

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XV–XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History Sciences.

This special issue of *Eastern European History Review* addresses the complex and intense history of Christian-Ottoman relations in Central and Eastern Europe during the Early Modern Period. Tracing the salient moments and facts with battles, border issues, diplomacy and intelligence, the volume – with the participation of authors from different parts of Europe and Türkiye – constitutes an international opportunity to analyze topics that continually offer new study themes.

Central and South-Eastern Europe between the Christian world and the Ottoman world: conflicts, encounters and compromises (XVI–XVIII centuries), edited by the Turkish historian Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy, is the result of research and scientific collaboration between the CESPoM Study Center and Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group (ELKH-PPKE-PTE).

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Edited by Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy



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**CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
BETWEEN THE CHRISTIAN AND OTTOMAN WORLDS:
CONFLICTS, ENCOUNTERS AND COMPROMISES
(XVI–XVIII CENTURIES)**

Edited by
Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy

Co-edited by
Katalin Nagy

Special Participation of
Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group (ELKH-PPKE-PTE)



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EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: LA RIVISTA

Il Comitato redazionale e scientifico è lieto di presentare al pubblico la rivista scientifica *Eastern European History Review*.

Con un carattere internazionale e interdisciplinare, una cadenza annuale e una fruibilità *open access* la rivista focalizza i propri interessi sulle dinamiche occorse nell'Europa Orientale durante tutta l'età moderna (XIV-XIX). *Eastern European History Review* è espressione del Centro Studi dell'Università della Tuscia CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna) nato nel 1997 per intuizione del Prof. Gaetano Platania, Direttore Emerito della Rivista.

L'iniziativa editoriale che presentiamo nasce dall'evidente mancanza in Italia di una rivista scientifica relativa alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale in Età Moderna, nonostante la penisola abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale per la Storia e la Cultura di una parte integrante del continente, a torto considerata come lontana e periferica.

Consapevoli di questo, il Comitato ha posto quale obiettivo primario della *Eastern European History Review* quello di offrire uno spazio di riflessione e di discussione su temi che appartengono alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale, e insieme alle relazioni - politiche e culturali - che questa vasta area del Vecchio Continente ha avuto con l'occidente d'Europa, e l'Italia in particolare, incoraggiando il dialogo tra studiosi e esperti di settore, e tra differenti approcci della ricerca scientifica.

Il Comitato Redazionale e Scientifico

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: THE JOURNAL

The Editorial and Scientific Board are proud delighted to present the *Eastern European History Review* under the aegis of Sette Città Editore.

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV-XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997, from an idea of Prof. Gaetano Platania, today Director Emeritus of this journal.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History sciences.

The editorial initiative we present comes from the obvious lack of a journal, in Italy, concerning the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the Modern Age, this despite its fundamental role in the history and culture of that part of the continent, wrongly considered distant and peripheral.

Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Main objective of the journal is to create a space for reflection and discussion on topics pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, but also relations with Continental Europe, encouraging dialogue between scholars and experts in the field, and between different approaches of scientific research.

The Editorial and Scientific Board

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INTRODUCTION

The advance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe in the Modern Age posed a threat to many European states. The conquest of Constantinople (later İstanbul) during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II (the Conqueror) in the XV century, followed by the Otranto expedition and siege, the Ottoman advance in Central Europe during the reign of Sultan Suleyman I in the XVI century, particularly the Siege of Vienna, as well as the successes of Chief Admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha in the Mediterranean and many other similar events generated a sense of anxiety and fear in Europe for centuries. As a matter of fact, the phrase *Mamma li Turchi!*, used by Italians even today in response to negative events, dates back to this historical Turkish threat and the negative feeling it generated, which has its roots in the XV and XVI centuries.

It is rather challenging to cover such a broad subject as the relations between the Ottoman Empire and European states in the Modern Age, especially between the 16th and 18th centuries, in an introduction. However, in order to understand the dynamics between the Ottoman Empire and the Christian world, it would be useful to go back a little further and give a brief overview of how the parties viewed each other as an introduction to the subject. Starting from the Late Middle Ages until the middle of the Modern Age, the East and the West, in other words, the two worlds comprised mostly of Muslims and Christians, were in constant interaction with each other in a relationship that alternated between wars and trade. However, the fear became a dominant emotion in this intense and dynamic relationship from the XV century onwards. Although the world order changed due to geographical discoveries, the main region where the conflict of control and domination took place was the Mediterranean and Central-Eastern Europe. On the one hand, there was the Western Christian world, which had entered a new era with the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia, and on the other was the Ottoman Empire, which had conquered Byzantium and its culture. From another perspective, it can be deduced that the conflict between these two sides evolved from a clash of "civilizations" to a clash of "powers" and gained a stronger political character at least since the XVI century¹. At this point, it is necessary to underline the differences between Western historiography and Ottoman historiography. For a long time, contrary to what Western historiography suggests, the Ottoman Empire did not carry out its conquests with the aim of forcibly converting the peoples of the conquered regions to Islam, however mainly aimed to expand the borders of the Empire². The distinguished Turkish historian Professor Halil İnalcık provided in his works important information on Ottoman conquest policy. For example, how the Ottomans conquered the Christian Balkans and managed to establish themselves there for so long remain a historical question even today. According to the old theory, Ottoman rule was manifested by force and persecution and lasted

1 Franco Cardini, *Il Turco a Vienna. Storia del grande assedio del 1683* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2011), 4.

2 Marko Jacov, *L'Europa tra conquiste ottomane e leghe sante* (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana), 255.

as a regime of exploitation under the control of a military class of Sipahi³. However, according to the current historical analysis derived from research based on Ottoman archive documents, the Ottoman Empire was able to persuade the local Christian populations to peace and reconciliation thanks to the principles of *istimalet*⁴ and *aman* which meant looking out for the people, especially non-Muslim subjects, and treating them with clemency. The Ottoman Empire always offered the opponent three chances to surrender, and if the offer was accepted, a sworn “ahdname”⁵ guaranteed the opponent’s security of life and property. These guarantees were rigorously implemented, and many conquests were accomplished by this way. In fact, speaking about the Balkans again, it is known that Orthodox Greeks and Slavs often viewed the Ottoman regime as a protector of their Church. In addition, one of the main reasons for the long-lasting Ottoman rule in the conquered lands was the Ottoman tax-land system. Unlike the old feudal system, this system guaranteed the peasant’s land use through the *mîrî* land (State owned land that was transferred to those who use the right of disposition) regime⁶.

The Ottomans have been called “Turks” by the Western world for centuries. In the Modern Age, fear for the “Turk” has manifested as activities and efforts of “marginalization”, “vilification” and therefore “disparagement”. Turks have been the main representative of the “other” for Europeans for centuries, from the very beginning of Muslim-Christian contact⁷. However, the Ottoman Empire was not only a source of fear for the Western world, but also a source of great curiosity and fascination. In the West, most literary scientific works were written against the Ottomans, who were described as “*infidel*”. Thus, for centuries, the Ottomans were not only unlikeable and feared by Europeans, but also appealing and attractive. In addition to being “foreigners” for historical and geographical reasons, their traditions became the focus of interest for researchers and scholars as they were

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- 3 The most distinguished group of the household cavalry troops in the Ottoman military system. Erhan Afyoncu, “Sipahi”, *DİA*, 37 (2009): 256-58.
 - 4 The dictionary meaning of “*istimâlet*” is «to predispose, to appeal, to win the heart». In Ottoman chronicles it meant: «to look after the people, especially non-Muslim subjects, and be lenient towards them». Treating the people of conquered places well, protecting them, ensuring the security of life and property against external enemies, granting freedom in religious matters, facilitating taxation are the main elements of Ottoman *istimâlet*. See: Mücteba İlgürel, “İstimalet”, *DİA*, 27 (2001): 362.
 - 5 A document issued by the order of the rulers to grant special rights to certain states, groups and individuals. See: Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu “Ahidname”, *DİA*, 1 (1988): 536-40.
 - 6 Halil İnalcık, *Doğu Batı, Makaleler II* (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2008), 248, 96-110. On Ottoman provincial administration and the fief system, see also Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, trans. Ruşen Sezer (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 108-23. The work was first published in English. See Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, Classical Age (1300-1600)* (London: Nicholson Publishing, 1973).
 - 7 Mustafa Soykut, *Papalık ve Venedik Belgelerinde Avrupa’nın Birliği ve Osmanlı Devleti (1453-1683)* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 17, 24.

close or neighbors. In short, many works depicting the Ottomans and providing information about them appeared in the XVI and XVII centuries⁸. In many of these works, when Western historiography tried to explain the success of Ottoman progress, the concepts such as “religious fanaticism”, “oppression”, “persecution” were used, contrary to the information given above⁹.

