

Director Emeritus

Gaetano Platania (Università degli Studi della Tuscia)

Director

Alessandro Boccolini (Università degli Studi della Tuscia)

Scientific Board

Irena Vaišvilaitė (Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to UNESCO)

Matteo Sanfilippo (Università degli Studi della Tuscia)

Massimo Carlo Giannini (Università degli Studi di Teramo)

Rimvydas Petrauskas (Vilnius University)

Giordano Altarozzi (Petru Maior University of Târgu Mures)

Giovanni Pizzorusso (Università degli Studi “G. d’Annunzio”, Chieti-Pescara)

Michaela Valente (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”)

Cesare La Mantia (Università di Trieste)

Prokhorov Andrei (Belarusian State University of Minsk)

Olexiy Sokyrrko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv)

Rafał Quirini-Popławski (Jagiellonian University of Kraków)

Jarosław Pietrzak (Pedagogical University of Kraków)

Marta Gołąbek (Museum of King John III’s Palace at Wilanów – Warsaw)

Dorota Gregorowicz (University of Silesia in Katowice)

Michał Salamonik (Södertörn University)

Language Expert

Sonia Maria Melchiorre (Università degli Studi della Tuscia)

Editorial Board

Bogdana Nosova (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv)

Francesco Vitali (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”)

Małgorzata Trzeciak Cygan (University of Warsaw)



Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna
(Study Center on the Sobieski Age and of Modern Poland)
www.cespom.eu

Proprietà letteraria riservata. La riproduzione in qualsiasi forma, memorizzazione o trascrizione con qualunque mezzo (elettronico, meccanico, in fotocopia, in disco o in altro modo, compresi cinema, radio, televisione, internet) sono vietate senza l'autorizzazione scritta dell'Editore.

Eastern European History Review è una rivista on-line peer-reviewed con lettori anonimi

Chiuso il 31-12-2025

Impaginazione a cura di: *Emanuele Paris*

ISBN: 979-12-5524-219-2
ISBN ebook: 979-12-5524-220-8
ISSN: 2612-0402 009

Permalink: <http://hdl.handle.net/2067/54096>

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW
Via Santa Maria in Gradi 4 – 01100 Viterbo
www.easterneuropeanhistory.eu
eehr@unitus.it

Edizioni **SETTE CITTÀ**
Via Mazzini 87 – 01100 Viterbo
t. +39 0761 303020 – info@settecitta.eu

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW

Annually Historical Journal

~
n. 8/2025
Special Issue

**FROM THE LONG TURKISH WAR (1593-1606)
TO THE LIBERATION OF VIENNA (1683)**

Edited by
Alessandro Boccolini and Ovidiu Cristea



EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: LA RIVISTA

Il Comitato redazionale e scientifico è lieto di presentare al pubblico la rivista scientifica *Eastern European History Review*.

Con un carattere internazionale e interdisciplinare, una cadenza annuale e una fruibilità *open access* la rivista focalizza i propri interessi sulle dinamiche occorse nell'Europa Orientale durante tutta l'età moderna (XIV-XIX). *Eastern European History Review* è espressione del Centro Studi dell'Università della Tuscia CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna) nato nel 1997 per intuizione del Prof. Gaetano Platania, Direttore Emerito della Rivista.

L'iniziativa editoriale che presentiamo nasce dall'evidente mancanza in Italia di una rivista scientifica relativa alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale in Età Moderna, nonostante la penisola abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale per la Storia e la Cultura di una parte integrante del continente, a torto considerata come lontana e periferica.

Consapevoli di questo, il Comitato ha posto quale obiettivo primario della *Eastern European History Review* quello di offrire uno spazio di riflessione e di discussione su temi che appartengono alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale, e insieme alle relazioni - politiche e culturali - che questa vasta area del Vecchio Continente ha avuto con l'occidente d'Europa, e l'Italia in particolare, incoraggiando il dialogo tra studiosi e esperti di settore, e tra differenti approcci della ricerca scientifica.

Il Comitato Redazionale e Scientifico

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: THE JOURNAL

The Editorial and Scientific Board are proud delighted to present the *Eastern European History Review* under the aegis of Sette Città Editore.

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV-XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997, from an idea of Prof. Gaetano Platania, today Director Emeritus of this journal.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History sciences.

The editorial initiative we present comes from the obvious lack of a journal, in Italy, concerning the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the Modern Age, this despite its fundamental role in the history and culture of that part of the continent, wrongly considered distant and peripheral.

Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Main objective of the journal is to create a space for reflection and discussion on topics pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, but also relations with Continental Europe, encouraging dialogue between scholars and experts in the field, and between different approaches of scientific research.

The Editorial and Scientific Board

SUMMARY

Ovidiu Cristea and Alessandro Boccolini <i>Preface</i>	9
Alessandro Boccolini <i>Introduction</i>	13
Marian Coman <i>Framing conflict. Maps of the Ottoman-habsburg Long War</i>	17
Livia Magina <i>Transylvanian defensive system and territorial changes on the Ottoman frontier in the first half of the 17th century</i>	41
Adrian Magina <i>Confrontation on the Transylvanian-ottoman frontier: the battles in Banat during the “Long Turkish War”</i>	53
Ovidiu Cristea <i>“Notabili successe nel viaggio dell’Ungheria”: a testimony about the Ottoman campaign of 1596</i>	69
Oana-Andreia Sâmbrian <i>Girolamo Frachetta, una spia per la spagna durante la lunga guerra turca (1593-1606). Tecniche, strategie e alcune informazioni sulla Transilvania</i>	89
Dorel Țuinea <i>The Habsburgs and the Transylvanian Diets convened by Michael the Brave</i>	101
Florina Ciure <i>The Transylvanian Contribution to the Thirty Years’ War in 17th-Century Venetian Historiography</i>	111

Paweł Duda	
<i>The Battle of Khotyn in 1621 in the accounts of papal diplomats</i>	131
Cristina Codarcea	
<i>La lutte anti ottomane et le monde catholique de la Bulgarie du XVIIème siècle. Sémantique et mythes historiographiques autour d'une réalité confessionnelle marginale</i>	153
Susanna Piselli	
<i>The Battle of Kothyn (1673): A Road to the Throne</i>	175
Alessandro Boccolini	
<i>From Żurawno to Grodno: Jan III Sobieski and the Ottoman Threat</i>	189
Gaetano Platania	
<i>Sobieski, Leopoldo, Innocenzo XI e la liberazione di Vienna (1683) attraverso alcuni documenti editi e/o inedita</i>	211

VARIA SECTION

Matteo Sanfilippo	
<i>Katalin Prajda's research on migratory exchanges between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period</i>	233



FROM ŻURAWNO TO GRODNO: JAN III SOBIESKI AND THE OTTOMAN THREAT

ABSTRACT: The article examines the evolution of Jan III Sobieski's foreign policy from the Truce of Żurawno (1676) to the Diet of Grodno (1679-1680), contextualising it within the geopolitical tensions of Central and Eastern Europe and the diplomatic initiatives of Pope Innocent XI. It argues that Sobieski's initial accommodation with the Ottoman Empire, often viewed as a departure from Poland's traditional role as "Christianity's bulwark", was driven by pragmatic political considerations and influenced by French strategy and the Jaworów agreements. Drawing on correspondence held in the Vatican Archives, the study highlights the Holy See's efforts to forge a unified Christian front against Ottoman expansion while navigating Franco-Imperial rivalry and Muscovy's complex stance. It traces the shift in Polish policy from alignment with France to rapprochement with the Habsburg Empire, culminating in the resolutions of the Grodno Diet and the subsequent 1683 alliance. The conclusions illustrate how this alliance was shaped not only by long-term diplomatic strategies but also by the pressing context of the imminent Ottoman threat to Vienna, which necessitated urgent collective action.

KEYWORDS: Jan III; Ottomans; Holy See; Diplomacy; Polish-Habsburg relations.

INTRODUCTION

In the discourse surrounding the geopolitical dynamics of Central and Eastern Europe, 1676 emerges as a crucial year that warrants critical examination for understanding the trajectory of Jan Sobieski's reign amid the mounting Ottoman threat. This year marked a confluence of events that substantially reconfigured the political landscape of the region, leading to significant tensions and transformative developments in the years that followed. Notable events included the siege of Vienna in 1683, the gradual reconquest of the Danube-Balkan territories, culminating in the liberation of Buda in 1686, and the eventual resolution of hostilities through the Treaties of Constantinople (1699) and Carlowitz (1700), which effectively concluded the prolonged seventeenth-century conflict between Christendom and the Ottoman Empire.

On February 2, 1676¹, Jan Sobieski was formally crowned King of Poland at Wawel Castle in Krakow. The coronation ceremony, which elicited enthusiastic support from a large assembly, was noted in a report by the apostolic nuncio, Francesco Martelli, sent to the Roman Curia shortly thereafter². This event occurred two years

1 On the election of Jan Sobieski, see: Gaetano Platania, *Scritti minori. Saggi di Storia sobiesiana* (Sette Città: Viterbo 2021), 27-82, and the cited bibliography.

