

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XV–XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History Sciences.

This special issue of *Eastern European History Review* addresses the complex and intense history of Christian-Ottoman relations in Central and Eastern Europe during the Early Modern Period. Tracing the salient moments and facts with battles, border issues, diplomacy and intelligence, the volume – with the participation of authors from different parts of Europe and Türkiye – constitutes an international opportunity to analyze topics that continually offer new study themes.

Central and South-Eastern Europe between the Christian world and the Ottoman world: conflicts, encounters and compromises (XVI-XVIII centuries), edited by the Turkish historian Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy, is the result of research and scientific collaboration between the CESPoM Study Center and Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group (ELKH-PPKE-PTE).

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CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Edited by Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy



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**CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
BETWEEN THE CHRISTIAN AND OTTOMAN WORLDS:
CONFLICTS, ENCOUNTERS AND COMPROMISES
(XVI-XVIII CENTURIES)**

Edited by
Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy

Co-edited by
Katalin Nagy

Special Participation of
Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group (ELKH-PPKE-PTE)



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EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: LA RIVISTA

Il Comitato redazionale e scientifico è lieto di presentare al pubblico la rivista scientifica *Eastern European History Review*.

Con un carattere internazionale e interdisciplinare, una cadenza annuale e una fruibilità *open access* la rivista focalizza i propri interessi sulle dinamiche occorse nell'Europa Orientale durante tutta l'età moderna (XIV-XIX). *Eastern European History Review* è espressione del Centro Studi dell'Università della Tuscia CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna) nato nel 1997 per intuizione del Prof. Gaetano Platania, Direttore Emerito della Rivista.

L'iniziativa editoriale che presentiamo nasce dall'evidente mancanza in Italia di una rivista scientifica relativa alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale in Età Moderna, nonostante la penisola abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale per la Storia e la Cultura di una parte integrante del continente, a torto considerata come lontana e periferica.

Consapevoli di questo, il Comitato ha posto quale obiettivo primario della *Eastern European History Review* quello di offrire uno spazio di riflessione e di discussione su temi che appartengono alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale, e insieme alle relazioni - politiche e culturali - che questa vasta area del Vecchio Continente ha avuto con l'occidente d'Europa, e l'Italia in particolare, incoraggiando il dialogo tra studiosi e esperti di settore, e tra differenti approcci della ricerca scientifica.

Il Comitato Redazionale e Scientifico

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: THE JOURNAL

The Editorial and Scientific Board are proud delighted to present the *Eastern European History Review* under the aegis of Sette Città Editore.

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV-XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997, from an idea of Prof. Gaetano Platania, today Director Emeritus of this journal.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History sciences.

The editorial initiative we present comes from the obvious lack of a journal, in Italy, concerning the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the Modern Age, this despite its fundamental role in the history and culture of that part of the continent, wrongly considered distant and peripheral.

Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Main objective of the journal is to create a space for reflection and discussion on topics pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, but also relations with Continental Europe, encouraging dialogue between scholars and experts in the field, and between different approaches of scientific research.

The Editorial and Scientific Board

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INTRODUCTION

The advance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe in the Modern Age posed a threat to many European states. The conquest of Constantinople (later İstanbul) during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II (the Conqueror) in the XV century, followed by the Otranto expedition and siege, the Ottoman advance in Central Europe during the reign of Sultan Suleyman I in the XVI century, particularly the Siege of Vienna, as well as the successes of Chief Admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha in the Mediterranean and many other similar events generated a sense of anxiety and fear in Europe for centuries. As a matter of fact, the phrase *Mamma li Turchi!*, used by Italians even today in response to negative events, dates back to this historical Turkish threat and the negative feeling it generated, which has its roots in the XV and XVI centuries.

It is rather challenging to cover such a broad subject as the relations between the Ottoman Empire and European states in the Modern Age, especially between the 16th and 18th centuries, in an introduction. However, in order to understand the dynamics between the Ottoman Empire and the Christian world, it would be useful to go back a little further and give a brief overview of how the parties viewed each other as an introduction to the subject. Starting from the Late Middle Ages until the middle of the Modern Age, the East and the West, in other words, the two worlds comprised mostly of Muslims and Christians, were in constant interaction with each other in a relationship that alternated between wars and trade. However, the fear became a dominant emotion in this intense and dynamic relationship from the XV century onwards. Although the world order changed due to geographical discoveries, the main region where the conflict of control and domination took place was the Mediterranean and Central-Eastern Europe. On the one hand, there was the Western Christian world, which had entered a new era with the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia, and on the other was the Ottoman Empire, which had conquered Byzantium and its culture. From another perspective, it can be deduced that the conflict between these two sides evolved from a clash of "civilizations" to a clash of "powers" and gained a stronger political character at least since the XVI century¹. At this point, it is necessary to underline the differences between Western historiography and Ottoman historiography. For a long time, contrary to what Western historiography suggests, the Ottoman Empire did not carry out its conquests with the aim of forcibly converting the peoples of the conquered regions to Islam, however mainly aimed to expand the borders of the Empire². The distinguished Turkish historian Professor Halil İnalcık provided in his works important information on Ottoman conquest policy. For example, how the Ottomans conquered the Christian Balkans and managed to establish themselves there for so long remain a historical question even today. According to the old theory, Ottoman rule was manifested by force and persecution and lasted

1 Franco Cardini, *Il Turco a Vienna. Storia del grande assedio del 1683* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2011), 4.

2 Marko Jacov, *L'Europa tra conquiste ottomane e leghe sante* (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana), 255.

as a regime of exploitation under the control of a military class of Sipahi³. However, according to the current historical analysis derived from research based on Ottoman archive documents, the Ottoman Empire was able to persuade the local Christian populations to peace and reconciliation thanks to the principles of *istimalet*⁴ and *aman* which meant looking out for the people, especially non-Muslim subjects, and treating them with clemency. The Ottoman Empire always offered the opponent three chances to surrender, and if the offer was accepted, a sworn “ahdname”⁵ guaranteed the opponent’s security of life and property. These guarantees were rigorously implemented, and many conquests were accomplished by this way. In fact, speaking about the Balkans again, it is known that Orthodox Greeks and Slavs often viewed the Ottoman regime as a protector of their Church. In addition, one of the main reasons for the long-lasting Ottoman rule in the conquered lands was the Ottoman tax-land system. Unlike the old feudal system, this system guaranteed the peasant’s land use through the *mîrî* land (State owned land that was transferred to those who use the right of disposition) regime⁶.

The Ottomans have been called “Turks” by the Western world for centuries. In the Modern Age, fear for the “Turk” has manifested as activities and efforts of “marginalization”, “vilification” and therefore “disparagement”. Turks have been the main representative of the “other” for Europeans for centuries, from the very beginning of Muslim-Christian contact⁷. However, the Ottoman Empire was not only a source of fear for the Western world, but also a source of great curiosity and fascination. In the West, most literary scientific works were written against the Ottomans, who were described as “*infidel*”. Thus, for centuries, the Ottomans were not only unlikeable and feared by Europeans, but also appealing and attractive. In addition to being “foreigners” for historical and geographical reasons, their traditions became the focus of interest for researchers and scholars as they were

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- 3 The most distinguished group of the household cavalry troops in the Ottoman military system. Erhan Afyoncu, “Sipahi”, *DİA*, 37 (2009): 256-58.
 - 4 The dictionary meaning of “*istimâlet*” is «to predispose, to appeal, to win the heart». In Ottoman chronicles it meant: «to look after the people, especially non-Muslim subjects, and be lenient towards them». Treating the people of conquered places well, protecting them, ensuring the security of life and property against external enemies, granting freedom in religious matters, facilitating taxation are the main elements of Ottoman *istimâlet*. See: Mücteba İlgürel, “İstimalet”, *DİA*, 27 (2001): 362.
 - 5 A document issued by the order of the rulers to grant special rights to certain states, groups and individuals. See: Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu “Ahidname”, *DİA*, 1 (1988): 536-40.
 - 6 Halil İnalcık, *Doğu Batı, Makaleler II* (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2008), 248, 96-110. On Ottoman provincial administration and the fief system, see also Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, trans. Ruşen Sezer (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 108-23. The work was first published in English. See Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, Classical Age (1300-1600)* (London: Nicholson Publishing, 1973).
 - 7 Mustafa Soykut, *Papalık ve Venedik Belgelerinde Avrupa’nın Birliği ve Osmanlı Devleti (1453-1683)* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 17, 24.

close or neighbors. In short, many works depicting the Ottomans and providing information about them appeared in the XVI and XVII centuries⁸. In many of these works, when Western historiography tried to explain the success of Ottoman progress, the concepts such as “religious fanaticism”, “oppression”, “persecution” were used, contrary to the information given above⁹.

Today it is still evident that such images persist in Western historiography. However a significant effort in consulting Ottoman and Turkish sources by historians would lead to a more objective perspective on the complex relationships between the Ottoman and Christian worlds.

The issue of Eastern European History Review titled *Central and South-Eastern Europe between the Christian and Ottoman Worlds: conflicts, encounters and compromises (XVI-XVIII centuries)*, contains 14 articles on the topic. This issue presents articles by researchers from different countries such as Italy, Hungary, Romania, Poland and Türkiye and was prepared in collaboration with *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group* (ELKH-PPKE-PTE).

I extend my sincere appreciation to the director of EEHR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alessandro Boccolini for offering me the special editorship of this issue of the journal.

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8 Giovanni Ricci, *Ossessione turca. In una retrovia cristiana dell'Europa moderna* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), 41; Soykut, *Papalık ve Venedik Belgelerinde*, 19-24.

9 İnalçık, *Doğu Batı, Makaleler II*, 248.

THE VILMOS FRANKÓI VATICAN HISTORICAL RESEARCH GROUP (ELKH-PPKE-PTE)

The *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group* of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Péter Pázmány Catholic University was established in the June of 2012 as the 'Impetus' Church History Research Group in the frame of the Church History Research Institute of the University founded by Rector Péter Erdő in 1999. It carries on independently the latter's publications (*Bibliotheca Historiae Ecclesiasticae Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány Nuncupatae*) and researches in Rome and in Vienna, with the involvement of academic and other funding sources. From 1st July 2017 onwards it performs its activity within the framework of the Supported Research Places Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences visualizing its goals and professional identity also in its name. The official name from 2022: ELKH-PPKE-PTE *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group*.

Its examinations concentrate decisively on political, diplomatic, cultural and institutional history. Its priority task is the systematic publication and processing of sources that has been heavily neglected since the age of positivism. The Vatican collections serve as the primary place of research, completed by the relating material – primarily in thematic context – of the Hungarian and Vienna archives and manuscript collections. Its publications provide space to the results of revealing of sources and historiographic works according to their scholarly profile (*Collectanea Textuum et Studiorum*), and separately to the Hungarian researches in the Vatican due to its particular importance (*Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae*). The long-term aim of the research institute is to serve as the professional framework of the establishment and efficient operation of an independent Hungarian institute of history in Rome of purely scientific nature. Owing to its academic background it pays special attention to the education of the future historian generation, to the engagement of students in certain phases of its work.

The main international cooperative partners are: Università della Tuscia (CESPoM-Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna), Universität Wien (Institut für Historische Theologie), Deutsches Historisches Institut in Rom, Università Pontificia Gregoriana (Facoltà di Storia e Beni Culturali della Chiesa), Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. The relevant common publications are published by Edizioni Setta Città and Duncker & Humblot

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GREGORIO XIII E L'EUROPA ORIENTALE: LA VISITA APOSTOLICA DEL VESCOVO DI STAGNO BONIFACIO DE STEFANI¹

ABSTRACT

In the last decades of the sixteenth century, in the wake of the Council of Trent and the battle of Lepanto, central-eastern Europe suffered a multiplication of Rome's efforts aimed to take down the Ottoman domination over the heterogeneous Danubian-Balkan world to get it back in the spiritual and geopolitical boundaries of Catholic Christianity. In this context, in 1580, Gregory XIII commissioned bishop Bonifacio De Stefani, supported by some Jesuit missionaries, to accomplish an apostolic visit in complex areas such as Dalmatian, Bosnian and Hungarian in order to verify the living conditions of Christians, Catholics and Orthodox, subjects of the sultan and their multiple relations with the Turkish world. Finally, the Pope had requested Destefani to evaluate what possibilities there were to trigger, feed and lead the insurrection of those populations against the Turks.

KEYWORDS: Papacy; Counter-Reformation; Central-Eastern Europe; Ottoman Empire; Apostolic visitation.

TRA CONFESSIONALIZZAZIONE E LOTTA ANTITURCA, LE VISITE APOSTOLICHE NEI BALCANI DURANTE IL PONTIFICATO BONCOMPAGNI

Negli ultimi decenni del XVI secolo, anche per effetto delle istanze controriformiste, la politica pontificia manifesta una strutturale attitudine per la mediazione diplomatica internazionale e per l'intervento confessionale attraverso il ricorso ad un personale ecclesiastico sempre più specializzato e, in misura crescente, missionario². Tale processo si snoda tra gli anni Sessanta e gli anni Novanta del Cinquecento conoscendo un punto di svolta con il pontificato Boncompagni che,

¹ Il presente saggio è stato scritto in modo congiunto ed equiparato da Giulio Merlani, responsabile del paragrafo 1 e 3, e da Katalin Nagy, responsabile del paragrafo 2 e 4.

² Già con Paolo III, ma in modo più strutturato dopo il Concilio di Trento, il Papato si era orientato verso l'affermazione della figura del pontefice *Pater Communis* rispetto alla linea tracciata da pontificati marziali, dominanti tra XV e XVI secolo, come quello di Giulio II. Cfr. David Chambers, *Popes, Cardinals and War. The Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *La Roma dei papi. La corte e la politica internazionale (secoli XV-XVII)* (Roma: Viella, 2018), 257-64.

come noto, ha rivoluzionato la fisionomia interna ed estera del Papato di età moderna. Se Pio V aveva esplicitato le direttrici tridentine di rilancio del primato pontificio attraverso una politica teocratica, il suo successore aveva difeso e corroborato questa supremazia papale con un'estesa e concreta strategia universalistica. L'impulso dato allo sviluppo del sistema delle nunziature apostoliche, l'istituzione delle Congregazioni cardinalizie e la riorganizzazione dei *collegia* delle *nationes* a Roma sono solo alcuni ma rappresentativi tasselli dell'ambizioso disegno di Gregorio XIII e della sua personale applicazione della linea tracciata dalla Controriforma la quale, oltre all'impegno politico-diplomatico, aveva prescritto un intervento profondo e capillare di controllo confessionale attraverso la duplice azione di difesa e di riconquista dello spazio religioso³.

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La prospettiva adottata da papa Boncompagni, dunque, implicava un'operazione risoluta in alcuni territori-chiave della disarticolata *Respublica christiana* al cui interno il quadrante balcanico, sottoposto alla dominazione *infedele* e minacciato dalle eresie riformate, occupava una posizione di primo piano nei propositi pontifici. Dopo Lepanto, che nonostante i suoi deludenti effetti aveva riacceso lo spirito crociato, la tradizionale strategia di lotta armata per la liberazione dell'Europa centro-orientale dal giogo ottomano viene associata e, in molti casi, sostituita dall'attività missionaria e di confessionalizzazione, volta alla tutela e all'espansione del cattolicesimo nei Balcani⁴.

Per queste ragioni e in linea con i suoi costanti sforzi di opposizione al Turco e di lotta alla diffusione dell'eresia riformata, Gregorio XIII aveva posto particolare attenzione alla cura delle comunità cattoliche, e cristiane in senso lato, disseminate nella regione danubiano-balcanica, anche organizzando numerose visite apostoliche. Questo istituto è precedente alla "svolta" del secondo Cinquecento, sono infatti attestate visite apostoliche risalenti al XII-XIII secolo, e si configura come un intervento straordinario disposto dalla suprema autorità della Chiesa per affrontare problematiche particolari e, spesso, differenti. Di conseguenza, non vi è una legislazione uniforme che delinei le facoltà e l'attività dei visitatori i quali devono attenersi alle precipue istruzioni ricevute. È evidente, quindi, perché le

3 Cfr. Ludwig von Pastor, *Storia dei papi dalla fine del Medio Evo*, vol. IX, (Roma: Desclée & C., 1929), 44 e ss.; Visceglia, *La Roma dei papi*, 266-67. Per un'analisi dettagliata e di lungo periodo della politica della Controriforma si rimanda a Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, *La Controriforma. Il mondo del rinnovamento cattolico, (1540-1770)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001); Elena Bonora, *La Controriforma*, (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 2020). Sul ruolo diplomatico-religioso dei nunzi dopo Trento, cfr. Pierre Blet, *Histoire de la représentation diplomatique du Saint Siège des origines à l'aube du XIX^e siècle* (Città del Vaticano: Archivio Vaticano, 1982), 275-94. Riguardo alle Congregazioni cardinalizie vedere, più nel dettaglio, Lajos Pásztor, *La Curia Romana. Problemi e ricerche per la sua storia nell'età moderna e contemporanea* (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1971), 64 e ss. Era obiettivo dei collegi formare un corpo ecclesiastico che potesse esportare i dettami controriformisti e la volontà pontificia su scala "globale". Cfr. Visceglia, *La Roma dei papi*, 272-73 e relativa bibliografia citata.

4 Cfr. Domenico Caccamo, *Roma, Venezia e L'Europa centro-orientale. Ricerche sulla prima età moderna* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2010), 26-7; Visceglia, *La Roma dei papi*, 273-74.

visite apostoliche, dopo la temperie tridentina, siano tornate in primo piano e, ancor più, durante un pontificato di prospettiva globale quale fu quello Boncompagni. Per Gregorio XIII, con le visite apostoliche trovavano applicazione quegli intenti controriformisti che miravano a superare la non coincidenza tra confini politici ed ecclesiastici in Europa e, nel caso specifico dei Balcani, offrivano anche un sostegno o una valida alternativa alla tradizionale strategia di lotta contro l'*infedele*⁵.

I territori balcanici costituiscono un caso peculiare in quanto, nonostante l'operato ecclesiastico di confessionalizzazione seguisse la stessa linea tracciata dalla Santa Sede nel resto del continente, la dominazione ottomana, le continue tensioni e la permeabilità dei confini politici, religiosi e culturali, rendevano unici gli esiti di applicazione delle volontà tridentine e papali. Al riguardo, già Pastor sottolineava l'importanza di alcune visite apostoliche condotte nei Balcani per volere di Gregorio XIII tra le quali vi è quella compiuta dal vescovo di Stagno, Bonifacio de Stefani, nel 1580-1581. L'operato del de Stefani risulta di particolare interesse per gli effetti avuti nei successivi sviluppi della strategia politico-religiosa di Roma all'interno dell'area perimetrata dalle regioni di Moldavia, Bulgaria e Dalmazia e per il quadro che fornisce sulle condizioni di vita dei cristiani lì dimoranti nonché sui loro rapporti con il mondo islamico⁶.

17

BONIFACIO DE STEFANI, IL VISITATORE APOSTOLICO

Per comprendere meglio il contesto storico e le circostanze della visita apostolica di Bonifacio de Stefani sui territori occupati dagli ottomani, può essere utile approfondire la sua figura. Di Bonifacio de Stefani si hanno scarse notizie, neppure la sua data di nascita è certa, benché sia da collocare all'inizio del XVI secolo. De Stefani è nato a Mezzo (in croato Lopud), un'isola dell'arcipelago delle Elafiti, a poca distanza dalla città di Ragusa⁷, motivo per cui, talvolta, viene identificato

5 Per uno sguardo complessivo alla politica antiturca di Gregorio XIII, cfr. Pastor, *Storia dei papi*, IX, 232 e ss. Sulla strategia papale di diffusione dei dettami tridentini e di controllo confessionale, attraverso l'istituto delle visite pastorali/apostoliche e delle missioni nel secondo Cinquecento, vedere: Luigi Fiorani, "Le visite apostoliche del Cinque-Seicento e la Società religiosa romana", *Ricerche per la storia religiosa di Roma*, 4 (1980): 53-148; Adriano Prosperi, *Tribunali della coscienza. Inquisitori, confessori, missionari* (Torino: Einaudi, 1996), 316-33, 600-49; Xenio Toscani, "La visita apostolica a Milano del 1575-1576", *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia*, 66/1 (2012): 178-82; Péter Tusor, *The Baroque Papacy (1600-1700)* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2016), 20-2; *Visita apostolica e decreti di Carlo Borromeo alla diocesi di Brescia*, I: *La città*, a cura di Angelo Turchini e Gabriele Archietti (Brescia: Associazione per la storia della Chiesa bresciana, 2003); John P. Beal, "The apostolic visitation of a diocese: a canonico-historical investigation", *The jurist*, 49 (1989): 347-98.

6 Cfr. Pastor, *Storia dei papi*, IX, 742-44; Visceglia, *La Roma dei papi*, 281 e ss.

7 Per approfondire la storia della città di Ragusa tra Cinquecento e Seicento vedere: Sergio Bertelli, *Trittico, Lucca, Ragusa, Boston, Tre città mercantili tra Cinque e Seicento* (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 2004), 51-68, 280-88; Giovanni Evangelista Cusmich, *Cenni storici sui Minori Osservanti di Ragusa* (Trieste: Tipografia del Lloyd Austriaco, 1864).

come Bonifacio di Ragusa, in croato Bonifacije Stefanović o Stivanić; in latino era noto come Bonifacius de Stephanis mentre in italiano si usava chiamarlo anche Bonifacio Drakolica, Bonifacio Crassa o, più comunemente, Bonifacio de Stefani⁸. Le famiglie di mercanti e di marinai provenienti dalla Bosnia-Erzegovina, giunte nei territori di Ragusa durante il XV secolo sulla spinta delle numerose prospettive di ascesa socioeconomica offerte dalla ricca città costiera, combinarono matrimoni di interesse con i membri della famiglia De Stephanis, cognome che ereditò anche Bonifacio di Ragusa⁹. De Stefani ha completato i suoi studi e si è addottorato in teologia all'Università di Parigi, dove si iscrisse nello stesso periodo in cui entrò a far parte dell'ordine dei francescani. Successivamente, i suoi studi e la sua vocazione religiosa lo portarono al servizio del monastero francescano di Gerusalemme in veste di guardiano. Dai primi anni della seconda metà del XVI secolo fu custode di Terra Santa e delegato apostolico¹⁰. La sua determinazione e le sue esperienze lo condussero a partecipare alle ultime sedute del Concilio di Trento, distinguendosi tra i teologi più esperti della Sacre Scritture. Intorno al 1564, de Stefani tornò in servizio presso i francescani di Terra Santa, fino alla sua elezione a vescovo di Stagno (Ston) (17 novembre del 1564), città della costa dalmata vicina a Ragusa¹¹. Non da ultimo, è da ricordare che il vescovo di Stagno, in virtù della sua attività religiosa pregressa, fu inviato da papa Pio V presso la corte spagnola per trattare di questioni riguardanti la sicurezza dei pellegrinaggi in Terra Santa. Inoltre, sono da accennare, anche, le doti intellettuali di Stefani che trovano espressione in una sua opera in latino, pubblicata a Venezia nell'anno 1573, dal titolo *Liber de ortu clericorum in ecclesia*¹². Dal breve accenno alla formazione e alle esperienze del

8 Cfr. István György Tóth, *Misszionáriusok a kora újkori Magyarországon* (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2007), 11. István György Tóth, "Raguzai Bonifác, a hódoltság első pápai vizitátora", *Történelmi Szemle*, 39/3-4 (1997): 447-72; Antal Molnár, *Katolikus missziók a hódolt Magyarországon I (1572-1647)* (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2002), 125-36.

9 Cfr. Gianluca Masi, "Alcune famiglie di mercanti ragusei fra i XVI e XVII secolo: De Stefanis-Svoccibucca (Stjepović-Skočibuha) e Faccenda (Fačenda)", in *La storia di un ri-conoscimento: i rapporti tra l'Europa Centro-Orientale e la Penisola italiana dal Rinascimento all'Età dei Lumi*, a cura di Cristian Luca e Gianluca Masi (Brăila-Udine: Museo di Brăila Istros Editrice, Campanotto Editore, 2012), 195-96.

10 Sulla vita del vescovo di Stagno e sulla situazione della città di Ragusa colpita dal morbo della peste si rimanda a Cusmich, *Cenni storici*, 30.

11 Cfr. Cusmich, *Cenni storici*, 31, circa l'elezione del vescovo di Stagno: «Il Senato compreso da gratitudine per tanti spirituali beneficii lo scelse nel 1564 a Vescovo di Stagno, ove la sua apostolica dignità dovette sopportare una tremenda angheria dalla laica prepotenza». Vedere altri riferimenti riguardo all'elezione in Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 13.

12 Fr. Bonifacio Stephano Ragusino, *Liber de ortu clericorum in ecclesia* (Venetijs: ex Typographia Guerraea, 1573) (Cusmich accennò che de Stefani compose la sua opera in latino nel 1568 e dedicò a mons. Grisostomo Calvino, arcivescovo di Ragusa, cfr. Cusmich, *Cenni storici*, 30). Altri riferimenti in Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 13. Cusmich, *Cenni storici*, 30, riporta anche l'altra opera di

vescovo risulta chiaro che de Stefani possedeva le caratteristiche adatte al ruolo di visitatore apostolico: fu esperto di teologia e della vita ecclesiastica ed ebbe una conoscenza vasta e profonda della lingua latina, turca, italiana e croata¹³.

«VISITARE LI POVERI CHRISTIANI, CHE NE LE PARTI SETTENTRIONALI, ET DI EUROPA SONO IN MANO D'INFIDELI»¹⁴

Nel febbraio del 1580, la Curia pontificia incaricava Bonifacio de Stefani di compiere una visita apostolica nei territori balcanici di Dalmazia, Ungheria, Croazia, Bosnia, Serbia e in altre regioni, sottoposte al Turco, in cui si parlava la lingua «schiavona», una giurisdizione territoriale, quella affidata al prelato, molto estesa e complessa¹⁵. L'istruzione consegnata al vescovo di Stagno esplicitava, in modo chiaro, gli interessi e i propositi ecumenici di Gregorio XIII in Europa centro-orientale¹⁶. Il pontefice voleva avere un quadro esaustivo sulle condizioni di vita, spirituale e materiale, dei cristiani sudditi di Costantinopoli e, anche, di quelli che vivevano nelle instabili aree di confine poste tra l'Impero ottomano e i possedimenti veneziano-asburgici, con un'attenzione particolare verso il clero cattolico lì presente. Difatti, entro i domini turchi, le popolazioni non islamiche erano soggette a trattamenti eterogenei, più duri per i cattolici che per gli ortodossi e, aspetto significativo, maggiormente vessatori nelle regioni distanti dal controllo diretto dell'autorità sultanale, risultando, nel secondo Cinquecento, complessivamente disperse e pressoché abbandonate a sé stesse¹⁷.

Per queste ragioni, la Curia aveva prescritto al vescovo di Stagno di visitare scrupolosamente ogni città e insediamento in cui fosse passato e le chiese di qualunque ordine e giurisdizione, cercando «d'informarsi bene de la vita, qualità, et sufficienza de li Vescovi, Ordinarii Curati, et altri Superiori, come sono vigilanti

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Stefani del 1572, dedicata a Gregorio XIII, dal titolo: *De perennni cultu Terrae Sanctae, ehusque fructuosa peregrinatione*.

¹³ Cfr. Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 12; Tóth, “Raguzai Bonifác”, 447-49.

¹⁴ AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, f. 196r.

¹⁵ Cfr. Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 15; Molnár, *Katolikus missziók*, 125-36. Una panoramica politico-religiosa dei Balcani ottomani tra XVI e XVII secolo in Egidio Ivetic, *I Balcani. Civiltà, confini, popoli (1453-1912)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2020), 57-103.

¹⁶ «Visitare li poveri Christiani, che ne le parti Settentrionali, et di Europa sono in mano d'Infideli [...]. Perché Nostro Signore con ogni paterna carità et vigilantia, non perdonando a spesa alcuna, tiene sollecita cura di procurar in tutti quei modi che può il bene et la salute universale di tutte le Nationi Christiane». AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, ff. 196r, 206v (l'intera istruzione ai ff. 196r-211r).

¹⁷ Cfr. Pastor, *Storia dei Papi*, IX, 742 e ss.; Gabriel Adriányi, “Die Situation der Kirchen während der Türkenherrschaft im Königreich Ungarn (1526-1686)”, in *Europa cristiana e Impero ottomano. Momenti e problematiche*, a cura di Agostino Borromeo, Pierantonio Piatti, Hans Ernst Weidinger (Città del Vaticano-Vienna: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Hollitzer, 2020), 141-57; nello stesso volume: Miroslav Palameta, “I Turchi nelle cronache francescane della provincia di Bosnia Argentina”, 199-216.

ne la cura, et salute de le anime de sudditi, et del loro gregge»¹⁸.

Gli intenti papali si iscrivevano in un più generale processo di rilancio e affermazione universali dell'autorità petrina, proposito che, nei Balcani, era associato ad una marcata sensibilità verso la minaccia turca, mirando a predisporre l'offensiva antiottomana attraverso una politica di effettiva unione con le chiese orientali, quella ortodossa in primo luogo¹⁹. Anche in questa prospettiva, Roma aveva inviato a Bonifacio de Stefani numerosi testi, in lingua greca, contenenti i decreti dell'unione del 1439, quelli tridentini e vari documenti apostolici «per saper meglio gli abusi de Greci, et toglierli, et emendarli dove si può»²⁰.

La missione del vescovo di Stagno, quindi, era parte di un più ampio progetto del Papato che, proprio sulla base delle visite apostoliche svolte nei primi anni Ottanta, avrebbe elaborato la sua strategia di intervento, in Europa centro-orientale, di inizio Seicento. Roma aveva già compiuto un primo passo al di là dell'Adriatico con le visite di Giovanni Francesco Sormano (1573-1574) e di Agostino Valier (1579-1580), inviati a Ragusa, il primo, e in Istria e Dalmazia, il secondo. Quest'ultima visita, in particolare, era connessa, sia per la contiguità temporale che per quella geografica, all'incarico affidato a de Stefani. Il vescovo di Verona, celebre sostenitore della linea tridentina, aveva documentato le criticità di quelle regioni osservando gli abusi perpetrati da numerosi prelati e i danni provocati a chiese e insediamenti dalle continue incursioni turche²¹. Difatti, Istria e Dalmazia, come altri territori governati dalla *Serenissima*, Venezia inclusa, costituivano aree di particolare interesse per la Curia pontificia e, soprattutto, per l'Inquisizione romana nel processo di

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18 AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, f. 199v.

19 All'indomani di Lepanto, Gregorio XIII riteneva necessario spostare dal piano marittimo a quello terrestre la guerra *contra Turcas*. Così, tra gli anni '70 e '80 del XVI secolo, la diplomazia pontificia si era mossa su più fronti per costituire un'ampia coalizione antiottomana, tentando di includere la Moscovia e, anche, la Persia, quest'ultima già in guerra con Costantinopoli dal 1578. Cfr. Visceglia, *La Roma dei papi*, 360-61. La ricerca di un'unione effettiva con i Greci aveva trovato esito nella nascita della *Congregazione per la riforma dei Greci* (1573) e del *Collegio Greco* (1577), istituzioni che rinverdivano l'intreccio tra il tema dell'espulsione dei turchi dal mondo balcanico e gli intenti spirituali ecumenici di Roma. Cfr. Vittorio Peri, "L'unione della Chiesa orientale con Roma: il moderno regime canonico occidentale nel suo sviluppo storico", *Aevum*, 58/3 (1984): 439 e ss.

20 AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, f. 209r. Al riguardo si vedano: ff. 197v-98r, 208v-09r.

21 Il 10 febbraio 1579, Agostino Valier riportava le sue indagini sui sospetti di simonia sollevati contro il vescovo di Smederevo, Nicolò Ugrinovich, accusato, anche, di ordinare i giovani prelati «purché paghino quel tanto, ch'egli dimanda». AsdVr, *Visite apostoliche del card. Agostino Valier*, B. 1, Fasc. 1.9, n.n. Mentre, durante la visita alla diocesi di Nona, il 22 maggio 1579 Agostino Valier scriveva che la chiesa di San Giovanni «non ha entrata alcuna, né chiesa da far officiare per esser stata ruinata da' Turchi», proseguendo ad annoverare lo stato di decadimento e i danni patiti da diverse chiese della diocesi. AsdVr, *Visite apostoliche del card. Agostino Valier*, B. 4, Fasc. 1.1, n.n.

applicazione delle istanze controriformiste²².

All'indomani di Trento, il proposito di rafforzamento-ripristino della sovranità spirituale pontificia nei Balcani prescriveva, naturalmente, un intervento duro e capillare contro la diffusione delle dottrine eterodosse che, come sottolinea l'istruzione per il vescovo di Stagno, preoccupavano seriamente Roma, ancor più in una regione dove la compresenza di molteplici fedi e l'assenza di una giurisdizione cattolica definita e forte facilitavano l'infiltrazione dei culti eretici. Per queste ragioni, la Santa Sede aveva posto come prioritarie la verifica e l'applicazione dei decreti tridentini ordinando a Bonifacio de Stefani di scoprire «se in quelle parti fussero Heretici Lutherani, Confessionisti, Calvinisti, Sacramentarii, Trinitarii, o d'altre Sette»²³. In tal caso, la Curia aveva conferito ampie facoltà al visitatore al fine di ricondurre i rei entro l'ortodossia cattolica o, quando necessario, di sopprimere qualsiasi minaccia eterodossa. Inoltre, il vescovo era stato dotato, con specifica dispensa dei cardinali inquisitori, del potere di «absolvere, et riconciliare gli Heretici, et quei che errano contra la Santa Fede Cattolica [...], acciò che possa ricevere a penitenza nel grembo de la Santa Chiesa, et riconciliare Apostati, Heretici et Scismatici in foro conscientiae tantum, o vero in utroque foro et anco se quelli sono persone ecclesiastici»²⁴. Le indicazioni fornite a de Stefani sottolineano la premura con cui Roma mirava ad incrementare il controllo sulle coscienze e sui territori secondo un processo di sovrapposizione tra figura vescovile e inquisitoriale e tramite la convergenza delle istanze amministrativa e poliziesca all'interno dell'istituto delle visite apostoliche²⁵.

L'ampiezza delle facoltà e delle richieste prescritte al visitatore, tuttavia, attesta il fatto che la corte pontificia avesse una conoscenza sommaria del complesso scenario balcanico. Altre disposizioni impartite al vescovo, invece, evidenziano una consapevolezza più precisa, da parte del Papato, di aspetti concreti della vita dei cattolici soggetti alla dominazione ottomana. Alla Curia, infatti, erano ben note «la rarità, et penuria di Parochi, et Sacerdoti in quei popoli, [le] differentie, et dispareri tra 'l Vescovo de la Bosna et li [...] Frati Minori Osservanti», la frequenza di «matrimonii illeciti» tra le popolazioni locali nonché l'usurpazione «di molti beni

22 Cfr. Andrea Del Col, "L'Inquisizione romana e il potere politico nella Repubblica di Venezia (1540-1560)", *Critica storica*, 28 (1991): 189-250. Per uno specifico caso di studio di confronto tra le autorità veneziane e l'Inquisizione si rimanda a Michaela Valente, "Padova, alveare a molte api e a non poche vespe della Riforma. Gli studenti tedeschi a Padova: una sfida alla Chiesa", in *Dis/simulazione e tolleranza religiosa nello spazio urbano dell'Europa moderna*, a cura di Élise Boillet, Lucia Felici, (Torino: Claudiana, 2020), 105-25.

23 AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, f. 199r.

24 AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, ff. 198v-99r.

25 Cfr. Prosperi, *Tribunali della coscienza*, 282-85, 327-32. Per la ridefinizione della fisionomia e dell'attività dei vescovi post-tridentini cfr. Bonora, *La Controriforma*, 47-59. Sul ruolo assunto dall'Inquisizione con il Concilio di Trento si rimanda a Massimo Firpo, *La presa di potere dell'Inquisizione romana* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2014).

ecclesiastici che si trovano in quei Regni et Paesi, occupati etiam da Christiani»²⁶. Accanto a queste problematiche di primo piano, l'istruzione per il vescovo di Stagno notificava tutta una serie di criticità più specifiche, ma rilevanti, di cui il visitatore apostolico doveva occuparsi. Tra di esse spiccavano il diffuso utilizzo, da parte del clero locale, dell'olio comune al posto di quello benedetto e la presenza di un culto devozionale per un'immagine della Vergine Maria «ne la quale si ha relatione che si fanno molti miracoli, etiam a Turchi et Infideli che vi ricorrono»²⁷. In linea con la peculiare politica confessionale ed ecumenica intrapresa da Gregorio XIII, inoltre, la Curia aveva chiesto a de Stefani di selezionare dei giovani, «de l'Ungharia [...] et de la Schiavonia, da inviare nei collegi Ungarico e Illirico per imparare et essere istituiti ne la Religione, lettere, et discipline, et [che] poi ritornassero a le patrie loro per servitio di Dio et de le Chiese et beneficio di quei popoli»²⁸.

Per ottemperare a disposizioni così numerose e differenti, il visitatore aveva ricevuto, oltre alle ampie facoltà, una somma di denaro, strumenti devozionali e una lunga serie di testi sacri, teologici e dottrinari, scritti in lingua, «illirica, schiavona e ciurula»²⁹. Infine, erano stati concessi al de Stefani due accompagnatori: il francescano Antonio Matković, vescovo di Bosnia, e il gesuita Bartolomeo Sfondrato, entrambi esperti conoscitori del mondo balcanico³⁰. Di quest'ultimo religioso, nato a Ragusa in una famiglia aristocratica, l'archivio dei gesuiti conserva l'istruzione che il generale Everardo Mercuriano gli aveva indirizzato nel febbraio del 1580³¹. Il documento ordinava a Sfondrato di limitarsi a coadiuvare il vescovo di Stagno seguendo una condotta improntata all'assoluta obbedienza verso il visitatore apostolico e alla moderatezza nello svolgimento dei compiti assegnatigli, evitando manifestazioni di eccessivo zelo e d'intraprendenza³². Ciò è indicativo, da un lato, della precaria azione con cui la Chiesa cercava di infiltrare e consolidare la propria presenza, velatamente, in territori privi di stabilità politico-religiosa, soprattutto per scongiurare sospetti presso le autorità secolari o dure reazioni

²⁶ AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, ff. 201r, 202r, 201r.

²⁷ AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, f. 207v.

²⁸ AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, ff. 206v-07r. Al riguardo cfr. István György Tóth, *Litterae missionariorum de Hungaria et Transilvania (1572-1717)* (Roma-Budapest: Bibliotheca Academiae Hungariae, 2002).

²⁹ AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, f. 210rv. Per la strumentazione data al visitatore apostolico, si vedano: ff. 197v-98r.

³⁰ Cfr. AAV, Misc. Arm. II, 130, ff. 196r-97r.

³¹ Su Bartolomeo Sfondrato cfr. Đuro Bašić, *Elogia Iesuitarum Ragusinorum* (Zagreb: Tisak Nadbiskupske Tiskare, 1933), 8-10. Per l'istruzione del generale Mercuriano a Sfondrato vedere: ARSI, Inst. 188, ff. 290rv, 294r. Sull'ascesa dei gesuiti, tra XVI e XVII secolo, come ordine emblema della Controriforma cattolica, cfr. Hsia, *La Controriforma*, 45 e ss.

³² «Vostra Reverenza non è mandata per riformare, ma per disporre per mezzo de' ministeri gli animi di quei popoli a ricevere gli aiuti spirituali quali che da detto Reverendissimo [il visitatore apostolico] saranno loro dati». ARSI, Inst. 188, f. 290r.

da parte ottomana³³. D'altro canto, il "basso profilo" raccomandato a Sfondrato esplicita il tipico *modus operandi* della Compagnia di Gesù che, in particolare nel secondo Cinquecento, mirando a stabilizzare la propria posizione all'interno della Chiesa, manifestava la tendenza alla coniugazione delle proprie caratteristiche intrinseche con il contesto post-tridentino attraverso pratiche dissimulatorie volte al contenimento e all'autodisciplinamento³⁴. L'ambivalenza operativa dei gesuiti emerge, anche, in un passo dell'istruzione in cui Mercuriano conferisce al suo sottoposto facoltà speciali specificando, però, che «di questa nostra concessione non ne dia notizia al Reverendissimo Visitatore, ne ad altre persone»³⁵.

In primavera, Bartolomeo Sfondrato aveva raggiunto Bonifacio de Stefani a Stagno da dove, il 23 aprile 1580, aveva espresso al padre generale le sue perplessità sulla buona riuscita della missione a causa, in primo luogo, della tensione con le autorità ragusee le quali, scriveva il gesuita, «non ci hanno voluto favorir, o farci lettere di raccomandatione» per evidente ostilità verso il visitatore apostolico e, soprattutto, per timore dei turchi³⁶. Ma le principali riserve di Sfondrato erano motivate dall'età avanzata, dalle cattive condizioni fisiche e dalle intenzioni del vescovo di Stagno che, secondo il gesuita, sembrava unicamente interessato a dirimere la controversia tra i francescani e il vescovo di Bosnia³⁷. Dunque, Bartolomeo Sfondrato non si aspettava risultati significativi dalla visita apostolica appena iniziata e, contravvenendo alla linea d'azione prescrittagli da Mercuriano, aveva affermato di volersi dissociare dai propositi di de Stefani per verificare, concretamente, quali fossero le condizioni di vita dei cristiani all'interno dei Balcani ottomani.

33 «Non si imponi in negotii di Stati, et Governi» aveva infatti scritto il generale Mercuriano a Bartolomeo Sfondrato. ARSI, Inst. 188, f. 290v. A sua volta, il vescovo di Stagno era stato ammonito di modulare le sue azioni affinché «non portino sospetto al governo temporale de' Turchi, ne pericolo a' Christiani». ARSI, Inst. 188, f. 290v, f. 209r. Sulla strategia d'azione del Papato post-tridentino, accorta ma, al contempo, dedita al complotto e aperta all'intervento armato, cfr. Visceglia, *La Roma dei papi*, 280 e relativa bibliografia citata.

34 Cfr. Michele Camaioni, "Lo spirito e la maschera. Note sul nicodemismo di cappuccini e gesuiti nell'Italia del Cinquecento", in *Dis/simulazione e tolleranza religiosa*, 50-1. Sulla dialettica tra integrazione e preservazione, relativa all'attività gesuitica nel secondo Cinquecento, vedere: Bonora, *La Controriforma*, 75-82; Sabina Pavone, *I gesuiti dalle origini alla soppressione* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2013), 3-45.

35 ARSI, Inst. 188, f. 294r.

36 ARSI, Ital. 156, f. 90r.

37 «Monsignor Visitatore mi dice che [...] giunto nella Bossina si fermerà alla prima terra, et se vogliono in Roma che segua il suo viaggio li mandino danari, talchè vedo, che fa pensiero tosto di ritornarsene, et mi pareno alcuni disegni particolari solo di accomodar le cose de' Frati, talché non so che dirmi, che da molti particolari amici etiam religiosi, et molto spirituali, son stato quasi ripreso a lassarmi persuadere, che non havesse a succedere ben di questa Visita, et Mons. Visitatore come vecchio, et molto grasso non mi pare sia molto atto a questa impresa». ARSI, Ital. 156, f. 90v.

VISITA APOSTOLICA: STRUMENTO DI CONOSCENZA DEI TERRITORI SOTTO IL CONTROLLO OTTOMANO

24

Soffermendosi sulla visita apostolica del vescovo di Stagno, occorre dire che de Stefani, dopo aver affrontato le prime difficoltà economiche e organizzative del viaggio³⁸, partì per la Bosnia nell'autunno del 1580, accompagnato dal francescano Antonio Matković, vescovo della diocesi di Bosnia. L'altro accompagnatore, il gesuita raguseo Bartolomeo Sfondrato³⁹, riuscì a raggiungere de Stefani nella primavera del 1581, dopo una serie di viaggi compiuti sui territori balcanici. Nel frattempo, i due vescovi, de Stefani e Matković, avevano visitato alcuni territori della Bosnia e dell'Erzegovina⁴⁰. Tuttavia, i documenti d'archivio riguardanti la visita apostolica del vescovo di Stagno permettono di andare oltre l'analisi delle tappe del viaggio e di prendere in considerazione gli avvenimenti all'interno dei territori occupati dagli ottomani. In questo modo, la lettera di Sfondrato inviata dalla Bosnia, il 15 dicembre 1580, a Olivier Manare - vicario generale dell'ordine dei gesuiti - è particolarmente significativa dal punto di vista dell'analisi delle vicende dei cristiani che erano sudditi dei turchi⁴¹.

La vita nella Bosnia del Cinquecento fu prevalentemente condizionata dalla dominazione turca. Dopo la conquista dei territori bosniaci ad opera del sultano Mehmet II, momento in cui gli ottomani assunsero il controllo su tutti i territori della Bosnia, i francescani bosniaci riuscirono, comunque, a ottenere un accordo, l'*Ahdnama* (1463), che gli garantiva la libertà di praticare la loro attività pastorale⁴². Le due vicarie bosniache, la Bosnia Argentina e la Bosnia Croata, lo ricordiamo brevemente, nacquero nel primo decennio del 1500, dalla Vicaria bosniaca, quando fu decisa la divisione di questi territori in occasione della riunione del Capitolo Generale tenuta nella città di Assisi (1514). Tra Quattro e Cinquecento, la Bosnia

38 Bonifacio de Stefani ebbe uno scontro con le autorità ragusee che non appoggiarono la sua partenza in veste di visitatore apostolico verso i Paesi occupati dai turchi. Cfr. Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 16. Di recente è stata rinvenuta una copia della lettera, del 7 ottobre 1581, scritta da papa Gregorio XIII alle autorità di Ragusa (firmata da Antonio Boccapaduli), in cui vengono elencati una serie di motivi e consigli su come rafforzare il rapporto con la fede cattolica: AAV, Segr. Stato. Vescovi, 115, f. 378rv.

39 Qualche accenno e altri riferimenti su Bartolomeo Sfondrato in Tamás Kruppa, *A kereszt, a sas és a sárkányfog, Kelet-közép-európai törökellenes ligatervek és küzdelmek a Báthory-korszakban (1578-1597)* (Budapest-Roma: Gondolat, 2015), 48.

40 Cfr. Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 15; Tóth, "Raguzai Bonifác", 453-55.

41 Cfr. ARSI, Ital. 156, ff. 169r-70r, lettera di Bartolomeo Sfondrato dalla Bosnia (15 dicembre 1580). Documento analizzato e trascritto in Tóth, "Raguzai Bonifác", 467-69; Molnár, *Katolikus missziók a hódolt Magyarországon I*, 130.

42 Cfr. Palameta, "I Turchi nelle cronache francescane", 201. Per la storia dei francescani sotto l'Impero Ottomano vedere Alfonso, M. Sammut, "I francescani dell'Impero Ottomano", in *I francescani nella storia dei popoli balcanici nel VIII centenario della fondazione dell'Ordine*, a cura di Viviana Nosilia e Marco Scarpa (Venezia: ArchetipoLibri, 2011), 1-12.

Argentina, la parte occidentale della Provincia francescana, comprese anche i territori estesi dalla Costa Adriatica fino alla città di Buda⁴³. Soprattutto in questo contesto storico risulta chiaro perché, nel febbraio del 1580, papa Gregorio XIII scelse per la visita apostolica dei Balcani proprio il vescovo di Stagno e i suoi accompagnatori: de Stefani oltre che essere membro dell'ordine francescano, aveva origini di Ragusa, una città-Stato vassalla e tributaria dell'Impero Ottomano, per cui poteva muoversi sui territori dell'Impero turco, così come il francescano e il gesuita che lo accompagnavano⁴⁴.

Dalla lettera di Bartolomeo Sfondrato del 15 dicembre 1580 si ha informazione che egli proseguì il suo viaggio tentando di ricongiungersi al vescovo di Stagno, passando il fiume Narenta (Neretva) e arrivando nella città di Gabella in Bosnia. Il gesuita cercò anche di farsi un quadro della situazione della popolazione di Bosnia e svolgere i compiti affidati a lui. Così, raggiungendo Sarajevo, annotò che «questa città e la principale et come metropoli di questo regno della Bossina, haverà da dieciotto milla case, vi saranno dentro da cinque milla christiani della Chiesa Romana fra gli mercanti et schiavi et schiave, attendono ad aiutargli questi padri degli osservanti di San Francesco»⁴⁵. In effetti, Sfondrato alloggiando «in casa de Turchi» scoprì la presenza di cristiani che gli chiesero «quando sarebbe il giorno di Natale [...] affermando che nella circoncisione de lor figliuoli, benché tutti gli altri nomi de' santi de christiani siano mancati, tuttavia resta il nome di Natale»⁴⁶. L'insicurezza delle basi su cui poggia la pratica della fede cristiana, tra la popolazione che ormai si identificava con i turchi, derivata dalla dominazione ottomana in corso da più di cent'anni sui territori della Bosnia, portò Sfondrato a celebrare la messa ogni giorno e a confessare alcuni cittadini, con lo scopo di rivitalizzare le usanze cristiane⁴⁷.

Presumibilmente Sfondrato raggiunse il vescovo di Stagno ancora sui territori della Bosnia, e proseguirono la visita apostolica insieme, il 10 luglio 1581, già nella città di Tuzla, avvicinandosi ai territori ungheresi. Avrebbero proseguito il viaggio a Pozsega, poi fino alla città di Temesvár (Timișoara)⁴⁸. Diversamente attesta una lettera di Bonifacio de Stefani, rinvenuta presso l'Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, in cui il vescovo scrisse al papa il 15 dicembre del 1581, facendo cenno alle sue visite completate in Bosnia e in Erzegovina, e soffermandosi particolarmente sulla situazione nella città di Semendria⁴⁹. Alla luce di tutto ciò, per comprendere meglio il contesto storico della visita apostolica, è bene ricordare brevemente che la

43 Cfr. Palameta, "I Turchi nelle cronache francescane", 201.

44 Cfr. Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 13.

45 ARSI, Ital. 156, f. 170r.

46 ARSI, Ital. 156, f. 169v.

47 Cfr. ARSI, Ital. 156, f. 170r.

48 Cfr. Tóth, "Raguzai Bonifác", 457. Vilmos Fraknói, *Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római Szent-Székkal, a Mohácsi véstől Magyarországnak a török járom alól felszabadításáig* (Budapest: Szent-István-Társulat Tud. És Irod. Osztálya, 1903), III, 215-16.

49 Cfr. AAV, Segr. Stato. Vescovi, 10, f. 47rv.

città Semendria (Smederevo) fu sotto il controllo degli ottomani dal 1459, inoltre, successivamente, divenne un centro amministrativo del sangiaccato (*Sancağ*), suddivisione amministrative delle province dell'Impero Ottomano, con il compito di tenere sotto sorveglianza i confini dell'Ungheria e di Belgrado. Il centro del *Sancağ* fu trasferito a Belgrado da Semendria, dal momento della conquista della città da parte degli ottomani (29 agosto 1521)⁵⁰. Da queste poche righe, risulta ben chiaro che lo svolgimento della visita apostolica di Bonifacio de Stefani sui territori di Semendria, spostandosi verso Belgrado, avrebbe rappresentato una mossa strategica, per la corte pontificia, nella lotta contro gli *infedeli*. L'impresa sarebbe stata più complessa, come descrisse de Stefani nella sua lettera «Samandria, una città nobile ma possesa dalli infedeli, in essa non vi sono altro che sette case dello catholici ne in essa può viver un vescovo, con qualche agiuto che li sarà dato»⁵¹. Dalla descrizione del vescovo di Stagno risultò la presenza di pochissime abitazioni di cattolici. Un'analisi di questo tipo può suggerire che il vescovo fece una visita approfondita della città, ispezionando oltre i luoghi di culto anche le abitazioni dei cittadini e riconoscendo una piccola comunità di cristiani. In effetti, nessun cenno viene fatto alle eventuali chiese ma viene determinato il bisogno di affidare la cura d'anime ad un vescovo con gli aiuti necessari. Con queste parole, de Stefani diede, inoltre, un giudizio concreto circa la conservazione della fede cattolica presso un numero concreto, anche se ristretto, di abitanti di Semendria.

Ritornando alla visita apostolica di de Stefani sui territori ungheresi, possiamo aggiungere che, gli ottomani dopo aver sottomesso gli altri stati balcanici, raggiungendo i confini dell'Ungheria nel 1390, invadendo per la prima volta il Paese, con una presenza durata circa 150-200 anni, lasciarono un segno profondo nella storia magiara (*magyar*)⁵². Alcune ricerche recenti riguardanti le conseguenze demografiche del dominio ottomano in Ungheria, affermano che nel XV secolo, intorno agli anni della battaglia di Mohács (1526), la popolazione dell'Ungheria era stimata in circa 3 milioni di persone. Le uniche informazioni sul numero dei cristiani presenti nei territori occupati dagli ottomani provengono dalla fine del XVI secolo: l'Ungheria ottomana fu di 120.000 km², in essa vissero 850.000 cristiani e circa 50.000 musulmani per un totale di 900.000 persone⁵³. Dai dati qui riportati si evidenzia una vasta e solida presenza di cristiani sui territori ungheresi. In conseguenza di questa panoramica, possiamo affermare che il vescovo di Stagno, durante le sue visite apostoliche in Ungheria, trovò basi piuttosto solide del culto cristiano, un dato confermato anche dalle sue esperienze personali. Ad esempio, all'inizio dell'anno 1582, quando de Stefani raggiunse la città di Temesvár incontrò due comunità cattoliche: una che comprendeva i commercianti che avevano raggiunto i territori ungheresi dalla vicina Ragusa, l'altra, invece, formata

50 Cfr. Hatice Oruç, "Ocaklik Timar in the Sanjak of Smederevo", in *Life on the Ottoman Border, Essays in Honour of Nenad Močanin*, a cura di Vjeran Kursar (Zagreb: FF press, 2022), 103.

51 AAV, Segr. Stato. Vescovi, 10, f. 47v.

52 Cfr. Géza Dávid e Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Rule in Hungary, Political, Military and Demographic Aspects", in *Europa cristiana e Impero ottomano*, 15.

53 Dávid, Fodor, "Ottoman Rule in Hungary", 23.

dai cittadini di origine ungherese. Bonifacio de Stefani fu accolto con onore da entrambe le comunità⁵⁴. Inoltre, si deve sottolineare, anche, che de Stefani tenne dei concili ai pochi sacerdoti cattolici che incontrò a Pozsega, a Pécs (25-28 luglio 1581) e a Bács (28-29 agosto 1581)⁵⁵. Bonifacio de Stefani è morto precocemente nel febbraio del 1582 a Temesvár non potendo concludere la sua importante missione, le visite in Transilvania, in Moldavia e in Valacchia. Nonostante la brevità della visita apostolica, papa Gregorio XIII ne diede un giudizio complessivamente molto positivo⁵⁶.

Per concludere, possiamo affermare che gli atti di questa visita nella sua interezza, per quanto poco documentati da fonti esaustive, sono molto utili in quanto forniscono una preziosa istantanea sulla realtà dei Balcani settentrionali, sottoposti alla dominazione ottomana, sul finire del XVI secolo e all'indomani di Lepanto.

54 Cfr. Fraknói, *Magyarország*, 216.

55 Cfr. Tóth, "Raguzai Bonifác", 461.

56 Cfr. Tóth, *Misszionáriusok*, 21; Tóth, "Raguzai Bonifác", 462.

ABBREVIATION

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano

ARSI: Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu

AsdV: Archivio storico diocesano di Verona

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CONTESTED BORDERLANDS: WAR AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BETWEEN TRANSYLVANIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1594-1595)¹

ABSTRACT

A few years after the Long Turkish War (1591-1606) began, Sigismund Báthory, ruler of Transylvania, decided to join the Habsburgs and the other members of the Holy League in their war against the Ottomans. Through this political decision Báthory interrupted several decades of good relations between his country and the Sublime Porte. Although Transylvania was a rather small state, with limited military and economic potential, Prince Sigismund had great ambitions. Joined by the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia he attacked the Ottoman Empire on three fronts. In this article I will analyse the military operations on the frontier of Transylvania with the Ottoman province (*vilayet*) of Timișoara (Temesvár/Temeșvar) in the years 1594-1595. The various forms of regular and irregular warfare employed by the two opponents show the complexity of this confrontation. Major campaigns and sieges, which involved large numbers of combatants, were accompanied by frequent raids and skirmishes, typical for frontier warfare. These events also reveal the specific social and economic dynamic of frontiers in early modern Central and South-Eastern Europe.

KEYWORDS: Long Turkish War; Transylvania; Ottoman Empire; Borderlands; Frontiers.

INTRODUCTION

By the end of the sixteenth century Transylvania was approaching the last stage of a long process of political and institutional reorganization as a distinct state, following the partition of the Hungarian Kingdom after the battle of Mohács (1526). Throughout these long and difficult decades Ottoman suzerainty was fundamental for the political survival of the new state. Following the tradition established by King John Szapolyai, the subsequent rulers of the Eastern Hungarian Kingdom, later identified as the Principality of Transylvania, nurtured good relations with the Sublime Porte. Sigismund Báthory, son of voivode Cristophor Báthory and nephew of Stephen Báthory, was the first elected Transylvanian ruler who broke with this tradition and engaged in open hostilities with the Ottoman Empire. In this article I will analyse the military confrontations along the frontier of Transylvania and the province (*vilayet*) of Timișoara (Temesvár/Temeșvar) during

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the years 1594 and 1595. From a Transylvanian perspective this was the first phase of the war with the Ottomans, in which the troops of Sigismund Báthory made several attempts (some of them successful) to retake territories and fortifications in the region encompassed by the Carpathians and the Danube, Tisa and Mureş rivers, later known as Banat.

The Long Turkish War (1591-1606) was a vast and complex military conflict with many “theatres of war” across Central and South-East Europe. The evolution of the Ottoman-Transylvanian confrontation in the Banat, during the years 1594-1595, has been approached in general monographs or studies focused on particular events², but the importance of local territorial disputes and the motivation of smaller states for joining this conflict still lacks a comprehensive analysis.

32 Although Báthory reached an official agreement with Rudolph II only in January 1595, his troops had already made several incursions into Ottoman territory during the previous year and sustained the revolt of the Christian population from the province of Timișoara. In the following years the Transylvanian army was on the offensive and managed to regain some of the disputed territories in the borderlands, but was unable to conquer the centre of the Ottoman *vilayet*. After the second failed siege of Timișoara in the winter of 1597, Sigismund Báthory lost faith in his chances to win the war and gave up on the throne, and thus ended the first phase of the Transylvanian involvement in the Long Turkish War. This “theatre of war” expended over a significant part of the Ottoman-Transylvanian borderland, including the Ottoman *vilayet* of Timișoara with its administrative subdivisions: Timișoara (Temeşvar), Cenad (Çanad), Lipova, Moldova Veche (Modava), Gyula (G’ula) and Ineu (Yanova)³; the Banat of Caransebeş and Lugoj (under Transylvanian authority) and also territories from the counties of Zarand, Bihor and Hunedoara.

FRONTIER INCIDENTS AND THE RISING TENSION IN OTTOMAN-TRANSYLVANIAN RELATIONS

Plunder raids were common in early modern borderlands and often neglected official relations between states. However the last decade of the sixteenth century witnessed an unprecedented intensification of frontier disputes between Transylvania and

2 Among the most recent contributions on this subject see, Sándor László Tóth, *A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború* (Szeged: Belvedere, 2000), 129-255; Liviu Cîmpeanu, “Domnul fie lăudat [...] turcii au predat cetatea: Cucerirea Lipovei Otomane de către Transilvăneni în august 1595”, *Historia Urbana*, 26 (2018): 97-111; Tamás Kruppa, “Erdély és a Porta 1594–1597. évi békealkudozásainak történetéhez”, *Századok* 137/3 (2003): 603-51; Florin Nicolae Ardelean, “The Siege of Timișoara from 1596 in the Works of Bernardino Beccari da Sacile”, in *Politics and society in Central and South-East Europe: life under the shadow of the Ottoman Empire’s expansion (15th-16th centuries)*, ed. Zsuzsanna Kopeczny (Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2021), 117-25; Ioan Hațegan, *Cronologia Banatului*, vol. II/2 (Timișoara: Editura Banatul, Artpress, 2005), 101-29; Yusuf Heper, “Uzun Savaşlar Dönemi’nden Bir Kesi’t: Erdel’In Temeşvar’I Geri Alma Teşebbüsleri (1596-97)”, *Karadeniz İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 30 (2021): 429-50; Aurel Decei, “Încercările lui Sigismund Báthory de a elibera Banatul și Timișoara de turci”, *Tibiscus*, 3 (1974): 171-80.

3 On the administrative organization of the *vilayet* of Timișoara at the end of the sixteenth century see, Cristina Feneșan, *Vilayetul Timișoara (1552-1716)* (Timișoara: Editura Ariergarda, 2014), 128-42; Klára Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary: Fortresses, Fortress Garrisons and Finances* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2018), 492-532.

the Ottoman Empire. Officials on both sides of the frontier accused each other of territorial transgressions and other acts of hostility. In fact the limits of authority and jurisdiction had never been very clear in this area. Many settlements were in the peculiar situation of *condominium* as illustrated by the case of Dezna estate and fortress. Reoccupied by Ottoman forces in 1565, Dezna was gifted by the sultan to the ruler of Transylvania, John Sigismund Szapolyai. The Habsburgs were able to occupy the fortress for a short while in 1566 but it was soon lost to Ottoman troops. After this confusing succession of events it remained unclear who was the rightful owner. Decades later, in 1590, Sigismund Báthory was still arguing with the Paşa of Timișoara over the ownership of this fortress and the surrounding settlements⁴. Local commanders often initiated aggressive actions into neighbouring territories neglecting treaties and capitulations. A notable frontier incident occurred on 16 September 1590, when 1.000 Ottomans from the garrisons of Ineu, Békés and Gyula attacked a small group of Transylvanian soldiers (40 foot guards and 50 horsemen) who were escorting serfs to the village of Zsáka (Jaca) in Bihor County. The Transylvanian voivode was particularly angered by this attack because the above mentioned village was part of the fiscal estate and thus under his direct authority⁵. In 1591, the Transylvanian envoy to Istanbul, Pongrácz Sennyey, was instructed to deliver the annual tribute and to complain about the many incursions and raids of Ottoman troops into Transylvanian territories. As an eloquent example of the abuses committed by Ottoman marcher lords, Sigismund Báthory mentioned the case of a Transylvanian nobleman, Nicolae Fiat who was killed on his estate while his wife was abused (tortured) during an Ottoman raid⁶.

