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Diplomatic Activities at the Turn of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*). The author emphasises the initially divergent interests of both states in addressing the directions of the foreign policy of *Rzeczpospolita* (especially concerning contacts with Muscovy) and their influence on the functioning of the diplomatic service. Moreover, Sirutavičius draws attention to the evolution and gradual uniformisation processes of the Polish and Lithuanian visions of conducting foreign policy,

nowoczesną formą (Kraków: Universitas, 2011). According to Sowa, «the concept of the “ghost body of the King” [inspired by Ernst Kantorowicz] marks a notional horizon in which *Rzeczpospolita* presents itself as a non-existent state entity, or in the process of its disappearance, utterly unsuitable for any modern form of social, political and economic organisation, which took shape in Europe from the early modern age, with the nascent capitalism and parliamentarism» (285). Sowa’s perspective is certainly interesting, although historically not sustainable. Translation in English is of the author.

8 Matthew S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London-New York: Longman, 1993), 27–8.

9 Riccardo Fubini, *La “residentialité” de l’ambassadeur dans le mythe et dans la réalité: une enquête sur les origines* (Paris: PUF, 1998); Id., “Diplomacy and government in the Italian city-states of the fifteenth century (Florence and Venice)”, in *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, eds. Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 26–8.

10 Sowerby, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, 442.

which took place in the initial period of the reign of Sigismund III Vasa, pointing to the multilateral origins of those developments.

The problem of the source material's characteristics for studying the history of diplomacy is discussed by nunciatures' specialists Henryk Litwin and Paweł Duda in a joint article *Correspondence of Warsaw Nuncio Antonio Santa Croce with Roman Catholic Bishops from 1629 – Frequency, Intensity and Content*. The researchers focused on the analysis of "internal" correspondence maintained by the apostolic nuncio with hierarchs of the Polish-Lithuanian Catholic Church, underlining its parallel importance in relation to the mainstream canals of diplomatic information exchange (between the Polish-Lithuanian periphery – nunciature's chancellery and Roman centre – Secretariat of State).

Finally, the first part of the book includes the reflection of Michał Salamonik on some non-institutional structures and mechanisms of diplomatic activity in the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, along with the case study on the diplomatic context of the postal and news-spreading duties of the Gdańsk merchant and postmaster Francesco Gratta [1613–1676] (*News Agents and Postmasters: Background Figures or Active Diplomats?*).

The second part of this book is devoted to diplomacy as to the art of great politics' conduct and to the geopolitical position of Poland-Lithuania in seventeenth-century Europe. The advantages of diplomatic negotiations as an alternative to pursuing *Rzeczpospolita's* foreign policy in the military field are highlighted here. This group of articles may seem of a more traditional topicality. Still, it is significant to accentuate its emphasis on the multilateral character of early modern diplomatic relations, strongly including the subject of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Miguel Conde Pazos analyses the impact of the Catholic Monarchy's diplomacy on the involvement of *Rzeczpospolita* in the pan-European conflict (*Spanish Diplomats in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Thirty Years' War*). This example perfectly illustrates the breadth of political, economic and dynastic interactions that were determined by the diplomatic activities of all major European countries, even those geographically distant from each other. Conde Pazos also draws attention to the personal profile of diplomats sent on specific missions and to their respective political culture, experience, and preparation for dedicated charges.

The role of political nuances and, at first glance, of less important elements in conducting a diplomatic activity is treated by Ryszard Skowron (*Palatinate: the Key to Europe. On the Art of Diplomacy of Władysław IV Vasa*). The author points to the role of a seemingly secondary German state, as well as to the complicated system of ties between single European states at that time, in the perspective of the implementation of the great political and dynastic plans of the Polish-Lithuanian monarch, primarily related to his efforts to reclaim the Swedish throne. In fact, it is worth observing how the interests represented and defended through early modern diplomatic negotiation were primarily dynastic, typical of the sovereign families that divided the European spaces between themselves¹¹. In his article, Skowron has distinguished two basic categories defining Władysław IV's foreign policy: peace tactics (diplomatic activity and matrimonial policy) and war (military involvement in connection with the events of the Thirty Years' War).

The English point of view on the last years of the Polish Vasas' rule and on the election of 1669 is presented by Aleksandra Ziober (*The Last Years of the Reign of John Casimir Vasa and Interregnum after his Abdication in the Light of Reports of Francis Sanderson and Robert Yard*). The author shows how the image preserved in diplomatic accounts of various backgrounds' services allows us to recreate the historical narrative for many research topics with more detail. Thus diplomacy becomes a way of acquiring knowledge about single courts and state entities. Ziober also refers to the degree of understanding of the particular form and functioning of the Polish-Lithuanian political structures in seventeenth-century Europe.

The universalist-political dimension of the Holy See's diplomats' activity during the short reign of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669–1673) is discussed by Alessandro Boccolini (*Diplomacy and Papal Politics during the "Unfortunate" Reign of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki*). The author analysed the

11

Claudio Rosso, "Burocrazia, fiscalità, diplomazia", in *Storia d'Europa e del Mediterraneo. Dal Medioevo all'età della globalizzazione*, sez. 5: *Età moderna (secoli XVI–XVIII)*, vol. XII: *Popoli, stati, equilibri di potere*, ed. Roberto Bizzocchi (Salerno-Roma: Salerno Editrice, 2013), 43.

activity of the then apostolic nunciature primarily in the context of the relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the papal vision of *Rzeczpospolita* as *Antemurale Christianitatis*.

As Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger observed, «another major theme within recent reassessments of early modern diplomacy has been non-verbal communication. The early modern diplomatic ceremonial was essential to the expression of hierarchies»¹². In fact, in the third part of the book, we deal with a set of texts referring to the issues of diplomatic ceremonial, as «in early modern European diplomacy, the relationship between the ceremonial symbols and the mechanisms of power was closer and carried more weight»¹³.

In Marta Szymańska's article, *The Ceremonial of Receiving of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł and his Stay at the Courts of Western Europe as a Royal Envoy during the Journey of Prince Władysław Vasa 1624–1625*, the diplomatic role of the Lithuanian magnate, member of the Vasa Prince's retinue during Władysław's educational trip around Europe, as well as the diplomatic dimension of the entire enterprise, seemingly unrelated to the implementation of the Polish-Lithuanian foreign policy, are discussed. One of the key aspects of the study is how the ceremonial applied to the Prince's retinue members indicated the diplomatic nature of the expedition.