2 Nuncio in Poland from 1675 to 1680. *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, vol. I, ed. CP Henrik Damian Wojtyska (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1990), 275-76.

after a protracted electoral process that resulted in Sobieski's unanimous selection by the Polish *Sejm*³. His election was met with considerable optimism by the Roman court, who perceived in Sobieski—celebrated for his military prowess at the Battle of Khotyn in 1673⁴—a capable leader poised to spearhead a renewed offensive against the Ottoman Empire⁵.

The prevailing belief was that the new King's future military successes against the common adversary of Christianity would be both significant and commendable. Nonetheless, the period immediately following his ascension to the throne largely failed to meet the papacy's expectations, despite significant financial support intended to bolster the Polish military and Sobieski's reiterated commitments to combat the Ottomans⁶. In early October 1676, reports reached Rome of Sobieski's military victory over the Turks⁷; however, this news was rapidly eclipsed by the announcement of the Peace of Żórawno, signed on October 26, 1676, which the Curia regarded as "disadvantageous and prejudicial"⁸. This truce, concluded with the Sultan, allowed the Ottomans to retain control over substantial territories in the southern regions of the *Rzeczpospolita*, including Kamieniec and other locations in Podolia and Ukraine. Consequently, it had reaffirmed the most significant terms of the earlier 1672 Treaty of Buczacz [16/18 October]⁹, which had been widely

3 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, *Relazione*, Krakow 9 II 1676, ff. 53-5r. The ceremony was extensively documented in a variety of printed notices and manuscripts, which facilitated its dissemination across Europe. BAV, Barb. Lat. 6381, *Avvisi manoscritti*, Krakow 2 february 1676, f. 78r.

4 Following the defeat near Kamieniec Podolski in 1672, which compelled King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki to sign the Treaty of Buczacz, the Polish army, under General Jan Sobieski, secured a significant victory at Khotyn in 1673. This triumph notably bolstered Sobieski's candidacy for the Polish throne in 1674. An account of the battle in BAV, Barb. Lat. 6410, *Relazione della vittoria insigne che l'armi Polacche et Lituane hanno ottenuto contro i Turchi alle ripe del fiume Dnistro in Valacchia il giorno di San Martino 1673*, ff. 414r-31v. See, Damian Orłowski, *Chocim 1673* (Warszawa: Bellona, 2007).

5 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, F. Martelli to P.P. Altieri, Krakow 4 IV 1676, f. 190r.

6 Jan III Sobieski repeatedly expressed his intention to combat the Turks to the nuncio, a sentiment later contested by the signature from Żórawno. This aspiration was conveyed to Martelli upon his arrival in Poland and during several public and private audiences. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, F. Martelli to P.P. Altieri, Krakow 16 II 1676, f. 77r.

7 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, F. Martelli to P.P. Altieri, Krakow 4 IV 1676, f. 190r.

8 "svantaggiosa, e pregiudiziale", AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 21 XI 1676, f. 8v.

9 The treaty provisions dictated the cession of the Podolian Voivodeship, including Kamieniec Podolski, from the *Rzeczpospolita* to Constantinople. The Braclaw Voivodeship and the southern portion of the Kyiv Voivodeship were designated for administration by Cossack hetman Piotr Doroshenko, under

disdained in Poland as an acknowledgement of Ottoman dominance, having been signed by the preceding monarch, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki¹⁰. Martelli, in his communication with Rome, anticipated the profound dissatisfaction this peace would elicit from “Our Lord”¹¹. At the same time, Curial circles recognised the potential for such an agreement to exacerbate instability in Central and Eastern Europe. It was posited that the peace initiative favoured by Jan III might inadvertently empower the Ottoman Turks to support insurgent factions opposing the Habsburgs in Hungary¹². Thus, the implications of Sobieski’s reign and the decisions taken during this tumultuous period must be understood within the broader context of the region’s geopolitical challenges.

To discerning observers of the era, Jan Sobieski’s decision appeared largely unmotivated and perplexing, particularly given its stark contrast to Poland’s established image as a formidable bastion of Christianity, or *Antemurale Christianitatis*. Only a select few comprehended that this decision was underpinned by “other designs”¹³ of a predominantly political and diplomatic nature. The majority were unaware that the Polish sovereign’s pursuit of an accommodation with the Ottoman Empire had been meticulously orchestrated under the auspices of French diplomacy, specifically by King Louis XIV and his representatives: Bishop Toussaint de Forbin-Janson [1629–1713]¹⁴ in Warsaw and ambassador Charles Marie François Ollier de Nointel

191

Turkish protection. Additionally, Warsaw was obligated to pay an annual tribute to the sultan. However, the *Sejm* of 1673 rejected the treaty, leading to the resumption of hostilities against the Turks, culminating in the Victory of Cochim under King Sobieski’s leadership. On the Podolia under the Turks, see: Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ejlat Kaminiecki. Podole pod panowaniem tureckim (1672-1699)* (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Polczek, 1994).

- 10 See, Gaetano Platania, *Rzeczpospolita, Europa e Santa Sede tra intese e ostilità* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 200), 105.
- 11 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Warsaw 28 X 1676, f. 521r.
- 12 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 86, f. 129r.
- 13 “altri disegni”, ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/10, F. Buonvisi to P.P. Altieri, Warsaw 13 march 1675, f. 88r. See also, Furio Diaz, Nicola Carranza, *Francesco Buonvisi. Nunziatura a Varsavia*, vol. II: (6 giugno 1674-28 agosto 1675) (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età moderna, 1965), 303. Buonvisi’s assessment as nuncio in Warsaw noted Jan III Sobieski’s ambiguous policy toward the Turks prior to his transfer to Vienna. Despite his commitment to combat the Ottomans, Sobieski appeared to avoid direct military engagement with the sultan. Alessandro Boccolini, *Un lucchese al servizio della Santa Sede. Francesco Buonvisi, nunzio a Colonia, Varsavia e Vienna* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2018), 125-35; Janusz Woliński, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich* (Warszawa: Mon, 1983), 74-6.
- 14 French ambassador to Poland for two terms (from 1674 to 1677 and from 1680 to 1681). Created cardinal by Alexander VIII on February 13, 1690. On him, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris Aevi*, vol. 5, eds. Remigius Ritzler, Pirminius Sefrin (Patavii: Il Messaggero di S. Antonio, 1952), 17, 117, 260.

[1635–1685]¹⁵ in Constantinople, later succeeded by Gabriel-Joseph de Lavergne, Count of Guilleragues¹⁶. For an extended period, Louis XIV had been strategically redirecting Ottoman military pressure toward other regions, particularly the southern territories of the Habsburg Empire. This strategic orientation encompassed the financial backing extended by Louis XIV to Sobieski following his ascension to the throne, as well as the secret agreement signed in June 1675 in Jaworów, which carried distinct anti-Habsburg implications¹⁷. In exchange for a comprehensive contribution of 300,000 florins to bolster the Polish army and neutralise domestic opposition, Jan III committed to pursuing a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the disputes with Constantinople. This commitment marked the initial phase of a broader French strategy concerning the *Rzeczpospolita*, which encompassed, on one hand, a Polish claim to Silesia—a territory embroiled in contention with the Habsburg Empire—and, on the other, support for the Hungarian rebels (*kuruc*), who were engaged in active resistance against Leopold I, and crucially, an obligation for Sobieski to refrain from entering any league or alliance with Vienna¹⁸. Through this strategic combination of diplomatic and military manoeuvres, Louis XIV sought to establish an eastern front against the Habsburgs, intended to complement the ongoing military conflicts along the Rhine border.

Upon the arrival of news regarding the Truce of Żórawno in Rome, a recent transition at the papal throne had occurred. The death of Clement X Altieri¹⁹ on July 22, 1676, was succeeded by the unanimous election of Cardinal Benedetto Odescalchi on September 21, who assumed the papal name Innocent XI²⁰. Renowned for his austere morals and unwavering integrity, the new pontiff was also among the most staunch adversaries of Ottoman expansionism. During the pontificate of his predecessor, Innocent XI had already manifested this orientation, significantly contributing to

15 French Ambassador to the Sultan from 1670 to 1679. *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648)*, vol.1: 1648-1715, ed. Ludwig Bittner (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1936), 243.

16 On his embassy [1679-1685], see the entire correspondence exchanged with the court of Louis XIV. *Guilleragues. Correspondance*, 2 voll., eds. Frédéric Deloffre, Jacques Rougeot (Paris-Genève: Librairie Droz, 1976).

17 On Warsaw's pro-French policy, which served France's purpose against the Habsburgs, see Gaetano Platania, "Alcuni significativi episodi dei rapporti francopolacchi nel Seicento", in *Gli archivi della Santa Sede e la storia di Francia*, eds. Giovanni Pizzorusso, et al. O. Poncet e M. Sanfilippo (Viterbo: Sette Città) 2006, 137-60. On the context of the Jawarow agreement (1675), Boccolini, *Un lucchese*, 111-35.