On the other side of the frontier, Ottoman commanders complained that the Transylvanians were collecting taxes in their territories. Although the situation was tense diplomatic contacts were maintained throughout this period and the sultan showed his willingness to make concessions when he removed Hassan Pasha, the beylerbeyi of Timișoara, from office⁷. Nevertheless, the situation in the borderlands did not change drastically over the following years. Several Transylvanian military officials were determined to settle matters through force and sustained the anti-ottoman policy of the young Transylvanian ruler. This attitude is reflected in a long discourse held by Ference Geszty, captain general of the Transylvanian army and commander of Deva fortress, during a diet session in early 1594. In opposition to the efforts of Chancellor Farkas Kovácsóczy and Sándor Kendi to maintain peace with the Ottomans, Geszty insisted that war was the only solution to securing the frontiers of the country⁸.

4 Imre Lukinich, *Erdély területi változásai a török hódítás korában 1541-1711* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1918), 139-53; Sándor Márki, *Aradvármegye és Arad szabad királyi város története*, vol. II (Arad, Monográfia-Bizottság, 1895), 14.

5 Márki, *Aradvármegye*, 15.

6 Andrei Veress, ed., *Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei și Țării Românești*, vol. III (București: Cartea Românească, 1931), 233-40; Dragoș-Lucian Țigău, "Familia Fiat de Armeniș în secolele XV-XVII", *Banatica*, 14 (1996): 25.

7 Kruppa, "Erdély és a Porta", 604-05.

8 Wolffgangi de Bethlen, *Historia de rebus Transsylvanicis*, vol. III (Cibinii: Typis et

THE HESITANT BEGINNINGS OF THE CONFLICT (1594)

In the beginning of 1594, Sigismund Báthory was not yet ready to declare war on his liege lord, the Ottoman sultan, because he did not have the full support of the political elite. On one hand, an influential group of nobles, led by chancellor Kovacsóczy, was determined to keep the peace with the Ottomans and to avoid the war at all costs. On the other hand, the “marcher lords” - military officials from the western borderland, Ferenc Geszty (captain of Deva fortress), István Bocskay (captain of Oradea fortress) and Gáspár Kornis (captain of Huszt fortress) – were eager to enter the conflict and expand the western frontier of the country.

A first opportunity to take action without major risks was to support a local rebellion in the province of Timișoara. The uprising began in late January 1594 and involved a large but heterogeneous group of Christians from the Ottoman borderlands, estimated at about 5.000 fighters. Although they lacked coordination and experienced leadership, the rebels were able to take some smaller fortresses and fortified settlements in the area⁹. The most important agents who acted on behalf of the Transylvanian ruler were György Palatics (ban of Caransebeș and Lugoj)¹⁰, Ferenc Geszty (commander of Deva fortress) and Moses Székely. Palatics and Geszty were the most important military office holders on the south-western frontier of Transylvania. According to narrative sources they both played an active role from the beginning of the rebellion and instigated the local population against the Ottomans¹¹. Báthory had instructed Palatics to provide the rebels with artillery, gunpowder, ammunition, provisions and soldiers (*tormenta, pulverem, tela, globos, & quantamcunque militum manu, aliaque subsidia, que bello usui essent*)¹². The Transylvanian involvement in the conflict was also noted by foreign reports who emphasized the hesitant attitude of Báthory and his intention to conquer Timișoara¹³. With the help of the insurgents, Palatics and his troops took control of Făget (Facsád), but the fortress was soon returned to the Ottomans as a gesture of

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sumptibus Martinii Hochmeister, 1785), 302-13.

- 9 Cristina Feneșan, “Din premisele luptei antiotomane a Țărilor Române în vremea lui Mihai Viteazul. Mișcările populare din 1594 în eialetul Timișoarei”, *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj-Napoca*, XXVII (1985-1986): 99-137; Sima M. Ćirković, *The Serbs* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 141-42; Nenad Lemajić, “The Serbian Population of the Banat and the Western Mureș Basin”, in *The cultural and historical heritage of Vojvodina in the context of classical and medieval studies*, ed. Đura Hardi (Novi Sad: Filozofski fakultet, 2015), 219-20.
- 10 Dragoș Lucian Țigău, “Banii de Caransebeș și Lugoj. Considerații asupra atribuțiilor și competențelor acestora (I)”, *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie*, 16 (1998): 236.
- 11 Bethlen, *Historia*, 183; Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Monumenta Comititalia Regni Transylvaniae*, vol. III (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akad. Könyvkiadó Hivatala, 1877), 309.
- 12 Bethlen, *Historia*, 279.
- 13 Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, ed., *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*, vol. III/2 (București: Academia Română și Ministerul Cultelor și Instrucțiunii Publice, 1888), doc. LVII, 42; doc. LVIII, 42.

good will, during the diplomatic mission of Ladislau Szalanczy to Istanbul¹⁴.

Moses Székely, an experienced military commander who had served in the army of the Stephen Báthory in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was sent in the Banat region in June 1594. In the camp of Vârșeț (Vršac/Versec) he received an oath of fealty from the Serbian leaders of the uprising who were ready to recognize the leadership of Sigismund Báthory¹⁵. However the rebellion was soon quelled by a brutal intervention of Ottoman troops under the command of Sinan Pasha and the Tartars sent by Gazi Gheray II, Khan of Crimeea.

The arrival of the Tartars was of great concern for the Transylvanian estates. The Diet (estates assembly) insisted on a general levy and Pongrácz Sennyey was sent in the Székely seats to oversee their mobilization. While the army was gathering at Sebeș (Mühlbach/ Szászsebes) in the southern parts of the country, the Tartars advanced towards Hungary through Polish territory along the northern frontier of Transylvania¹⁶. While most of the Tartars crossed the Tisza River in Maramureș County, smaller detachments advanced into Transylvanian territory and plundered settlements along the north-western frontier, including the Șimleu estate of the Báthory family¹⁷.

While the Tartars advanced towards the Danube, the political situation in Transylvania was about to take a radical turn. During the Diet of Cluj (20-28 August 1594), Sigismund Báthory brutally eliminated those who opposed the idea of war against the Ottomans. With complete control over the country and its resources, the voivode was ready to resume hostilities against the Ottomans. Once again the Banat region represented the main focus of Transylvanian military actions. Smaller detachments of Transylvanian soldiers made incursions into Ottoman territories, often reaching the Danube area¹⁸. A notable raid was initiated by Moses Székely and his troops in the beginning of September (*circa Festum Nativitatis Mariae*) against a convoy of ships that was transporting provisions for the Ottoman army. The Transylvanians captured 12 ships and sunk eight of them¹⁹. Venetian reports from this period also mentioned attempts to disrupt the provisioning of the

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- 14 Bethlen, *Historia*, 416, 429; Szalanczy was one of the nobles who opposed the war against the Ottomans. After the Diet of Cluj (20-28 August) he was killed and his estates were confiscated. Some of his properties in Hunedoara county were given to György Palatics, a loyal supporter of Sigismund Báthory, SJAN Cluj, *Fond Familial Bánffy*, Seria 2, Subseria, 1b, Fascicula 83, nr. 1.
 - 15 Veress, *Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului*, vol. IV, doc. 45, 78; Bethlen, *Historia*, 233.
 - 16 Tasin Gemil, *Tătarii: relații cu otomanii și românii* (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Univ. Clujeană, 2021), 222-23.
 - 17 Bethlen, *Historia*, 300-60.
 - 18 Mustafa Naima mentions that one of the first hostile actions of the rebel vassals, Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia, was to attack the Ottoman territories along the Danube. Cf. Mustafa Naima, *Annals of the Turkish Empire from 1591 to 1659 of the Christian Era*, trans. Charles Fraser (London: John Murray, 1832), 36.
 - 19 Josephus Trausch, ed., *Chronicon Fuchsio-Lupino-Oltardinum sive annales Hungarici et Transsilvanici*, vol. I (Coronae: Impressum per Johannem Gött, 1847).

Ottoman army and attacks against the Danube fleet performed by Transylvanians in cooperation with Serbian rebels²⁰.

In November 1594 an army of Turkish and Tartar troops approached the town of Lugoj and plundered the surrounding settlements. While orders were sent out for a general levy²¹, Báthory dispatched 2.000 soldiers, commanded by Ferenc Geszty²², to deal with this threat. A small detachment, led by Moses Székely, was left behind to besiege the fortress of Făget. While Geszty and his men were successful in chasing away the Ottoman besiegers, Székely suffered a wound from a culverin shot and his troops had to abandon the siege of Făget²³.

While Sigismund Báthory was still negotiating an alliance with the Habsburgs his troops had already engaged the enemy in the borderlands. As the weather was getting colder, major military operations were halted and the year 1594 ended without any significant territorial changes on the Ottoman-Transylvanian frontier.

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THE TRANSYLVANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE BANAT AND THE CONQUEST OF LIPOVA AND INEU (1595)

The beginning of 1595 was dominated by diplomatic negotiations with both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. On 28 January a Transylvanian-Habsburg military alliance was signed in Prague and later consolidated through a matrimonial alliance between the Báthory and Habsburg families. The issue of the western frontier of Transylvania was often approached during negotiations. The voivode of Transylvania clearly expressed his intention to occupy the fortresses of Gyula, Lipova and Timișoara and asked the help of the Habsburgs in strengthening the western defensive system²⁴. In the meantime a new sultan ascended to the throne, Mehmet III. The change of central leadership prompted the appointment of new officials on the frontiers of the empire. Ahmet Pasha, the new beylerbeyi of Timișoara came with peaceful intentions and promised to respect the boundaries between his province and Transylvania²⁵.

20 Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*, vol. III/2, doc. LXVIII, 50-51; doc. LXX, 52.

21 When a general levy was proclaimed, the parish priests of the Saxon communities of Transylvania were required to provide horses, carriages and manpower for the transport of the artillery. Báthory had dispatched such orders in November 1594, SJAN Sibiu, *Capitulul Evanghelic C.A. Bistrița*, nr. 241.

22 At this point Ferenc Geszty was the most influential politician and military commander at the Transylvanian court. He held many important offices like commander of Deva fortress, count (*comes*, *ispán*) of Hunedoara, member of the princely council and captain general of the Transylvanian army. At the end of the campaign in the Banat, Sigismund Báthory rewarded him with several new estates in Alba, Turda and Târnave counties, including the castle of Iernut (Radnot), SJAN Cluj, *Fond Familial Kornis*, Seria 1- Documente medievale, nr. 273.

23 Trausch, *Chronicon Fuchsio*, 117; Márki, *Aradvármegye*, 18-9; Bethlen, *Historia*, 507-09.

24 Veress, *Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului*, vol. IV, doc. 85, 154-58.

25 Mihail Guboglu and Mustafa A. Mehmet, eds., *Cronici turcești privind Țările Române*, vol. I (București: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1966), 368; Mustafa A. Mehmet, ed., *Cronici turcești privind Țările Române*, vol. III (București: Editura

Although there were no significant clashes between the two neighbours during the first half of the year, a state of tension persisted in the Ottoman-Transylvanian borderlands. Ferenc Geszty, Captain General of the Transylvanian Army, died in May 1595. Sigismund Báthory avoided naming a new captain general but the command of troops on the south-western frontier was entrusted to the new ban of Caransebeş and Lugoj, György Borbély²⁶. The Transylvanian ruler was preparing to wage war on three fronts and dispatched troops to his allies in Moldavia and Wallachia but also in the Banat region. Besides the regular (fortress garrisons and the banners of local nobles) and irregular troops (free hajdúks) usually concentrated in the frontier area, Sigismund also dispatched troops from the hinterland. For example, Saxon militias from the town of Sighișoara were sent to enforce the garrisons from the south-western frontier²⁷. Foreign mercenaries were also mobilized in this area. Cossack envoys had arrived at the court of Alba Iulia and offered their services to Sigismund Báthory²⁸. It remains unclear if the Transylvanian voivode hired Cossack mercenaries in this phase of the war but sources mention them in the following years among the troops who fought against the Turks in the Banat region²⁹.

In the summer of 1595 hostilities between the Ottomans and the Transylvanians resumed³⁰. György Borbély took the first initiative and occupied two smaller Ottoman fortresses: *Bokcsa* (Bocșa) and *Varsocs* (Vârșeț), before heading for Alba Iulia to attend the wedding of Sigismund Báthory and Maria Christierna of Austria. Taking advantage of this situation the Ottomans mounted a counteroffensive, retook the two fortresses and raided Transylvanian settlements along the Mureș valley up to the market town of Dobra (Jofö) in Hunedoara County³¹. When news of the raid reached the court of Alba Iulia a vanguard of 1,500 soldiers was sent to

Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1980), 29; Kruppa, "Erdély és a Porta", 607.

- 26 Zsolt Trócsányi, *Erdély központi kormányzata, 1540-1690* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1980), 337-38; *Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului*, vol. IV, doc. 121, 226 and doc. 122, 228.
- 27 Hațegan, *Cronologia*, 107; *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*, vol. XII, eds. Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki and Nicolae Iorga (București: Academia Română și Ministerul Cultelor și Instrucțiunii Publice, 1903), 27.
- 28 Veress, *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*, vol. III/2, doc. CIV, 85; Bethlen, *Historia*, 531.
- 29 In a letter issued on 14 June 1597, Chancellor István Jósika mentions the Cossack mercenaries from the garrison of Lipova. Cf. Costin Feneșan, ed., *Diplomatarium Banaticum*, vol. II (Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2016), 188-91.
- 30 During the months of June and July Sigismund Báthory issued orders for the Saxon parish priests to prepare the means of transportation for the artillery of the Transylvanian army, SJAN Sibiu, *Episcopia Bisericii Evanghelice C.A. din Transilvania*, Colecția de documente episcopale, nr. 299; SJAN Sibiu, *Capitulul Evanghelic C.A. Bistrița*, nr. 247.
- 31 Bethlen, *Historia*, vol. III, 580-82; Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Monumenta Hungariae Historica, Scriptores*, vol. XXX: *Szamosközy István történeti maradványai 1542-1608*, IV: *Vegyes följegyzések* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, 1880), 50; Cîmpeanu, "Domnul fie lăudat", 100-02.

deal with the threat. The Ottomans avoided a direct confrontation and returned to their fortresses. In the next months the Transylvanian campaign followed the usual pattern, focusing on taking control of fortified settlements and engaging in occasional skirmishes with enemy troops. Vărădia de Mureș (Tótvárad) was taken without significant casualties during a single night. Afterwards troops from the hinterland joined the borderland army of Borbély before heading for the fortress of Făget, their next objective. In this phase of the campaign, the Transylvanian army from the Banat was estimated at 4.000 soldiers including: noble cavalry, peasant militia, Saxon militias, borderland garrisons and free hajdúks³².

Făget³³ had been an important target for Transylvanian attacks during the previous year and had a significant strategic importance because it was located on the route connecting the Banat of Caransebeș and Lugoj with Hunedoara County. A strong Ottoman garrison in such a position was a constant threat to the Transylvanian troops operating on the south-western frontier. After a few days of siege the Ottomans surrendered unaware of the fact that a strong relieving force was coming to aid them. The Pasha of Timișoara and the commanders from Lipova and Ineu arrived in the vicinity of Făget with an army of about 8.000 soldiers when the fortress was already under Transylvanian control. What followed was the only significant pitched battle of this conflict, concluded with a decisive Transylvanian victory. According to narrative sources Borbély took advantage of his superior fire power causing many casualties among the Ottomans. The Pasha of Timișoara was wounded during this battle and barely escaped while many other Ottoman commanders were killed or captured³⁴.

After this significant victory, Borbély moved on towards his next objective, Lipova. This fortress had a major strategic importance for the Ottomans as main defensive point on the north-eastern boundaries of the *vilayet*, situated on the main route connecting the Banat with Transylvania, along the Mureș valley. At the end of the sixteenth century Lipova was defended by 227 paid soldiers but the total number of defenders was probably increased to 350 men³⁵. The Transylvanian army was able to take the outer wooden rampart during the first day and moved their artillery in a favourable position close to the walls of the citadel. The Ottoman garrison surrendered after five days of siege (21-25 august 1595)³⁶.

The conquest of Ineu³⁷ fortress was a more difficult task. Sigismund Báthory had

32 Bethlen, *Historia*, vol. III, 584; Decei, "Încercările", 174; Márki, *Aradvármegye*, 19.

33 Situated on the banks of Bega River, the fortress of Făget consisted of a stone castle surrounded by a wooden rampart and a 20-30 m wide and 3 m deep ditch. At the time it was defended by a regular garrison of 140-150 soldiers, Zsuzsanna Kopeczny, "Medieval Noble Residences in the Danube-Tisza-Maros Region during the Ottoman Wars", *Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Historica* 21/2 (2017): 25-7.

34 Cîmpeanu, "Domnul fie lăudat", 103.

35 Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military*, 519-20.

36 Cîmpeanu, "Domnul fie lăudat", 105-08.

37 Ineu became an important borderland fortification in the context of the Ottoman expansion in the area, during the sixteenth century. All factions who exercised control over this fortress (Transylvanians, Habsburgs and Ottomans) consolidated and expanded

recalled many of his soldiers from the western frontier as he was preparing a major campaign in Wallachia. The siege of Ineu began on 16 September and was entrusted to soldiers from Lugoj (2.000) and Oradea (1.000) under the command of István Békés. With a garrison of about 700 men, the Ottomans were prepared to repel any direct assaults. The Transylvanians made arrangements for a long siege and tried to change the course of the river which was supplying the defensive ditch. Abundant rains foiled their plans and the attempt to dig mining galleries. Eventually the besiegers were able to overcome this obstacle by filling the ditch with debris and moved their artillery closer to the walls of the inner citadel. The Transylvanians organized a general assault on 15 October but were unable to defeat the Ottoman garrison. A few days later the ban of Caransebeş and Lugoj arrived with reinforcements. Under these circumstances the Ottomans decided to negotiate their surrender and Borbély, the new commander of the besieging force, agreed to their conditions. On 21 October the garrison left the fortress with 60 carriages of goods and various belongings. Although the Transylvanian commander had guaranteed their safety, the Ottomans were attacked by a large group of free haydúks³⁸.

By the end of the year Transylvania was in control of a large part of Zarand and Arad counties, which had been lost to the Ottomans in 1552. Among the 13 fortresses and fortified settlements occupied during 1595 three (Făget, Lipova and Ineu) required sieges, while the others were abandoned, surrendered or taken by force through a single assault³⁹. The Transylvanians achieved significant results without concentrating a large military force in the borderlands (3-4.000 soldiers). The Pasha of Timișoara, on the other hand, was compelled to send troops in Hungary (Esztergom, Hatvan and Szolnok)⁴⁰ and was thus unable to make a decisive move against Transylvania.

CONCLUSION

Sigismund Báthory used the territorial disputes on the south-western frontier of his country as *casus belli* against his liege lord, the Ottoman sultan. During 1594 and 1595 the Ottoman-Transylvanian conflict in the Banat made a gradual transition from a local borderland confrontation to open war between the two states. After a successful campaign in 1595 the Transylvanian Prince was bitterly disappointed by two futile attempts to conquer Timișoara in 1596 and 1597. In 1596 Prince Sigismund was forced to retreat after 14 days of siege although he had mobilized an impressive

the fortress; Florin Mărginean, Zsolt Csók, Keve László, Victor Sava, "Unveiling History. Archaeological Excavations in the Fortress of Ineu (Arad County)", *Ziridava. Studia Archeologica*, 31 (2017): 241-79.

38 Márki, *Aradvármegye*, 23; Ferencz Toldy, ed., *Monumenta Hungariae Historica, Scriptores*, vol. XVII: *Baronyai Decsi János Magyar historiája 1592-1598* (Pest: Eggenberger, 1866), 224-29.

39 These territorial losses were acknowledged with great concern by Ottoman authorities, realizing that Timișoara was now vulnerable to a direct attack from Transylvania, Naima, *Annals*, 112.

40 Tóth, *A mezőkeresztesi csata*, 173; Hațegan, *Cronologia*, 108.

military force under his personal command⁴¹. In the following year the command of the Transylvanian army was entrusted to Chancellor István Josika but the siege, although considerably longer, had the same outcome⁴².

An overview of the military operations from 1594 and 1595 seems to indicate that, at the time, the Transylvanian army was proficient in irregular warfare. With a small concentration of troops (no more than 4.000 soldiers), local Transylvanian commanders (Ferenc Geszty, György Palatics, Moses Székely and György Borbély) were able to organize successful forays into Ottoman territory and occupy smaller fortifications, which were often abandoned by their defenders or easily taken after a single assault. However, well supplied larger fortifications were very hard to take by force. Besiegers were usually successful only when they convinced the defenders to surrender willingly as in the case of Făget, Lipova and Ineu fortresses. It is also important to underline that, during these two years, the Ottomans were mostly on the defensive and the only military forces involved in the conflict were local garrisons and the Tartars arrived in August 1594. Their major offensive initiatives were limited to a siege attempt of Lugoj (November 1594) and a raid in Hunedoara County (August 1595). The occasional raids organized by local garrisons had limited impact on the balance of war but were often used as propaganda tools. Foreign reports but also borderland commanders in their official correspondence describe, sometimes in great detail, the results of successful attacks against the enemy. The capture of important officers⁴³, military insignia but also the value of war spoils are among the most common elements in the narratives surrounding the conduct of irregular warfare in the borderlands.

Following a common pattern in that period, the Transylvanian elite was divided between two political options, the maintenance of Ottoman suzerainty or the alliance with the Habsburgs. It is worth mentioning that in this particular crisis, the most important military office holders from the western frontier (Ferenc Geszty - captain of Deva fortress, István Bocskay - captain of Oradea fortress and Gáspár Kornis - captain of Huszt fortress) were the main supporters of the war against the Ottomans. Their position can be explained by their official but also personal interest in the expansion of the borderlands. Sigismund Báthory relied on a network of powerful nobles who supported his anti-ottoman plans. They were richly rewarded by the ruler with proprieties confiscated from the disloyal nobles eliminated after the Diet of Cluj (20-28 August 1594) and with the newly acquired territories on the south-western frontier⁴⁴.

41 Ardelean, "The Siege of Timișoara", 117-23.

42 The second siege of Timișoara began during the second half of October and the Transylvanian army retreated by the end of November 1597, Decei, "Încercările", 179; Hațegan, *Cronologia*, 125.

43 On 30 March 1595 for example, Gáspár Kornis wrote that his hajdúks (*Heyduggen*) captured the Pasha of Gyula during a raid. Nicolae Iorga, *Acte și fragmente cu privire la istoria românilor*, vol. I (București: Imprimeria Statului, 1895), 139.

44 Gáspár Kornis, for example, received the fortress and estate of Dezna in 1597. Chancellor István Jósika was rewarded in a similar manner, with proprieties in Hunedoara and Arad counties. Márki, *Aradvármegye*, 29.

By establishing close ties with the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia Sigismund Báthory secured the southern and eastern frontiers of his country but he also took commitments of military support. Thus, he was faced with the difficult task of fighting on three fronts. This is the main reason why his 1595 campaign in the Banat, although successful, had limited strategic consequences.

ABBREVIATIONS

SJAN: Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale (Romania)

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SJAN Cluj

Fond Familial Bánffy

Fond Familial Kornis

SJAN Sibiu

Capitulul Evanghelic C. A. Bistrița

Episcopia Bisericii Evanghelice C.A. din Transilvania

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THE BORDERS BETWEEN WALLACHIA AND THE GIURGIU KAZA, AN AREA OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION ON THE IMPERIAL OTTOMAN DANUBE LIMES

ABSTRACT

When the Ottomans created a new territorial entity with fixed borders at Giurgiu, this was due to Sultan Kanun's initiatives to centralize the Empire. The border between Wallachia and this new Ottoman region at Giurgiu dates back to 1544, but is later on confirmed by successive sources. Starting with the second half of the 16th century relations between the Ottoman authorities in Giurgiu and the rulers of Wallachia were not always conflictual. There were periods of cooperation and every act of transgression by Ottoman subjects on Wallachian soil were punished. At the same time, Romanian subjects tried to appeal to the Porte for help and protection whenever they were abused by Ottoman representatives, Christian or Muslim. As far as the Wallachian prices were concerned, the borders at Turnu, Giurgiu and Braila were a place for conflicts, violence, excesses and delinquents, largely because the area was lightly defended and lacked central authority. Giurgiu, a Muslim city on Christian lands, was however a tempting place for the inhabitants of Wallachia.

KEYWORDS: Ottomans; Wallachia; Danube; Giurgiu; Diplomacy.

In the Romanian Historiography, we have not ignored issues such as border disputes, but these are, of course, more common in the modern and contemporary works. For the Medieval Era however, the study of borders has been intermittent, without an exhaustive view on the area inhabited by the Romanian people. This was caused, on the one hand by the lack of documentary sources, and on the other by the state ideology when the studies were written. The subject of border analysis was sometimes in direct contradiction with the official line of the Historiography, which propagated the idea of a union between Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania going as far as the Middle Ages.

We should define the terms from the beginning. According to the contemporary sense, the *frontier* is a line drawn between certain points on the map, to define the limits for the territory of a state from other states, open seas or even cosmic space and going underground as far as modern means can reach. Frontiers are usually established through treaties between countries and naval frontiers through unilateral declarations. There are many types of borders: natural, geometric, astronomical, land, river, maritime and air borders¹.

In current tongue and broadly speaking *frontier*, *border* or *boundary* mean the demarcation line between countries, properties or settlements.

1 Petre Bărbulescu, Ionel Cloșcă, Nicolae Ecobescu, et al., eds., *Dicționar diplomatic* (București: Editura Politică, 1979), 446.

Despite the fact that in the Middle Ages the term of *frontier* had a slightly different meaning than today, it is undoubtedly that even then there were well-defined limits for the territories of states, both from a military and a political sense. In the case of Giurgiu, the creation, its existence and its evolution were strongly influenced by its status as a fortress-town on the border, and only after that, we could add its economic dimension.

During the Sultan led expedition of Mehmed I, which some sources place in 1417 or in the autumn of 1419, (we actually argue it was more likely to have happened in the spring of 1420), the Ottomans conquered Giurgiu. Its walls were damaged and required substantial repairs.

46 From an Ottoman perspective, Giurgiu was an important outpost for the protection of their Danube borders. It could control the river passing and control the trade coming from Wallachia. Some recent discoveries point to the fact that there was a strategic element as well². Both from a military and strategic point of view, the fortress, well defended by small isles and channels and close to the left bank of the river, was an excellent bridgehead for future campaigns. The Ottomans frequently attacked the territories north of the Danube, using the irregular troops of the Akinji. All of these points in mind, it is clear that the Ottomans were interested in holding Giurgiu and its limitrophe territory. Thus, they instituted a very strict administrative status similar to that of their vast empire. The non-believers were tolerated, order preserved and economical profitability prioritized³.

All of the known sources confirm that the conquest of Giurgiu did not mean the annexation of its hinterland. Despite this, the pattern of Ottoman conquests leads us to speculate that at first they only acquired the fortress on the island. Down the line, taking advantage of the inactivity of the Wallachian princes, they secured the outpost by expanding in the neighbouring regions. This slow but steady expansion made it necessary to have a written document, defining the borders between Giurgiu and Wallachia in the late Sixteenth Century.

This was similar to the way in which the Ottomans handled the larger bridgehead of Europa, earlier on, in the Fourteenth Century. In addition, this was their method of colonizing the Balkan countries, all done under a centralized policy based upon the superiority of their administrative skills compared to those of the local Balkan rulers⁴. To that we must add their religious tolerance, which was very important during those times. The Ottomans realised that a policy of the concessions towards the Orthodox Christians would allow them to accept Muslim rule and increase their revenue⁵.

Therefore, we cannot state that they occupied the city and its hinterland all at once, or if this territory was annexed later on, as part of peace deal between the Turks

2 Marian Coman, *Frontierele medievale ale Țării Românești* (PhD Thesis Summary: București University, 2011), 27.

3 Nicolas Vatin, *Ascensiunea otomanilor (1362-1451)*, in *Istoria Imperiului Otoman*, ed. Robert Mantran (București: Ed. All, 2001), 40.

4 Halil Inalcik, *Imperiul Otoman. Epoca clasică (1300-1600)* (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1996), 55.

5 Inalcik, *Imperiul Otoman*, 56.

and Wallachia. However, it is more plausible that they first got the city, which was then reinforced. We know the Ottomans aimed at the conquering the Moravia Valley, towards the Middle Danube to subdue the Serbian territories and then Hungary. Later on, after they had taken the city, the Ottomans slowly expanded in the surrounding territories. This was done in style of medieval border marches. Lastly, we have to take into account the supply needs of Giurgiu and its substantial garrison, which had to rely on the food being produced on the left bank of the river. We can explain in this manner the inclusion of Giurgiu and its “dependencies”⁶ among the border fortresses of the Ottoman Empire, mentioned in the treaties with Hungary in 1479, 1503 and 1519.

We find a mention, albeit indirectly, about the border between Giurgiu and Wallachia in one of Vlad Țepeș’s letter dated February 11, 1462. It was written in Giurgiu and the ruler describes the Turkish attempts of seizing the fortress. This was actually the start of his anti-Ottoman campaign⁷.

The formation of a territorial entity at Giurgiu could be attributed to Sultan Suleiman the Lawmaker (*Kanun*) also known as “The Magnificent” [1494-1566]. He was the one that initiated a centralized administrative system, which was to become the classical *eyelet*, *sancak*, *kaza* and *nahiye*⁸.

The first mention of a stable ottoman possession in Wallachia comes from 1544, during the reign of Radu Paisie (or Radu of Argeș, son of Radu the Great, which ruled intermittently from 1535-1545). An ancient Wallachian chronicles said that «[...] during his rule the Turks took Braila, Giurgiu and Turnu»⁹. At his settlement the prince was represented by the great vornic (governor) Constantin Coadă and the Great Ban of Oltenia¹⁰.

Another argument that proves this settlement was achieved in 1544 and not in 1546, as it was credited so far is the fact that the boyar Constantin Coadă held the title of great vornic between January 10, 1542, and February 28 1545¹¹. We know he was present in this quality in the commission that made that settlement at Braila¹² and it

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- 6 Paul I. Cernovodeanu, “Cetatea Giurgiului. Studiu istorico-militar”, *Studii și materiale de muzeografie și istorie militară*, 2-3 (1969-1970): 85.
 - 7 Nicolae Iorga, *Scrisori de boieri. Scrisori de domni* (Vălenii de Munte: “Datina românească”, 1932), 167.
 - 8 Anca Popescu, “Vestigii ale organizării Dobrogei preotomane într-un defter din anul 1530”, in *Vocația istoriei: prinos profesorului Șerban Papacostea*, eds. Ovidiu Cristea and Șerban Lazăr (Brăila: Istros, 2008), 506.
 - 9 *Istoria politică și geografică a Țerei Românești, de la cea mai veche a sa întemeiere până la anul 1774*, trans. George Sion (București: Typographia Națională a lui Ștefan Rassidescu, 1863), 136.
 - 10 Sion, *Istoria politică*, 136.
 - 11 Nicolae Stoicescu, *Dicționar al marilor dregători din Țara Românească și Moldova (secolele XIV-XVII)* (București: Edit. enciclopedică română, 1971), 45.
 - 12 In a document of 1643 about Radu of Izvorani (Great Ban, August 30, 1535 and May 18, 1539), it is stated that he died at Istanbul, «when he was accused in the Empire with the vornic Coadă that he gave up on Brăila to the Turks». Stoicescu, *Dicționar*, 95.

is known that he was a trusted member of Radu Paisie's inner circle.

When he took the reign, Mircea Ciobanu (1545-1552, 1553-1554 and 1558-1559) had to agree to the new borders in 1546¹³. The hostility of the boyars towards him seems to come from this agreement and the fact that he used this to blame the vornic Coadă as the main culprit for the territorial losses two weeks after he took the throne¹⁴. The same opinion about Coadă's blame was shared by the Ban Mihail Cantacuzino. He thought that «[...] it was the Vornic Coadă the one that split these cities [Braila, Giurgiu and Turnu] when they were given to the Turks. History also says that he was one of the traitors that worked towards this loss»¹⁵.

In this context its worth mentioning that the exact borders of the Giurgiu Kaza must be analysed with an eye on the bigger picture. During the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566) the Ottoman foreign policy was changing drastically with a new offensive to the European Centre¹⁶. It was not a coincidence that the settlement of borders between Giurgiu and Wallachia coincided with the conquest of Tighina (1538) and the occupation of Braila (1538-1540) and their conversion into kazas. It was also during the time of the creation of the pasalik of Buda (1541). Along the Danube, there was now a strong defensive belt for the Ottomans.

We cannot state the length of the Giurgiu kaza, as it was settled in 1544. We can agree with Constantinescu however. He stated that the Ottomans followed the Sub-Danube terrace as a frontier between Giurgiu and Wallachia. It was even stated that they wanted to control the Danube meadows, which is about 15-20 km from the river¹⁷. The length of the meadows varied in time and their height was 60-65 m compared to the riverbank¹⁸.

This assertion is backed by logical arguments, especially since in the Middle Ages borders tended to be settled on geographical structures, such as rivers, mountains etc.¹⁹. Both in the Eastern and Western worlds the idea of borders was not connected with fixed lines.²⁰ Instead, they relied on relative terms, unlike the Roman limes, for

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- 13 Ion Heliade Rădulescu, *Elemente de historia românilor sau Dacia și România*, (București: Typographia Statului, 1869), 187.
 - 14 Stolnicul Constantin Cantacuzino, *Istoria Țării Românești*, ed. Mihail Gregorian (București: Editura Minerva, 1984), 111.
 - 15 Sion, *Istoria politică*, 136.
 - 16 Tasin Gemil, "În fața impactului otoman", in *Petru Rareș*, ed. Leon Șimanschi (București: Editura Academiei, 1978), 136.
 - 17 N.A. Constantinescu, "Întinderea raielelor cu deosebită privire la raiaua Giurgiului", *Anuar de geografie și antropogeografie*, 2 (1911): 70.
 - 18 Constant Nițescu, "Monografia regiunii sud-estice a județului Vlașca. Contribuțiuni la cunoașterea caracterului agricol-tehnic și social-economic al regiunii", *Buletinul agriculturii (Supliment)*, 2 (1928): 10.
 - 19 Ioan Marian Țiplic, "Hotar, graniță și/sau frontieră în Evul Mediu timpuriu", in *Acta Terrae Septemcastrensis*, 2 (2003): 156.
 - 20 Jacques Le Goff and Jean-Claude Schmitt, *Dicționar tematic al Evului Mediu occidental* (Iași: Polirom, 2002), 138.

example²¹.

It is worth remembering that all other borders rectifications between Giurgiu and Wallachia happened from East to West, but not from North to South, which is exactly where the border followed the Danube terrace.

The “initial” borders between Giurgiu and Wallachia can be identified to some degree through Selim II’s firman (edict) granted to the ruler of Wallachia, Alexandru Mircea [1568-1577]. This firman confirmed the borders settled thirty years before that.

Four years later, another firman of Murad II (1574-1595) enforced the same borders, based on the findings of a “special commission”²². This was during the reign of Mihnea Turcitul (1577-1583, 1585-1591) in Wallachia²³. The documents asked that the borders, «as they were done before that» should be respected by the Turkish authorities in Giurgiu. This proves that there were some border disputes. To settle the conflicts and establish fixed borders and to put the border markers (*direk*)²⁴, the Wallachians sent some representatives, such as Ștefan. The Turks were represented by Behram bin-i-Abdullah, Casâm voivode, bin-i-Casim, Sinan bin-i-Mustafa, Mehmed bin-i, Behram bin-i-Yusuf. From Giurgiu came Ali bin-i, Yahya bin-i-Ali, Hasan bin-i-Ali, Elias bin-i-Piri, Davud bin-i-Hadâr. The judge (cadiu) of Cernavodă, Ahmed Efendi, was the one that settled the matter.

The border settlement started in:

the Eastern part of Giurgiu, in front of the Danube, in the area called Talambăcu-Bogazi²⁵, among the reeds, at the mound called Kuciuk Hislarlık²⁶; then they placed a sign at the mound called Beliclerbaşı²⁷, also known as Straja²⁸; then they placed a sign at that mound, and coming back from there they marked the lake called Chiriva-Golu²⁹ and placed another marker at the public road (Tarik-i-am). This road starts at the markers and goes to Marotin³⁰; then they marked a place

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- 21 Dan Horia Mazilu, *Lege și fărădelege în lumea românească veche* (Iași: Polirom, 2006), 295.
 - 22 Mihail Guboglu, ed., *Catalogul documentelor turcești*, vol. I (București: Direcția generală a Arhivelor Statului din RPR, 1960), doc. 86, 43.
 - 23 Guboglu, *Catalogul*, vol. I, doc. 86, 43.
 - 24 Hagop Siruni, “Acte turcești privitoare la hotarele dunărene ale Țării Românești”, *Revista arhivelor*, V/1 (1942): 144.
 - 25 Unidentified; it could be Talămbaciu or Glămbocelul, a stream that runs in to the Argeș river, Siruni, “Acte turcești”, 161-65.
 - 26 Unidentified.
 - 27 Unidentified.
 - 28 The name of that mound could come from a permanent border point of Wallachia. Nicolae Stoicescu, *Curteni și slujitori. Contribuții la istoria armatei române* (București: Editura Militară, 1968), 316-17.
 - 29 Lake Criva.
 - 30 Today Frasin, Giurgiu County.

called Suniia³¹. It was agreed that fish in Lake Chiriva to go to Giurgiu with no interference from Wallachia. The deserted places in the Romanian side of Lake Chiriva belonging to Wallachia, they agreed they should be left as pastures for them with no interference from Turks. Also, the Turkish Raias will be allowed to bring their cattle to Lake Chiriva for watering. Going back to the markers put on the public road to Marotin and at the place they call Sulin³², they marked the valley near the village called Cosova³³ the Romanian places will belong to the Romanian areas and the places near Giurgiu to the city. It was settled that the fields would not be confused and that the places shall be owned by the former owners. They marked the place where this valley joins Cosova and the road called Calea Banului³⁴; they also marked this road at its ends. Then they marked the villages of Ului³⁵ and Paraipani³⁶ and Yenige Koi³⁷ of Wallachia and at the road that turns East from this village. Going back to the mark at the end of this road towards the lake known as Mihri golu³⁸, they reinforced the old marks there. New markers were added on the shores of Lake Mihri and on the road leading to the Danube; the fish here was to go to Giurgiu³⁹.

In 1669, during the reign of Antonie Vodă of Popești (1669-1672), a new border was agreed for the «restoration of the older borders»⁴⁰. In those times, «the estates of the country around Giurgiu are offended and breached by the people of that town»⁴¹. Gheorghe Băleanu, former Ban of Oltenia and current *mare vornic*, helped establish the new border, alongside Radul Crețulescu, former *mare logofăt* (chancellor) and

31 Unidentified.

32 Unidentified.

33 Probably Coșoveni or Onceasca, a hamlet of the village of Bălănoaia, «placed on the hills of the Danube, from Stănești». P.S. Antonescu-Remuși, *Dicționar geografic al județului Vlașca* (București: Stabilimentul grafic Socecu., 1890), 82.

34 Because the road (or “calea”) Banului appears as a border element in this settlement at Turnu, Giurgiu and Braila, we have to admit the hypothesis that in the Ban of Oltenia must have been in the first commission, Cf. Constantinescu, “Întinderea raielelor”, 71. The road to Banul also appears as a border element in a Ottoman document of 1819, under the same name, but in Turkish *Eski Ban Yolu*.

35 Unidentified.

36 In 1872 this hamlet was called Arasche, after the name of the owner of the estate. Today its part of the Vedea commune, Giurgiu County. Cf. Antonescu-Remuși, *Dicționar geografic*, 226

37 Could be Enichiom or Zlatum, «a valley with reeds in front of the village of Gostinu». Antonescu-Remuși, *Dicționar geografic*, 116.

38 The lake of Mahăru, near the village of Slobozia, Giurgiu County, is quite a large one: at the start of the XX century it had about 890 ha. Cf. Grigore Antipa, *Regiunea inundabilă a Dunării. Starea ei actuală și mijloace de a o pune în valoare* (București: Inst. de Arte grafice Carol Göbl 1910), 15.

39 Siruni, *Turkish documents*, 144-45.

40 Cf. Constantinescu, “Întinderea raielelor”, 73.

41 Sion, *Istoria politică*, 98.

other boyars and dignitaries. The Turkish side was represented by Hussein Selam-Agais, special envoy from the Sultan, Mehmed Efendi Endreneli, the *cadiu* of Rusciuk and other *cadii* from Giurgiu and Rușava – Haselim Efendi Ghiumulgalini. They started from the «estates of the Radu-Vodă monastery, Paraipanii and Recenii, north of Giurgiu, from the bank of the Danube straight to the estate of Odiovoaia, where they set a stone. From there beyond the pond⁴², at the mound that we call Mihnea Vodă's; from there on the valley towards the Ban's road, at the ends of the estates we call Stepănești (Stănești?), Gurbanul, Oțești (Oncești), Cossoveni, Frătești and Șirmănești (Daia), up untul Știubeiul near the lake and from thereto the Danube, at the mouth of that water called Cumasca⁴³, where they set a stone right on the river banks. The territories before those stone were left to the country. And the people of Giurgiu were not to cross those stones, because the *cadii* agreed that was the just border»⁴⁴.

Even so, it seems that this settlement of 1669 was breached right after Constantin Brâncoveanu was dethroned (1714). The «elders say that people of Giurgiu extended their lands and crossed the border from the East and from the West, making *senete* and *ciftlicuri*»⁴⁵, meaning estates. Furthermore, starting with the first reign of Nicolae Mavrocordat (1715-1716, 1719-1730) there were increasing cases of Ottoman and breaches into Wallachia from the Danube *kazas*. They entered in official positions or as simple individuals⁴⁶.

Another settlement was made on July 13 1764 and it is recorded in an Ottoman document of July 1802⁴⁷. It was done during the reign of Ștefan Racoviță (1764-1765):

North of the Gura Gârliei, which was shut by Constantin Vodă Brâncoveanu with șarampoaie (stakes), the border runs from the village belonging to the people of Giurgiu which we call Braniștea to Știubeii, at the estate of Șerbatesci⁴⁸ near a lake. From there it goes into the Ban's road to Zăgazu, where we find the borders of the Odiovoaiei estate, called today Mihnea Vodă's, through the river bed of the Pârâu up until Balta and from there straight to the banks of the Danube⁴⁹.

Alongside this new settlement, we find other agreements on the line of the Danube

42 Probably the pond of Mahâru.

43 A small arm of the Danube, near the hill and forest of Penciu. It flows near the villages of Băneasa, Meletie and Pietrele.

44 Sion, *Istoria politică*, 98-9.

45 Sion, *Istoria politică*, 98-9.

46 Maria Matilda Alexandrescu-Dersca, "Despre regimul supușilor otomani în Țara Românească în veacul al XVIII-lea", *Studii*, 14/1 (1961): 89.

47 Mustafa A. Mehmet, ed., *Documente turcești privind istoria României*, vol. III: (1791-1812) (București: Editura Academiei, 1986), doc. 106, 164-65.

48 Probably Șerpătești, today Daia, Giurgiu County.

49 Sion, *Istoria politică*, 89-90.

between Wallachia and the Ottoman Empire⁵⁰ concerning some estates. The last known settlement was in 1796, a small one. The Wallachian Prince was represented by the *great paharnic* Vintilă Prejbeanu and Alexandru, *ex mare medelnicer*. They focused on the Western borders of the *kaza*, on the lands of the Paraipani estate.

Besides the settlements that concerned the border between Giurgiu and Wallachia, there were some other minor border agreements. From the correspondence of Mustafa Paşa, *muhafâzul*⁵¹ of Giurgiu and the Prince of Wallachia, Alexandru Şuţu in 1819 we find that the two parties agreed to cooperate in draining some neighbouring lakes. There were some agreements for (or between) the estates of Daia in Wallachia and the village of Oinak Koy (Oinac) of the Giurgiu *kaza*⁵².

Therefore, broadly speaking, until 1829, the limits of the Giurgiu *kaza* were the same as in the sixteenth century: starting from Arsache, passing Hodivoaia, Stăneşti, Bălănoaia, Frăţeşti, north of Oinac and Braniştea, reaching the Danube beyond the stream of Comasca, near Gostinu⁵³.

Other indicators of the borders of Giurgiu in the Middle Ages are represented by Daia and Hodivoaia (Odivoaia)⁵⁴, where some *Captaincies* existed⁵⁵ with border duties, tasked with looking out for the borders of Wallachia and follow the Prince's orders during war⁵⁶. At Daia and Hodivoaia, border settlements («two hours away from the fortress of Giurgiu»⁵⁷) there were some quarantine zones, to protect the people of Wallachia from contagious diseases such as plague, like in 1825⁵⁸.

Some settlements near Giurgiu which were mentioned in the border agreements were not part of the *kaza*. The village of Marotin (Frasin) was not part of the *kaza*, as stated by a document in March 19 1779 from the Metropolitan Church of Un-

50 Mihail Stăncescu, "O delimitare de moşie la hotarul Țării Româneşti în 1764", *Revista arhivelor*, 1 (1924): 131-32.

51 "Muhafâz" (*muhafız*): the one that guards and protects; the commander of a town.

52 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, doc. 1381, 272-73.

53 Scarlat A. Stăncescu, *Din trecutul oraşului Giurgiu* (Bucureşti: Institutul modern de Arte Grafice Unirea, 1935), 28.

54 The importance of the Hodivoaia marginal Captaincies is also given by the fact that for small cases, the captain had the right to sue for Vlaşca County. Cf. Sion, *Istoria politică*, 35.

55 In the middle of the Seventeenth century there were ten *Captaincies* in the area of Vlaşca County, with 120 servants at Căcaleţi (Izvoru), Călugăreni, Podul Doamnei (both close to Videle), Frăsineşti, Găeşti, Hodivoaia, Izvor, Udeni and Meri (close to Găeşti). The border *Captaincy* at Hodivoaia had 23 servants. Cf. Olga Cicanci, "Informaţii despre organizarea administrativă şi fiscalitatea în Țara Românească (1764-1765) în opera lui Atanasie Comnen Ipsilanti", *Studii*, 19/2 (1966): 11/353-12/354).

56 Nicolae Stoicescu, "Despre organizarea pazei hotarelor în Țara Românească în sec. XV-XVII", *Studii şi materiale de istorie medie*, 4 (1960): 218.

57 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, doc. 1999, 401.

58 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, doc. 1999, 401; doc. 2234, 447-48; doc. 2235, 448.

gro-Wallachia during a divorce settlement between one Stana and her husband, Istrate, both from that village⁵⁹. If Marotin were a part of the *kaza* the situation would have been settled by the *cadiu* from Giurgiu⁶⁰. Similarly, the villages of Prundu, Puieni and Pietrele were on Wallachian territory at the end of the Eighteenth century having Church estates (Puieni was a part of the St. George monastery and Pietrele of the Cotroceni one, both from Bucharest) or noble estates, as was the case of Prundu under the lordship of the *vornic* Racoviță.

During the Sixteenth-Nineteenth centuries the abuses done by Ottoman subjects in the territories considered Wallachian were treated as such and punished. Romanian rulers felt within their rights to appeal to the Sultan for protection whenever Ottoman subjects breached their territories (be it Muslims, Christian, Turks, Tatars or otherwise). To counteract these acts, the Sultans often issued decrees to the Danube *kazas* to stop such activities⁶¹.

The Prince Mihai Racoviță (1730-1731, 1741-1744), for example, asked the Great Vizir Seyyid-Hassan Paşa in 1744 to stop the breach of the Wallachian borders and of its lakes formed by the Danube's overflow⁶².

Many of these conflicts were caused by agriculture. In 1768 Sultan Mustafa III (1757-1774) order the *vali*⁶³ of Oceaş, Mustafa Paşa and the *nazâr*⁶⁴ of Silistra to settle the boundary disputes between Wallachia and the *kaza* of Giurgiu caused by sowing. The same document warned the Paşa of Oceaş that the claims of the people of Giurgiu were unfounded, prohibiting them to sow, gather wood or otherwise infringe on the territories of Wallachia⁶⁵. The Sultan's decision was enforced immediately, announcing to the people of Giurgiu, called *raialâi*⁶⁶ or *serhatlâi*⁶⁷ that they mustn't sow or cut the wood from the land of Wallachia⁶⁸.

59 Constanța Vintilă-Ghițulescu, *În şalvari şi cu işlic. Biserică, sexualitate, căsătorie şi divorţ în Ţara Românească a secolului al XVIII-lea* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2011), 401.

60 There are some opinions, based on oral sources that claim that Daia and Marotin (Frasin) were actually a part of the Giurgiu *kaza*. Cf. Ion Boldescu, *Monografia oraşului Giurgiu* (Giurgiu: Institutul Grafic Ulpiu Stănculescu, 1912), 67.

61 Viorel Panaite, *Pace, război şi comerţ în Islam. Ţările Române şi dreptul otoman al popoarelor (secolele XV-XVII)* (Bucureşti: Ed. All, 1997), 349.

62 Valeriu Veliman, *Relaţiile româno-otomane (1711-1821). Documente turceşti* (Bucureşti: Direcția generală a Arhivelor Statului din RPR, 1984), doc. 110, 278.

63 "Vali": governor, the ruler of a province (vilayet or eyalet).

64 "Nazâr" (*nazir*): supervisor or the ruler of city.

65 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, doc. 254, 77.

66 From "raia" (turk: *re'âyâ*), which literally means "herd". Until the Seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire recognized by this only the non-Muslim. After that, it included Muslims.

67 From "serhad" (*serhat*): border, frontier. "Serhatlâi": people on the fringes, frontiersmen.

68 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 77, doc. 255.

Despite this, in 1774 the Princial Chancellery told the Ottoman authorities that the people of Giurgiu occupied 17 estates that used to belong to Wallachia⁶⁹.

Although the Turks restricted the entry into Wallachia for the people in the *kazale*, during the reign of Alexandru Moruzi (1793-1796) and Constantin Hangerli (1797-1799) there were some people from Giurgiu roaming the Romanian villages from Vlaşca County, stealing produce from peasants or plowing their fields. In May 1796 some 15 huts made by Ottoman subjects from the *ciftik* of Hagi Minus-aga were demolished. Constantin Hangerli ordered the *inspravnic* from Vlaşca County to prevent the people of Giurgiu to cross the borders⁷⁰.

In 1801 the *capucheia* of the Wallachian ruler from Istanbul pointed out in a document (*takrir*) from April 15 addressed to the Chancellery of the Great Vizir that the *serhat* of Wallachia near Giurgiu are being overrun by the people of the *kaza*. The dignitary showed that, although there were strict orders to settle the borders, they were not enforced⁷¹. In July 1802 he pointed out to Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) the repeated violation of the Wallachian border by Giurgiu. He asked for the copies of former orders to enforce the borders and the issue of another one to settle the grievance:

Any strong advice that is given, despite illustrious orders issued for the removal of the intruders that attack the borders of Wallachia and occupy our estates, breaching the Imperial borders at the Danube, as in the *serhats* on Wlach soil, it is clear that at this moment some of the inhabitants of Giurgiu are disrespecting the established borders and are occupying Wallachian lands. This calamity makes the *raia* of Wallachian very upset as is the case with the owners of the estates. It is also apparent that even though there will be new orders issued, they will be without effect if we do not extract from the *chornicles* the old border lines established between Giurgiu and Wallachia [...]⁷².

Selim III replied in October 18-27 1802 with a *hатиşерif* in which, among other things, he ordered that none would enter Wallachia except on the basis of a *teşcherele*⁷³, since there were some many violations from the *sethatâli*. This new document had to be issued by a *zabit*⁷⁴ without infringing on the Romanian *raiale*. Also, the *ai-ani*⁷⁵ on the Danube, from Turnu, Giurgiu and Brăila were ordered not to send their *mubaşiri*⁷⁶ into Wallachia to cause problems there⁷⁷. In August-September 1806 the

69 Alexandrescu-Dersca, "Despre regimul", 17, doc. 103.

70 Alexandrescu-Dersca, "Despre regimul", 13, doc. 99.

71 Alexandrescu-Dersca, "Despre regimul", 158, doc. 669.

72 Mehmet, *Documente*, vol. III, 164-65.

73 "Teşcherea" (*tezkere*, *tezkire*): letter, permit.

74 "Zabit": one that rules, officer, leader, commander.

75 "Aian" (*a'yan*): notable figure, leader of a small community or a region.

76 "Mubaşir" (*mübaşir*): civil servant acting for the state or in place of a dignitary.

77 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 166, doc. 705.

capuchehaia came back with a new complaint with similar issues⁷⁸.

It's worth remembering that the Ottoman central authorities and those in Giurgiu assured the rulers in Bucharest that the old boundaries will be respected. As commanded by Sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730) on November 18/27 1714, the Ottoman authorities on the Danube were ordered to respect the sanctity of the Wallachian borders⁷⁹. Another example is the letter of 1751, signed by Mir Mustafa, Hasan and Selim, voivodes⁸⁰, *aiani* and *agale*⁸¹ of Giurgiu who promised that in peace times the Ottoman soldiers would not cross into Wallachia or cause any damage there⁸². The situation repeated itself in 1822; a report (*inha*) on October 14 from Mehmed Salih, *mufahâz* of Giurgiu, was sent to the ruler of Wallachia, Grigore Ghica. In it was said that in the future only *capalnâi* merchants⁸³ with official documents and the people of Giurgiu would be fined if they didn't refrain.⁸⁴ The *molla* of Rusciuc, es-Seid Mustafa, acted in a similar manner which proves that the people in Giurgiu were crossing illegally into Wallachia, as did the ones in Rusciuc, south of the Danube⁸⁵. Two years later, on September 13 1824, the *naib*⁸⁶ of Giurgiu, es-Seid Feizullah, told the Porte that he received the imperial firman ordering him to stop the crossings into Wallachia, except for the *capalnâi* and *serhatlâi* merchants. He assured his superiors that measure will be taken to prevent future border problems⁸⁷.

It is noteworthy that after each new appointment of a dignitary in Giurgiu, he would send letters of recommendation to Bucharest, always accompanied by gifts, as was the Oriental tradition. Mehmed, the new Aga of the Janissaries did just that on March 28 1824, when he sent to Grigore Ghica a letter expressing his wishes to cooperate⁸⁸. After being named *muhağfâz* of Giurgiu, Husein Paşa also sent a letter to the same Wallachian ruler on March 27 1825, calling for good relations⁸⁹.

We mustn't consider the relations between Giurgiu and Wallachia as constant bickering; there were moments of cooperation. On February 19 1826 the *mufahâz* of Giurgiu, Mustafa Paşa, sent a new letter to Ghica, in which he stated that he was

78 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 175, doc. 752.

79 Veliman, *Relațiile româno-otomane*, 94-6, doc. 16.

80 "Voievod" (*voyvoda*): administrator of a Vizir's estate.

81 "Aga" (*ağa*): military leader.

82 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 59, doc. 173.

83 Merchants from Kapan (warehouse), tasked with the resupply of the imperial capital markets and Danube cities with different items. Cf. Mustafa A. Mehmet, "O condică domnească din a doua jumătate a veacului al XVIII-lea scrisă în limba turcă, privind Țara Românească", *Revista arhivelor*, 2 (1958): 249.

84 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 291, doc. 1462.

85 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 292, doc. 1470.

86 "Naib": a *cadiu*'s help.

87 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 385, doc. 1919.

88 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 387, doc. 1927.

89 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 398, doc. 1983.

informed of the Wallachian ruler's visit to the village of Daia. The Prince greeted his envoy, returning from Istanbul. As a token of friendship, Mustafa sent the *cumbaragibaşa*⁹⁰, Mehmed Aga and Ahmed Aga, one of the *aga* of the city fortifications⁹¹. A few days later, on February 25, the *muhafâz* of Giurgiu invited the Prince to «visit for a few days and strengthen our friendship»⁹².

The Ottoman authorities in Giurgiu had to contend with illegal border crosses themselves. Some Wallachian subjects crossed the frontiers of the *kaza*. In 1826 a few gypsies fled Wallachia to Giurgiu and «after they committed robberies here as well», they fled the city even though the Prince of Wallachia demanded they return⁹³. In the Eighteenth Century some couples are mentioned fleeing to Giurgiu, where they could get married without the restrictions they had to endure in Wallachia. Giurgiu was definitely seen a refuge from the authorities in Bucharest. At the start of the Eighteenth Century, Maria Cantacuzion, a relative of the Prince, Nicolae Mavrocordat (1715-1716, 1719-1730) left Wallachia for Giurgiu to get married with Constantin Zaguriano, a Greek noble from the court⁹⁴. In 1786, one called Gheorghe with his partner, Maria, from the village of Ștefanda, Vlașca County, fled to Giurgiu and married there. They ended up staying for five years⁹⁵. Similarly, Petco and Neaga, from Singureni, also found refuge in Giurgiu, married there and even had a child in the city⁹⁶. These all mean that there weren't any major problems for the Wallachians to cross into the territory of Giurgiu.

As a result, Giurgiu, a city run the Muslims, but with a majority of population of Christian faith, offered some temptations. From a private life point of view, the freedoms there were quite appealing. Indirectly, the people of Wallachia found different ways to reach the *kaza*, some of them actually owning properties in the city. Interestingly, the *serhatlâi* of Giurgiu were more strictly regulated and prevented to roam the territories to the north.

For the Princes of Wallachia, the area around Giurgiu was seen as turbulent region, characterized by delinquencies and excesses. The area was lightly defended and the central authority there was scarcely represented⁹⁷. The Ottoman authorities found that it was in their interest to cooperate with the Wallachians in keeping the central decrees in effect. In an address on November 30 1822, the *aian* of Rusciuc, en-Seid Mustafa, announced to the Prince of Wallachia that he took all measure to stop all suspects, Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs or Albanian, to cross into Romanian lands. Mustafa also wanted the speedy arrival of a *capuchehaie* at Giurgiu to help him in

90 “Cumbaragi-başâ”: from *cumbara* (big bomb, shell) and *baş* (leader); the gunnery commander in a garrison.

91 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 434, doc. 2161.

92 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 434, doc. 2163.

93 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 436, doc. 2171.

94 Vintilă-Ghițulescu, *În șalvari și cu ișlic*, 125.

95 Vintilă-Ghițulescu, *În șalvari și cu ișlic*, 365-66.

96 Vintilă-Ghițulescu, *În șalvari și cu ișlic*, 366.

97 Mazilu, *Lege și fărădelege*, 296.

protecting the border⁹⁸.

One year later, the *muhafâz* Salih Mehmed told Ghica that he took coercitive actions against 30 Muslims and 4-5 Serbs who all grazed their horses on Romanian lands, terrifying the border villages⁹⁹. In 1826 some horses are mentioned, stolen from Wallachia and sold at Giurgiu¹⁰⁰.

Evidently, there were some abuses on the other side. Ahmed, an aide to the *muhafâz* of Giurgiu sent a letter to Grigore Ghica. In it he asserted that one Iorgu, the captain of Hodivoaia, is disturbing the Muslims of Giurgiu, curses and beats them. Ahmed could not explain such an attitude, since the Muslims were warned to be on their best behavior when they travelled into Wallachia¹⁰¹.

98 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 302, doc. 1512.

99 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 328-29, doc. 1637.

100 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 436, doc. 2171.

101 Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor*, vol. I, 459, doc. 2293.

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THE WRITTEN AND ORAL DISPUTES OF ISTVÁN SZÁNTÓ (ARATOR)

ABSTRACT

In reviewing the activities of the Jesuit István Szántó (Arator), I would like to explore the very first steps of the Catholic renewal movement in Transylvania and of the recatholization process that found political support in princely power in the wake of the promulgation of the decrees of the Council of Trent. I must note, however, that my analysis of the religious dispute taking place in Nagyvárad (Grosswardein, Oradea) goes beyond merely giving an account of the specific event and aims to shed light on the spiritual horizon that so succinctly characterized Szántó, the main protagonist of the dispute.

KEYWORDS: Jesuit István Szántó; Transylvania; Nagyvárad; Religious dispute; King Stephen Báthory of Poland.

In reviewing the activities of the Jesuit István Szántó (Arator), I would like to explore the very first steps of the Catholic renewal movement in Transylvania and of the recatholization process that found political support in princely power in the wake of the promulgation of the decrees of the Council of Trent¹. I must note, however, that my analysis of the religious dispute taking place in Nagyvárad (Grosswardein, Oradea) goes beyond merely giving an account of the specific event and aims to shed light on the spiritual horizon that so succinctly characterized Szántó, the main protagonist of the dispute.

In 1571, Stephen Báthory ascended to the throne of the Principality of Transylvania, and in 1576 he was crowned King of Poland. His programme as a ruler focused on the recatholization of the principality and on the war against the Ottomans, and with the crushing of the coup staged by Transylvanian pretender Gáspár Bekes and the prosecution of Ferenc Dávid, the leader of Transylvanian antitrinitarianism, the road was finally paved for the implementation of that programme². It was in

1 On Szántó, cf. Vilmos Fraknói, "Egy magyar jezsuita a XVI. században", *Katholikus Szemle*, 1 (1887): 385-433; Kálmán Tímár, "Szántó Arator István irodalmi tervei", *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 40/1 (1930): 34-42, 161-74; István Szántó (Arator), *Confutatio Alcorani*, ed. Lázár István Dávid (Szeged: JATE Press, 1992), 8-10; Dénes Szittyai, "Szántó (Arator) István S.J. (1540-1612) élete és munkássága", *Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok*, 6/3-4 (1994): 5-35; Csaba Szilágyi, "Szántó Arator István mint a Missio Transylvanica szervezője", in *A magyar jezsuiták küldetése a kezdetektől napjainkig* (Piliscsaba: Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem Bölcsészettudományi Kar, 2006), 131-41; Ead., "Szántó (Arator) István erdélyi és partiumi működése", *Történelmi Szemle*, 44/3-4 (2002): 255-92.

2 Antal Pirnát, *Die Ideologie der Siebenbürger Antitrinitarier in den 1570er Jahren*,

this context that in 1579 Stephen Báthory called in the Society of Jesus³. At the time, the Jesuits had but a few Hungarian members; the majority of those arriving to the Principality of Transylvania represented a wide variety of nationalities and mother tongues. Although with such few members the order could only establish a single mission in Nagyvárad, the city still played a key role in more than one aspect, for example, in terms of political representation, as the city was under the patronage of the Báthorys. One of Hungary's most popular saints, King Ladislaus I of the House of Árpád, was buried here. His sepulchre was a place of pilgrimage. Another king of Hungary, Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387-1437) also found his resting place here. The life-size statues of three Hungarian royal saints (Saint Stephen, Saint Emeric, and Saint Ladislaus) were outstanding achievements of the International Gothic in Hungary⁴, however, Ottoman troops occupying the city in 1660 destroyed them in religious fervour as monuments of idolatry. The country having been riven into three parts – 1. Royal Hungary, which remained under Habsburg rule; 2. Ottoman Hungary; 3. Principality of Transylvania – Nagyvárad occupied a geopolitically significant location right at the triple border, both defending the roads leading to the Kingdom of Hungary and blocking further Ottoman expansion in Hungary, which also granted it key strategic importance. Last but not least, the city was home to a Catholic community of several thousand⁵.