Mariusz Sawicki (*The Coronation Parliament of John III Sobieski in French-Language Reports Sent to London*) presents a picture of the anointing act and then the entire coronation *sejm* (1676) of the later victor from Vienna. The author shows the image that French diplomats, present at that time in Poland-Lithuania, created in their reports on the events of Sobieski's coronation: its political, social and ceremonial aspects. Interestingly, those reports were sent in London and not in Paris. Sawicki shows himself fully aware of the strengths and weaknesses of historical interpreting similar creation that any external observers could create.

Ewelina Sikora (*Feasting and Fasting in Moscow: Peace Negotiation Between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy as Seen Through Eating and Drinking Customs*) takes up the theme of feasting as an essential element of Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic practice during the missions to Muscovy. The article constitutes an important contribution for developing further research on material culture in the field of the history of diplomacy¹⁴, also in the context of ceremonial treatments and traditional usages.

Finally, Gaetano Platania draws attention to the institution of obedience missions that Polish-Lithuanian kings traditionally sent to the papal court in order to certify their loyalty to the Catholic Church and its superior (*Michał Radziwiłł's Obedience Embassy in the Rome of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi between Diplomacy and Ceremonial*). The author presents a case study, a picture of the *Rzeczpospolita's* envoy's entry to the Eternal City in 1680, putting Michał Radziwiłł's mission in the large political context of the Holy League's organisation. The ceremonial becomes here an authentic baroque, theatrical representation, still, by no means deprived of its political importance.

The last part of the book is devoted to a series of outstanding personalities of diplomats operating in the context of seventeenth-century *Rzeczpospolita*. Many scholars have adopted an actor-centred approach to inquiry early modern diplomacy, and such career case studies result as extremely useful. Placing ambassadors at the heart of the analysis offers a rich research perspective regarding the relationships they cultivated, their contacts and personal capacities, as well as the individual factor in conducting foreign policy that has always accompanied the great policy's sketches.

Uładzimir Padalinski develops the topic of the diplomatic activity of Mikhayla Haraburda (*Diplomatic Activity as the Basis of Political Advancement and Material Reward in the Sixteenth-Century Grand Duchy of Lithuania: The Case of Mikhayla Haraburda*). It is a specific case study of a multiple envoy of

12 Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger, "Zeremoniell, Ritual, Symbol: Neue Forschungen zur symbolischen Kommunikation in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit", *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 27, 3 (2000): 389-405. Cf. Sowerby, "Early Modern Diplomatic History", 445.

13 Jan Hennings, "The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue: Pomp and Circumstance in Tsar Peter I's Visit to Vienna in 1698", *The International History Review*, 30, 3 (2008), 515.

14 Cf. Harriet Rudolph, "Entangled Objects and Hybrid Practices? Material Culture as a New Approach to the History of Diplomacy", in *Material Culture in Modern Diplomacy from the 15th to the 20th Century*, eds. Rudolph and Gregor M. Metzger (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2016), 1-28.

the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Muscovy and Crimea. Padalinski shows the dynamics with which the involvement in the implementation of foreign policy could determine both the political career and the social status of a diplomat in the noble context of *Rzeczpospolita*. His study also provides an outstanding example of the Lithuanian ambassador's *cursus honorum*.

Krzysztof Zbaraski's Constantinopolitan mission is examined by Tetiana Grygorieva (*The "Decisive Embassy" of Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski to Constantinople (1622–1623) and European Diplomacy amidst the 'Thirty Years' War*). The article rejects the bilateral vision of Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman diplomatic contacts, presenting the image of Zbaraski's expedition in a broad European context, including, *inter alia*, political relations of both countries with Transylvania, as well as their involvement in the events of the Thirty Years' War.

Peter P. Bajer presents a diplomatic career as a path of personal development and one of the ways to build a social position in the early modern *Rzeczpospolita*. The author observes the case of foreign newcomers or/and their families (based on the example of Scottish immigration), the desirable result of who was usually obtaining a noble status in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*The Career of Jerzy (George) Bennet, the Scottish Agent of the Radziwiłł Family*)¹⁵.

The diplomatic mission as a field for the realisation of personal interests of a diplomat, in addition to the tasks provided by representing his political superior, is presented by Aleksandra Skrzypietz (*Between the King's Instructions and the Ambassador's Ambition. Cooperation Between Melchior de Polignac and Polish Magnates*). The author shows how diplomatic feedback could have influenced the evolution of the instructions entrusted to ambassadors and, consequently, had a direct impact on their political activity. Skrzypietz presents Polignac not only as a performer but as a co-creator of the French political program towards the *Rzeczpospolita* ruled by John III Sobieski. Finally, she explains the difficulties encountered by ambassadors of foreign countries in approaching the complex political and social context of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The activities of diplomats of Pope Innocent XI in Poland-Lithuania and at the imperial court, as well as the nature of their regular contacts with the Roman Curia, are presented by Claudia Curcuruto (*Francesco Buonvisi and Opizio Pallavicini. Correspondences and Activities of Two Apostolic Nuncios in the Service of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi. 1676–1689*). The author focuses on the communicative aspects of the activities of the apostolic nunciatures. She presents diplomats as mediators between radically different (geographically, politically, culturally) realities (not only on the line of the royal/imperial court and the papal court but also between local bishops and the Bishop of Rome – the pope). Finally, the issue of mediation, as one of the crucial elements of early modern diplomatic practice, is presented by Béla Mihalik on the example of the activity of a relative of the Polish-Lithuanian monarch Augustus II the Strong (1697–1706, 1709–1733) – Bishop of Győr, Christian August (*The King's Cousin, the Emperor's Bishop. Christian August of Saxe-Weitz as Mediator between Poland and the Holy See*). It is another text that highlights the problem of the personal interests of diplomats in carrying out their missions. In the case of Wettin, these were primarily the efforts to obtain the cardinal's hat. As observed by John Watkins, «the time has come for a multidisciplinary reevaluation of one of the oldest, and traditionally one of the most conservative, subfields in the modern discipline of history: the study of premodern diplomacy»¹⁶. Contemporary research on the history of diplomacy in the early modern *Rzeczpospolita* is doing quite well, but it still requires a reorientation and innovation of methodological approach. The history of diplomacy should no longer be seen as an abstract account of negotiations and treaties, disconnected from parallel social, economic and cultural aspects. Indeed, as this collection of studies demonstrates, historiography is continually discovering new research fields in matter. Among those contained in the presented volume, we can indicate: legal and institutional forms of early modern “international” relations, nature of diplomatic sources and character of the narrative present in the documents, multilaterality and complexity of the early modern interstate connections,

15 Recently on similar issues: Michał Salamonik, *In Their Majesties' Service. The Career of Francesco De Gratta (1613–1676) as a Royal Servant and Trader in Gdańsk* (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2019); Wojciech Tygielski, *Dylematy włoskiego emigranta. Giovanni Battista Jacobelli (1603–1679), śpiewak i kapelan nadworny, kanonik warmiński* (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2019).