18 Gaetano Platania, "Diplomazia e guerra turca nel XVII secolo. La politica diplomatica polacca e la "lunga guerra turca" (1673-1683)", in *I Turchi, il Mediterraneo e l'Europa*, ed. Giovanna Motta (Milano: Franco Angeli 1998), 242-68.

19 See, Luciano Osbat, "Clemente X, Altieri", in DBI, vol. 26 (1982), 293-02.

20 On the complex figure of Innocent XI, see the collective volume *Innocenzo XI Odescalchi. Papa, politico, committente*, eds. Richard Bösel, Antonio Menniti Ippolito, et al. (Roma: Viella 2014), and cited bibliography.

the financial assistance provided to Poland in its conflict against the Ottomans²¹. This stance engendered notable animosity within Ottoman circles, as evidenced by a 1682 report from the Venetian bailo Pietro Civran to the Senate, which underscored the trepidation elicited by a pontiff perceived as capable of orchestrating a coalition among Christian princes, widely considered the most formidable deterrent against the *infidels*²².

The accession of Innocent XI to the papal throne occurred within a complex geopolitical landscape characterised by escalating tensions. On a broader European scale, unresolved rivalries between France and the Holy Roman Empire foreshadowed the likelihood of a generalised conflict. Meanwhile, in the Central-Eastern quadrant, the agreement forged by King Sobieski with the Sultan arguably indicated an even more violent phase of warfare along the borders of Christendom. This eventuality rapidly materialised following the death of Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü on November 3, 1676. His successor, Kara Mustafa, demonstrated his intent to focus the Ottoman military offensive on the Hungarian front, perceiving the Kurucs' entreaty for protection from Constantinople against Leopold I as the most immediate avenue for reinvigorating Ottoman presence in the heart of Europe.

The political landscape of Central Europe became increasingly intricate. Reports from Warsaw by the apostolic nuncio Francesco Martelli indicated an imminent breakdown in military operations in Hungary²³. This concern was soon validated by correspondence from Pressburg (Bratislava). The Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of Hungary, in a letter to the Pope, expressed profound apprehension about the threats facing the Magyar territories. Aware of the dynamics inherent in Ottoman military strategy, the prelate noted that "the Turk never allows his armies to remain idle"²⁴, predicting that, once peace was achieved, attention would soon pivot towards Győr (Javarino).

The fall of Győr would not only risk the stability of the Kingdom of Hungary but also pose a significant threat to Habsburg Austria. In this fraught context, Innocent XI was compelled to navigate multiple tiers of European diplomacy concurrently. In accordance with one of the capitulations sworn before his election, which obligated him to "propagate and preserve the Catholic faith" and to "procure peace among the

21 In the context of the financial contributions collected within the Sacred College under Pope Clement X for the war against the Turks, Cardinal Benedetto Odescalchi stands out as the primary donor (13,733.55 scudi). For a detailed account of the remittances from the Holy See during the years 1672-1676, refer to ASR, Fondo Camerale II, Decime, b. 2, *Denari che sono stati rimessi in Polonia per aiuto di quella Corte contro l'Armi Ottomane [...] dalla Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Clemente X*, ff. n.n

22 *Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, vol. XIII: *Costantinopoli*, ed. Luigi Firpo (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmus 1984), 270.

23 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, F. Martelli to P.P. Altieri, Krakow 28 III 1676, f. 175r.

24 "il Turco, non permette mai, che gl'eserciti suoi restano oziosi", AAV, Lettere di Vescovi, vol. 60, G. Szelepcheny to A. Cybo, [Posonia] 23 III 1677, f. 81r.

Princes”²⁵, the new pontiff promptly endeavoured to identify effective solutions to the continent’s pressing challenges. Following a well-articulated strategy and ensuring a steady flow of intelligence with the nuncio in Vienna, Francesco Buonvisi²⁶, Pope Odescalchi, prioritised achieving a general peace between Leopold I and Louis XIV. This objective represented a foundational prerequisite for the realisation of the Pope’s overarching project of constructing a league of Christian princes “to form a single army corps”²⁷ capable of consolidating its forces against the Ottoman Empire. To this end, Innocent XI dispatched a series of letters and papal briefs to principal Catholic sovereigns and princes, urging them to foster the restoration of general harmony.

However, constructing this diplomatic framework proved exceptionally challenging. The initial Roman designation of Bishop Fabio Guinigi as a papal mediator between France and the Empire was swiftly rejected by Louis XIV. He was succeeded by Francesco Bevilacqua, formerly an extraordinary nuncio to the Emperor and later appointed as the Holy See’s plenipotentiary to attend the forthcoming peace congress, to be held in Nijmegen. The commencement of negotiations was promptly communicated to major European chancelleries, with particular emphasis on the court of Warsaw, where Rome instructed Martelli to inform Jan III of the papacy’s intent to “put an end to the calamities of Christianity by restoring harmony among the Catholic crowns”²⁸, thereby facilitating a unified response against the common enemy.

The pontiff hoped that Sobieski, reassured by the papacy’s steadfast commitment to fostering unity among Christian princes against the Turks, would reconsider his diplomatic overtures toward Constantinople initiated by the Treaty of Żórawno. However, the negotiations were marked by significant complexities and numerous

25 “propagare e conservare la fede cattolica, [e a] procurare la pace fra i Principi”. The points of the capitulation were transcribed by Carlo Cartari, a Roman diarist, in his diary. ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 86, ff. 94v-5r.

26 Already during Clement X’s papacy, Buonvisi recognised the intrinsic connection between the Turkish issue in the East and the continental conflict between France and the Empire. He understood that Leopold, preoccupied with engagements against the French and the Swedes, could not effectively deploy his forces across multiple fronts. Thus, establishing continental peace was crucial for a unified response to the Turkish threat. ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/11, n. 83, F. Buonvisi to P.P. Altieri, Vienna 27 may 1676.

27 “per formar un solo corpo d’armata”. The quote is taken from the Memorials that the Capuchin friar Paul de Lagny sent to Innocent XI upon his return to Europe after years of residence in Constantinople. De Lagny argued for a general league of Christian princes and sovereigns to defeat the Ottoman Empire. BAV, Vat. Lat. 6926, *Memoriali di fra’ Paolo da Lagni*, f. 37v. See, Gaetano Platania, *Mamma li turchi! la politica pontificia e l’idea di una crociata moderna* (Viterbo: Sette Città 2010).

28 “la Santità Sua [intendeva] impor fine alle calamità del Cristianesimo colla reintegrazione della Concordia tra le corone cattoliche, e per rivolgerne poi le forze [...] contro il comun nemico”, AAV, Segreteria Stato. Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 12 XII 1676, f. 13r.

unresolved historical grievances. A particularly obstructive element was Louis XIV's deliberate strategy of delay, aimed at exhausting the imperial delegation and prompting the congress to abandon talks. This fact was exemplified by France's demands for support of Spanish territorial claims in the Netherlands and for the release of Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, who had been detained in Cologne in 1674 for his pro-French affiliations and was perceived as a staunch adversary of Leopold I. Amid intense political tensions, Innocent XI's tenacity proved pivotal in steering the negotiations toward a favourable outcome. By 1678, the pontiff not only called for the publication of an indulgence to address the "present needs"²⁹ for peace and defense against the Turks but also earnestly urged the sovereigns of Spain, France, and the Empire to achieve a general pacification expeditiously, emphasising that such an accord was indispensable for coordinated action against the increasingly pressing Ottoman threat at the borders of Christendom.

Following an extended and challenging series of negotiations, the Holy See's efforts ultimately yielded significant diplomatic achievements. These negotiations culminated in a series of treaties: first, the peace accord between France and the United Provinces, signed on September 10, 1678; followed by an agreement between Paris and Madrid on September 17 of the same year; and concluding with the peace treaty between Louis XIV of France and Leopold I of the Holy Roman Empire, signed on February 5, 1679, in Nijmegen. This last agreement was accompanied by a concurrent understanding between Vienna and Sweden, further consolidating France's traditional alliances³⁰.

The successful conclusion of these treaties was met with considerable approval in Rome, particularly by Pope Innocent XI, who received the news from a courier dispatched by Bishop Bevilacqua detailing the peace arrangements between the Emperor and the King of France, thereby establishing peace among the principal Catholic monarchs of Europe. In light of these developments, the pontiff expressed his congratulations to both sovereigns³¹, recognising them as the principal architects of European pacification. Subsequently, he shifted his focus to organising a more effective defence of Christendom, which was increasingly threatened by external

29 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, Diario, vol. 87, f. 32r. Annotation dated May 27, 1678. The pontiff would have proclaimed another extraordinary jubilee (bull of indiction: In suprema. Iubileum Universale ad implorandam divinam opem contra Turca) on August 11, 1683, when the Turks had already besieged Vienna. Gaetano Platania, "L'assedio di Vienna del 1683 e il giubileo straordinario del beato Innocenzo XI Odescalchi", in *I giubilei straordinari in età moderna (XVII-XVIII)*, ed. Francesca De Caprio (Viterbo: Sette Città 2016), 93-132.