Today it is still evident that such images persist in Western historiography. However a significant effort in consulting Ottoman and Turkish sources by historians would lead to a more objective perspective on the complex relationships between the Ottoman and Christian worlds.

The issue of Eastern European History Review titled *Central and South-Eastern Europe between the Christian and Ottoman Worlds: conflicts, encounters and compromises (XVI-XVIII centuries)*, contains 14 articles on the topic. This issue presents articles by researchers from different countries such as Italy, Hungary, Romania, Poland and Türkiye and was prepared in collaboration with *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group* (ELKH-PPKE-PTE).

I extend my sincere appreciation to the director of EEHR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alessandro Boccolini for offering me the special editorship of this issue of the journal.

Dr. PhD. Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy
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8 Giovanni Ricci, *Ossessione turca. In una retrovia cristiana dell'Europa moderna* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), 41; Soykut, *Papalık ve Venedik Belgelerinde*, 19-24.

9 İnalçık, *Doğu Batı, Makaleler II*, 248.

THE VILMOS FRANKÓI VATICAN HISTORICAL RESEARCH GROUP (ELKH-PPKE-PTE)

The *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group* of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Péter Pázmány Catholic University was established in the June of 2012 as the 'Impetus' Church History Research Group in the frame of the Church History Research Institute of the University founded by Rector Péter Erdő in 1999. It carries on independently the latter's publications (*Bibliotheca Historiae Ecclesiasticae Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány Nuncupatae*) and researches in Rome and in Vienna, with the involvement of academic and other funding sources. From 1st July 2017 onwards it performs its activity within the framework of the Supported Research Places Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences visualizing its goals and professional identity also in its name. The official name from 2022: ELKH-PPKE-PTE *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group*.

Its examinations concentrate decisively on political, diplomatic, cultural and institutional history. Its priority task is the systematic publication and processing of sources that has been heavily neglected since the age of positivism. The Vatican collections serve as the primary place of research, completed by the relating material – primarily in thematic context – of the Hungarian and Vienna archives and manuscript collections. Its publications provide space to the results of revealing of sources and historiographic works according to their scholarly profile (*Collectanea Textuum et Studiorum*), and separately to the Hungarian researches in the Vatican due to its particular importance (*Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae*). The long-term aim of the research institute is to serve as the professional framework of the establishment and efficient operation of an independent Hungarian institute of history in Rome of purely scientific nature. Owing to its academic background it pays special attention to the education of the future historian generation, to the engagement of students in certain phases of its work.

The main international cooperative partners are: Università della Tuscia (CESPoM-Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna), Universität Wien (Institut für Historische Theologie), Deutsches Historisches Institut in Rom, Università Pontificia Gregoriana (Facoltà di Storia e Beni Culturali della Chiesa), Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. The relevant common publications are published by Edizioni Setta Città and Duncker & Humblot

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THE COLLAPSE OF THE BORDER FORTRESS SYSTEM AGAINST THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN 1521 AND 1527

ABSTRACT

1521 became a turning point in the history of the border fortress system against the Ottoman Empire, as in the history of Hungary, although this is obscured by the battle of Mohács, but all the catastrophe that took place between 1521 and 1541 could be traced back to the loss of Nándorfehérvár (Beograd) and Szabács (Šabac). In my study I want to present the period of the collapse of the Hungarian border fortress system between 1521 and 1527, from the siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1521 to the fall of Jajca (Jajce) in 1527.

KEYWORDS: Ottoman Empire; Medieval Hungary; Ottoman-Hungarian War; Fortress system; Fall of Nándorfehérvár.

ANTECEDENTS, PREPARATION AND BEGINNING OF THE OTTOMAN CAMPAIGN OF 1521

King Louis II and Sultan Selim made peace with each other in 1519, but this lapsed with the sultan's death on September 22, 1520. He was succeeded by Sultan Suleiman, who sent Behram courier to Buda to announce his accession to the throne and announce his peace offer. The question arises as to whether Suleiman wanted to make peace at all. According to the theory of Géza Perjés, the sultan did not want to occupy Hungary, for it fell outside the military sphere of his empire and rather he wanted to force a fiduciary dependence on Louis II. According to Perjés, after the Habsburg-Jagiellonian Treaty of Marriage and Inheritance of 1515, the influence of the Habsburgs in Hungary increased, while the election of Emperor Charles V upset the balance of power in Europe. And Suleiman was interested in reducing Hungary's relations with the Habsburgs¹.

Whatever was in the background, it was a fact that Louis II captured the sultan's envoy, and this was not the usual diplomatic move, even if the Turks took the opportunity at times. Although the political situation was temporarily favorable for the Hungarian leadership, whereas Janbirdi al-Ghazali's uprising in Syria forced Suleiman to begin his rule by resolving internal problems. Thus, it was time to detect whether the princes of Europe would support a war against Turkey, so Louis II could send his envoys to the princes of the continent².

1 Perjés Géza, *Mohács* (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1979), 142; Attila Bárány, *A szulejmáni ajánlat Magyarország, a Török Birodalom és a Nyugat (1521-24)* (Máriabesnyő: Attraktor, 2014), 17.

2 MNL, OL, DL, 38069; Kosáry Domokos, *Magyar külpolitika Mohács előtt* (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1978), 50-1, 54-5.

On January 18, 1521, the Venetian doge of Leonardo Loredan informed the Hungarian envoy that he accepted Suleiman's offer of peace and recommended it to Louis II, too. Like Venice, no one has proposed a war against the Turks.

The opposition between King Francis I of France and Emperor Charles V played a role in this, but there were also serious tensions on the continent (e.g. the Polish-Tatar conflict, the Reformation). That is why it was important what happened at the imperial assembly in Worms, which opened on January 27, 1521, at which Hungary was represented by István Werbőczy, as *personalis regiae*, and Jerome Balbi, a provost in Bratislava, while the Croatian barons were represented by Kristóf Frangepán. The latter, threatened by ongoing Turkish burglaries, led by Bernát Frangepán and János Korbáviai, threatened to become Turkish taxpayers in the absence of support. Bernát Frangepán also presented their ultimatum at the 1521 Parliament in Buda. Like the Croats, the Hungarian envoys were heard in Worms, but the Reformation and the Franco-German conflict were more important than the case of the Hungarians³.

In the end, Louis II and his court had to face reality because the imprisonment of Behram courier became a *casus belli*. The 16th century descriptions of the fate of the Turkish envoy(s) are contradictory. Miklós Istvánffy knew that they had been strangled into the Lake Tata. Ferenc Zay wrote that the envoy had his ears and nose cut off and then sent to Szendrő (Smederevo). This was written about by Rabbi Elijah Capsali from Candia, too⁴.