By this period of time, Nagyvárad – a city with strong Catholic ecclesiastical traditions and a significant population of believers professing Catholicism – was already overwhelmingly Protestant as a result of the Reformation. In 1584, it became the venue of a religious dispute between Calvinists and Jesuits⁶. On the following pages, I will give an account of the religious dispute held in Nagyvárad. However, before delving into the events, I believe it is important to take a closer look at the main protagonist of the dispute, one of the first Hungarian Jesuits, István Szántó (Arator), his personality, his spirituality, his historical perspective, and, in that light, his attitude towards Protestantism⁷.

Szántó belonged to the very first generation of Hungarian Jesuits. In 1560, at the age of 21, he joined the Society of Jesus in Rome, where he served as the confessor of the Hungarian pilgrims from 1575. However, we know more of his activities concerning the establishment of the Collegium Hungaricum in Rome. Setting up this institution

trans. Edith Roth (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1961), Mihály Balázs, *Early Transylvanian Antitrinitarianism (1566-1571). From Servet to Palaeologus* (Baden-Baden: Bouxviller, 1996).

- 3 Lucian Persi, *Le missioni gesuite in Transilvania e Moldavia nel Seicento* (Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 1998).
- 4 Jolán Balogh, *Varadinum. Várad vára*, vol. I-II (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982).
- 5 Tamás Kruppa, "Nagyvárad jelentősége a Báthoryak művelődés és valláspolitikájában", *Századok*, 139/4 (2005): 945-68.
- 6 For the documents: Ladislaus Lukács S.J., ed., *Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae*, vol. II (Romae: Institutum Historicum SJ, 1976), 741-48.
- 7 On this topic, cf. Tamás Kruppa, *Tradíció és propaganda keresztútján. Fejezetek Báthory Zsigmond udvarának kultúrájából* (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2015).

interfered with the interests of various circles. The Habsburgs did not welcome a seminary churning out priests and, inevitably, laying down the foundations for an independent Jesuit province in Hungary. Not to mention the fact that the cause of the Collegium found a supporter in King Stephen Báthory of Poland, a great rival of the Habsburgs, who also aspired to the throne of Hungary. The Habsburgs found Báthory's aspirations especially alarming because even though it was the Habsburg dynasty that occupied Saint Stephen's throne, the Hungarian nobility supported Báthory. They saw the Habsburgs as foreign rulers; in the person of the Polish king, however, Hungarians would have had a sovereign from within the ranks of the nation. The project of the Collegium Hungaricum also ran against the interests of the Hungarian clergy, which had serious misgivings about Jesuit expansion in the country, especially as Szántó intended to secure the Santo Stefano Rotondo and its revenues for the Collegium Hungaricum, which was at the hands of the Pauline Fathers at the time⁸. In this struggle, Hungary's clergy sided with the Pauline Fathers. Szántó was no match for all those vested interests and was doomed to fail eventually. Just a few months after it was established, the Collegium Hungaricum merged with the Collegium Germanicum (which from then on was known as the Collegium Germanicum et Hungaricum) while the pope ordered Szántó, under threat of anathema, to refrain from any further activities dedicated to the cause⁹. The fact that Szántó was an admirer of the Polish king is clearly reflected in the letters he wrote him back in Rome, while as the confessor of the Hungarian pilgrims. In those letters, he recommended that the king, whom he did not personally know, follow the examples of the royal and princely saints of the House of Árpád (namely Saint Stephen, Saint Emeric, and Saint Ladislaus) as well as of the Polish Kings Saint Stanislaus, Saint Casimir, and Władysław I, and Hungary's Matthias Corvinus. In the eyes of the Hungarians – and, therefore, of Szántó – the Árpáds and the Hunyadis represented the ideal of a nation under the rule of its own national royalty, with Szántó expecting Báthory to rid Hungary of both Habsburg and Ottoman rule.

Further proof of Szántó's patriotism is his aspiration to locate Magna Hungaria, the ancient homeland of Hungarians. In a letter dated on February 16, 1606 he wrote that the accession of Tsar Pseudo-Demetrius I to the Russian throne opened an opportunity for finding the ancient Hungarian homeland. The idea had occurred to him back during the time when, commissioned by Stephen Báthory, he had been researching historical sources on Hungarian and Polish history in the Vatican Library, and had them copied¹⁰. It must have been around this time

8 Documents of the Pauline monastery published in Lorenz Weinrich, ed., *Hungarici monasterii ordinis Sancti Pauli primi Heremitaie de urbe Roma instrumenta et priorum registra* (Roma-Budapest: Római Magyar Akadémia Fraknói Vilmos Történeti Intézet Magyar Egyháztörténeti Enciklopédia Munkaközösség, 1999); on the conflict, cf. IX.

9 Bitskey, István, *Il collegio Germanico-Ungarico di Roma: contributo alla storia della cultura ungherese in età barocca* (Roma: Viella, 1996), 33-43. For the documents themselves, cf. Ladislaus Lukács S.J., ed., *Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae*, vol. I (Romae: Institutum Historicum SJ, 1969), passim.

10 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. I, 672-73.

that he ran into Ricardus' account of the expedition led by Friar Julian. Back in 1236, King Béla IV of Hungary had sent out Dominican friars to locate the ancient Hungarian homeland. Friar Julian's account of his journey was also used by famous Franciscan traveller Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck. The report survives in *Liber Censuum*, a record of the financial claims of the papacy, along with other information considered to be of utmost importance¹¹.

Szántó's thinking is a curious amalgam of his ideal of a nation under a sovereign from within its own ranks and his anti-Habsburg sentiments and xenophobia, especially his anti-German attitude. In his oration written to the pope in support of the Collegium Hungaricum in Rome, he asked the Holy Father not to commingle Hungarian pilgrims with foreign nationals, and especially not with Germans because, as he wrote, the two nations harbour an inborn hatred (*naturali quomodo odium*) for one another, such hatred often being the cause of the frequent wars between the two peoples¹². Once he left home, and not long after he settled in Transylvania (1579), he also had a skirmish with his Polish superiors. When the Collegium Hungaricum, which, as I mentioned above, would have been the core institution of a Hungarian Jesuit province in its own right, was merged into the Collegium Germanicum, and Szántó – who had been quite vocal on the issue on several occasions – was silenced under the threat of anathema, Báthory decided to send Jesuits to the Transylvanian principality under the aegis of the Polish province of the order. As a natural consequence, the members of the Jesuit mission operated under Polish control, along with all other members of the order, whether they were Hungarians or of any other nationality. While in his letters to General Claudio Acquaviva, Szántó only swung broad accusations at Polish rector Jakub Wujek criticising his activities; there is little, if any, doubt that the animosity between the Jesuits was rooted in ethnic conflicts. In his letter to the provincial superior,

11 For an extract of Szántó's letter, cf. Mihály Balázs, Tamás Kruppa, et al., eds., *Jezsuita Okmánytár. Erdélyt és Magyarországot érintő iratok 1601-1606*, vol. I/2 (Szeged: JATE Press, 1995), 544-45. On Riccardo's report, cf. Lukács, *Monumenta* vol. I, 627. On accounts of the journeys made by Friar Julian, Plano Carpin and William of Rubruck and on other reports and correspondence, cf. György Györffy, ed., *Julianus barát és napkelet fölfedezése* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Kiadó, 1986).

12 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. I, 647. For Hungarian representatives of the major intellectual and spiritual renewal movements emerging at the end of the Middle Ages, namely humanism and devotio moderna, the terms *natio hungarica* and *patria* did not exclusively refer to the nobility but in fact included the entirety of Hungarian society, whose members were interconnected by strong ties of blood kinship. Based on shared ethnicity and kinship, this understanding of the concept of nation led to the Biblically based idea that Hungarians were the chosen people. In his sermon delivered on the day of Saint Ladislaus of the House of Árpád, Franciscan author of widespread Western European renown Osvát Laskai (Osvaldus Lasco) described this community as follows: King Ladislaus was our flesh and bone (*os nostrum caro nostra*). These ties overwrite even the Christian command of love, for even the Holy King killed Christians, and Germans for example, to defend his Hungarians and his homeland. Cf. *Sermones de sanctis... biga salutis* (1502), XLIX. sermo, RIIIr.

Szántó explained that members of any given nation will only follow the orders of the leaders of their own nationality¹³, and in fact used the same language in writing about the Polish as he had used earlier to write about Germans. He believed that Transylvania should be under the management of Hungarian superiors: What would happen, he asks, if the superior were German in Spain or Polish in Italy?

Szántó's historical perspective was also shaped in accordance with his concepts of a nation under its own national sovereign and his general xenophobia. Just like his Protestant contemporaries, Szántó also raised questions – in his case, from the Catholic standpoint – about what caused the failure of the Kingdom of Hungary and how God could allow the Kingdom of Hungary to come under the yoke of Ottoman rule. Szántó attributed Hungary's failure not to the actions or omissions of Hungarians but to heretics and foreign rule. At first glance, his opinion hardly strikes one as all that original. Heresy was frequently quoted as the root of all evil. Where, in my opinion, Szántó was indeed original is that he also blamed foreigners, in effect acquitting Hungarians, at least to some extent, of their sins, after all, both foreign rule and heresy are attributable to external causes: Hungary's own heretics had been misled (or, to use the modern term, "brainwashed") by foreigners; consequently, they bear less of the guilt for the rape of Hungaria – the allegorical female, the last bastion of Christianity – than foreigners: the heresy of Lutheranism came from Germany, that of Calvinism from France, while Miguel Serveto hailed from Spain. On top of all this, even though after the Battle of Mohács Hungarians elected a legitimate national ruler from within their own ranks, Archduke Ferdinand (later Ferdinand I of Hungary) asserted his hereditary right and ascended to the throne of the country, splitting the nation into two factions. The struggle between those political factions was incessantly quoted by Hungarian contemporaries as one of the main causes of Hungary's failure and, as far as we understand today, it was indeed a factor in the country's Ottoman occupation. However, Szántó saw this division as a result of external, foreign intervention. In this context, it is very interesting to see how he distinguishes between Transylvanian Hungarians, whom he defines as free people not subjected to German rule (*ungari transylvanienses*) and living in peace under Ottoman rule on the one hand, and, on the other hand, their Hungarian compatriots subject to Habsburg rule. The latter had to fight a ruthless war against the Turks up until 1568, shedding their precious blood in vain just because they had elected foreign rulers to lead them (referencing Ferdinand and Maximilian of the Habsburg House)¹⁴.

For Szántó, Hungarians were a chosen people, one worthy of a unique status among all the nations of Christendom on account of its piety and saints. For him, the fact that Hungary played a role as the last bastion of Christianity against the Ottomans was a sure sign of this chosenness. For sure, he must have seen Nagyvárád itself as a lesser, regional propugnaculum or bulwark. In 1571, the fortress and the city, as well as the castle district, were under the command of Christopher Báthory, the brother of Prince Stephen Báthory of Transylvania. Christopher held this office until 1576, when he replaced his brother as the Prince of Transylvania after the

13 «naturale est ut unaquaeque natio magis erga suam afficiatu»: Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. II, 176-77.

14 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. I, 723-24.

latter left for Poland as the new king of the country. From then, the fortress came under the command of János Ghiczy, a trusted follower of the Polish king. Under the supervision of Christopher Báthory, fortification works continued; however, his deeds of gift, in which he granted support to the Nagyvárád school as well as to the Saint Giles church, attest to the fact that he also tried to strengthen the Catholic community in the city. In one of the deeds, he quotes his own religious piety as the reason behind his act. As we can see, Christopher tried to improve the position of his own denomination, although he was not at all aggressive about it¹⁵. There is no trace of any resentment on behalf of the Calvinist community of Nagyvárád concerning his actions, which may be a result of the tacit deal between the city's Calvinists community and its new political leadership.

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Historical sources dedicate much more attention to religious life under the rule of Ghiczy as the Governor of Nagyvárád. Even though the rich correspondence of the order, published by Jesuit historian László Lukács, is undoubtedly somewhat partial and often even tendentious in its reporting on the events and protagonists of the era, it still portrays the Governor of Nagyvárád as a man who may be a heretic, but a heretic with a degree of willingness to help (today we would say he demonstrated integrity in his actions). When members of the Society of Jesus arrived to the city in 1579, he received them with special attention. Similarly, when Báthory's Jesuit diplomat, Antonio Possevino¹⁶ came to town in 1583, Ghiczy, leading an illustrious cortege, received him right outside the city's gate. One year later, he was equally welcoming to Polish provincial Joannes Campano. The superior made it a point to mention that, with a view to the period of Lent, hardly any meat was served; that conversations around the table frequently revolved around matters of religions; and that when he left town, Ghiczy's senior officers and dozens of noblemen escorted him partway home. However, this attention did not focus on the order and its members but instead on the king – for hurling defiance at the king would have surely been a hazardous venture. With the support of the Prince of Transylvania behind them, the Jesuits planned to establish two schools. Campano did not fail to note that because of its location, Nagyvárád could serve well as a bridgehead from which to expand to Hungary. By writing his letter, he intended to promote the cause of the Catholic community of Nagyvárád; the Catholics had approached General Claudio Acquaviva asking him to do everything in his power to ensure that the king establishes a college in the city as soon as possible, especially with a view to the fact that the city had been without priests for over twenty years. This step certainly threatened Calvinist positions; in the light of the Jesuits' school projects, the cordial relations must have been little more than a mere façade. In

15 Tamás Kruppa, "Die Religionspolitik der Báthorys in den 1580er Jahren. Ein Versuch zur Verhinderung der protestantischen Religionspraxis (1579–1581)", in *Radical reformation. Die Unitarier in Siebenbürgen*, eds. von Ulrich A. Wien, Juliane Brandt and András F. Balogh (Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau, 2012), 143–50.

16 On Possevino, cf. Vilmos Fraknói, "Egy jezsuita diplomata hazánkban", *Katholikus Szemle*, 16 (1902): 85–607, 685–707, 796–811; Jan Joseph Santich, *Missio Moscovitica: the role of the Jesuits in the westernization of Russia 1582–1689* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 85–111.

April 1584, Ghiczy finally committed himself by facilitating a dispute between the representatives of the two denominations. Szántó was a central figure in the polemics; back in 1580, he had already attracted attention in Nagyvárad by the aggressive overtones of his approach. At that time, Christopher Báthory intervened and had him removed from the city¹⁷.

His return was facilitated by the fact that because of his frail health, his fellow Jesuit, György Törös, was unable to cater for the needs of his flock single-handedly. From this point on, my account of the events will be based on Szántó's report. Prior to the dispute, Szántó's superior, the Jesuit Provincial of Transylvania, Ferdinand Capeci visited Nagyvárad on April 17. The next day, speaking in the presence of the Governor, Capeci asked two questions of Calvinist preacher Péter Beregszászi (Berexasius), who was present in person: one about Easter, and one about appealing to the saints for help. Hence, the dispute was provoked by the Jesuits. Beregszászi, who, according to the account, acted confused and remained silent, called in all his fellow preachers from around town. The Governor had no intention to authorise the dispute because of the royal ban on anything even similar to a dispute; however, according to Szántó, the Calvinist preachers did not intend to leave such provocation without an answer¹⁸. The colourful account of the dispute is richly interwoven with Biblical analogies and combinations of the number 3. The Calvinist preacher, Beregszászi put forth 30 theses of faith; allegedly, 303 Calvinist preachers gathered together and, led by Superintendent Máté Gönczi, launched an attack against Szántó, who, throughout three entire days, withstood the offensive on his own – for, according to the report, his fellow Jesuit Capeci had to return to Kolozsvár (Klausenburg, Cluj-Napoca) because of certain machinations of the Kolozsvár heretics. Written in a colourful Biblical style, the report details how Szántó – a single sheep among the wolves, finding himself much in the same situation as Christ among the Pharisees – fended off one attack after another for three entire days, offering his responses to each of the above 30 theses of faith item by item. Beregszászi attempted to interrupt Szántó as he launched into the – surprise, surprise – third item, but he failed. Seeing that he was not up to par with the Jesuit, he enlisted all the other preachers, who also failed to achieve any success. Beregszászi then addressed the masses who gathered around to witness the dispute, and did so in their mother tongue, Hungarian. This effort also failed as Szántó switched to Hungarian and went on¹⁹. This deserves emphasis – and in fact it is duly emphasized in the report – because one of the most important Protestant accusations hurled at the Jesuit order coming to Transylvania and Hungary, and in fact one of the most commonly raised Catholic argument against Jesuit operations in Hungary, was that the members of the order did not speak Hungarian and therefore could not communicate with their flock, who wanted to hear mass in their mother tongue. In light of the above, it is hardly a miracle that this part of the dispute, which started at 11 in the morning, happened to last until exactly 3 o'clock

17 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. II, 76.

18 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. II, 745.

19 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. II, 744-45.

in the afternoon²⁰.

The second day brought no relief to the populous Calvinist camp either. To quote Szántó's own phrase, they struggled in the web of arguments for three times three, that is, a total of nine hours. As it is only to be expected by now, the turning point came on the third day: when they saw that Szántó, turning their own arms against them, spoke in the vernacular and only quoted the Bible, they switched tactics and started to cite papal bulls in an effort to prove that the pope's followers considered him God on earth, wherefore they were guilty of idolatry. Szántó's performance peaked on this last day – even though the participants themselves had no idea that the dispute would soon be discontinued – when, as he claims, he brought three of the preachers back to the Catholic Church. Frustrating the expectations of his opponents, Szántó abstained entirely from quoting bulls or prayer books, and, instead referencing theologians, relied only on the text of the Holy Scripture²¹. In other words, he did not employ the usual arsenal of Catholic religious debaters (ecclesiastical traditions, papal and Council decrees) but instead applied, in effect, Luther's *sola scriptura* doctrine²². His Calvinist opponents, on the other hand, desperate to prove that Szántó was guilty of idolatry and that the pope was the Antichrist himself, broke their habit of quoting the Scripture in all religious disputes and instead pulled out a variety of other written documents. In a sense, the parties switched roles, provided of course that Szántó's account of the events is reliable. Overall, he suggests having claimed victory over the Protestants by turning their own weapons against them while forcing them to adopt the Catholic debating method. His approach completely confused the Protestants. On top of it all, Szántó, using clever tactics, at some point stopped talking to the Protestant preachers explaining their positions alternating between Latin and Hungarian, and started addressing the citizens of Nagyvárad directly, who did not understand Latin. And they paid him due respect: for, even though Szántó was all alone in the middle of the maddening cacophony and, as he humbly admits, he occasionally used rather harsh words, they knew he was telling the truth. Then again, as he suggests, it could not have transpired in any other way, given that while he cited the Scripture, the preachers and their disciples were kicking up dust like unbridled horses and jackasses. Already during the second day, Szántó commented that the Calvinists, since they acted like horses and jackasses, had better be led to the stables or to the threshing barn. Even their church – which the Jesuit claimed the Calvinists had built at the site of a demolished Catholic church – befitted them.

On the third and final day of the heated debate, János Ghiczy, the Calvinist Governor of Nagyvárad, who was the patron of the religious dispute, appeared at the venue and, citing a letter he had received from Báthory, put an end to the dispute, banning the organization of any similar spiritual battles in the future²³. Szántó claimed that it was the Calvinists who, seeing that they were about to lose,

20 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. II, 746.

21 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. II, 746, 747.

22 Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. The Age of Reformation*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3-12.

23 Lukács, *Monumenta*, vol. II, 748.

coaxed the king into adopting this decision; however, this is obviously not true as the dispute was clearly provoked by the Jesuits, something even Szántó admitted to eventually. Unfortunately, the king's letter does not survive; then again, the claims made by the Jesuit are clearly tendentious: it is hard to believe the statement that Báthory wrote his letter in defence of the Calvinists because they were allegedly unable to defeat their opponent; in fact, Szántó contradicts himself in his account of the events when he writes that the group of Nagyvárad citizens witnessing the dispute were aware of the fact that Szántó himself enjoyed the protection of the king and that both the Governor and the Calvinist preachers feared him. In light of this, it is only obvious that terminating the dispute favoured the Jesuits because this gave them the chance to spin the event as a victory. I can only guess what Szántó's intention was with this dispute beyond mere provocation: it may have been a mere demonstration of force through which he meant to encourage the Catholics and, in turn, to intimidate the Calvinists of Nagyvárad. As I mentioned before, Governor János Ghiczy initially did not authorise the dispute in the light of the royal ban, but eventually he did accept the challenge and allowed the debate to take place. This was clearly beyond his scope of competence: organizing a religious dispute does not fit in very well with the tasks of a Governor. Whatever the intentions may have been on either side, the up until then decent relations the order maintained with Ghiczy swiftly deteriorated. Just one year later, Báthory appointed Ghiczy Governor of Transylvania, whereby he lost any direct influence over religious life in Nagyvárad²⁴. It is not unrealistic to assume that the unrest provoked by the religious dispute was one of the reasons for his replacement. From this time on, any mention of him in Jesuit documents was rather negative. The Jesuits saw him as the primary obstacle of their further successes in the capital of the principality and in the Gyulafehérvár (Weissenburg, Alba Iulia) court. In fact, the Jesuits received news of his death in 1588 with malicious contentment. We might add that his removal and eventual death did not manage to defuse the situation in Nagyvárad; a few years later, during the Long Turkish War (1593-1606), this tension between the religious denominations escalated into armed conflicts claiming multiple lives²⁵. To conclude this paper, may I summarize the two main lessons learned: 1. The religious dispute of Nagyvárad is a rare and therefore important moment of the Protestant-Catholic confrontation not only in the ecclesiastical history of Transylvania but also in that of Hungary. The dispute is a prime example of how post-Tridentinum Catholicism – in our case, the Jesuit order – learned to use some of the tools that had played a key role in the success of Protestantism including the realisation of the importance of the mother tongue or the literal interpretation of the Holy Scripture²⁶. Szántó's account of the events is also the first in a series of works written in Hungary and Transylvania in the Catholic spirit dedicated to fight the war against Protestantism wielding the very weapons that belong to the spiritual arsenal of the Protestants. 2. Not only did the erudition of the Jesuit who

24 Kruppa, "Nagyvárad jelentősége", 952.

25 Kruppa, "Nagyvárad jelentősége", 961-63.

26 Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, *La Controriforma. Il mondo del rinnovamento cattolico (1540-1770)*, trans. Elena Bonora (Bologna: Mulino, 2001).

deployed this spiritual arsenal in the religious dispute of Nagyvárad encompass certain Humanistic elements but it also incorporated the ideals of *devotio moderna*, the religious reform movement represented by two internationally known authors of Hungary's Late Middle Ages, Pelbartus Ladislaus of Temesvár and Osvát Laskai (Osvaldus Lasco). It fused into an amalgam with one of the forms of late medieval patriotism, which found a mutual platform with the topos that was later phrased by the Protestants, according to which Hungary was struggling from the grip of two pagans that of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire.

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Vilmos Fraknói, "Egy magyar jezsuita a XVI. században" [A Hungarian Jesuit in the 16th Century]. *Katholikus Szemle*, 1 (1887): 385-433.

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**INSTEAD OF ANTI-OTTOMAN HELP AN ANTI-IMPERIAL LEAGUE
PAPAL NUNCIO GIOVANNI FRANCESCO CAPI'S
MISSION OF 1526¹**

ABSTRACT

Pope Clement VII was informed about Suleiman the Magnificent's plans to occupy Buda from the reports of the nuncios. The pope sent letters to the monarchs of the Christian world on 9 February 1526 to urge a prompt aid to the Kingdom of Hungary, since it was threatened by a huge Ottoman attack. As there were further grim reports from Buda, Clement VII planned to send an extraordinary nuncio, whose main duty would have been to inform the European courts about the Ottoman campaign that threatened Hungary. At first, he chose the Florentine Paolo Vettori, the captain of the papal navy, for the role; however, he died soon after his departure. Therefore, the experienced papal diplomat, Giovanni Francesco (Capino) de'Capi was appointed. Capeno de' Capi set off in March 1526 to France, where he entered negotiations with Francis I to form an ally against the emperor. On 22 May 1526 the League of Cognac was signed by the Clement, Francis, Venice, and Milan. Consequently, Hungary's case of an anti-Ottoman campaign was rather for the sake of covering secret diplomatic negotiations.

KEYWORDS: Papal Diplomacy; Hungarian-Ottoman War; League of Cognac; Crusade; French Royal Court

The papacy's foreign policy had focused on the fight against the Turks since the middle of the 15th century. The Holy See not only helped Hungary directly with diplomatic tools or financial support. Reconciling the Christian princes and establishing the opportunity of a coordinated attack against the Ottoman Empire was also a primary aspect of shaping the relations systems of the European states². These diplomatic efforts of the Pope were further impelled when the Turks occupied Belgrade in 1521, which played a key role in protecting Hungary's southern border³.

- 1 It was prepared in the ELKH-PPKE-PTE Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group. Special thanks to Judit Szűtné Gősi for the translation. Bálint Lakatos assisted in writing the paper, hereby I should say thanks for his remarks and advice.
- 2 Vilmos Fraknói, *Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római szentszékkal*, vol. II (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 1902); Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, voll. I-III (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976-1984).
- 3 Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. III, 198-200; Attila Bárány, "A Humanist Diplomat in Early 16th Century Hungary: Hieronymus Balbus", *Acta Neerlandica*.

However, the peace between the Christian princes seemed really distant during these years. Although since the Peace of Lodi of 1454 the most powerful states of the peninsula, i.e. Venice, Milan, Florence, the Papal States and the Neapolitan and the Sicilian Kingdoms, lived in a relative peace while paying particular attention to the balance of power⁴, this was broken by the Italian campaign of the French king Charles VIII in 1494. A new age began in Italy: warfare for more than half a century and a period of short-lived, ever changing allies serving often only momentary interests⁵.

On 8 May 1521 Emperor Charles V, English king Henry VIII and Pope Leo X formed an alliance against the French king Francis I and the Republic of Venice⁶. In the beginning, the French were defeated in the fights: first, Odet de Foix had to give up Milan⁷, and then the allied army led by Prospero Colonna beat the French-Venetian armed forces in the Battle of Bicocca on 27 April 1522⁸. The French – after the Venetians abandoned them upon making a separate peace with the emperor in July 1523⁹ – made a desperate counterattack in Lombardy in the autumn of 1523 but in spite of the initial successes they were beaten again by the imperial troops led by Charles de Lannoy in the Battle of Sesia on 30 April 1524¹⁰. After the summer counterattack of the imperials in Provence, King Francis I stood up personally to lead the French armies. The French army arrived in Lombardy in October 1524, reoccupied Milan and laid siege to Pavia to indicate its further conquest wills¹¹.

The quick French victories encouraged Pope Clement VII to take steps and he – primarily on the advice of his Francophile Florentine counsellors, i.e. Francesco Guicciardini, Jacopo Salviati and Roberto Acciaiuoli – concluded a secret agreement with King Francis I. According to this if the Pope guarantees free passage to the

Bijdragen tot de Neerlandistiek Debrecen, 15 (2019): 11-48.

- 4 Maurizio Gattoni, *Sisto IV, Innocenzo VIII e la geopolitica dello Stato Pontificio (1474-1492)*, (Roma: Edizioni Studium, 2010).
- 5 Christine Shaw and Michael Mallett, *The Italian Wars 1494-1559. War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe*, 2° ed. (Abingdon-New York: Routledge, 2019), 6-160.
- 6 Maurizio Gattoni, *Leone X e la geo-politica dello Stato pontificio (1513-1521)* (Città del Vaticano: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, 2000), 235-39; Shaw and Mallett, *The Italian Wars*, 162.
- 7 Shaw and Mallett, *The Italian Wars*, 163-64.
- 8 Shaw and Mallett, *The Italian Wars*, 165.
- 9 Maurizio Gattoni, *Clemente VII e la geo-politica dello Stato pontificio (1523-1534)*, (Città del Vaticano: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, 2002), 31-6; Shaw, Mallett, *The Italian Wars*, 168.
- 10 Gattoni, *Clemente VII*, 56-8; Shaw and Mallett, *The Italian Wars*, 169-70.
- 11 Gattoni, *Clemente VII*, 79-80; Shaw and Mallett, *The Italian Wars*, 170-72.

French troops to Naples, the Papal States can acquire Parma and Piacenza¹². However, the diplomacy of the Holy See made a mistake. On 24 February 1525 Emperor Charles V defeated the French army in Pavia, even King Francis I was captured¹³. Afterwards, the Pope was only able to renege on the secret agreement with the French to the side of the emperor through awkward explanations and they renewed the alliance on 1 April 1525¹⁴.

On 14 January 1526 Charles V and Francis I signed the Treaty of Madrid, which would fundamentally have reshaped the power map of Europe. The agreement between the emperor, who won the Battle of Pavia, and the captured French king, who was in a vulnerable situation during the peace talks, did not prove to be longlasting. The French king, who was released on 6 March, declared the peace void immediately after stepping on French soil and looked for new allies against the Habsburg Emperor, who was at the peak of his power at the time¹⁵.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire was preparing against Hungary again. Because of Giovanni Antonio Burgio's report (the Apostolic Nuncio sent to the Hungarian royal court) on 18 January 1526¹⁶ – according to which Suleiman sultan was planning to occupy Buda with a giant army – Pope Clement VII invited six older cardinals to discussion and they agreed to write to the princes and nuncios about the Turkish danger threatening Hungary¹⁷. So the Holy See's diplomacy found itself at a crossroads: they either prevent the excessive growth of the emperor's power, or establish peace between the Christian princes in favour of a campaign against the Ottoman Empire¹⁸.

On 9 February 1526 Pope Clement VII sent a letter to the emperor and his brother, Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, to Henry VIII King of England and Cardinal Wolsey¹⁹, to John III King of Portugal, as well as to Queen Louise of Savoy, who was in charge that time instead of Francis I King of France. He emphasized that Hungary is threatened by a huge Turkish danger and they should provide help as soon as possible²⁰.

12 Gattoni, *Clemente VII*, 82-93.

13 Shaw and Mallett, *The Italian Wars*, 172-74.

14 Gattoni, *Clemente VII*, 94-106.

15 Robert J. Knecht, "Francis I in Aquitaine: A British View"; Id., *Francis I and Sixteenth-Century France*, (London-New York: Routledge, 2015), XII, 6-8.

16 Vilmos Fraknói, ed., *Magyarországi pápai követek jelentései 1524-1526* (Budapest: kiadja a Szent-István-Társulat, 1884), n. 78, 303-07.

17 Campeggio reported on this to Cardinal Wolsey on 8 February 1526. John Sherren Brewer, ed., *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII*, vol. IV/1 (London: Logman & Co., 1870), n. 1959.

18 Cardinal Campeggio reports on this dilemma to Cardinal Wolsey. Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2098.

19 On 27 February 1526 Cardinal Campeggio specifically asked Wolsey to convince King Henry VIII to help Hungary. Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 1998.

20 Gábor Nemes, ed., *Brevia Clementina. VII. Kelemen pápa magyar vonatkozású*

Since Nuncio Burgio sent further threatening reports²¹, Pope Clement VII was planning to send a special nuncio, whose main task would have been to report on the Ottoman attack threatening Hungary in the European courts. Initially, he chose the Florentine Paolo Vettori²², the captain of the Papal Navy. However, Vettori set off vainly, he got sick in Florence soon after his departure and died unexpectedly²³. As a result, Giovanni Francesco (also called Capino) de' Capi²⁴ was chosen, who had just returned from the peace talks in Madrid to Rome on 1 February, and had been the nuncio of Mantova in the court of Charles V for years²⁵. However, the majority of the recommendation letters issued to the nuncio were addressed to the influential majesties of the French court – to King Francis I and his mother, Queen Louise of Savoy, to Princess Marguerite d'Angouleme, to Antoine Duprat French Grand Chancellor, to cardinals Jean de Lorraine and François-Louis de Bourbon – and to the generals of the French king – to Anne de Montmorency²⁶, to Odet de Foix, to Charles (IV) de Bourbon and to Philippe de Chabot²⁷. Besides, recommendation letters were prepared for the visit to the

brévée (1523-1526) (Budapest-Győr-Róma: Gondolat, 2015), 134-45. The answer of Archduke Ferdinand, King Henry VIII and Cardinal Wolsey (4 March 1526, 16 April) see Augustin Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, vol. II (Roma: Typis Vaticanis, 1860), 661-63, 669-70.

- 21 Fraknói, *Magyarországi pápai követek*, 320-23, n. 83.
- 22 Alberto Guglielmotti, *La guerra dei pirati e la marina pontificia dal 1500 al 1560*, I (Florence: Successori le Monnier, 1876) 121-270; Valentina Lepri, "Vettori, Paolo", in *Machiavelli. Enciclopedia machiavelliana*, vol. III, ed. Gennaro Sasso (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2014), 670-71; Marcello Simonetta, "Vettori, Paolo", in *DBI*, vol. 99 (2020) [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/paolo-vettori_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/].
- 23 Francesco Vettori, *Scritti storici e politici*, ed. Enrico Niccolini, (Bari: Gius. Laterza & figli, 1972), 222-23, 344; Rawdon Brawn, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. III: 1520-1526 (London: Logmans, Green & Co., 1869), n. 1226; Pascual de Gayangos, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*, vol. III/1: 1525-1526 (London: Logman & Co., 1873), n. 356; Gattoni, *Clemente VII*, 134. The Pope wrote a letter of condolence to Paolo's brother Francesco Vettori, the Florentine diplomat known as a close friend of Niccolò Machiavelli on 8 March 1526, see AAV, Arm. XL, vol. 10, fol. 137r-v, n. 167.
- 24 To his life see Tiziano Ascari, "Capi, Giovan Francesco", in *DBI*, vol. 18 (1975) [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giovan-francesco-capi_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/; Gattoni, *Clemente VII*, 133, 37. j].
- 25 Ascari, "Capi".
- 26 On 1 March 1526 Datarius Giovanni Matteo Giberti wrote a separate letter to him that Capi would be sent instead of Vettori, Joseph Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France. Nonciatures de Clement VII*, t. I: *Depuis la bataille de Pavie jusqu'au rappel d'Acciaiuoli* (Paris: Alphonse Picard et fils, 1906), 7.
- 27 Nemes, *Brevia Clementina*, 146-50. The further letters issued together with these for the French royal couple and to Queen Mother Louise of Savoy see AAV, Arm. XLIV, vol. 9, fol. 433r-35v, published: Petrus Balan, ed., *Monumenta*

imperial (Charles V²⁸, Neapolitan Viceroy Charles de Lannoy, winning general of the Battle of Pavia and Cardinal Legate Giovanni Salviati), to the English (Henry VIII and Cardinal Thomas Wolsey), as well as to the Portuguese royal courts (John III King of Portugal)²⁹.

Capino de' Capi set off in the beginning of March and headed straight to Bayonne³⁰ to greet King Francis I, who was released from his capture³¹. However, Capi travelled to Saint-Sever via Lyon³², where he met the ruler, who set off in the meantime, and he escorted him to Bordeaux via Mont-de-Marsan³³. After having participated in the ceremonial entry³⁴, Capi, together with the Venetian nuncio Andrea Rosso, started secret discussions with the king immediately, but instead of the matter of the letter of recommendation, i.e. providing help to Hungary, the topic was making a covenant against the Emperor Charles V³⁵.

In the meantime, both Luis Fernández de Córdoba, the Prince of Sessa and envoy of Emperor Charles V³⁶ and Miguel de Herrera, attorney of the embassy got suspicious

saeculi XVI. historiam illustrantia, vol. I: *Clementis VII. epistolae per Sadoletum scriptae* (Oeniponte: Libreria Academica Wagneriana, 1885), 220-21.; Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, vol. I, 7; Luigi Nanni, ed., *Epistolae ad principes*, vol. I: 1513-1565 (Città del Vaticano: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, 1992), n. 1379-381.

- 28 The emperor mentions in a letter to his brother Ferdinand dated on 30 March that the brief had arrived to him, see Wilhelm Bauer, *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I*, vol. I: *Familienkorrespondenz bis 1526* (Wien: Adolf Holzhausen, 1912), 378.
- 29 Nemes, *Brevia Clementina*, 146-48; Gábor Nemes, "The Relations of the Holy See and Hungary under the pontificate of Clement VII (1523-1526)", in *The Jagiellonians in Europe: Dynastic Diplomacy and Foreign Relations*, ed. Bárány Attila (Debrecen: Hungary in Medieval Europe Research Group, 2016), 180. Meanwhile the Pope sent Uberto Gambara to England, so that he can involve King Henry in establishing the anti-imperial league. About his assignment as nuncio (25-26 Feb 1526) see AAV, Arm. XL, vol. 11, fol. 103rv, 105rv, 109rv; AAV, Arm. XLIV, vol. 9, fol. 438r, 439r; Balan, *Monumenta saeculi XVI*, 218-19; Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 1992-998. His mailing with Capi and Acciaiuoli see Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, in some places. To his life see Giampiero Brunelli, "Gambara, Uberto", in DBI, vol. 52 (1999) [[https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/uberto-gambara_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/uberto-gambara_(Dizionario-Biografico))].
- 30 King Francis I arrived to Bayonne on 17 March 1526. Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2032.
- 31 Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2068.
- 32 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 7-8.
- 33 On 8 April Capi is already in Bordeaux. Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 8-9.
- 34 Capi was walking between the Grandmaster of Rhodes and Charles de Bourbon on the ceremonial entry, Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1243, 1245.
- 35 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 10.
- 36 Miguel Á. Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la diplomacia española*, vol. V: *La diplomacia de Carlos V* (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2003), 107-08.

in Rome. They both informed the emperor about their assumption that Capi's delegation was most likely about more than just helping Hungary's fight against the Turks. Moreover, the Prince of Sessa also believed that Vettori died because of the burden of the task he had been assigned to³⁷. Lope de Soria, the Genoese envoy of the emperor wrote similarly: according to him the papal nuncios not only had to report on the Turkish preparations but also had to convince the French king to break the Treaty of Madrid³⁸. The fact that helping Hungary was not mentioned at all when Pope Clement VII reported on the discussion between Nuncio Capi and King Francis I to Prince Sessa, proved this, as well³⁹.

After the entourage of Francis had moved its seat to Cognac at the end of April 1526, things moved ahead rapidly, and on 1 May Capi and Rosso had a long discussion with the French ruler about the details of the anti-imperial league⁴⁰. There were more reasons to hurry. On the one hand, Pope Clement VII was afraid of losing Milan and Cremona under siege because of the longlasting negotiations⁴¹. On the other hand, it was also feared that the imperial diplomacy might persuade King Francis to desist from making an alliance⁴². The appearance of the Neapolitan viceroy Charles de Lannoy, the winning general of the Battle of Pavia, who was sent as an envoy by Emperor Charles V, did not only cause concern for the papal and the Venetian but also for the English diplomats⁴³. In order to calm things down, the English-French alliance, which was made under the reign of Louise of Savoy, was ceremonially confirmed on 10 May. This, however, triggered Lannoy's disapproval⁴⁴. During the following days the discussions made good progress and the drafting of the league's treaty, in which Capino de' Capi and Andrea Rosso took key role, was started, as well⁴⁵. Viceroy Charles de Lannoy – who was convinced that the French king did not want to keep the Treaty of Madrid – left on 18 May⁴⁶. Afterwards, the League of Cognac was made on 22 May 1526 upon clarifying a few moot points⁴⁷.

37 Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers*, III/1, n. 363-64.

38 Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers*, III/1, n. 366. It is however important to highlight that breaking the peace treaty was not only an idea of the papal diplomacy. Cardinal Wolsey encouraged Queen Louise of Savoy to the same himself. Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2036.

39 Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers*, III/1, n. 395.

40 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 16; Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1265; Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2135-2136.

41 Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, nn. 1164, 1171, 1185, 1249, 1270, 1272, 1280, 1281, 1286, 1287; Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, XLVIII.

42 Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2148.

43 Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, nn. 1270, 1276.

44 Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1273.

45 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 17-20; Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1272.

46 Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2185-2186.

47 Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1284-1285; Gayangos, *Calendar of State*

among the allying parties⁴⁸. The surviving copies about the discussions mentioned Capi's official purpose, i.e. supporting Hungary's fight against the Turks, only once. Even then he talked about it to the French king very briefly – as Capi admits it to Umberto Gambarà, the papal nuncio sent to Henry VIII – in order to avoid causing confusion in the discussions about the league⁴⁹.

In the beginning, there was a kind of distrust towards Capino de' Capi from the French and English diplomacy. Partially, because he was not a papal but a Mantuan subject and partially because he was an imperial envoy⁵⁰. Therefore, Clement VII sent another nuncio, Roberto Acciaiuoli in April 1526, to get involved in the discussions based on the instructions of Francesco Guicciardini, the Pope's chief adviser⁵¹. Nevertheless, an aim similar to Capi's was named in his official assignment bull, i.e. the peace between the Christian princes and the war to be started against the Turks in Hungary, as well as on the Mediterranean Sea⁵². Eventually, Acciaiuoli missed the discussions because he was still in Lyon on 23 May⁵³.

After Pope Clement VII had ratified the draft of the league⁵⁴, Capi was replaced by Acciaiuoli, who arrived at the French court on 9 June 1526 that was already seated in Angoulême⁵⁵. His new task was to recruit 10.000 mercenaries in Switzerland, but instead of for Hungary's fight against the Turks, for the league. Capi – after participating on the ceremonial proclamation of the league⁵⁶ – set off on 29 June⁵⁷.

Papers, III/1, n. 431.

- 48 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 26-8; Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1289-1291, 1300; Riccardo Predelli, ed., *I Libri Commemorativi della Repubblica di Venezia. Registri*, vol. VI (Venezia: a spese delle società, 1903), 183-85. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, III, 241-42; Gattoni, *Clemente VII*, 137, 339-46; Knecht, "Francis I in Aquitaine", 9-10.
- 49 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 22-4.
- 50 About this see the report of Gregorio Casale, the Roman envoy of the English king, Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2058.
- 51 To his life see Guido Verucci, "Acciaiuoli, Roberto", in DBI, vol. 1, (1960) [[https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/roberto-acciaiuoli_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/roberto-acciaiuoli_(Dizionario-Biografico))]. Piero e Luigi Guicciardini, eds., *Opere inedite di Francesco Guicciardini*, vol. IV (Firenze: Presso M. Cellini e comp., 1863), 1-5; Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 11-2.
- 52 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 12-5; Predelli, *I Libri Commemorativi*, 183.
- 53 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 24-9.
- 54 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 32, 44; Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1311, 1320; Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2257; Predelli, *I Libri Commemorativi*, 186.
- 55 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 33-42.
- 56 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 51-2; Brown, *Calendar of State Papers*, III, n. 1322.
- 57 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 45-58, 415-16; Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2288.

In the end, his mission was crowned by success: he arrived to Bergamo with 8300 Swiss soldiers on 17 August⁵⁸.

In the meantime, Hungary got in a more and more difficult situation and King Louis II would have needed external support more than ever. Because of the worrying news about the Ottoman attack Louis II wrote a letter to the Pope on 24 March⁵⁹, which was read aloud by Cardinal Innocenzo Cibo on the papal consistory on 20 April. In the end, the Pope and the College of Cardinals decided to call in all the envoys staying in Rome so that they inform their rulers about the danger threatening Hungary and ask for their help⁶⁰. Regardless of the decision, Pope Clement VII sent a letter to the French king, Francis I, the Portuguese king, John III and to the English king, Henry VIII, as well as to Cardinal Wolsey on 23 April and asked for prompt financial help for the Hungarians⁶¹. The Pope emphasized that together with the cardinals they offered 50.000 ducats for the protection of Hungary⁶².

By that time tensions had already run high in the relationship between the emperor and the Pope. Charles V wrote in his letter to his brother Archduke Ferdinand that he was getting so many letters from the Pope about the Turkish danger threatening Hungary that he had not even known if he should believe it or not⁶³. Besides, the emperor wrote to Luis Fernández de Córdoba, his envoy in Rome, that as long as the Pope would not allow him to gather the incomes of the Holy Year's Farewell in Spain – allocated to the crusade –, he would not support the Hungarian king and shifted any further responsibility onto the Pope⁶⁴.

The Ottoman danger was mentioned on the papal consistory more and more often in the following months: Cardinals Innocenzo Cibo and Paolo Emiliano Cesi read

58 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 81-4; Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2465.

59 Edgár Artner, *Magyarország mint a nyugati keresztény művelődés védőbástyája*, eds. Kornél Szovák, József Török and Péter Tusor (Budapest-Rome: Gondolat, 2004), 176-78. To this see also the reports of Burgio, Fraknoi, *Magyarországi pápai követek*, 343-51, n. 88, and the letter of Brodarics István Petrus Kasza, ed., *Stephanus Brodericus: Epistulae* (Budapest: Argumentum, 2012), 138-39.

60 Péter Tusor and Gábor Nemes, eds., *Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia de Regnis Sacrae Coronae Hungariae (1426-1605)* (Budapest-Rome: Gondolat, 2011), n. 65. Girolamo Ghinucci, the Bishop of Worcester reported about the same to Cardinal Wolsey, see Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2124, and Luis Fernández de Córdoba to Emperor Charles V Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers*, III/1, n. 395.

61 Nemes, *Brevia Clementina*, 157-62. The letter of King Louis II to the Pope, the letter of Archduke Ferdinand dated on 24 March and the report of Burgio dated on 27 March were certainly attached to these briefs, see Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2048, 2050, 2056.

62 Fraknoi, *Magyarország egyházi*, 301. The offerings of each cardinal see Artner, *Magyarország*, n. 156.

63 Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2051.

64 Gayangos, *Calendar of State Papers*, III/1, n. 401.

aloud here the reports of Nuncio Burgio and there the letters of King Louis II⁶⁵. Cardinal Cesi read out the letter of Pál Tomori, Archbishop of Kalocsa, sent to King Louis on the session of the Papal College on 27 July. According to this the Turkish army had already reached the river Sava, which was regarded as the Southern border of Hungary⁶⁶. On 30 July these news urged the Pope to write letters for help again: He asked the French king Francis I, the English king Henry VIII, the Portuguese king John III and Ferdinand, the Archduke of Austria to send money or weapons to Hungary urgently⁶⁷.

Unfortunately, the Pope's letters did not have much impact. The Portuguese king John sent some money⁶⁸, but his envoy was captured as he entered French soil at Bayonne and was held hostage until the end of September⁶⁹. The envoy of Henry VIII, Sir Thomas Wallop set off in August 1526, he received the news about the heavy defeat of the Hungarian army and about the death of the Hungarian king along the way⁷⁰.

In 1526 Pope Clement VII got in a tight situation. While Italy and within it the Papal States were threatened by the remarkably increased power of the Emperor Charles V, the Ottoman Empire set off against the Christian world with a huge army. It was convenient for the Papal diplomacy in this situation to cover the secret discussions of the anti-imperial league with Hungary's anti-Ottoman fight. Although Capino de' Capi was not looking for help for Hungary, the Pope cannot be accused of abandoning the Hungarian Kingdom, as he supported the fights not only with money but also with grain and weapons⁷¹. On 29 August 1526 Suleiman

65 About the consistories see Tusor and Nemes, *Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia*, n. 66-74. Burgio's reports on the Turkish attacks: Fraknói, *Magyarországi pápai követek*, 370-422, n. 95-113. The letters of King Louis: Artner, *Magyarország*, n. 137-38, 140-41.

66 Tusor and Nemes, *Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia*, n. 75. The letter of Pál Tomori see AAV, A.A. I-XVIII. n. 6522, fol. 85r-86v, published: Fraknói Vilmos, "Tomori Pál kiadatlan levelei", *Magyar Történelmi Társulat*, 30 (1882): 92-5. Its copy sent to the English king Henry VIII, see Brewer, *Letters and Papers*, IV/1, n. 2301.

67 Nemes, *Brevia Clementina*, 165-68.

68 The answer of the Portugese king on 16 June see Luis Augusto Rebello da Silva, ed., *Corpo diplomatico portuguez contendo os actos e relações politicas e diplomaticas de Portugal com as diversas potencias do mundo desde o seculo XVI até os nossos dias*, vol. II (Lisboa: Tipographia de Academia Real Das Sciencias, 1865), 268-70; Artner, *Magyarország*, n. 139.

69 Fraikin, *Nonciatures de France*, I, 81-4, 116-18.

70 György Kurucz, "Érdekek és előítéletek. A brit diplomácia és Magyarország a 18. század végéig", *Századok*, 129 (1995): 260-61.; Richárd Botlik, "Henry VIII and the New Hungarian Political Élite in 1526-1527. The Anglo-Hungarian Relationship After the Battle of Mohács", *Publicationes Universitatis Miskolcensis. Sectio Philosophica*, 12/2 (2007): 129; Attila Bárány, *Magyarország nyugati külpolitikája (1458-1526). Angol-magyar kapcsolatok Mátyás és a Jagellók korában* (PhD diss., Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2014), 523-28.

71 Nemes, *The Relations*, 182.

sultan inflicted a stunning defeat on the Hungarian army, and *Sacco di Roma* meant the failure of the papal diplomacy in 1527.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano

DBI: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani

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NOS CHRISTIANI QUI HABITAMUS IN HAC URBE TEMESUAR.
CHRISTIANS AND OTTOMANS IN TIMIȘOARA IN THE SECOND HALF OF 16TH CENTURY

ABSTRACT

In 1552, following a brutal military campaign, Timișoara and its surroundings were occupied by Ottomans and integrated in the Empire. Although the political change was initially a real shock for the Christian communities inside the city (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox), the religious life continued under Turkish rule. A lot of documents from the second half of the 16th century offer information about the cohabitation between different Christian denominations and, of course, Christian-Muslim relation. The Ottoman authorities had established the best relations with the Serbian Orthodox church, recognizing many of its privileges, even allowing the foundation of a Serbian Orthodox bishopric inside the city. The Catholic and Protestant communities felt much stronger the Ottoman pressure, because the two Christian denominations tried to get support from Turkish authorities in their dispute over faith. In the early 1580, the Holy See sent the first missionaries to the city in order to help Catholic inhabitants and to stop the spread of the Reformation among them. The Protestant believers had their own dispute with the Catholics, but were not united at all: a few Lutherans, some Calvinists and even a curious Anti-Trinitarian bishopric under influence of Judaic theology can be found inside the city in the second half of the 16th century.

KEYWORDS: Timișoara; 16th century; Ottomans; Christian denominations; cohabitation.

Timișoara (Hung. Temesvár) was one of the most important urban centres in the south of the medieval Hungarian kingdom, certainly the most representative of today's Banat territory, a province which, in its present form, acquired its specific identity after its integration into the territories of the House of Austria at the beginning of the 18th century. Despite its importance and the research carried out to date, the history of the town still retains many white spots. Of course, the archives can still offer surprises, new contributions to the detailed knowledge of political, military or ecclesiastical life. The history of the city's religious life is perhaps the least known, with specialist research being channelled into other aspects such as Timișoara's role as a royal residence, the sieges it went through, urban topography during the Ottoman period, etc.

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

In 1526 the medieval Hungarian kingdom succumbed to Ottoman troops. The defeat at Mohács, and the death of the Hungarian king in battle sparked a dispute

for the throne between John Szapolyai and Ferdinand of Habsburg. The first one manage to impose himself with Ottoman support, but his death in 1540 prompted Ferdinand to reclaim the Hungarian kingdom. The Ottoman Empire's forceful intervention in 1541 partially resolved the problem of the Hungarian inheritance, and the kingdom was divided into three distinct parts: northern and western Hungary remained with the Habsburgs, the central part was occupied directly by the Ottomans, and the eastern and southern parts (Transylvania and present-day Banat) came under the administration of the minor John Sigismund Szapolyai and his mother Isabella. But the Habsburgs never gave up on recovering the whole kingdom. Driving the Turks out of Buda was beyond Ferdinand's military capacity, so attempts were made to recover Transylvania and the adjacent territories, especially as brother George Utješonović Martinuzzi was receptive to the idea. After several attempts, with the complicity of Martinuzzi, who had been awarded as cardinal of the Catholic Church, the imperial general Giovanni Battista Castaldo entered Transylvania, occupied the main urban centres and forced the minor John Sigismund and the widowed Queen Isabella to give up the throne in favour of the House of Habsburg. Imperial garrisons made up of Spanish, German, Hungarian and Serbian soldiers were set up in the urban centres south of the Mureş River. With this act, the Ottoman High Porte saw its rights violated, since the territory was considered both in theory and legally as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire¹. The Sultan considered it necessary to recover the territory from the Habsburgs and impose direct Ottoman authority. Mehmet Sokollu, the Beylerbey of Belgrade, was appointed in the summer of 1551 to bring the area back under the authority of the Porte. In September of the same year, the fortresses and urban centres of Beche (Becsej), Becicherecul Mare (Nagy Becskerek, today Zrenjanin-Serbia), Cenad (Csanád), Lipova (Lippa), Ciacova (Chák) and Ilidia (Illyad) were attacked and occupied. Timișoara, however, resisted Turkish military pressure which ceased with the onset of the cold season. The Christian counterattack that year was successful, with most of the lost centres recovered. The following year, a large Turkish army under Ahmed Ali Pasha attacked again the area between the Mureş, Danube, Tisa and Carpathians. After prolonged resistance, on 27 July 1552 Timișoara fell into the hands of the Ottomans, who slaughtered the Christian garrison led by Stephen Lossonczy. Alongside this urban centre, the plain area's towns were occupied: Cenad, Arad, Lipova, Felnac (Fenlak). For more than 160 years the Ottoman rule was established, the territory being integrated into the Empire under the administrative form of the vilayet of Timișoara².

1 Cristina Feneșan, *Constituirea principatului autonom al Transilvaniei* (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997), 18-20.

2 Almost daily description of the fighting at Károly Czimer, "Temesvár megvétele 1551-1552", *Hadtörténelmi közlemények*, 6 (1893), 15-71, 196-229, 308-76. Useful are also George Postelnicu, "Asediul Timișoarei în 1551-1552 și cucerirea ei de către turci", *Banatul. Revistă literară, artistică, socială*, 12 (1927), 26-31, and Petru Iambor, "Cucerirea Banatului de către turci și transformarea lui în pașalâc (1552)", in *Vilaetul Timișoarei (450 de ani de la întemeierea pașalâcului 1552-2002)*, ed. Doina Benea (Timișoara: Mirton 2002), 14-22.

THE OTTOMANS AND CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS SOUTH OF THE MUREŞ RIVER

Because the Islamic enclaves in Europe were surrounded by a Christian majority, the need for collaboration and coexistence between the different ethnic and confessional groups arose. Even so, according to the Ottoman legal system, the Christian population was subject to a number of social restrictions in order not to disturb the good Muslims: not to build houses higher than those of the Muslims, not to ring bells, not to ride horses. What was wanted of the reya (Christian subject) was to be a good taxpayer, under such conditions the state was tolerant of his religious choices³. The conquest of Hungary, and thus of the present-day territory of Banat, superimposed Ottoman authority on a large Christian population. Sixteenth-century Hungary was a “linguistic and confessional Tower of Babel”. As we have seen, the southern area of the kingdom was no exception. A specific situation in the period immediately following the conquest was the transformation of some of Christian churches into Muslim places of prayer. In Timișoara «its churches were turned into mosques, the bells were thrown out of the towered belfries and the reading of the ezan was started there»⁴. The situation was the same in Lipova where, immediately after the Turkish troops took over the town, the churches were transformed into mosques, or in Becicherec where the Ottomans «decorated the fortress according to the customs of the Mohammedan religion». On this occasion, a lot of Christian objects of worship and crosses in the town were destroyed and a mosque and Islamic school were built⁵.

The tradition of occupying Catholic churches and converting them into mosques was perpetuated until the end of the 17th century, when the precarious state of the few remaining Catholics in the province, who had lost their places of worship to the Ottomans or the Reformed, was deplored⁶. The latter, for their part, considered the situation after the Ottoman conquest catastrophic. The Reformed deanery of Zarand, which had owned sixty-seven churches, lost a large number of them to the Ottoman occupiers⁷.

The Ottoman state encouraged trade and crafts, which attracted many South Slavic elements involved in these activities, who founded specific colonies in Timișoara or Lipova. Some of these were Islamic, such as the Bosnians of Lipova, the so-called Poturi. The Muslim population, much smaller in number than the Christian one, was mainly concentrated in the urban perimeter, being represented by soldiers

3 Mihai Maxim, “Teritorii românești sub administrație otomană”, *Revista Arhivelor*, 9 (1983): 884.

4 Mihail Guboglu and Mustafa Mehmet, eds., *Cronici turcești despre Țările Române*, vol. I (București: Ed. Academiei RSR, 1965), 274.

5 Guboglu and Mehmet, *Cronici turcești*, vol I, 280, 287; The impact of turning Christian churches into mosques is examined by Cristina Feneșan, *Vilayetul Timișoara 1552-1716* (Timișoara: Ariergarda 2014), 319-25.

6 Arhiva Episcopiei Romano-Catolice Cenad-Timișoara, *Anales Venerabilis Capituli Cathedralis Ecclesiae Csanadiensis*, Liber secundus, mss., 111: *Certe templa a Catholicis olim erecta, in Turcarum fana, vel Calvinianorum oratoria cesserunt*, f. 111r.

7 Pál Ember, *Historia Ecclesiae Reformatae in Hungaria et Transilvania*, ed. Adolf Lampe (Trajecti ad Renum: Jacobum van Poolsum 1728), 639.

and their families, officials of the administration, merchants and small producers of traditional products⁸. In the case of the area under study, there has been no massive settlement by Muslims, with Christians retaining their absolute majority. The Ottomans, even if reduced in numbers, held the levers of power, being in administrative positions or as holders of land plots (timars). In the occupied towns, especially in Timișoara, the social and cultural life of the Muslim communities was particularly flourishing, especially in the 17th century⁹.

The political changes after 1552 benefited the Orthodox denomination. In 1557, at the intervention of vizier Mehmed Sokollu, a Bosnian Serb, the old Serbian patriarchate of Ipek (Peć) was reactivated. The first patriarch, Macarius, was, not coincidentally, the brother of the vizier. The jurisdiction granted to the new patriarchate was very large, extending over the whole of the Balkan Peninsula and occupied Hungary, with the patriarchs having religious, political, administrative and fiscal powers over the faithful, obviously within the limits allowed by the Ottoman authorities to whom they were submitted¹⁰. After the foundation of the Patriarchate of Ipek, the former southern areas of the Hungarian kingdom automatically came under the jurisdiction of this institution, especially since the territory south of the Mureș River seems to have been institutionally annexed to the Serbian Church since the 14th century¹¹. The Ottoman conquest had a major impact on the other two Christian segments: the Reformed denominations and Catholic Church. Both confessions were seriously affected by the change of political context. The Catholics were left without the few churches and convents they still had in the province after the impact of the Reformation, such as the Franciscan convent in Lipova. The Protestants, on the other hand, had to reconsider their strategy because of the halt of institutional progress in its infancy and isolation from other like-minded communities. The favouring of one or other of the confessions was not dictated

8 Cristina Feneșan, *Cultura otomană a Vilayetului Timișoarei (1552-1716)* (Timișoara: Editura de Vest, 2004), *passim*; Lists of Muslim officials and soldiers in Timișoara and neighbouring towns can be found at Antal Velics and Ernő Kammerer, *Magyarország török kincstári defterek*, vol. I (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1886), 379-81, 383, 414-23; As elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim population of towns in the formerly occupied southern territory of Hungary was concentrated in the central areas, while Christians lived mostly on the periphery.

9 Towards the end of the 17th century, several Ottoman chroniclers from Timișoara, such as Ibrahim Pecevi, Ali, Osman Aga, Ibrahim Naimeddin, who were familiar with the cultural aspects of the empire but, at the same time, through their experiences, were connected to the Central European cultural context, came to the fore: Feneșan, *Cultura otomană*, 178-225.

10 Ivana Andrić, "Položaj Pečke patrijaršije u Osmanskom Carstvu od 1557 do 1690 godine", *Povijesni prilozi*, 27 (2004): 71-90; László Hádovics, *Le peuple serbe et son eglise sur la domination ottomane* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1947), 48-52; Jovan Radonitsch, *Histoire des serbes de Hongrie* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1918), 105.

11 Radoslav M. Grujić, "Духовни живот", in Војводина, vol. I: Од најстаријих времена до велике сеобе, ed. Душан Поповић (Нови Сад: Историско друштво у Новом Саду, 1939), 343-48; Id., "Pečka patrijaršija", in *Narodna enciklopedija srpsko-hrvatsko-slovenačka*, vol. III (Zagreb: Bibliografski Zavod, 1928), 374-75.

by religious considerations but, in most cases, by the performance of the Turkish authorities in the territory, as well as by the political context of the time¹².

CHRISTIANS IN OTTOMAN TIMIȘOARA IN THE 16TH CENTURY

We have very little information about what happened in Timișoara after the Ottoman conquest. We know little about what happened to the Christian population of the city immediately after 1552, and for more than two decades we have no information about what happened at a religious level. Timișoara underwent an urban, administrative and social transformation, but the Christian community survived, including through the arrival of new members from the Balkan area, because almost immediately after the conquest various South Slavic merchants settled in the city, especially Ragusans. The first merchant from Ragusa present in Timișoara after the city's integration into the Ottoman Empire was Ivan Radov in 1554¹³. Both Roman churchmen and reformers struggled to survive in the new political and institutional climate. Leaving aside the relationship with the Orthodox world, historiography considers that the Ottomans generally favoured the Reformed confessions. Initially, the Protestants suffered like all other Christians: they lost their churches and the priesthood was killed or driven out. In the case of central Hungary, the Reformed represented a numerical majority compared to the Catholic faithful. The local Ottoman authorities often took into account the numerical factor in the religious field in order to maintain the status quo established before the conquest. In the case of the Protestants, other aspects that made them desirable were also taken into account: the puritanism of the church, the doctrine of obedience to the superior and, above all, the anti-German sentiments specific to the Hungarian Reformed world¹⁴.

In the southern area remaining under the Ottomans, the tendency of the Reformation was one of radicalisation and it particularly targeted the population remaining faithful to the dogmas promoted by the Catholic Church. The Balkan merchants, together with the Hungarian community in the town, would form the Catholic core of the area, but were deprived of the functioning of divine services because of the shortage of priests. Several letters from the local population to the Holy See or from missionaries who came to offer them religious assistance have survived, letters from which we can partially reconstruct the religious life of the Christian communities in the town and how they interacted with each other and with the Ottoman authorities in a well-defined time segment.