16 Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History”, 1.

their religious and confessional nature¹⁷, diplomatic ceremonial and non-verbal communication, tools and techniques used by ambassadors, *people* as direct implementers of the “art of diplomacy”, their *cursus honorum* and mechanisms of social advancement, cultural image expressed in diplomatic documents, social, economic, commercial and dynastic causes that determined political choices, as well as material culture in diplomacy¹⁸. This volume will undoubtedly contribute to the further development of contemporary analysis of these issues. We would like to continue to engage in new methods, ask additional questions, and rethink how early modern Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy is currently being studied.

Dorota Gregorowicz
University of Silesia in Katowice

¹⁷ Cf. *Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Roberta Anderson and Charlotte Backerra (London-New York: Routledge, 2021).

¹⁸ Cf. Daniela Frigo, “Politica estera e diplomazia: figure problemi e apparati”, in *Storia degli antichi stati italiani*, eds. Gaetano Greco and Mario Rosa (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1996), 117.

Miguel Conde Pazos
ALFONSO X UNIVERSITY (SPAIN)

SPANISH DIPLOMATS IN THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH DURING THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

ABSTRACT

The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War meant an increment of contacts between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the war, the Madrid court developed intense diplomatic activity in the area, adapted to the particularities of the Polish political system. In this article we analyse the qualities of the different Spanish envoys in the area, the main characteristics that conditioned their activity and the influence of the different courts that took part in the decisions. Later, we will focus on the case of Baron de Auchy and his last diplomatic mission in Warsaw (1645–1647); a journey that reflects the importance of personal ties in relationships, as well as the different strategies developed by Hispanic diplomacy to regain influence in a period of crisis.

KEYWORDS: Spanish diplomacy; Philip IV; Thirty Years' War; House of Vasa; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

67



<http://hdl.handle.net/2067/46367>

The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War caused an intensification of the relations amongst the various regions of Europe. For the Spanish Monarchy, it coincided with a change in the orientation of its foreign policy, as consequence of the reincorporation of the Low Countries to the Spanish Crown and the beginning of hostilities with the United Provinces. Therefore, during the first years of the reign of Philip IV the government in Madrid took up a range of projects and memorials with a common objective: to re-establish the Spanish position in northern Europe. This strategy, at the same time political and trade-oriented, resulted in the establishment of closer ties with other regional powers. Among them, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was particularly relevant, the only Catholic power present in the Baltic and one of the main suppliers of raw materials to the continent. For years, the Habsburg of Madrid tried to win the support of the kings of the Polish line of Vasa dynasty, encouraging them to participate in their projects and the broader interests of the House of Austria in the European conflict. To this end, they deployed intense diplomatic activity, sending a significant number of agents to the region.

This diplomatic effort faced numerous obstacles. On top of the great distance between both courts, the peculiarities of the Polish political system and the animosity of broad sectors of the *szlachta* towards the House of Austria compounded the difficulties. All that conditioned the activity of the successive agents, giving way to a peculiar diplomacy, characterised by their discreet profile and the greater visibility of the various princes of the Polish royal family. In this article we analyse the general features of that diplomacy, to later focus on the paradigmatic case of Charles de Bonnières, Baron of Auchy (1595-1668), main artifice of the relationship during the war. As his activity as a Spanish agent in Warsaw was ample, we will focus on his last and less known mission in the region (1646-1647), carried out when the old ties between the Vasa and Austrian dynasties were changing, requiring a profound reevaluation of the contacts.

ELEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The relations between the Spanish Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Thirty Years' War have been studied by several historians. From the Spanish perspective, the Baltic plans of the 1620's have attracted most of the attention¹. Meanwhile, from the Polish side, the studies have

¹ Rafael Rodenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la guerra de los Treinta Años (1624–1630)* (Madrid: CSIC, 1961). José Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618–1639)* (Madrid: CEC, 2001).

been rather eclectic, including subjects such as the participation of Polish troops in the western conflict or the presence of Polish agents in Naples and Madrid². Thanks to the studies such as those by Ryszard Skowron, we have today a rather complete picture of the contacts³. The court in Madrid was interested in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for political as well as economic reasons. Its geopolitical situation, bordering the Empire and with access to the Baltic Sea, placed it in a privileged position at the outbreak of the war. Trade also attracted the Spanish interest. Every year vast amounts of raw materials departed from the port of Gdańsk headed towards the West. Many of them were vital for ship construction and their grain fed a good part of the United Provinces. On the other hand, the House of Austria sourced thousands of soldiers from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the conflict, based on the friendship treaties signed by Sigismund III with the various Emperors – 1613, 1621 –⁴. The geopolitical situation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth also allowed the House of Austria to divert some of their main enemies. When in 1626 the Count of Solre moved to Warsaw as ambassador, his objective was to keep the war with Gustav Adolf active⁵. Twenty years later, in 1646, Spanish diplomacy worked in favour of the diversion carried out by the Venetians against the Ottoman Empire⁶.

We can distinguish three stages in the activity of the Spanish agents in Poland-Lithuania after the initial crisis in Bohemia. The first, from 1621 to 1629, was centered in the Baltic plans, the creation of a Spanish-Polish imperial fleet and an ambitious trade strategy aimed at displacing the Dutch merchants in favour of those from the Hanseatic League⁷. The second stage, from 1629 till 1644, was characterised by the strengthening of family ties – the marriage of Władysław IV and Cecilia Renata of Austria, the signing of a family treaty – and the attempts by the Madrid court to involve the Polish Vasa in the European conflict (Treaty of Naples)⁸. The Queen's death in 1644 was the beginning of the third stage in the relations in which, against a background of military defeats undergone by the Austria, Władysław IV became gradually closer to the French through his marriage with Marie Louise Gonzaga⁹.

The Spanish diplomacy deployed several strategies to gain the support of the Polish to their plans. First, they took advantage of the Vasa's interest to recuperate the Swedish Crown, associating their plans in the Baltic to the war with Gustav Adolf. Madrid also believed that the potential benefits of trade between Spain and Poland-Lithuania would persuade many Polish to support their projects. However, they soon realised the scarce interest that their activities in that region generated. On the contrary, the reports provided by the agents revealed the animosity that the House of Austria aroused in broad sectors of the aristocracy. They also gathered a better knowledge of the peculiar Polish political system, the limited authority of their monarchs and the role played by the parliament, which led them to reconsider many of their strategies. In 1628 the Count Duke de Olivares proposed to offer some money to certain nobles and to invite them to send their sons to the Spanish court to have them raised as pages¹⁰. Between 1639 and 1643, the Viceroy Medina de las Torres pledged important sums with some nobles, as part of the negotiations of the Treaty of Naples¹¹.