While the diplomatic steps of Louis II were in progress, in the month of February 1521, the Ottoman army crushed the Janbirdi al-Ghazali's uprising. With this, all obstacles to Suleiman's campaign were removed, and the establishment of an army, the backbone of which was formed by the rumelian troops, could begin. Suleiman ordered 10,000 azabs from Anatolia to Europe and set out for the campaign with 12,000 janissaries stationed in Constantinople. According to Louis II's letter of 30

3 MNL, OL, DL, 105256; Bárány, *A szulejmáni ajánlat*, 15-16, 23, Id., "Adalékok az 1521-es magyar-török viszonyhoz a nyugati követjelentések tükrében", in *Középkortörténeti tanulmányok 8. - A VIII. Medievisztikai PhD-konferencia (Szeged, 2013. június 17-19) előadásai*, eds. Ágnes Maléth and Márta Tóber (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 2015), 26; Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Szulejmán*, (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1974), 42; Lajos Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár bukása (1521)", *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 2 (1889): 406-07; Kosáry, *Magyar külpolitika*, 56-7, 61-3, 68-9, 72-4; Péter Kulcsár, *A Jagelló-kor* (Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1981), 166-67; "A magyar követek az 1521.-i wormsi birodalmi gyűlésen. Kivonat Martin Aurél rendes tagnak 1925 március hó 13-án tartott székfoglaló értekezéséből", *A Szent István Akadémia Értesítője*, 10/ 1-2, (1925): 126-28; Perjés, *Mohács*, 150; *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Karl V*, vol. II, ed. Adolf Wrede (Gotha: Die Historische Kommission bei der Königlich Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1896), 758, 811.

4 Péter Benits, *Istvánffy Miklós magyarok dolgairól írt históriája. Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában*, I/1 (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2001), 170-71; Kohn Sámuel, "Héber kútforrások és adatok Magyarország történetéhez (Kapszáli Élijáhu kándiai rabbi krónikájának Magyarországra vonatkozó adatai, 1523)", *Történelmi Tár*, (1880): 118-19; Zay Ferenc, *Az Lándorfehérvár elveszésének oka e vót és így esött* (Budapest: Magyar Helikon, 1980), 8; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 401-03.

June to King Henry VIII of England, 200,000 Turks started against Nándorfehérvár. Elijah Capsali wrote about more than 400,000 people, and Zay knew about 300,000 Turks⁵.

The older literature (Mihály Holéczy: 250,000, Lajos Kiss: 250,000-300,000) wrote about a significant Ottoman army, but according to Ferenc Szakály the number may have been 160,000, of which only 70-80,000 were soldiers. Interestingly, Francesco Massaro, the secretary of the Venetian embassy, wrote in his 1523 report of 100,000 people, of whom “only” 30,000 were soldiers, while Jerome Balbi, the envoy of the Hungarian king, informed Emperor Charles V that 34,000-35,000 Turkish soldiers had attacked Hungary, which was joined by non-combat auxiliaries⁶.

Military equipment (e.g. gunpowder, lead, stone bullets) was transported to Sofia by Pasha Ferhád with 3,000 camels, while the artillery had 300 cannons and 40 large galleys from the Black Sea – 17 of them Venetian – paddled on the Danube to Nándorfehérvár in order to the rivers be brought under their control. Under the leadership of Mehmed bey, the armed forces of Transylvania, Muntenia and Moldavia were tied down, 80,000 (!) Turks and 50,000 (!) Tartars attacked the Poles, and the Bosnian pasha depredated the Sava-Drina region⁷.

Suleiman left Constantinople on 19 February and went on the campaign with his army on 18 May. On June 18-19, 1521, there was a council of war in Sofia, at which the opposition between the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed and Ahmed the beylerbey of Rumelia became apparent. The Grand Vizier suggested occupying the castle of Nándorfehérvár, while Pasha Ahmed preferred to occupying Szabács (Šabac) and then advancing to Buda. Sultan Suleiman accepted Ahmed’s concept, but allowed Piri Mehmed to siege Nándorfehérvár (Beograd). The Turks set out from Sofia for Szabács on 21 June, then two days later 1000 janissaries were sent to Szendrő, that they encircle Nándorfehérvár together with Husrev bey of Szendrő. And Pasha Ahmed was ordered by the sultan to siege Szabács. Suleiman and Piri Mehmed went on together for a while, then the Grand Vizier headed for Nándorfehérvár on July 3rd⁸.

5 Bárány, “Adalékok”, 26-7; Káldy-Nagy, *Szulejmán*, 42-3, Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404; Kohn, “Héber kútforrások”, 120, Kosáry, *Magyar külpolitika*, 56-77, 68-9, 72-4; Ferenc Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521: a vég kezdete”, in *Az Lándorfehérvár elvesztésének oka e vót és így esött*, ed. Ferenc Zay (Budapest: Bibliotheca Historica, 1980), 107; József Thúry, *Török történetírók*, vol. II, (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1896) 42-4; Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 50.

6 Bárány Attila, “Követjelentés Magyarország állapotáról 1521-ből”, in *Arcana tabularii Tanulmányok Solymosi László tiszteletére*, vol. II, eds. Attila Bárány, Gábor Dreska and Kornél Szovák (Budapest-Debrecen: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 2014), 490; Mihály Holéczy, “Belgrád hadi történetei”, *Tudományos Gyűjtemény*, XVII/12 (1833): 24; István Balogh, *Velencei diplomaták Magyarországról (1500-1526) (Forrástanulmány)* (Szeged: Egyetemi Kiadó, 1929), 47; Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 134; *Magyar történelmi okmánytár londoni könyv-és levéltárakból 1521-1717*, ed. Ernő Simonyi (Pest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottmánya, 1859), 63.

7 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 134.

8 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404, 546-48; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 104-07, 115;

THE SIEGE OF SZABÁCS (ŠABAC) AND THE SYRMIAN (SREM) RAIDINGS

The defense of Szabács was ruled in 1521 by vicebans Simon Logody and András Thorma, because the bans István Sulyok and Balázs left the border fortress and its 500 defenders⁹. To protect the ill-equipped fort, Simon Logody sent a courier to Buda to ask for help, but the food and gunpowder and the 200 infantry did not get there on time¹⁰.

The siege took place from 4 to 7 July, and as a result of Pasha Ahmed's attack on 5 July, the number of defenders was reduced to 100¹¹. The guard was trapped in the inner castle, sealing the fate of Szabács. On July 7, 1521, the Turks ordered a general assault. According to Zay, there was a killing fight between the Hungarians and the Turks in the castle market, who lost 700 soldiers, according to Ludovicus Tubero, but 1,500, according to other sources. Although the Hungarians fought heroically, the border fortress fell. Suleiman arrived in Szabács on July 8, his path was lined with the heads of the defenders pinned to sticks¹².

The news of the fall of Szabács reached Buda on July 10, which caused great alarm because they were so informed that Suleiman would start his troops against our capital. To this end, the sultan ordered the construction of a planned bridge to the Sava at Szabács. And Pasha Ahmed was sent with the spahis of the Rumelian army and a thousand janissaries for the syrmian (Srem) raidings¹³.

It was these days that the widow of the Serbian despot János Beriszló, Ilona Jaksics mistress of Kölpény (Kulpin), "surrendered" to the Turks. That is, she pretended to surrender so that she could escape with twenty chariots of wealth, money, and her children. In response, Pasha Behram of Nicapol (Nikopol) and Pasha Mahmud of

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József Thúry, *Török történetírók*, vol. I (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1893), 282-85; Id., *Török*, vol. II, 46, 124; Marosi Endre, "Török várostromok Magyarországon II. Szulejmán korában", *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 22/3 (1975): 430.