30 On the Peace of Nijmegen see *The Peace of Nijmegen/La Paix de Nimegue 1676-1678/1679*, ed. Hans Bots (Amsterdam: Holland Universiteits Pers 1980).

31 Innocent XI wrote to Louis XIV on March 15, 1679, and to Leopold on the 18th. The letters are cited in Augustin Theiner, *Monuments Historique de Russie relatif aux règnes d'Alexis Michaelowitch, [...]* (Rome: Vaticane 1859), 159-60. The letter sent by the French king in response to the pontiff assured Rome of his commitment to the common enterprise against the Ottomans. Subsequent events would later prove the opposite, with Louis XIV's total withdrawal from the Eastern Front. AAV, *Lettere de Principi*, vol. 110, *Louis XIV to Innocent XI*, Saint Germain 18 IV 1679, f. 87r.

forces, especially in the Kingdoms of Poland and Hungary³². In response to the pope's appeals for support, both the Emperor and the King of France promptly assured their backing. However, while tangible contributions were forthcoming from Vienna, the court of Versailles appeared to lack the operational initiatives necessary for transforming the expressed unity of Christianity into a coordinated military campaign against the encroaching Ottoman Empire. This lack of initiative underscored the complexities and challenges inherent in fostering a unified Christian front in the face of external threats.

BEHIND THE GRODNO SEJM

Once the continent had achieved a state of relative peace, the Holy See was positioned to pursue more decisively the establishment of a coalition of Christian princes to counter Ottoman dominance. In this context, Pope Innocent XI mobilised the entire papal diplomatic corps operating in the principal European capitals, with particular emphasis on the nuncios in Warsaw and Vienna, Francesco Martelli and Francesco Buonvisi³³. These nuncios were repeatedly tasked with coordinating their respective diplomatic engagements to foster a climate of "good friendship and correspondence"³⁴ among the major neighbouring powers. It was evident in Rome that a decisive challenge to the formation of a unified Christian military coalition stemmed from the enduring mutual distrust between Emperor Leopold I and King Jan Sobieski of Poland. In accordance with the commitments made at Jaworów in 1675 to the French representatives, the Polish monarchy continued to provide support to the Hungarian rebels (kuruc), facilitating the supply of troops and armaments through the efforts of Prince Hieronim Augustyn Lubomirski (ca. 1647–1706). This activity was characterised by papal sources as that of "an accomplice in the levies of soldiers gathered in this Kingdom, and sent to Hungary to aid the Emperor's rebels"³⁵. The Holy See consistently criticised this conduct via the nuncio in Warsaw³⁶, as its continuation posed a dual threat: it risked further entrenching Leopold I's opposition, who had already dispatched a representative to the Polish court to formally address grievances concerning the aid provided to

32 *Lettera in cifra del Cardinal Cybo al Buonvisi in data de' 25 Febbrajo 1679*, in Tommaso Trenta, *Memorie per servire alla storia politica del cardinale Francesco Buonvisi patrizio lucchese*, t. I (Lucca: Bertini 1818), 368–69.

33 See, in general, Alessandro Boccolini, *Roma, Varsavia e il pericolo turco nel contesto della diplomazia europea (1679-1684)* (Roma: Istituto Nazionale di Studi Romani 2022), and cited bibliography.

34 "uniti in buon amicizia, e corrispondenza", AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 21 V 1678, f. 147v.

35 "complice nelle leve de' Soldati radunati in questo Regno, e trasmessi in Ungheria in aiuto de' Ribelli dell'Imperatore", AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 96, Avviso, Jarosław 5 X 1678, f. 521r.

36 Martelli, on the orders of Innocent XI, had written expressly to Sobieski to urge him to withdraw the irregular Polish troops from Hungary. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 96, F. Martelli to Jan III Sobieski, Warsaw 31 I 1678, f. 59r.

the Hungarian insurgents³⁷; additionally, it risked the delicate negotiations aimed at renewing the 1664 Truce of Vasvár with the Ottoman Empire.

Simultaneously, the Roman Curia was cautiously assessing Muscovy's potential as a decisive actor in the anti-Ottoman campaign. As the Nijmegen negotiations approached conclusion, reports surfaced about Tsar Fyodor Alexeevich Romanov, who had ascended the throne in 1676, during an initial period marked by political uncertainty due to his youth and health issues³⁸. The Tsar reportedly expressed a desire to engage in military action against the Ottoman Empire to gain control of parts of Ukraine. Nuncio Martelli indicated that discussions between Warsaw and Moscow were imminent and focused on resolving territorial disputes stemming from the 1667 Treaty of Andruszów³⁹. In this framework, he posited that once the Ukrainian border issues were finally adjudicated, Muscovy could be incentivised to participate in a coordinated effort against the Ottomans.

In a confidential communication dispatched to Rome at the end of 1676, Martelli, anticipating the convening of the Polish Diet and the impending arrival of Muscovite ambassadors in Warsaw⁴⁰, advocated for the promotion of collaboration among the Christian entities directly bordering the Ottoman Empire—the Habsburg Empire, Poland, and Muscovy—with an eye toward a joint military initiative.

197

One of the most important issues to be discussed at the upcoming Diet is the peace negotiations or the extension of the Truce with the Muscovites, which is a primary concern for Lithuania. The Grand Chancellor, given his role and authority in the Grand Duchy, will play a significant part in these negotiations. Additionally, since the current Truce requires mediation by foreign princes due to unsuccessful previous treaties between the Poles and the Muscovites, there has been discussion about whether the King and the Diet should appoint the Grand Chancellor as mediator. It is reasonable to believe that His Majesty the Emperor could help establish harmony between these two nations, especially given their shared concerns about the Turks who border their states⁴¹.

37 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 96, *Avviso*, Warsaw 28 I 1678, f. 6or.

38 The father Aleksej Michailovič Romanov [1629-1676] died in February 1676. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Krakow 4 IV 1676, f. 19ov.

39 The treaty (January 30–February 9, 1667) ended the war between Muscovy and the *Rzeczpospolita* that began in 1654. It established the Dnieper as the border, excluding Kyiv, which was temporarily ceded to the tsar for two years. The agreement included a joint defence against the Ottomans. Poland did not respect the treaty, but it was reaffirmed in 1686 with the Eternal Peace, officially making the Dnieper the border and permanently ceding Kyiv to Moscow for 146,000 rubles. See, Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat Andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1959); Carl Bickford O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine from the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667* (Berkeley: University Press, 1963).

40 Martelli had already pointed out this possibility some time ago. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 93, F. Martelli to P.P. Altieri, Krakow 7 III 1676, f. 14ov.

41 “Tra gli altri affari più importanti si deve trattare nella prossima Dieta della Pace,

This proposal garnered notable interest within the Curia, which harboured hopes that “the Diet and the King himself would appoint His Majesty the Emperor as mediator to reconcile the differences with Poland and Muscovy”, ultimately aspiring to forge a league for “common defence against the Ottoman power”⁴².

This strategy received the approval of the new Secretary of State, Cardinal Alderano Cybo⁴³, who, as early as March 1677, conveyed to the nuncio in Poland Pope Innocent XI’s reaffirmed intentions regarding Muscovy.

The league mentioned by Your Most Illustrious Lordship, which includes the Emperor, the King of Poland, and the Grand Duke of Muscovy, united against the Turk, their common enemy, has prompted His Holiness to consider establishing trade with the Muscovites. This would involve addressing the grievances they expressed during the previous Pontificate⁴⁴.

198

The statements made by Cardinal Cybo subtly referenced the unsuccessful diplomatic endeavour undertaken during the papacy of Clement X Altieri in 1673. This initiative, which emerged in response to the Ottoman incursion into the *Rzeczpospolita* and aimed to form a Christian coalition, notably included the reception of the Scottish baron Paul Menzies de Pitfodels (Paolo Menesio)⁴⁵ as a Muscovite representative at the Vatican. However, this effort was thwarted

o della prolongatione della Tregua colli Moscoviti, il che preme principalmente alla Lituania confinante con essi; et il Gran Cancelliere per ragione della sua carica, e per l'autorità che ha in quel Gran Ducato havrà grandissima parte in questa negotiatione. E perché secondo i Capitoli della presente Tregua, si deve hora ricorrere alla mediazione de' i Principi forastieri dopo i trattati fatti in vano per il passato tra li Commisarij di Polonia e di Moscovia, parlandosi col Gran Cancelliere di questa materia hebbe motivo d'insinuarli di fare riflessione se per coltivare la bramata confidenza coll'imperatore fosse stato bene che il Re e la Dieta lo nominassero per mediatore, dovendosi ragionevolmente credere che a Sua Maestà Cesarea fusse per premere la concordia tra questa due nationi per andar anch'essa unita con loro, attesa la gelosia che tutti devono havere de Turchi confinanti colli loro stati”, AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 94, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Warsaw 20 XII 1676, ff. 79v-80r.