2 Ryszard Skowron, "Las levas de polacos para los ejércitos españoles en la época de la guerra de los Treinta Años", in *From Ireland to Poland. Northern Europe, Spain and the Early Modern World*, eds. Enrique García Hernán and Ryszard Skowron (Valencia: Albatros, 2015), 19-37; Id. *Dyplomaci polscy w Hiszpanii w XVI i XVII wieku* (Kraków: Universitas 1997).

3 Ryszard Skowron, *Olivares, los Vasa y el Báltico. Polonia en la política internacional de España en los años 1621-1632* (Warszawa: DIG, 2008); Id. *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hiszpańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632-1648* (Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze "Historia Iagellonica", 2013).

4 Alexander Baran and George Gajecy, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War* (Rome: Basiliani, 1969); Skowron, "Las levas".

5 AGS, Est., K. 195, *Instrucciones al conde de Solre*, 5 January 1626.

6 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Junta de Estado*, 10 January 1646.

7 Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes*, 176-243; Skowron, *Olivares*, 107-59.

8 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 73-257.

9 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 271-89; Miguel Conde Pazos, *La Monarquía Católica y los confines orientales de la cristiandad. Relaciones entre la Casa de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia* (PhD diss., Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2016), 442-519.

10 AGS, Est., Leg. 1442, *Junta de Estado*, 16 September 1628.

11 Miguel Conde Pazos, "El Tratado de Nápoles: el encierro del príncipe Juan Casimiro y la leva de polacos de Medina de las Torres (1638-1642)", *Studia historica. Historia moderna*, n. 33 (2011): 123-39.

A key element was the role played by the sons of Sigismund III. As descendants of an elective monarch, the political situation of the Princes was weak, and they were economically insecure. Some of them, like John Albert or Charles Ferdinand joined the ecclesiastic career, becoming bishops or cardinals. But others tried to lean on their maternal family, seeking the support of the House of Austria to secure their social status. In 1624, Władysław, future king, embarked on a trip around Europe, which allowed him to get acquainted with the Spanish elites in Europe. During the rest of the decade, he became one of the main champions of Spanish diplomacy in Warsaw. His brother John Casimir, who later became king, capitalised on a great deal of interest during the following decades. In 1638, the Prince embarked on a trip to Spain with the purpose of becoming the Viceroy of Portugal. But his capture by the French, when crossing the Mediterranean, doomed that mission¹². The court in Madrid tried to profit from their interest, promising the Princes money and positions. Władysław received presents and the promise of Spanish protection when carrying out his projects. John Casimir and Charles Ferdinand received allowances from Philip IV¹³. The two older brothers were also awarded the Golden Fleece. All that interest was summed in the Family Treaty of 1637 that pledged the protection and promotion of the Princes by the House of Austria. Philip IV was reluctant, however, to sign it and assume that heavy burden. Of course, there were other limits. For example, the sons of Sigismund III sought a beneficial marriage in Italy, preferably with some of the wealthiest lineages of Naples, which was opposed by the court in Madrid, that did not favour the union between a royal son (with Habsburg's blood) and a local lineage¹⁴.

A feature of the relations was multilateralism. The long distances and the way the Spanish Monarchy functioned led to a dispersion of decisional centres. In the case of the relations with Poland-Lithuania, we must highlight two spaces. The first were the Spanish Low Countries which, after their annexation, became a real window towards the North for the Monarchy. The court in Brussels had ample experience and knowledge after years of autonomous policy in the Baltic¹⁵. At the same time, it was the place the most exposed to changes in trade flows in the region. It is no coincidence that most of the diplomats sent to Poland-Lithuania came from that region – Count of Solre, Gabriel de Roy, Baron of Auchy – or had some responsibilities there – Enrique Teller, Pedro Rouco Villagutierrez –. The views of the Brussels court had great influence on the Spanish diplomatic strategy in Poland-Lithuania, particularly during the governing years of Isabel Clara Eugenia. Their influence, however, was diminished by the instability in the territory and by the differences between Madrid and Brussels over the ultimate objectives of the Baltic policy¹⁶. In 1628, the Count-Duke of Olivares ordered that all correspondence addressed to the Governess by Auchy and de Roy was sent directly to Madrid¹⁷. The internal situation also had a personal impact on some of the diplomats. In 1630, the Count of Solre expressed his frustration for being excluded from the businesses in Brussels. Madrid attributed this situation to the links the noble had with the Count of Bergh, suspect of treason¹⁸. Years later, the Baron of Auchy would consider his link with the Duke of Aarchot, arrested for his involvement in the Flanders' events of 1632, as the possible cause for his first fall from grace¹⁹.

12 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 195-222.

13 AGS, Est., Leg. 2459, *Felipe IV al protonotario*, Madrid 8 July 1633.

14 AGS, Est., Leg. 3833, *Consejo de Estado*, 18 February 1634.

15 Luc Duerloo, *El archiduque Alberto. Piedad y política dinástica durante las guerras de religión* (Madrid: CEEH, 2015), 399-400; Ryszard Szmydki, "Sigismund III and the Netherlands", in *The House of Vasa and the House of Austria. Correspondence from the Years 1587-1668*, ed. Ryszard Skowron (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), 69-94.

16 Robert A. Stradling, *La armada de Flandes. Política naval española y guerra europea, 1568-1668* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1992) 89-92.

17 AGS, Est., Leg. 1442, *Junta de Estado*, 16 September 1628.

18 AGS, Est., Leg. 2044, *Consejo de Estado*, 28 February 1630.

19 BNE, Mss. 2375, *Representación hecha por el barón de Auchy*, 1644.

The second important space was the court of Vienna²⁰. Given its geopolitical position and interests, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was under the influence of the imperial branch of Habsburgs. Thus, for the court in Madrid the priority in its relations with Warsaw was to strengthen the Emperor's position and the defence of his interests in the country. In fact, the diplomacy of Philip IV hinged on the imperial position in Poland-Lithuania. The Spanish never tried to establish a group or a party of their own within the court of Warsaw relying instead on the supporters of the Emperor.

The exchanges took place through the Spanish Embassy in Vienna, which oversaw the activities of the various agents, taking care of the recruiting of troops, under a regime of a tight dynastic collaboration acting under a mutual agreement with the Emperor and his ministries. As a result, the relationship between the Spanish and Polish-Lithuanian Monarchies was severely conditioned by the court of Vienna, and subordinated to the Emperor's interests in the region.