9 Zay knows of 500 defenders, while Istvánffy knows of 100 horsemen and a few infantry, and Tubero and Giovanni Michele Bruto know of only 60 soldiers. Zay, *Az Lándorfejérvár*, 45; Istvánffy, *Magyarok*, 172; Ludovicus Tubero, *Kortörténeti feljegyzések (Magyarország)* (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1994), 306; *Brutus János Mihály Magyar Históriaja, 1490-1552*, vol. II: *Lajos király trónra léptétől 1537-ig*, ed. Ferenc Toldy (Pest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, Pest, 1867), 91.

10 Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 438-40; Marosi, "Török várostromok", 430; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 115-16.

11 In this regard, the *Memoria rerum* writers of only 35 peasants, and the Sultan's war diary knows of more than 100 people. 1504-1566 *Memoria Rerum A Magyarországon legutóbbi László király fiának legutóbbi Lajos királynak születése óta esett dolgok emlékezete (Verancsics-évkönyv)*, ed. József Bessenyei (Békéscsaba: Magyar Helikon, 1981), 21; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 286.

12 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 116; Zay, *Az Lándorfejérvár*, 460; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 286; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 549.

13 Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 286-87.

Silistra intruded Syrmia with newer troops¹⁴.

The construction of the bridge at Szabács was hindered by the attack of timber transported from Zvornik on the Drina by Sirmium citizens and soldiers. Meanwhile, many have fled the Southern region¹⁵.

For Suleiman, the commissioning of the wooden bridge in Szabács, which was completed on July 18, was the most important, but the bridge was destroyed by a sudden flood on the 19th.

SIEGE OF NÁNDORFEHÉRVÁR (BEOGRAD)

On June 25, Husrev bey of Szendrő began to destroy the Nándorfehérvár area with 15,000 soldiers. Then, at the end of June and the beginning of July, the Turkish outposts, the troops of the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman fleet also appeared, and then they surrounded the castle, the gates of which were closed around 9 July. To the south of the castle stood the Turkish army with artillery, which, at about of July 9, began breaking the walls of Nándorfehérvár from the east and west. On the same day, Suleiman ordered the suspension of the siege, probably on the advice of Pasha Ahmed. The Grand Vizier refused to obey the Sultan's order and continued to fight day and night against the defenders of Nándorfehérvár, who did everything they could to protect the castle¹⁶.

Piri Mehmed instructed Husrev bey to capture Zimony. It should be noted here that even in the 1490s Suleiman had the help of the spies of the sanjak bey of Szendrő to make a detailed map of the castle and area of Nándorfehérvár in order to assess how it would be worthwhile to occupy the border castle using previous experience. The siege of Zimony indicated that the Turks had taken into account the recommendations of the "map"¹⁷.

There were 400 defenders in the castle of Zimony, who left the castle of Nándorfehérvár for an unknown purpose. In contrast, according to Pecsevi, Louis II sent 300 riflemen to Nándorfehérvár, but when they met Husrev bey, they pulled into Zimony. According to Pecsevi, many did not want to stay in Zimony and wanted to return to Buda. The leader of the people of Zimony was Mihály pinnace

14 Kölpény was occupied by the Turks on July 21, and its stones, along with several other strengths, were used to rebuild Szabács. László Gere, "Várak a Szerémségben", in *A középkori Dél-Alföld és Szer*, ed. Tibor Kollár (Szeged: Csongrád Megyei Levéltár, 2000), 366; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 128-29; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 288.

15 Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 46-8; *Memoria rerum*, 21.

16 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 11-18, 120; Thúry, *Török*, vol. II, 125-26; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár": 555.

17 Marko Popović, "Belgrád 15. századi erődítményei", in *A déli harangszó Magyarországon és a nagyvilágban*, ed. Zsolt Visy (Budapest: Zrínyi Média, 2011), 10; Marko Popović, "Siege of Belgrade in 1521 and restoration of fortifications after conquest", in *Belgrade 1521-1867*, ed. Dragana Amedoski (Belgrade: Institute of History Belgrade-Yunus Emre Enstitüsü/Turkish Cultural Centre, 2018), 6; Péter E. Kovács, "Az ostrom-török tanulságokkal", *História*, 29/1 (2007): 16.

voivode or Markó Szkoblics¹⁸.

500 janissaries served in the Turkish troops preparing for the siege, and Husrev bey carried some wall-breaking cannons and immediately started attacking the castle¹⁹. The people of Zimony closed the gates and, according to Tubero, the Turks confirmed under oath that if the inhabitants of the town gave up the settlement, they would be free to live in their place of residence, but they would also be free to leave it. Eventually, the defenders surrendered, but in this connection it is important to know that when Husrev bey to discuss this, the ban of the castle fell out of a damaged watchtower among the Turks. Pecsevi described this as one of the castle captains negotiating from a tower with the Turkish bey, which collapsed and then his men surrendered. It should be noted here that the heroism of the defenders of Zimony (Zemun) is highlighted in the description of Ferenc Zay. It is interesting that in both Szabács and Zimony the contemporary Hungarian narratives record that there was a fierce struggle between the Hungarians and the Turks in the castle market. Ferenc Szakály believes that this story at Zay is unlikely. Either way, Zimony fell into the hands of the Turks on July 11, and the defenders were butchered by the Ottomans²⁰.

Despite the capture of Zimony, Suleiman again ordered the end of the siege of Nándorfehérvár. However, the situation changed, in which it played a major role that on July 15 Second Vizier Pasha Mustafa and Piri Mehmed met next to Nándorfehérvár and the Grand Vizier, through his Second Vizier, had the opportunity to convince his lord to continue the siege. It was enough time for the sultan to make that decision, because there was no serious countermeasure from the Hungarian side. This was a problem because this way the Turks were free to destroy Syrmia. Just as Pasha Mustafa successfully upset the region, so did Jahja pasa oglu Bali, a Bosnian Bey. The latter attacked the port at Titel on July 24, and at the end of the month, after occupying a castle, he had 70 or 80 Hungarians beheaded. After that, he occupied Szalánkemen (Stari Slankamen) so that they could monitor the Hungarian military movements and prevent crossing attempts²¹.

Eventually, Piri Mehmed was forced to abandon the siege, but at that point, Suleiman's plan took a turn. The sultan ordered the siege to continue and headed for Nándorfehérvár himself. This ad hoc Ottoman campaign in 1521, in fact, could only

18 According to the *Memoria rerum*, Mihály voivode was in Zimony with 500 sailors. According to the research of Ferenc Szakály, Markó Szkoblics first name it was not Markó but György and he served as a royal aulic (equestrian officer) at the ends. *Memoria rerum*, 21; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 121-23; Ármin Vámbéry, "A belgrádi és magyarországi győzelmekről. Pecsevi török történetiről fordítva", *Új Magyar Múzeum*, 10/2 (1860): 419.

19 Vámbéry, "A belgrádi", 419; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 122; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 556.

20 According to Pecsevi, in accordance with the Padişah's order, the 300 defenders who capitulated were butchered on the Great War Island opposite Nándorfehérvár. Vámbéry, "A belgrádi", 419; Tubero, *Kortörténeti*, 310-11; Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 51; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 287-88; Id., *Török*, vol. II, 133.

21 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 126-28; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 290; Vámbéry, "A belgrádi", 419.

be successful because there was no one in Hungary to lead the defense. Meanwhile, Buda received a lot of information about the situation at the southern ends. The king sent a multitude of letters of request for help to the princes of Europe, but the foreign policy situation was still not favorable for Hungary. Venice lent 24,000 gold forints, while the Poles clashed with the Tartars in the spring and the Russians during the summer, but sent 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry to Hungary for fear of a Tatar-Turkish alliance. Meanwhile, King Francis I bribed 20,000 Czech infantry and 2,000 cavalry to in his service against the emperor. Knowing this, Louis II ordered these soldiers to return to his service under beheading burden²².