42 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 30 I 1677, f. 3r.

43 On Alderano Cybo [1612-1700], Enrico Stumpo, “Cibo [or Cybo], Alderano”, in DBI, vol. 25 (1981), 227-32. The Secretary of State had immediately approved the perspective suggested by the nuncio Martelli, AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 30 I 1677, f. 3r.

44 “La lega che Vostra Signoria Illustrissima accennò potersi trattar fra l'imperatore, il Re di Polonia, et il Gran Duca di Moscovia per difendersi contro il Turco comun nemico, ha dato motivo a Sua Santità di riflettere che sarebbe forse espediente d'habilitarsi ad haver commercio co i Moscoviti, con purgar l'amarezza, ch'essi dichiararono d'haver provata nel Pontificato passato”, AAV, Segr. di Stato, Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 6 III 1677, f. 30r.

45 On the diplomatic mission conducted by Paul Menzies in Rome in 1673, see Gaetano Platania, “Diplomatici Moscoviti a Roma (1673)”, in *Sentieri Ripresi: studi in onore di Nadia Boccara*, ed. Id (Viterbo: Sette Città 2013), 299-321.

by the papal refusal to acknowledge the title of “tsar” as insisted upon by Alexei Mikhailovich⁴⁶, a prerequisite for military alignment, thereby inhibiting Muscovy’s involvement in the proposed alliance⁴⁷.

In light of this historical context, Cardinal Cybo elucidated to Nuncio Martelli Pope Innocent XI’s stance on Muscovite affairs. In a confidential communication dated 10 April 1677, the Secretary of State revisited the historical precedents governing the relations between Rome and Moscow under the papacies of Gregory XIII⁴⁸ and Clement X. He articulated the Pope’s readiness to officially recognise the Grand Duke’s title as Tsar, thereby alleviating a significant obstacle that had previously hampered the establishment of an effective political and military coalition aimed at countering Ottoman expansion.

By now, Your Lordship will have received my letter in which I conveyed Our Lord’s desire to reopen negotiations with the Grand Duke of Muscovy. These negotiations were previously terminated during the last Pontificate when he was denied the title of Czar. With intentions similar to those of Grand Duke John, who sought the intercession of Gregory XIII for peace between himself and Stefan Bathory—and successfully obtained it—the Grand Duke has sent a Scottish gentleman to propose the introduction of commerce between Clement X and his master. His Beatitude believes that to foster a positive disposition in that Prince, it will suffice to indicate that His Holiness never approved of Clement X’s rejection of the Czar title. Therefore, he can expect not just this title but also other demonstrations of love and esteem from Our Lord⁴⁹.

199

46 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. Add. 13, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, n.d., ff. n.n. This correspondence from the Secretariat of State conveys the pope’s intention to acknowledge the title of tsar for the Grand Duke of Muscovy. It outlines diplomatic exchanges between Rome and Moscow from the era of Gregory XIII to the unsuccessful negotiations under Clement X’s pontificate.

47 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 6 III 1677.

48 Gregory XIII’s pontificate is also associated with efforts to forge diplomatic relations between Rome and Moscow, particularly through the endeavours of Jesuit Antonio Possevino. This initiative, situated within the context of the Polish-Muscovite War and the Holy See’s pursuit of peace, ultimately proved unsuccessful. Following the Peace of Jam Zapolski in 1582, diplomatic contact between Rome and Moscow ceased. Extensive scholarship addresses Possevino’s mission to Muscovy. See: Domenico Caccamo, “La diplomazia della Controriforma e la crociata: dai piani del Possevino alla “lunga guerra” di Clemente VIII”, *Archivio Storico Italiano*, vol. 128/ 2 (1970): 255-81.

49 “A quest’ora avrà Vostra Signoria ricevuta la mia lettera dove le significai il desiderio di Nostro Signore di riaprir la porta al commercio col Gran Duca di Moscovia chiusa nel Pontificato passato col negargli il titolo di Czar; mentre con intenzione simile a quella del Gran Duca Giovanni che pregò Gregorio XIII d’interporsi per la pace tra lui e Stefano Battori, e l’ottenne, avea inviato qua un Gentilhuomo scozzese a proporre l’introduzione del Commercio tra Clemente X e il suo signore. [...]. Considera Sua Beatitudine che [...] basterà per insinuare a quel Principe la buona disposizione [...] accennargli insieme non aver mai Sua Santità approvata la ripulsa che si diede da Ministri di Clemente X al titolo

Despite the concerted efforts of Pope Innocent XI, particularly through the mission entrusted to the Jesuit Juraj Križanić—a scholar educated at the Greek College of Saint Athanasius in Rome and previously engaged in missions to Muscovy—the pontiff ultimately came to terms with the impracticability of securing Moscow's involvement in a unified front against Constantinople. The ideological and theological divisions that began with the Great Schism of 1054 had progressively entrenched themselves, further exacerbated by Moscow's elevation to patriarchate in 1589. These divisions had become deeply rooted in the political and religious culture of the era, rendering meaningful and lasting dialogue between the Latin and Orthodox worlds nearly unattainable.

200

Compounding this was the failure of negotiations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy concerning the implementation and revision of the Treaty of Andruszów, which contributed to a gradual recalibration of Muscovite policy towards a disengagement from the Ottoman question⁵⁰. This shift ultimately culminated in the Sultan's signing of the Peace of Bakhchysaray in 1681⁵¹.

As the potential for Muscovite military assistance diminished, the Holy See was compelled to redirect its diplomatic efforts to fostering a closer, more structured alliance between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburg Empire. This pivot became increasingly urgent amid growing disinterest among other European powers in the Ottoman issue, driven by domestic political challenges or divergent strategic priorities. While France covertly sought to manipulate the Ottoman offensive against Leopold I in Hungary, Spain and Portugal grappled with intricate internal difficulties. Venice, having recently emerged from the prolonged and arduous war of Candia against the Ottomans, adopted a policy of non-belligerence, remaining vigilant and poised to respond to future developments. In this complex geopolitical context, the Holy See found it imperative to prioritise the establishment of a coalition between Vienna and Warsaw. It was the fervent hope of Nuncio Martelli that "God wills that all mistrust between these two courts will finally vanish"⁵². Such a bilateral convergence was emerging as the sole viable foundation for a concerted and effective response to the intensifying Ottoman pressure on the borders of Christendom.

The crucial *Sejm* meeting in Grodno [Hrodna, Belarus], convened between 1679 and 1680, marked a significant turning point in the foreign policy of the *Rzeczpospolita*,

di Czar: che perciò può egli aspettarsi da nostro Signore non solamente questo titolo ma ogn'altra dimostrazione d'amore e di stima molto singolare", AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 94, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 10 IV 1677, ff. 4v-5r.

50 As early as 1679, the nuncio Martelli warned Rome of the cautious position adopted by Moscow towards the Turks. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 97, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Warsaw 10 IV 1679, f. 266v.

51 Carl Bickford O'Brien, "Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai", *The Russian Review*, 12/4 (1953): 259-68.

52 "se Dio vorrà che si dileguino una volta affatto tutte le diffidenze tra queste due corti", AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 96, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Jarosław 31 VIII 1678, f. 436r.

as it formally declared itself “at war with the Turks”⁵³ and initiated a strategic rapprochement with the Habsburg imperial court. This shift was accompanied by an increasingly marked distancing from the previously favoured French diplomatic sphere. The transformation in Polish foreign policy, which had been aligned mainly with Louis XIV’s Eastern ambitions and anti-Habsburg strategies as articulated in the 1675 Jaworów Accords, can be attributed to a confluence of factors.

Historians have highlighted the considerable influence of Maria Kazimiera Sobieska (1641–1716), the consort of King Jan III, a Frenchwoman whose disillusionment with King Louis XIV’s failure to fulfil commitments made in 1675 played a fundamental role in the deterioration of relations between Warsaw and Paris. Additionally, a rising internal opposition—initially subdued but gradually more pronounced—emanated from sectors of the magnate aristocracy, who adhered to the traditional concept of Poland as an *Antemurale Christianitatis*. This faction expressed increasing apprehension regarding the diplomatic overture toward the Ottoman Empire established by the Peace of Żórawno, which they perceived as detrimental to the monarchy’s international prestige and its historical role as a defender of Christianity. The correspondence between the Roman Curia and the papal nuncio, Francesco Martelli, preceding the convocation of the Diet, illustrates the intense political tensions enveloping the *Sejm*’s proceedings. Martelli himself noted a pronounced “discrepancy of opinions”⁵⁴ among the political elite. The deliberations were further complicated by numerous unresolved domestic issues, including the conflict between Hieronim Augustyn Lubomirski, the court marshal and knight of the Order of Malta, and Dymitr Wiśniowiecki, the grand general of the kingdom, over the contested inheritance of the Duchy of Ostrogh. Additionally, the claims of the queen’s secretary, Andrzej Chryzostom Załuski (1650–1711), regarding the annual allowances owed to the sovereign and the assertions of certain Ruthenian families concerning properties acquired by the Society of Jesus in Jarosław, where a Jesuit college had existed since 1575, further contributed to the intricate political landscape⁵⁵.