The earliest letter known to date comes from January 6, 1578, when the Catholic community, represented by Ragusan and Bosnian merchants, together with John Herceg, judge of the Hungarians (*de primatibus et ex antiquis Ungarorum civis*

12 Adrian Magina, *De la excludere la coabitare. Biserici tradiționale, Reformă și Islam în Banat (1500-1700)* (Cluj-Napoca: Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane 2011), 129-30.

13 Bogumil Hrabak, "Дубровачки трговци у османлијском делу Паноније до 1570 године", *Зборник Матице српске за историју*, 30 (1984): 17.

14 Fodor Pál, "The ottomans and their christians in Hungary", in *Frontiers of faith*, eds. Eszter Andor and István György Tóth (Budapest: Ariergarda, 2000), 142-43.

Temesuariensis), sent a pathetic letter to the Holy See asking for help and spiritual assistance. In addition to the vexations coming from the Ottomans, the Catholic community had to endure the pressures of the anti-Trinitarian “heretics”, active at that time in the city on the Bega River. «In these countries the heretics of the various sects» (*In questi paesi gli eretici delle varie sette*) write the South Slavic merchants, the good Catholics were bitterly attacked by them «continually sneaking with their predication blaming the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and seduce the debaters in the faith» (*continuamente serpendo con le lor predicationi il biasfemare il nome di nostro signor Giesu Christo et sedure le debati nella fede*) and with «their diabolical and poisonous predication» (*loro diabolici et velerose predicationi*). The followers of the Catholic Church, simple people, were frequently exposed to such preaching, especially since there were no Catholic priests to help the community. The letter to the Holy See stated that Boniface, the bishop of Ston (Stagno), was asked to send «a good priest» (*un pastore idoneo*) «to fight false Protestant teachings» (*confutar li falsi dogma di eretici*) – who made «thousand evils of Christian piety» (*mille mali della pieta christiana*) and to administer the sacraments and lead the community. There was only one Catholic priest in the town, the Ragusan Dominican Dominic Giurgević, but he was always running into difficulties with the «perverted heretics» (*perversi heretici*). The Dominican was making great efforts to be a good shepherd of the souls, «defend his flock against the infernal wolves» (*difendere le pecorele de Christo dei lupi infernali*) and «answer the heretical threat» (*rebattere le loro falsità*). The authors of the letter identify very well the threat coming from the Unitarians, the dogma they professed and propagated among the Catholic Christians of the city:

perfidi eretici qui nagano la Santissima Trinità, la divinità del nostro redentore, li sancti sacramenti, l'autorità della romana Chiesa, la croce di Christo, la intercessione et la veneratione di Sancti et de Dio et brevemente tutta la pieta Christiana predicando et insegnando per il contrario ogni impietà et ogni pravità¹⁵.

The letter reveals the shortcomings of Catholicism in the southern part of Hungary, but also the stubborn tenacity of the radical Reformation, which appealed to preaching and public disputes to gain a foothold. Apart from professing typical Reformation concepts such as preaching, the rejection of the authority of the Catholic Church and the papal primacy or the intercession of saints, the emphasis on the denial of the divinity of Christ and the Holy Trinity indicates pressure from the most radical wing of the Unitarians, the Judaizing one, which was flourishing in the Timisoara area in those years. Although it did not succeed in dislodging the Catholic community, the anti-Trinitarian propaganda seems to have been successful because «many have apostate» (*molti hanno apostate*), especially among the Hungarian population, to whom the anti-Trinitarians addressed themselves in the vernacular, while the Ragusan Catholic priest did not know that language¹⁶.

¹⁵ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, *Instrumenta Miscellanea*, n. 5907, ff.nn.

¹⁶ A letter from 1582 mentioned only one Ragusan priest in the Hungarian Catholic community of Timișoara, but he was unable to preach in their language: «quorum unus

How did the anti-Trinitarians become a danger to the Catholic community in Ottoman-occupied Timisoara? The case was not unique, as the Unitarians managed to spread their ideas and become religiously influential in several territories of Ottoman-occupied Hungary during that period. This is also the case in the Pécs area, where in 1581 the Catholic community complained about both the Turkish rule and the anti-Trinitarians from Transylvania, who denied the Holy Trinity and the divine nature of Christ¹⁷. In the case of Timișoara, the role of Paul Karádi, one of the most interesting Hungarian Unitarian figures of that period, is worth mentioning. Originally from Székesfehérvár, Karádi went through various stages in his search for the true Christian faith. He was quite familiar with the present-day Banat region, having worked in Caransebeș in the 1560s in the entourage of the local lord Gregory Bethlen. After the death of his patron, Karádi returned to Transylvania and spent some time in the Principality. In 1568 he took part as an arbitrator in the great dispute between the Calvinists and the Unitarians in the princely palace of Alba-Iulia, and the following year he was in Abrud (Hung. Abrudbánya), where he had set up a printing press where he printed the “Comedia Balassi Menyhart”¹⁸.

The success of the promotion of Anti-Trinitarian ideas was limited in Transylvania to certain areas, the most representative Unitarian urban centre being Cluj (Hung. Kolozsvár). The dissemination of anti-Trinitarian ideas was, however, constantly opposed by the reformed (Calvinist) Hungarian community. Since Karádi was familiar with the territory of the province of Banat, he together with a group of young Unitarians from Cluj headed for the Ottoman-occupied southern areas. Taking advantage of the goodwill of the Turkish authorities in Timișoara, who saw certain similarities between the denial of the Trinity and the Islamic monotheistic faith, the anti-Trinitarian managed to take over by force a number of Reformed churches, from which the Calvinist pastors were expelled. The Unitarians established two main parishes, one in Șimand (Arad County, north of the Mureș River), where Benedict Ovári remained as preacher, and another in Timișoara, where Karádi himself settled. The anti-Trinitarians tried to use the Abrud printing press for proselytising purposes, but without notable results, because shortly after settling in the area the Ottomans confiscated it. Apparently the Unitarians met with a reaction from the representatives of the Orthodox Church, who, in collaboration with the

est inter nos, qui vocatur Dobronichi frater Dominicanus, qui etiam nescit concionari Hungarice». The Latin translation of the original Hungarian document was published in Augustinus Theiner, ed., *Annales Ecclesiastici*, vol. III (Romae: Typographia Tiberina, 1856), 331; Adrian Magina, “Între Luther și Mahomed. Catolicii din Timișoara în a doua jumătate a secolului al XVI-lea”, *Analele Banatului, S.N., Arheologie-Istorie*, 15 (2007): 142.

17 Theiner, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, vol. III, 273-274.

18 János Kénosi Tőzsér, *Unitario-ecclesiastica historia Transylvanica Liber I-II*, vol. IV/1, ed. János Káldos, (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2002), 165; Adrian Magina, “The Unitarian Denomination in Sixteenth century Banat”, *Transylvanian Review*, 13/1 (2004): 3-11; Antal Molnár, “Ragusa and the beginning of Balkan missions”, *Dubrovnik Annals*, 25 (2021): 104-08.

Ottoman authorities, stopped their action¹⁹. Recently, Antal Molnár considered that instead of the Orthodox who instigated the Ottoman authorities against the Unitarians, one should see the Ragusans, who at that time felt the pressure from the radical Reformation acutely²⁰. After 1576, both Karádi and Ovári came closer and closer to the Judaizing dogma promoted by Francis David, which they will disseminate in turn in Šimand, Timișoara and Cenad. After David's condemnation in 1579, the Sabbatarian Unitarians in Banat came into open conflict with those in Transylvania, with Karádi becoming the first Judaizing bishop in the whole of Hungary. It was the only such attempt in the sphere of the radical Reformation, which divided the anti-Trinitarian church for over a hundred years. After 1580, in the context of disputes with the Catholic community and due to the disappearance of their leaders, Ovári and Karádi, the Unitarians lost their persuasive power. The Sabbatarian bishopric of Timișoara is the last ecclesiastical institution linked to any of the Reformed denominations mentioned in the Ottoman-occupied southern area²¹. In the territory south of Mures River, only parishes' continued to function, without the necessary institutional support.

To respond to the challenge in the Ottoman area, the Holy See resorted to a specific weapon of the Counter-Reformation: the apostolic visitation. To some extent the framework was similar to that in other areas occupied by the Ottomans: the situation had to be assessed and it had to be decided what could be saved and, as far as possible, the existing Catholic community strengthened. In 1581 the Bishop of Ston (in present-day Croatia), Bonifacije Stefanović Drakolica (known as Boniface of Ragusa), was appointed Apostolic Visitor. He was accompanied by Bartolomeo Sfondrato (Bartol Sfondrati), a Croatian Jesuit, priest confessor at the Casa Sacra in the College of Loretto, and the Franciscan Observant Antonio Matković. The appointment of Boniface of Ragusa was no coincidence as he had been a missionary in Jerusalem at a Franciscan convent, spoke Turkish and through his connections was able to obtain a pass from the Ottoman authorities²². Bartolomeo Sfondrato, was born in Ragusa around 1534 into a famous local family. Once in the Jesuit order he was sent as a missionary to Italy, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Croatia²³. Because of his training he was recognised at the time as *doctissimus missionarius*. On his return to his homeland he was appointed by Pope Gregory XIII to accompany the apostolic visitor Boniface of Ragusa to the South Slavic areas and Ottoman Hungary²⁴. Coming from Ancona in Italy, the bishop and the two missionaries disembark in the port of Sibenik and head for Sarajevo where they arrived on 24 May 1581. A month later they were at the Franciscan convent in Olovo, from where they crossed

19 Magina, *De la excludere*, 132.

20 Molnár, "Ragusa and the beginning of Balkan missions", 107.

21 Magina, *De la excludere*, 132.

22 István György Tóth, "Raguzái Bonifác a hódoltság első pápai vizitátora (1581-1582)", *Történelmi Szemle*, 3-4 (1997): 448-51.

23 Dragoljub Pavlović, "Elogia Iesuitarum Ragusinorum", *Croatia Sacra*, 3/6 (1933): 120-22.

24 Miroslav Vanino, "Ljetopis Dubrovačkoga kolegija (1559-1564)", *Vrela i prinosi: zbornik za povijest isusovačkoga reda u Hrvatskim krajevima*, 7 (1937): 4-5.

to Tuzla. From this last location they entered the former Hungarian territories, at Požega from where the bishop went to Pécs and Sfondrato to Belgrade²⁵. From here, he left for Cluj, via Alba-Iulia, to renew his votes, and then returned to Timisoara²⁶. On 18 September of the same year, the missionaries reached their final destination in the urban centre on the Bega River. What they knew from the letter of the Catholic community was only part of the shortcomings of the faithful, as revealed in the first letter sent from the mission site²⁷. Until 1551-1552, when the Ottomans came to power, there is no known case of acceptance of the Reformation in the rural world south of the Mures River. Reformed communities had been established exclusively in urban areas, in Lipova (Hung. Lippa), Caransebeş (Hung. Karánsebes) or Timișoara, in particular through the efforts of the former lord of Timis County, Peter Petrović. As in other areas of the former Hungarian kingdom, the lack of a priestly body, felt after the Turks conquered the area, led some Catholics to turn to Protestant pastors²⁸. The missionaries concentrated their efforts in those urban area where they would try to implement Tridentine Catholicism and reform Catholic communities to face the Protestant pressure. The instructions received by the missionaries in this regard speak for themselves. In 59 points they were asked to punish apostates and those who did not accept the new Reformed Catholicism, to open schools, to solve the marriage problem. Particular emphasis was placed on the dissemination of religious books in Latin to the faithful, but especially to the priestly body, secular or regular, remaining in the territory, so that they could discover the new Tridentine dogma²⁹.

In Timisoara the Bishop of Ston had limited success in promoting the message through the printed book, because after his death 18 copies of the Roman Breviary remained, which the Holy See was endeavouring to recover. Members of the community were to receive books on doctrine, probably catechisms in the vernacular, printed in both Latin and Cyrillic characters³⁰. In February and March 1582, two letters from the Ragusan and Hungarian communities in Timișoara revealed new aspects of the Reformation's relationship with the Catholic faithful. The death of the Bishop of Ston further reduced the city's precarious Catholic priesthood. The only priest left to effectively shepherd the Catholic community was the same Ragusan Dominic Giurgević. As parish priest of the town, he strove to promote Catholic

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- 25 Endre Veress, ed., *Fontes Rerum Transilvanicarum*, vol. I (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1911), 171; Tóth, "Raguzai", 454.
 - 26 Ladislaus Lukács, ed., *Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae*, vol. II (Roma: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1976), 158-59; Veress, *Fontes Rerum Transilvanicarum*, I, 153.
 - 27 István György Tóth, ed., *Litterae Missionariorum de Hungaria et Transilvania*, vol. I (Roma-Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézete-Római Magyar Akadémia, 2003), 118-19.
 - 28 This situation is highlighted by a series of reports from the early 17th century: Magina, *De la excludere*, 137.
 - 29 Eusebius Fermendžin, ed., *Acta Bosnae potissimum ecclesiastica cum insertis editorum documentorum regestis ab anno 925 usque ad annum 1752* (Zagrabiae: Academia Scientiarum et Artium Slavorum Meridionalium, 1892), 321-34.
 - 30 Fermendžin, *Acta Bosnae*, 335-36.

principles among the youth, but was limited by his poor knowledge of Hungarian. Both letters insist on material support that would have helped to found a school. Only through education could the young people, and thus the community, face the “Lutheranism” and unbelief in the town. The zealous Dominican made full use of the weapons of the counter-reformation: preaching and public disputes³¹, and finally succeeded in eliminating the threat from the radical Reformation, because his intervention prevented the Unitarians from holding the synod scheduled for Simand, practically affecting the possibility of coordinating their actions, which in time led to an Anti-Trinitarian backlash in the area³².

Father Bartolomeo Sfondrato, although he was well prepared for the mission, could not give him any support in his actions because, in the meantime, he had fallen ill. The Jesuit, with his mind wandering (*mente captus*), refused to pray or attend the Holy Mass, and ended up wandering around the city and making a pact with one of the Protestant preachers. On 10 November, because he refused treatment, Sfondrato died in the house of a Ragusan merchant³³. His death marked the end of the first attempt to restore the Catholic positions south of the River Mures. The large number of Christian believers left without spiritual assistance in the Ottoman-occupied territories attracted the attention of the Jesuits on mission in Transylvania. They found that there were many Catholics under Ottoman rule who were in dire need of priests:

Christiani, qui sub Turcis Tömösvarini et Giulae habitant, miserunt ad eum nuncios rogantes, ut ipsis aliquem Sacerdotem Catholicum concederet, asserentes se omnes sub Basa Tömösvariensi in quadraginta villis et in civitate in Catholica Religione constanter permansisse³⁴.

For economic reasons, but also because of the large number of followers of the Roman religion, the Ottomans favoured the Catholic communities in the Timisoara area, contrary to what happened in other parts of the former Hungarian kingdom. The Ragusan and Bosnian merchants, who were actively involved in trade with the Levant, brought important benefits to the Ottoman state, even though they were of

31 «fratrem Dominicum Giurgevich Ragusinum ordinis Sancti Dominici, hic Temesuarii nobiscum morantem, patrem quidem et vitae integritate et scientia admodum insiquem, qui tum praedicationibus, tum disputationibus inimicos Sanctae Fidei persequi non cessat». The letter is signed by 23 members of the town's South Slavic community, most likely merchants from Ragusa. This documents was first published in *Annales Ecclesiastici*, III, 330-331, but without the names of South-Slavic merchants and in full by Magina, “Între Luther și Mahomed”, 140-41.

32 Molnár, “Ragusa and the beginning of Balkan missions”, 111 and Id., *Le Saint-Siege, Raguse et les missions catholiques de la Hongrie ottomane 1572-1647* (Roma-Budapest: Accademia d'Ungheria, 2007), 118.

33 Veress, *Fontes Rerum Transilvanicarum*, II, 30; Maria Holban, Maria Matilda. Alexandrescu, Dersca Bulgaru et al., eds., *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, vol. III (București: Editura Stiintifica, 1971), 79; Miroslav Vanino, “Bartol Sfondrati u Temesvaru g. 1582”, *Vrela i Prinosi*, 4 (1934): 153.

34 Lukács, *Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae*, III, 344.

the Catholic faith. By favouring them economically and religiously, the Turks had everything to gain. Secondly, their numbers and ethnic composition also favoured the Catholic population. Most of the faithful were South Slavs, and there was a fairly large number of South Slavs among the local authorities in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire who had converted to Islam, but who continued to favour their former co-religionists³⁵.

Thus it can be explained why the Pasha of Timisoara «ordered, under penalty of having their noses and ears cut off, that they should bring only a priest of the old religion, and if they brought him he would give him maintenance. Another, also a Turk, rebuilt the church from the ground up»³⁶. The situation is not unique. Another step promised to allow the safe return of Catholic priests by giving the missionaries letters in the Turkish language by which they were free to preach the Gospel in the occupied regions: «litteras ei Thurcica lingua scripta dedit, ut per ditionem Turcarum libere in Ungaria predicaret Evangelium Christi»³⁷.

The envoys of the Holy See also took advantage of the goodwill shown by the Ottoman authorities. In the region between Gyula and Timișoara, Protestant pastors were expelled from three towns, if a report from 1585 is to be believed, and 80 villages were restored to the Catholic faith, while in over a hundred villages the faithful who had not accepted the Reformed preachers hastened to reaffirm their attachment to the traditional religion³⁸. The reports show how effective the mission can be when a favourable political factor is present. This success has also been facilitated by the summary reception of the Reformation. In rural areas, the success of the Reformation was not due to a good reception and understanding of the message, but to the lack of Catholic priests. The communities in southern Hungary accepted the Protestants for want of something better, a priest to officiate at divine services. Here it was no longer a question of educating the population in the spirit of the Reformation and building an identity, but of filling a void in the priesthood, although even the Reformed pastors were not enough, as links with the Protestant world had become increasingly tenuous after the integration of the territory into the Ottoman Empire. The missionaries' reports were optimistic, but perhaps only partially reflected the reality on the ground, because despite some auspicious predictions, things did not always work out as well as expected. The changing political situation at the end of the 16th century and the Ottoman conflicts with the Habsburgs marked a setback for the success of the missionaries

35 For the role of the South Slavic Catholic population in the Ottoman Empire and relations with the missionaries see: Antal Molnár, *Le Saint-Siege, Raguse et les missions catholiques*, passim and István György Tóth, *Politique et religion dans la Hongrie du XVIIe siècle. Lettres des missionnaires de la Propaganda Fide* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004), 13-58.

36 Holban, et al., *Călători*, III, 111.

37 Lukács, *Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae*, III, 345.

38 «Sunt denique pagi 80, in quibus sum versatus ab eo tempore. Essent centum quoque et ultra pagi, qui carent sacerdotibus et haereticis ministris si fuisset sufficiens ad peragrandum illos, in quibus a Quadragesima usque ad Pentecostes audivi confessiones mille hominum et ultra». Veress, *Fontes Rerum Transilvanicarum*, II, 119-20.

in the occupied area, so that at the end of that century the Catholic community in Timișoara was in the same situation as before the beginning of the mission. It was the Orthodox Church in Timișoara and its surroundings that benefited from these changes and managed to establish an institutional structure and become the dominant denomination in the region.

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**NOVITATES DE TURCIS SCRIBIT:
SPIES AND NEWS ABOUT OTTOMANS ON BORDERS OF TRANSYLVANIA AND
SOUTHERN PARTS UP TO 1526¹**

ABSTRACT

The issue of news about Ottomans in Transylvanian territories was not subject of Romanian or Hungarian scholars' debate. The Turkish threat was permanent and became "intimate" at the southern borders of the Hungarian kingdom in the 15th and 16th centuries. As part of the kingdom, Transylvanians were directly involved in fighting the Ottomans, but also in a huge network of spies and news about the Crescent. The proximity and the close connections with Wallachia and Moldavia of the Saxon towns in the south Transylvania, allowed them to inform the Transylvanian or even Hungarian central authorities about Ottomans. A lot of news described troop movements, its number or possible invasions in different parts of the Hungarian Kingdom. In reality, most of this news was just rumors', but produced fear and the feeling of insecurity for both officials and ordinary people.

KEYWORDS: Spies; News; Ottoman borders; 15-16th century; Transylvania.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of the news about the Ottomans is not new, but the question has not been analysed as it should have been. I have chosen to focus on documents describing the southern parts of the Hungarian Kingdom and Transylvania. I'm not targeting matters of diplomacy and official war news, but those small matters that were transported by the scouts through a network developed over time between the main border towns. The chronological upper limit is the mid-16th century, due to the fact that the area south of the Mureș Valley was conquered by the Crescent troops in 1552, and Transylvania itself became an area of contact with the Ottoman Empire. The system of fortresses in the border area played a special role during military campaigns, the main obligation being to defend the territory and control the access routes. The network of fortresses was doubled by a clever network of scouts who were able to gather vital information on the state of the enemy armies by knowing the places, the people and not least the spoken language, let alone the written one. Documents containing important data on the activity of the scouts and spies in the Turkish territories can be found mainly in the account books of the

1 This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-TE-2019-0457, within PNCDI III, *From Medieval Frontiers to Early Modern Borders. The Military organization of the Western Parts of the Transylvanian Principality in the XVI-XVII centuries.*

Saxon towns from southern Transylvania. Thus, most of the information used in this material comes from the Sibiu Accounts, because it indicates the name of the scout/spy, the money received and where the mission took place.

The details of the news regarding the Turkish army's movement were "locked" in the memory of the scout, being expressed only in the presence of the recipient. The information came with the merchants and went with the shepherds, returned with the trusted men of the nobles fearful of the imminence of some new raids. In the documents, the rumours are often referred to as *novitates*.

The Turkish threat was permanent and became "intimate" on the southern borders from the end of the 14th century, and was highly visible at the end of the next century and the beginning of the 16th. Many news reports described troop movements, their numbers or possible invasions directions in different parts of the Kingdom. In reality, most of this news has only remained at the level of rumours, but it has nevertheless caused fear and fuelled a sense of insecurity for both officials and ordinary people.

Ovidiu Cristea² is the only Romanian historian to have analysed the impact of this news in Romanian Principalities and how it affected the undertaking of new campaigns, but his research is focused on Wallachia and Moldavia with very little reference to the situation in Hungary and Transylvania. In Hungary, in the early 20th century Sándor Tokáts' briefly analysed the confusing world of scouts during the Turkish conquest³. In the last decade, Hungarian historiography has also produced some valuable contributions to the spy movement and war news with a special focus on the 17th century⁴.

In the 15-16th centuries, the communication of news developed differently, but the danger of news that was if not false, at least alarming enough to start a hasty military campaign that could adversely affect the country was known. In the 16th century, the Transylvanian Assembly stipulates on several occasions the need to pay these scouts, and recognises their role and importance, but warns at the same time of the possible risks of spreading false news⁵. Access to information

2 Ovidiu Cristea, *Puterea cuvintelor. Stiri și război în sec. XV-XVI* (Târgoviște: Cetatea de Scaun, 2014).

3 Sándor Tokáts, "A kalauzok és a kémek a török világban", in *Rajzok a török világból*, vol. II (Budapest: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Kiadása, 1915).

4 Géza Pálffy, "Hírszerzés és hírközlés a törökkori Magyarországon", *Studia Agriensia*, 20 (1999): 33-63; Gábor Ágoston, "Információszerzés és kémkedés az Oszmán birodalomban a 15-17. században", *Studia Agriensia*, 20 (1999): 125-153; János Szabados, "Habsburg-Ottoman Communication in the Mid-17th Century. The Death of Imperial Courier Johann Dietz. A Case Study", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 54 (2019): 119-40.

5 Sándor Szilágy, ed., *Monumenta Comititalia Regni Transilvania*, vol. VIII (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1882), 437: «Supplicans tamen iidem Domini Regnicolae Maiestate Suae, ut sua Maiestas dignetur mandare Domino Waywodae ut sua Dominatio exploratores necessarios, pro agendis explorationibus tenere curaret, quo, iuxta reportatam explorationem, opus exigeret particulariter, ubi vero necessitas major cognosceretur generaliter ab omnibus insurrection fieri, ne ob frequentem generalem ad quoscunque leues

was not easy, transmission channels were not so wide and only a small number of people had access to it. The major threat to Transylvania and the entire Hungarian Kingdom was the Ottoman Empire, so the territorial advance towards the Danube after the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula in the second half of the 14th century left little space, physically and mentally, between the official borders of the Kingdom of Hungary and the powerful Ottoman Empire. This was the beginning of fear: the pagans conquering the entire Christian world, taking children, raping women, killing and disembowelling, burning and stealing [...]. If someone was unfortunate enough to fall into the hands of Turks (*in manibus Turcorum*) had his fate sealed⁶. Moreover, the image of the Ottomans in the Kingdom of Hungary, most often regarded as *sevissimi Turcorum*, has been a subject of debate in the scientific world since the 19th century.⁷

At the end of the 14th century, Sultan Bayezid changed his policy and tried to fight on two fronts, one in the Anatolian region and the other in Eastern Europe. Only the disaster represented by the battle of Ankara followed by the internal struggle between Bayezid's sons gave a respite to the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The Ottoman return marked a new cohabitation with fear and a new exposure to raids by Turkish troops. The entire 15th century is marked by numerous campaigns on the Danube. The leader of the anti-Ottoman struggle was at first John Hunyadi, a knight of Romanian origin from Transylvania and later governor of the Hungarian kingdom. In 1438 and later in the spring of 1442 the Ottomans attacked Transylvania. In the second attack from 1442, Mezid bey of Vidin divided his army in two: one column went towards Alba-Iulia, along the Mureş valley, and the other towards Sibiu. The Hungarian-Wallachian army won the battle against the invaders, but the Ottoman army managed to penetrate into the interior of Transylvania, spreading fear and terror among the inhabitants of the villages between Alba-Iulia and Sibiu⁸. In such uncertain times and changing geo-political conditions, it is easy to understand the existence of espionage, closely linked especially to the border area. For Transylvania and the southern parts of the kingdom, I think we can talk about strategic espionage, well organized and even well paid. The first news (*novitates*) about the Ottoman threat in Hungary comes from the end of the 14th century, with the beginning of the Turkish raids on the territory of the Kingdom. It was only in the second half of the 15th century that news became articulated in the era of John Hunyadi. He was directly interested in information about his enemies,

rumores, insurrectionem Regnicolae grauentur, et rebus eorum familiaribus per hoc detrimenta subire compellantur».

- 6 Adrian Magina, "In the hands of the turks. Captives from Southern Hungary in the Ottoman Empire (14-16th centuries)", in *State and society in the Balkans before and after establishment of Ottoman rule*, eds. Srđan Rudić and Selim Aslantaş (Belgrade: Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2017), 65-78
- 7 Gábor Ágoston, "The image of the Ottomans in Hungarian historiography", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae*, 61/1-2 (2008): 15-26.
- 8 Liviu Câmpeanu, "Magnificus Johannes de Hunyad, Wayuoda Transylvanus, validam potentiam sevissimos turcorum Debelasset, Triumphum Victorie Reportando", *Transilvania*, 4 (2019): 86-96.

and the most reliable sources were from the areas close to the border line, namely Transylvania and the southern parts (*partes inferiores*, nowadays the territory of Banat). The two important cities in southern Transylvania, Sibiu and Braşov, had multiple connections with Wallachia, Moldavia and the territory south of the Danube thanks to the trade relations developed between these areas.

In the context of the permanent threat from the south, in July 1449 John Hunyadi asked the magistrate of Braşov to send him news about the Turks⁹, a sign that the governor was aware that the inhabitants of Braşov had enough connections to know about the Ottoman movements. Although the archives do not preserve the correspondence in this case, it is clear that the town magistrate sent a reply to the governor. Only a few years later, in 1454, Oswald, the mayor of Sibiu, sent more information to the city of Vienna. In his letter, Oswald emphasize with pride his origin from Sibiu and, at the same time, the explanation for the Turks' desire to conquer Sibiu are highlighted:

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I have heard from one of my trusted spies, who had just come from the Turks, that Sibiu is taken by the Turks as the most important city, before other cities of the kingdom of Hungary; therefore the damned Turks often and loudly shout, young and old, without interruption *Cibin, Cibin!* i. e. Sibiu, Sibiu, hoping that if they conquer this city, they will bring all the more easily, by their wickedness, damage and trouble not only to the aforesaid kingdom of Hungary, whose shield is Sibiu, but also to all Christendom¹⁰.

In the second half of the 15th century as well as in the following centuries, these two cities, Braşov and Sibiu, became the main centres for collecting information about the Turks. Not just the Saxon towns had a network of scouts, but also other Transylvanian officials, such as the bishop of Alba Iulia, Ladislas Gereb. He was so well informed in 1493 by one of his scouts of the imminent Turkish attack (*repentina fama turcarum veniret*) that he promptly told Captain George Bechk of Santău (Zantho, Satu-Mare county) to keep his soldiers, horses and weapons ready to intervene when the Turks entered the country next Sunday¹¹.

On the news road, an important role was played by the towns of Orăştie (Germ. Broos, Hung. Szászváros) and Haţeg. I included those small towns on the spies' route only after identifying some documentary information. Thus, on the evening of 28 September 1466, the members of the magistrate of Orăştie were surprised to

9 In 17th of July 1449: Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor. Acte şi scrisori din arhiva oraşelor ardelene (Braşov, Sibiu, Bistriţa) 1358-1600*, vol. XV/1, ed. Nicolae Iorga (Bucureşti: Atelierele Grafice Soccec, 1911), 35.

10 Ştefan Pascu, Constantin Cihodaru, et al., eds, *Documenta Romaniae Historica*. seria D: *Relaţii între Ţările Române*, vol. I (Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Române, 1977), 442.

11 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára, *Diplomatikai Levéltár*, n. 65159: «quare presentibus vos certificamus. Nam et nos ex omni parte ita certificati sumus eciam ab exploratore nostro qui hec ora reversus est, ut proxime die dominico aut sequenti die procul dubio hoc regnum intrabunt».

receive a trusted man sent by the nobleman Ladislas Kendeffy from Râu de Mori, (Hung. Malomviz, Hunedoara/Hunyad county) who brought the most frightening news: the Turks were in the mountains (probably between Caransebeş and Haţeg) and another army was making its way into Transylvania via Călnic, near Sibiu. The very worrying news was sent to Sibiu, but remained without consequences. The same document shows the fear, as the sender immediately wrote to the magistrate of Sibiu: «From Orăştie, *celeriter manu*, on the same day, at the same hour, *circa horam vespertinam*»¹². This shows a close link, a rapid movement by the city authorities to pass on the alarming news as quickly as possible. Another town, right on the border with the Ottoman Empire, less than 100 km from Haţeg, was Caransebeş (Hung. Karánsebes). It can be included among the centres of information on Ottoman troop movements. Being in the vicinity of the Ottoman occupied areas of Serbia, the town is directly linked to the fortresses on the Danube border of the Hungarian Kingdom, Mehadia (Hung. Miháld), Peth, Orşova or Severin (Hung. Szörény). The people of Caransebeş (Karansebes, Caraş-Severin county), like the people of Sibiu (Germ. Hermannstadt, Hung. Szeben, Sibiu county) and Braşov (Germ. Kronstadt, Hung. Brassó, Braşov county), were also linked to the southern Danube area by trade.

That is why I think that, most probably, the news from across the Danube first reached Caransebeş, and then was sent to the various officials of the kingdom. Although the Turkish danger was equally present, no such information has come from the Caransebeş area since the 15th century. Only in the context of the increased pressure on the Danube fortresses after the conquest of Belgrade, Caransebes appears as a centre of the scouts/spies in Turkish matters. A very large amount of information comes from the spring of 1525. In this respect, in addition, the preparation of a large-scale military campaign can be felt, and as a result, the shock wave has reverberated all the way to the border. One such scout was Jacob Pesthy of Caransebeş, who, in February 1525 was paid 2 florins for bringing news of the Turks to the royal court in Buda¹³. An even more important and interesting fact is that Caransebeş had an organised and paid group of spies, if we consider the information that on 1 April 1525, Lucas Margai, the captain of Caransebeş, received 100 gold florins to support his group of scouts. The following year brings a different situation, namely getting first-hand news from soldiers fleeing the Turkish army. On 21 June 1526, Gregory Besenyei from Ciacova (Hung. Csák) and Gregory from Timişoara arrived in Buda with news of the state of affairs in the Turkish camp. For their effort they received 8 florins:

On the same day (the Thursday nearest before the feast of St. John the Baptist) Gregory Bessenyei of Ciacova and another Gregory of Timişoara, who had fled from Turkey and from the Turkish emperor's army coming to the Royal Majesty with certain news of the Turkish efforts, were given 8 florins in good coin, well weighed¹⁴.

¹² Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XV/1, 62.

¹³ Costin Feneşan, *Diplomatarium Banaticum*, vol. I (Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2016), 307.

¹⁴ Feneşan, *Diplomatarium*, 311.

On the southern border line between Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire, the westernmost city was Timișoara (Hung. Temesvár). It can be concluded that in the second half of the 15th century, similarly to Caransebeș, news about Ottoman movements and intentions also came to Timișoara from the occupied Serbian territories, sometimes through Serbian noblemen who had taken refuge in the Hungarian Kingdom and kept in touch with the South-Slav territories. In 1470, Stephen and Demeter Jakšić's henchmen brought news to the Transylvanian voivode, John Pongracz. In turn, he informed the magistrate of Sibiu that he had received truthful news that the Turks crossing the Danube at Vidin (Bulgaria) were heading for Transylvania¹⁵. In the last decades of the 15th century, Timișoara became an important centre for coordinating anti-Ottoman actions thanks to the presence of Paul Kiniszi. A nobleman originally from the northern part of the Kingdom, in 1479 he became the lord of Timiș county and captain of the Lower Parts, a position from which he coordinated the entire anti-Ottoman defence of the kingdom¹⁶. He did not limit himself to defending the borders of the realm, but made several raids across the Danube, raiding the territories of Ottoman-occupied Serbia, from where he transferred part of the Christian population to the north of the river¹⁷. Kiniszi's closeness to the Serbian population was also evident in their use as spies. Among them, we find a certain Dwyo about whom we do not have much data. In 1523 the descendants of Dwyo and his brother had a legal dispute over the Sipzo estate in Timiș County. The estate was received by the two brothers as a reward from the king for their services as scouts for Paul Kiniszi in the Turkish territories¹⁸. Knowing that Kiniszi died in 1494, the two brothers mentioned in the document of 1523 certainly acted before this date, most likely in the early 1480^s when the anti-Ottoman campaigns of the Hungarian troops in Serbia took place. In the 16th century, military events followed one another with even greater speed. The anti-Ottoman front along the Danube was strongly affected by Suleyman Kanunî intervention in imposing rulers in Moldavia and Wallachia, on the one hand, and by the Ottoman Empire's advance to Mohács and Buda and its takeover of Transylvania, on the other. In 1521, more than 50 missions' *ad partes transalpinas*

15 Gustav Gündisch, ed., *Urkundenbuch zur geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen* [Ub], vol. VI (București: Franz Michaelis, 1981), n. 3802: «Venerunt ad nos homines egregiorum Stephani et Demetrii Jachyth veris cum novitatibus, ut Thurci magno bello et exercitu conquisito penes castrum Bodon per vada Danubii transfertantur voluntque illas Transsilvanarum partes subintrare».

16 In this respect see Ioan Hațegan, *Pavel Chinezul* (Timișoara, 1994) and Adrian Magina, "Cognomen a paterno pago inditum. On the origin and social ascension of Paul Kiniszi", *Initial. A review of Medieval Studies*, 8 (2020): 83-100.

17 Adrian Magina, "Le long voyage vers la terre promise: les migrations serbes en Banat (XV^e-XVI^e siècles)", in *Between Worlds: The age of Jagellonians*, eds. Florin Nicolae Ardelean, Christopher Nicholson, et al., (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2013), 129-140.

18 Adrian Magina, ed., *Acta et documenta partes Regni Hungariae inferiores concernentia 1500-1552* (Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2020), 119: «Dwyo ad Thurciam per magnificum condam dominum Paulum de Kynis felicitis recordationis ad explorandum missus fuerant».

were sent from Sibiu alone over the mountains¹⁹. In the year of the battle of Mohács (1526), from spring to July, the authorities of Sibiu sent several missions south of the mountains or even south of the Danube: three times Iwan cnez (a certain member of the Romanian elite from the Hungarian kingdom), the reeve of Rășinari (between March and June), twice the reeve Mayna of Săliște²⁰. Another moment of frequent mentions of news and scouts from the Danube to Vienna is 1551-1552, when the Ottoman threat became imminent and troops moved north of the Danube²¹, but this is a different story.

NEWS ROUTES, SCOUT ROUTES

The Transylvanian communication network of the 15-16th centuries partly overlapped with the Roman road network, including roads, paths, tracks, fords and bridges, supported by a “network” of inns and taverns, resting places for men and horses. A direct consequence of the shape of this network is the system of human settlements and fortresses. The whole network was constantly changing under the influence of natural factors, such as swelling rivers and melting snow²².

In the area of the southern border of Transylvania, where the mountains were the strongest defence, it is quite easy to imagine the shortest routes by which the scouts could reach their destination in the shortest time, through the known passes, along the alpine paths where they grazed their sheep or even along the merchants' roads. From Sibiu via Turnu Roșu (Germ. Rothenturm, Hung. Vöröstorony) pass to Wallachia, at the end of the 15th century, there was a narrow road that could only be travelled on horseback²³ and then along the Olt Valley to Bucharest, Turnu Măgurele and from there to Nicopolis or Vidin in Bulgaria. Such a tedious and dangerous route had been made by the Romanian cnez Oprea who was sent on such a mission over the mountains in the summer of 1521, and returned with the news that Mehmet beg was heading for Severin²⁴. The envoy from Porcești (near Sibiu) was on his way to Mehedinți, while Barbat had to cross the Danube to Rahova

19 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, vol. XI, 844-45.

20 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, vol. XI, 844-45.

21 Costin Feneșan, “Banatul Caransebeșului și Lugojului între Habsburgi și Poartă în anul 1552”, *Studii și materiale de istorie medie*, 12 (1994): 161-200.

22 Research on the road network in Hungary and medieval Transylvania has been carried out especially recently, see in this regard Magdolna Szilágyi, “Mobility, Roads and Bridges in Medieval Hungary”, in *The Economy in Medieval Hungary*, eds. József Laszlovszky, Balázs Nagy, Péter Szabó, et al. (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2018), 64-80; Oana Toda, “Reutilizarea medievală a drumurilor romane în Transilvania și Banat”, *Banatica*, 27 (2017), 361-97.

23 Ub, VI, n. 3966, 555: «quomodo quadam via prope eandem civitatem nostram Cibiniensem penes quoddam castrum Weresthoron existens ad partes Transalpinas tendens, per quam res mercimoniales [...] adeo stricta esset, ut vix unus equus dumtaxat sequi alium posset, saepiusque per inundationes aquarum et nivium in tantum obstrueretur, ut nemo per eandem viam ire neque redire posset [...]».

24 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 844.

(Orahovo, Bulgaria)²⁵. From Braşov, however, the scouts took the road to Bucharest via the Rucăr pass to Piteşti²⁶, Buzău and Predeal²⁷. A large number of scouts also left Braşov for Bulgaria, heading for *Gercinum and Dresther* (unidentified settlements)²⁸.

Routes such as Caransebeş – Haţeg – Orăştie – Sibiu – Braşov or Orşova – Severin – Caransebeş – Timişoara were, at the same time, routes of merchants passing to and from the Ottoman Empire with commodities. A route from the Saxon area to central Hungary followed the Mureş Valley, through Gurasada (Hunedoara / Hunyad County) to Lipova (Hung. Lippa) and from there on to the Great Hungarian plain market-towns²⁹. It has to be said that few ventured on such a journey alone, as it was much more prudent to join a caravan, such as those of the merchants. But the more often the scouts/spies followed one another, the nearer the danger was felt, and it was very probable that the scouts had walked alone.

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INVISIBLE FACES LOST IN HISTORY

Who were the spies? What skills and knowledge did they have to carry out their mission? Not just one man was tasked with getting the news from source to destination. So if a scout left Nicopolis for Sibiu with news of the Turks, the news was carried on from this “information” centre to the Transylvanian voivode by a messenger. Information about the movements of the Turks could come in stages, scouts could meet halfway, as did Francis, the envoy of Sibiu and servant of Peter Schlwm, who had been in Wallachia and met at Turnu Roşu to exchange information³⁰. Messages also arrived through stations, if it came via Caransebeş, from across the Danube, which was evident in the case of 1538 when Gregory Vaida together with the Caransebes town council, knowing from their own scouts’ information about the state of the Turkish armies, sent a message to the people of Sibiu about the Turkish ships sailing on the Danube³¹.

It can be assumed that in the mountainous area of southern Transylvania, from Braşov to Haţeg, and even further, in the area of Caransebeş, hundreds of scouts were active, paid either from the funds of the magistrates of the various towns or from the royal treasury. So many names, so many faces that we do not know and cannot remember. The terms under which scouts are found in documents are most commonly «*exploratores nostrorum*», «*explorator secretus*», «*agentium*», «*vespilio*», «*nuncio*», «*famulus*» but also *my scout* or *my spy*. If the information found the informant, so it was only a circumstantial matter, and the matter exposed was not of particular importance, the person is called *someone*. The terms

25 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 845.

26 *Quellen zur geschichte der stadt Kronstadt: Rechnungen aus dem Archiv der Stadt Kronstadt: 1526-1540*, vol. II (Kronstadt: Druck von Albert & Zillich, 1889), 204.

27 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 783.

28 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 783.

29 Ub, IV, 2172.

30 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 845.

31 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XV/1, 376.

encountered with regard to the task these characters carry out derive from the potential secrecy or importance of the event a *very significant affair, in our affairs*, «de rumores Thurcorum», «novitatibus Turcorum», «pro inquirendo novitatibus», «in eadem causa», «in eodem negotio».

An important issue concerning spies is their social status. Intelligence carriers were often people whose lives were spent travelling. Travelling from one side of the border to the other has fostered encounters with a wide variety of situations, people and, obviously, information. Soldiers, officials, merchants, monks and priests are among the best information carriers. Romanian Orthodox priests from the villages in the area of Sibiu appear several times in the accounts of the city. The priest of Rășinari, speaking German and Romanian – *frater popa de Rozonayr* (Rășinari, Stederdorff, Sibiu county)³², was also sent over the mountains. Two other cases, from Sibiu's information centre, indicate the camouflage of intelligence gathering about Turkish movements underneath the merchants' activity. In 1522, Kasul, a merchant from Wallachia, came to Sibiu with his commodities, but also carried in his luggage certain *novitates* about Mehmet beg³³. In 1524, under the pretext of buying pigs, a certain Barbath also had to find news of Turkish movements³⁴.

It seems that good spies were a valuable commodity. In 1524 the city council of Sibiu commissioned the reeve /cnez of Rășinari to cross the mountains in order to collect news, but he was taken prisoner by the Turks.³⁵ The magistrate of Sibiu, however, did not abandon him, as one might think, but 100 florins were paid for his release³⁶. On the other hand, traitors or those who spread fake news were also important. In 1521, one of the servants of Sibiu was sent to catch a Wallachian who came with false news, «qui falsos rumores attulerat»³⁷.

A prerequisite was knowledge of the language of the population of the territory to which they were sent. Most of the scouts seem to be Romanians from the villages around Sibiu, having been sent to Wallachia, while most of the scouts from the Caransebeș – Timișoara area seem to have been South Slavs. Most probably the news were transmitted orally, but the essence of some was preserved in the letters sent between centres, as is evident, for example from the letter of 1513 belonging to Ladislav Barlabassy, the vice-voivode of Transylvania, who transmitted information about the Turkish plan to attack Sibiu³⁸. John Vitez, the captain of Caransebeș, also wrote to Sibiu about the two Turkish commanders – Balibeg and Ferhad Pasha's – and their plan to attack Severin.³⁹

32 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 844.

33 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 845.

34 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 845.

35 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 849.

36 Toma Cosmin Roman, *Sibiul între diplomație și război* (Sibiu: Honterus, 2017), 240.

37 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 844.

38 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XV/1, 403.

39 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XV/1, 276.

A direct testimony, however, we find through the voice of the scouts themselves. Thus, it is impossible not to mention Neacșu, a wealthy merchant of Câmpulung (Wallachia), whose information were written in 1521. The document, considered to be the first preserved text in Romanian with the Cyrillic alphabet, is, in fact, an informative sketch⁴⁰. The message was written in the context of the Ottoman preparations for the assault against Hungary, a campaign that eventually led to the fall of Belgrade to Turkish troops.

Dumitru cnez, reeve of Săliște village near Sibiu, is another long-lived character in this business. He has been identified as a scout from Sibiu in Wallachia for over 20 years both to the rulers Radu the Great and Mihnea the Bad, as well as to the ban of Craiova (a high dignitary in medieval and early modern Wallachia). In 1509, the ban Barbu of Craiova sent a letter to the people of Sibiu praising the merits of Dumitru as a bearer of news between Craiova and Sibiu: «your lordship must feed such a man, for he carries your words and ours well»⁴¹. His name is mentioned in the town's registers from 1515 to 1525, but he was active as early as 1504, if we consider the letters of Radu the Great from that year⁴². For two decades he was tasked with finding out news about the Turks and may well have crossed the Danube. By 1510, Dumitru of Săliște had been commissioned with 12 such missions. He had a very good relationship with the boyars Socol and Preda from Wallachia. In 1521, in the context of the Ottoman preparations for the assault on the Hungarian Kingdom under the new Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent, the scouts in the southern parts were trying to find out as much as possible about Turkish intentions. In this year, Dumitru was sent on a different mission, on the roads leading to Timișoara for news about the Turks, about the same time that Neacșu was also sending his letter written in Romanian. No letters are known to have been written by Dumitru, but he certainly spoke, in addition to Romanian, German and probably had some knowledge of Slavonic.

Another interesting character is Iwan, reeve of the village of Rășinari, also Romanian in origin. He is often mentioned in the registers of the magistrate of Sibiu between 1515 and 1530. In the events of 1521, he crossed the Danube to Vidin *explorandi gratia*, and in 1526, between March and June, he crossed the mountains in Wallachia at least three times.

It must be said that another group of couriers were sent to the voivode of Transylvania or even to the king. As far as the financial side is concerned, a large amount of money was allocated to each centre. The group of scouts from Caransebeș received 100 florins; for a mission in Wallachia the city of Sibiu paid between 50 dinars and 3 florins and a journey to the Transylvanian vice voivode cost the city between 1.5 and 3.5 florins. For carrying a letter to the king in Buda were paid 5 florins. For a single errand, the journey to and from Vidin, a spy named Ystok received 6

40 Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, XI, 843.

41 Ioan Lupaș, "Din relațiile Transilvaniei cu Țara Românească: activitatea cnezului Dumitru din Săliște", *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj*, 4 (1961): 72.

42 *Quellen zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens aus saschischen Archiven*, I: *Rechnungen aus dem archiv des Stadt Hermanstadt 1380-1516* (Hermanstadt: Druck bei Franz Michaelis, 1880), 20; Lupaș, "Din relațiile Transilvaniei", 70.

florins from the magistrate of Sibiu. In 1492 alone, the magistrate of Sibiu, headed by George Sartor, spent 37 florins for 18 missions over the mountains for scouts in Wallachia (in addition to official delegations to the vice voivode or to Moldova or to the congregation of the seven Saxon seats)⁴³. In the same year, four names stand out: Marco, Dussa, Petrus Barbocz and a certain Balczog. In 1521, the same magistrate spent almost 100 florins for more than 50 missions over the mountains. It is visible that the number of scouts and the number of missions have tripled in less than 30 years in only one centre of information.

CONCLUSIONS

In the 15-16th centuries some characteristics of spies network stand out: 1. The centres of the scouts/spies were border towns; 2. the number of requests with news about the Turks increased on the eve of battles or alleged Ottoman campaigns to the Central Europe; 3. the scouts were valuable and their work was financially supported by the king and local officials; 4. the routes of the spies coincided with routes that were known for merchants, but not easily accessible even at the time; 5. they had a diverse social status, but most of them were Romanians or South Slavs from the settlements near the important urban centres of the border area. Across the mountains on south of the Danube area each created their own network of relationships, based on common goals and friendship.

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43 Serviciul Judeţean al Arhivelor Naţionale Sibiu, *Magistratul oraşului şi scaunului Sibiu. Colecţia de documente medievale*, U V, nr. 1183.

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THE COLLAPSE OF THE BORDER FORTRESS SYSTEM AGAINST THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN 1521 AND 1527

ABSTRACT

1521 became a turning point in the history of the border fortress system against the Ottoman Empire, as in the history of Hungary, although this is obscured by the battle of Mohács, but all the catastrophe that took place between 1521 and 1541 could be traced back to the loss of Nándorfehérvár (Beograd) and Szabács (Šabac). In my study I want to present the period of the collapse of the Hungarian border fortress system between 1521 and 1527, from the siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1521 to the fall of Jajca (Jajce) in 1527.

KEYWORDS: Ottoman Empire; Medieval Hungary; Ottoman-Hungarian War; Fortress system; Fall of Nándorfehérvár.

ANTECEDENTS, PREPARATION AND BEGINNING OF THE OTTOMAN CAMPAIGN OF 1521

King Louis II and Sultan Selim made peace with each other in 1519, but this lapsed with the sultan's death on September 22, 1520. He was succeeded by Sultan Suleiman, who sent Behram courier to Buda to announce his accession to the throne and announce his peace offer. The question arises as to whether Suleiman wanted to make peace at all. According to the theory of Géza Perjés, the sultan did not want to occupy Hungary, for it fell outside the military sphere of his empire and rather he wanted to force a fiduciary dependence on Louis II. According to Perjés, after the Habsburg-Jagiellonian Treaty of Marriage and Inheritance of 1515, the influence of the Habsburgs in Hungary increased, while the election of Emperor Charles V upset the balance of power in Europe. And Suleiman was interested in reducing Hungary's relations with the Habsburgs¹.

Whatever was in the background, it was a fact that Louis II captured the sultan's envoy, and this was not the usual diplomatic move, even if the Turks took the opportunity at times. Although the political situation was temporarily favorable for the Hungarian leadership, whereas Janbirdi al-Ghazali's uprising in Syria forced Suleiman to begin his rule by resolving internal problems. Thus, it was time to detect whether the princes of Europe would support a war against Turkey, so Louis II could send his envoys to the princes of the continent².

1 Perjés Géza, *Mohács* (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1979), 142; Attila Bárány, *A szulejmáni ajánlat Magyarország, a Török Birodalom és a Nyugat (1521-24)* (Máriabesnyő: Attraktor, 2014), 17.

2 MNL, OL, DL, 38069; Kosáry Domokos, *Magyar külpolitika Mohács előtt* (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1978), 50-1, 54-5.

On January 18, 1521, the Venetian doge of Leonardo Loredan informed the Hungarian envoy that he accepted Suleiman's offer of peace and recommended it to Louis II, too. Like Venice, no one has proposed a war against the Turks.

The opposition between King Francis I of France and Emperor Charles V played a role in this, but there were also serious tensions on the continent (e.g. the Polish-Tatar conflict, the Reformation). That is why it was important what happened at the imperial assembly in Worms, which opened on January 27, 1521, at which Hungary was represented by István Werbőczy, as *personalis regiae*, and Jerome Balbi, a provost in Bratislava, while the Croatian barons were represented by Kristóf Frangepán. The latter, threatened by ongoing Turkish burglaries, led by Bernát Frangepán and János Korbáviai, threatened to become Turkish taxpayers in the absence of support. Bernát Frangepán also presented their ultimatum at the 1521 Parliament in Buda. Like the Croats, the Hungarian envoys were heard in Worms, but the Reformation and the Franco-German conflict were more important than the case of the Hungarians³.

In the end, Louis II and his court had to face reality because the imprisonment of Behram courier became a *casus belli*. The 16th century descriptions of the fate of the Turkish envoy(s) are contradictory. Miklós Istvánffy knew that they had been strangled into the Lake Tata. Ferenc Zay wrote that the envoy had his ears and nose cut off and then sent to Szendrő (Smederevo). This was written about by Rabbi Elijah Capsali from Candia, too⁴.

While the diplomatic steps of Louis II were in progress, in the month of February 1521, the Ottoman army crushed the Janbirdi al-Ghazali's uprising. With this, all obstacles to Suleiman's campaign were removed, and the establishment of an army, the backbone of which was formed by the rumelian troops, could begin. Suleiman ordered 10,000 azabs from Anatolia to Europe and set out for the campaign with 12,000 janissaries stationed in Constantinople. According to Louis II's letter of 30

3 MNL, OL, DL, 105256; Bárány, *A szulejmáni ajánlat*, 15-16, 23, Id., "Adalékok az 1521-es magyar-török viszonyhoz a nyugati követjelentések tükrében", in *Középkortörténeti tanulmányok 8. - A VIII. Medievisztikai PhD-konferencia (Szeged, 2013. június 17-19) előadásai*, eds. Ágnes Maléth and Márta Tóber (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 2015), 26; Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Szulejmán*, (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1974), 42; Lajos Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár bukása (1521)", *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 2 (1889): 406-07; Kosáry, *Magyar külpolitika*, 56-7, 61-3, 68-9, 72-4; Péter Kulcsár, *A Jagelló-kor* (Budapest: Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1981), 166-67; "A magyar követek az 1521.-i wormsi birodalmi gyűlésen. Kivonat Martin Aurél rendes tagnak 1925 március hó 13-án tartott székfoglaló értekezéséből", *A Szent István Akadémia Értesítője*, 10/ 1-2, (1925): 126-28; Perjés, *Mohács*, 150; *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Karl V*, vol. II, ed. Adolf Wrede (Gotha: Die Historische Kommission bei der Königlich Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1896), 758, 811.

4 Péter Benits, *Istvánffy Miklós magyarok dolgairól írt históriája. Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában*, I/1 (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2001), 170-71; Kohn Sámuel, "Héber kútforrások és adatok Magyarország történetéhez (Kapszáli Élijáhu kándiai rabbi krónikájának Magyarországra vonatkozó adatai, 1523)", *Történelmi Tár*, (1880): 118-19; Zay Ferenc, *Az Lándorfehérvár elveszésének oka e vót és így esött* (Budapest: Magyar Helikon, 1980), 8; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 401-03.

June to King Henry VIII of England, 200,000 Turks started against Nándorfehérvár. Elijah Capsali wrote about more than 400,000 people, and Zay knew about 300,000 Turks⁵.

The older literature (Mihály Holéczy: 250,000, Lajos Kiss: 250,000-300,000) wrote about a significant Ottoman army, but according to Ferenc Szakály the number may have been 160,000, of which only 70-80,000 were soldiers. Interestingly, Francesco Massaro, the secretary of the Venetian embassy, wrote in his 1523 report of 100,000 people, of whom “only” 30,000 were soldiers, while Jerome Balbi, the envoy of the Hungarian king, informed Emperor Charles V that 34,000-35,000 Turkish soldiers had attacked Hungary, which was joined by non-combat auxiliaries⁶.

Military equipment (e.g. gunpowder, lead, stone bullets) was transported to Sofia by Pasha Ferhád with 3,000 camels, while the artillery had 300 cannons and 40 large galleys from the Black Sea – 17 of them Venetian – paddled on the Danube to Nándorfehérvár in order to the rivers be brought under their control. Under the leadership of Mehmed bey, the armed forces of Transylvania, Muntenia and Moldavia were tied down, 80,000 (!) Turks and 50,000 (!) Tartars attacked the Poles, and the Bosnian pasha depredated the Sava-Drina region⁷.

Suleiman left Constantinople on 19 February and went on the campaign with his army on 18 May. On June 18-19, 1521, there was a council of war in Sofia, at which the opposition between the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed and Ahmed the beylerbey of Rumelia became apparent. The Grand Vizier suggested occupying the castle of Nándorfehérvár, while Pasha Ahmed preferred to occupying Szabács (Šabac) and then advancing to Buda. Sultan Suleiman accepted Ahmed’s concept, but allowed Piri Mehmed to siege Nándorfehérvár (Beograd). The Turks set out from Sofia for Szabács on 21 June, then two days later 1000 janissaries were sent to Szendrő, that they encircle Nándorfehérvár together with Husrev bey of Szendrő. And Pasha Ahmed was ordered by the sultan to siege Szabács. Suleiman and Piri Mehmed went on together for a while, then the Grand Vizier headed for Nándorfehérvár on July 3rd⁸.

5 Bárány, “Adalékok”, 26-7; Káldy-Nagy, *Szulejmán*, 42-3, Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404; Kohn, “Héber kútforrások”, 120, Kosáry, *Magyar külpolitika*, 56-77, 68-9, 72-4; Ferenc Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521: a vég kezdete”, in *Az Lándorfehérvár elvesztésének oka e vót és így esött*, ed. Ferenc Zay (Budapest: Bibliotheca Historica, 1980), 107; József Thúry, *Török történetírók*, vol. II, (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1896) 42-4; Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 50.

6 Bárány Attila, “Követjelentés Magyarország állapotáról 1521-ből”, in *Arcana tabularii Tanulmányok Solymosi László tiszteletére*, vol. II, eds. Attila Bárány, Gábor Dreska and Kornél Szovák (Budapest-Debrecen: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 2014), 490; Mihály Holéczy, “Belgrád hadi történetei”, *Tudományos Gyűjtemény*, XVII/12 (1833): 24; István Balogh, *Velencei diplomaták Magyarországról (1500-1526) (Forrástanulmány)* (Szeged: Egyetemi Kiadó, 1929), 47; Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 134; *Magyar történelmi okmánytár londoni könyv-és levéltárakból 1521-1717*, ed. Ernő Simonyi (Pest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottmánya, 1859), 63.

7 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 134.

8 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 404, 546-48; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 104-07, 115;

THE SIEGE OF SZABÁCS (ŠABAC) AND THE SYRMIAN (SREM) RAIDINGS

The defense of Szabács was ruled in 1521 by vicebans Simon Logody and András Thorma, because the bans István Sulyok and Balázs left the border fortress and its 500 defenders⁹. To protect the ill-equipped fort, Simon Logody sent a courier to Buda to ask for help, but the food and gunpowder and the 200 infantry did not get there on time¹⁰.

The siege took place from 4 to 7 July, and as a result of Pasha Ahmed's attack on 5 July, the number of defenders was reduced to 100¹¹. The guard was trapped in the inner castle, sealing the fate of Szabács. On July 7, 1521, the Turks ordered a general assault. According to Zay, there was a killing fight between the Hungarians and the Turks in the castle market, who lost 700 soldiers, according to Ludovicus Tubero, but 1,500, according to other sources. Although the Hungarians fought heroically, the border fortress fell. Suleiman arrived in Szabács on July 8, his path was lined with the heads of the defenders pinned to sticks¹².

The news of the fall of Szabács reached Buda on July 10, which caused great alarm because they were so informed that Suleiman would start his troops against our capital. To this end, the sultan ordered the construction of a planned bridge to the Sava at Szabács. And Pasha Ahmed was sent with the spahis of the Rumelian army and a thousand janissaries for the syrmian (Srem) raidings¹³.

It was these days that the widow of the Serbian despot János Beriszló, Ilona Jaksics mistress of Kölpény (Kulpin), "surrendered" to the Turks. That is, she pretended to surrender so that she could escape with twenty chariots of wealth, money, and her children. In response, Pasha Behram of Nicapol (Nikopol) and Pasha Mahmud of

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József Thúry, *Török történetírók*, vol. I (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1893), 282-85; Id., *Török*, vol. II, 46, 124; Marosi Endre, "Török várostromok Magyarországon II. Szulejmán korában", *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 22/3 (1975): 430.

9 Zay knows of 500 defenders, while Istvánffy knows of 100 horsemen and a few infantry, and Tubero and Giovanni Michele Bruto know of only 60 soldiers. Zay, *Az Lándorfejérvár*, 45; Istvánffy, *Magyarok*, 172; Ludovicus Tubero, *Kortörténeti feljegyzések (Magyarország)* (Szeged: Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, 1994), 306; *Brutus János Mihály Magyar Históriaja, 1490-1552*, vol. II: *Lajos király trónra léptétől 1537-ig*, ed. Ferenc Toldy (Pest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, Pest, 1867), 91.

10 Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 438-40; Marosi, "Török várostromok", 430; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 115-16.

11 In this regard, the *Memoria rerum* writers of only 35 peasants, and the Sultan's war diary knows of more than 100 people. 1504-1566 *Memoria Rerum A Magyarországon legutóbbi László király fiának legutóbbi Lajos királynak születése óta esett dolgok emlékezete (Verancsics-évkönyv)*, ed. József Bessenyei (Békéscsaba: Magyar Helikon, 1981), 21; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 286.

12 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 116; Zay, *Az Lándorfejérvár*, 460; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 286; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 549.

13 Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 286-87.

Silistra intruded Syrmia with newer troops¹⁴.

The construction of the bridge at Szabács was hindered by the attack of timber transported from Zvornik on the Drina by Sirmium citizens and soldiers. Meanwhile, many have fled the Southern region¹⁵.

For Suleiman, the commissioning of the wooden bridge in Szabács, which was completed on July 18, was the most important, but the bridge was destroyed by a sudden flood on the 19th.

SIEGE OF NÁNDORFEHÉRVÁR (BEOGRAD)

On June 25, Husrev bey of Szendrő began to destroy the Nándorfehérvár area with 15,000 soldiers. Then, at the end of June and the beginning of July, the Turkish outposts, the troops of the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman fleet also appeared, and then they surrounded the castle, the gates of which were closed around 9 July. To the south of the castle stood the Turkish army with artillery, which, at about of July 9, began breaking the walls of Nándorfehérvár from the east and west. On the same day, Suleiman ordered the suspension of the siege, probably on the advice of Pasha Ahmed. The Grand Vizier refused to obey the Sultan's order and continued to fight day and night against the defenders of Nándorfehérvár, who did everything they could to protect the castle¹⁶.

Piri Mehmed instructed Husrev bey to capture Zimony. It should be noted here that even in the 1490s Suleiman had the help of the spies of the sanjak bey of Szendrő to make a detailed map of the castle and area of Nándorfehérvár in order to assess how it would be worthwhile to occupy the border castle using previous experience. The siege of Zimony indicated that the Turks had taken into account the recommendations of the "map"¹⁷.

There were 400 defenders in the castle of Zimony, who left the castle of Nándorfehérvár for an unknown purpose. In contrast, according to Pecsevi, Louis II sent 300 riflemen to Nándorfehérvár, but when they met Husrev bey, they pulled into Zimony. According to Pecsevi, many did not want to stay in Zimony and wanted to return to Buda. The leader of the people of Zimony was Mihály pinnace

14 Kölpény was occupied by the Turks on July 21, and its stones, along with several other strengths, were used to rebuild Szabács. László Gere, "Várak a Szerémségben", in *A középkori Dél-Alföld és Szer*, ed. Tibor Kollár (Szeged: Csongrád Megyei Levéltár, 2000), 366; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 128-29; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 288.