The death of Archbishop Tamás Bakócz of Esztergom on June 11 was a huge loss for Hungary. In his will, the cardinal left 40,000 forints to the king. Louis II quickly obtained this, and even put his hand on the movables in the Bakócz estate. The troubles were compounded by the fact that the king had a conflict with the mining towns due to the monetary reform, but even the commander-in-chief of the army could not be easily selected, and in the end the election fell on István Báthori²³.

The mobilization of the force was towed and cumbersome. Although András Báthori became the new captain of the pinnaces, this did not improve the situation, despite the fact that Báthori tried to recruit people, but in the meantime instead of his brother holding his wedding in Nyírbátor he also recruited the inter-Temesian banderiums. Thus, after the return to the pinnaces entrusted to György Szerémi at Bata, he only ventured with his fleet to the mouth of the Drava²⁴.

When the Hungarian troops started to gather in July – August, Szabács and Zimony were already in Ottoman hands and Sirmia was completely destroyed, while Nándorfehérvár had been under siege for weeks. While it was tried to gather the Hungarian army at Tolna and Zenta, János Szapolyai from Transylvania was ordered to hurry to the palatine camp. At the beginning of August, Polish, Czech and German troops arrived in Buda, then on August 8, with a force of about 4,000, Louis II left his headquarters again and headed for Tétény! The king wanted to save Nándorfehérvár, but this was not realistic.

While the Hungarian leadership struggled with the mobilization, Piri Mehmed began the siege of Nándorfehérvár again and began shooting down the castle again on July 23-24. The Grand Vizier also dug mines to bring down the walls, but the defenders led by Balázs Oláh neutralized them with anti-mines. The defenders attacked the Ottoman artillery several times, and even preyed a large siege cannon along with the Turkish flags²⁵.

Suleiman left for Nándorfehérvár on July 25, and arrived in a few days, and on August 1, the “real” siege began. Based on the description of Mustafa Dzelálzáde (Mustafa bin Dzelal), we know that the troops of the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed stood on the west side (right wing) south of the castle, with the janissary formations under the command of the janissary-aga. While leaning on the Danube on the eastern

22 Bárány, “Követjelentés”, 490-91; Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 559-60.

23 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 562-63, 566; Balogh, *Velencei diplomaták*, XLVIII.

24 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 564-65; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 133.

25 Tamás Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig 1396-1526* (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2005), 186; Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 576-77, Kohn, “Héber kútforrások”, 120.

side (left wing), Mustafa's second vizier units were stationed with the Sekbanbaşı controlled janissaries. It should be noted that the writer of the Turkish war diary, viewed from the Sultan's camp at Zimony, defined the right and left wings of the army. In 1521, the Turks left no room for Hungarian attempts at liberation. With the Rumelian army, Suleiman occupied his position on the side of Syrmia²⁶.

On August 2, Suleiman ordered the attack on Nándorfehérvár. Fierce fighting broke out between the defenders and the Turks, and according to enemy records, 500-600 of their soldiers were killed in the battle. After the unsuccessful attack, Suleiman ordered digging approach trenches. Then, on August 3, another attack followed, deploying larger forces than before. The new attack was repulsed by the defenders in a tough fight.

Meanwhile, palatine István Báthori camped in Futak (Futog) with 17,000–18,000 soldiers and loaded a couple of ships with supplies for the people of Nándorfehérvár. In the end, these ships did not reach Nándorfehérvár, the walls of which were constantly destroyed by the Ottoman artillery, and according to the August 4th record of the Sultan's war diary, they also blew up the cannon tower on the banks of the Danube²⁷.

The shooting of the walls may have been good, because on August 8 Suleiman's soldiers launched a much larger attack on Nándorfehérvár next to the Sava, the troops of the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed, along the Danube, the Second Vizier corps of Mustafa, and in the center of the army, the Rumelian army of the beylerbey of Ahmed launched an attack. The lower town and the water town became the property of the Turks, and the defenders were pushed back into the citadel and the upper town. In addition to 800 janissaries, azabs and spahis also fell in the hard fight. And although Balázs Oláh viceban and his soldiers did everything they could, their fate was sealed²⁸.

After the attack, according to Zay and Tubero Suleiman wanted to surrender the siege, but that was not his intention, but this was not his intention, as evidenced by the fact that on August 9 he ordered the miners of the Turkish army to dig mines and blow up the towers of the citadel, and also to bring the cannons closer to the walls. From then on, the castle was shot from several sides until August 16th. Although the Turks feared that Louis II would arrive in Nándorfehérvár with a rescue army, the Sultan ordered another assault on 16 August at the suggestion of Pasha Ahmed. Pasha Ahmed's troops from the north from the rivers and Pasha Mehmed and Pasha Mustafa from the south attacked the border castle on August 16, but much of the struggle awaited the troops led by Pasha Ahmed, as they tried to penetrate the fortress on one of the most inaccessible sides of the castle, which they succeeded, and their ponytail flags were set on the walls, but were eventually beaten back. After another unsuccessful attack, the sultan rested his troops. Nevertheless, a battle unfolded until midnight on the 17th after one of the towers collapsed. On

26 Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 293; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 131, 134, 136; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 573.

27 Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 292.

28 Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig*, 186-87; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 582-84, 589; Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 56; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 293.

this day, the palatine's army advanced all the way to Szávaszentdemeter (Mitrovica), but after the insignificant battle with the Bali bey, it retreated to Pétervárad (Petrovaradin) While Lajos II arrived in Tolna with his troops only on August 22²⁹! In these days of the siege, the main task of the Turks was for the miners and artillery to demolish the castle walls. On August 19, a watchtower caught fire, and on the 21st (according to the Sultan's War Diary on 20) the top of a tower collapsed. On August 24, it was reported in the Sultan's war diary that someone had escaped from the castle to the Turkish camp and brought news to them. This is also interesting because the defenders began a bargain on the capitulation on August 25 due to the catastrophic situation of the guard to gain time. The Turks did not go into ceasefire and launched another assault on Nándorfehérvár on 26 August, but the defenders defended the castle again³⁰.

On August 27, after lengthy work, the Turks blew up the residential tower of the citadel, the Nebojša Tower. In the blast, the outer wall of the residential tower collapsed, burying many under it, but the defenders were helped to create a huge barrier from the ruins. Many Turks³¹ and Hungarians also died in the fight, so a total of 72 Hungarian heroes survived.

August 28, 1521 was a fateful day for everyone. In addition to the leaders of the "diván", Suleiman also sought the advice of the beys and infantry commanders about the siege. Meanwhile, it was recorded in the Sultan's war diary that a courier sent by the defenders to Louis II, betrayed by a defender, had been captured. Eventually, the courier was pulled into a stake in front of the eyes of the people of the castle. This betrayal was a particularly sad case because of the heroism of the defenders. According to the sultan's war diary, someone escaped first on August 24 and then on the 28th. According to Zay, one of the alleged traitors, Mihály Móré, had fallen days earlier. According to Lajos Kiss, on the other hand, instead of Móré, who fell in the siege, it was János Morgay, who was appointed viceban, who betrayed the castle. According to József Thúry, they both probably betrayed the defenders. He bases his position on the war diary. It is certain that after the siege, several sources mention Mihály Móré as a traitor, who accordingly did not lose his life during the fighting³².

Either way, there is no excuse or reason for betrayal. To be sure, the courier would not have been able to help even if he had not been betrayed, as the border fortress was only hours away from falling into Turkish hands. Balázs Oláh also knew this, who with his military staff decided to give up Nándorfehérvár and surrender to Sultan Suleiman. Under the agreement, the defenders surrendered on August 29,

29 Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig*, 188; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 128, 139-40; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 569-70, 588-89.