In this context, Nuncio Martelli’s interventions proved instrumental in advancing the Holy See’s objectives. Following prolonged unsuccessful attempts to persuade King Sobieski to engage militarily against the Ottomans, Martelli recognised the emergence of a political transition and redirected his focus toward Queen Maria Kazimiera. In a private audience, he articulated that the Republic had demonstrated greater unity, peace, and loyalty to the King during the war against the Turks. He simultaneously posited that the prevailing peace had allowed internal suspicions and tensions to resurface⁵⁶.

53 The Holy See will be promptly informed of the conclusion of the Diet directly by Nuncio Martelli. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 97, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Hrodna 10 IV 1679, f. 262r.

54 “discrepanza de’ pareri”, AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 97, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Warsaw 1 I 1679, f. 6r.

55 On the Diet of Grodno, see Platania, *Rzeczpospolita*, 187–230; Boccolini, *Roma, Varsavia*, 63–84.

56 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 94, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Jarosław 19 VII 1678, f. 180v.

By casting doubt on the political stability of the kingdom, Martelli endeavoured to garner the support of influential figures within the senatorial and equestrian orders, in alignment with directives from Rome to “prepare minds [...] for a generous deliberation in the Diet itself, to defend the ancient glory and freedom of the Fatherland” against Ottoman encroachments⁵⁷.

202

The proceedings of the *Sejm*, which commenced on January 28, unfolded gradually and appeared inconclusive. Factors such as the notable absence of several deputies, the non-arrival of the Moscow commissioners tasked with discussing the Andruszów question, and the sovereign’s prioritisation of secondary matters and internal conflicts among the attendees contributed to the delay in reaching a decisive resolution. Martelli astutely identified the principal impediment to a swift culmination of the Diet regarding a declaration of war against the Ottomans, noting that “the health of this Kingdom depends on sincere union with the Emperor”⁵⁸. This objective proved challenging, given Poland’s commitments to France and the need for broader peace among Christian princes. The nuncio explicitly acknowledged the connection between the negotiations in Nijmegen between Louis XIV and Leopold I and the fervent discussions at the Grodno *Sejm*. It was no mere coincidence that, amidst the Diet’s first proceedings, he expressed his frustrations in Rome concerning the lack of substantive progress, which he characterised as a “wealth of fine words and a paucity of action”⁵⁹. The simultaneous establishment of a general peace between France and the Holy Roman Empire was crucial to the eventual outcome. The ratification of treaties confirming Louis XIV’s formal withdrawal from the Rhine and, consequently, also from the “informal” Hungarian front, enabled Sobieski to pursue a potential political rapprochement with Vienna. On April 10, 1679, John III, in conjunction with the Polish Diet, proclaimed their intention to recommence “the war with the Turks”⁶⁰. This proclamation culminated in a unanimous decision to dispatch an extensive network of embassies to the principal European courts, tasked with assessing their diplomatic stances and laying the groundwork for a comprehensive crusade against the Ottoman Empire⁶¹, in line with the strategic alliance of Christian princes envisaged by Innocent XI. Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski († 1688) was assigned to Muscovy, while Michał Radziwiłł (1635–1680) undertook missions to Vienna and Rome; Piotr Mikołaj Koryciński (1644–1680) was entrusted with engagements in the courts of Lisbon and Madrid,

57 “dispor gli animi dell’Ordine senatorio, et equestre ad una generosa deliberazione nella Dieta medesima, per difender l’antica gloria, e la libertà della Patria”, AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 183A, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 15 X 1678, f. 197r.

58 “che la salute di questo Regno dipende dalla sincera unione coll’Imperatore”, AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 94, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, [Regon] 23 IX 1677, f. 140r.

59 “con larghezza di buone parole, e scarsezza nei fatti”, AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 94, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Hrodno 27 III 1679, f. 205r.

60 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 97, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Hrodno 10 IV 1679, f. 226r.

61 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 97, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Hrodno 29 IV 1679, f. 279r.

and Grand Treasurer Jan Andrzej Morsztyn represented the kingdom in London, the United Provinces, and Versailles. These principal embassies were complemented by missions to lesser-known courts, such as the Duke of Cleves of the Radziwiłł family's mission to the Elector of Brandenburg, and Hieronymus Augustyn Lubomirski's assignment to Turin⁶².

The decisions reached in Grodno in April 1679 marked a significant turning point in the *Rzeczpospolita*'s foreign policy under Sobieski. The resolution to wage war against the Ottomans unequivocally aligned Warsaw with the crusade initiative conceived by Innocent XI since 1676, positioning Poland to converge with Vienna while simultaneously diverging from France.

Although Rome would have consistently reiterated its commitment to providing financial backing to bolster the *Rzeczpospolita*'s military capabilities, the paramount concern for Jan III Sobieski rested on discerning the responses of the major European courts to the embassies dispatched from Warsaw. This objective underscored many discussions between the sovereign and nuncio Francesco Martelli during the Grodno Diet, re-centring their reflections in the aftermath of the *Sejm*'s closure, with the shared conviction that the diplomatic endeavours undertaken would yield favourable outcomes.

203

In June, we will know whether the Republic has made the necessary contributions and whether the treaty with Russia will be finalised. At that time, the Emperor will have determined whether the peace established with France is likely to be stable. If so, there should be no issue in moving his forces toward Hungary, and victory would be more assured if both the Poles and the Russians acted simultaneously. The King informed me that at the beginning of June, the Duke of Radziwiłł, his Extraordinary Ambassador, will be in Vienna. He will then travel to Rome and negotiate with the Imperial Court at the appropriate time. The King insists that if the Emperor, Poland, and Muscovy act together, we should not doubt our ability to achieve victory. They also discussed the support the Most Christian King could provide if he were to deploy the naval armada reportedly being prepared in the Mediterranean to besiege the Turks in the Archipelago. Following that, he could position himself in front of the Dardanelles, creating significant confusion among the Turks and the city of Constantinople⁶³.

62 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 97, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Hrodno 10 IV 1679, ff. 266r-267r. On the various embassies: Platania, *Rzeczpospolita*, 187-230; Boccolini, *Roma, Varsavia*, 85-128.

63 "[...] nel mese di giugno si vedrà se la Repubblica averà stabilite le contribuzioni necessarie, e se si concluderà il Trattato co' i Moscoviti, che all'ora l'Imperatore avrà scoperto se la Pace colla Francia potrà sperarsi stabile, nel qual caso non vi sarà difficoltà a muovere l'armi da quella parte in Ungheria [...] onde sarebbe poi più sicura la Vittoria, se unitamente si muovessero i Polacchi et i Moscoviti. [...] il re mi rispose appunto verso il principio di giugno sarà in Vienna il Signor Duca di Radzwill suo Ambasciatore Straordinario, il quale dovrà poi passare a Roma e che perciò potrà negoziare in tempo opportuno alla Corte Cesarea, e che se si muoverà l'Imperatore, la Polonia, e la Moscovia non si deve dubitare una certa, e spedita Vittoria. Si passò poi a parlare de' gli aiuti che potrebbe contribuire

In a relatively short time, the initial hopes and expectations for diplomatic engagements were significantly dashed⁶⁴. The missions assigned to Piotr Mikołaj Koryciński in Lisbon and Madrid, as well as to Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł in Vienna and Rome, yielded disappointing results. In Koryciński's case, this was primarily attributable to the prevailing political and economic challenges faced by the Iberian monarchies. Similarly, Radziwiłł's efforts were undermined by the ineffectiveness of the diplomatic initiatives undertaken. France, while publicly voicing reluctance to engage directly against the Ottomans to protect its Levantine trade interests, was, in reality, intent on safeguarding its anti-Habsburg objectives and thus ignored King Sobieski's appeals. The only affirmative response came from the small Republic of Ragusa, known for its historical antagonism toward Ottoman authority. Additionally, Muscovy would have opted in 1681 to sign the Peace of Bakhchysaray with the Sultan, despite prolonged solicitations from both Rome and Warsaw; this decision effectively precluded Muscovy's involvement in any coordinated military efforts against the Ottoman Empire.