15 Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 46-8; *Memoria rerum*, 21.

16 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 11-18, 120; Thúry, *Török*, vol. II, 125-26; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár": 555.

17 Marko Popović, "Belgrád 15. századi erődítményei", in *A déli harangszó Magyarországon és a nagyvilágban*, ed. Zsolt Visy (Budapest: Zrínyi Média, 2011), 10; Marko Popović, "Siege of Belgrade in 1521 and restoration of fortifications after conquest", in *Belgrade 1521-1867*, ed. Dragana Amedoski (Belgrade: Institute of History Belgrade-Yunus Emre Enstitüsü/Turkish Cultural Centre, 2018), 6; Péter E. Kovács, "Az ostrom-török tanulságokkal", *História*, 29/1 (2007): 16.

voivode or Markó Szkoblics¹⁸.

500 janissaries served in the Turkish troops preparing for the siege, and Husrev bey carried some wall-breaking cannons and immediately started attacking the castle¹⁹. The people of Zimony closed the gates and, according to Tubero, the Turks confirmed under oath that if the inhabitants of the town gave up the settlement, they would be free to live in their place of residence, but they would also be free to leave it. Eventually, the defenders surrendered, but in this connection it is important to know that when Husrev bey to discuss this, the ban of the castle fell out of a damaged watchtower among the Turks. Pecsevi described this as one of the castle captains negotiating from a tower with the Turkish bey, which collapsed and then his men surrendered. It should be noted here that the heroism of the defenders of Zimony (Zemun) is highlighted in the description of Ferenc Zay. It is interesting that in both Szabács and Zimony the contemporary Hungarian narratives record that there was a fierce struggle between the Hungarians and the Turks in the castle market. Ferenc Szakály believes that this story at Zay is unlikely. Either way, Zimony fell into the hands of the Turks on July 11, and the defenders were butchered by the Ottomans²⁰.

Despite the capture of Zimony, Suleiman again ordered the end of the siege of Nándorfehérvár. However, the situation changed, in which it played a major role that on July 15 Second Vizier Pasha Mustafa and Piri Mehmed met next to Nándorfehérvár and the Grand Vizier, through his Second Vizier, had the opportunity to convince his lord to continue the siege. It was enough time for the sultan to make that decision, because there was no serious countermeasure from the Hungarian side. This was a problem because this way the Turks were free to destroy Syrmia. Just as Pasha Mustafa successfully upset the region, so did Jahja pasa oglu Bali, a Bosnian Bey. The latter attacked the port at Titel on July 24, and at the end of the month, after occupying a castle, he had 70 or 80 Hungarians beheaded. After that, he occupied Szalánkemen (Stari Slankamen) so that they could monitor the Hungarian military movements and prevent crossing attempts²¹.

Eventually, Piri Mehmed was forced to abandon the siege, but at that point, Suleiman's plan took a turn. The sultan ordered the siege to continue and headed for Nándorfehérvár himself. This ad hoc Ottoman campaign in 1521, in fact, could only

18 According to the *Memoria rerum*, Mihály voivode was in Zimony with 500 sailors. According to the research of Ferenc Szakály, Markó Szkoblics first name it was not Markó but György and he served as a royal aulic (equestrian officer) at the ends. *Memoria rerum*, 21; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 121-23; Ármin Vámbéry, "A belgrádi és magyarországi győzelmekről. Pecsevi török történetiről fordítva", *Új Magyar Múzeum*, 10/2 (1860): 419.

19 Vámbéry, "A belgrádi", 419; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 122; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 556.

20 According to Pecsevi, in accordance with the Padişah's order, the 300 defenders who capitulated were butchered on the Great War Island opposite Nándorfehérvár. Vámbéry, "A belgrádi", 419; Tubero, *Kortörténeti*, 310-11; Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 51; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 287-88; Id., *Török*, vol. II, 133.

21 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 126-28; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 290; Vámbéry, "A belgrádi", 419.

be successful because there was no one in Hungary to lead the defense. Meanwhile, Buda received a lot of information about the situation at the southern ends. The king sent a multitude of letters of request for help to the princes of Europe, but the foreign policy situation was still not favorable for Hungary. Venice lent 24,000 gold forints, while the Poles clashed with the Tartars in the spring and the Russians during the summer, but sent 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry to Hungary for fear of a Tatar-Turkish alliance. Meanwhile, King Francis I bribed 20,000 Czech infantry and 2,000 cavalry to in his service against the emperor. Knowing this, Louis II ordered these soldiers to return to his service under beheading burden²².

The death of Archbishop Tamás Bakócz of Esztergom on June 11 was a huge loss for Hungary. In his will, the cardinal left 40,000 forints to the king. Louis II quickly obtained this, and even put his hand on the movables in the Bakócz estate. The troubles were compounded by the fact that the king had a conflict with the mining towns due to the monetary reform, but even the commander-in-chief of the army could not be easily selected, and in the end the election fell on István Báthori²³.

The mobilization of the force was towed and cumbersome. Although András Báthori became the new captain of the pinnacles, this did not improve the situation, despite the fact that Báthori tried to recruit people, but in the meantime instead of his brother holding his wedding in Nyírbátor he also recruited the inter-Temesian banderiums. Thus, after the return to the pinnacles entrusted to György Szerémi at Bata, he only ventured with his fleet to the mouth of the Drava²⁴.

When the Hungarian troops started to gather in July – August, Szabács and Zimony were already in Ottoman hands and Sirmia was completely destroyed, while Nándorfehérvár had been under siege for weeks. While it was tried to gather the Hungarian army at Tolna and Zenta, János Szapolyai from Transylvania was ordered to hurry to the palatine camp. At the beginning of August, Polish, Czech and German troops arrived in Buda, then on August 8, with a force of about 4,000, Louis II left his headquarters again and headed for Tétény! The king wanted to save Nándorfehérvár, but this was not realistic.

While the Hungarian leadership struggled with the mobilization, Piri Mehmed began the siege of Nándorfehérvár again and began shooting down the castle again on July 23-24. The Grand Vizier also dug mines to bring down the walls, but the defenders led by Balázs Oláh neutralized them with anti-mines. The defenders attacked the Ottoman artillery several times, and even preyed a large siege cannon along with the Turkish flags²⁵.

Suleiman left for Nándorfehérvár on July 25, and arrived in a few days, and on August 1, the “real” siege began. Based on the description of Mustafa Dzelalzade (Mustafa bin Dzelal), we know that the troops of the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed stood on the west side (right wing) south of the castle, with the janissary formations under the command of the janissary-aga. While leaning on the Danube on the eastern

22 Bárány, “Követjelentés”, 490-91; Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 559-60.

23 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 562-63, 566; Balogh, *Velencei diplomaták*, XLVIII.

24 Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 564-65; Szakály, “Nándorfehérvár 1521”, 133.

25 Tamás Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig 1396-1526* (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2005), 186; Kiss, “Nándorfehérvár”, 576-77, Kohn, “Héber kútforrások”, 120.

side (left wing), Mustafa's second vizier units were stationed with the Sekbanbaşı controlled janissaries. It should be noted that the writer of the Turkish war diary, viewed from the Sultan's camp at Zimony, defined the right and left wings of the army. In 1521, the Turks left no room for Hungarian attempts at liberation. With the Rumelian army, Suleiman occupied his position on the side of Syrmia²⁶.

On August 2, Suleiman ordered the attack on Nándorfehérvár. Fierce fighting broke out between the defenders and the Turks, and according to enemy records, 500-600 of their soldiers were killed in the battle. After the unsuccessful attack, Suleiman ordered digging approach trenches. Then, on August 3, another attack followed, deploying larger forces than before. The new attack was repulsed by the defenders in a tough fight.

Meanwhile, palatine István Báthori camped in Futak (Futog) with 17,000–18,000 soldiers and loaded a couple of ships with supplies for the people of Nándorfehérvár. In the end, these ships did not reach Nándorfehérvár, the walls of which were constantly destroyed by the Ottoman artillery, and according to the August 4th record of the Sultan's war diary, they also blew up the cannon tower on the banks of the Danube²⁷.

The shooting of the walls may have been good, because on August 8 Suleiman's soldiers launched a much larger attack on Nándorfehérvár next to the Sava, the troops of the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed, along the Danube, the Second Vizier corps of Mustafa, and in the center of the army, the Rumelian army of the beylerbey of Ahmed launched an attack. The lower town and the water town became the property of the Turks, and the defenders were pushed back into the citadel and the upper town. In addition to 800 janissaries, azabs and spahis also fell in the hard fight. And although Balázs Oláh viceban and his soldiers did everything they could, their fate was sealed²⁸.

After the attack, according to Zay and Tubero Suleiman wanted to surrender the siege, but that was not his intention, but this was not his intention, as evidenced by the fact that on August 9 he ordered the miners of the Turkish army to dig mines and blow up the towers of the citadel, and also to bring the cannons closer to the walls. From then on, the castle was shot from several sides until August 16th. Although the Turks feared that Louis II would arrive in Nándorfehérvár with a rescue army, the Sultan ordered another assault on 16 August at the suggestion of Pasha Ahmed. Pasha Ahmed's troops from the north from the rivers and Pasha Mehmed and Pasha Mustafa from the south attacked the border castle on August 16, but much of the struggle awaited the troops led by Pasha Ahmed, as they tried to penetrate the fortress on one of the most inaccessible sides of the castle, which they succeeded, and their ponytail flags were set on the walls, but were eventually beaten back. After another unsuccessful attack, the sultan rested his troops. Nevertheless, a battle unfolded until midnight on the 17th after one of the towers collapsed. On

26 Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 293; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 131, 134, 136; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 573.

27 Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 292.

28 Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig*, 186-87; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 582-84, 589; Zay, *Az Lándorfehérvár*, 56; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 293.

this day, the palatine's army advanced all the way to Szávaszentdemeter (Mitrovica), but after the insignificant battle with the Bali bey, it retreated to Pétervárad (Petrovaradin) While Lajos II arrived in Tolna with his troops only on August 22²⁹! In these days of the siege, the main task of the Turks was for the miners and artillery to demolish the castle walls. On August 19, a watchtower caught fire, and on the 21st (according to the Sultan's War Diary on 20) the top of a tower collapsed. On August 24, it was reported in the Sultan's war diary that someone had escaped from the castle to the Turkish camp and brought news to them. This is also interesting because the defenders began a bargain on the capitulation on August 25 due to the catastrophic situation of the guard to gain time. The Turks did not go into ceasefire and launched another assault on Nándorfehérvár on 26 August, but the defenders defended the castle again³⁰.

On August 27, after lengthy work, the Turks blew up the residential tower of the citadel, the Nebojša Tower. In the blast, the outer wall of the residential tower collapsed, burying many under it, but the defenders were helped to create a huge barrier from the ruins. Many Turks³¹ and Hungarians also died in the fight, so a total of 72 Hungarian heroes survived.

August 28, 1521 was a fateful day for everyone. In addition to the leaders of the "diván", Suleiman also sought the advice of the beys and infantry commanders about the siege. Meanwhile, it was recorded in the Sultan's war diary that a courier sent by the defenders to Louis II, betrayed by a defender, had been captured. Eventually, the courier was pulled into a stake in front of the eyes of the people of the castle. This betrayal was a particularly sad case because of the heroism of the defenders. According to the sultan's war diary, someone escaped first on August 24 and then on the 28th. According to Zay, one of the alleged traitors, Mihály Móré, had fallen days earlier. According to Lajos Kiss, on the other hand, instead of Móré, who fell in the siege, it was János Morgay, who was appointed viceban, who betrayed the castle. According to József Thúry, they both probably betrayed the defenders. He bases his position on the war diary. It is certain that after the siege, several sources mention Mihály Móré as a traitor, who accordingly did not lose his life during the fighting³².

Either way, there is no excuse or reason for betrayal. To be sure, the courier would not have been able to help even if he had not been betrayed, as the border fortress was only hours away from falling into Turkish hands. Balázs Oláh also knew this, who with his military staff decided to give up Nándorfehérvár and surrender to Sultan Suleiman. Under the agreement, the defenders surrendered on August 29,

29 Pálosfalvi, *Nikápolytól Mohácsig*, 188; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 128, 139-40; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 569-70, 588-89.

30 Thúry, *Török*, vol. II, 141; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 140; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 295; Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 590.

31 According to Venetian envoy Orio, 8,000 Turks died. Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 595; Gusztáv Wenzel, "Marino Sanuto világkrónikájának Magyarországot illető tudósításai III", *Magyar Történelmi Tár*, 25 (1878): 239.

32 Kiss, "Nándorfehérvár", 591-92; Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 143; Thúry, *Török*, vol. I, 296-97;

1521, after 66 days of siege in exchange for free retreat. Suleiman relocated the Serb population to Constantinople. The Turks tried to be recruited the Hungarians with promises or threats, but no one was willing to do so. In the end, the Hungarians were free to leave. Although several Christian writers accused Suleiman of slaughtering the Hungarians, it is certain that several castle defenders (e.g. Miklós Káldy, Péter Ovcsárevics, Ferenc Perneszy) appear in later sources, so it is unlikely that the Turks broke their promise. Of course, it is no longer possible to know for sure in the absence of resources. On September 15, the Sultan appointed Bali bey as the sanjak bey of Szendrő and Nándorfehérvár. He placed a garrison of 3,000 men in the newly conquered castle, leaving 200 cannons left to defend it. He also ordered that the walls of Nándorfehérvár be repaired.

The news of the loss of Nándorfehérvár caused alarm in Hungary. Bálint Török and his brother Miklós, Ferenc Héderváry and István Sulyok were blamed for the loss of Nándorfehérvár, Zimony and Szalánkemén, and Balázs Sulyok for Szabács. Later, there were those who were forgiven, there were those who did not, but Nándorfehérvár was permanently lost.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE FIRST LINE OF THE SOUTHERN BORDER FORTRESS SYSTEM

As Nándorfehérvár, Zimony and Szabács coming under the rule of Sultan Suleiman in 1521, a huge gap was created in the southern border fortress system. Huge and irreparable. The worries were exacerbated by the occupation of Szávaszentdemeter, Kölpény, Berekszó (Beregsău Mare), Barics (Barič), Kamanc (Sremska Kamenica), Rednek (Vrdnik) in Syrmia, and destruction of Szalánkemén. It is true that the Turks withdrew from these smaller castles, but since then these important small castles have remained less suitable for the protection of the borderland³³.

As can be seen from the above, the loss of Nándorfehérvár radically changed the military and political situation in the country. The gaps created by the Turkish hands of the border fortress at the mouth of the Sava in the southern borderland should have been filled by the castles of Titel, Futak (Futag), Újlak (Ilok) and Pétervárad, but this was a completely impossible undertaking, as only the two wings of the border line remained in Hungarian hands. On the one hand, the area from Keve (Kovin) to Szörényvár (Drobeta-Turnu Severin), which has become inaccessible on the Danube from the interior of the country, since the centers of the pinnacles were Nándorfehérvár and Szabács in the hands of the enemy, while Szalánkemén was destroyed. On the other hand, the Croatian-Bosnian borderland between Jajca (Jajce) and Klissza (Klis) was still under Hungarian rule. This completely upset the operation of the border fortress system in the future³⁴.

In this situation, the Hungarian government wanted to consolidate the royal power, citing the Turkish threat, under the influence of Chancellor László Szalkai and probably Queen Mary. Furthermore, they wanted to ask soldiers from the German-Roman Empire, and they wanted an offensive campaign in alliance with the Poles and the Austrians, apparently with the aim of bringing Nándorfehérvár back under

33 András Kubinyi, "A Szávaszentdemeter. Nagyolaszi győzelem 1523-ban", in *Nándorfehérvártól Mohácsig A Mátyás-és Jagelló-kor hadtörténete*, ed. András Kubinyi (Budapest: Argumentum Kiadó, 2007), 128.

34 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 129.

Hungarian rule. In the end, the former gate of the country was not recaptured, nor was the power of the Transylvanian voivode János Szapolyai broken, and thus the royal power could not be significantly increased either³⁵.

In the situation of the country, it was a great fortune that Sultan Suleiman embarked on a conquest campaign against Rhodes in 1522, and after an exhausting 179-day siege, he occupied the island ruled by the Johannita order until then.

From Hungary's point of view, the consequences of the events of 1521 still determined the country's foreign and domestic policy. It has become quite clear that Hungary is unable to maintain the weakened border fortress system in the future. From then on, the aim of the Hungarian court was to try to reclaim Nándorfehérvár in order to restore the border region as we mentioned above. The steps of Hungarian diplomacy were also subordinated to this goal. Of course, this was hardly a reality in the given domestic and foreign policy situation. It follows that it is no coincidence that in 1522 Archduke Ferdinand was already actively involved in maintaining the protection of the Croatian border region. The reason for this is to be found in the fall of Nándorfehérvár, because Styria, Carinthia and Carniola have also become endangered areas. This encouraged Ferdinand to pay the mercenaries of 6,000 soldiers as early as 1522. Moreover, at the Parliament of 1522, the Hungarian orders asked the Archduke to pay for the care of the Croatian frontier castles! Thanks to this, a captain from Laibach supervised Klissa, Krupa, Zengg (Senj), Lika, Skardonna (Skradin), Knin and Ostrovica, but these border castles received also German garrison. In other words, a foreign power has taken over the protection of Hungary's territory in order to guarantee its own security! On the other hand, the support of the Austrian provinces certainly came in handy against the Ottoman Empire, which was threatening our country, because by this time it had become clear that Hungary had become unable to defend itself against its increasingly powerful southern neighbor. It follows from the above that from then on, Archduke Ferdinand was completely involved in Hungarian internal affairs in order to protect his provinces from Turkish invasions. And parts of our country began to become a kind of collision zone between the Ottoman Empire and the hereditary provinces of the Habsburgs³⁶.

At the imperial assembly in Nuremberg in the spring of 1522, the military situation between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire was revealed to the German orders again. Envoys of Archduke Ferdinand informed the orders that an Ottoman flotilla of 500 ships was stationed at Nándorfehérvár, but at Zengg also had Turkish ships. For this reason, they were asked to provide 5,000 troops to Croatia and 12,000 troops to Hungary³⁷. It was indicated that another 12,000 soldiers from Bohemia

35 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 132-33.

36 Péter E. Kovács, "Ferdinánd főherceg és Magyarország (1521-1526)", *Történelmi Szemle*, 45/1-2 (2003): 25-7; Jenő Csuday and Gyula Schönherr, *Nagy Képes Világtörténet*, vol. VI: *A középkori intézmények bomlása és a renaissance* (Büapest: Franklin Társulat-Révai Testvérek, 1904) 649-50; János B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata* (Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 2006), 53.

37 It should be noted here that due to the deterioration of the value of domestic money, German mercenaries were reluctant to come to Hungary at that time. Szakály Ferenc, *A mohácsi csata* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1975), 19.

would arrive at the Hungarian ends, which force could attack the Turks. It was suggested that after Charles V made peace with the Christian princes, he could also attack the Ottoman Empire from Naples. Imperial orders responded to Ferenc Jozefics Bishop of Zengg, envoy of King Louis II of Hungary - who also presented the sad situation of our country - that they were willing to help, but they also asked the Hungarian king, Hungarian, Czech, Moravian, Silesian, Lausitzian orders and Polish king to send envoys to the planned meeting in Vienna. The official Hungarian delegation did not attend the Congress of Vienna on May 20, 1522, although the representatives of the country were present, but the envoys of Hungary entitled to negotiate remained absent until July 5. The result was that, in addition to the hand of Emperor Charles V being bound by the war with the French, the imperial orders at that time supported a preventive anti-Turkish campaign to be launched by up to 3,000 German soldiers and 3,000 Czech mercenaries. The Congress of Vienna in 1522 was expected to make peace for the Christian rulers and send an army to recapture Nándorfehérvár³⁸ in 1523; Lajos II and the Buda court, on the other hand, wanted money³⁹ or soldiers, but he could not and did not want to pay for the latter. Thus, from the Hungarian point of view, the Vienna deliberations ended in failure, as did the new imperial assembly in Nuremberg, which opened in the autumn of 1522. Namely, on February 9, 1523, Hungary could not fulfill the conditions offered by the imperial orders in exchange for 4,000 soldiers, 20 cannon masters and 100 quintals of gunpowder. Consequently, the deliberations held in Vienna between 15 and 22 October 1523 with the participation of King Louis II, Queen Mary, Archduke Ferdinand, Archduchess Anna, the Polish Chancellor Szydłowiecki, the Czech barons and the papal envoy did not succeed. While these international events were taking place, and the Hungarian public situation so did, under the leadership of Husrev Bosnian and Bali of Szendrő – Nándorfehérvár beys, continued to occupy the remaining castles of the Hungarian border protection system. Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa made an attempt to reorganize the Hungarian defense system from 1523, after his appointment as chief captain of the lower parts, but the result could not have been significant in the given situation⁴⁰.

Despite the constant pressure from the Turks, the Hungarian army also had good results in these years. The fact that after 1521 the Turks devalued the Hungarian

38 On December 10, 1522, Pope Adorjan VI (1522-1523) issued several brevés in which he called on the Doge of Venice and encouraged other princes to support King Louis II of Hungary in his quest to reclaim Nándorfehérvár in 1523. "Magyarország mint a nyugati keresztény művelődés védőbástyája" A Vatikáni Levéltárnak azok az okiratai, melyek őseinknek a Keletről Európát fenyegető veszedelmek ellen kifejtett erőfeszítéseire vonatkoznak (cca 1214-1606), collected by Dr. Edgár Artner, eds. Kornél Szovák, József Török, and Péter Tusor (Budapest-Róma: Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem Egyháztörténeti Kutatócsoport, 2004).

39 In 1525, Louis II wanted the pope to give endangered frontier castles from the papal money at the Fuggers. Edgár Artner, "Magyarország és az Apostoli Szentszék viszonya a mohácsi vést megelőző években (1521-1526)", in *Mohácsi emlékkönyv 1526*, ed. Imre Lukinich (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1926), 82-3.

40 Kovács, "Ferdinánd", 2935; Szabó, *Mohács*, 50-1.

army may have played a role in this. During this period, they also tried to integrate Muntenia into the empire, but at least to have a voivode on the throne there that the Turks preferred. They had the opportunity to do so in 1521, when Neagoe Basarab Muntenian voivode passed away, and his son Teodosie came to power, but a battle for the throne unfolded between the candidates, in which Mehmed sanjak bey of Silistra intervened and first stood by the new voivode, but soon executed him in 1521. Then Radu (Radu de la Afumati) became the new voivode, whom Mehmed Beg defeated at Clejani in March 1522 and was chased away. Radu fled to Transylvania with his followers⁴¹.

Due to the strategic importance of Muntenia, palatine István Bátori and the Transylvanian voivode János Szapolyai took the necessary countermeasures during the king's stay in Bohemia. Szapolyai went to Transylvania in March and together with Radu tried to change the situation in Muntenia. The Transylvanian voivode led a campaign to Muntenia from July 7 to 18, 1522, and after defeating Mehmed bey at Gruzmani, Radu was restored to the throne, who was defeated in several battles from the sanjak bey of Silistra in early August and then Radu was chased away again. The voivode, which was again fleeing to Transylvania, was again assisted by Szapolyai, who defeated Mehmed bey again during his campaign from 14 October to 14 November, then Radu voivode defeated the bey at Didrih (Didrich) 50 km from Tirgoviste (Târgoviște), regaining his throne. After that, the troops of Szapolyai besieged Kisnikápoly (Turnu Măgurele) on November 1, and although the siege was unsuccessful, the Transylvanian voivode returned to Hungary with huge booty. The fact that palatine István Báthori and his troops were in Temesköz played a major role in the success of the Hungarian campaign, thus, the Turkish forces were divided⁴².

Despite the success in Muntenia, in 1522 Bali bey of Szendrő – Nándorfehérvár was able to break into the country despite the protection measures of palatine István Báthori and he besieged Pét's (Peth) castle, near Dunatölgyes (Dubova), and in early March captured Orsova (Orșova). The bey also destroyed the castles of Orsova, Pét and Miháld (Mehadia), with this, Timisoara and the Hungarian armies of the Temesköz region were permanently cut off from the Lower-Danube. The palatine also fortified Szörényvár, Titel, and Banja Luka and Jajca at the Croatian ends. This was also necessary because Knin in Croatia fell in this year while the inhabitants of Skardonna fled. At the same time, the two outstanding strengths of the Hungarian border fortress system, Klissza and Jajca, withstood the siege of the local Turkish forces in 1522.

From the Hungarian point of view, the year 1523 also brought serious but limited military successes against the Turks. The situation in Muntenia was still precarious, as the Turks again removed the Hungarian friend Radu from the throne, which is why Szapolyai proposed another campaign to reinstate him. Meanwhile, in March, Bali bey attacked Pétervárad, but was unsuccessful and retreated to Szalánkemén. In the spring of 1523, were rumors in Buda that 30,000 Turks were armed between

41 Norbert C. Tóth, "Szapolyai János erdélyi vajda török ellenes harcai (1510-1526)", in *Egy elfeledett királyi dinasztia: a Szapolyaiak*, eds. Fodor Pál and Varga Szabolcs (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 2020), 110.

42 Tóth, "Szapolyai János", 110-1.

Nándorfehérvár and Szabács, and news that Suleiman's brother-in-law Pasha Ferhad the earlier third vizier there was a more significant Turkish movement on the Hungarian border, and thousands of soldiers were pulled together. Pasha Ferhad was in the Nis (Niš) area with thousands of troops and headed for Hungary, while Klissza and Krupa also were besieged by the Turks. There became the new captain in Nándorfehérvár, but he could not take up his position, because a plague also devastated Nándorfehérvár and Szendrő, however, it was reportedly standing at the border with 15,000 troops⁴³.

At the parliament of Buda in 1523, palatine István Báthori was removed from office, but János Szapolyai remained a Transylvanian voivode, while Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa received the post of chief captain of the lower parts. The reason for this appointment was that Tomori could also use the financial resources of the Archdiocese of Kalocsa for border protection. Furthermore, Pétervárad belonged to the estate of the archdiocese of Kalocsa⁴⁴.

Tomori did everything he could to protect the part of the country entrusted to his care. This was also necessary, because after the invasion of Pétervárad in March, the Turks destroyed Valkó (Vukovar) County at the end of May, then in August, another attack was made against the country by the troops of Pasha Ferhad and Bali bey, whose number was estimated at 15,000 by contemporary sources, but was probably only 10 to 12,000⁴⁵.

Against the Turkish army, a 4,000-strong Hungarian army stood up and fought a victorious battle on August 6 or 7, 1523, at Szávaszentdemeter–Nagyolaszi (Mandelos). In the battle, both the Turks and the Hungarians suffered heavy losses, and so much has been achieved, that until 1526 the Turks did not attack the in the middle section of the southern border. As a result of the Turkish defeat, Pasha Ferhad was executed in 1523 in Drinápoly (Edirne). Despite the Hungarian victory, however, the situation did not change significantly, because in the possession of Nándorfehérvár and taking advantage of their dominance, the local forces of the Ottoman Empire were able to widen the gap that opened on the Hungarian border in 1521. Although the Hungarian leadership wanted to use a diversionary campaign to rebuild the Szalánkemén⁴⁶, which was demolished by the Turks in 1521, the Turks were also aware of the danger that the border fortress could be rebuilt into a kind of second Nándorfehérvár, so this Hungarian effort was constantly blocked⁴⁷.

In a letter to Pope Clement VII (1523-1534) dated February 4, 1524, Louis II wrote that he expected the Sultan to attack next year. and indicates that the Turks allied with the Tartars, while the princes of Europe were hostile to one another. He asked

43 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 138-40.

44 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 140, 142.

45 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 143-44.

46 At the Parliament of Rákos in 1525, the reconstruction of the said border fortress was dealt with, but finally in 1526 Sultan Suleiman rebuilt the castle of Szalánkemén. Szabó Dezső, *A magyar országgyűlések története II. Lajos korában* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, 1909), 79; Gere, "Várak a Szerémségben", 370.

47 Kubinyi, "Szávaszentdemeter", 144-45, 149.

for the support of the Holy Father to resolve this situation. Instead of the offensive expected by Suleiman in 1525, Hungary had to face the siege of Szörényvár by Bali bey twice in 1524. The second siege may have already begun in July and, after a brief struggle in August, fell into Turkish hands. The fortress at the eastern end of the border fortress system, similar to the siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1521, did not receive any help from the central government and thus it was statutory for it to fall into foreign hands. After the occupation of the castle, Bali bey also demolished this border fortress. The reason was to build Kladovo Castle on the right bank of the Danube, a more defensible place for the Ottoman Empire. In other words, a few years after the fall of Nándorfehérvár, the Turks practically abolished the first border fortress line, of which Klissza and Jajca remained to tell the tale. To feed the latter castle, in the summer of 1525, Kristóf Frangepán had to lead a real campaign. With this, he finally managed to free the border fortress under Turkish siege since April, as Pasha Husrev of Bosnia abandoned the attack on 5 June and dismantled the camp. Then, by June 11, the necessary food and munitions were brought to Jajca, but this was only a temporary solution. Just as it was a serious problem that Pétervárad⁴⁸, which became the gateway to Hungary after 1521, could not replace Nándorfehérvár. Moreover, in addition to all these problems, the fact that Louis II could not pay the mercenaries of the frontier army was a serious problem. The papal nuncio Burgio wrote of this on 10 November 1525:

Eight days ago, the delegates of Jajca, the rác (Serb) despot, some nobles and the pinnacles in the service of the Archbishop of Kalocsa were here, who served under the Archbishop of Kalocsa in the Danube Navy and complained about the great danger in which the people of Jajca in particular were. However, the king was not able to help them, and I helped them with 3,000 gold under the guarantee of the Archbishop of Esztergom⁴⁹.

The difficulty of the situation is also well illustrated by the fact that at the beginning of 1526 Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa resigned due to the lack of service pay of his soldiers. This was not the first time that Tomori wanted to resign because of the lack of service pay, the financial situation of the ends, but as in 1526, his resignation had not been accepted before. At the same time, it also shows the impossible situation in what Hungary was in between 1521 and 1526. Consequently, it is no coincidence that events took place in 1526 as they were. This is also shown by what happened in Pétervárad, which was besieged by the Grand Vizier Ibrahim. Despite the heroic resistance of the defenders led by György Alapy, the defenders, stuck in a church tower, were forced to give up the border fortress on the banks of the Danube on July 28, and Tomori could not do anything about it in the absence

48 The castle was not further strengthened after the death of Archbishop of Kalocsa, Pál Várdai, in 1501, and according to Marino Sanudo, the walls of Pétervárad were not strong. Horváth Alice, "Egy magyar humanista, Váradi Péter építkezései (16. századi építészeti központ Dél-Magyarországon)", *Művészettörténeti Értesítő*, 36/1-4 (1987): 72, 84; Gere, "Várak a Szerémségben", 376.

49 Bartoniek Emma, trans., *Mohács Magyarországa Bárá Burgio pápai követ jelentései* (Budapest: Magyar Irodalmi Társaság, 1926), 32.

of troops. As in 1521, the mobilization was bitterly slow in 1526, not even helped by the fact that the siege of Pétervárad and Újlak somewhat interrupted the Turkish advance. At the same time, not so much that all Hungarian teams get to Mohács on time. The troops of King Louis II, Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa and Imre Perényi granger of Temes were there, but the units of the Transylvanian voivode János Szapolyai were heading towards the Tisza, but the Croatian troops did not get there, just as the German imperial formations were in the area of Székesfehérvár at the time of the battle. The 25,000-strong Hungarian army, standing against the 75,000-strong army of Sultan Suleiman, was suffered a devastating defeat in Mohács. Most of the cream of the country's nobility was lost. Among them are King Louis II, Archbishop Pál Tomori of Kalocsa, judge royal János Drágffy, György Szapolyai. After the victorious battle, Suleiman marched first to Székesfehérvár and then to Buda. He finally left Hungary on October 9, taking 200,000 prisoners with him⁵⁰. Mohács could close our story with the battle of 1526, but the epilogue of the present study concludes with a symbolic defeat for the southern border fortress system. In 1527 the castle of Jajca fell. As a prelude to this, after the battle of Mohács, Ferdinand Habsburg and János Szapolyai came to the Hungarian throne, and there was a struggle to decide which of them should have the famous Bosnian border fortress. And finally, somewhere in the double royal election there may have been a kind of result that Bosnian Pasha Husrev and Bali bey occupied Jajce relatively easily from its defender István Grabrovacki, who gave up the castle he had taken care of on the tenth day of the siege. As a result, the castles of Jezero, Orbász (Orbavac), Szokol, Levács, Orovác, Perga (Peeg), Bocsác and Greben also fell into Turkish hands. The former Banovina of Jajca also became part of the Ottoman Empire, and with it the former first border fortress line was almost completely abolished, as the most important former Hungarian border forts became Ottoman fortifications. It was still left for Hungary the division of the country into three parts by a century and a half of Turkish rule. And these events, the beginning of which was on August 29, 1521, culminated in the field of Mohács exactly five years later with the fall of Nándorfehérvár, and then ended on August 29, 1541 with the fall of Buda.

50 Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár 1521", 152-53; Szakály, *Mohács*, 22; Frigyes Pesty, *A szörényi bánság és Szörény vármegye története. Első kötet*, (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, 1877), 46-8; Káldy-Nagy, *Szulejmán*, 61; Artner, *Magyarország mint*, 166; Bartoniek, *Burgio*, 32; Margit Beke "Pétervárad története a kezdetektől a XVIII. század végéig", *Magyar Sion*, 7/1 (2013): 70; Érdűhelyi Menyhért: "Pétervárad hadászati jelentősége", *A Bács-Bodrog Vármegyei Történelmi Társulat Évkönyve*, 8 (1892) 28-30; Ferenc Szakály, "A Magyar állam összeomlása", in *Nagy képes milleniumi hadtörténet 1000 év a hadak útján*, ed. Árpád Rácz (Budapest: Rubicon-Könyvek, 2008), 97-9.

ABBREVIATIONS

MNL OL: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára – Budapest

DL: Diplomatikai Levéltár

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FIGURES




Fig. 1 - The territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire 1390–1526 (Történelmi Tár)

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Fig. 2 - Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I on horseback in 1526
(British Museum - Wikipedia)




Fig. 3 - Capture of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), 1521
(Topkapi Saray Museum - Wikipedia)

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Fig. 4 - A Turkish soldier on horseback carrying slaves
 (Hans Guldenmundt, Wikipedia)



Fig. 5 - The Battle of Nándorfehérvár (Beograd), 1521 (Wikipedia)



Fig. 6 - Titian Vecellio's painting of King Louis II of Hungary
(Hungarian National Museum - Wikipedia)



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Fig. 7 - The Battle of Mohács in 1526, painting of Bertalan Székely (Hungarian National Gallery - Wikipedia)




Fig. 8 - The Ottoman conquest 1521-1541 (Történelmi Tár)



**FROM THE ARMY OF KING MATTHIAS TO THE SERVICE OF GOD¹.
A CASE STUDY ON THE ROLE OF THE APOSTOLIC PENITENTIARY IN THE PROMOTIONS OF
CLERICS IN THE TIME OF KING MATTHIAS CORVINUS**

ABSTRACT

The main character of this study is Gáspár Bak from Berend, the provost of Szepes (1464-1493). After he had fought in the army of King Matthias against the Hussites and the Ottomans, the cleric of the Diocese of Csanád decided to embrace ecclesiastic orders. The young man, who has previously studied in Vienna, Ferrara, and Bologna submitted three supplications to the *Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica*, in which he asked to be released from the obstacles preventing his ordination. He received the permission in December of 1469. After that, he was consecrated a deacon in Bologna, and three years later, when he gained the degree in canon law in Rome, he was ordained as a priest. On the basis of the materials collected in the archives in Rome, this present work makes an attempt to elaborate on the circumstances of this extremely well-documented promotion placing it in an international context.

KEYWORDS: Medieval Hungary; Matthias Corvinus; Apostolic Penitentiary; Rome; promotion of clerics.

On 30 October 1469, the *Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica* issued a charter for Gáspár Bak, the diocesan cleric of Csanád. The document describes that he had been a member of the army of King Matthias (1458-1490) in the victorious Battle of Jajce (1463/64), and then he participated in the campaign against the Hussites as the scrivener of the captain who led the contingents. These campaigns demanded many lives and because Gáspár was actively involved in the fights, he applied for and received the approval by the highest grace-conveying office of the Catholic Church to be disposed of the obstacles to receive holy orders as he wished to receive such orders². In this study, the focus will not be on the successful and rather well known fights in Bosnia³, neither on the military manoeuvres against the Hussites

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2 See the second charter in the Appendix.

3 Attila Bárány, János B. Szabó and László Veszprémy, "A késő középkor hadtörténete (1387–1490)", in *Magyarország hadtörténete I. A kezdetektől 1526-ig*, ed. László Veszprémy (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2017), 274, 279; Lajos Thallóczy, *Jajca (bánság, vár és város) története* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1915), LXXXIII-CXIV;

in Upper Hungary⁴, but on one segment of the church career of the Gáspár Bak, specifically the circumstances of his promotion.

GÁSPÁR BAK FROM BEREND

Although researchers studying the late Middle Ages and the history of Szepes County (also known as Spis or Zips in Slovakia) have been interested in the subject of this study since the 18th century, we have rather few pieces of information about Gáspár's life⁵. He was first mentioned in the sources in November 1447, when the family estate in Temes county (also known as Timiș, in Romania) was divided among his mother, Krisztina Papdi, and his paternal relatives. The charter that was issued by the *locus credibilis* in the chapter of Csanád mentions his father, János Bak from Berend (*dictus*) and his brother, Boldizsár⁶. His father, who came from Berend⁷ located in the County of Szatmár can be seen as the *familiaris* of Governor János Hunyadi since 1446⁸. After their marriage, the parents of Gáspár, who had noble roots on both sides (*nobilis ex utroque parente procreates*)⁹, lived on the estates that was a maternal inheritance. It is supported by the fact that later he consistently called himself as a diocesan cleric of Csanád¹⁰. The next information

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Péter E. Kovács, "Jajca 1464. évi ostroma", in *Az értelem bátorsága. Tanulmányok Perjés Géza emlékére*, ed. Gábor Hausner (Budapest: Argumentum, 2005), 403-18. On the castle's integration into the Hungarian border defence system and on its role see Richárd Horváth, "The Castle of Jajce in the Organization of the Hungarian Border Defence System under Matthias Corvinus", in *Stjepan Tomašević (1461-1463) – slom srednjovjekovnoga Bosanskog Kraljevstva*, ed. Ante Birin (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest Katolički bogoslovni fakultet u Sarajevu, 2013), 89-98.

- 4 In general on this see Pál Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita mozgalmak és uralom története Magyarországon* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1917).
- 5 Hungarian and Slovakian historians have written about his life. The basis of our knowledge is still served by the source collection of Károly Wagner (Carolus Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii sacri et profani pars I-IV*, Viennae-Posonii-Cassoviae 1774-1778), and then by the monograph of Márton Pirhalla (*A szepesi prépostság vázlatos története kezdetétől a püspökség felállításáig*, Lőcse: Szepesmegyei Történelmi Társulat, 1899), who mainly relied on the former's work.
- 6 MNL OL DL 14125, 8 November, 1447
- 7 On the localization of the town, see Péter Németh, *A középkori Szatmár megye települései a XV. század elejéig* (Nyíregyháza: Jósza András Múzeum, 2008), 30, n. 50.
- 8 15 August, 1446: «propria domini gubernatoris referenete Johanne Bak de Berend»: MNL OL DF 231223; the agreement that was reached by János Hunyadi and György Brankovics (Đurađ Branković) in front of Palatine László Garai in the castle of Szendrő on 8 August, 1451, which was supposed to be confirmed by the marriage of Mátyás Hunyadi and Erzsébet Villei, was guaranteed by the oath of two vassals on behalf of the governor: «coram nobis presentibus etiam et audentibus egregiis Ladislao de Orbowa et Johanne Bak de Berend familiaribus dicti domini Gubernatoris corporale prestitit iuramentum»: MNL OL DL 37614.
- 9 AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 684, fol. 122r.
- 10 APA, Reg. Suppl., vol. 17, fol. 124r, 147v; see in the Appendix of this paper n. 13. Namely,

on him is from April 1456, when he was registered as the student of the *artes* faculty of the university of Vienna¹¹. If we accept the generally held view that in the Middle Ages the students pursued their studies in the given faculty from the age of 13-14 on an average¹², Gáspár could have been born around 1442/1443. This means that he might have been the same age as Matthias Hunyadi (Corvinus), the later king of Hungary¹³. Based on the aforementioned relationship of their fathers, we can assume that they had known each other from a young age. After this reference, Gáspár disappears from the sources for years, therefore we cannot be sure whether he finished his studies in Vienna, or not, which we will discuss in more detail later. The next known episode of his life is related to the above-mentioned Hungarian-Ottoman battle. According to his own account, he served in the artillery during the siege, where the monarch entrusted him with monitoring the gunpowder for the *spingardas*¹⁴ and other weapons and tools (*ingenia*)¹⁵. The siege was in late autumn of 1463, though, it is possible that Gáspár still served in the castle during the unsuccessful Ottoman counter-attack in the following year¹⁶. In the supplication we have been discussing, he mentions another campaign, which was against the Czech heretics (*Boemos hereticos*), and during which he was the scrivener of the royal army's captain¹⁷. It is known that the monarch and his captains led numerous campaigns against several companies of mostly Czech (unemployed) mercenaries who caused many troubles and skirmishes in the northern part of the country from the 1460s¹⁸. Gáspár might have hinted at the campaign in 1465¹⁹, though it is also possible that a previous campaign is discussed there. We can also identify the mentioned captain. As the marauding mercenaries looting in the region required special attention, the members of the Upper Hungarian headquarter had an important role in the maintenance of the territory's public order. The

Berend belonged to the diocese of Transylvania, more precisely to the *archidiaconatus* of Ugocsa. Németh, *A középkori Szatmár*, (see note 6), 30, n. 50.

- 11 He was registered twice with different names: "Caspar Bak de Berend" and "Caspar Wakk de Werind". He might have supported the studies of his brother, Boldizsár, moved to Vienna later. Anna Tüskés, *Magyarországi diákok a bécsi egyetemen 1365-1526* (Budapest: Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Levéltára, 2008), 200, n. 3883 and 3886.
- 12 Tamás Fedeles, István Lengvári, Éva Pohánka, et al., *Centuries of Higher Education in Pécs*, (Pécs: University of Pécs, 2017), 13.
- 13 Born in February, 1443. András Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex* (Budapest: Balassi, 2008), 7.
- 14 Originally battering-ram; however, in this case a mortar. Cf. *Gran dizionario teorico-militare contente le definizioni di tutti i termini tecnici spettanti all'arte della guerra [...]*, (Italia, 1847), 684.
- 15 Charter 2 in the Appendix.
- 16 Thallóczy, *Jajca*, LXXXIII-CXIV.
- 17 Charter 2 in the Appendix.
- 18 Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszinga mozgalmak*; Richárd Horváth, "A Felső Részek kapitánysága a Mátyás korban", *Századok*, 137 (2003): 929-54.
- 19 Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszinga mozgalmak*, 329.

mentioned office was held by the Szapolyai brothers during the examined period, who built up their main estate in the Szepes, which was bordering the threatened parts. Imre Szapolyai was in Buda most of the time between 1460 and 1465 as a treasurer, while from 1464 he was mostly in the South due to his title of the ban of Slavonia. As a result, practically his brother István controlled the threatened regions and attended to the duties of the captain on and off between 1460 and 1465. Yet, there are references given that in 1465, Imre himself led a campaign against the Czech looters²⁰. After this successful operation – in which the monarch personally participated, as we saw – Matthias appointed Imre as the hereditary bailiff of Szepes²¹. As a consequence, Imre Szapolyai was likely to be the unnamed *capitaneus* in the charter. Nevertheless, Gáspár must have been on good terms with both Szapolyai brothers, since he became the head of the canonical community of the Saint Martin collegiate church of Szepeshely (Spišská Kapitula in Slovakia), which was under the authority of the Szapolyai family and was their burial place²². Matthias appointed Gáspár as the provost of Szepes in 1464 presumably after his coronation on 29 March but before 20 August. Unfortunately, the royal diploma did not survive, yet, the royal endowment's fact is proven by the charter of Cardinal Dénes Szécsi, the archbishop of Esztergom, which was addressed to Gáspár and confirmed the endowment and ordered the inauguration²³. Consequently, from late summer of 1464, Gáspár Bak from Berend worked as the provost of the collegiate chapter of Szepes²⁴.

20 Horváth, "A Felső Részek", 941, 943, 953-54.

21 Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. I, 145-47.; Tibor Neumann, "A Szapolyai család legrégebbi címere", *Turul*, 84/4 (2011): 123-28, here: 125.

22 On the role of the church in the devotion of the family, see Tamás Fedeles, "E földi hazát örök és mennyei palotával elcserélni". Szempontok a késő középkori főúri vallásosság vizsgálatához", in *Mesterek és Tanítványok. Tanulmányok a bölcsészettudományok területéről*, eds. Gábor Böhm and Tamás Fedeles (Pécs: PTE BTK Kari Tudományos Diákköri Tanács, 2014), 54-80, here: 61, 72-3.

23 20 August 1464: «[...] presentationem serenissimi principi et domini nostri Mathie regis Hungarie etc. de te nobis factas, de quibus quidem nominatione et presentatione nobis per litteras eiusdem domini Mathie regis per te nobis in specie exhibitas, legitime constituit in prefatam preposituram s. Martini de dicta Scepus, autoritate nostra ordinaria instituimus, confirmamus per presentes [...]», MNL OL DF 249 045. Its publication: C. Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. I, 340-41.

24 On his provostship, see Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. III, 69-72; Pirhalla, *A szepesi prépostság*, 101; Márta Török, *Az egyházi középréteg mobilitása a szepesi káptalanban* (PhD diss., University of Loránd Eötvös-Budapest, 2011) 164; Peter Labanc, "Spišskí prepošti 1301-1511", in *Z dejín Spišského prepoštstva. Zborník z medzinárodnej konferencie pri príležitosti 800. výročia prvej známej písomnej zmienky o Spišskom prepoštstve*, ed. Luboslav Hromják, (Spišské Podhradie: Nadácia Kónazského seminára biskupa Jána Vojaššáka, 2010), 564-65, 565; Peter Labanc and Miroslav Glejtek, *Spišské prepoštvo na prelome stredoveku a novoveku* (Trnave: Filozofická fakulta Trnavskej univerzity, 2015) 36-8; Norbert C. Tóth, *Magyarország késő középkori főpapi archontológiája. Érsekek, püspökök, illetve segédpüspökeik, vikáriusai és jövedelemkezelőik az 1440-es évektől 1526-ig* (Győr: Győri Egyházmegyei Levéltár, 2017), 142.

THE THREE SUPPLICATIONS

Concerning his church career, it could be stated in advanced that by obtaining the provostship of Szepes he became a member of the middle class of the church hierarchy that consisted of several hundreds of people, moreover, he gained access to the higher ranks of this class. According to the sources, he abandoned the battlefield for good after this promotion, and, according to Wagner, he «bound his soul to the sacred service»²⁵. This reinforces the fact that Gáspár served the Almighty at the altar by embracing holy orders. At the time, administering holy orders had multiple degrees, out of which the first four were the so-called minor ones (*minors*), the next three belonged to the sacred orders' group (*sacri ordines*), and then the episcopal order ended the line²⁶. We have already mentioned above that Gáspár is referred to in many sources as the cleric of Csanád, which certainly indicates that he must have received the first tonsure (*prima tonsura*) earlier, which was a visual sign – the crown of the head was shaved off in a circular shape – of being a member of the clergy. Nevertheless, it did not automatically mean that one could not return to secular life; celibacy was obligatory only after the consecration as a sub-deacon. However, Gáspár – noticeably after a longer period of contemplation – decided to dedicate his life to God permanently. Five years after obtaining the dignity of the provost, he decided to receive the higher orders. His supplications (*supplicationes*) lodged to the *Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica* report about this²⁷. He sent altogether three supplications to Rome to request the permission of consecration. Chronologically, the first supplication was documented on 28 March 1469 by the notaries of the office, in which he requested the permission to receive holy orders (*ad omnes ordines promoveri*) from the bishop of Ferrara, since he was studying in that Italian town (*Ferrariensis causa studii commorans*)²⁸. Seven months later, Philippus Calandrini, cardinal grand penitentiary received another

25 «animum ad sacrum militiam adiecit»: Wagner, *Analecta Scephusii*, vol. III, 69.

26 In more detail with further literature see Kirsi Salonen, Jussi Hanska, *Entering a Clerical Career at the Roman Curia, 1458-1471* (London-New York: Routledge, 2016), 6-8.

27 On the function of the office, see Emil Göller, *Die päpstliche Pönitentie von ihrem Ursprung bis zu ihrer Umgestaltung unter Pius V* (Rom: Verlag von Loescher & Co., 1907-1911); Filippo Tamburini, *Santi e peccatori. Confessioni e suppliche dai Registri della penitenzieria dell'Archivio Segreto Vaticano (1451-1586)* (Milano: Istituto di Propaganda Libreria, 1995); Ludwig Schmugge, Patrik Hersperger and Beatrice Wiggerhauser, *Die Supplikenregister der päpstlichen Pönitentie aus der Zeit Pius' II (1458-1464)* (Tübingen: De Gruyter, 1996); Kirsi Salonen and Ludwig Schmugge, *A sip from the "Well of Grace". Medieval texts from the Apostolic Penitentiary* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009); Gabriella Erdélyi, "A Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica hivatala és magyar kérvényei a 15-16. században", *Levéltári Közlemények*, 74/1-2 (2003): 33-57 and 76, n. 1 (2005): 63-103.

28 APA, Reg. Suppl., vol. 17, fol. 147v. Former literature does not speak about his studies in Ferrara. Cf. Endre Veress, *Olasz egyetemeken járt magyarországi tanulók anyakönyve és iratai 1221-1864* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1941), passim; Stanisław Sroka, "Il Diploma di Dottorato di Kasper Back (Università di Bologna, anno 1472)", *Annali di storia delle università Italiane*, 16 (2012): 267-74.

supplication of his²⁹. Luckily, in this case not only the abstract kept in the register book³⁰ survived, but the original charter too, which covered both the request and the permission. It can be found in the Private Archives of the Chapter of Szepes.³¹ It appears from this document that he wanted to receive holy orders as the student of the university of Bologna, and since he lived in Bologna at the time (*quia universitate Bononiensis causa studii ad presens moram trahis*) he could not reach his ordinary due to the distance between them (*propter distantiam loci*), therefore he wanted to be consecrated in the Northern Italian town.

Obviously, this was not a unique case, since there are numerous similar requests known from that period, including several ones related to Hungarians. According to canon law, the clerics could receive the orders only from their own diocesan bishops. However, those who wanted to be consecrated somewhere else had two legally acceptable options: they could ask for a written permission (*littera dimissoria, dimissorialia*) from their ordinary, or they could appeal to the offices, chancery, or chamber of the Roman Curia, as well as to the Penitentiary³². Numerous clerics who wanted to enjoy their church benefice (*fructus percipere*) during their studies requested for dispensation by the latter body. And besides that, they usually wished to postpone their consecration until the end of their studies (*non promoveri*)³³. It was a general practice that the foreign clerics studying at the university of Padua and Bologna,³⁴ as well as at other Italian and European universities received

29 Philippus Calandrini [†1476] the bishop of Bologna (1447-1476), the cardinal priest of the s. Susannae's church (1448-1451), and of the s. Laurentii in Lucina's church (1451-1476), and then of the cardinal bishop of Albano (1468-1471) and Porto (1471-1476). He held the office of the grand penitentiary between 1458 and 1476. Cf. *Hierarchia Catholica medii et recentioris aevi, sive Summorum Pontificum, S.R.E. Cardinalium, ecclesiarum Antistitum series I-VIII*, eds. Guilelmus Van Gulik, Conradus Eubel, Patricius Gauchat, et al. (Monasterii-Patavii: Sumptibus et typis librariae Regensbergianae, 1913-1978), II, 11, 59, 60, 63, 108; Schmugge et al., *Die Supplikenregister*, 12.

30 APA, Reg. Suppl., vol. 17, fol. 124r.

31 The text of the charter is published in the Appendix (Charter 1).

32 Salonen and Hanska, *Entering a Clerical Career*, 28-30.

33 Schmugge et al., *Die Supplikenregister*, 173; Kirsi Salonen, "Zur Kommunikation zwischen der Pönitentie und der Provinz von Uppsala", in *The Roman Curia, the Apostolic Penitentiary and the Partes in the Later Middle Ages*, eds. Kirsi Salonen and Christian Krötzel (Roma: Foundation Institutum Romanum Finlandiae, 2003), 23-31.

34 Paolo Sambin, "Chierici ordinati a Padova alla fine del Trecento", *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia*, 2 (1948): 388; Paolo Sambin, "Altri chierici ordinati a Padova nella seconda metà del sec. XIV", *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia*, 6 (1952): 386; Andreas Rehberg, "Deutsche Weihekandidaten in Rom am Vorabend der Reformation", in *Kurie und Region. Festschrift Brigide Schwarz zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. Brigitte Flug, Michael Matheus and Andreas Rehberg, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005): 289; Andreas Rehberg, "L'affluenza di ordinandi a Roma alla vigilia della riforma luterana", in *La papauté à la Renaissance*, eds. Florence Alazard and Frank la Brasca (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2007): 167-249; Ludwig Schmugge, "Zum römischen 'Weiherismus' unter Papst Alexander VI. (1492-1503)", in *Europa e Italia. Studi in onore di Giorgio Chittolini*, eds. Paola Guglielmotti, Isabella Lazzarini and Gian Maria Varanini,

the various degrees of holy orders in the town of their education³⁵. Two peers of Gáspár in Bologna, Miklós Stolcz, the bishop of Várad (1470-1473)³⁶ and Balázs Pozsegavári³⁷ from the diocese of Pécs also lodged similar requests to the *Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica*. In his request, Pozsegavári referred to the fact (besides the basic reason of him staying in Bologna) that there was no bishop in Pécs at the time³⁸. Miklós Alattyáni, the canon of Bács who studied in Padua, also wished to be consecrated on the location of his studies due to the great distance (*propter longam distantiam*)³⁹.

Gáspár continued his studies which he had started in Vienna in Italy after his appointment as a provost in 1464. According to his first request, at first he had been in Ferrara, and then he studied canon law in Bologna, which town was popular among the Hungarian students. Consequently, we assume that he had finished his *artes* studies in Vienna earlier. However, we do not know for certain the starting date of his Italian studies. Yet, it is likely that he arrived there sometime between 1465 and 1466 due to the fact that he passed his doctoral exam in July 1472⁴⁰. On the basis of the available data, we can assume that he spent the first three years in the

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(Firenze: University Press, 2011), 421. Some contemporary German requests to the *Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica*: RPG, vol. V, n. 3834, 3915; RPG, vol. VI, nn. 2080, 6684.

35 Bertalan Jakabfi from the archdiocese of Esztergom studied in Krakow; he asked his consecration in Krakow due to “propter distantiam” (1476). APA, Reg. Suppl., vol. 24, fol. 192r.

36 «Nicolaus electus et confirmatus Varadiensis subdiaconus cupit promovere, sed quia in civitate Bononiensis studet et per aliquamdiu studere incendit, quatenus petit licentia, ut ab episcopo Bononiensis vel eius vicariis dictos ordines recipere possit»: APA, Reg. Suppl., vol. 20, fol. 272r. See N. C. Tóth, *Magyarország késő középkori*, 109.

37 According to the supplication register of the office, on 26 November, 1472 as the diocesan of Aquileia he requested to receive the minor orders from the bishop of Bologna. RPG, vol. VI, n. 6479.

38 In the charter issued by the grand penitentiary: «sed quia de presenti Bononie causa studenti moram trahis, ac etiam quia ecclesia Quinqueecclesiensis ad presens caret pastore»: Celestino Piana, *Nuove ricerche su le Università di Bologna e Parma* (Quaracchi. Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1966), 482. The bishoprics was vacant between 27 July, 1472 and 8 January, 1473. Cf. Tóth, *Magyarország késő középkori*, 90. After completing the studies of canon law, Balázs obtained a prebendal benefice in the cathedral chapter of Pécs (1473-1478), and he also administered the duties of the vicar general in 1473. Cf. Tamás Fedeles, *Die personelle Zusammensetzung des Domkapitels zu Fünfkirchen im Spätmittelalter (1354-1526)* (Regensburg: Verlag Ungarisches Institut, 2012), 311, n. 20.; Tóth, *Magyarország késő középkori*, 90.

39 «ab ipso Paduano vel aliquo episcopo in civitate Paduani de ipsius licentia sacros ordines celebravit»: APA, Reg. Suppl., vol. 24, fol. 79v.

40 The original parchment charter issued on his doctorate in canon law survived in the Private Archives of the Chapter of Szepes. It was published: Sroka, “Il Diploma di Dottorato”. All this harmonizes with the data of a charter of Szepes from 1478, in which the following can be read: «de consilio capituli, quia ivenis homo erat, ad studium iuris canonici Boniam recepit». Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. I, 348; MNL OL DF, 272, 799.

studium generale at Ferrara, and after having earned his *baccalaureatus* he changed institution. This assumption is further supported by the date of his two above-mentioned requests. In Bologna, his peers were – among others – Tamás Bakócz, future archbishop of Esztergom, Péter Váradi, future archbishop of Kalocsa, László Szokoli, the bishop of Csanád⁴¹, and the above-mentioned Miklós Stolcz and Balázs Pozsegavári.

Besides the supplications we have already discussed, there is a third supplication that survived⁴², which we can find in the charter of the grand penitentiary Philip as a transcript dated 30 October 1469⁴³. While the transcription of this diploma is among those few *in partibus* survived supplications⁴⁴ – similarly to the one dated three days earlier – that were issued for the Hungarian clients of the Penitentiary, it also includes further details about the younger days of the provost of Szepes. Specifically, his role in the campaign of Jajca and Upper Hungary is depicted therein, during which many were killed and slaughtered (*multa homicidia, plurimeque mutilationes fuerunt*). According to the contemporary canon law, these were such offences (*delictus*) that caused irregularity (*irregularitas*) and incapacity (*inhabilitas*), therefore an obstacle to the consecration, which could only be absolved by the offices of the Curia Romana, including the Penitentiary (*absolutio, dispensatio*)⁴⁵. In the charter issued for Gáspár, the grand penitentiary confirmed that there is no blood on the provost's hand, meaning he had not killed any enemies (*exponens neminem interfecerit aut mutilaverit*) during the two military actions; therefore, his requested promotion had no obstacles (*non obstantibus dicto clericali caractere uti, et ad prefatos ordines promoveri*). Although, we have no direct data, but it can be assumed that he personally handed in his requests in Rome, considering his long Italian stay.

41 Veress, *Olasz egyetemeken*, 47-52.

42 APA, Reg. Suppl., vol. 17, fol. 255v-256r.

43 Charter 2 in the Appendix.

44 It is a general tendency that the charters issued by the office perished in great proportion in the local source-material, primarily due to their personal nature. Mainly those documents survived that were addressed to the local ordinaries or their vicars. Cf. Salonen, "Zur Kommunikation", 24.

45 Salonen and Schmutge, *A sip from the "Well of Grace"*, 30-1. On 30 December, 1531 Gratiani de Rothon filed a request, in which he narrated that as a young man he took part in the Italian war of Francis I, French monarch; moreover along with the king he fell into captivity of the emperor during the siege of Pavia (1525). At that time he pledged a vow that in case of being released he would enter the service of the Church (*si ab inimicis salvus evaderet homo ecclesiasticus et presbiter efficeretur [...] Deo vovit*). Thereafter, he returned home, where while he had a clash with thieves, he killed many of them. Yet, at the age of 25 he had the papal legate of Avignon ordained him as a priest; thereupon he celebrated masses and administered other liturgical acts. As he had not asked for absolution from his previous sins before his consecration, he drew excommunication upon himself, and therefore asked for absolution only later (*ab excommunicationis suspensionis et interdicti absolvi hac vice*). Tamburini, *Santi e peccatori*, 265-66, n. 66.

“AD SACRUM SUBDIACONATUS ORDINEM [...] PROMOVIT ET ORDINAVIT”

In the survived requests of Gáspár Bak from Berend, he wished to receive all the degrees of the sacrament of holy orders – according to the general formulas (*ex magno devotionis fervore cupit ad omnes etiam sacros ordines promoveri*) – by referring to his deep piety and that he wished to serve God permanently (*perpetuo Domino famulari*). His first step was to show the charter issued on 30 October 1469 to the vicar of the bishop of Bologna, who carefully examined the document (*diligentius interrogavimus et examinavimus*). Alexander de Longaris from Perugia, who was a canon of Bologna, had great experience in such “routine cases”, since on the one hand, he had a degree in canon and civil law, and on the other hand, he had headed the office for almost a decade⁴⁶. The harmonic collaboration between the episcopal curia of Bologna and the Penitentiary was guaranteed by the fact that at the time the bishop was Cardinal Calandrini, who also happened to be the grand penitentiary (1447-1476)⁴⁷. Since the vicar had been convinced that the charter’s contents were true (*supra premise facta invenimus contenta in dictis preinsertis litteras vera esse*), he permitted the ordination. A notarial document was issued about this on 13 December, which also included the transcript of the charter of the grand penitentiary⁴⁸.

To be able to receive certain degrees of the sacrament of holy orders, one had to meet various requirements. In addition to the requirement of a legitimate birth, the minimum age for each category was also laid down. The physical health, morals, and theoretical knowledge of the candidates were also verified by examination prior to ordination. Apart from the above mentioned criteria, to receive the *subdiaconatus*, which was the lowest stage of the higher orders, proof had to be presented about sufficient income or funds (*titulus patrimonii, titulus ecclesiasticus*)⁴⁹. In compliance with the general practice, the examination of the suitability of the candidates, like that of Gáspár’s, took place in the episcopal curia of Bologna in the last couple of days preceding the consecration. As Gáspár was a university student, his theoretical preparedness was beyond doubt, he must have had a good command of Latin, and as he had received the smaller orders presumably in Hungary (*in minoribus ordinibus legitime constitutum*)⁵⁰, he knew the catechism, so he could pray the Divine Office. Eventually, Gáspár proved to be suitable in every respect (*repertum ydoneum et sufficientem*) after a thorough examination, and owing to his provostship he had an

46 He discharged the duties of the vicar general between 23 January, 1460 and 23 September, 1497. Celestino Piana, Cesare Cenci, *Promozioni agli ordini sacri a Bologna e alle dignità ecclesiastiche nel Veneto sei secoli XIV-XV* (Quaracchi: Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 1968), 144 note 1, and 229.