30 Thúry, *Török*, vol. II, 141; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 140; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 295; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 590.

31 According to Venetian envoy Orio, 8,000 Turks died. Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 595; Gusztáv Wenzel, "Marino Sanuto világkrónikájának Magyarországot illető tudósításai III", *Magyar Történelmi Tár*, 25 (1878): 239.

32 Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 591-92; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 143; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 296-97;

1521, after 66 days of siege in exchange for free retreat. Suleiman relocated the Serb population to Constantinople. The Turks tried to be recruited the Hungarians with promises or threats, but no one was willing to do so. In the end, the Hungarians were free to leave. Although several Christian writers accused Suleiman of slaughtering the Hungarians, it is certain that several castle defenders (e.g. Miklós Káldy, Péter Ovcsárevics, Ferenc Perneszy) appear in later sources, so it is unlikely that the Turks broke their promise. Of course, it is no longer possible to know for sure in the absence of resources. On September 15, the Sultan appointed Bali bey as the sanjak bey of Szendrő and Nándorfehérvár. He placed a garrison of 3,000 men in the newly conquered castle, leaving 200 cannons left to defend it. He also ordered that the walls of Nándorfehérvár be repaired.

The news of the loss of Nándorfehérvár caused alarm in Hungary. Bálint Török and his brother Miklós, Ferenc Héderváry and István Sulyok were blamed for the loss of Nándorfehérvár, Zimony and Szalánkemén, and Balázs Sulyok for Szabács. Later, there were those who were forgiven, there were those who did not, but Nándorfehérvár was permanently lost.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE FIRST LINE OF THE SOUTHERN BORDER FORTRESS SYSTEM

As Nándorfehérvár, Zimony and Szabács coming under the rule of Sultan Suleiman in 1521, a huge gap was created in the southern border fortress system. Huge and irreparable. The worries were exacerbated by the occupation of Szávaszentdemeter, Kölpény, Berekszó (Beregsău Mare), Barics (Barič), Kamanc (Sremska Kamenica), Rednek (Vrdnik) in Syrmia, and destruction of Szalánkemén. It is true that the Turks withdrew from these smaller castles, but since then these important small castles have remained less suitable for the protection of the borderland³³.

As can be seen from the above, the loss of Nándorfehérvár radically changed the military and political situation in the country. The gaps created by the Turkish hands of the border fortress at the mouth of the Sava in the southern borderland should have been filled by the castles of Titel, Futak (Futag), Újlak (Ilok) and Pétervárad, but this was a completely impossible undertaking, as only the two wings of the border line remained in Hungarian hands. On the one hand, the area from Keve (Kovin) to Szörényvár (Drobeta-Turnu Severin), which has become inaccessible on the Danube from the interior of the country, since the centers of the pinnacles were Nándorfehérvár and Szabács in the hands of the enemy, while Szalánkemén was destroyed. On the other hand, the Croatian-Bosnian borderland between Jajca (Jajce) and Klissza (Klis) was still under Hungarian rule. This completely upset the operation of the border fortress system in the future³⁴.

In this situation, the Hungarian government wanted to consolidate the royal power, citing the Turkish threat, under the influence of Chancellor László Szalkai and probably Queen Mary. Furthermore, they wanted to ask soldiers from the German-Roman Empire, and they wanted an offensive campaign in alliance with the Poles and the Austrians, apparently with the aim of bringing Nándorfehérvár back under

33 András Kubinyi, "A Szávaszentdemeter. Nagyolaszi győzelem 1523-ban", in *Nándorfehérvártól Mohácsig A Mátyás-és Jagelló-kor hadtörténete*, ed. András Kubinyi (Budapest: Argumentum Kiadó, 2007), 128.

34 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 129.

Hungarian rule. In the end, the former gate of the country was not recaptured, nor was the power of the Transylvanian voivode János Szapolyai broken, and thus the royal power could not be significantly increased either³⁵.

In the situation of the country, it was a great fortune that Sultan Suleiman embarked on a conquest campaign against Rhodes in 1522, and after an exhausting 179-day siege, he occupied the island ruled by the Johannita order until then.

From Hungary's point of view, the consequences of the events of 1521 still determined the country's foreign and domestic policy. It has become quite clear that Hungary is unable to maintain the weakened border fortress system in the future. From then on, the aim of the Hungarian court was to try to reclaim Nándorfehérvár in order to restore the border region as we mentioned above. The steps of Hungarian diplomacy were also subordinated to this goal. Of course, this was hardly a reality in the given domestic and foreign policy situation. It follows that it is no coincidence that in 1522 Archduke Ferdinand was already actively involved in maintaining the protection of the Croatian border region. The reason for this is to be found in the fall of Nándorfehérvár, because Styria, Carinthia and Carniola have also become endangered areas. This encouraged Ferdinand to pay the mercenaries of 6,000 soldiers as early as 1522. Moreover, at the Parliament of 1522, the Hungarian orders asked the Archduke to pay for the care of the Croatian frontier castles! Thanks to this, a captain from Laibach supervised Klissa, Krupa, Zengg (Senj), Lika, Skardonna (Skradin), Knin and Ostrovica, but these border castles received also German garrison. In other words, a foreign power has taken over the protection of Hungary's territory in order to guarantee its own security! On the other hand, the support of the Austrian provinces certainly came in handy against the Ottoman Empire, which was threatening our country, because by this time it had become clear that Hungary had become unable to defend itself against its increasingly powerful southern neighbor. It follows from the above that from then on, Archduke Ferdinand was completely involved in Hungarian internal affairs in order to protect his provinces from Turkish invasions. And parts of our country began to become a kind of collision zone between the Ottoman Empire and the hereditary provinces of the Habsburgs³⁶.

At the imperial assembly in Nuremberg in the spring of 1522, the military situation between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire was revealed to the German orders again. Envoys of Archduke Ferdinand informed the orders that an Ottoman flotilla of 500 ships was stationed at Nándorfehérvár, but at Zengg also had Turkish ships. For this reason, they were asked to provide 5,000 troops to Croatia and 12,000 troops to Hungary³⁷. It was indicated that another 12,000 soldiers from Bohemia

35 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 132-33.

36 Péter E. Kovács, "Ferdinánd főherceg és Magyarország (1521-1526)", *Történelmi Szemle*, 45/1-2 (2003): 25-7; Jenő Csuday and Gyula Schönherr, *Nagy Képes Világtörténet*, vol. VI: *A középkori intézmények bomlása és a renaissance* (Büapest: Franklin Társulat-Révai Testvérek, 1904) 649-50; János B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata* (Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 2006), 53.

37 It should be noted here that due to the deterioration of the value of domestic money, German mercenaries were reluctant to come to Hungary at that time. Szakály Ferenc, *A mohácsi csata* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1975), 19.

would arrive at the Hungarian ends, which force could attack the Turks. It was suggested that after Charles V made peace with the Christian princes, he could also attack the Ottoman Empire from Naples. Imperial orders responded to Ferenc Jozefics Bishop of Zengg, envoy of King Louis II of Hungary - who also presented the sad situation of our country - that they were willing to help, but they also asked the Hungarian king, Hungarian, Czech, Moravian, Silesian, Lausitzian orders and Polish king to send envoys to the planned meeting in Vienna. The official Hungarian delegation did not attend the Congress of Vienna on May 20, 1522, although the representatives of the country were present, but the envoys of Hungary entitled to negotiate remained absent until July 5. The result was that, in addition to the hand of Emperor Charles V being bound by the war with the French, the imperial orders at that time supported a preventive anti-Turkish campaign to be launched by up to 3,000 German soldiers and 3,000 Czech mercenaries. The Congress of Vienna in 1522 was expected to make peace for the Christian rulers and send an army to recapture Nándorfehérvár³⁸ in 1523; Lajos II and the Buda court, on the other hand, wanted money³⁹ or soldiers, but he could not and did not want to pay for the latter. Thus, from the Hungarian point of view, the Vienna deliberations ended in failure, as did the new imperial assembly in Nuremberg, which opened in the autumn of 1522. Namely, on February 9, 1523, Hungary could not fulfill the conditions offered by the imperial orders in exchange for 4,000 soldiers, 20 cannon masters and 100 quintals of gunpowder. Consequently, the deliberations held in Vienna between 15 and 22 October 1523 with the participation of King Louis II, Queen Mary, Archduke Ferdinand, Archduchess Anna, the Polish Chancellor Szydłowiecki, the Czech barons and the papal envoy did not succeed. While these international events were taking place, and the Hungarian public situation so did, under the leadership of Husrev Bosnian and Bali of Szendrő – Nándorfehérvár beys, continued to occupy the remaining castles of the Hungarian border protection system. Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa made an attempt to reorganize the Hungarian defense system from 1523, after his appointment as chief captain of the lower parts, but the result could not have been significant in the given situation⁴⁰.