THE QUALITIES OF THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR

The language, the distance, and the differences between the Polish and the Spanish political systems required a specific type of diplomacy. In 1625, Georges Henin wrote a memorandum for the court in Madrid, in which he described the qualities with which the Spanish ambassador in Poland should be endowed²¹. According to the manuscript, the chosen person should be knowledgeable in the matters in northern Europe, its trade and alliances, and especially be able to defend the endeavours of the Emperor. Also, he should be able to interpret the interests of the Polish Kings, as well as to identify the power circles of the court. To that end, he should be able to enter the spaces of socialization, being desirable that he spoke Latin fluently. Also, he should be tolerant in the confessional field, since in Poland he would be bound to negotiate with non-Catholic nobles, without referring to them as "heretics". An interesting remark referred to the custom of Polish Nobles to drink wine during negotiations and banquets. The person assigned to that duty should be a moderate drinker, since the Poles, he wrote, made astute use of beverages at banquets to unveil the real intentions of their counterparties. He should be a liberal expender in gifts and promises. Henin estimated the cost of an Embassy at 200'000 ducats, including presents for the royals and nobles. Despite all those considerations, the key for the diplomat was neither in the spending nor the ostentation, but in keeping secrets. In his view, the arrival of a Spanish ambassador in Warsaw would raise suspicion amongst the enemies of the Austria that would entangle the negotiations. For that reason, he recommended abandoning the old practice of extraordinary embassies. Instead, he proposed sending to Poland an experienced agent to negotiate in a discreet manner. Extraordinary embassies should be reserved for protocolary missions and the signing of pacts previously agreed upon by the agents.

Henin's memorandum proposed a kind of secret and pragmatic diplomacy carried out by middle-level agents. That reduced costs, provided information, and allowed access to the royal sphere without so many obstacles. We find evidence of this diplomacy carried out during the war years with the dispatching of agents with different titles. Many of them had a military background (Auchy, Villagutierrez) or ecclesiastic (Allegretto Allegretti, Enrique Teller). There were also experts such as Gabriel de Roy²². The extraordinary embassies, similar in style to those of 1597 or 1612, were reserved for decisive instances (Solre's missions, 1626 and 1636) or protocol (the embassies of the Count of Siruela and the Prince of Dietrichstein, 1633 and 1645). That provided discreet contacts allowing to establish direct access with the Princes. Most of these embassies were under the wing of the Spanish embassy in Vienna and the itineraries towards Poland-Lithuania often included the courts of Vienna and Brussels.

The advice provided by Henin must have had a limited eco in Madrid in 1625, since they chose the Count of Solre for an extraordinary embassy. The Flemish became the Monarchies' most influencing

20 Rubén González Cuerva, "The Spanish Embassy in the Empire, Watchtower of Poland (1590–1624)", in Skowron, *The House of Vasa and the House of Austria*, 115–44.

21 BNE, Mss. 2359, *Partes que debe tener un buen embajador [...]*; about the Manuscript: Skowron, *Olivares*.

22 Jonathan I. Israel, "The Politics of International Trade Rivalry during the Thirty Years War: Gabriel de Roy and Olivares' Mercantilist Projects, 1621–1645", *The International History Review*, VIII/4 (1986): 1606–61.

noble in the court of Poland. A member of a secondary branch of the Cröy family, Solre always maintained a close link with the Hispanic Monarchy, even before the reincorporation of the Low Countries²³. In 1626, he travelled to Poland under the excuse of communicating the breakup with England. Instead, his trip aimed at setting up the Baltic plans and the Swedish-Polish war active. Once there, he established correspondence with Prince Władysław, who always devoted great respect to him. In 1636 he returned to Poland, this time to strengthen the alliance between the Vasa and Austria²⁴. His passing away, in 1638, represented a great loss for the Spanish-Polish relations.

In 1625 it was decided that, should negotiations continue, the person in charge of staying in Warsaw would be Baron de Auchy. This Flemish noble was the main intermediary between the Polish and Spanish courts during the conflict, carrying out various missions during the decades of 1620 and 1640. The son of the Governor of Lens, Charles de Bonnières started his services to the Monarchy at an early age²⁵. In 1610 he served in Milan as Captain of Infantry. In 1616, in Flanders, he was Captain of Dragons. And in 1620, he commanded 1000 German cavalry soldiers. He managed to conciliate this military career with the life in court. Like the Count of Solre, Auchy became prominent for the close links he established in the Madrid court, obtaining one of the palatine positions that Philip III offered in Flanders. In 1614, he was appointed *Gentilhombre de boca*. In 1623, he received the Governorship of Bapume thanks to the Spanish intercession. His influence would increase after marrying Ursula, daughter of John Mancisidor, one of the closest Spanish Secretary of the Archdukes²⁶. After the death of Albert, Isabel Clara Eugenia sent him to Madrid, where he made some military proposals. There he was made a member of the *Junta de Población*, an institution of which Count Solre was also a member, linked in turn to the *Almirantazgo* (of which Gabriel de Roy took part). During those years Auchy also assumed some diplomatic missions, visiting various courts in Germany.

Auchy's mission in 1627 has been well researched, so we will only highlight some aspects²⁷. The Baron travelled to Poland undercover. There, he entered Prince Władysław's circle, who appointed him Chamber Gentleman, becoming the main link between the Prince and the Spanish Monarchy. In Warsaw he contributed to the success of the Baltic plans, together with Gabriel de Roy, obtaining 10 of Polish King's vessels for the Wismar fleet. During that time, he also served Prince Władysław. Years later, the Baron proudly rememorate his participation in two campaigns in Prussia next to the Prince²⁸. In 1629, at the Vasas' request, he moved to Vienna to present Ferdinand II a plan to undermine the Swedish successes. A year later he returned to Madrid (via Brussels) to inform on his mission and present new proposals from Władysław.

By then, he was already the best expert of the Polish reality, aided by several confidants. However, despite of the promising outlook for his situation, his career was truncated during the decade of 1630. Immediately after his return to Spain, the court started conceiving a new mission in Poland-Lithuania. In particular, the Count-Duke of Olivares was delighted by the tight relationship that the Flemish had established with the Polish royal family. But Auchy declared himself tired after years of stay in Poland-Lithuania and resisted the new assignment unless he was awarded some compensations. Specifically, he demanded a post as *Mayordomo* of Prince Infant Carlos and a seat in the Council of

23 Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "Afición, entendimiento y celo al servicio de Su Majestad. El Conde de Solre, Jean de Croÿ, y la unión hispano-flamenca en el reinado de Felipe IV", in *Agentes e identidades en movimiento. España y los Países Bajos siglos XVI-XVIII*, eds. René Vermeir, Maurits Ebben and Raymond Fagel (Madrid: Silex, 2011), 195-230.