47 See note 28.

48 Charter 2 in the Appendix.

49 Willibald Plöchl, *Geschichte des Kirchenrechts*, vol. 2: *Das Kirchenrecht der abendländischen Christenheit 1055 bis 1517* (Wien-München: Herold, 1962), 302-03.

50 The following were the four minor orders (*quatuor minores*): *hostiarius, lector, exorcista, acolitus*. Cf. *Ordinationum documenta pontificia de Regnis Sacrae Coronae Hungariae (1426–1523). Ex Libris Formatarum Cemeræ Apostolicæ*, edendo operi praeftit Tamás Fedeles (Budapest–Róma: Gondolat, 2021), XIV-XVI.

income that provided sufficient income for his living expenses, which meant that there were no obstacles to his consecration.

He was promoted in the Saint Peter Cathedral of Bologna on 23 December 1469. The event, in which many other candidates were consecrated as well (*generales clericorum ordinationes sollemniter celebrans*), took place on a Saturday, the last day of the ember days of Advent. The high mass was celebrated by the Dominican Matheus de Pontremulo, who was the titular bishop of Tanis and the first *suffraganeus* of the *ordinarius* of Bologna⁵¹. He consecrated the candidates. Although the provost of Szepes wished to receive the sacrament of holy orders, the auxiliary bishop of Bologna only promoted him as a sub-deacon at that time (*ad sacrum subdiaconatus ordinem rite et sollemniter promovit et ordinavit*). After the promotion, a notarial document (*littera testimonialis, littera ordinum, littera formata, formata*) was issued for Gáspár, which officially confirmed the reception of his *subdiaconatus*.

IN THE ETERNAL CITY

Gáspár, after becoming a sub-deacon, continued his studies in law at the centre of the contemporary legal education, in the well-established *studium generale* of Bologna. As we have already mentioned, he finished his studies by obtaining the doctoral degree in canon law in the summer of 1472. The capitular charter that was issued six years later informs us that after his doctoral exam, he travelled to the Roman Curia, where he stayed for long⁵². During his stay in Rome, apart from completing the “obligatory” pilgrimages, he had the chance to take care of other personal and official affairs. Based on available data, it seems that he was ordained in the *Urbs Aeterna*, however there is not any *littera formata* survived on the event⁵³. We can deduce this from a document dated October 1478, which (based on

51 On 20 April, 1464 he received papal provision. *Hierarchia Catholica*, II, 245, note 2. On his person, see Pietro Bologna, “I vescovi appartenenti a famiglie di Pontremoli e del suo territorio”, *Atti e memorie della R. Deputazione di storia patria per le provincia Modenesi*, V/3 (1904): 38-42.

52 «ad dignitatem doctoratus iuris canonici promotus, demum inde secessit ad Curiam Romanam [...] in eadem Curia Romana per certa tempora residens»: Wagner, *Analecta Scephusii* (see note 4), I, 348; MNL OL DF, 272 799.

53 From the 15th century, the *Camera Apostolica* organized the foreigners’ consecration in the Curia, and at the same time documented the basic information (the time and place of consecration, name, benefice, diocese) of the promotions. The data – containing larger and smaller hiatuses – relating to the promotions were registered in the volumes of the *Libri Formatarum*. Cf. AAV, Camera Apostolica, *Libri Formatarum*, vol. 1-14. On the description of the volumes, see Ludwig Schmitz(-Kallenberg), “Die Libri Formatarum der Camera Apostolica”, *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und für Kirchengeschichte*, 8 (1894): 451-72. On the basic literature relating to the series, and on the short outline of the Hungarian related notes, see Tamás Fedeles, “A magyar medieviztika egy kevésbé ismert forrása. A Libri formatarum és bejegyzései”, in *Laborator Assiduus. A 70 éves Zombori István köszöntése*, eds. Ádám Somorjai and Gabi Somorjai (Budapest: MTA BTK Történettudományi Intézet, Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár

the personal account of Gáspár) reports that he celebrated his first mass (*primicia*) in Rome on Martyr Crispin's day, 25 October 1472⁵⁴. Unfortunately, in the lack of further data, we do not know when, where and from whom he received the order of the deacon, and then of the presbyter⁵⁵. During his stay in Rome, he also had the opportunity to deal with the affairs of the provostship of Szepes. One of Gáspár's request, which he likely presented himself, was registered in one of the Apostolic Chancery's request registers with the date of 21 November 1472. In this request, by referring to old tradition, he asked that he and the other provosts of Szepes coming after him be allowed to wear the pontifical insignia⁵⁶. Pope Sixtus IV (1471-1484) approved his request in his bull dated on the same day⁵⁷.

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As the good shepherd he was, he primarily focused on the prebendal community of Szepes and the congregation under his authority after returning home from the Eternal City. With the help of the contributions of the members of the chapter, the cleric of the district, and of the congregation he had the provostship's church refurnished, the windows and the roof renovated. The restored Gothic church was consecrated by László Sirokai, the auxiliary bishop of Eger on 10 October 1478⁵⁸. In his last will, he established a foundation for perpetual Masses in Szepeshely

Országos Levéltár: 2019), 149-66.

54 «ibique [sc. in Curia Romana – T. F.] primam missam suam in eadem Urbe in die ss. Crispini et Crispiani martyrum feliciter celebravit»: Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. I, 348-49.; MNL OL DF, 272 799.

55 The *Libri Formatarum* contains only one date relating to Hungary from 1472. Iacobus Iacobi Vrtel de Cydino, the diocesan of Esztergom, was made a deacon on the occasion of the general consecration in the sacristy of the Roman St. Peter's Basilica by Jacob, the bishop of Lombardy on 14 March, and two weeks later he was ordained in the Basilica's Our Lady of the Column Chapel. AAV, Cam. Ap., Libri Format., vol. 6. fol. 34r, 39v. Its publication: *Camera apostolica 1 (Libri formatarum 1425-1524)*, ad edendum preparavit Vladimír Rábik (Trnavae-Romae: Slovenský historický ústav v Ríme pri Trnavskej univerzite v Trnave, 2014), n. 42-3, and *Ordinationum documenta pontifical* (see note 26) n. 167-68.

56 «[...] ecclesiam sancti Martini in comitatu Scepusiensi, Strigoniensis diocesis, olim cathedralem fuisse et adhuc inter alia ipsi ecclesia iocalia conservet mitra et baculus pastoralis ipsiusque ecclesie prepositus pro temore existens de antiqua est consuetudine [...] in prefata ecclesia et ex eam in quibuscunque locis in quibus iurisdictionis predicta uti consuevit, mitra etiam aurifrigata seu margaritis et lapidibus pretiosis decorata, ac baculo pastoralibus quotiens sibi placuerit uti et populo etiam solemniter benedicere [...] ubique locorum rochetum gestare libere et licite valeat concedere dignemini de gratia speciali [...]»: AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 684, fol. 122r.

57 Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. I, 344-47.

58 Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. I, 344-47.

to advance his own and his parents' salvation (*pro refrigerio salutis anime sue et parentum suorum*). He left two vineyards and 800 forints to the chapter. In return the canons ensured the celebration of the daily masses. Honouring his last will, he was laid to rest in front of the Magi's Altar in Saint Martin church. Masses were celebrated there in honour of the Holy Trinity on Sundays, for sins committed on Thursdays, in memory of the Passion of the Lord on Fridays, and in honour of the Blessed Virgin on Saturdays, and requiems were prayed on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays⁵⁹. According to the epitaph of Gáspár Bak from Berend, the provost of Szepes, he was gathered to his God Almighty on 5 June 1493⁶⁰.

59 The testament is contained in the charter issued by the chapter on 9 June 1493. At that time Gáspár had already been deceased. We can read the following in the document: «quod cum *nuper* reverendus *quondam* dominus Caspar Bak, decretorum doctor, prelatus et prepositus dicte ecclesie nostre»: MNL OL DF 272 804 [it is highlighted by – T. F.]

60 The text of his old epitaph (which has been lost in the sands of time) had been written down by Károly Wagner: «Hic iacet dominus Gaspar Bak de Berenth praepositus huius ecclesiae Scepusiensis. Obiit V. die Iunii Anno Domini MCCCCXCIII»: Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii*, vol. II, 339.

APPENDIX

1.

Rome, 27 October, 1469.

Due to the great distance from his own ordinary, Philip, the cardinal bishop of Albano and grand penitentiary allows Gáspár Bak, the provost of Szepes, to receive holy orders in the town of his studies, in Bologna, if he proves to be suitable and has satisfactory benefices.

(The original: Slovakia, Spišský Archív, Private Archives of the Chapter of Szepes, Part I. /U 757 11 1 10/, its copy: MNL OL DF 272 729)

Philippus, miseratione divina episcopus Albanensis, dilecto in Christo Caspari Back, clerico Cenadiensis diocesis salutem in Domino. Ex parte tua fuit coram nobis propositum, quod tua ex magno devotionis fervore cupit ad omnes etiam sacros ordines promoveri, et in eis perpetuo Domino famulari, sed quia universitate Bononiensis causa studii ad presens moram trahis, et in futurum ad tempus trahere intendis, et ad ordinarium tuum prosu sapiendis huiusmodi ordinibus propter distantiam loci commode adire non potes, quare supplicari fecisti humiliter tibi super hiis per Sedem Apostolicam misericorditer provideri. Nos igitur tuus in hac parte supplicationibus inclinatu auctoritate domini pape cuius penitentie etiam gerimus, et de eius specialiter mandato super hoc vive vocis oraculo nobis facto, ut a vicario in pontificalibus nostro vel suffraganeibus ecclesie nostre Bononiensis catholico iam et communionem dicte sedis habente ad dictos ordines duntamen aliis idoneus et sufficiens existas, secundum canonicas, sanctiones et sufficientem titulum habeas, super quibus ordinantis conscientiam oneramus, rite statutisque a iure temporibus libere recipere, et in eis postmodum licite ministrare valeas, alio tibi non obstante canonico verisque existentibus supradictis tenore presentium tibi et ordinati predicto licentiam impartimur, constitutionibus apostolicis et statutis tam provincialibus, quam sinodalibus contrariis non obstantibus quibuscunque. Datum Rome apud Sanctumpetrum, sub sigillo officii penitentie, VI Kalendas Novembris, pontificatus domini Pauli pape II, anno sexto.

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Ia. de Cremonense, Teofilus
G. Seuqohmi

Parchment fasten with a hanging seal, on the *plica*: 'C. de Urbino', on the top of the *verso*: 'Io. Marsily'.

2.

Bologna, 13 December, 1469.

Alexander de Longaris, the general episcopal vicar general of Bologna allows the promotion of Gáspár Bak of Berend by virtue of the absolution of the grand penitentiary.

(The original: Slovakia, Spišský Archív, Private Archives of the Chapter of Szepes,

Part I. /U 757/11 4 66/; its copy: MNL OL DF 272 792; its partial publication: C. Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii* (see note 4), III, 9-70)

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Universis et singulis ad quos presentes adveneant. Alexander de Longaris de Perusio, iuris utriusque doctor, canonicus Bononiensis, reverendissimi in Christo patris et domini, domini Philippi miseratione divina sacrosancte Romane ecclesie episcopi cardinalis Bononiensis, et episcopi Albanensis, ac maioris penitentiarii in episcopatu Bononie vicarius in spiritualibus et temporalibus generalis, ac comissarius et executor universis ad infrascripta per prenominationem reverendum dominum episcopum cardinalem ac maiorem penitentiarium specialiter deputatus, salutem in Domino. Litteras prefati reverendissimi in Christo patris et domini, domini episcopi cardinalis et maioris penitentiarii scriptas in membrana et sigillo cereo officii penitentie pendentis munitas, sanas integras et illesas, non abolitas, non cancellatas, nec in aliqua sui parte viciatas vel suspectas, sed omnia prorsus vitio et suspicionem carentes nobis per venerabilem virum dominum Casparem Back, clericum Cenadiensis diocesis in civitate Bononie studii causa residente principale in ipsis litteris principaliter nominatum coram notario publico et testibus infrascriptis presentatas, nos cum ea, qua decuit reverentia benigne noveritis recepisse huiusmodi sub tenore videlicet: ^aPhilippus miseratione divina episcopus Albanensis discreto viro vicario nostro in spiritualibus in ecclesia nostra Bononiensis salutem in Domino. Ex parte Casparus Back, clerici Cenadiensis diocesis nobis oblata petitio continebat, quod ipse olim cum serenissimo rege Ungarie in expugnatione seu obsidione cuiusdam castri Jayza nuncupati, ab inamissimis Turcis, Christi nominis inimicis tunc tenti, in quo seu ex ipso per infideles innumera, mala et oppressiones plurime Christianis fiebant in bellis interfuit, ac pulveres pro spingardis et aliis machinarum generibus necessarios, ac alia ingenia oportuna per prefatum serenissimum regem ad hoc deputatus custodivit, illosque pulveres et alia huiusmodi quoties opus fuit in obsidione huiusmodi ad loca sibi commissa portari fecit ad infidelium expugnationem dumtaxat, et castrum predicti obsidionem ut prefertur. Necnon dum rex predictus Boemos hereticos pestilentes de patria pro ipsius et fidei orthodoxie tuitione reicere contenderet, ipse exponens, qui cuiusdam dicti regis capitanei notarius existebat, ab ipso capitaneo iussus, litteras nonnullas aliis gentium armorum capitaneis scripsit, ut ad obsidionem castrorum et terrarum predictarum hereticorum properarent, ac etiam civibus civitatum prelibato regi subiectarum, quod ad obsidionem predictam contra hereticos huiusmodi fiendam instrumenta bellica et alia necessaria afferrent, opemque ^bprestarent eisdem, atque premissa ministrarent, prout gentes armorum huiusmodi ad obsidionem accesserunt, civesque instrumenta et alia necessaria predicta, opem eiusdem prestantes attulerunt seu ministrarunt et propterea in bellis huiusmodi occasione inter eos initis, multa homicidia, plurimeque mutilationes fuerunt ex utriusque parte perpetrata, quibus omnibus interfuit, ac dum preparationes ad premissam fierent astitit nullum tamen manibus propriis interfecit seu mutilavit, nec interfeci seu mutilari mandavit. Cum autem ipse exponens manus a sanguine aliis, quod ut permittitur continuerit, cupiatque clericali carachere uti et ad omnes etiam sacros ordines promoveri, et in eis postquam promotus fuit perpetuo Altissimo famulari, stimuletur tamen quandoque in conscientia agnoscens culpam, ubi minime repperitur et magis posset in futurum stimulari, si forsitan ab aliquibus simplicibus

et uiris ignarus, ac ipsius exponentis emulis affereretur, ipsum propter premissa homicidiorum et mutilationum reatus incurrisse, et irregularitatis maculam seu inhabilitatis notam contraxisse, ac dicto clericali caractere uti, ac ad dictos ordines promoveri, et in eis postquam promotus erit, licite ministrare non posse, ad tollendum igitur stimulos huiusmodi et obstruenda ora quorumcumque in futurum fortassis obloqui volentium emulorum obstruenda supplicari fecit dictus esxponens sibi super his per Sedem Apostolicam in foro conscientie dumtaxat misericorditer provideri. Nos igitur auctoritate domini pape cuius penitentie curam gerimus, discretione tue, cum dictus exponens ^c(ut asserit) ibidem causa studii aliquamdiu residere habeat, committimus, quatenus si per simplicem ipsius exponentis assertionem nullis desuper adhibitis testibus, nullisque litteris datis, sed presentibus laniatis premissa vera esse inveneris, et quod exponens^c neminem interfecerit aut mutilaverit super quibus tuam constientiam oneramus declares in foro conscientie tantum, ipsum premissorum occasione nullos homicidiorum seu multilationum reatus incurrisse, sed premissis non obstantibus dicto clericali caractere uti, et ad prefatos ordines promoveri, ac in eis postquam promotus fuerit, alio sibi canonico non obstante ministrare posse. Datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub sigillo officii penitentie III Kalendas Novembris,⁶¹ pontificatus domini Pauli pape II anno sexto. C. Boccardinus.^a Post quarum quidem litterarum presentationem et receptionem nobis et per nos ut promittitur factas fuimus per prefatum dominum Casparem principalem in eisdem litteris principaliter nominatum debiti cum instantia requisiti, ut ad ipsarum litterarum et contentorum in eis executionem iuxta litterarum earundem vim, formam et tenorem procedere dignaremur. Nos igitur Alexander, vicarius et commissarius ac executor antedictus attendentes requisitione huiusmodi fore iustam et consonam rationi quoque iusta petentibus non est denegandus assensus preinsertis litteris et contentis in eis perlectis ac diligenter consideratis prefatum dominum Casparem principalem in ipsis litteris nominatum de et super contentis in eisdem preinsertis litteris maturius et diligentius interrogavimus et examinavimus. Verum qua per examinationem huiusmodi et assertionem dicti domini Casparis nobis in de et supra premisse facta invenimus contenta in dictis preinsertis litteras vera esse, et quod ipse dominus Caspar nemine interfecit aut mutilavit auctoritate prefati reverendissimi domini episcopi cardinalis maioris penitentiarii nobis in hac parte ut supra commissa, et qua fungimur omnique modo iure via, causa et forma quibus melius et efficacius potuimus atque possumus declaravimus, prout etiam harum serie declaramus in foro conscientie tantum ipsum dominum Casparem premissorum in presentis litteris contentorum occasione nullas homicidiorum seu mutilationum reatus incurrisse, sed premissis in eisdem litteris descriptis non obstantibus eundem dominum Casparem dicto clericali caractere uti et ad omnes etiam sacros ordines promoveri, ac in eis postquam promotus fuerit alio sibi canonico non obstante ministrare posse. In quorum fidem et testimonium presentes nostras litteras vim publici instrumenti continentes ex inde fieri et publicari fecimus et sigilli curie episcopalis Bononiensis munimine roborari. Datum et actum Bononie, in episcopali palacio in camera nostre solite residentie, presentibus venerabili et eximii decretorum doctore domino Iohanne, quondam Cathelani de Sala de Bononie, priore monasterii sancti

Michaelis de Castello Britonum, Bononiensis diocesis, ordinis militie beate Marie virginis et Nicolao Iohannis de Modiema, habitatore Bononie in capella sancti Mathei de Accharisiis testibus ad predictam vocatis adhibitis et rogatis, sub anno a nativitate Domini nostri Ihesu Christi, Millesimo quadringentesimo sexagesimo nono, Indictione secunda, die tertio decimo mensis Decembris, pontificatus prefati sanctissimi in Christo patris et domini nostri, domini Pauli divina providentia pape secundi anno sexto.

Albizus de Dugliolo, notarius curie episcopalis
Bononiensis rogatus ac mandato scripsit

Parchment, on the *verso*: 'Dispensatio Casparis Back, ut ad ordines promoveri possit, tametsi occasione belli Turcici et Bohemici irregularitatem incurrisse de anno 1469'. | ^{a-a} This part was published by: C. Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii* (see note 4), III, 69-70 | ^b Crossed before it: 'illis'. | ^{c-c} This part was left out from the publication of Wagner.

3.

Bologna, 23 December, 1469.

A notarial document that confirms that during the general ordination taken place in the cathedral of Bologna, Gáspár Bak, the provost of Szepes, was promoted sub-deacon by Matheus de Pontremulo, the auxiliary bishop of Bologna.

(The original: Slovakia, Státny archiv v Levoci, Private Archives of the Chapter of Szepes, Charters issued before Mohács /U 608/ 364//; its copy: MNL OL DF 264 483)

In Christi nomine amen. Anno nativitatis eiusdem millesimo quadringentesimo nono, indictione secundo, die vigesimo tertio mensis Decembris, tempore pontificatus sanctissimi in Christo patris et domini nostri, domini Pauli, divina providentia pape secundi missam et generales clericorum ordinationes sollemniter celebrans Bononiensis in ecclesia cathedrali santi Petri Bononiensis, apud altare maius eiusdem ecclesie, reverendus in Christo dominus Matheus de Pontremulo, Dei et Apostolice Sedis gratia episcopus Tanensis, reverendissimi in Christo patris et domini domini Philippi, episcopi Albensis presbiteri cardinalis, episcopi Bononiensis et principis suffraganeus, de licentia venerabilis viri et eximii utriusque iuris doctoris domini Alexandri de Longaris de Perusio, canonici Bononiensis, prefati reverendissimi domini cardinalis et episcopi Bononiensi in spiritualibus et temporalibus curie episcopalis Bononiensis vicarii generalis, venerabilem virum et eximum iuris peritum dominum Casparem Back, clericum Cenadiensis diocesis, prepositum ecclesie sancti Martini, Strigoniensis diocesis in minoribus ordinibus legitime constitutum, ad hoc que repertum ydoneum et sufficientem eius diligenti examinatione premissa, vigore tamen licentie Apostolice sibi concesse per prefatum reverendissimum dominum et dominum Philippum, episcopum Albanensem, prefati sanctissimi domini nostri maiorem penitentiarium ad titulum sue prepositure ibidem presentem et humiliter acceptantem ad sacrum subdiaconatus ordinem rite et sollemniter promovit et ordinavit iuxta ritum et formam sancte matris ecclesie consuetos. Mandans prefatus Alexander dominus episcopus michi,

Ioannisbaptiste (!) de Grassis notario relato, ac me rogans prefatus dominus Caspar prepositus antedictus, ut de predictis omnibus et singulis publicam conficiam instrumentum iussit sigillo curie episcopalis Bononiensis impressione muniri infidem et testimonium omnium singulorum premissorum. Actum Bononie in ecclesia cathedrali sancti Petri Bononiensis, presentibus ibidem venerabilibus viris domino Ludovico de Muzolis utriusque iuris doctore, canonico Bononiensis, D. Floriano cum Ioannis bidelli, domino Caspare de Capite Leonis, ambobus capellanis ecclesie Bononiensis, domino Christoforo Arestani et domino Lanaloto ambobus mansionariis prefate cathedralis ecclesie sancti Petri Bononiensis testibus omnibus ad premissa omnia et singula vocatis adhibitis specialiter et rogatus.

Ego Lazarus filius quondam Ioannis dela Peña, publicus Apostolici et Imperiali auctoritatibus notarius, predicta omnia et singula prout in notis rogationibus et scripturis circumscripti viri domini Ioannis Baptiste de Grassis, notarii predicti inveni, et omnia de ipsius domino Ioannis Baptiste voluntate commissione et mandato scripsi, sumpsi et exemplavi et in hanc publicam formam redegei, hic ideo me publice subscripsi et signum meum consuetum appositi in fidem omnium premissorum.

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Ego Ioannes Baptista, quondam scilicet Iacobi de Grassis, civis Bononiensis publica Apostolica Imperiali et communis Boniensis ac curie episcopalis Bononiensis auctoritate notarius predictis omnibus et singulis dum sic, ut permittitur agerentur et fierent interfui eaque rogatis et quia aliis negotiis impeditus extiti ideo suprascriptum, Lazarum notarium antedictum scribi et exemplari feci hic ideo me publici subscipsi signum nomenque meum apposui consuetum infidem et testimonium omnium premissorum subscipsi.

On parchment, two notarial signet can be seen next to the clause. At the bottom, in the middle there is the vesica seal of the episcopal curia. On its back with a contemporary handwriting: 'Gaspar Bak Bononie promotus ad subdiaconatus gradum'.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano

Cam. Ap. Libri Format.: Camera Apostolica Libri Formatarum

Reg. Suppl. Registri delle Suppliche

APA: Archivio della Penitenzieria Apostolica

MNL OL: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára – Budapest

DF: Diplomatikai Fényképgyűjtemény

DL: Diplomatikai Levéltár

RPG, V: *Repertorium Poenitentiariae Germanicum*, vol. V: *Verzeichnis der in den Supplikenregistern der Pönitentie Pauls II. vorkommenen Personen, Kirchen und Orte des Deutschen Reiches 1464-1471*. Text bearbeitet von Ludwig Schmugge, unter Mitarbeit von Peter Clarke, Alessandra Mosciatti und Wolfgang Müller. Indices bearbeitet von Hildegard Schneider-Schmugge und Ludwig Schmugge. Tübingen: De Gruyter, 2002.

RPG, vol. VI: *Repertorium Poenitentiariae Germanicum*, vol. VI: *Verzeichnis der in den Supplikenregistern der Pönitentie Sixtus' IV. vorkommenen Personen, Kirchen und Orte des Deutschen Reiches 1471-1484. I. Teil*: Text bearbeitet von Ludwig Schmugge, unter Mitarbeit von Michael Marsch und Alessandra Mosciatti. Tübingen: De Gruyter, 2005.

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NUNCIO GIROLAMO MARTINENGO'S REPORTS ON THE MILITARY EVENTS OF 1552

ABSTRACT

One of the most famous periods of the anti-Ottoman wars was the year 1552. This was the time when the Ottoman armies captured among others the castles of Temesvár, Szolnok and Drégely which were originally in the hands of King Ferdinand I Habsburg of Hungary. The famous siege of Eger and the battle of Palást also happened this year. We have a special opportunity for a fresh view of the turbulent events of the war, provided by the examination of the reports written by Girolamo Martinengo. He was the nuncio sent by Pope Julius III to the court of King Ferdinand I. In these reports, the nuncio told in detail about the events of the war in Hungary, not only reporting in a factual and informative manner but also interpreting and commenting. This gives us a special opportunity to examine how the court of Ferdinand I saw the events, from whom did the nuncio obtain his information and what was the Holy See interested in the affairs and developments in Hungary? In addition, the reports show us how the Hungarian theatre of war was integrated into the grand European politics of the time.

KEYWORDS: Diplomacy; Kingdom of Hungary; anti-Ottoman wars; papacy; nuncio.

THE ANTI-OTTOMAN STRUGGLE AND HUNGARY

The year 1552 is one of the most significant and famous periods of the anti-Ottoman struggles of the 16th century in Hungary. The military events of this period determined the conditions of the era for a long time. Although historians internationally examine the Ottoman wars mainly in the context of the actions in the Mediterranean, the importance of the Hungarian theatre of war was well known throughout Europe in its own time, and countless reports and accounts were written about it, especially the sieges of Temesvár and Eger.

Among the diplomatic reports of the time, which were sent to Ferdinand I, King of Bohemia, Hungary, Archduke of Austria – brother of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor – the accounts of Nuncio Girolamo Martinengo stand out. The discussion of these events will not be carried out by following a linear order. After presenting the news of the most notable military affairs, such as the sieges of Veszprém, Temesvár, Eger, and the Battle of Palást, I will highlight two important, not so well observed, although fascinating topics to the Hungarian and European public eye of the time: the question of King Ferdinand's military engagement and the campaign of Prince Maurice of Saxony in Hungary.

The fate of the Kingdom of Hungary was of particular importance to King Ferdinand I. After Buda was conquered by Sultan Suleiman in 1541 – and the eastern part of the country was given into the hands of King John Zápolya's widow and son, Isabella Jagiellon, and John Sigismund, as well as the Bishop of Várad, George Martinuzzi (György Fráter/Utyeszenics) – one of Ferdinand's main aims was to regain the lost eastern territories, later known as the Principality of Transylvania. A possibility opened for these purposes in 1551, notably when, under the leadership of George Martinuzzi, the Hungarian Holy Crown was obtained, the queen and John Sigismund were removed from Transylvania, and an army led by Giovanni Battista Castaldo was sent to the province. In the meantime, Ferdinand succeeded in having George Martinuzzi created a cardinal by Pope Julius III. However, distrust of Martinuzzi led to the king's soldiers assassinating the cardinal in December 1551, while the number of incoming news of an impending Ottoman invasion was growing.

Ferdinand endeavoured to be prepared for this, but the spring of 1552 brought one of the most critical periods for the Habsburgs. King Henry II of France invaded the Empire from the west, the German orders led by Maurice, Elector of Saxony revolted, while the Ottoman fleet attacked Italy and the land forces invaded the Kingdom of Hungary. The imperial main forces led by Kara Ahmed Pasha attacked from the south and captured important elements of the Hungarian border fort system, Temesvár and Lippa, while Ali Pasha of Buda occupied Veszprém and the smaller keeps around Buda, destroying the Christian armies sent against him at Palást. The two Ottoman troops united under Szolnok, and after the castle was taken, they moved against Eger. However, the castle, defended by Captain István Dobó, demonstrated heroic resistance and managed to repel the attackers. Meanwhile, Ferdinand invested all his efforts into organizing the defence, sending reinforcements to the Hungarian front and even contemplated his own personal military engagement. Not surprisingly, Nuncio Martinengo, who was at his court, kept Rome constantly informed of military events in Hungary in his reports.

MARTINENGO AND THE OTTOMAN ISSUE

The Ottoman question was a central feature of Martinengo's weekly reports¹. He was particularly concerned with Transylvanian politics, especially with the following matters: the actions of George Martinuzzi and Isabella, the fate of Castaldo's troops, and the ever-changing (domestic) politics. Nevertheless, due to conflicting pieces of information, Martinengo also struggled to comprehend Transylvanian politics. At times he concluded that the final demise was near, at others he felt that affairs and circumstances in the province were improving, and then in his following week's account he stated the exact opposite viewpoint on more than one occasion. What he clearly perceived, however, was that the forces

1 About Martinengo: Viktor Kanász, "The life and work of the Abbot and Nuncio Girolamo Martinengo in Hungary", *Specimina Nova Pars Prima Sectio Mediaevalis*, 10 (2019) 211-30; Id., *Magyarország és a Szentszék a 16. század közepén. Girolamo Martinengo nuncius és a Magyar Királyság (1550-1554)* (PhD diss., University of Pécs, 2022).

sent to hold the province were constantly struggling with insufficient supplies and kept on asking for reinforcements. According to the nuncio, the army commander, Castaldo, had serious doubts as to whether Transylvania could avoid falling under the Ottoman's control, since he was reluctant to believe that it was manageable to keep the province in royal hands².

The difficulties are truly illustrated by the failures of 1552. One of the first significant events of the year was the "Peril of Szeged". On the night of 20–21 February, a Christian army surprised the Ottoman-held settlement, the palisade of which was successfully occupied, but the castle remained to be obtained by the Turks³. The highly publicised news had already been the subject of discussions in Vienna by 28 February⁴. Nevertheless, it was not until 7 March that Martinengo, who was in Bratislava, reported the unexpected military successes to Rome. According to his accounts, the castle was besieged by the Hungarians and Germans under Bernardo de Aldana, but the Pasha of Buda was on his way to rescue the keep⁵. These remarks were indeed credible, as the castle was failed to be seized, and Hadim Ali, Pasha of Buda, defeated the Christian troops on 1 March⁶. Shortly after the news arrived in Vienna, on 10 March, the nuncio reported that Szeged had been recaptured by the Ottomans⁷.

The newsworthiness of the affair on a European scale is demonstrated by the fact that the incidents were known throughout Italy. In addition to Martinengo, the Venetian

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- 2 Helmut Goetz, ed., *Nuntiatur des Girolamo Martinengo (1550-1554)* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1965), letter 116. Castaldo has already wished to resign several times, further see ÖStA HHStA UA AA Kt. 67. Konv B. 1552. fol. 58r. The international context of the war more recently: Fodor Pál, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire. The Ottomans in Central Europe. A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390-1566)* (Budapest: RCH HAS, 2015), 103-129; Zoltán Korpás and János B. Szabó, "If they came as a legation, they are many, if they are soldiers, they are few". The military background of the 1551 attempt to unite Hungary", in *Isabella Jagiellon, Queen of Hungary (1539-1559)*, eds. Ágnes Máté and Teréz Oborni (Budapest: MTA BTK, 2020), 147-62.
 - 3 Péter Kulcsár, ed., *Humanista történetírók* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1977), 596-600; Sándor László Tóth, "Két világ között: Tót Mihály és a "szegedi veszedelem" 1552-ben", in *Oszmán-magyar viszony a 16-18. században*, ed. Zsuzsanna J. Újváry (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2020), 96-7.
 - 4 Imre Szántó, *A végvári rendszer kiépítése és fénykora Magyarországon. 1541–1593* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1985), 85; D. Csaba Veress, *A szegedi vár* (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1986), 57-8.
 - 5 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 53.
 - 6 Szántó, *A végvári*, 88-93; Miklós Istvánffy, *Istvánffy Miklós magyarok dolgairól írt históriája. Tályai Pál XVII. századi fordításában*, I/2, ed. Péter Benits (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2003), 174-79; Tóth, "Két világ között", 105-09; Zoltán Péter, Bagi "Moháctól Zsitvatorokig (1526-1606)", in *Magyarország hadtörténete II.* ed. Kálmán Mészáros (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2020), 32-3.
 - 7 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 55. Castaldo only notified the emperor about the defeat on 4 March. Veress, *A szegedi vár*, 65.

Nuncio⁸, and even Pope Julius III has expressed their opinions on the matter. According to Del Monte's letter to Martinengo, the Pope declared that he did not consider the occupation of Szeged to be a favourable move, since it would upset the Ottomans a great deal resulting in a possible attack, which the Holy Father did not want, due to the fact that hardly any help could be expected from others. The emperor was very preoccupied and the Pope himself required help as well⁹. On the same day, King Ferdinand's envoy to Rome, Don Diego Lasso, also articulated Rome's joy and concerns about the seizure of Szeged, as they were anxious that this might aggravate the Turks¹⁰. The consequent acts ultimately vindicated the Pope's stance.

Meanwhile, increasingly worrying news arrived from Istanbul. By the end of April, it has already been discussed at the Viennese court that the Sultan had threatened with war if John Sigismund was not permitted to return to Transylvania. A month later, rumours started to circulate about Suleiman's personal arrival¹¹.

The Ottoman troops eventually launched an offensive. One of the first major theatres of these was Veszprém. On 30 May, Martinengo reported that the Turks were at Veszprém, "a bishop's town in Hungary", which is near Styria, insufficiently supplied with Hungarian troops, and in a poor condition, certainly being taken without the hope of liberation¹². On 5 June, the nuncio had already heard about the capture of the castle on 1 June and the massacre of its guards, which caused great discontent among the Hungarians¹³. On 2 July, Cardinal Del Monte, the Secretary of State, replied to the Nuncio. In his letter he informed him that the loss of Veszprém devastated the Pope and the College of Cardinals¹⁴. Ferdinand I also informed the Holy See in a letter about the loss of Veszprém and the Ottoman attacks on Transylvania, seeking for aids from Rome. The Pope set up a commission of seven

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8 Franco Gaeta, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia. (2 gennaio 1552–14 luglio 1554)*, vol. 6 (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'età Moderna e Contemporanea, 1967), 76.

9 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 57. The European newsworthiness of the events: Thuani, Jac[ques] Aug[uste], *Historiarum sui temporis opera*, 1 (s.l. 1609), 190–92.

10 August von Druffel, ed., *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts. mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Bayerns Fürstenhaus. Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte*, II: 1552. (München: M. Reiger'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1880), 266, 295.

11 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 68, 73; Druffel, *Briefe*, 449. Compare: this was a familiar theme in Rome and Venice as well, e.g., Druffel, *Briefe*, 152, 174–75; Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 91.

12 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 74. The castle was surrounded on 20 May, and news of the siege spread through the court on 28 May. Organising the liberation of the keep began during the siege, although it was not successful. E.g., MNL OL E 21-1552.06.01.

13 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 75; Istvánffy, *História*, 182–84; Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 608–09.

14 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 78. Compare: HHStA ÖStA Rom, *Correspondenz*, 13. 1550–1555. 207V, 211V

cardinals to deal with the matter¹⁵. In addition, the Venetian nuncio also reminisced about the siege of Veszprém in his account of 18 June, however, he shared with Del Monte the less authentic but all the more fascinating news he had heard from a Czech nobleman¹⁶.

After the occupation of Veszprém, the Pasha of Buda turned against the Hungarian holds surrounding his seat. Martinengo also disclosed these incidents in detail. He discussed the siege of Drégely, defended by György Szondi. He noted that it was a small but well-fortified and guarded stronghold of the Esztergom archbishopric¹⁷. Similarly, the invasion of Buják and the castle of Ság, once a Premonstratensian monastery, are also included in his records. The nuncio pointed out here that the loss of these two small keeps was also dangerous, due to their close proximity to the mines of Upper Hungary¹⁸.

He also commemorated the Battle of Palást, which resulted in a great defeat from the Christians' perspective. On 12 August, he noted that the Pasha of Buda had gathered men to fight a battle with the Christians, thus, on 9 August he attacked Erasmus von Teufel with 15 000 men. After the battle, only a few Germans and Italians survived, and although the Bishop of Vác was killed, many Hungarians managed to escape. According to the nuncio, there was no one to guard the frontier after the combat, and regardless of the fact that the Ottomans had suffered significant losses, they were still capable to cause further damages¹⁹. The gravity of the battle and the contemporary value of the news are demonstrated by the fact that the Venetian nuncio and the nuncio of Charles V both reported the events²⁰.

The southern affairs did not escape his attention either; he was also aware that the Turkish commanders who had sacked Slavonia had retreated after the capture of Csázma²¹. The nuncio also disclosed the siege of Szolnok. In his note on 8 September

15 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 78; Tusor Péter and Nemes Gábor, eds., *Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia de Regnis Sacrae Coronae Hungariae (1426–1605)* (Budapest-Roma: Gondolat Kiadó, 2011), 105; Tusor Péter, "A konstanzi bulla "alkalmazása". A magyar királyi főkegyúri jog a 15-16. században", in "*Causa unionis, causa fidei, causa reformationis in capite et membris*", eds. Attila Bárány and László Pószán (Debrecen: Printart-Press, 2014), 236.

16 Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 123.

17 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 80. Compare, Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 609-11. King Ferdinand informed Charles V of the seizure of the castle on the 15th. Korpás Zoltán, "I. Ferdinánd levelezése V. Károly melletti követével, Juan Alonso de Gámizzal. (1542-1556)", *Fons*, 16 (2009): 343.

18 Goetz, *Martinengo*, 83, 81. According to Castaldo, the castle (*Arcem Buyack*) was repaired by the Turks shortly after the siege. ÖStA HHStA UA AA Kt. 68. Konv A. 1552. 153v.

19 Goetz, *Martinengo*, 87. On the same day, Ferdinand I reported the battle to his envoy being at the side of Charles V. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 344.

20 Heinrich Lutz, ed., *Nuntiaturen des Pietro Camaiani und Achille de Grassi. Legation des Girolamo Dandino (1552-1553)* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1959), 96-97. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 145, 165.

21 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90. Compare, Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 344; Szabolcs

1552, he declared that the castle was besieged, which was well equipped with artillery and troops, but would require two thousand men to defend it, however, only a thousand were available there²².

WHAT WAS LOST AND WHAT IS LEFT – THE SIEGE OF TEMESVÁR AND EGER

The nuncio also provided a comprehensive account of the actions of the Ottoman army. The first significant point of it was the strategically important city of Temesvár, defended by István Losonczi. On 5 June, the nuncio wrote that rumour had it that Ahmed Pasha would construct a bridge on the Tisza to besiege Temesvár, Szolnok and Eger, as the Ottoman armies considered it unreasonable to march towards Austria²³. Twenty days later, it became a certainty for him that the Turks were moving against Temesvár²⁴. The siege of the keep was then disclosed several times. On 13 July, the nuncio still expressed his hopes for victory²⁵, but by 18 July he saw a much less significant chance of it²⁶. On 26 July and 2 August, he explained meticulously how gallantly Temesvár had been held so far by its exhausted defenders²⁷. The next day, however, breaking the chain of reports he had been writing every week or so, he informed the Holy See of the occupation of Temesvár, although he had almost no information about the details, including the circumstances of the captain's beheading²⁸. It was only a few days later when he could provide shed some new light on the latter event²⁹. However, Martinengo was not the only one interested in these affairs; the fate of Temesvár was being followed all over Europe, for example, the news of the two sieges of the fortress reached not just Charles V, but the nuncio as well³⁰.

Varga, *Europe's Leonidas: Miklós Zrínyi, Defender of Szigetvár (1508-1566)* (Budapest: RCH HAS, 2016), 181.

- 22 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90. Compare, Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 158; Thuani, *Historiarum*, 195; Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 345-46; Druffel, *Briefe*, 770; Herrmann, Johannes Wartenberg, Günther Winter and Christian, eds., *Politische Korrespondenz des Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen*, vol. 6. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006), 516.
- 23 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 75.
- 24 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 76. Two days later, on 27 July, Ferdinand I sent a note to his envoy from Passau, who was at his brother's side, that Temesvár was being successfully defended, although they needed a thousand more men, and Castaldo complained that he did not have enough capacity. He subsequently informed the emperor of the fate of Temesvár. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 342-44. Compare, Thuani, *Historiarum*, 213-17; Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 606.
- 25 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 81.
- 26 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 82.
- 27 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 83, 84.
- 28 «[...] after I was informed about the fall of Temesvár, although I don't know precisely what happened, I will write the news». Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 85.
- 29 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 86.
- 30 Druffel, *Briefe*, 705, 733. Georg Kupke, ed., *Nuntiaturen des Pietro Bertano*

The siege of Eger in 1552 is one of the most famous military affairs of early modern Hungary. Interestingly, the first mention of the city in Martinengo's accounts dates from a year earlier, in 1551³¹. It became the centre of attention in the following year, after the fall of Drégely. The nuncio's excellent geographical knowledge is supported by the fact that he considered the fall of Drégely and Buják a vital issue, as their garrisons protected the road to Transylvania and Eger³². By that time already, he highlighted that Eger was a famous city of great significance due to its location, but unfortunately, the Turks were marching against it. He also listed the characteristics of the town's fortifications: he was aware that the castle was not very secure, since it was well fortified and manned, but there was a hill from which the keep could be held under fire, making it weak and less resilient³³. On 16 September, he documented the beginning of the siege – starting on 11 September – and on 25 September he wrote that according to some reports «the enemy had abandoned the siege of Eger». This is one example of the many hoaxes circulating in the Viennese court³⁴. A week later, on 2 October, he received information on two major assaults which were repulsed by the Eger defenders, who, he says, were well prepared for the attack. As an example, he recounts that they burned everything within a radius of 8–10 km around the castle, leaving the besieging army without any food³⁵. On 9 October, the news of Captain Dobó's famous oath can also be found at Martinengo, according to which the defenders of Eger would rather die than surrender the castle. Besides these recollections, he also emphasized that the Turks were exhausted³⁶. By 16 October, he could provide Rome some good news indeed: the Turks were disappointed by the failed invasions and were being decimated by a plague reportedly killing hundreds of people a day. They are unable to stabilize the public sentiment among the besiegers neither with attempts to convince, nor with threats. The Ottoman soldiers expressed their desire to go home, but Ali, the

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und Pietro Camaiani 1550-1552 (Berlin, 1901), 101-02. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 141-43, 148. Fake news about the siege, see Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 731., Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 490.

- 31 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 33. Compare, Gustav Turba, ed., *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe (Dispacci di Germania)*, voll. I-II (Wien: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1892), 448.
- 32 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 81. Szántó, *A végvári*, 145. Ferdinand also interpreted the advancements as the Ottoman commanders aiming to cut off the road to Transylvania. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 343.
- 33 This can be identified with the Almagyar hill or Királyszéke. Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 83.
- 34 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 91-2. Numerous similar rumours were circulating in the later imperial city. Therefore, Ferdinand I believed to know that the Pasha of Buda had died during the siege of Eger. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 347-53; Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 149, 165.
- 35 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 93.
- 36 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 94.

Pasha of Buda, is forcing the siege. The Christian armies fortified Győr (which he called the gateway to Austria)³⁷, fearing that it would be the next stronghold to be attacked after Eger³⁸.

On 28 October, he had already been informed about the victory from ten days prior. In his account he noted, the walls of Eger Castle had been destroyed, some of the noblemen inside were killed and many wounded, but the siege had failed. The Ottomans tried in vain, but the defenders refused to accept any terms of surrender³⁹. Even on 5 November, he devoted his attention to the matter, mentioning that the Ottoman forces had retreated from Eger, leaving a lot of ammunition, food, and dead corpses behind – even though they previously considered the city to be the weakest among the other lost ones. According to Martinengo, «but the goodness of God, the virtue of the soldiers – half of whom were missing – and the diligence of the bishop, who took care [of the city] and kept more men there than usual, protected [Eger] for us»⁴⁰.

It was not only through Martinengo that Rome received information about the siege of the episcopal see, but also, among others, from the Venetian nuncio Ludovico Beccadelli, who repeatedly informed Cardinal Del Monte of the actions⁴¹. Thoroughly observing these sources it is apparent, that Nuncio Martinengo, with

37 Martinengo correctly assessed the key role of Győr in the defence of Austria and Vienna. Further see Géza Pálffy: *A császárváros védelmében. A győri főkapitányság története 1526-1598* (Győr: Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Győri Levéltár, 1999).

38 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 96. Ferdinand I wrote to the court of Charles V a day later, mentioning among other things that the defenders of Eger were holding out and causing much damage to the besiegers. He also mentioned that he was confident that the Turks would abandon the siege when the bad weather arrived. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 346. On the demoralised state of the Ottoman army, the plight of Ali Pasha and the plague among the besiegers, see: MNL OL P 1314. No. 12962. and No. 17286., Szántó, *A végvári*, 231, 234; Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 536. It is possible that Ottoman soldiers who contracted the plague in here also brought the disease back to Constantinople. Tamás Kruppa, “Pestisjárvány és háború a 16. századi Magyarországon”, in *Dögvészkalauz. Járványok és gyógyításuk története az ókortól napjainkig*, eds. Dóra Czeferner and Tamás Fedeles (Pécs: Kronosz Könyvkiadó, 2021), 102-103.

39 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 97. On the very same day, Ferdinand I wrote to the court of Charles V with news of the end of the siege. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 353. Compare, Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 536.

40 Goetz, *Martinengo*, 98. Miklós Oláh, the bishop of Eger truly spared no effort to help the defence of the castle, for example, he even monetised his gold pots to send material aid. Pongrácz Sörös, “Egy fejezet Oláh Miklós életéből”, *Katolikus Szemle*, 19/2 (1905): 130.

41 Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 158, 165, 170, 174, 177. Maurice of Saxony announced on the 28th that the Turks had retreated. The siege was also commemorated in the contemporary newspapers of the time. Druffel, *Briefe*, 796, 825; Herrmann–Wartenberg–Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 490, 516-17, 535. On the reception of the news in Rome: HHStA ÖStA Rom, *Correspondenz*, 13. 1550-1555. 249v.

his geographic and military knowledge, correctly assessed the importance of Eger. His reports also reflect when news arrived in Vienna and how military affairs were perceived in Ferdinand's immediate environment. Comparing the content of these reports with our current historical knowledge it can be concluded that the nuncio's information was mostly accurate, but in some cases, false reports were obtained. Martinengo, however, was not only informed in Viennese circles: we know, for example, that Castaldo also corresponded with him, initiating the exchange between the parties as early as 20 August 1552 regarding the need to fortify Eger. On 25 November 1552 he cited the battle of Eger as an admirable and exemplary case to the nuncio.⁴²

Overall, Martinengo wrote several times, in varying degrees of detail, usually based on authentic information, about the Ottoman advance towards Eger and the siege itself. Therefore, in reality, Rome and the papacy devoted significant attention to the events and the development of the theatre of war in Hungary, thus, the siege of Eger was not a matter of indifference for papal diplomacy as well.

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THE BROKEN PROMISE – THE KING AT THE HEAD OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMIES

The almost constant attacks by the Ottoman troops led to the emergence of the idea that King Ferdinand himself would go to war⁴³. The monarch seems to have put his faith in the concept. On 29 February 1552, at the Hungarian Diet, he declared that he would be personally present with the army, and that the noble orders should not delay, «for the enemy does not sleep, and now one hour worth a year»⁴⁴. It was also declared in the acts that in case of the Sultan attacked Hungary, the emperor, accompanied by his two sons, would confront the enemy with his entire military force⁴⁵.

Martinengo's report addressed the issue, specifically discussing the necessary actions if the king or one of his sons went to war against the Ottomans⁴⁶. As much as King Ferdinand desired to lead the campaign personally, the geopolitical situation intervened. The monarch, on the command of his brother, Charles V, was requested to go to Linz and then Passau to negotiate with the rebelling imperial orders. This forced the king to stay away from the borders during the most critical months, thus he was unable to send the necessary troops to the Hungarian theatre of operations⁴⁷.

42 Goetz, *Martinengo*, 325, 331-32.

43 E.g., Vilmos Fraknói, ed., *Magyar Országgyűlési emlékek. Magyar Királyság (1526-1606), Erdély (1540-1699)*, vol. 3: 1546-1556 (Budapest: MTA, 1876), 15.

44 Sándor Garády, "Türk Dániel naplója, 1548-1559", *Századok*, 5 (1871): 16.

45 Fraknói, *Országgyűlési*, 332, 336, 357-78. The Vatican Apostolic Archives also possesses old copies of the articles of the Diet. AAV, Misc. Arm. II, vol. 55, fol. 74-87r, on the king's marching to war: AAV, Misc. Arm. II, vol. 55, fol. 75r. On the same day, 29 March, King Ferdinand also wrote from Bratislava to Charles V, promising him a personal engagement on the behalf of him and Maximilian. Druffel, *Briefe*, 299.

46 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 60.

47 He also reported these events to Charles V in 1553, demonstrating that he was

On 13 July, the nuncio discussed that, despite the difficulties encountered, Ferdinand had promised to arm himself or his son, Maximilian, by 10 August, but as it was unlikely that the king would be able to send troops to Hungary, he wished to mobilise the army of Maurice of Saxony to fulfil this purpose. According to Martinengo, the monarch explained his absence to the Hungarians demanding his return by stating that he must remain in Passau, where he was suffering and labouring for the survival of the land and the country⁴⁸. The situation had not improved significantly by the beginning of August. On 7 August, Martinengo noted that Ferdinand was unable to come to Hungary, causing distress among its people, and that Archduke Maximilian believed that change cannot be expected in these circumstances⁴⁹.

Nevertheless, the news of a possible military engagement reached the Ottoman leaders, and when the Pasha of Buda discovered that Ferdinand was about to get involved in the military procedures, he declared his welcoming sentiments and expressed his hopes that this time, he, the Pasha, would have the chance to show the world that the real master of the country was not Ferdinand indeed, but his master, the sultan. Based on the records of the nuncio, at that time the king was still adamant about joining the forces, but there was no sign of actual participation taking place⁵⁰. Perhaps this is the reason why the French envoy to Venice was reluctant to believe that the king truly intended about going to war⁵¹.

This was still the case at the beginning of September: according to Martinengo, the king's march was further delayed, and the Hungarians were convinced that without his aid, the country would be lost. Ferdinand claimed that he personally wished to go and was not fleeing from battle⁵². The delay generated reproaches to which Ferdinand replied that he was doing all he could, but at the end, he personally had never been involved in leading a military operation in Hungary⁵³. Nevertheless, the idea arose whether Archduke Maximilian should attend to the forces, consequently he arrived in Hungary, in the Csallóköz⁵⁴. However, a possible

putting his brother's affairs before his own interests. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 355-63. Compare, Thuani, *Historiarum*, 213, Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 645-46.

48 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 81. On numerous occasions, the absence of the king was used by the nobles to justify their avoidance to go to war.

49 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 86. Although the king was in Passau, he also attended to Hungarian affairs from there, e.g., MNL OL P 419. A-41-No. 8.

50 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 89.

51 Druffel, *Briefe*, 750.

52 Therefore, according to the Nuncio, the only and most appropriate remedy to the problems that have arisen is for King John's son to return to Transylvania. Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90.

53 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 91. According to Ferenc Forgách, a famous contemporary historian, «Ferdinand did not go to war personally – as was his habit to state – but continued to delay, as before. By chance or by grace, by the court men of wealth, and by his recurring financial problems simultaneously prevented him to act so». Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 611-12.

54 Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 159; Szántó, *A végvári*, 179.

campaign was prevented by the Archduke's serious illness, which became so severe that his life was feared⁵⁵.

The Hungarian nobility did not forget what had happened, and at the beginning of the following year King Ferdinand declared that he would have gone to war against the Turks personally if the siege of Eger had not already ended and if winter had not been in such close proximity⁵⁶. At the Diet of Sopron in 1553, Ferdinand explained to the orders how he interpreted the events of the previous year. He emphasized that a serious decision was made, namely, to launch a personal campaign against the Ottomans the previous year, and that everything was prepared for this endeavour, but upon his return to Vienna after the Diet, he was confronted with the unexpected news that a domestic unrest had broken out again in German territories. Therefore, not only out of respect for the emperor – but also because he expected substantial financial assistance against the Turks from the imperial court – he devoted all his might in trying to restore peace between Charles V and the rebellious princes, which efforts have proven to be fruitful. In addition, he did not fail to fortify the Hungarian outposts and to maintain an army in Hungary, Transylvania, and Slavonia. In the end, the campaign was cancelled, but the king was determined to keep his promise, which is why he summoned the orders. However, during the previous year, several castles fell, and the royal army suffered a severe strike due to the fact, that the orders were reluctant to take up arms despite being repeatedly called upon to do so. Therefore, Ferdinand «blamed the grievous events of the past year on the negligence and carelessness of the Hungarians», which stirred a great uproar⁵⁷. Regardless, the orders asked the king again – without any success – for him or his son to lead the armies in Hungary⁵⁸.

There was although one prince who eventually took an active part in the Hungarian military actions in 1552 with his army of thousands. He was none other than Maurice, Electoral Prince of Saxony, who had been fighting against Emperor Charles just a few months earlier.

FROM ENEMY TO ALLY – MAURICE OF SAXONY

We could whiteness how greatly Ferdinand needed an army to counter Ottoman attacks. In these desperate times, Prince Maurice was given a key role. On 12 March 1552, Martinengo reported that he had received information from Archduke Maximilian of Maurice's offer, namely that he would come to Hungary with three thousand cavalry men to fight the Turks, completely at his own expense⁵⁹. In order to fulfil the undertaking, Maurice had requested the release of his father-in-law,

55 Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 347-52, 355-63.

56 Fraknoi, *Országgyűlési*, 405.

57 Fraknoi, *Országgyűlési*, 415, 417-18; Garády, *Türk*, 22.

58 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 118, Fraknoi, *Országgyűlési*, 420. On 17 April 1553, Canisius wrote in a letter that «it is uncertain whether our king is preparing to reconquer Hungary» Gábor Jablonkay SJ, «Jézus Társaságának első érintkezései Magyarországgal», *Katolikus Szemle*, 23/8 (1909): 828.

59 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 56., Druffel, *Briefe*, 222, 268, 457.

Philip of Hesse⁶⁰.

King Ferdinand and Prince Maurice first met in Linz on 19 April⁶¹. Although the negotiations were held in secret, the Nuncio remained in Linz and tried to obtain as much information as he could. In the meantime, he also had to face the fact that the news of the truce between his commissioner, the Pope, and the King of France – being concluded on 29 April – did not particularly delight Ferdinand⁶². Perhaps this factor contributed to the exclusion of Martinengo by the king from the negotiations in Passau. In his account of 3 May, the nuncio documented the incident, stating that on that same day, the monarch had informed him through a secret adviser that he could not stay long in Innsbruck. In response, Martinengo requested an audience, but the king handed over the commission of the investigation into Martinuzzi's murder and ordered him back to Vienna to take care of matter. The Nuncio, inevitably did not wished to be away from the Emperor and only whiteness the latest advancements from distance, therefore he insisted on staying to which the king reply was that «it is not good for you to come among people who look askance at you, who hate you»⁶³. It is dubious by all means whether the king was only thinking of the Protestant negotiating party in this case, or whether the reconciliation between Pope Julius III and Henry II also played a role.

Nevertheless, Rome continued to rely on the news received from the Nuncio on the negotiations⁶⁴. Thus, among other issues, he expressed his hopes to the king that Maurice would assist on the Hungarian field of battle⁶⁵. Ultimately, on 7 August, he broadcasted the binding of peace and the news of Maurice's confidence in his army of 13,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry⁶⁶. The king was in dire need of this army in the Kingdom of Hungary, and therefore in his letter of 12 August, he asked Charles V to order Maurice to join as soon as possible⁶⁷. Maurice also urged the departure of the army, since his men began to disassemble when they learned that they had to come to Hungary⁶⁸.

60 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 58.

61 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 64. Compare, Kupke, *Nuntiaturen*, 368-70.

62 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 69, 71, 72.

63 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 71. letter. About the audience: ÖStA HHStA UA AA 72. Konv.B. fol. 111r.

64 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 72. At this time, and in the period that followed, the imperial diets became an increasingly difficult terrain. With the word of Alexander Koller, a "minefield" for the representatives of the Holy See. Alexander Koller, "La dieta di Augusta del 1582 come spazio di esperienza diplomatica. L'esempio dei rappresentanti della curia romana", in *Diplomatische Wissenskulturen der Frühen Neuzeit. Erfahrungsräume und Orte der Wissensproduktion*. ed. Guido Braun (Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2018), 116.

65 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 80.

66 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 86; Lutz, *Nuntiaturen*, 77-8, 81; Turba, *Depeschen*, 542; Kulcsár, *Humanista*, 646; Thuani, *Historiarum*, 196-97, 217-18.

67 Szántó, *A végvári*, 106; Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 344.

68 Druffel, *Briefe*, 732.

The prince did indeed leave for Hungary, but his joy was not without its ups and downs. In addition to the mistrust that remained between the parties, on 21 August the nuncio wrote from Vienna that the soldiers of Maurice did not want to fight on the Hungarian front⁶⁹. In addition, a problem, which would cause issues later started to emerge, namely the small number of infantry and cavalry⁷⁰. Furthermore, on 8 September Martinengo disclosed that the prince had arrived with three thousand five hundred infantry and one thousand five hundred horsemen, who are selected soldiers, but insolent to those known to be religious⁷¹. Besides the above-mentioned matters, on 16 September the Nuncio had already expressed his worries that there was little confidence that Maurice would keep his oath of allegiance⁷².

The Saxon prince strengthened and fortified Győr (Raab), a key city for the defence of Vienna, in order to ward off a possible Ottoman attack⁷³. Furthermore, based on Martinengo's narrative, he was not only preparing a passive defence, but also planned to attack the archbishop's seat, Esztergom, in order to relieve Eger⁷⁴. In the end, the great attack on Esztergom was cancelled, but Maurice nevertheless sent a troop of mainly Hussars towards Esztergom, who earned a brilliant victory, drowning part of the enemy in the Danube and capturing more than a hundred Turks⁷⁵. The departure of the liberating army was also aborted. This may have been due to the fact that the assembled forces were considered too small for a notable

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- 69 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 88; Druffel, *Briefe*, 714; Turba, *Depeschen*, 545.
- 70 Lutz, *Nuntiaturen*, 97, 95; Turba, *Depeschen*, 546-48.
- 71 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 90. In a letter written to Castaldo on 14 August, King Ferdinand estimated that Maurice's army had 10-12,000 infantry and 3-4,000 cavalry. Szántó, *A végvári*, 235. Others estimated this sum to be somewhere between 11-16,000. E.g., István Sugár, *Az egri vár és viadala*. (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1971), 102; Bagi, *Mohácstól*, 36. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 345-46, 355-63. On 13 August, the Venetian nuncio had knowledge of 4,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantries. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 142-43, 148, 157. By 1 October, he knew about 10 000 infantry and 3 000 cavalry: Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 159. Compare. Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 516-517.
- 72 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 96.
- 73 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 91. Compare, Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 353. At this time, the opinion that the Turks would march on Győr and then attack Vienna from there was well known. Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 471, 490-91.
- 74 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 97. Gaeta, *Nunziature*, 165, 170. The background to the news may have been that the king had repeatedly urged Maurice, and Castaldo had also strongly urged the prince to launch a liberating campaign on Eger, or if not, at least to move on to Esztergom. Sugár, *Az egri*, 103, Szántó, *A végvári*, 235-37. E.g., ÖStA HHStA UA AA Kt. 67. Konv B. 1552, fol. 15r-18r, 49r-50v, 102r. On 18 October, however, Maurice complained that he had not received permission from Ferdinand to attack, consequently there was nothing else to do but defend the border, and that he would have a chance to attack in the spring, when his health improved. Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 516-17.
- 75 Druffel, *Briefe*, 796, Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 536.

campaign⁷⁶. Thus, although the keep of Győr was still fortified, there was no significant altercation between his army and the Ottoman troops⁷⁷.

During the span of autumn, the prince received increasingly worrying news from his estates, also an epidemic broke out in his army, which urged the prince to leave, and after defending Eger, he set off for home between 28 October and 1 November⁷⁸. In his notes of 29 December, the nuncio also noted that, as far as he knew, the prince had stayed in Wrocław, since he had caught the French disease, syphilis – which was raging at the time – and tried to heal from it⁷⁹.

The failure of the offensive campaign led to a very negative assessment of Maurice's activities in Hungary by his Hungarian contemporaries and later historiography. However, it was not without results, on the contrary. It expressed a strong message, which Ferdinand – and the Ottoman leadership – clearly perceived. The king believed that the military march of his former enemy on his side demonstrated to the Ottomans they are not to trust the French, who believed that the imperial orders were against the emperor, also urging them to be more cautious⁸⁰.

CONCLUSION

Closely investigating the most substantial affairs of Martinengo's nunciature, the war –rooted in the Habsburg–Valois antagonism, and the alliance of the Protestant imperial orders, which set much of the Empire on fire as well as to northern Italy – has a prominent part. As these advancements had a major influence on the decisions of Pope Julius III and Ferdinand I, Martinengo alertly followed the news he received and obtained, for e.g., about the siege of Parma, the campaign of Maurice of Saxony, and the negotiations in Linz and Passau. In fact, we can assume that one of the focal points of his reports was this great power rivalry, which not only seized the nuncio's attention but also occupied Ferdinand I's military capacities. This is important to emphasize, since this fundamental geostrategic fact tends to be forgotten in Hungarian literature in the context of the castle wars of the 1550s, and Ferdinand I's personal military engagement and the lack of imperial assistance. Regardless of much attention Martinengo devoted to the matters of the West, the other subject of his interest was clearly the course of the Ottoman wars. The political and, above all, military events in Hungary between 1551–1552 constitutes a vital part of his reports. From the very beginning of his Nunciature, he tracked the fate of

76 Compare, Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 347–32.

77 Goetz, *Martinengo*, 98.

78 Druffel, *Briefe*, 793–94, 796, 805; Herrmann, Wartenberg and Winter, *Korrespondenz*, 1158; Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 97. Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 353.

79 Goetz, *Martinengo*, letter 104. Archduke Maximilian was also aware of Maurice's illness. Druffel, *Briefe*, 809, Johannes Herrmann, "Zu Krankheiten und Tod des Herzogs und Kurfürsten Moritz von Sachsen", *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte*, 81 (2010): 69–71. Up until today, it is still unclear exactly what disease the Prince was suffering from, perhaps he was infected with the plague.