Despite the constant pressure from the Turks, the Hungarian army also had good results in these years. The fact that after 1521 the Turks devalued the Hungarian

38 On December 10, 1522, Pope Adorjan VI (1522-1523) issued several brevés in which he called on the Doge of Venice and encouraged other princes to support King Louis II of Hungary in his quest to reclaim Nándorfehérvár in 1523. "Magyarország mint a nyugati keresztény művelődés védőbástyája" A Vatikáni Levéltárnak azok az okiratai, melyek őseinknek a Keletről Európát fenyegető veszedelmek ellen kifejtett erőfeszítéseire vonatkoznak (cca 1214-1606), collected by Dr. Edgár Artner, eds. Kornél Szovák, József Török, and Péter Tusor (Budapest-Róma: Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem Egyháztörténeti Kutatócsoport, 2004).

39 In 1525, Louis II wanted the pope to give endangered frontier castles from the papal money at the Fuggers. Edgár Artner, "Magyarország és az Apostoli Szentszék viszonya a mohácsi vést megelőző években (1521-1526)", in *Mohácsi emlékkönyv 1526*, ed. Imre Lukinich (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1926), 82-3.

40 Kovács, "Ferdinánd", 2935; Szabó, *Mohács*, 50-1.

army may have played a role in this. During this period, they also tried to integrate Muntenia into the empire, but at least to have a voivode on the throne there that the Turks preferred. They had the opportunity to do so in 1521, when Neagoe Basarab Muntenian voivode passed away, and his son Teodosie came to power, but a battle for the throne unfolded between the candidates, in which Mehmed sanjak bey of Silistra intervened and first stood by the new voivode, but soon executed him in 1521. Then Radu (Radu de la Afumati) became the new voivode, whom Mehmed Beg defeated at Clejani in March 1522 and was chased away. Radu fled to Transylvania with his followers⁴¹.

Due to the strategic importance of Muntenia, palatine István Bátori and the Transylvanian voivode János Szapolyai took the necessary countermeasures during the king's stay in Bohemia. Szapolyai went to Transylvania in March and together with Radu tried to change the situation in Muntenia. The Transylvanian voivode led a campaign to Muntenia from July 7 to 18, 1522, and after defeating Mehmed bey at Gruzmani, Radu was restored to the throne, who was defeated in several battles from the sanjak bey of Silistra in early August and then Radu was chased away again. The voivode, which was again fleeing to Transylvania, was again assisted by Szapolyai, who defeated Mehmed bey again during his campaign from 14 October to 14 November, then Radu voivode defeated the bey at Didrih (Didrich) 50 km from Tirgoviste (Târgoviște), regaining his throne. After that, the troops of Szapolyai besieged Kisnikápoly (Turnu Măgurele) on November 1, and although the siege was unsuccessful, the Transylvanian voivode returned to Hungary with huge booty. The fact that palatine István Báthori and his troops were in Temesköz played a major role in the success of the Hungarian campaign, thus, the Turkish forces were divided⁴².

Despite the success in Muntenia, in 1522 Bali bey of Szendrő – Nándorfehérvár was able to break into the country despite the protection measures of palatine István Báthori and he besieged Pét's (Peth) castle, near Dunatölgyes (Dubova), and in early March captured Orsova (Orșova). The bey also destroyed the castles of Orsova, Pét and Miháld (Mehadia), with this, Timisoara and the Hungarian armies of the Temesköz region were permanently cut off from the Lower-Danube. The palatine also fortified Szörényvár, Titel, and Banja Luka and Jajca at the Croatian ends. This was also necessary because Knin in Croatia fell in this year while the inhabitants of Skardonna fled. At the same time, the two outstanding strengths of the Hungarian border fortress system, Klissza and Jajca, withstood the siege of the local Turkish forces in 1522.

From the Hungarian point of view, the year 1523 also brought serious but limited military successes against the Turks. The situation in Muntenia was still precarious, as the Turks again removed the Hungarian friend Radu from the throne, which is why Szapolyai proposed another campaign to reinstate him. Meanwhile, in March, Bali bey attacked Pétervárad, but was unsuccessful and retreated to Szalánkemén. In the spring of 1523, were rumors in Buda that 30,000 Turks were armed between

41 Norbert C. Tóth, "Szapolyai János erdélyi vajda török ellenes harcai (1510-1526)", in *Egy elfeledett királyi dinasztia: a Szapolyaiak*, eds. Fodor Pál and Varga Szabolcs (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 2020), 110.

42 Tóth, "Szapolyai János", 110-1.

Nándorfehérvár and Szabács, and news that Suleiman's brother-in-law Pasha Ferhad the earlier third vizier there was a more significant Turkish movement on the Hungarian border, and thousands of soldiers were pulled together. Pasha Ferhad was in the Nis (Niš) area with thousands of troops and headed for Hungary, while Klissza and Krupa also were besieged by the Turks. There became the new captain in Nándorfehérvár, but he could not take up his position, because a plague also devastated Nándorfehérvár and Szendrő, however, it was reportedly standing at the border with 15,000 troops⁴³.

At the parliament of Buda in 1523, palatine István Báthori was removed from office, but János Szapolyai remained a Transylvanian voivode, while Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa received the post of chief captain of the lower parts. The reason for this appointment was that Tomori could also use the financial resources of the Archdiocese of Kalocsa for border protection. Furthermore, Pétervárad belonged to the estate of the archdiocese of Kalocsa⁴⁴.

Tomori did everything he could to protect the part of the country entrusted to his care. This was also necessary, because after the invasion of Pétervárad in March, the Turks destroyed Valkó (Vukovar) County at the end of May, then in August, another attack was made against the country by the troops of Pasha Ferhad and Bali bey, whose number was estimated at 15,000 by contemporary sources, but was probably only 10 to 12,000⁴⁵.

Against the Turkish army, a 4,000-strong Hungarian army stood up and fought a victorious battle on August 6 or 7, 1523, at Szávaszentdemeter–Nagyolaszi (Mandelos). In the battle, both the Turks and the Hungarians suffered heavy losses, and so much has been achieved, that until 1526 the Turks did not attack the in the middle section of the southern border. As a result of the Turkish defeat, Pasha Ferhad was executed in 1523 in Drinápoly (Edirne). Despite the Hungarian victory, however, the situation did not change significantly, because in the possession of Nándorfehérvár and taking advantage of their dominance, the local forces of the Ottoman Empire were able to widen the gap that opened on the Hungarian border in 1521. Although the Hungarian leadership wanted to use a diversionary campaign to rebuild the Szalánkemén⁴⁶, which was demolished by the Turks in 1521, the Turks were also aware of the danger that the border fortress could be rebuilt into a kind of second Nándorfehérvár, so this Hungarian effort was constantly blocked⁴⁷.