Confronted with this disheartening scenario, wherein the ambitions expressed in Grodno were largely unrealised, Jan III Sobieski found himself constrained in terms of political manoeuvrability. The new political course initiated by the Diet of 1679–1680 now threatened to rebound adversely on both the sovereign and the kingdom's stability. With the realisation that the unsuccessful embassy led by Jan Andrzej Morsztyn to the court of Louis XIV had failed, Sobieski was compelled to expedite the formation of an alliance with the Habsburg Empire, the only power genuinely invested in countering Ottoman expansionism. Such an alliance, if realised, could substantially alter the geopolitical dynamics of Central and Eastern Europe. It is noteworthy that Louis XIV's confidence in Sobieski increasingly waned, culminating in its complete dissolution. In response, Paris undertook a strategic reshuffle of its diplomatic presence in Poland, dispatching Marquis Nicolas-Louis de Vitry⁶⁵, known as de l'Hospital, along with Bishop Toussaint de Forbin-Janson to Warsaw, simultaneously launching a systematic campaign of internal destabilisation aimed at undermining the Polish sovereign's anti-Turkish posture. The repercussions of this strategy became apparent to the newly appointed apostolic nuncio to Poland, Opizio Pallavicini⁶⁶.

il Re Christianissimo se si disponesse a valersi dell'armata navale, quale si sente si prepari nel Mediterraneo, per infestare i Turchi nell'Arcipelago, e che se essa si presentasse a Dardanelli metterebbe i Turchi e l'istessa Città di Costantinopoli in un'estrema costernazione e confusione", AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 97, F. Martelli to A. Cybo, Warsaw 15 IV 1679, f. 28or-v.

64 Rome anticipated the potential failure of diplomatic missions sent to Grodno and across Europe. Cybo, while commending Poland's decision to resume hostilities against the Turks, expressed significant reservations about the deployment of ambassadors to European courts, underscoring the need to form alliances with the Empire and Muscovy. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 94, A. Cybo to F. Martelli, Rome 13 V 1678, f. 17r-v.

65 See Zbigniew Wojcik, *Jan Sobieski* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy 1983), 307–13, 410.

66 Already nuncio in Cologne from 1673 to 1680 replacing Buonvisi, he remained

On the eve of the 1681 Diet, which convened to deliberate on the *Rzeczpospolita*'s potential involvement in an anti-Ottoman campaign alongside the Empire, Pallavicini communicated to Francesco Buonvisi in Vienna that the meticulous efforts exerted by French diplomacy were engendering widespread disorder within the kingdom, beginning with local Diets, wherein "no mention was made of a defensive alliance, nor any discussion of waging war against the common enemy"⁶⁷. This state of disarray was unmistakable at the commencement of the new Diet, which reconvened in Grodno and was officially inaugurated on January 14, 1681. Anticipated to be a "Diet memorable for posterity"⁶⁸ due to the significance of the decisions to be rendered, the assembly exhibited profound divisions from its inception. Pallavicini quickly discerned the Diet's inherent fragility, noting that "if so multitude of disagreements and daily issues did not arise, the Diet could have been expedited; but, when one [issue] is concluded, another commences"⁶⁹. The increasingly pronounced opposition among the pro-French and pro-royal factions was also exacerbated by the imperial perspective, which even resorted to orchestrating an assault against the family of Louis XIV's ambassador⁷⁰. Additionally, the influential Lithuanian families of Pac and Sapieha, intensifying tensions within the Diet's proceedings, were escalating toward the potential for civil conflict. In a kingdom that had become politically fragmented, the adeptness of agents operating under the auspices of the *Christianissimo* King further contributed to the disruption. Exploiting the structural vulnerabilities of the Polish institutional framework, predicated on the principle of unanimous decisions within the *Sejm*, they ultimately facilitated the division of the Diet by corrupting the vote of Władysław Przyjemski († 1699), the palatine of Kalisz⁷¹, thereby thwarting the adoption of a formal resolution endorsing an alliance with the Empire.

nuncio in Poland from 1680 to 1688. Wojtyska, *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, t. I, 277-79; Maria Domin-Jáčov, *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, t. XXXIV, voll. 1-9 (1995-2021).

- 67 "non fecesi mentione alcuna di lega defensiva, nemeno di muover guerra contro il nimico comune", ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/49, n. 22, O. Pallavicini to F. Buonvisi, Warsaw 29 XI 1680.
- 68 "Dieta [che] seria memorabile alla posterità", AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 98, O. Pallavicini to A. Cybo, Warsaw 4 XII 1680, f. 643v.
- 69 "se non s'incontrassero molte discordie e questioni particolari, già si seria al fine della Dieta, ma queste sorgano ogni giorno, e quando una è finita l'altra comincia", ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/52, n. 134, O. Pallavicini to F. Buonvisi, Warsaw 23 IV 1681.
- 70 The reference is to the ambush against the French ambassador in which one of his faithful servants lost his life, as attested by several "Avvisi". AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 99, Avviso, Warsaw 5 II 1681, f. 66r.
- 71 The news spread throughout Europe, reaching Rome by means of an extraordinary courier sent by the nuncio Pallavicini (AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol 99, O. Pallavicini to A. Cybo, Warsaw 27 V 1681, f. 352r.); even the personal secretary of Jan III Sobieski, Tommaso Talenti, had informed the Cardinal Protector of the Kingdom Carlo Barberini of what had happened. (BAV, Barb. Lat. 6655, T. Talenti to C. Barberini, Warsaw 28 V 1681, ff. 13r-15r.).

After the army's levies and contributions for its maintenance, amounting to 12 million for the year, had been agreed upon, the Diet was expected to close positively on the Saturday before Pentecost. A certain Prziemshi, the ambassador of Great Poland and a young man of 25, did not lodge an official protest, and, declaring that he would not impede the proceedings, left the Senate, promising to return once the Diet was closed to kiss the king's hand. However, the situation worsened when Dombroshi disrupted the Diet by protesting its validity. Whispers calling him a traitor circulated among hundreds in the Senate. Things escalated for Prziemshi when, on Friday, after withdrawing from the Senate, he found himself in danger. He was attacked by hundreds of servants who hurled the most ignominious insults at him, stopped him, and nearly killed him⁷².

206

In the context of the unfolding political crisis, Jan III Sobieski endeavoured to adhere to constitutional protocol by urging the *Sejm* members present to reconvene to conclude the Diet formally. However, these efforts were met with resistance. During the night of May 26–27, Dąbrowski, an individual closely associated with the Elector of Brandenburg and with ties to French interests, vehemently opposed the proposal for a military alliance between Warsaw and Vienna⁷³. His actions culminated in a crucial veto that compelled the sovereign to dissolve the Diet officially⁷⁴.

These developments transpired at a particularly precarious moment characterised by the dissemination of alarming intelligence. Reports confirmed the ratification of the Treaty of Bakhchisaray between Muscovy and the Ottoman Porte. At the same time, simultaneous accounts noted significant military preparations by the Ottomans, orchestrated under Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa⁷⁵. According to these assessments, a substantial Ottoman force was already mobilised along what had become a crucial southern frontier of Christendom, positioned between Hungary and Poland⁷⁶.

72 “Dopo aggiustato il numero da levarsi e le contribuzioni per il mantenimento d'essache dovevano ascendere a 12 milioni per un anno, quando si sperava il sabato avanti la Pentecoste vederla felicemente terminata, un tal Prziemshi, ambasciatore della Gran Polonia giovine di 25 anni subornato da gl'altri dal palatino di Posnania o, per meglio dire, corrotto dal denaro se bene non si protestò, si dichiarò di non impedire l'attività et uscendo di senato promise che se quel giorno si fosse terminata sarebbe retornato per avere l'onore di baciare la regia mano [...]. Quando il Dombroshi con la protesta d'invalidità ruppe la dieta, si sentirno in senato sussurri col nome di traditore al medesimo da centinaia di persone. Ma peggio però arrivò al Prziemshi, mentre venerdì ritiratosi dal senato e discendendo a basso in castello, fu veduto in pericolo della vita, mentre centinaia di servitori con parole delle più ignominiose l'assaltorno, lo fermorno e quasi lo trucidorno”, BAV, Barb. Lat. 6655, T. Talenti to C. Barberini, Warsaw 28 V 1681, ff. 13r-15r.

73 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6655, T. Talenti to C. Barberini, Warsaw 4 VI 1681, ff. 16r-17r.

74 The nuncio informed Rome with a long and detailed letter: AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 99, O. Pallavicini to Alderano Cybo, Warsaw 27 V 1681, ff. 346r-351r.