80 Korpás, *I. Ferdinánd*, 263; Barnabás Guitman, Zoltán Korpás, Ferenc Tóth, et al., "A magyarországi török várháborúk nemzetközi háttere, 1547–1556", *Világtörténet*, 9/2 (2019): 286.

the eastern part of the country closely. He also disclosed the unification procedures and regularly issued reports on Castaldo's army in Transylvania. Similarly to his contemporaries, Martinengo, despite his best efforts, had difficulties to comprehend the affairs of Transylvania. The main reason behind was Castaldo's contradictory and often exaggerated reports.

Sensibly, the anti-Ottoman struggles appear most often and most prominently in his reports in 1552, in one of the most momentous years of the castle wars. This is the period when he provided a detailed account of the progress of the Ottoman armies, week by week, including the unsuccessful attempt to recapture Szeged, the fall of Veszprém, the Ottoman seizure of Lippa, Szolnok, Drégely, Buják and Ság, and the Battle of Palást. He described most meticulously the fall of Temesvár, the famous siege of Eger and the heroic stand of the castle defenders.

He separately dedicated efforts to discuss the questions often raised by the Hungarian orders: when and why did Ferdinand I not personally join the war efforts against the Ottomans? In the context of this issue, a lot of evidence can be found on how Ferdinand agreed with Maurice of Saxony to march his army into Hungary, which, if it could not be a substitute for the original plans, signalled an important message to the Ottoman commanders.

At the same time, Martinengo wrote surprisingly little about the affairs of the Hungarian Church compared to the events of the war and was less receptive to the pressing problems of the disintegrating medieval church structures. This clearly demonstrates that during the reign of Ferdinand, both the papacy and the royal court were concerned with the fate of Hungary, and that the events in the kingdom were interpreted at a pan-European level. Consequently, it is a definitive refutation of the historical topos that the papacy and the Habsburg court considered the Kingdom of Hungary merely as a buffer zone. It should be pointed out, however, that outside of the episcopal sees and the cardinalate, ecclesiastical and religious matters were not in the centre of attention, and the nuncios, including Martinengo, taken Hungary primarily as a theatre of war, embedded in the framework of the pan-European anti-Ottoman struggle. This is the main reason why the nuncio paid that much attention to the war in Hungary.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano

Misc. Arm.: Miscellanea Armadi

ELTE EKK: Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Könyvtára

MNL: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár

OL: Országos Levéltár

ÖStA: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv

HHStA: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv

UA: Ungarische Akten

AA: Allgemeine Akten

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CONFLICTS OF JOINT SOVEREIGNTY ON THE BORDER OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF TRANSYLVANIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 17TH CENTURY

ABSTRACT

The confrontation of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in the 16th Century resulted in the disintegration of the Kingdom of Hungary and the formation of the Principality of Transylvania in the eastern parts of the country. The constant state of war in the middle of the 17th century taking place in the border regions of the Ottoman Empire and that of the Habsburg dynasty came to an end for two decades owing to the Peace Treaty in Vasvár in 1664. Yet, the delineation of the border between the provinces (*vilayets*) in Hungary and the Principality of Transylvania was not defined.

The divergent interests resulted in a specific situation, that is the development of the joint sovereignty (*condominium*) in the border region.

The present study features the effects of the joint sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of Transylvania on the political, economic and cultural life of the area alongside its daily life. It put a great emphasis on the significant role of the Transylvanian fortress captain from Genoa, Francesco Biale.

KEYWORDS: Joint sovereignty; Ottoman Empire; Principality of Transylvania; Michael I Apafi; Ferenc Olasz.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant turning points in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary is the Battle of Mohács in 1526, as it was the starting point of a decades-long process that resulted in the break-up of a country that had previously had great power in the region. In the battle, the Ottoman Empire wreaked havoc on the Hungarian army, where King Louis II Jagiellon and most of the nobles also lost their lives. This created a confusing situation from the point of view of domestic politics as well, as two suitable persons formed the right to the royal title, which eventually led to the so-called double royal election and the separation of the former integer territory. The Western half of the country fell under the rule of Ferdinand I of the great European Habsburg dynasty, while the Eastern territories were controlled by John Szapolyai, who as a voivode of Transylvania (1510-1526) previously had significant governmental and military influence in the region. The Ottoman Empire, led by Sultan Süleyman I, also joined the civil war rivalry between the two legally elected rulers and his followers. As Süleyman considered the Habsburg dynasty the real enemy, he supported King John I by accepting him as his vassal. The expansionist policy of the Ottoman Empire towards Europe in the 16th century and the struggle of the Habsburg dynasty eventually led to the break-up of the medieval Kingdom

of Hungary. The Northern and Western territories of the former integer country were still known as the Kingdom of Hungary but continued to function as member of the Habsburg monarchy. The central part of the country, including the capital Buda, became a province of the Ottoman Empire. While in the Eastern region a state that did not exist until then, with internal autonomy but operating under a dual Ottoman-Habsburg dependency, resulted in the formation of the Principality of Transylvania¹.

The policy of the Transylvanian Prince George II Rákóczi (1648-1660) that he decided to join the North-eastern conflict by attacking Poland without the authorisation of the Porte, again created conditions for war. The Prince's action led to a retaliatory campaign against Transylvania by the Ottoman Empire, stabilized by Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed. However, the intervention was not viewed idly by the other major power in the region either, the Habsburg Monarchy. In the Ottoman-Habsburg border region, the recurrent warfare between the two great powers was settled by the peace of Vasvár in 1664 for two decades. However, the points of peace hardly touched on the problems of the Principality of Transylvania, which in some sense depended on both great powers. The peace treaty did not include the designation of the border between the province (*vilayet*) of Temesvár (Rom. Timișoara), which was established in the middle of the 16th century as a result of the conquest of the Ottoman Empire and was territorially enlarged as a result of the war, and the Ottoman province (*vilayet*) of Várad (Rom. Oradea), that was previously the most important border fortress of the Principality of Transylvania².

In the absence of a regulation by the great powers, the *Beglerbegis* (provincial governor-generals) of Várad and Temesvár, as well as the Transylvanian government, tried to determine the extent of the territories taxed by them in accordance with their own interests.

At the time of the abandonment of the castle of Várad (1660), the Prince of Transylvania, Michael I Apafi (1661-1690), and his government considered relevant the "promissory note" issued by Pasha Köse Ali when designating the affiliation of the taxed territories. According to the "promissory note", only the 258 villages that had previously belonged to the castle of Várad would have fallen into Ottoman hands³.

The legal basis of the Ottomans in Várad can also be partly linked to the aforementioned Pasha Köse Ali: the pasha ordered the census of the territories taxing

1 Gábor Ágoston, *The last Muslim conquest. The Ottoman Empire and Its Wars in Europa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), 159-87, 204-5, 247.

2 Hajnalka Tóth, "The circumstances and documents of the Peace of Vasvár", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 34/1 (2017): 243-56. For the earlier operation of the *vilayet* of Temesvár: Pál Fodor, "Das Wilayet von Temeschwar zur Zeit der Osmanischen Eroberung", *Südost-Vorschungen*, 55/1 (1996): 25-44.

3 For the points of Pasha Ali's "promissory note" see: József Koncz, "Nagyvárad capitulatioja 1660-ban", *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 5/3 (1892): 390-94. About the 258 settlements of Bihar County see: ANR DJS, *Colecția personală J. Benigni von Mindenberg*, vol. 40, f. 14. About the work of Pasha Köse Ali see: Balázs Sudár, "A hódoltsági pasák az oszmán belpolitika forrásaiban (1657-1665)", *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 124/3 (2011): 899-901.

the newly created *vilayet* of Várad, entrusting the task to Pír Mehmed. However, Pír Mehmed not only recorded the villages of Bihar County, which was formerly part of the Principality of Transylvania and formed the base area of the *vilayet* of Várad, together with the castle of Várad. The register (*defter*), also referred to as the “defter of Píri Pasha” and accepted by the Porte, also included some villages in the counties of Kraszna, Közép-Szolnok, Belső-Szolnok, Kolozs, Doboka and Hunyad, thus covering almost a third of the Principality of Transylvania⁴.

In the case of the *vilayet* of Temesvár, I must refer to the Transylvanian-Ottoman special trial of 1664. According to this, the Transylvanians considered only the 40 villages of Hunyad County in the immediate vicinity of the *vilayet* to be under Ottoman rule, which were taken from Transylvania during the occupation of Jenő (Rom. Ineu, in 1658). Jenő became the secondary seat of the *vilayet* of Temesvár during its expansion. However, the Ottomans of Temesvár sought to increase the number of their tax-paying villages in the County of Zaránd, north of the aforementioned territory, referring to the case of Jenő⁵.

The different demands, like at the other confines of the Ottoman Empire⁶, gave rise to a special situation that resulted in the formation of a so-called joint sovereignty (*condominium*) in the area. In other words, the Western border counties, or at least most of its villages, which were formerly an integral part of the Principality of Transylvania, were considered by the Transylvanian and Ottoman governments to be their own tax territories at the same time. The current situation has also naturally changed the daily lives of the population.

The aim of the study is to illustrate with a few examples, that fit the limites of this essay, the impact of the Transylvanian-Ottoman joint rule on the political, economic and everyday life of the region, the Transylvanian suburb. The highlighting of each case was basically justified by two factors. On the one hand, they are related to Somlyó (Rom. Șimleu Silvaniei), a key border fortress connected to the Transylvanian border region, which has been fortified to replace the castle of Várad. On the other hand, the special interest of the examples is that they also provide information on the activities of Captain Ferenc Olasz (Francesco Biale) of Genoa. The time frame of the study also needs some explanation, as the phenomenon of *condominium* has already been experienced by Transylvanian society in the decades preceding the period under review. However, with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 17th century the difficulties of joint sovereignty intensified, clashes

4 Sudár, “A hódoltsági pasák”, 895-96.

5 Gábor Döbrentey, “Erdély históriájához tartozó Emlékírások”, in *Felső-Magyarországi Minerva*, t. I, ed. Gábor Döbrentey (Kassa: Ellinger István Könyvnyomtató, 1829), 26-7; MNL, OL, P659, *Teleki család marosvásárhelyi levéltára, Missiles*, vol. 33, no. 762, f. 165.

6 For an example see: Ferenc Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás a török hódoltságban* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981); Gábor Ágoston, “A ‘Flexible Empire’: Authority and Its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers”, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 9/1-2 (2003): 15-31; Géza Dávid, “Administration in Ottoman Europe”, in *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, eds. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (London: Longman, 1995), 71-90. For a more recent multi-faceted review of *condominium* and Ottoman-Hungarian relations: *Identity and Cultural in Ottoman Hungary*, eds. Ács Pál and Fodor Pál (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2017).

became more frequent, and far more written records of the subject remained. Thus, the issue of the *condominium* can be examined better also in terms of resources than in previous periods⁷.

JOINT SOVEREIGNTY – SHARED TAXATION

As a result of the joint sovereignty, the inhabitants of the Western counties, which had previously been an integral part of the Principality of Transylvania and were taxed by the state and landlords under Transylvanian law, had to contend with the demands of the Ottomans at the same time. By implication, all of them, including the Ottoman *vilayets*, the Transylvanian state, the “old” Transylvanian landlords, and the “new” Ottoman landowners, sought to collect their own taxes and enforce their interests, thereby imposing multiple burdens on those who remained in place. Thus, it is worth examining the issue from the perspective of all concerned, through the presentation of some examples.

As a result of the war conditions and the *condominium*, it was a matter of life and death for the Transylvanian state to collect taxes as efficiently as possible, thus ensuring the enforcement of Transylvanian interests in the confines. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the North-South Transylvanian border fortress system established in the 1660s and the role of its officials. Among them, the work of the Transylvanian officials in Somlyó mentioned in my introduction, and especially that of Captain Ferenc Olasz⁸.

On the one hand, I must point out that the unclear power situation in the *condominium* and the presence of Ottoman soldiers have made it difficult to collect taxes on behalf of the state of Transylvania⁹. In the 1660s, the Transylvanian government entrusted Gergely Ugray as the tax collector (*perceptor*) of the Bihar counties most affected by the Ottoman conquest. As a Bihar-born, he undoubtedly had excellent local knowledge. The border fortress of Somlyó near the taxing areas was designated as his headquarters¹⁰. Under his instructions, the Transylvanian Treasury (*fiscus*) was required to collect both monetary (Hun. *kapuadó*, “gate tax”) and crop (*decima*) taxes on the joint sovereignty territories. However, due to the turbulent conditions in the region, it was difficult for him to carry out his tasks, and he had repeatedly asked the Transylvanian government to clarify the situation in the region already in the early years of his term¹¹. The Transylvanian diet sought to regulate the taxation of dual-dominated territories independently of Ugray’s

7 See: Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 350-60, 369-81.

8 Ágnes Szalai, “‘Nagyságotok és kegyelmetek lévén az haza oszlopi’ A fejedelmi kormányzat szerepe a váradi török tartománnyal szembeni végvárrendszer megszervezésében az 1660-as évek derekán”, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 134/3 (2021): 547-75; Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 392-94 and passim.

9 Example: MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 42, no. 845, f. 61.

10 Sándor Szilágyi, *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek*, vol. 14: 1664-1669 (Budapest: MTA Könyvkiadó Hivatal, 1889), 234.

11 MNL OL P658, *Teleki család marosvásárhelyi levéltára*, *Új rendezés*, vol. 7, f. 1783r.

request¹², however, it was typically the *perceptors* and the army at the confines who assisted in their work that agreed with the taxing settlements and collected most of the taxes that were used to operate the border fortresses. However, it is also clear from the sources I have examined that, due to the burden of joint sovereignty, Transylvanian officials often only managed to achieve this by threatening the inhabitants of the given settlement and, in our examples, temporarily imprisoning them in the fortress of Somlyó¹³.

In addition, the military and economic officers of the Somlyó border fortress played a prominent role in the efficient operation of the network of princely and treasury estates, which brought income to the Principality of Transylvania but was threatened by the presence of the Ottomans. This is well illustrated by their relationship with the Manor of Székelyhíd (Rom. Săcueni) in the northern part of Bihar County. According to the Peace of Vasvár (1664), the fortress of Székelyhíd, which was chosen to replace the occupied Várad castle and to protect the manor and the population of the countryside, had to be destroyed. Therefore, the protection of the manor was provided by the border forts of the newly established Transylvanian border fortress system, mostly Somlyó. The income of the Manor of Székelyhíd was also mostly allocated to maintain this fortress. During the indicated period, the supply of crop annuities, mainly wheat, to the castle guard (*praesidium*) from a total of nine settlements of the Manor of Székelyhíd¹⁴, was supervised by the aforementioned Gergely Ugray *perceptor* – he notified the captains of the Transylvanian border fortresses (Hung. Kővár – Rom. Chioar, Hung. Szamosújvár – Rom. Gherla, Hung. Cseh – Rom. Cehu Silvaniei) on the necessity of forwarding and transporting the crop to Somlyó¹⁵. However, due to the presence of Ottoman soldiers and the collection of taxes, the transport of crops of Székelyhíd to Somlyó was by no means an easy task¹⁶. Thus, on several occasions, Captain Ferenc Olasz had to send his own soldiers to ensure the supply of wines from the manor¹⁷.

In addition, Olasz was said to be the liaison between the members of the princely court in the interior of the Transylvanian Principality and the confines, including the Manor of Székelyhíd. In our words today, in addition to “intelligence” tasks, he

12 Szilágyi, *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek*, vol. 14, 140.

13 Áron Szilády and Sándor Szilágyi, *Török-Magyarkori Állam-okmánytár*, vol. IV (Budapest: Eggenberger, 1871), 359; ANR, DJC, *Fond Familial Béldi din Ozun*, vol. 146, f. 73.

14 About the settlements of the dominion see: Béla Szádeczky, *I. Apafi Mihály udvartartása*, t. I: *Bornemisza Anna gazdasági naplói. 1667-1690* (Budapest: MTA, 1911), 191. I have to note here that the settlements of North Bihar County were also taxed and afflicted by the army stationed in the fortresses in the hands of Habsburgs in Upper Hungary, especially in Szatmár. However, the presentation of this question is not the subject of the present study. It can be consulted here: Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 360-69.

15 MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 21. no. 674. ff. 9, 78.

16 For an example of the oppression of the Manor of Székelyhíd by the Ottomans see: Szilády and Szilágyi, *Török-Magyarkori*, vol. IV, 270, 288, 431. ANR, DJC, *Fond Familial Béldi*, vol. 146. f. 74.

17 ANR, DJC, *Colecția personală Kemény József*, fond: 594, no. 361/1-2.

also mostly administered the cash taxes from the manor to the treasury¹⁸. According to the princely order, he also provided for the distribution of income: in 1678, for example, he allocated 200 forints from the taxes of the manor to the preachers who had fled (*exul*) Várad¹⁹. In addition, in several cases he spent the monetary taxes in Székelyhíd on the salary of the *praesidium*, therefore the border residents themselves were also interested in collecting the taxes as efficiently as possible. Ferenc Olasz also learned about the development and change of incomes and the difficulties of the settlements of the manor and reported these to the Prince²⁰. In 1667, he informed Michael I Apafi that the former Székelyhíd's customs duty of foreign trade called thirtieth (*tricesima*) of the Principality were already operated by the Ottomans, who collected the customs, thus causing a loss of revenue for the state²¹. Due to his position as captain of the fortress, he also detected the activities of counterfeit minters in the joint sovereignty territory, confiscated the counterfeit coins and sent them to the princely court, thus preventing further damage²².

The “old” Transylvanian landowners of the dual-ruled counties sought to have the paragraph of the “promissory note” issued by Pasha Köse Ali referring to them, mentioned in the introduction, recognized by those living and serving in the Ottoman *vilayets* – according to the Transylvanian laws the former landlords to be able to keep their lands and to freely tax their serfs. The Transylvanian landowners also applied to the Transylvanian government in the hope of asserting their own interests: in addition to allowing their monetary taxes to be levied, they demanded their share of the crop tribute (*nonae*) to be kept instead of being supplied to the state, in exchange of the *decima* that they were forced to spend on the maintenance of their border fortresses. With the death of Pasha Köse Ali (1664), there was less and less chance of enforcing the points of his “promissory note” to the Ottomans²³, but sources say that in many cases the Transylvanian landlords did receive the ninth (*nonae*) from their serfs²⁴.

Due to the presence of the Ottomans, the landlords of Transylvania were unable to maintain the former monetary taxation structure in the dual-dominated counties due to the increased tax burden. As a result, the monetary taxation of the local population was governed by separate agreements between the landlord and his serfs. An example of this was the Ugray family from Bihar County: several members of the family²⁵, including the aforementioned Gergely and György, moved from the

18 ANR, DJC, *Kemény József*, no. 361/30-31.; MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 14, no. 328, f. 83; Szádeczky, I. *Apafi Mihály*, 191-92, 222, 467.

19 ANR, DJC, *Kemény József*, no. 361/23-4.

20 MNL, OL, P1239, *Teleki család marosvásárhelyi levéltára*, *Apafi Mihály gyűjtemény*, 4. d. no. 1-1675-13.

21 MNL, OL, P1239, *Apafi Mihály*, 2. d. no. 1-1667-16.

22 MNL, OL, P1239, *Apafi Mihály*, 4. d. no. 1-1675-14.

23 József Koncz, “Szalárdi János kiadatlan levelei és reá vonatkozó apró adatok. Második közlemény”, *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, 9/1 (1899): 221-22.

24 Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 397-99.

25 Petra Mátyás-Rausch and Ágnes Szalai, *Fejedelmi prefektusok Erdélyben. Források a*

Ottoman-taxed Bihar County, and took on military and economic positions at the Transylvanian border fortresses of Déva (Rom. Deva) and Somlyó in the 1660s, which meant greater security. György Ugray was later forced to make an agreement with the serfs of Telegd (Rom. Tileagd) who remained in the joint sovereignty territory so that, until they were liberated from the rule of the Ottomans of Várád, they owed him only 16 imperial thalers a year in cash and crimson leather as a “gift”²⁶. The recalled treaty also clearly confirms that, similarly to the border region of the Kingdom of Hungary, both the landowners and the serfs considered the presence of Ottoman rule in the region to be temporary²⁷.

The issue of taxation of the Ottoman provinces adjoining the Principality of Transylvania and their armies from the counties of Transylvania can be illustrated by a case from 1671. In order to resolve the border conflict between the Ottomans of Várád and the Principality of Transylvania at that time, the parties concerned turned to the Porte. In order to substantiate its own claim, the Transylvanian government ordered a census of the amount of Transylvanian taxes payable to the Várád *vilayet* by type of tax²⁸. According to the *defter* of Pír Mehmed Pasha, we know from the register of Doboka County, which also served the Ottomans of Várád, that the inhabitants of the Transylvanian villages were obliged to pay the taxes typical of other border regions of the Ottoman Empire²⁹. On the one hand, the “emperor’s tax” (*kharaj*) belonging to the line of state taxes³⁰. In addition, the population also paid a cash and crop tribute to the local Ottoman landowners. According to the sources, the definition of this may have worked similarly to the relationship with the landlords of Transylvania: that is, the tax burden of each village was formed through agreements with Ottoman officials. Residents of the village of Drág (Rom. Dragu) in Doboka County, for example, have managed to reduce their financial tax burden to approximately one-fifth of their landlord. However, it was rather the case of the neighbouring town of Adalin (Rom. Adalinu) that could be considered common: their Ottoman leader, “Pasha Bulyok”, imposed about four times the monetary tax on them. The crop burdens of the villages were similarly different and varied: food (butter, honey, beef) and expensive hides and fabrics. The burden on those who remained in place also included the service required to maintain the castle and forts, in most cases its monetary redemption and the so-called mosque money. Undoubtedly, the Ottomans demanded significant sums of money,

kora újkori Erdély igazgatástörténetéhez (Budapest: ELKH BTK TTI, 2021), 301.

- 26 ANR, DJB, *Fond Familial Ugray-Bölöni*, vol. 51, f. 13. Cf.: Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 371, 395, 400.
- 27 Klára Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés Magyarországon* (Budapest: História Könyvtár, 1995), 41-2.
- 28 Ágnes Szalai, “A fejedelmi tanács és az erdélyi deputáció törekvései az Erdélyi Fejedelemség és a váradi török tartomány közötti 1671-1672. évi konfliktus rendezésére”, *Studia Agriensia*, ed. Ingrid Fejér, 34 (2022) (Under release).
- 29 Klára Hegyi, “A magyar tartomány helye és helyzete az Oszmán Birodalomban”, *Világtörténet*, 16/1 (1994): 20-1.
- 30 Sándor Szilágyi, *Vértanúk a magyar történetből: történeti tanulmányok* (Pest: Kiadja Heckenast Gusztáv, 1867), 478-85.

crops, and services from the counties considered subjugated under the “defter of Píri Pasha” for the operation of their own *vilayet* and the supply of their army. More than 3,000 forints a year were collected from Doboka County alone, and a total of about 40,000 forints a year was collected from the five counties claimed based on Píri’s *defter*. By way of comparison, this amount was of the same order of magnitude as the amount of the annual tax paid by the Principality of Transylvania to the Porte during this period due to its vassal status³¹.

Thus, the Ottomans, similarly to the border region with the Kingdom of Hungary, developed and shaped their tax system in the border region of the Principality of Transylvania in order to ensure their own livelihood. In addition, the administrative and tax structure of the Transylvanian state and the network of officials continued to operate in the region. It goes without saying that, in their own interests, both parties have sought to prevent each other from supplying the tax to the other side of the population. The repeatedly mentioned Captain Ferenc Olasz in Somlyó reported to the Prince in the 1670s that the Ottomans of Várad were scheming to prevent «the supply of taxes by the people of Bihar County to Transylvania»³². But sources also report similar complaints from the Ottomans of Várad: on the one hand, it was common for judges in charge of collecting taxes from individual villages and bringing them in to their Ottoman superiors to sabotage the delivery of taxes³³. On the other hand, it has regularly happened that the Transylvanian border residents did not allow the inhabitants of the joint sovereignty areas to pay their taxes either, although in principle the Ottoman tax collectors (should have) had to be helped by Transylvanian soldiers to collect their taxes, and vice versa³⁴. However, mutual efforts to prevent taxation have almost without exception culminated in failure, often in smaller or larger armed clashes³⁵.

JOINT SOVEREIGNTY IN ECONOMIC LIFE

Dual domination has, of course, also brought about changes in economic life. To increase their own revenues, the Ottomans tried to make the most of the economic opportunities offered by the region. Thus, the control and operation of the mills, one-thirtieth customs duties and mines that previously benefited the Principality of Transylvania fell into the hands of the Ottomans in several cases. The first example is the occupation of the watermill of Szőlós by Pasha Hussein in the immediate vicinity of the Ottoman provincial centre, Várad³⁶. The village judges also informed Transylvanian landlord Domokos Bethlen of the loss of revenue due to the “confiscation” of the mill, saying they could do nothing, «the mill is of no use as

31 Szilágyi, *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek*, vol. 13, 58.

32 «a Bihar vármegyebeliek Erdélyhez semmit ne adózzanak»: MNL, OL, P1239, *Apafi Mihály*, 2. d. no. 1-1676-15. Cf.: Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 394.

33 MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 55. no. 1125. f. 114.

34 ANR, DJS, *Benigni*, vol. 40. ff. 14, 40, 43. Cf.: Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 375-76.

35 ANR DJS, *Benigni*, vol. 40. f. 53.

36 MNL, Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Levéltára, *Debrecen város magisztrátusi jegyzőkönyvei*, b. 17, f. 101.

the stone grinds to the benefit of the pasha»³⁷. In connection with the customs, the thirties of Székelyhíd were controlled by the Ottomans: from 1667 it was operated by the Ottomans of Szentjobb (Rom. Sâniob)³⁸. To the south, one of the customs offices in the vicinity of the *vilayet* of Temesvár, it is worth referring to the case of the thirtieth customs office in Körösbánya (Rom. Baia de Criș). The customs in Transylvania became difficult to control in Transylvania in the 1660s due to the presence of the soldiers in Temesvár and Jenő, and from 1671 onwards, due to frequent Ottoman looting and the conquest along the Körös (Rom. Criș) rivers, the princely government was unable to operate³⁹. With regard to the occupation of the mines by the Ottomans, I must also mention an example from Bihar County, the case of Rézbánya (Rom. Băița) and the opposition between the Ottomans of Várad and the Transylvanians. The ore-mining mine, which had previously brought significant benefits to the Principality of Transylvania⁴⁰, had been cultivated by the Ottomans since the 1660s and was referred to as the «copper mine of our great emperor»⁴¹. However, the operation of the mines was not easy for the Ottomans either: the Ottomans of Várad once accused the Transylvanians, one of the key figures of the border guard, the chief captain of Kolozsvár (Rom. Cluj-Napoca) Dénes Bánffy, of attacking the mine with the border military, capturing the mining master, killing other miners and robbing all their goods. The Ottomans of Várad, and later the mining master of Rézbánya, turned to the Porte to complain about the case. Although this caused great alarm in the Principality of Transylvania, the issue was finally settled: it was proved that it was not the Transylvanian border soldiers who had acted, but «the evildoers and thieves lurking in the forest»⁴². This difficulty, that is the large number of thieves living in insecurity due to the war and the increased burdens, but taking advantage of the confusing conditions, had to be dealt with in the area by both Transylvanians and Ottoman provinces and the traders who traded with them⁴³. The following excerpts point to the difficulties of the water trade in the Maros (Rom. Mureș) due to looters:

they attacked the other day the vessels going upstream, now [...] they raided the packed vessels going downstream and took their goods [...] and sent word that if fifty-fifty thalers are not given from each packed vessels, they shall be sunk [...]»⁴⁴.

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- 37 «a malomnak semmi haszna sincsen, mivel köve a pasának öröl», ANR, DJC, *Colecția personală Mike Sándor*, fond: 246. no. 1128.
- 38 See note no. 23. Moreover: MNL, OL, P658 Új rendezés, vol. 7, f. 1783.
- 39 MNL, OL, P659 *Missiles*, vol. 21. no. 675. ff. 40-1.
- 40 Petra Mátyás-Rausch, «Kupfergewinnung im Komitat Bihar im 16-17. Jahrhundert», *Vorschungen zur Volks und Landeskunde*, 63/1 (2020): 9-12.
- 41 «hatalmas császárunk réz bányájaként», MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 14. no. 331. f. 11.
- 42 Szilágyi, *Vértanúk*, 467; Sámuel Gergely, *Teleki Mihály levelezése*, vol. IV (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1908), 526; Ibid., vol. V, 131; Szilágyi and Szilágyi, *Török-magyarkori*, vol. 5, 28, 37-8.
- 43 ANR, DJC, *Mike Sándor*, no. 1057. See also: Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 380, 392.
- 44 Mátyás-Rausch and Szalai, *Fejedelmi prefektusok*, 259.

Transylvanian traders have been forced to change their north-western trade route due to thieves raiding the *condominium* area⁴⁵, or traders have been murdered⁴⁶. In addition, the “Greek” traders of the Balkans⁴⁷, who traded in commodities in Transylvania at the time, were confiscated or lost their money by residents of Saxon cities, such as Brassó (Rom. Braşov), which also had a strong interest in the Transylvanian trade⁴⁸. In addition to occasional traders from the Balkans turning to dignitaries in the Ottoman provinces to remedy their grievances, the sources also report damage they have done to Ottoman soldiers in joint sovereignty areas⁴⁹. Although the situation in the confines made it difficult to export and import goods from Transylvania, it is interesting to note that many Eastern products entered the Principality of Transylvania through traders in the Balkans. For example, it is well known that smoking became widespread in Transylvania during the time of Michael I Apafi⁵⁰, but the sherbet, a delicacy flavoured with honey and various herbs also became a popular drink thanks to the Ottoman-“Greek” mediation, especially for the upscale population⁵¹.

Regarding “Greek” traders, it is also important to cover their business relations with the Transylvanian government. Their presence and assets were in part a solution for Transylvania’s revenue loss due to *condominium*. As can be seen from the above, some of the customs and mines were either under the control of the Ottomans or destroyed. In addition, there was a continuing risk of losing other customs and mining sites along the border, as well as ports (*portus*) reserved for the transport of Transylvanian salt, which also made significant profits. The operation of customs, mines and salt ports which remained under their control despite the Ottoman presence were also cumbersome and often unprofitable for the Transylvanian government. Therefore, and due to the almost permanent shortage of cash, the Transylvanian government has decided to lease most of the customs and salt ports for an immediate, secure and lump-sum annual income (*arenda*). There was a “Greek” interest in almost all of the leases, the name of János Páter should be emphasized. As a result, the Transylvanian government earned a secure income of tens of thousands of forints a year from the 1670s onwards, and they did not have to deal with the day-to-day problems of operating customs and salt ports⁵².

45 ANR, DJS, *Benigni*, vol. 40, f. 19.

46 ANR, DJS, *Benigni*, vol. 40, f. 44.

47 Mária Pakucs, “This is their profession: Greek merchants in Transilvania and their Networks at the End of the 17th century”, *Cromhos: Cyber review of modern historiography*, 21/1 (2018): 39-40.

48 ANR, DJS, *Benigni*, vol. 40, f. 13.

49 ANR, DJS, *Benigni*, vol. 40, f. 42.

50 Kinga S. Tüdös, “A dohányzással kapcsolatos erdélyi országgyűlési végzések”, in *Országgyűlések–országgyűlések*, ed. Dániel Ballabás (Eger: Líceum Kiadó, 2011), 34-54.

51 Ágnes Szalai, “Honey: the hidden treasure of the Principality of Transylvania”, *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Historia*, 67/2 (2022): (Under release.)

52 Árpád Kulcsár, “Sóbányászat és sókereskedelem Erdélyben I. Apafi Mihály uralkodása idején”, *Századok*, 125/5-6 (1991): 432-35. More examples here: MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*,

JOINT SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WEEKDAYS

The *condominium* and the resulting difficulties have also naturally changed the daily lives of the local population. Meeting the tax liability in several directions was in itself a serious burden on the population, and food shortages could also be a problem. As Ferenc Olasz, the captain of Somlyó put it: «here [...] poverty has risen so much that in some places, [people] live by drying and grinding the acorns and the bark of the tree»⁵³. The presence of (taxing) soldiers and a large number of looters also made the everyday life of the population more difficult. According to sources, the abduction of the civilian population was daily, and in many cases locals, including women and children, were captured or killed⁵⁴. Those passing through the *condominium* were not in an easier position either. Prince Michael I Apafi told the other members of the Transylvanian government about the horrors of everyday life:

[...] Ottomans of Várad are attacking, raiding and killing [them] for no reason. A few days ago, we have sent our dapifer to Debrecen when nineteen Ottomans grabbed him, hang him [...] in some forest, since then he was presumably already cut down⁵⁵.

As a result of the existing conditions, most of the landowners left the joint sovereignty territories and sometimes moved to their estates in the inner part of Transylvania, in absence of such an estate, they joined the service of the Transylvanian state. At the same time, as a result of the current situation, lower-strata social strata, such as serfs, also tried to get rid of their growing burdens and in several cases fled their landlords⁵⁶. It is worth examining the situation of the escaped serfs, the problems arising from the increased burden of the population and the presence of Ottoman soldiers from a legal point of view, as well. The Transylvanian government, while maintaining their own jurisdiction in the region, sought to resolve the contradictions and problems in the area of the occupation at the Transylvanian

vol. 11. no. 290. ff. 4, 14-5.

- 53 «itt [...] már annyira jutott a szegénység, hogy némely helyen a makkot és a fa héját megszáraztván és őrlővén, azzal él», ANR, DJC, *Kemény József*, no. 361/8-9.
- 54 For examples see: Szilády and Szilágyi, *Török-Magyarkori*, vol. IV, 469-71.; MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 19, no. 665, f. 5; ANR, DJS, *Benigni*, vol 40. f. 42.
- 55 «[...] a váradiak is igaz ok nélkül szolgálainkra és embereinkre rátámadván, rabolják és vágják [ti. őket]. Az elmúlt napokban is étekgónkat expedáltuk Debrecenbe, tizenkilenc török megragadta, felkötözte [...] valami erdőbe, feltehetően levágták már», MNL, OL, X 7314 19048. *Törzsgyűjtemény* [Core Archives], Letter from Michael I. Apafi to Dénes Bánffy, 19 January 1674, nn.
- 56 ANR, DJC, *Mike Sándor*, no. 1102, 1105, 1107, 1141; ANR, DJC, *Colecția socoteli princiare* [Princely court sources], vol. 60, f. 138. This was a pre-existing phenomenon due to the *condominium*, however, as the difficulties increased, the extent of this also increased. Cf.: Ferenc Szakály, *Magyar intézmények a török hódoltságban* (Budapest: MTA TTI, 1997), 216-23.

judicial forums. At the same time, we must add that the Ottomans, similarly to the border region of the Kingdom of Hungary, did not really seek to control society in addition to securing their taxes from the inhabitants of the Transylvanian joint sovereignty territories and exploiting the economic potential of the territory⁵⁷. This is reinforced by the fact that while the Ottoman dignitaries tried to lure their fleeing taxpayers back through concessions, the Transylvanians, although they also made concessions, investigated the cases according to their own custom⁵⁸. An example of this is the case of the serfs who escaped from Sajókeresztúr (Rom. Cristur-Şieu) in Doboka County: their case was investigated before elected judges⁵⁹. The increased tax burdens and the arbitrariness of the Ottomans were investigated before the Transylvanian county courts and/or the Transylvanian diet. As a result, it is not surprising that the much-mentioned Ferenc Olasz, the captain of Somlyó who, by the end of the period became lord lieutenant (Hun. *főispán*) of Kraszna and Közép-Szolnok Counties, conducted an *inquisitio* on the burdens of the subjugated population due to the Ottomans.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the investigation of the complaint of the residents of Magyarvalkó (Rom. Văleni) about the destruction of their church was also connected to the county court sitting in Somlyó⁶¹.

It can also be seen from the latter case that the religious frictions that fundamentally determined everyday life were also present in the era. Várad ceased to exist as a former cultural and ecclesiastical centre since the start of the Ottoman rule in 1660, but in the area of joint sovereignty the Reformed Church, even in the shadow of the Ottomans, was able to continue to operate. The ecclesiastical and cultural role of Várad was taken over by the city of Debrecen and the Reformed College, a city of special status (*hass*), which was previously of special importance in this respect, supplying the population of the *condominium* with pastors and the schools with rectors⁶². However, in turbulent times, the people of dual-dominated territories also received help from the Transylvanian government in order to preserve the continuity of their church life. For example, Michael I Apafi waived 50 forints from the annual tax of the settlement for the maintenance of the school in Diószeg (Rom. Diosig), located in the aforementioned Manor of Székelyhíd in Bihar County⁶³. The Prince

57 Hegyi, *A magyar tartomány*, 22; Pál Fodor, “A kincstár számára a hitetlen a leghasznosabb: Az oszmánok magyarországi valláspolitikája”, in *Magyar évszázadok. Tanulmányok Kosáry Domokos 90. születésnapjára*, ed. Mária Ormos (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2003), 88–99.

58 As an example see: ANR, DJC, *Mike Sándor*, no. 1241. Cf.: Szakály, *Magyar intézmények*, 55.

59 ANR, DJC, *Mike Sándor*, no. 1102, 1105, 1107.

60 MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 14. no. 328. ff. 84r-86v. Cf.: Mór Petri, *Szilágy vármegye monographiája*, I/XIII (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1901), 337.

61 Szilády and Szilágyi, *Török-magyarkori*, vol. V, 31.

62 István Szabadi, “A református egyház a hódolt Biharban”, in “*Őrizzük Váradot...*” *Nagyvárad és Bihar vármegye története a kora újkorban*, ed. Teréz Oborni (Nagyvárad: Varadinum Kulturális Alapítvány, 2017), 55–68.

63 MNL, OL, P1239, *Apafi Mihály*, 2. d. no. 2-1675-13.

similarly supported the request of the residents of Magyarvalkó to restore their church. Indeed, the inhabitants argued that because of their exposure to Ottoman power, they could not do so on their own, as «we have to serve these strangers and pay taxes beyond our means»⁶⁴. But, as in previous periods, the Transylvanian government also gave special support to the operation of the Debrecen College with a cash grant and salt, one of Transylvania's important natural resources. The latter, after its sale, also made a significant financial contribution to the operation of the school⁶⁵.

SUMMARY

The government of the Transylvanian Principality was seriously challenged by the Ottoman takeover of the castle of Várada in 1660. After the fall of this key destination, another Ottoman province with the centre of Várada was established in the Western neighbourhood of the state, in addition to the previously established *vilayet* of Temesvár (1552). However, as in other confines of the Ottoman Empire, no border line was drawn between the two Ottoman provinces and the state of the Principality of Transylvania, which resulted in the existence of joint sovereignty (*condominium*) in the region.

With the expansion of the Ottomans, almost a third of the territory of the Principality of Transylvania, a significant part of the so-called Parts (Lat. *Partium*), was subject to shared taxation. The remaining population owed not only to the former Transylvanian landlords and the state of Transylvania, but also to the neighbouring Ottoman *vilayets* and dignitaries by paying taxes on money and crops. Although a significant proportion of the population that survived the severe devastation of the mid-17th century war emigrated from the region due to increased tax burdens, the local population sought to agree to reduce their multi-directional tax liabilities through separate agreements with their Ottoman and Transylvanian leaders. However, the delivery of taxes has been hampered in many cases due to the declining population and the turbulent conditions. In addition, the two sides were also working to prevent the supply of taxes by serfs to another. This endeavour, in addition to the fact that the presence of soldiers sparked frictions and minor armed conflicts, was largely unsuccessful.

Joint sovereignty also had economic consequences: the Ottomans repeatedly succeeded in bringing the opportunities for economic gain, such as trade duties and mines, under their own control to maintain and supply their own provinces and officials. Although the Transylvanian government tried to preserve its economic influence over the area, it solved the problem by renting customs and salt ports in the area by the 1670s due to uncertain conditions, the presence of Ottomans and a large number of thieves and destruction. Leasing with the interest of usually "Greek" traders meant a lump sum and a certain amount of revenue for the Transylvanian government every year.

Of course, the *condominium* also had an impact on the daily lives of the civilian

64 «z idegeneknek erőnk felett kell szolgálnunk, s értékünk felett adóznunk», ANR, DJC, *Colecția socoteli*, vol. 60, f. 87.

65 Tiszántúli Református Egyházkerület Levéltára, *Sinai Miklós-féle hagyaték*, I. 24. a. 5. no. 1060–1070.; MNL, OL, P659, *Missiles*, vol. 11, no. 290, f. 44.

population. In addition to the occasional food shortages, robberies and abuses by soldiers were commonplace. With the Ottoman rule of Várad, the ecclesiastical and cultural centre of the region was also lost, and the market town of Debrecen, which was already significant in the field of religion and culture, took its place. Although the presence of the Ottomans limited the opportunities for Christian churches to function, the local diocese and the Transylvanian government sought to maintain and support the continuity of church life, more often than not with success. Since the Ottomans' goal was basically to collect the taxes needed to run their own *vilayet*, the grievances of the *condominium* population were discussed in Transylvanian legal forums. At the same time, it is a fact that the leaders of the Transylvanian state and the Transylvanian society considered the presence of the Ottomans in the region to be temporary, so the Transylvanian government itself sought to preserve its own powers in all areas of public administration.

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In addition, it is worth referring to the outstanding role of Captain Ferenc Olasz in Somlyó in the issue under review. The cases presented for illustrative purposes also suggest that the military officer of Genoa origin can be considered one of the key figures of Transylvanian advocacy in the Apafi period.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANR: Arhivele Naționale ale României
 DJS: Direcția Județeană Sibiu
 DJB: Direcția Județeană Bihor-Orodea
 DJC: Direcția Județeană Cluj-Cluj-Napoca
 MNL: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár-Budapest
 OL: Országos Levéltára

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FIGURES



Fig. 1 - Map by Béla Nagy cartographer (Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of History, Budapest, Hungary).



A THIRD WAY. AN ATTEMPT TO REORIENT HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN VENETIAN/ ITALIAN CONNECTIONS WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS BORDERLANDS

ABSTRACT

The history of early modern Italian connections with the Ottoman Empire and its borderlands is often considered separated from those of any other Central/Eastern European state or area. Only sporadically, when referred to moments of anti-Ottoman alliances' formation, it is presented in a wider geographical context. Depicted even so, it is usually limited to political cooperation between respective Italian and Central/Eastern European polities.

Taking cue from a report on Georgia by Pietro della Valle – who indicated a third way from Italy to that country passing through Poland-Lithuania, equivalent to those via Constantinople or Aleppo – the paper aims to reorient studies on connections between Poland-Lithuania, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire in the 16th/17th century. Based i.a. on primary sources mostly taken from the Venetian archives, it invites to adopt an entangled, “triangular” perspective on the study of the considered areas' history through a closer examination of diplomatic practices, circulation of motifs in diplomatic writings on the Ottomans, and individuals' migrations.

KEYWORDS: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Venice; Ottoman Empire; Diplomacy; Armenians.

INTRODUCTION

In 1626 a Roman traveler Pietro Della Valle presented to the Pope Urban VIII a detailed report on Georgian lands and their inhabitants. The document was used by the Papal curia to prepare a new Catholic mission in the Caucasus, entrusted to the Theatines. In his report Della Valle proposed to missionaries to use one of three alternative ways to that country: via Constantinople/Istanbul, Persia, or Poland-Lithuania¹. The first one was the shortest. It began as a sea journey to Constantinople. More difficult, in the traveler's opinion, was the rest of this route, passing by the Ottoman Empire and thus requiring caution from traveling clergymen. An alternative way – via Persia – was presented by Della Valle as much easier, even if secrecy, «prudence and great caution» also there were of the essence. Both these ways to Georgia, running across lands not governed by the «Christian princes», assumed cooperation of the newly sent priests with other Catholic missionaries

¹ Juansher Vateishvili, ed., “Informazione della Georgia data alla Santità di nostro Signore Papa Urbano VIII da Pietro della Valle il Pellegrino l'anno MDCXXXVI”, *Regnum Dei*, 56 (2000): 106-07. All translations of quoted passages from Italian and Polish texts are mine [PC].

already operating locally. Finally, a third way indicated by Della Valle was the way «through Poland». Choosing it, one could easily reach the Black Sea and thence «in a very few days arrive in Georgia»; an alternative way passed through Kyiv and then down with the course of Dnieper. While the Theatines could also profit from the assistance of other missionaries present in Poland-Lithuania, they could – moreover – rely on «that very Catholic and pious king» and on the support by Cossacks or Catholic Ruthenians thanks to whom «not only simple missionaries [...] but even a bishop, nuncio or ambassador [...] might enter Georgia in perfect security».

The description of possible missionaries' routes from Italy to Georgia – situated in the then borderlands of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires – served as inspiration for the present contribution. The history of early modern Italian (and, mainly analysed here: Venetian) contacts with the Ottomans is increasingly more often considered in a broader Mediterranean context, oftentimes extended to a Balkan hinter – or borderland². At the same time, however, studies linking Venice (and more broadly: Italy), Ottoman Empire, and East-Central Europe are less frequently undertaken. In particular, the connections between Venice and the latter area in the Ottoman context are usually studied through the lens of strictly political aspects; such studies are often focused on anti-Ottoman leagues or efforts to establish them, mostly in the 17th century³. Yet, as the outcome of those alliances not always seemed to be satisfactory for all their participants (let alone historians), an interest in other dimensions of contacts between all mentioned polities or regions seems to offer a wide range of research possibilities. This is the rationale of this article, mostly focused on certain aspects of contacts between Poland-Lithuania and Venice in the Ottoman context roughly between 1550 and 1650, as shown by Venetian sources. Given its limited character, this contribution aims at setting a general agenda for directions of a possible further research – rather than at thoroughly describing them.

2 E.g., Eric R. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople. Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire. Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Stephen Ortega, *Negotiating Transcultural Relations in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Ottoman-Venetian Encounters* (Ashgate: Farnham, 2014); Maria Pia Pedani, *The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries)* (Venezia: Ca' Foscari, 2017).

3 Cf. recently: Alessandro Boccolini, “‘In mare et in terra’. La Lega Santa del 1684 e la diplomazia pontificia”, *Perspektywy Kultury/Perspectives on Culture*, 30/3 (2020): 179-96; Alessandro Boccolini, “La Lega Santa del 1684 e l'ambasciata straordinaria di Angelo Morosini alla corte di Jan III Sobieski tratta dalle carte conservate presso l'Archivio di Stato di Venezia”, *Eastern European History Review*, 3 (2020): 27-46 – and the vast bibliography included in both contributions, in particular works by Domenico Caccamo and Gaetano Platania. On plans of a Polish-Venetian alliance in the late 1640s cf. Wiktor Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV* (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1895).

A DIPLOMATIC TRIANGLE: POLAND-LITHUANIA, VENICE, AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Polish-Venetian relations in the early modern period did not develop particularly intensively, despite a general positive perception of the Republic (and its original constitutional solutions) by the nobility of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and a lack of problematic issues on bilateral agenda throughout the centuries in question. What potentially blocked the development of any deeper mutual relations was a significant difference in organization of foreign missions in both polities. Contrary to Venice, Poland-Lithuania – as a rule – did not either send or accept foreign residents, mostly using envoys on ad hoc missions in its practice related to the foreign policy. As a consequence, the diplomatic documentation preserved in the State Archives of Venice and concerning Venetian missions to Poland-Lithuania is relatively small, including only eight reports (*relazioni*)⁴ and a similarly limited set of dispatches sent by Venetian envoys to Poland-Lithuania back to their capital⁵.

Besides a general respect for the Republic of St. Mark noted among the Polish-Lithuanian nobles, the country's attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire were another area of interest for the Venetian diplomats when considering potential driving factors to intensify mutual relations. For instance, Marino Cavalli in his report from Vienna (1545) included two observations on Poland-Lithuania: that it was actually a republic (and hence the respect of its inhabitants towards Venice) and that it was «prudently governed» to maintain peace with its neighbours, including the Ottoman Empire⁶. Equally, these two elements were included in a short mention on the country in the Federico Badoer's report from 1557⁷. In a similar vein, the *relazione* produced by Pietro Duodo – who was sent to Poland-Lithuania in 1592 – aimed to analyse «friendship that can be contracted» with that country, and to «consider reasons that can move Poles to be united with this most excellent Republic [of Venice – PC]». Among these motives, the only one thoroughly described in the report's introductory part was a possible cooperation against a

4 Andrea Da Mosto, *Archivio di Stato di Venezia. Indice generale, storico, descrittivo ed analitico*, vol. I (Roma: Biblioteca d'Arte, 1937), 48. These reports are dated: 1557, 1568, 1574, 1573-80, 1647, 1649, 1685, 1717. Their number is definitely lower than those from Constantinople, France, Spain, Germany/Austria, and even England, but still much higher with respect to those concerning other countries such as Portugal, Switzerland, Muscovy/Russia etc. (Italian polities excluded). The given number of reports from Poland-Lithuania should be increased by several unpreserved ones.

5 The dispatches of Venetian envoys to Polish-Lithuania are gathered in 20 or 21 files (*filze*) and 6 or 7 registers; cf. diverging data given by Da Mosto, *Archivio*, 41 and *Guida generale degli Archivi di Stato italiani*, vol. IV (Roma: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, 1994), 897. This not very impressive legacy should be integrated by documents from the Venetian mission in Vienna, partly covering news from Poland-Lithuania.

6 Eugenio Alberi, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto*, ser. I, vol. 3 (Firenze: Società editrice fiorentina, 1853), 141.

7 Alberi, *Relazioni*, I/3, 210-11.

«universal enemy», i.e., the Ottoman Empire⁸. This perception grew stronger over time; as Józef Garbacik underlines, the Polish-Venetian relations started to intensify in the 17th century due to a need to address the Ottoman expansion⁹.

No wonder then that when looking for sources for Polish-Venetian relations in early modern times one should be interested in the documents left by the Venetian residents in Constantinople (*baili*): i.e., their reports and dispatches. Clearly, these documents also constitute an important source for Polish-Ottoman relations. For example, Poland was mentioned in 17 summaries (headings) of the dispatches' register from March through December 1633 and in 26 further ones of the subsequent year¹⁰. The observations included in the dispatches concerned both events of local importance (i.a., arrivals of subsequent Polish envoys to Constantinople) and plans or progresses of wars or peace negotiations not only between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire but also in a broader geopolitical context, including Muscovy and Sweden. Interestingly, news from Poland-Lithuania and from Persia – i.e., countries that could assume the burden of fighting against the Ottoman Empire or temporarily blocking its forces, which Venice was keenly interested in – are sometimes described in the same dispatches¹¹. A recurring motif of an imminent (or at least future) Ottoman expansion towards Poland-Lithuania can also be found in numerous reports by Venetian baili, including Giovanni Correr (1578), Lorenzo Bernardo (1592), Giovanni Moro (1590), and Ottaviano Bon (1608)¹².

An attempt to analyse baili's dispatches in this respect was made by Józef Garbacik who studied a number of these documents from the turn of the 16th and 17th century (1587-1608)¹³. More recently, a study in this direction was undertaken by Dariusz Kołodziejczyk who focused on a number of dispatches of the early 17th century, concerning the activity of Cossacks, and on those related to the Venetian diplomacy's actions towards Poland-Lithuania after the outbreak of the War of Candia¹⁴. Furthermore, endeavours to establish a permanent Venetian mission in

8 Eugenio Alberi, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto*, ser. I, vol. 6 (Firenze: Società editrice fiorentina, 1862), 319-20.

9 Józef Garbacik, "Polska wobec konfliktu Wenecji z papieżem Pawłem V (1606–1607)", *Collectanea Theologica*, 19/2 (1938): 159-60.

10 ASVe, Disp. Cost., reg. D23a.

11 E.g., ASVe, Disp. Cost., reg. D23a, f. 44r (disp. 46, 16.10.1633).

12 Luigi Firpo, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato tratte dalle migliori edizioni disponibili e ordinate cronologicamente*, vol. XIII (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1984), 20 (Moro) and 67 (Bernardo); Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, vol. 14: *Costantinopoli. Relazioni inedite 1512-1789* (Padova: Aldo Ausilio, 1996), 248 (Correr) and 490 (Bon).

13 Józef Garbacik, "Le relazioni turco-polacche tra XVI e XVII secolo alla luce dei rapporti e dei dispacci dei baili veneziani a Costantinopoli", in *Italia, Venezia e Polonia tra Umanesimo e Rinascimento*, ed. Mieczysław Brahmer (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1967), 215. His sources are presented on 218-19.

14 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "The Ottoman Northern Policy as Seen from the Venetian

the Commonwealth – with the Ottoman threat in their potential background – also met with a significant interest by Polish historians¹⁵. In light of their findings, these attempts failed mostly due to divergent current interests in other areas than a potential anti-Ottoman cooperation; or sometimes even because of actions undertaken by other actors, including the Papacy. Quite symbolically, it seems to show that it might be advisable not to restrict studies on the Polish-Venetian political relations only to anti-Ottoman leagues. While the Venetian documents from the legation in Constantinople certainly show that the Polish-Venetian diplomatic connections cannot be separated from the Ottoman context, a more systematic study of these sources, focused on a longer period, would be certainly of benefit for further research. It could integrate entangled relations between Poland-Lithuania, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire, especially in the light of the latter's "Northern policy", to use Kołodziejczyk's words. Furthermore, the appearance of the new diplomatic history with its own agenda prompts a reformulation of this task to new directions.

In this context, a deeper study of contacts between Polish and Venetian envoys in Constantinople may contribute to a better understanding of how the Christian/European diplomatic corps in Constantinople functioned. This is an area seemingly less popular as a research theme when compared to – for example – the Ottoman court ceremonial¹⁶. We learn, for instance, from the Polish envoy Aleksander Piaseczyński's report (mission of 1630) that he asked i.a. the Venetian bailo to support his request to release captives, presented to the *kaymakam*. This mention confirms that there was a practice of joint actions by European ambassadors to the Sublime Porte undertaken in mutual support, especially in defence of capitulations,

Archives", *CIÉPO Osmanlı Öncesi ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Uluslararası Komitesi XIV. Sempozyumu Bildirileri XIV. Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, ed. Tuncer Baykara (Ankara: TTK, 2004), 417-26.

- 15 Ludwik Boratyński, "Sprawa ambasady weneckiej w Polsce za Stefana Batorego", in *Studia historyczne wydane ku czci Prof. Wincentego Zakrzewskiego* (Kraków: Drukarnia Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1908), 3-30; Józef Garbacik, "Sprawa ambasady weneckiej w Polsce za Zygmunta III", in *Studia z dziejów kultury polskiej: książka zbiorowa*, eds. Henryk Barycz and Jan Hulewicz (Warszawa: Gebethner i Wolff, 1949), 315-31.
- 16 E.g. Maria Pia Pedani, "The Sultan and the Venetian Bailo. Ceremonial Diplomatic Protocol in Istanbul", in *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Ralph Kauz, Giorgio Rota, and Jan Paul Niederkorn (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 287-99; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Semiotics of Behavior in Early Modern Diplomacy: Polish Embassies in Istanbul and Bahçesaray", *Journal of Early Modern History*, 7/3-4 (2003): 245-56; Tetiana Grygorieva, "Symbols and Perceptions of Diplomatic Ceremony. Ambassadors of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in Istanbul", in *Kommunikation durch symbolische Akte. Religiöse Heterogenität und politische Herrschaft in Polen-Litauen*, ed. Yvonne Kleinmann (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 115-31. On the functioning of the diplomatic corps in Constantinople: Geoff R. Berridge, "Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620", *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, 92 (2004): 1-20.

and that it was not restricted to resident ambassadors¹⁷. The same Piaseczyński was aware of another practice, i.e., courtesy calls on representatives of other polities staying in Constantinople; however – as he had no particular topics to be raised with them, including with Bailo Giovanni Cappello – the former only sent members of his suite to those diplomats¹⁸. Continuing this practice, in 1640, Polish legate Wojciech Miaskowski met his Venetian counterpart four times, including mutual visits – following Miaskowski's audience at the sultan's court – as well as greetings at the legation's arrival in Constantinople and before its departure¹⁹.

The Miaskowski's mission provided the Venetians with an opportunity to make an interesting note on the ceremonial. It was observed in the register of dispatches that the Polish envoy was required to kiss the «king's» (i.e., sultan's) garment. It seems that this information was related to a withdrawal from the custom of kissing the sultan by foreign diplomats on the hand. This practice was abandoned in 1636 (from then on, the envoys were to kiss the ground); it is then not excluded that this detail was perceived by the Venetian diplomatic milieu in the context of the recalled ceremonial's transformations²⁰. Certainly, this is not the only case showing how useful are the sources concerned for the study of Polish, Venetian or Ottoman diplomatic protocol, especially if not limited solely to bilateral contacts. For example, Giacomo Soranzo – an extraordinary envoy to the ceremony of the sultan's (Murad III) son Mehmet circumcision in 1582 – noted in his final report that during the recalled ceremony he was given a superior place with respect to that of the Polish envoy, so «it was publicly confirmed that it was given to Your Serenity [the doge – PC] a better place than that [assigned – PC] to Poland»²¹.

Other interesting issues that stem from personal contacts between the Polish and Venetian agents are related to communication flows they participated in. As

17 [Aleksander Piaseczyński], “Relacya poselstwa od Najjaśniejszego Zygmunta III, polskiego i szwedzkiego króla, do Amurata Sołtana, cesarza tureckiego [...]”, in *Trzy relacje z polskich podróży na Wschód muzułmański w pierwszej połowie XVII w.*, ed. Adam Walaszek (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1980), 68 and 70. This is also confirmed by Bailo Cappello's dispatches: ASVe, Disp. Cost., filza 111, ff. 1r-v (disp. 59, 2.09.1630). On the practice itself: Berridge, “Notes”, 12-14.

18 [Piaseczyński], “Relacya”, 68.

19 [Wojciech Miaskowski], “Dyaryusz legacyjej do Turek [...]”, in *Wielka legacja Wojciecha Miaskowskiego do Turcji w 1640 r.*, ed. Adam Przyboś (Warszawa: PWN, 1985), 56, 64, 66, and 69. The meetings are dated: April 21; May 13, 20, and 27. Their dates are confirmed in the diary of a member of Miaskowski's suite: [Zbigniew Lubieniecki], “Diariusz drogi tureckiej”, in Walaszek, *Trzy*, 114, 125, 127-28, and 130. It is worth noting that the Venetian bailo met by Miaskowski was Alvise Contarini and not Pietro Foscarini as mentioned by the editor in the note (114, n. 73). Cf. also Maria Pia Pedani, “Elenco degli inviati diplomatici veneziani presso i sovrani ottomani”, *Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies*, 5/4 (2002): 42-43.

20 ASVe, Disp. Cost., reg. D22, f. 52r (disp. 59, 2.09.1630). According to Piaseczyński, his audience with the sultan took place on August 20, 1630 (“Relacya”, 59). On the practice and its abolition: Pedani, “Sultan”, 296.

21 Pedani, *Relazioni*, 266-67.

Garbacik found, a future Polish envoy Krzysztof Dzierżek, guided by his personal attachment to Venice, used to send secret dispatches from Constantinople to Venice via Polish-Lithuania during a Venetian-Ottoman war (most probably, the War of Cyprus) when staying in Constantinople as a student of Oriental languages²². Thus, Polish agents sometimes facilitated exchange of information for Venetians – what might be quite surprising if we consider that it was mostly diplomats of other polities in Constantinople to complain about the Venetian omnipotence in terms of postal services and news delivery²³.

DIPLOMATIC WRITINGS: CIRCULATION OF KNOWLEDGE, TRANSMISSION OF MOTIFS

It was most probably in 1557²⁴ when a member of the Polish legation to the sultan, Erazm Otwinowski – accompanying the great envoy Andrzej Bzicki – visited Constantinople. He left a travel journal, describing in detail audiences at the court and “curiosities” of the city²⁵. In that text he paid attention to vast size of Constantinople and the city’s individual buildings such as caravansaries, mosques, baths, fountains, and *bezesten*, i.e., markets²⁶. He also noted some more general observations concerning the political constitution of the Ottoman Empire, including on particular offices, role of *devshirme*, secluded life of the sultan (Selim II – whom he characterised as prone to drink, impulsive, and unfair)²⁷. Finally, among his observations one can find motifs frequently recurring in the description of the Ottoman Empire by early modern diplomats, such as alleged “tyranny” and “barbarism” of the Ottoman political culture, low skills of the Ottomans demonstrated in governing the empire, or widespread corruption at the sultan’s court²⁸.

There are some themes of the Otwinowski’s narrative that resemble two texts left by a Venetian, Marcantonio Donini, who spent many years in Constantinople as secretary of the Republic’s mission to the Ottoman Empire, in the period close to the time of Otwinowski’s visit. Donini was posted in this capacity to the Ottoman capital three times (1554-57, 1560-62, and 1575-79), intertwining these stays with

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- 22 Garbacik, “Baili”, 220. The author does not clarify to which war his observation is referred to.
 - 23 Berridge, “Notes”, 16-17.
 - 24 Cf. n. 42.
 - 25 [Erazm Otwinowski], “Wypisanie drogi tureckiej [...]”, in *Podróże i poselstwa polskie do Turcyi*, ed. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Biblioteki Polskiej, 1860), 7-40.
 - 26 [Otwinowski], “Wypisanie”, 13 (size), 12 (caravansaries), and 22 (bezesten). Cf. especially his mentions on caravansaries: «There, each guest is allowed to stay for twenty-four hours, is given dinner and supper, and the poor [can stay – PC] until the third day»; and on bezesten «where they sell various precious things from gold, silver, pearls, precious stones, and garments [...]».
 - 27 [Otwinowski], “Wypisanie”, 24-29 (on Selim’s nature: 26).
 - 28 [Otwinowski], “Wypisanie”, 29 (tyranny), 13 (low skills), and 17 (corruption).

work in other Venetian legations, i.e., in Rome and Vienna²⁹. Moreover, during his second posting to Constantinople, he even temporarily headed the mission due to the death of the bailo (Girolamo Ferro). As a consequence, he prepared a final report of the mission, required from returning Venetian ambassadors³⁰. Apart from the report, he also wrote a treatise composed as a set of three dialogues «on the things of the Turks», presenting to the reader details of everyday life in Constantinople³¹. The loose form of the Donini's text brings to mind the chatty Otwinowski's narrative; moreover, both lower-ranking diplomats have another thing in common, i.e., their aversion to superiors. While Otwinowski portrayed Bzicki as a clumsy person – the best example of which is the description of the envoy who got tangled up in the garments he received from the sultan³² – Donini found himself in serious conflict with Vicebailo Dandolo who arrived in the place of the deceased Ferro, and the mutual complaints of both gentlemen presented in their *relazioni* are unprecedented in the entire corpus of such texts prepared by the Venetian diplomats³³.