In a letter to Pope Clement VII (1523-1534) dated February 4, 1524, Louis II wrote that he expected the Sultan to attack next year. and indicates that the Turks allied with the Tartars, while the princes of Europe were hostile to one another. He asked

43 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 138-40.

44 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 140, 142.

45 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 143-44.

46 At the Parliament of Rákos in 1525, the reconstruction of the said border fortress was dealt with, but finally in 1526 Sultan Suleiman rebuilt the castle of Szalánkemén. Szabó Dezső, *A magyar országgyűlések története II. Lajos korában* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, 1909), 79; Gere, "Várak a Szerémségben", 370.

47 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 144-45, 149.

for the support of the Holy Father to resolve this situation. Instead of the offensive expected by Suleiman in 1525, Hungary had to face the siege of Szörényvár by Bali bey twice in 1524. The second siege may have already begun in July and, after a brief struggle in August, fell into Turkish hands. The fortress at the eastern end of the border fortress system, similar to the siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1521, did not receive any help from the central government and thus it was statutory for it to fall into foreign hands. After the occupation of the castle, Bali bey also demolished this border fortress. The reason was to build Kladovo Castle on the right bank of the Danube, a more defensible place for the Ottoman Empire. In other words, a few years after the fall of Nándorfehérvár, the Turks practically abolished the first border fortress line, of which Klissza and Jajca remained to tell the tale. To feed the latter castle, in the summer of 1525, Kristóf Frangepán had to lead a real campaign. With this, he finally managed to free the border fortress under Turkish siege since April, as Pasha Husrev of Bosnia abandoned the attack on 5 June and dismantled the camp. Then, by June 11, the necessary food and munitions were brought to Jajca, but this was only a temporary solution. Just as it was a serious problem that Pétervárad⁴⁸, which became the gateway to Hungary after 1521, could not replace Nándorfehérvár. Moreover, in addition to all these problems, the fact that Louis II could not pay the mercenaries of the frontier army was a serious problem. The papal nuncio Burgio wrote of this on 10 November 1525:

Eight days ago, the delegates of Jajca, the rác (Serb) despot, some nobles and the pinnacles in the service of the Archbishop of Kalocsa were here, who served under the Archbishop of Kalocsa in the Danube Navy and complained about the great danger in which the people of Jajca in particular were. However, the king was not able to help them, and I helped them with 3,000 gold under the guarantee of the Archbishop of Esztergom⁴⁹.

The difficulty of the situation is also well illustrated by the fact that at the beginning of 1526 Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa resigned due to the lack of service pay of his soldiers. This was not the first time that Tomori wanted to resign because of the lack of service pay, the financial situation of the ends, but as in 1526, his resignation had not been accepted before. At the same time, it also shows the impossible situation in what Hungary was in between 1521 and 1526. Consequently, it is no coincidence that events took place in 1526 as they were. This is also shown by what happened in Pétervárad, which was besieged by the Grand Vizier Ibrahim. Despite the heroic resistance of the defenders led by György Alapy, the defenders, stuck in a church tower, were forced to give up the border fortress on the banks of the Danube on July 28, and Tomori could not do anything about it in the absence

48 The castle was not further strengthened after the death of Archbishop of Kalocsa, Pál Várdai, in 1501, and according to Marino Sanudo, the walls of Pétervárad were not strong. Horváth Alice, "Egy magyar humanista, Váradi Péter építkezései (16. századi építészeti központ Dél-Magyarországon)", *Művészettörténeti Értesítő*, 36/1-4 (1987): 72, 84; Gere, "Várak a Szerémségben", 376.

49 Bartoniek Emma, trans., *Mohács Magyarországa Báro Burgio pápai követ jelentései* (Budapest: Magyar Irodalmi Társaság, 1926), 32.

of troops. As in 1521, the mobilization was bitterly slow in 1526, not even helped by the fact that the siege of Pétervárad and Újlak somewhat interrupted the Turkish advance. At the same time, not so much that all Hungarian teams get to Mohács on time. The troops of King Louis II, Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa and Imre Perényi granger of Temes were there, but the units of the Transylvanian voivode János Szapolyai were heading towards the Tisza, but the Croatian troops did not get there, just as the German imperial formations were in the area of Székesfehérvár at the time of the battle. The 25,000-strong Hungarian army, standing against the 75,000-strong army of Sultan Suleiman, was suffered a devastating defeat in Mohács. Most of the cream of the country's nobility was lost. Among them are King Louis II, Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa, judge royal János Drágffy, György Szapolyai. After the victorious battle, Suleiman marched first to Székesfehérvár and then to Buda. He finally left Hungary on October 9, taking 200,000 prisoners with him⁵⁰. Mohács could close our story with the battle of 1526, but the epilogue of the present study concludes with a symbolic defeat for the southern border fortress system. In 1527 the castle of Jajca fell. As a prelude to this, after the battle of Mohács, Ferdinand Habsburg and János Szapolyai came to the Hungarian throne, and there was a struggle to decide which of them should have the famous Bosnian border fortress. And finally, somewhere in the double royal election there may have been a kind of result that Bosnian Pasha Husrev and Bali bey occupied Jajce relatively easily from its defender István Grabrovacki, who gave up the castle he had taken care of on the tenth day of the siege. As a result, the castles of Jezero, Orbász (Orbavac), Szokol, Levács, Orovác, Perga (Peeg), Bocsác and Greben also fell into Turkish hands. The former Banovina of Jajca also became part of the Ottoman Empire, and with it the former first border fortress line was almost completely abolished, as the most important former Hungarian border forts became Ottoman fortifications. It was still left for Hungary the division of the country into three parts by a century and a half of Turkish rule. And these events, the beginning of which was on August 29, 1521, culminated in the field of Mohács exactly five years later with the fall of Nándorfehérvár, and then ended on August 29, 1541 with the fall of Buda.

50 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 152-53; Szakály, *Mohács*, 22; Frigyes Pesty, *A szörényi bánság és Szörény vármegye története. Első kötet*, (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, 1877), 46-8; Káldy-Nagy, *Szulejmán*, 61; Artner, *Magyarország mint*, 166; Bartoniek, *Burgio*, 32; Margit Beke "Pétervárad története a kezdetektől a XVIII. század végéig", *Magyar Sion*, 7/1 (2013): 70; Érdűhelyi Menyhért: "Pétervárad hadászati jelentősége", *A Bács-Bodrog Vármegyei Történelmi Társulat Évkönyve*, 8 (1892) 28-30; Ferenc Szakály, "A Magyar állam összeomlása", in *Nagy képes milleniumi hadtörténet 1000 év a hadak útján*, ed. Árpád Rácz (Budapest: Rubicon-Könyvek, 2008), 97-9.

ABBREVIATIONS

MNL OL: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára – Budapest

DL: Diplomatikai Levéltár

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FIGURES




Fig. 1 - The territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire 1390–1526 (Történelmi Tár)

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Fig. 2 - Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I on horseback in 1526
(British Museum - Wikipedia)




Fig. 3 - Capture of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), 1521
(Topkapi Saray Museum - Wikipedia)

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Fig. 4 - A Turkish soldier on horseback carrying slaves
 (Hans Guldenmundt, Wikipedia)



Fig. 5 - The Battle of Nándorfehérvár (Beograd), 1521 (Wikipedia)

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Fig. 6 - Titian Vecellio's painting of King Louis II of Hungary
(Hungarian National Museum - Wikipedia)



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Fig. 7 - The Battle of Mohács in 1526, painting of Bertalan Székely (Hungarian National Gallery - Wikipedia)




Fig. 8 - The Ottoman conquest 1521-1541 (Történelmi Tár)