75 AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 94, O. Pallavicini to A. Cybo, Warsaw 14 V 1681, ff. 375r-76v.

76 The Notices of those days reported that part of the Turkish army was already

CONCLUSION

The alliance between Jan III Sobieski and the Holy Roman Emperor was formalised at the Diet of April 1683, despite substantial opposition from France. The French ambassador, de Vitry, undertook measures to undermine the agreement through a combination of intrigue and financial inducements, predominantly leveraging the influence of the pro-French faction led by Grand Treasurer Andrzej Morsztyn⁷⁷. The resultant accusations, bolstered by intercepted encrypted correspondence, elicited a vehement response from Sobieski, who publicly condemned French interference in a letter addressed to King Louis XIV, a document widely disseminated among European diplomatic circles⁷⁸. Amid this charged political climate, the mediation of papal nuncios Buonvisi and Pallavicini emerged as a crucial factor, advocating a strategy to defer the trial of Morsztyn and prevent an impasse at the Diet. This papal intervention facilitated Sobieski's negotiations with the imperial envoy Karl Ferdinand Waldstein⁷⁹ and, with the procurement of financial guarantees from Rome, he successfully persuaded the *Sejm* to grant unanimous approval for the military alliance between the Empire and the *Rzeczpospolita*⁸⁰. This crucial decision, sanctioned on Easter Eve 1683, unfolded amid circumstances significantly different from the initial diplomatic intentions of Sobieski and Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi. On the night of 18 April 1683, the dynamics had profoundly changed since the Grodno Diet of 1679, and the subsequent persistent internal dissent and opposition from Paris had given way to an urgent awareness of the impending conflict with the Infidels. In fact, Vienna was set to face a long and brutal siege by the Ottoman forces commanded by Kara Mustafa.

207

marching towards Hungary, part towards Ukraine. AAV, Segr. Stato. Polonia, vol. 99, Avviso, Warsaw 27 V 1681, f. 353r.

- 77 Vitry had engaged in correspondence with Morzstyn, the Grand Treasurer of Poland, exchanging compromising messages that suggested the possibility of a regicide plot. See, Charles Gérin, "Le pape Innocent XI et le siège de Vienne", *Revue des questions historiques*, 39 (1886): 95-147. The affair of the intercepted letters soon became "public", so much so that the Roman Carlo Cartari also wrote the news in his diary. ASR., Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 89, ff. 54v-5r.
- 78 Platania, *Scritti minori*, 119-23.
- 79 Bittner, *Repertorium*, vol. I, p. 160; Jean Du Hamel de Breuil, *Sobieski et sa politique*, vol. II (Paris: E. Leroux 1893) 63-9. The imperial endeavour left Vienna on 19 December 1682 and arrived in Warsaw on 2 January. BAV, Barb. Lat., 6655, T. Talenti to C. Barberini, Lviv 2 I 1683, ff. 219r-220r. The Polish resident in Vienna, Antonio Colletti, informed the Cardinal Protector of the first audience he had with Jan III, BAV, Barb. Lat., 6670, A. Colletti to C. Barberini, Vienna 1 III 1683, f. 130r.
- 80 BAV, Barb. Lat. 6567, Punti principali della Lega conclusa tra Sua Maestà Cesarea e la Maestà del Re di Polonia, f. 54r-v; Ib., Sommario della Lega Santa fra Cesare e la Polonia segnata in Varsavia il 30 marzo 1683. Capitolazioni dell'Imperatore e Re di Polonia per la Lega, f. 55v. See G.B. Chiarello, *Historia degl'avvenimenti [...]* (Venezia: Curti 1688), 30-1; Simpliciano Bizozzeri, *La Sagra Lega contro la Potenza Ottomana [...]* (Milano: Pandolfo Malatesta 1690), 18.

ABBREVIATION

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

Segr. Stato: Segreteria di Stato.

ASL: Archivio di Stato di Lucca.

ASR: Archivio di Stato di Roma.

BAV: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana.

Barb. Lat.: Barberiniano Latino.

DBI: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boccolini, Alessandro. "The unsuccessful election of Rinaldo d'Este to the throne of Poland (1674)". In *I Barberini e l'Europa*, edited by Alessandro Boccolini, and Péter Tusor, 77-98. Viterbo: Sette Città, 2022.

Bickford O'Brien, Carl. "Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai". *The Russian Review*, 12/4 (1953): 259-68.

Bickford O'Brien, Carl. *Muscovy and the Ukraine from the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667*. Berkeley: University Press, 1963.

Bittner, Ludwig. *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648)*, vol.1: 1648-1715. Berlin: Oldenburg, 1936.

Boccolini, Alessandro. *Roma, Varsavia e il pericolo turco nel contesto della diplomazia europea (1679-1684)*. Roma: Istituto Nazionale di Studi Romani, 2022.

Boccolini, Alessandro. *Un lucchese al servizio della Santa Sede. Francesco Buonvisi, nunzio a Colonia, Varsavia e Vienna*. Viterbo: Sette Città, 2018.

Bösel Richard, Menniti Ippolito Antonio, Spiriti Andrea, Strinati Claudio, and Visceglia Maria Antonietta. *Innocenzo xi Odescalchi. Papa, politico, committente*. Viella: Roma, 2014.

Bots, Hans, ed. *The Peace of Nijmegen/La Paix de Nimegue 1676-1678/1679*. Amsterdam: Holland Universiteits Pers 1980.

Caccamo, Domenico. "La diplomazia della Controriforma e la crociata: dai piani del Possevino alla "lunga guerra" di Clemente VIII". *Archivio Storico Italiano*, vol. 128/ 2 (1970): 255-81.

Deloffre Frédéric, and Rougeot Jacques, eds. *Guilleragues. Correspondance*, 2 voll. Paris-Genève: Librairie Droz, 1976.

Du Hamel de Breuil, Jean. *Sobieski et sa politique*, vol. II. Paris: E. Leroux 1893.

Firpo, Luigi, ed. *Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, vol. XIII: *Costantinopoli*. Torino: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1984.

Kołodziejczyk, Dariusz. *Ejlat Kamieniecki. Podole pod panowaniem tureckim (1672-1699)*. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Polczek, 1994.

Orłowski, Damian. *Chocim 1673*. Warszawa: Bellona, 2007.

Platania, Gaetano. "Alcuni significativi episodi dei rapporti francopolacchi nel Seicento". In *Gli archivi della Santa Sede e la storia di Francia*, edited by Giovanni Pizzorusso, Olivier Poncet, and Matteo Sanfilippo, 137-60. Viterbo: Sette Città 2006.

Platania, Gaetano. "Diplomatici Moscoviti a Roma (1673)". In *Sentieri Ripresi: studi in onore di Nadia Boccara*, edited by Gaetano Platania, 299-321. Viterbo: Sette Città, 2013.

Platania, Gaetano. "Diplomazia e guerra turca nel XVII secolo. La politica

- diplomazia polacca e la “lunga guerra turca” (1673-1683)”. In *I Turchi, il Mediterraneo e l'Europa*, edited by Giovanna Motta, 242-68. Milano: Franco Angeli 1998.
- Platania, Gaetano. “L'assedio di Vienna del 1683 e il giubileo straordinario del beato Innocenzo XI Odescalchi”. In *I giubilei straordinari in età moderna (XVII-XVIII)*, edited by Francesca De Caprio, 93-132. Viterbo: Sette Città 2016.
- Platania, Gaetano. *Mamma li turchi! la politica pontificia e l'idea di una crociata moderna*. Viterbo: Sette Città 2010.
- Platania, Gaetano. *Rzeczpospolita, Europa e Santa Sede tra intese e ostilità*. Viterbo: Sette Città, 2001.
- Platania, Gaetano. *Scritti minori. Saggi di Storia sobiesciana*. Sette Città: Viterbo 2021.
- Ritzler Remigius, and Sefrin Pirminius, eds. *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris Aevi*, vol. 5. Patavii: Il Messaggero di S. Antonio, 1952.
- Theiner, Augustin. *Monuments Historique de Russie relatif aux règnes d'Alexis Michaelowitch, Fédor III et Pierre le Grand Czars de Russie*. Rome: Vaticane 1859.
- Trenta, Tommaso. *Memorie per servire alla storia politica del cardinale Francesco Buonvisi patrizio lucchese*, t. I. Lucca: Bertini 1818.
- Wojcik, Zbigniew. *Jan Sobieski*. Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983.
- Wójcik, Zbigniew. *Traktat Andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1959.
- Wojtyńska, Henrik Damian Cp, ed. *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, vol. I. Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1990.
- Woliński, Janusz. *Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich*. Warszawa: Mon, 1983.

PRIMARY SOURCES

AAV

Segr. Stato. Polonia, voll. 93, 94, 96-99, 183A.

PRINTED SOURCES

- Bizzeri, Simpliciano. *La sagra lega contro la potenza ottomana successi delle armi imperiali, polacche, venete, e moscouite [...]*. Milano: Pandolfo Malatesta 1690.
- Chiarello, Giovanni Battista. *Historia degl'aunimenti dell'armi imperiali contro a ribelli et ottomani, confederationi e trattati seguiti fra le potenze di Cesare, Polonia, Venetia e Moscouia [...]*. Venezia: Curti, 1688.
- Diaz Furio, and Carranza Nicola, eds. *Francesco Buonvisi. Nunziatura a Varsavia*, vol. II: (6 giugno 1674-28 agosto 1675). Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Età moderna e contemporanea, 1965.