24 Ryszard Skowron, "Hiszpania wobec polsko-szwedzkiego rozejmu 1635 roku. Misja opata Vazqueza i hrabiego de Solre", in *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII Wieku*, ed. Mirosław Nagielski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2007) 45-57.

25 Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "Élites flamencas y patronato real: gestionar recursos y negociar expectativas en la Monarquía de Felipe IV (1621-1630)", *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, serie IV, t.23 (2010): 59-88.

26 Duerloo, *El archiduque*, 84-5.

27 Skowron, *Olivares*, 189-209.

28 Carlos Bonnières, *Arte militar deducida de sus principios fundamentales* (Zaragoza: Hospital Real i General de Nuestra Señora de Gracia, 1644).

Flanders-positions²⁹ that the Madrid court refused to award. He also requested for better terms for his embassy: more money and the possibility of getting loans. Therefore, when Auchy received the order to go to Poland, he postponed his departure. This disobedience (in the context of instability in Flanders) caused a loss of confidence in the court, especially from the Count-Duke. In early 1635, he was replaced by Fray Alonso Vazquez³⁰. The Baron was retained in Madrid, and his salary was blocked. The court did not require his services again until 1638, and only to send him to Barcelona to welcome the arrival of Prince John Casimir, which, as we know, never took place³¹.

THE LAST MISSION OF BARON OF AUCHY IN POLAND-LITHUANIA (1645–1647)

The decade of 1640 brought significant changes in the Spanish-Polish relations. The rebellions in the Iberian Peninsula triggered a scale-down of the European affairs by the Spanish Monarchy. At the same time, the Austrian armies started to suffer a series of defeats in central Europe. In this context, the relationship between Madrid and Warsaw started to decline, after years of failed projects and plenty of unfulfilled promises, and Władysław IV started to reorient his policy. After the death of Cecilia Renata, in 1644, the king approached to the Paris court, marrying a year later with Maria Louise Gonzaga³². Meanwhile, Prince John Casimir tried to be appointed cardinal with the support of Mazarine³³. The situation was not favourable either in neighbouring Copenhagen; another court considered friendly in the region, which started approaching the enemies of the House of Austria after being defeated in the war with Sweden (1643–1645)³⁴.

In that context, the court of Philip IV started arrangements to send a diplomatic mission to the region. The first moves were made in 1644, following a project of an alliance between Poland-Lithuania, Denmark and Muscovy against Sweden. But the mission only took shape in 1645. To carry it out, they summoned Baron of Auchy, considered one of the best experts in the northern affairs³⁵. The Baron's return to favour had started in 1640, after the outbreak of war in Spain. In 1641 he was called upon by Philip IV to command the first troops that arrived from Low Countries. A year later, he joined the War Council. Then he was appointed General Commissaire of the Castilian Infantry and General Overseer of the royal army. To this military aspect he added a literary one. In 1644, in Saragossa, he published his *Arte military deducida de sus principios fundamentales*, a book based on his experiences in the Flanders and Prussia wars. However, his personal luck did not seem to improve much. In 1642 Bapaume was captured by the French troops. In that same year, the only son he had had with Ursula Mancisidor died when serving in the royal army. His position in the court did not seem to prosper either. Despite the fall from grace of the Count-Duke of Olivares (the main obstacle for his ambitions), the court in Madrid was not keen to give him a seat in the Council of Flanders. In 1644 he wrote a new memorandum to the king where he reminded him that, after 36 years of services, he just received the same assignment of 300 shields that he had been awarded in 1627, when he left for Poland³⁶.

One of the reasons why the court decided to bring Auchy into the scene was his close personal relations with the Polish Vasa. For years, Władysław IV had written to Madrid asking the return of the Baron³⁷;

29 AGS, Est., Leg. 2333, *Consejo de Estado*, 22 January 1632.

30 AGS, Est., Leg. 2336, *Consejo de Estado*, 14 January 1635.

31 Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Leg. 1350, *el rey al cardenal de Borja*, 8 May 1638.

32 Maciej Serwański, "Polonia y la Guerra de los Treinta Años", in *350 años de la Paz de Westfalia* (Madrid: Carlos de Amberes, 1999), 73–86.

33 Miguel Conde Pazos, "Entre franceses y españoles: el Cardenalato del príncipe Juan Casimiro Vasa y la diplomacia hispana en Italia (1643–1648)", *Libros de la Corte*, 1 (2014), 33–51.

34 Enrique J. Corredera Nilsson, *Dealing with the North: Spanish Ambassadors in the Scandinavian Kingdoms 1648–1660* (PhD diss., Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2015), 120–21.

35 AGS, Est., Leg. 2346, *Consejo de Estado*, 30 September 1645.

36 BNE, Mss. 2375, *Representación hecha por el barón de Auchy*, 1644.

37 AGS, Est., Leg. 2339, *Consejo de Estado*, 23 July 1639.

a personal key the court was ready to capitalise on. The Baron of Auchy took this new opportunity to ask for new compensations. In this instance, on top of the seat in the Council of Flanders, he demanded a seat in the Finance Council. However, the court of Madrid postponed any new appointment to his return from Poland-Lithuania³⁸. The Baron also requested better conditions for his embassy: a salary of 500 shields per month and a one-time aide of 5'000 or 6'000 shields. He also asked permission to seek loans in Poland and Denmark. Finally, he claimed an aide to accompany him, arguing that he was too old to carry the weight of negotiations on his own. Madrid rejected his demands, establishing a salary of 400 shields plus a one-time aide of 4'000³⁹.

The Baron left for Poland-Lithuania with two objectives in mind. On the one hand, to keep the friendship with the kings of Poland and Denmark, steering them away from the attempts of French diplomacy to have them join the general cause against the House of Austria. It was a difficult mission given the scarcity of means. In 1636, the Count of Solre had travelled to Poland-Lithuania with similar objectives, making a whole range of promises to the king and the princes – help for the war with Sweden, rents –. Even more, he travelled as a special ambassador, accompanied by a numerous entourage. In turn, Auchy had little to offer: the rents had not been paid timely and the court was still due to compensating them for the 10 vessels delivered in 1628. Auchy was instructed to avoid discussing these debts⁴⁰. To make things worst, Auchy did not travel with an ambassadorial title, but with the rank of minister sent by Philip IV⁴¹. The second objective of his mission was to re-establish the Monarchies' position in the septentrional space, establishing correspondence channels in the various courts.

At the beginning, there were some hesitations as to the route to follow and the court he should visit first. Auchy wanted to travel by sea, from Cadiz or San Sebastian, towards England and until the Danish coast. A trip he considered doable in a month at best, or five at worst. However, the court chose to follow the traditional route, though Italy and the imperial territories. The reason was to have him reach a consensus over his mission's objectives with Ferdinand III and the Spanish ambassador in Vienna⁴². After crossing Genoa and Innsbruck, Auchy arrived in Linz. There, a sickness kept him detained for 6 weeks, delaying his arrival in Poland-Lithuania until early 1646.

The court that the Baron visited was very different to the one he had left years before. By then, Władysław IV had abandoned a good part of his anti-Sweden Baltic policy. Instead, he was trying to become a mediator in the Westphalian Peace, for which he expected the recognition of his dynastic rights. That mediation was not supported by the Emperor, who feared interferences with the peace process and his possessions in Silesia. Frictions between Vienna and Warsaw had also taken place because of the territories awarded to the Vasa in Silesia (Duchies of Opole and Ratibor-Racibórz), which had damaged the relationship. The first audience of Władysław IV to Auchy took place during the first weeks of 1646. The king manifested his unquestionable support for the House of Austria. However, he considered that it had been his cousins, the Emperor and the King of Spain that had failed to honour their commitments. In particular, he complained of the abandonment of his affairs in Madrid, not only concerning the payment of rents and the promise of positions for his brothers, but also the payment of the rents in Naples. Auchy blamed Alonso Vazquez, his substitute in 1635, who had made all kinds of promises in his stay in Poland. Władysław IV also expressed his desire to mediate in the universal peace. Moreover, he offered himself to arbitrate a peace treaty to end the war between the Spanish Monarchy and the United Provinces. The Spanish State Council did not accept that proposal, since they considered that talks undertaken by Peñaranda in Münster were well oriented⁴³.

38 AGS, Est., Leg. 2345, *Consejo de Estado*, 6 December 1644.

39 AGS, Est., Leg. 2345, *Consejo de Estado*, 20 December 1644.

40 AGS, Est., Leg. 2350, *Felipe IV al barón de Auchy*, 22 April 1645.

41 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 31 January 1647.

42 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 31 January 1646.

43 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 19 June 1646.

The Baron of Auchy could also note the changes in the state of the court. The king's marriage with Marie Luise Gonzaga had given way to the arrival of many French to Warsaw. But, as it was soon learned, there had also been some clashes between various Polish nobles and the French. In one of the audiences, Władysław IV reassured the Baron that he would send back to Paris most of the French as soon as he found the occasion⁴⁴. Despite all that, it was evident that the French diplomacy had acquired an enormous influence in Warsaw. The *sejm* of 1646 discussed, under the influence of Paris, the possibility of elevating the truce of 1635 with Sweden to peace. In that context, Mazarine had started recruiting soldiers in the country. Just a few weeks after his arrival, the Baron of Auchy intervened to stop the envoy to France of 4000 soldiers. The Baron was unable to block the shipment of troops, but he persuaded Władysław IV to divert 1500 for his own army⁴⁵.

As to the ministers, the Baron noticed the enormous influence that Jerzy Ossoliński exerted over the court's affairs. Also discussed the support that Adam Kazanowski continued to provide to the affairs of the House of Austria. But Auchy was not misled by this apparent friendship of this minister, who, in his opinion, was motivated by greed⁴⁶. The rest of the image Auchy described showed a court where the queen's French circle had great influence, attracting key figures previously close to the House of Austria, such as royal secretary Ludovico Fantoni⁴⁷.

Shortly after, Auchy left for Copenhagen, although his absence from Poland-Lithuania was brief. His objective in Denmark was to re-establish the Spanish position in the region, while maintaining the friendship with Christian IV and averting the recruiting of soldiers by the French. This subject – rebuilding the Spanish influence in the area – had already been discussed by the Baron in his meetings with the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of Terranova. In Auchy's opinion, the time had arrived to reformulate the Spanish diplomatic action, making it more flexible and adjusting it to the poor shape of the king's treasure. To that end, he advocated the creation of a low-profile agent network, spread along the Baltic coast and Poland-Lithuania, that should send notices regularly. They would be paid modest sums, 15 to 25 shields per month. In case of needing to negotiate a specific accord, an agent could travel from Vienna with a salary of 50 shields per month (or 400 thalers per year). By this proposal, Auchy copied the French model, that managed its action from Gdańsk where the recruiting and the commercial affairs were overseen, occasionally moving to Warsaw an agent when needed⁴⁸. Auchy tried to set up this network in his trip to the north. In Copenhagen, he hired an army commissary of Spanish origin, Antonio Garcia Vega. In Poland he got in contact with an Italian secretary of the king, who had access to secret correspondence⁴⁹. However, his name was not registered. We just know that he continued to send reports to Vienna regularly, serving as the base for the network of Spanish agents the Spanish embassy kept in the region until the decade of 1650.

Auchy's position in Poland began to get eroded after his return from Denmark (October 1646). At the end of that year, he had to arrange the arrival of Enrique Teller who travelled to Warsaw in a protocolary mission to congratulate Władysław IV for his marriage. But his task was impaired by the internal conflict in the Polish Embassy in Madrid⁵⁰. After this episode, the Baron suffered various humiliations by the Polish ministers and Teller was received by the king only after the intervention of Kazanowski. On the other hand, Władysław IV was upset by the lack of Vienna's support to his plans to crusade against the Turks, a project that Auchy saw collapse in the *sejm* of 1646⁵¹. Also, money

44 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 4 July 1646.

45 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 14 August 1646.

46 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 13 June 1647.

47 AGS, Est., Leg. 2065, *Consejo de Estado*, 22 December 1646.

48 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 2 February 1646.

49 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 31 January 1647.

50 Skowron, *Dyplomaci*, 146–96; Jan Kieniewicz and Matylda Urjasz-Raczko, "Fathoming Spanish Arcana: The Polish Ambassador Stanisław Mąkowski's Impossible Mission to the Court of Philip IV (1638–47)", in *Ambassadors in Golden-Age Madrid*, eds. Jorge Fernández-Santos and José L. Colomer (Madrid: CEEH, 2020), 173–201.

51 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 4 June 1647.

began to get scarce. His mission's expenses reached 11'000 shields, and the Duke of Terranova refused to continue diverting resources⁵². Auchy himself considered his presence in Warsaw unnecessary. After the king's failure in the *sejm*, he thought it unlikely that Władysław IV would undertake any action, much less to attack Silesia. But it was the humiliations by the king and Ossoliński that finally convinced him to leave without even waiting for the customary formalities. His decision would later be criticised by the State Council which considered that Auchy had acted under personal feelings⁵³. Auchy's sudden departure from Poland in the summer of 1647 stigmatised his embassy in the eyes of the court's general opinion. Consequently, when the Baron returned to Madrid he was barely considered for new appointments. That did not prevent Philip IV from going back to him to consult on Polish issues. In 1648, Władysław IV died and Auchy was consulted on his possible successors. He recommended supporting Prince Neuburg (with whom he kept old ties and whom he had tried to promote before), leaving aside the royal's brothers⁵⁴. But, in the middle of these consultations, one document he handled ended in the hands of the foreign diplomacy. Weeks later Auchy was arrested for disclosure of secrets. He defended himself from that accusation blaming the Polish ambassador in Madrid, Francisco de Biboni⁵⁵.

CONCLUSION

The jailing during months of the Baron of Auchy in the Castle of Santorcaz may seem an epilogue of the result of the Spanish-Polish relations during the conflict; relations based on a myriad of promises and failed projects, marked by a strong personal character by both, the Princes of the Vasa family and the Spanish diplomats. The latter carried out their duties in a distant and sometimes hostile environment, under a varied set of interests. Despite all that, they managed to establish a series of links and structures that provided information and allowed soldiers to recruit. In the long term, the grand Spanish plans in the region failed, which led to describing Poland-Lithuania as the ally of frustrated hopes. However, the main objective was to safeguard the Emperor's back lines, which was achieved, in part thanks to the links developed by that diplomacy.

The Baron of Auchy played a key role in all that. In 1646, he travelled to Poland-Lithuania with the purpose of rebuilding the Spanish position and adapting it to the new reality, in which the Spanish Monarchy could no longer commit a great deal of resources, and France, under Louis XIV, progressively established its hegemony. If his actions did not have the expected success – at least in the eyes of the court in Madrid – it was the result of a clear incapacity to balance his personal link with the king, in the face of a changing reality in which the House of Austria lost its influence in the continent.

52 AGS, Est., Leg. 2351, *Consejo de Estado*, 1 September 1648.

53 AGS, Est., Leg. 2351, *Consejo de Estado*, 11 April 1648.

54 AGS, Est., Leg. 2352, *Junta de Estado*, 29 July 1648.

55 BNE, Mss. 2359, *el barón de Auchy a d. Luis de Haro*, 6 February 1650.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGS: Archivo General de Simancas.

Est.: *Estado*.

BNE: Biblioteca Nacional de España.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alcalá-Zamora, José. *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618–1639)*. Madrid: CEC, 2001.
- Baran, Alexander, and Gajecy, George. *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*. Rome: Basiliani, 1969.
- Conde Pazos, Miguel. *La Monarquía Católica y los confines orientales de la cristiandad. Relaciones entre la Casa de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia*. PhD diss. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2016.
- Conde Pazos, Miguel. “Entre franceses y españoles: el Cardenalato del príncipe Juan Casimiro Vasa y la diplomacia hispana en Italia (1643–1648)”. *Libros de la Corte*, 1 (2014): 33–51.
- Conde Pazos, Miguel. “El Tratado de Nápoles: el encierro del príncipe Juan Casimiro y la leva de polacos de Medina de las Torres (1638–1642)”. *Studia historica. Historia moderna*, n. 33 (2011): 123–39.
- Corredera Nilsson, Enrique J., *Dealing with the North: Spanish Ambassadors in the Scandinavian Kingdoms 1648–1660*. PhD diss., Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2015.
- Duerloo, Luc. *El archiduque Alberto. Piedad y política dinástica durante las guerras de religión*. Madrid: CEEH, 2015.
- Esteban Estríngana, Alicia. “Afición, entendimiento y celo al servicio de Su Majestad. El Conde de Solre, Jean de Croÿ, y la unión hispano-flamenca en el reinado de Felipe IV”. In *Agentes e identidades en movimiento. España y los Países Bajos siglos XVI–XVIII*, edited by René Vermeir, Maurits Ebben and Raymond Fagel, 195–230. Madrid: Silex, 2011.
- Esteban Estríngana, Alicia. “Élites flamencas y patronato real: gestionar recursos y negociar expectativas en la Monarquía de Felipe IV (1621–1630)”. *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, serie IV, t.23 (2010): 59–88.
- González Cuerva, Rubén. “The Spanish Embassy in the Empire, Watchtower of Poland (1590–1624)”. In *The House of Vasa and the House of Austria. Correspondence from the Years 1587–1668*, edited by Ryszard Skowron, 115–44. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016.
- Israel, Jonathan I. “The Politics of International Trade Rivalry during the Thirty Years War: Gabriel de Roy and Olivares’ Mercantilist Projects, 1621–1645”. *The International History Review*, VIII/4 (1986): 1606–61.
- Kieniewicz, Jan, and Urjasz-Raczko, Matylda. “Fathoming Spanish Arcana: The Polish Ambassador Stanisław Mąkowski’s Impossible Mission to the Court of Philip IV (1638–47)”. In *Ambassadors in Golden-Age Madrid*, edited by Jorge Fernández-Santos and José L. Colomer, 173–201. Madrid: CEEH, 2020.
- Rodenas Vilar, Rafael, *La política europea de España durante la guerra de los Treinta Años (1624–1630)*. Madrid: CSIC, 1961.
- Serwański, Maciej. “Polonia y la Guerra de los Treinta Años”. In *350 años de la Paz de Westfalia*, 73–86. Madrid: Carlos de Amberes, 1999.
- Skowron, Ryszard. “Las levas de polacos para los ejércitos españoles en la época de la guerra de los Treinta Años”. In *From Ireland to Poland. Northern Europe, Spain and the Early Modern World*, edited by Enrique García Hernán and Ryszard Skowron, 19–37. Valencia: Albatros, 2015.
- Skowron, Ryszard. *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hispańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632–1648*. Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze “Historia Iagellonica”, 2013.
- Skowron, Ryszard. *Olivares, los Vasa y el Báltico. Polonia en la política internacional de España en los años 1621–1632*. Warszawa: DIG, 2008.
- Skowron, Ryszard. “Hiszpania wobec polsko-szwedzkiego rozejmu 1635 roku. Misja opata Vazqueza i hrabiego de Solre”. In *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII Wieku*, edited by Mirosław Nagielski, 45–57. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2007.

- Skowron, Ryszard. *Dyplomaci polscy w Hiszpanii w XVI i XVII wieku*. Kraków: Universitas, 1997.
- Stradling, Robert A. *La armada de Flandes. Política naval española y guerra europea, 1568–1668*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1992.
- Szmydki, Ryszard. “Sigismund III and the Netherlands”. In *The House of Vasa and the House of Austria. Correspondence from the Years 1587–1668*, edited by Ryszard Skowron, 69–94. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016.