If Otwinowski met Donini in Constantinople, they would probably agree on those observations that were written down by the Polish visitor. While the Donini's descriptions are much more detailed – proof of his much longer stay in the Ottoman capital – the Venetian secretary also marks as «most notable things about Turkey» buildings such as «mosques, serais, baths, fountains, streets, gates, gardens, imarets, caravanserais, and *bezesten*». In the latter places, one sells «of every kind of cloth of gold, silver, silk, wool, linen, bombage, carpets, jewels, pearls, works of gold, silver, silk [*sic!* – PC], slaves, mules, horses, camels, and many other things». The Venetian's secretary's attention is also drawn to caravansaries whose guests are served with different meals three times a day, can drink water from fountains, and sometimes are even provided with a candle in the evening³⁴. The motif of Constantinople's vast size returns in Donini's discussion on organization of judiciary in the city. Other themes present in Otwinowski – such as secluded life of the sultan, including Selim's drunkennes and injustice; or characteristics of the Ottoman Empire and its way of governance – are also reflected in Donini's works³⁵,

29 Donini's career is reconstructed here according to his writings: BCV, [Marcantonio Donini], *Tre dialoghi di Marc'Antonio Donini Già segretario Veneto nelli quali si tratta di diverse cose de Turchi et della Turchia*, ms. Wcovich-Lazzari 31.10, 30–32.

30 Eugenio Alberi, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto*, ser. III, vol. 3 (Firenze: Società editrice fiorentina, 1855), 173–208; a part lacking in this edition was completed by Pedani, *Relazioni*, 127–31.

31 Cf. n. 29.

32 [Otwinowski], “Wypisanie”, 30.

33 Alberi, *Relazioni*, III/3, 174.

34 BCV, [Donini], 36 (buildings), 61 (*bezesten*), and 57–58 (caravansaries).

35 Alberi, *Relazioni*, III/3, 179–80 (secluded life of sultans, Selim's description); 185–90 (lack of officials' skills); BCV, [Donini], 57, 84, 104, and 143 (alleged Ottoman barbarism); 154–55 (sultans' subjects as slaves); 70 and 137 (corruption).

being generally typical for late 16th-century Venetian ambassadors' *relazioni*³⁶. The similarity of observations made by both travelers might be theoretically attributed to their education and earlier life experience or to their common diplomatic background. Following this line of reasoning, Tetiana Grygorieva observed that Otwinowski «knew quite well what he was going to see, and that he already had a map of the city in his imagination, probably derived from previous readings»³⁷. Other scholars rather underlined his personal skills; according to Marek Prejs, Otwinowski was «certainly the most intelligent of the Poles» who visited the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century³⁸. In a similar vein, Otwinowski's intelligence, perceptiveness and independence of judgments, especially with regard to anthropological observations, was praised by Claude Backvis and, more recently, Piotr Tafiłowski³⁹. On the contrary, more critical towards the traveler was the older historiography, emphasising the lack of depth of his mind, simplicity, and numerous factual errors⁴⁰. These diverging evaluations show indeed that it is difficult to explain Otwinowski's "professional" and intellectual preparation, including possible sources of his observations. Contrary to Donini – a career secretary working i.a. in the doge's chancellery and sent seven times in total on diplomatic missions in different locations – Otwinowski did not have an experience related to a chancellery's work; moreover, it would be difficult to compare the Polish-Lithuanian and Venetian diplomacies in terms of their organization or accumulated institutional knowledge. Otwinowski was a poet staying in the service of Cracow's voivode Stanisław Tęczyński and his son Jan Baptysta. Most probably, apart from one journey to Denmark⁴¹ and the mission to Constantinople, he did not travel abroad⁴². As a consequence, it would be difficult to attribute

36 Paolo Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1975), 146-234; Lucette Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot. Venice and the Sublime Porte*, trans. Arthur Denner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), passim.

37 Grygorieva, "Symbols", 129-30.

38 Marek Prejs, *Egzotyzm w literaturze staropolskiej: wybrane problemy* (Warszawa: WPUW, 1999), 97.

39 Claude Backvis, *Szkice o kulturze staropolskiej* (Warszawa: PIW, 1975), 642-43; Piotr Tafiłowski, *Imago Turci. Studium z dziejów komunikacji społecznej w dawnej Polsce (1453-1572)* (Lublin: WUMCS, 2013), 209-10.

40 Cf. i.a. works by Bohdan Baranowski and Stanisław Kot quoted by Tafiłowski, *Imago*, 209-10 (n. 224-25). Their comments resemble observations made by previous generations of scholars with regard to "mental laziness" of Venetian diplomats in the Ottoman Empire, cf. a synthetic overview of these opinions in Eric R. Dursteler, "Describing or Distorting the 'Turk'? The Relazioni of the Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople as Historical Source", *Acta Histriae*, 19 (2011): 231-48.

41 The scope of the travel – undertaken in Jan Baptysta Tęczyński's suite – was Sweden. However, the whole suite was detained and imprisoned by the Danish forces. Cf. Kazimierz Gutaker, *Dramatyczne dzieje bałtyckiego dyplomaty* (Warszawa: PWN, 1993), 110-61.

42 Piotr Wilczek, *Erazm Otwinowski: pisarz ariański* (Katowice: Gnome Books,

Otwinowski's opinions to his familiarity with the diplomatic world or to travels, including those undertaken to complete university studies, for example, in Italy: a popular destination among the Polish nobility at that time. Unfortunately, given little knowledge of his biography – and his readings on the matter – we are not able to carry out such a detailed and fascinating analysis of the sources of his knowledge and views, as it was possible for John-Paul Ghobrial to do with the case of a 17th century English ambassador to the Sublime Porte⁴³. The same conclusion applies to Donini. Regardless of that (or maybe: all the more so), the circulation of motifs used by Polish-Lithuanian and Venetian envoys in their diplomatic writings on the Ottoman Empire – and possibly also a transformation of these motifs over time – certainly merits a closer examination.

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INDIVIDUALS' MOBILITY. ARMENIANS AS CULTURAL BROKERS

Finally, a third opportunity to broaden research on Venetian/Italian connections with the Ottoman Empire and its bordering countries – by Poland-Lithuania and East-Central Europe in general – is offered by fates of individuals and their mobility, as emerging from diplomatic (or mostly: consular) sources. The recalled documents confirm presence of subjects of the Polish king, seeking for Venetian representatives' assistance in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, in 1635, the bailo's chancellery issued a certificate to two such persons of «Greek rite», i.e., Orthodox confession: Oplątnicki and Jergonoroski⁴⁴. Some applicants were reportedly former slaves asking for a certificate to facilitate their further travel through lands of the «Christian princes». This was the case, i.a., of certain «Pietro Vroblaschi, a Pole» (most probably: Piotr Wróblewski) who asked the chancellery of Bailo Foscarini in 1633 to be granted with such a certificate⁴⁵.

Among individual persons coming from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Armenians are those whose presence is noticeable in the Venetian consular

1994), 18-20 and 25-6. Marek Prejs postponed the Otwinowski's stay in Constantinople – i.e., 1557, as written in the manuscript – to 1567, given i.a. mentions on Selim II as the then reigning sultan (*Egzotyzm*, 56-9; however, it rather seems to the author of this contribution that it is not the date of the stay itself, but the date of writing the text, which should be postponed). This new datation enabled Prejs to conclude that «the astonishing erudition and competence of the author demonstrated in his text may stem from his four-years stay in France and Spain in the suite of Jan Baptysta Tęczyński who spent the period 1556–1560 studying abroad» (Prejs, *Egzotyzm*, 59). Nevertheless, Otwinowski's participation in Tęczyński's journey is convincingly challenged by other scholars, including the very author of the monography on the poet (Wilczek, *Erazm*, 19). In fact, given Otwinowski's participation in a Protestant meeting in Pińczów in 1559, it would be difficult to assume that he had left the Tęczyński's suite earlier, returning alone to Poland.

43 John-Paul Ghobrial, *The Whispers of Cities. Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), mostly 19-41.

44 ASVe, BAC 297, fasc. 12, f. 1r (24.07.1635).

45 ASVe, BAC 297, fasc. 11, f. 10v (10.09.1633).

records. For example, in February 1601, the bailo's chancellery noted a visit of a certain «Daniel the Armenian» from Lviv to receive a certificate confirming his journey to Jerusalem; while seven months later he applied for another certificate attesting to his return journey. At that time, he was reportedly heading to Rome⁴⁶. Likewise, certain Lazzaro Vartario, «a Pole of Armenian nationality», was granted with a certificate on his way back to Europe in 1642⁴⁷. This presence of Armenians is unsurprising, given a visible representation of the nation's members in the cards of the Venetian consular documentation⁴⁸. A focus on Armenians allows a historian to consider an additional dimension of the connections here described, i.e., the role of Armenians as merchants, dragomans, or even envoys operating between European countries and the Ottoman and Safavid Empires; as well as Armenian political projects involving cooperation with Western Christians against the Ottoman Empire. While these topics have been already studied⁴⁹, these studies seem not to be fully integrated in the area of connections between Italy (including Venice) and the Ottoman Empire and its borderlands; perhaps being considered too specialised to this more general topic. Moreover, the context of Armenian mobility provides historians of Poland-Lithuania and of Venice with a rich and important background, also by highlighting the role of Lviv and Venice for the Armenian culture. Quite symbolically, the first play in Armenian language in modern times was staged in Lviv in 1668, in the context of the activity of Armenian College led by the Theatines⁵⁰. The same town was among the first centers of early Armenian printed publications (1618)⁵¹; certainly, preceded by Venice where the first Armenian book was issued (1512)⁵².

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Similar to other sections of this article, individuals' fates seem to be the most convincing argument for the proposed reorientation of research. Perhaps the best case in this context, by now understudied, is Clemente Galano (1611–66): a Theatine from Sorrento who served as missionary in Georgia, thereafter founded a college

46 ASVe, BAC 297, fasc. [nn], f. 6v (23.02.1601); f. 13v (3.09.1601).

47 ASVe, BAC 297, fasc. [nn], f. 14r (11.08.1642).

48 Piotr Chmiel, *Rethinking the Concept of Antemurale: Venetian Diplomacy in Respect of the Ottoman World (1573-1645)* (Roma: Accademia Polacca delle Scienze, 2019), 123-24.

49 E.g. Aldo Ferrari, *L'Ararat e la grù. Studi sulla storia e la cultura degli Armeni* (Milano: Mimesis, 2008); Aldo Ferrari, *In cerca di un regno. Profezia, nobiltà e monarchia in Armenia tra Settecento e Ottocento* (Milano: Mimesis, 2011); Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians. From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 75–126; incl. extensive bibliography in each of these works.

50 Panossian, *Armenians*, 88.

51 Sebouh David Aslanian, "Reader Response and the Circulation of Mkhitarist Books across the Armenian Communities of the Early Modern Indian Ocean", *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*, 22 (2013): 40; compared to Panossian, *Armenians* 91 n. 40.

52 Panossian, *Armenians*, 91.

for Armenians in Constantinople, and in the last years of his life was sent to Lviv to settle a new college for the Armenian youth in that town⁵³. These observations lead us once more to the Theatines and their mission in the Georgian lands. The clergymen used only the two first ways proposed by Della Valle, even if they were invited to consider positive aspects of the third route (via Poland-Lithuania) also by a Caffa-based Dominican – Giovanni da Lucca, who stopped several times in the Theatine missionary house in Gori on his way to Persia. In 1646, while performing a diplomatic mission entrusted him by several monarchs, including the king of Poland-Lithuania Ladislaus IV Vasa, to the Persian shah, the Dominican even offered an opportunity to join him to one of the Theatines, Cristoforo Castelli⁵⁴. Although a visit to Persia and a possible settlement of a Theatine mission in that country was a Castelli's big dream, he did not join the legation of Ft. Giovanni; the Dominican continued his travel accompanied by a confrere – a former renegade – Domenico Vedulato⁵⁵. The latter, in turn, was mentioned in Venetian consular records as recipient of a certificate issued to him by the bailo's chancellery on May 6, 1637. At that time, he was a priest travelling to Jerusalem⁵⁶.

CONCLUSION

When joining Giovanni da Lucca in his travel to Persia, Domenico Vedulato – as many missionaries, diplomats and travelers of the early modern times – was once more reorienting his life on a new track. Whether it was “a third way” – in both its literal and figurative senses – is probably less relevant to these considerations. Their scope was, however, to propose a reorientation of the studies on early modern connections between Italy and the Ottoman Empire (and their respective border- and hinterlands) by including East-Central Europe therein. Mostly inspired by diplomatic and missionary history, the proposed approach focuses on mobility of persons and ideas. It was exemplified here by a number of cases connecting Poland-Lithuania, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire, thus inviting to explore a “triangular” Polish-Veneto-Ottoman history and to consider new research opportunities

53 Mentions on Galano: Gabriella Uluhogian, *Gli armeni* (Milano: Il Mulino, 2009), 186; Ferrari, *In cerca*, 94 (who shifts Galano's life for 1610–65).

54 Patrizia Licini, *Carteggio inedito di D. Cristoforo Castelli chierico regolare, missionario in Georgia e Mingrelia* (Milano: Politecnico di Milano, 1980), 80. This was not Giovanni's first mission to Persia, at least entrusted him by the Polish king. He also travelled to the shah in this capacity in 1635, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “Historical Introduction”, in *Stosunki dawnej Rzeczypospolitej z Persją Safawidów i katolikosatem w Eczmiadzynie w świetle dokumentów archiwalnych/The Relations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with Safavid Iran and the Catholicosate in Etchmiadzin in the Light of Archival Documents*, eds. Stanisław Jaśkowski, Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, and Piruz Mnatsakanyan (Warszawa: AGAD, 2017), 82.

55 Licini, *Carteggio*, 80 and 87. According to Castelli, Vedulato converted in Constantinople, but afterwards he reconciled with the Catholic Church being under the influence of Ft. Giovanni and the Theatines who hosted him in Georgia for some months.

56 ASVe, BAC 297, fasc. 13, f. 3v, (6.05.1637).

offered by this attitude. Among them, a need for a broader and more systematic examination of Venetian diplomatic sources, rather focused on long-lasting political tendencies and diplomatic practices, has been underlined. Similarly, an analysis of circulation of themes and motifs concerning the Ottoman Empire, present in Venetian and Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic writings, is also worth considering. Finally, an exploration of migrations of individuals, including those belonging to the Armenian community, can strongly contribute to present the early modern history of the regions concerned in the triangular dimension here described.

It seems, however, that the proposed approach can be extended even more, both in geographical and chronological terms: i.e., to include the Safavid Empire and to be investigated over the whole range of the early modern times. The presence of the Armenian Mekhitarist order in Venice since the early 18th century – and its later branch in Vienna – serves as a good illustration of such patterns of circulation of people and ideas both within and outside the Armenian community that can link Venice, the Ottoman and Safavid Empires and their borderlands, even reaching India; and Central/East-Central Europe⁵⁷.

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57 On Mekhitarists in Venice and Vienna: Panossian, *Armenians*, 101–109; Aslanian, “Reader”, 31–70.

ABBREVIATIONS

ASVe: Archivio di Stato di Venezia

BAC: *Bailo a Costantinopoli*

Disp. Cost.: *Senato, Dispacci Costantinopoli*

BCV: Biblioteca del Museo Correr, Venezia

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EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE: FROM THE CRETAN WAR (1645-1669) TO THE ALLIANCE OF 1684 ACCORDING TO OTTOMAN AND VENETIAN SOURCES

ABSTRACT

The Ottoman Empire posed a constant threat to European states in the Modern Age, especially the Republic of Venice. The Republic of Venice suffered a great deal of political, military and material damage with the loss of Crete in the Ottoman-Venetian War between 1645 and 1669. After the war, various negative incidents occurred that would have an adverse impact on Ottoman-Venice affairs. This loss and the events between the two states played an active role in the Republic of Venice joining the alliance established by Pope Innocentius XI between the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Poland in 1684. Thus, the Ottoman Empire had to fight against the aforementioned allies until the Treaty of Karlowitz signed in 1699. The political events that caused the deterioration of Ottoman-Venetian relations and pushed the Republic of Venice to join this alliance before the Venetian Republic joined the Holy Alliance in 1684 will be examined in this article. The narration of these events will be made comparatively in the light of Venetian and Ottoman sources, especially the chronicles.

KEYWORDS: Ottoman Empire; Republic of Venice; Ottoman-Venetian Relations; Bailos; Holy Alliance of 1684.

It was then decided that the Alliance established against the Turks would also be valid with the Republic, that the Pope would be the protector, that Cardinal Pio would be obliged to swear on behalf of the Emperor, Cardinal Barberino for Poland and Cardinal Ottoboni for Venice. The Emperor and the King of Poland would participate with strong armies and the Republic of Venice with a strong navy from the sea and with troops from Dalmatia until peace was established, peace would never be made apart from the Alliance... The Emperor would take back the Hungarian Castles, the Polish King Kamanice, Podolia and Ukraine, and the Venetian Republic would take back previously owned and lost lands¹.

1 «Fu adunque stabilito, che corresse la Lega già scritta contra il Turco anche con la Repubblica, e protettore ne fosse il Papa, esiggendone il giuramento da' Cardinali Pio per l'Imperadore, Barberino per Pollonia, e Otthoboni per Venezia. Cesare, e il Re' di Pollonia dovessero operare con eserciti poderosi, e la Repubblica di Venezia con forte Armata sul mare, e con truppe in Dalmazia sino alla pace, da non potersi mai durante la Lega separamente accordare [...]. Intanto procuri l'Imperadore di ricuperare le Fortezze d'Ungheria, il Re' di Pollonia Caminietz, la Podolia, e l'Ukraina, e la Repubblica di Venezia il perduto, e cio', che si racquisera', sia di quello, a' cui primamente apparteneva». Pietro Garzoni,

That is how the diligent and meticulous historian of the period, Venetian Senator Pietro Garzoni [1645-1735] relays how the Holy Alliance (*Sacra Lega*) established by the Christian allied states between the Austrian Empire, the Kingdom of Poland and the Republic of Venice against the Ottoman Empire with the efforts of Pope Innocentius XI [1611-1689] in 1684 with the aim of driving the Turks from Europe, and in the words of many Western sources, by driving the final nail into the coffin of the Ottoman Empire by “expulsion”.

This article will study the impact of the entry process of the Republic of Venice into the Alliance of 1684 on the overall progress of the Cretan War (1645-1669), which can be considered as a turning point in Ottoman-Venetian relations, the events that took place in this process and the events that took place in the Venetian possessions in Istanbul will be explained through considerations on the bailos. Especially the Venetian chronicles will be used in the narration of the events that took place in this process, and the information given will be compared with the information portrayed by the Ottoman chronicles as much as possible. However, it is important to note one fact. The main subject of this article, the events experienced by the bailos in Istanbul before the participation of the Republic of Venice in the Holy Alliance and the events that had a negative impact on Ottoman-Venetian relations, although they seem to be the reasons for Venice’s inclusion in the Alliance are only the driving force and it should be underlined that they are only reasons reflected by the chronicles of the period. While discussing the real reasons, of course, must be taken into account the sensitivity of Ottoman-Venice relations, its past with wars and rivalries, the political and economic situation of the Republic of Venice, but most importantly the pressure of the Papacy and its European allies on Venice, the fragility of the Papacy-Venice relations at that time and the desire of Venice to reclaim its lost lands.

THE IMPACT OF LOSING CRETE ON VENICE

The Republic of Venice obtained most of its financial income from trade, especially from its commercial activities with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, after the Cretan War², which lasted 24 years, the economic situation of the Republic receded to a major degree as this important trade relationship slowed down during the war. Although the Republic received aid from other Catholic states, the effect of the war on Venice was evident in the 1660s. The Ottoman navy, under the command of Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha [1635-1676], made a major military landing in 1667, besieged the main city of Candia, which was considered the heart of Crete, and captured a large part of it³. After a long siege, the city of Candia was

Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia In Tempo Della Sacra Lega Contra Maometto IV e Tre Successori, Gran Sultani Turchi di Pietro Garzoni Senatore (Venezia: Gio. Manfrè, 1712), 57-8.

2 There is a wide range of works about the Cretan War as primary and secondary sources. For example see Andrea Valiero, *Historia della Guerra di Candia* (Venezia: Presso Paolo Baglioni, 1679); Ersin Gülsoy, *Girit’in Fethi ve Osmanlı İdaresinin Kurulması (1645-1670)* (Istanbul: Tatav-Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2004).

3 Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. IV, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli

completely captured by the Ottomans, and Crete became Ottoman territory in September 1669. An agreement with 18 articles was drawn between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire on September 6, defining the conditions for the surrender of the castle and thus Castle of Candia was handed over to the Ottoman Empire with all its ammunition; Suda, Ispirlonga and Granbusa remained with the Venetians while Klis was given to the Venetians which concluded the definitive and official loss of Crete, one of Venice's most important bases⁴. However, with this agreement, the Republic of Venice had to commit to paying 1500 ducats⁵ annually to the Ottoman Empire for the protection of Zante Island⁶. On September 27, 1669, the key of the Castle of Candia was handed over to the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish forces settled in the castle on the same day. The castle, which fell after the siege commandeered by Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and lasted for twenty-eight months and nine days, was defended by Venetian, as well as French and German forces, until a month before the Ottoman conquest; it was also protected from the sea by the Papal, Malta and of course the Venetian navy⁷. Venice immediately accepted the agreement dated 6 September 1669 with a kind of satisfaction that a peace agreement could be made with the Ottoman Empire under difficult conditions after the long and destructive war. Venetian bailo Alvise da Molin [1626-1680] brought the agreement document signed by the Doge of Venice to Istanbul; however, the negotiations between Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and the Bosnian province continued until 1671. The final agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Venice was signed on 24 October 1671⁸.

The loss of Crete was a blow not only for the Republic of Venice as one of its richest and most strategically important lands had been lost, but it was also a major blow for the entire European Catholic world. This is because Christianity saw the loss of Crete as a defeat of the Catholic religion against Islam. Pope Clemens IX [1660-1669] declared that the loss of Crete was of the greatest peril to all of Europe and Christianity⁹. The Republic of Venice had lost its former power to a great extent

(Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2009), 117-19.

- 4 Abdülkadir Özcan, "Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa", *DİA*, 26 (2002): 261.
- 5 Ducat is the name of two separate Venetian currencies. The first is the silver coin minted around 1202; the second is the gold coin, which was first minted in 1284 by the Venetian Doge Giovanni Dandolo. In later periods, it took the name zecchino. Later, due to its volume and high quality, this currency began to be used in other states as well. For example; the Papal ducat, the Imperial ducat, Milanese ducat etc. Cf., "Ducato", in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti*, vol. 13 (Roma: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 1932), 244-45.
- 6 Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 124.
- 7 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3/1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2009), 418-19.
- 8 Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 125.
- 9 Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i 'Aliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-III* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 104; Johann Wilhelm

due to the changing balance of power in Europe and especially the loss of Crete, which was strategically very important¹⁰. Although Venice was financially shaken¹¹ by spending a huge budget totaling 150 million gold Venetian ducats during the 24-year war, the navy, political power and wealth of Venice made it valuable for the Alliance against the Ottoman Empire¹². One of the main reasons why the Republic of Venice would join the alliance formed by Pope Innocentius XI against the Ottoman Empire exactly 15 years after the defeat of Crete was his desire to revenge Crete.

After the Cretan War, Venetian-Ottoman relations, although tense, returned to their normal course. Giacomo Querini [1619-1677], who was appointed bailo to the Ottoman Empire in Venice on 16 November 1670, set off by ship on 24 August 1671 and arrived in Istanbul after an 87-day journey. Querini, who had previously served as a member of the Collegio dei Savi and Ambassador in Münster, Madrid and Rome, was considered suitable by the Senate as a candidate to handle the relations between the two states which were sensitive and strained by the war. Although he was a diplomat who had strived not to lose Crete, he was appointed to Istanbul as a bailo, probably because it was thought that the next period of peace would be more critical. Contrary to what was predicted, it is known that this difficult tenure for Querini was extremely interesting and beneficial. The bailo had a close and good relationship with Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha. In the report he presented at the Palace of the Venetian Dukes (Palazzo Ducale di Venezia) on June 6, 1676, after his tenure, he mentioned his good relationship with the Grand Vizier and stated that their positive relationship was based on mutual trust. According to him, the Grand Vizier sincerely wished for peace between the Ottoman Empire and Venice and for the commercial relations between the two states to be robust¹³.

After Querini, Giovanni Morosini [1633-1682], who had previously served as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Savoy, France and Vienna, was appointed to the post of bailo, and the new bailo arrived in Istanbul on June 5, 1675. Although Morosini had some successes in favor of the Venetian Republic after he started his

Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. IV, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, Yeditepe (İstanbul: Yayınevi, 2019), 673-75; Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdar Tarihi*, vol. I, ed. Ahmed Refik Altınay (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928), 235.

10 Amy A. Bernardy, *Venezia e il Turco nella Seconda Meta' del Secolo XVII* (Firenze: Civelli, 1902), 75.

11 Ludwig von Pastor, *Storia dei papi dalla fine del Medio Evo*, vol. XIV/2 (Roma: Desclée & C., 1932), 141.

12 Vilmos Fraknói, *Innocenzo XI (Odescalchi) e La Liberazione dell'Ungheria dal Giogo Ottomano: in Base di Documenti Diplomatici dell'Archivio Vaticano* (Firenze: Bernardo Seeber, 1903), 85.

13 Gino Benzoni, "Querini, Giacomo", in DBI, vol. 86 (2016), 27. A large part of the reports sent from Istanbul to Venice during the Querini period is in the Venetian State Archives in the following classification: *Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato- Constantinopoli*, filze 156-158. For the diplomatic report (relazione) he wrote after completing his duty in Istanbul, see *Le relazioni degli Stati europei lette al Senato dagli ambasciatori veneziani nel secolo decimosettimo*, vol. V/2: *Turchia*, eds. Nicolò Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (Venezia: Pietro Naratovich, 1872), 121-95.

duty, it is generally seen that no significant progress was made in Ottoman-Venetian relations during his duty as a bailo between 1675 and 1679, and that he did not have the relationship of trust with Kara Mustafa Pasha from Merzifon [1634-1683], the Grand Vizier at the time that Querini had had with Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha; in fact on the contrary, there seemed to be a lack of trust as explained below¹⁴.

Pietro Civran [1623-1687], who had previously held important positions in the Venetian Senate and in the Balkan-Adriatic territory of Venice, arrives in Istanbul in 1679 after Morosini completes his duty as a bailo¹⁵. However, this change of bailo had a negative impact on the peaceful relations of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice at that time. During the period from 1679 which coincided with the arrival of the new bailo to 1684, a series of events occurred that would compromise Ottoman-Venetian relations.

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POUCHES FULL OF CASH: THE MATTER OF MONEY DEMANDED FROM THE VENETIAN BAILO

A very interesting event took place with the arrival of Civran in Istanbul on October 23, 1679. This can be accepted as the first incident that generated a problem that would shake the Ottoman-Venice relations of the period. After Civran's arrival in the port of Istanbul, the ships carrying him and his belongings were stopped by Ottoman administrators, suspecting the large cargo they were carrying. As per the rules, the belongings of diplomats cannot be checked. However, Civran's belongings were very valuable in terms of quality, and this aroused suspicion. The Ottoman administrators accused Bailo Civran of bringing commercial goods with his diplomatic goods to avoid paying the customs tax by taking advantage of the rule of not checking his personal belongings. Ottoman author Raşid Mehmed Efendi, one of the most important Ottoman sources of the period, openly accused the Venetians of concealing commercial goods on the ship just to avoid paying customs duty¹⁶. The goods in question were loaded on the ships by Venetian merchants. These goods, allegedly brought by Civran "irregularly", were worth 400,000 *reali*¹⁷. Therefore, Bailo Civran is faced with accusations. According to Venetian sources, Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha, who heard about this situation, summoned Civran and his predecessor Morosini, who was still in Istanbul despite completing his term, to the Court and humiliates them, and in return for not telling anyone about this issue, the vizier demands 50 pouches containing a total of 25,000 *reali*. Civran was told in

14 Gino Benzoni, "Morosini, Giovanni", in DBI, vol. 77 (2012), 140. For the *relazione* of Morosini see Barozzi-Berchet, *Le relazioni degli Stati europei*, vol. V/2, 197-248.

15 For the biography of bailo Pietro Civran see Gino Benzoni, "Civran, Pietro", in DBI, vol. 26 (1982), 120-25.

16 Raşid Mehmed Efendi Çelebizade İsmail Âsım Efendi, *Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli*, vol. I, eds. Abdülkadir Özcan, Yunus Uğur, Baki Çakır, et al. (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2013), 254.

17 It is a gold coin minted by Carlo d'Angio I first in Barletta then in Messina, see "Reale", in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze*, vol. 28 (1935), 937-38. We don't know why the bailo Civran used the Neapolitan currency rather than the Venetian one. We leave this issue for further investigation.

no uncertain terms that he would not be accepted to the city and this office without giving this amount to the Grand Vizier¹⁸. From the information given by the sources, it is not clear whether the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha really wanted these money-filled pouches from the bailo as tax compensation for smuggled commercial goods or was it another excuse created by the Ottoman Government to cause a crisis with Venice and whip up a pretext to declare war in the future. On the other hand, the fact that the Grand Vizier, whom both Senator Diedo and Senator Garzoni often describe as ambitious, money-loving and greedy in their works, demanded financial payment from the bailo to keep this matter quiet does give the impression that the Grand Vizier may have demanded this amount as a bribe.

The second important problem between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire occurred a few weeks after the aforementioned unpleasant incident, in January 1680, when the previous bailo Morosini, whose appointment in Istanbul had ended, was about to board the ship *Venere* in Istanbul to return to the Republic. This time, the cause of the incident was fugitive prisoners. While the Ottoman authorities were inspecting the port, they discovered a fearful Neapolitan prisoner on the ship. This prisoner confessed to them that 30 more fugitive prisoners were hidden on the ship. According to the Ottoman author Raşid, the prisoners who were hidden on the Venetian ship had escaped from Yedikule prison and taken refuge with the Venetians. Raşid even claimed that they were well-known and influential captives¹⁹. After a while the corpses of all other Neapolitan prisoners appeared in the water around the Venetian ships. Ottoman authorities noticed the bodies; accordingly the confession of the Neapolitan prisoner was confirmed. Ottomans came to the conclusion that they were killed and thrown into the sea by the Venetians who were aware of the confession of the Neapolitan prisoner²⁰. This incident caused a serious diplomatic crisis between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. In the letters Morosini and Civran wrote from Istanbul to the Venetian Senate, they explained the importance of the incident and the difficult situation they were in, that their lives and the lives of all Venetians living in the Ottoman Empire were in danger, and that the valuable goods in their two gunships and four merchant ships could be seized at any time by the Ottomans. However, this time, they would be able to solve this critical situation with a large payment made to the Grand Vizier which was resolved by paying an additional 50,000 *reali* for the fugitive prisoner incident²¹. Nonetheless, these two bailos actually committed an error against the Republic; they did not inform the Venetian Senate of this payment. Finally, with the payment of the money, the former bailo Morosini left Istanbul by obtaining the exit

18 Giacomo Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla sua fondazione all'anno MDCCXLVII*, vol. III (Venezia: Andrea Poletti, 1751), 357-58; Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 40-1.

19 Raşid, *Târih-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

20 The Venetian ships and the killing of the Neapolitan prisoners caused a great sensation and was recorded in many chronicles of the period. See Michele Foscarini, *Historia della Republica veneta*, t. X/3 (Venezia: Lovisa, 1722), 83-6.

21 Benzoni, "Civran, Pietro", 122. Venetian Senator Giacomo Diedo defined this amount as 100 pouches. Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 358.

permit²². However, in the meantime, the Senate strictly forbade payments without its consent, did not consider it appropriate to allocate the payments made for the prisoner incident from the state budget, and decided that all payments made to the Ottomans for the prisoners were the responsibility of Civran and Morosini. The Senate punished the bailo both financially and politically. The penal practice that the Senate ruled for Civran was also very harsh, and Civran was ordered to return to Venice, citing his personal reasons to the Ottoman Empire. Civran set out for Venice after receiving this order and reached the Republic on October 16, 1681. In his report Bailo Civran expressed his negative views about the Ottoman Empire, its government and its people and made ugly accusations. Civran, who greatly disappointed the Senate, was dismissed from the position of bailo by the Senate and he never returned to Ottoman territory²³.

Venetian sources describe these events as “usurpation”, but state that the main reason for this attitude of the Ottomans, which will be mentioned below, was the massacre of Turks in Dalmatia and the Ottoman Empire’s desire to take revenge from Venice²⁴.

THE MORLAK ATTACKS AND THE MONEY MATTER AGAIN

Giovanni Battista Donà [1627-1699], who had held prestigious state positions was appointed bailo after Pietro Civran in Istanbul at the beginning of 1680, and arrived in Istanbul on July 2, 1681²⁵. However, the problems in Ottoman-Venetian relations would continue to increase during Donà’s tenure²⁶. The good relations between the bailo and the Ottoman Government deteriorated in a short time as a result of the massacre of the Turks under Hasan Bey, the brother of Bosnian Governor Durak Bey, by a few Morlaks²⁷ who were subjects of the Republic of Venice. This incident occurred in September 1682 in Zemanico (Zemunik Donji) near Zara (Zadar). Bailo Donà became aware of this issue two months after its occurrence. According to Western sources, the Ottomans stated that the Venetians had united with the Habsburg forces and attacked Bosnia, looted the area and killed 200 of Hasan Bey’s troops. However, the Venetians think that the incident was not that serious, it

22 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 358; Benzoni, “Civran, Pietro”, 122.

23 Benzoni, “Civran, Pietro”, 122-23.

24 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 358.

25 His real surname is Donato (also known as Donado); however, in Venetian sources it is commonly seen that it is written as “Donà” in its abbreviated form. For the biography of Giovan Battista Donà, see Giuseppe Gullino, “Donà, Giovanni Battista”, in DBI, vol. 40 (1991), 738-41.

26 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 43.

27 The Morlaks are a Balkan people originating from the Velebit mountain range in Dalmatia. In the 6th and 7th century, they took an active role in the Slavic invasions that deeply affected the Balkan society. In the 15th century, some Morlaks were settled and Croatized by the Republic of Venice in the region of Istria devastated by epidemics. Cf. “Morlacchi”, in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze*, vol. 23 (1934), 858-59.

was exaggerated by Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha and was reflected as a grave incident. According to them, the Ottomans burned the houses of the Morlaks to seize their lands, and the Grand Vizier propounded this so-called reason to extort money from the Republic just as he was preparing to move towards Vienna. In response, the Ottoman Government demanded that Donà surrender 224 Venetian subjects, possibly in response to the Turks massacred in Dalmatia or Istanbul and killed in Bosnia. Donà negotiated with the Ottoman Government, especially Hüseyin Pasha²⁸, to solve this problem with a financial payment, but in the end, it was decided that Donà would deliver 600 bags of gold coins, as well as 100 thousand Venetian gold coins (*zecchini*)²⁹ and the bailo had to accept this decision³⁰. According to the information conveyed by the Venetian Senators, before the negotiations, the Grand Vizier reprimanded the bailo and exaggerated the incident by telling the bailo that he and his family would be locked up in Yedikule. Upon this, the Şeyhülislam announced that the spilled blood could only be replaced with gold to be paid. In the end, it was decided that Sultan Mehmet IV would be paid 175 thousand *reali*, the Grand Vizier and Hüseyin Pasha would receive 25 thousand *reali* each and other administrators would receive different sums. However, this payment to be made by Venice, which broke the agreement with the Ottoman Empire, would never bring peace again³¹.

The fact that the Venetians massacred the Turks on the Bosnian border is also confirmed by Ottoman chronicles. The Venetians were described as deceitful, treacherous and «nakz-i ahd ü misak» (broke their promises) by Ottoman historians³². Although they had promised that they would behave by begging for mercy with the agreement made with the Ottomans during the siege and surrender of the Castle of Candia, they concealed their goods to avoid customs duty³³. The

28 This person is thought to be Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha (†1702). He is the son of Hasan Ağa, the younger brother of Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. He became famous with the nickname Amcazade during the grand viziership of his uncle's son, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha. He participated in the Vienna expedition in 1683, and after holding many positions such as vizier, he was appointed admiral in 1694 and Belgrade guard in 1696. Between 1697 and 1702, he occupied the office of Grand Vizier. see Münir M. Aktepe, "Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa", *DİA*, 3 (1991): 89.

29 In the Italian source, the term *zecchini* is used as a plural. *Zecchino*, is a name that has been used since the middle of the 16th. It is a gold coin. Cf., "Zecchino", in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze*, vol. 35 (1937), 910-11.

30 Gullino, "Donà, Giovanni Battista", 740.

31 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45. Senator Diedo stated that 170,000 *reali* would be paid to the Sultan. See Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 359-60.

32 «Efrenç-i şekâvet-sencmekr ü hîle-vühiyânetlemevsûf ve nakz-i ahd ü mîsâk ile ma'rûf, mekkâr ü hîle-kâr tâife-i dalâlet-şi'âr [...]». Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekayiât (1066-1116/1656-1704)*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), 164.

33 Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

Venetians who were described as «known for their tricks and deceptions, known for breaking agreements and accustomed to betrayal»³⁴ attacked the Ottoman subjects on the Bosnian border of Venice and caused the death of many Muslims. Moreover, Venice did all this despite the agreement that had been made with the Ottoman Empire after the Crete Campaign and had promised not to take any action against the Ottomans³⁵. Sultan Mehmed IV [1642-1693] was very angry with this situation and ordered that the Venetian Ambassador be detained in 1682³⁶. In other words, the bailo was held accountable for these events. The bailo apologized, asked for forgiveness, confessed his crimes, was remorseful and offered 500 pouches of coins to compensate for the massacred people and the events that followed. This compensation offer was accepted by the Ottoman Government and what happened was overlooked and the issue was closed for the time being³⁷.

When we look at the information provided by the Ottoman and Venetian sources, it is clear that the arrest of the bailo was ordered by the Ottoman Sultan, but later this order was turned into a financial compensation that the Republic had to pay to the Ottomans. However, the first difference between the information provided by Ottoman and Venetian sources is the amount of compensation to be paid. As stated above, this amount was claimed to be 600 pouches of gold coins, as well as 100,000 Venetian gold coins (*zecchini*). However, Ottoman sources claim that this amount was 500 pouches. The second difference is which party demanded this compensation. As mentioned above, it was stated that the bailo offered to pay compensation to the Ottoman Empire³⁸. However, Venetian sources emphasize that this payment was demanded by the Ottoman Empire³⁹.

Moreover, according to Raşid Mehmed Efendi, the fact that the Ottomans agreed to be paid these 500 pouches of coins and overlooked Venice's faults was essentially a distraction policy. Kara Mustafa Pasha advised the Sultan not to get into a state of war with Venice while the war with Austria was still going on. He suggested that Venice should be handled with tolerance until the Austrian issue was resolved, and said Venice was up for revenge once Austria was taken care of⁴⁰.

According to Venetian sources, the Venetian Senate, which was aware of this unpleasant incident, condemned the above-mentioned payment that had to be made to the Ottoman Government, and with its decision on 15 May 1683, the Senate accused Donà of abusing and misusing his power, and dismissed him from the bailo position and ordered him to leave Istanbul immediately, citing personal reasons. Sources state that the Senate summoned the bailo to Venice to put him in

34 «Öteden beri hile ve dalavereleri ile tanınan, anlaşma bozmakla bilinen hilekâr ve hıyanete alışkın Venedik keferesi [...]». Efendi, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

35 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

36 Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

37 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 233, 254.

38 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

39 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 359-60; Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45.

40 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

the dungeons of *Avogadori di Comun*⁴¹.

Some letters in the Vatican Apostolic Archive confirms the information given by Venetian and Ottoman sources about the payment to the Ottoman Government and the punishment of the bailo. For example, in the letter dated 15 May 1683 sent from the Papal Secretary of State to the Papal representative in the Republic of Venice, Senor Iacobelli mentions the money to be paid to the Turk (Sultan) due to the turmoil caused by the bailo. Accordingly, the majority wanted the bailo to leave Istanbul, but this was very difficult because the “Turk” did not allow it. However, it was necessary to wait for the next bailo to arrive in Istanbul. At the same time, it was necessary to show the whole world that the obligatory payment caused by the bailo was made by the Republic of Venice, probably to enhance Venice’s reputation. That is why the bailo had to be punished publicly. However, the letter mentions the Alliance against the Turks with the Austrian Emperor and the Kingdom of Poland, and that the Alliance would be realized with the participation of other Christian Princes⁴². According to another letter sent to the same person on 17 July 1683 from the Papal Secretary of State, there was a great debate in the Consiglio dei Pregadi, also known as the Venetian Senate, on whether to send public funds to be paid to Istanbul or not, and for this reason, the members of the Venetian Senate – the *savii* (wise men) – voted on this issue. Almost all the members except for the wise men of *terra ferma*⁴³, Mocenigo and Grimani, expressed an opinion that these funds should be sent to Istanbul. However, increasing the number of soldiers that would constitute the army and navy in the war to be started was also mentioned⁴⁴.

The information in these two letters shows that the Republic of Venice feared the “Turk”, but even when the Siege of Vienna and the possibility of an Ottoman Empire victory continued, the Republic of Venice had started to contemplate joining the counter-alliance against the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the Republic of Venice had started to recruit troops suggests that actually some kind of decision had been taken on this issue in the summer of 1683, but this was intentionally hidden from the Ottoman Empire, the Pope, the allied states and other Christian kings and princes. A correspondence between the Papal Secretary of State and the Papal representative in the Republic of Venice dated July 3, 1683, supports this line of thought. This letter shows that the establishment of a communication network with the Papacy and also the structure of the Turkish army was discussed at the Consiglio dei Pregadi. Some letters of the Grand Vizier are also mentioned in this letter. Moreover, it is suspected that the Ottoman army would attack Dalmatia. Therefore, it would be beneficial for Hungary if the path of Pope Pius V [1504-1572] and Clemens IX was followed to form an alliance between the European Princes and a joint land army and navy. There is information that a clandestine Senate meeting was held in the Venetian

41 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 360. Gullino, “Donà, Giovanni Battista”, 740. For the *relazione* (diplomatic report) written by the bailo after the termination of his duty see Barozzi-Berchet, *Le relazioni degli Stati europei*, II, 287-351.

42 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Venezia*, vol. 126, f. 99 r-v.

43 One of the three parts that Venice is divided into: the land part.

44 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Venezia*, vol. 126, f. 128r-v.

Senate to discuss how to help the Austrian Emperor⁴⁵.

As a result, tension arose again between the Istanbul Bailo and the Ottoman Government. This kind of humiliation of the bailo and the Republic of Venice could be considered as a political error on the part of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha at this sensitive period when the siege of Vienna was about to take place. From a broader perspective, these events and the large sums that the Republic was obliged to pay to the Ottoman Government, would play a role in the inclusion of the Republic of Venice in the Holy Alliance only one year later. After the events, a new bailo was not appointed to the post of bailo in Istanbul to replace Bailo Donà⁴⁶. However, Giovanni Cappello [1632-1701], the Secretary of the Council of Ten (Consiglio di Dieci)⁴⁷, was appointed to Istanbul to remedy the situation. At this point, it should be noted that after Donà, the Venetian bailo position in Istanbul would remain vacant for 17 years due to the approaching war⁴⁸.

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REVOLT OF MORLAKS IN DALMATIA AND THE INVITATION TO VENICE TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE

According to Venetian sources, the Morlaks were in Dalmatian territory at this time and wanted to take their lands back. The Morlaks, who gathered an army to rebel against the Ottomans, set fire to many places in Dalmatia and started a rebellion. The Turks are of the opinion that the Venetian Republic provoked the Morlaks. Faced with this grave situation in Dalmatia and Bosnia, the Pope invites Venice to join the alliance with Poland and Austria against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, if the Turks were defeated, Venice would be able to take back the lands that had been lost to the Turks⁴⁹.

THE TENSE RELATIONS AND THE ESCAPE OF SECRETARY GIOVANNI CAPPELLO FROM ISTANBUL

The main task of Secretary Giovanni Cappello⁵⁰ was to pay off the debt caused by Donà as soon as possible. Cappello, who had previously been in Istanbul as a secretary during the time of Bailo Alvise Molin, encountered a tense atmosphere when he arrived in the city. The Ottoman Government did not hesitate to display its displeasure because the Republic had appointed a diplomat who had a lower rank and title compared to the previous bailo to their country. In addition to the tense relations, news spread in the Ottoman Empire that Venice was negotiating to join the Alliance, which was founded and supported by the Pope. This alliance

45 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Venezia*, vol.126, ff. 122-123r.

46 Most of the letters and reports sent to Venice by Donà, the Istanbul bailo, are in the Venetian State Archives in the classification of *Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato – Constantinopoli*, filza 162.

47 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45-6.

48 Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991), 274.

49 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 47-8; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 360-61.

50 For a comprehensive biography of Giovanni Cappello see Gino Benzoni, "Cappello, Giovanni", in DBI, vol. 18 (1975), 789-91.

against the Ottoman Empire was perceived by the Ottomans as a Christian union and a religious war against the Muslims, so the possibility of Venice's involvement in this union further deteriorated the Ottoman-Venetian relations. According to the information given by Secretary Cappello during his stay in Istanbul⁵¹, a call was made to recruit troops to join the Ottoman army and new ships were being built for the navy. On June 11, 1684, a letter was sent from the Doge of Venice to the Secretary, stating that the Republic of Venice had joined the Holy Alliance; the Secretary should inform Venetian merchants to hide their capital and tell the Ambassadors of other states that Venice had joined the alliance by explaining them the justified reasons of this participation and he was ordered to leave Istanbul⁵².

However, the Secretary fled from the Ottoman Government without obtaining permission to leave the city. Senators Garzoni and Diedo emphasized that Cappello had fled the city simply because he was afraid⁵³. According to them, Cappello, who was obliged to inform the Ottoman Government that Venice had joined the alliance with Austria and Poland in 1684 but could not find the courage to give this news to «these wild people», «first went to Izmir and then fled to Venice and somehow escaped danger». Since Cappello fled, it was up to dragoman Tommaso Tarsia to deliver this difficult task. Sultan Mehmed IV did not hide his disappointment at the news given by Tarsia and told him that a peaceful path could always be found with Venice⁵⁴. Senators stated that the reason why Cappello escaped was that he thought that he would be killed when he said this to the Sultan⁵⁵.

Other sources report that Cappello, unable to obtain permission to leave İstanbul, shaved his beard and head, changed his appearance, boarded a Greek ship and sailed to Çanakkale, where several other employees of the bailo's office had already arrived, and from there managed to escape on a French sailing ship⁵⁶. Ottoman sources, on the other hand, claim that Secretary Cappello escaped by starting a fire at night, and while everyone was busy putting out the fire, he took advantage of the chaos and escaped in a boat⁵⁷.

51 Most of the letters and reports sent by the Secretary Cappello to Venice are ASVe, *Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato. Costantinopoli*, filza 163 in the Venetian State Archives. About Cappello see, *Le relazioni degli Stati europei lette al Senato dagli ambasciatori veneti nel secolo decimosettimo*, vol. V/1: *Turchia*, eds. Nicolò Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (Venezia: Pietro Naratovich, 1871), 10, and vol. V/2, 123, 291.

52 Benzoni, "Cappello, Giovanni", 789-90.

53 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 58; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369.

54 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369

55 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 63; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369.

56 Benzoni, "Cappello, Giovanni", 790.

57 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 255.

THE MAIN REASONS OF THE DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONS ACCORDING TO OTTOMAN SOURCES

Ottoman sources described in detail the process that would result in Venice breaking the peace treaty, turn against the Ottoman Empire and go to war. Ottoman sources emphasized two important events that were not reported by the Venetian sources. We have already mentioned the smuggled goods seized from the ships, which led to the punishment of Donà, Venetian bailo. Firstly, Raşid Mehmed Efendi states that an accidental fire broke out in the cellar where these goods were temporarily confiscated and sealed. The Venetians considered this accidental fire as a deliberate action perpetrated against them by the Ottomans⁵⁸. According to Ottoman author Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Aga a major event that had an impact on Venice's breaking the treaty was the fact that the Ottoman Government had ordered the unloading of 4 thousand bags of merchandise from 10 Venetian galleons to the Kurşunlu Mahzen and forcibly sent these galleons to dispatch troops from Egypt. When the Venetian owners raised their voices about their goods, this merchandise was transported into a cellar and burned to silence them. In retaliation, the Venetians took revenge by confiscating the Bosnian merchants' merchandise and sending a group of bandits to hassle them⁵⁹.

The other event that caused Venice to break the treaty was the capture of a message written by the Grand Vizier to the Sultan when the Austrians invaded Kara Mustafa Pasha's tent in front of Vienna and the events that followed⁶⁰. During this period, the Ottomans actually pursued a certain policy towards Venice. The Ottomans intended to postpone the war against the Venetians until the campaign against Austria took place with the idea that «revenge is a dish consumed cold»⁶¹. In the captured message, the Grand Vizier tells the Sultan that Venice should be treated with false tolerance until the Austrian issue was resolved, and that after Austria was dealt with, it will be the turn of the Ottomans to take revenge on Venice. This message was delivered to the Austrian Emperor, who immediately informed the Venetian Doge of this situation and informed the Venetians of the Grand Vizier's telegram, stating that they should be in alliance. Thanks to this message, Emperor Leopold of Austria finally had a great opportunity to draw Venice into the war on his side. Thus, the true opinion of the Ottoman Empire about Venice became known to Venice. The Venetians were convinced by the Austrians that they had no choice but to enter an alliance⁶². Venice finally responded positively to Austria's offer after the tension over smuggled goods and captives, the 500 coins in compensation, the burning of Venetian merchandise in a fire in a cellar, and the revelation of Kara Mustafa Pasha's

58 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

59 Nazire Karaçay Türkal, *Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Zeyl-i Fezleke (1065-22 Ca.1106 / 1654-7 Şubat 1695) (Tahlil ve Metin)*, (PhD diss., T.C. Marmara University Institute of Turkic Studies, 2012), 924-26.

60 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

61 «Vaktinde intikam alınmak». Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

62 The message is «Venedik keferesinin beynine dahi tefrika düşürmeğe bundan özge münasib iş olmaz». Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

unfriendly designs on Venice in the captured message.

In conclusion, according to the Ottoman sources, three events played a major role in the breakdown of Venice's agreement with the Ottoman Empire and its subsequent inclusion in the Alliance. The first was that Venice hid some trade goods on its ships to avoid paying customs, the second was that Venice hid some prisoners who had escaped from the Yedikule Prison on its ships, and the third was that Venice attacked Ottoman subjects on the Bosnian border and caused the deaths of many Muslims⁶³. On the other hand, according to Venetian sources the main reasons for Venice joining the Alliance were that the Ottoman Government took money from them by force, seized the lands in Dalmatia, collected taxes and constantly threatened Venice and The Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha's humiliating attitude against Venetian bailos⁶⁴. In addition, the fear that the war might one day spread to its territories, the intention of defeating the Ottomans while they were at war and the desire to regain the lost territories were essential elements for Venice to join the Alliance of 1684.

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63 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

64 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 63; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

ASVe: Archivio di Stato di Venezia.

DBI: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani).

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“NEWS IN PAPERS ARE NOT THAT MUCH CREDIBLE!” ABDULHAMID I AND THE EFFORTS TO FOLLOW THE EUROPEAN PRESS

ABSTRACT

It is a well-known fact that the advent of the printing press, and therefore the periodic and non-periodical publishing in the Ottoman society took place relatively late compared to its European counterparts. It was thought that this delay meant that the Ottomans were incapable of using the media tools of the period, either actively or passively. In this context, it was assumed that the Ottomans followed not the European press and showed no tendency to use papers as a source of “intelligence” until 1884, when Sultan Abdulhamid II established the Directorate of Foreign Affairs. Contrary to this common belief, despite the few and trivial efforts beforehand, it is seen that Sultan Abdulhamid I (1774-1789) made a consistent and careful effort to follow the European press during his reign. In this article, the sultan’s pursuit of the European press, how the papers were procured, what kind of issues were underlined in the extracts translated and how the relevant news and comments were evaluated will be emphasized, and how this effort turned into almost a standard practice following his reign will be shown.

KEYWORDS: Abdulhamid I; Newspaper; European Press; Directorate of Foreign Affairs; Intelligence.

INTRODUCTION

Today, printed newspapers are dying and Turkish society is freed from the stigma of “not reading newspapers”! Actually, the fact that the Turkish ruling elite and the public do not read newspapers has long been the subject of criticism by the Europeans. During the reign of Mahmud II, when *Frankfurter* made fun of the Turks “starting from the statesmen down to the sultan”, probably one of the officers in Foreign Ministry made an offer to the sultan saying, «Let’s send a note to the journalist so that he does not write such a thing again». The determination of the aforementioned officer regarding the established opinions about the Ottomans was also remarkable: «Until this time, believing that the Ottomans do not read papers, they write whatever they want and tear apart the state’s reputation». However, what he said after this determination was of a nature that would shake the general opinion about the Ottomans: «Our Grand Seigneur, the Sultan, reviews all the papers and reads the articles regarding his empire».

European diplomats serving in the Turkish Empire in the early modern period followed the newspapers published in capitals such as Vienna, Paris and London¹,

1 Antoine Galland, *İstanbul’a Ait Günlük Hatıralar*, vol. I (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1949), 49, 173, 183.

and also delivered the intelligence they gathered from Istanbul to their countries². We know that they had contributed to the flux of information. But know not that the Ottoman ministers of state or sultans had such a practice³. Even though the Ottoman sultans did not resort to publishing papers in their own land until the middle of the 19th century, and even if they did not “order” even the foreign elements inside to publish newspapers in Istanbul for various reasons, they seemed to have understood early on that papers could be considered as a tool for intelligence. As can be understood from the sentences quoted above, there was a widespread belief in Europe that the Ottomans did not read newspapers for a long time⁴; but it seems that there were individual cases that would shake this stereotype. For example, although it was not consistently maintained, it was seen that the «news seen in the papers from Frengistan»⁵ was translated and presented to the sultan during the reign of Sultan Mahmud I (reign 1730-54). Over time, the situation seemed to have changed somewhat. According to the documents come across in the Ottoman Archives, Sultan Abdulhamid I made a serious and consistent effort to follow the European press, unlike his predecessors.

RUSSIAN THREAT

Sultan Abdulhamid I, whose first move was to accept the independence of Crimea when he came to the throne, saw Russia as his biggest enemy because of the annexation of Crimea by the Russians (1783). Austria was another country that the Sultan always kept an eye on, often due to its alliance with Russia. As a result, he was meticulous and uneasy for getting news about the activities and alliances of these two bordering powers.

Abdulhamid I was in a remarkable effort to obtain information about Europe in general, especially those two aforementioned, by various means and methods. In the regions bordering those two powers in the eastern and western parts⁶ the Sultan was giving strict and frequent warnings, directly and indirectly, to the regional administrators⁷ private spies⁸ about making uninterrupted investigations and sending intelligence on gradual grounds⁹. It was also a fact, especially from the

2 John-Paul Ghobrial, *The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 94-102.

3 In Sarıcaoğlu's (1999: 96) work, it is also mentioned that there were “summaries of papers” among the files submitted to Abdulhamid I. But, for example, when the practice began, how long this practice lasted, how those were evaluated is not mentioned.

4 BOA, TS.MA.e 560/76.

5 BOA, C.HR 55/2737.

6 Ahmet Yüksel, *Rusların Kafkasya'yı İstilas ve Osmanlı İstihbarat Ağı* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2014), 72-3

7 BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1668; BOA, AE.SABH.I 16/1430.

8 BOA, A.DVN.DVE 179/110.

9 Yüksel, *Osmanlı İstihbarat Ağı*, 63-4, 67.

countries bordering Austria and Russia, it was difficult to «provide reliable spies» because it was impossible to find capable ones "knowing foreign languages" among the Muslims. It was not «permissible to trust» Jews and Christians¹⁰. Therefore, papers that also contained international political and military news could be a significant element as an intelligence source. As a matter of fact, due to the reason just articulated, Mehmed Pasha (guardian of Belgrade), for example, stated that he would take the "papers (*kağıt*) called newspapers" and have them translated and forwarded to the grand vizier.

INTELLIGENCE AND THE PAPERS

Basically, intelligence is an activity of "security". Being safe is a subjective fact/perception for the state as well as for individuals. Knowing the historical areas of conflict and the perpetrators thereof, the Turkish Empire reflexively tried to gather information about the capabilities and equipment of the (opponent) state/s that it considers a potential threat, while on the other hand, struggled hard to restrict the access to information about itself as much as possible. Undoubtedly, intelligence is a method of obtaining information that all states, large or small, apply not only outside the homeland, but also within the country in order to maintain their existence. Starting from the very first conquests, the Ottomans also engaged in an irregular in earlier times, and then a systematic intelligence activity beginning from the 16th century, and these efforts continued until the collapse of the Empire¹¹. It is generally accepted that intelligence activities are grouped under two headings, in accordance with their subject/types and their levels. It can be claimed that the information obtained through newspapers is political and military in terms of type and strategic, in terms of level. As a matter of fact, newspapers, which take the pulse of the society they are a product of, are information sources that can provide political and military news of an "intelligent"¹² quality in proportion to the proximity of the editorial team to intelligence sources, as well as a mass media tool¹³. Although it is said that newspapers were a direct tool of intelligence in the 19th and 20th centuries¹⁴, as it is understood from the example given in this article and the attitude of the ruling elites, papers are politically active and has long been used as a military manipulation tool.

Journalism in Europe started quite early compared to the Ottoman Empire. Austria, Prussia, Venice and England were the leading figures in this sense. The first papers

10 BOA, HAT 1416/57870.

11 Haldun Eroğlu, "Klasik Dönemde Osmanlı Devleti'nin İstihbarat Stratejileri", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 22/34 (2003): 22-33.

12 James Grant, *The Newspaper Press; Its Origin, Progres and Present Position* (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1871), 9-10.

13 Donald W. Whisenhunt, "The Frontier Newspaper: A Guide to Society and Culture", *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 45/4 (1968): 726; Robert Ezra Park, "Natural History of Newspapers", *American Journal of Sociology*, 29/3 (1923): 276.

14 Von Klevitsch, *İstihbarat*, trans. Mustafa Şevki (Istanbul: Askerî Akademiler Matbaası, 1927): 10-1.

were prepared by hand, not by print, and had limited circulation, for sure. With the loosening of the political tension in the second half of the 17th century, journalism began in the significant centers of Europe in a format close to today's standards¹⁵. For the Ottomans, the main factor in the publication of the first public paper was the concern «to inform the people about the daily events and innovations of the time during an attempt to adopt the methods of Western civilization»¹⁶. In addition, the state wanted the society, which had difficulty in keeping up with the reforms made one after another, to give credit not to “rumors” but to the news to be publicized from the official mouth through the papers¹⁷. In other words, the ideal of being a partially independent tool for publishing articles on international politics, as in Western papers, was not in question for the first period of Ottoman journalism. The main concern was to inform the public and especially the civil servants about administrative and some political moves taken by the central government¹⁸.

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SULTAN'S CHANNELS FOR INTELLIGENCE: IS THE NEWS IN PAPERS CAN BE INTELLIGENCE?

The most important sources of intelligence during the classical period of the Empire were the civil and military officials in the frontier regions¹⁹, the Ottoman subjects, non-Muslim clergy, and especially the voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia²⁰. The voivodes mentioned were responsible for collecting the rumors and intelligence circulating among diplomats, especially being aware of what was going on in the eastern Europe and Russia, through their men «in charge of collecting news»²¹ and conveying them to the Ottomans. The grand vizier emphasized the importance of this very issue in the document submitted to the Sultan by saying that «gathering news is the only duty of the Moldavian and Wallachian voivodes», on a piece of note sent by the Moldavian voivode, where these activities were directly mentioned²². Apart from the intelligence sources mentioned, the Sultan also received news about interstate events from the ambassadors of France, Sweden and Prussia, and did

15 Grant, *The Newspaper Press*, 1-31; Yusuf Ziya, “İngiltere’de Gazeteciliğin Suret-i Tekemmülü”, *İctihad*, 26 (1911), 767-69.

16 Cengiz Orhonlu, “Türkçe Yayınlanan İlk Gazete: Takvim-i Vekâyi”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 1/6 (1968): 35.

17 Orhonlu, “İlk Gazete”, 36.

18 Orhonlu, “İlk Gazete”, 37.

19 Virginia Aksan, “The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply and Command in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1808”, in *Ottomans and Europeans. Contacts and Conflicts*, ed. Ead. (Piscataway: Gorgias Press), 145.

20 *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Osmanlı’da İstihbarat*, eds. Kemal Gürülkan, Ersin Kırca, Numan Yekeler, et al. (İstanbul: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2017), 5-6. Mevlüde G. Daş Darici, “Eflak-Boğdan-Erdel Voyvodaları ve Osmanlı İstihbaratına Dair Roller”, *Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 3/1, (2019): 87-99; Vedat Kanat, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Lehistan’a Dair İstihbarat Kaynakları”, *Turkish Studies*, 10/13 (2015): 118-21

21 BOA, AE.SABH.I 98/6668.

22 BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1694.

not hesitate to be fed from almost every source, provided that he was “cautious” in terms of the sources of intelligence²³.

In this context, it was understood that the governor of Bosnia, Abdullah Pasha, had spies in the districts bordering Austria, followed the papers issued in Vienna and sent to the Bosnian lands, and forwarded some of them he deemed important to the Sultan. However, Abdullah Pasha drew attention to the fact that «the news being published in the papers and sent to various places» could also be «one of the tricks that have become the character of the Austrians»²⁴.

In the aforementioned summary (April 9, 1747) presented to Sultan Mahmud I, with the headline “newspaper news from *Frengistan* (Europe)”, it is reported that France will attack Belgium, and that there was consensus that Louis XV should attack Flanders with a “perfectly equipped” army lead by him personally. It was also recorded that the Austro-Sardinian alliance attacked the Genoese, that the Genoese successfully resisted, while it was stated that France and Spain supported the Genoese both by land and by sea. The proximity between Austria and the duke of Cologne was also noted; and lastly, it was mentioned that Carl Gustaf Tessin became the prime minister in Sweden despite the Russian opposition²⁵.

At the end of the same year, this time there was a newspaper summary presented by the Wallachian voivode through his special agent (*kapikethüdası*) in the Porte. It was reported that the newspaper favored Austrian policies on the grounds that it was published in Cologne and that Cologne was also subject to Austria at that time, and that it should be taken into account that some of the news given in the papers could be meant to “deceive the Turkish Empire”. However, Wallachian voivode Konstantin Mavrokordato²⁶ stated that similar things had happened in the recent past as well, and that in this context, and that he read this type of a “proper situation” in the *Tarih* authored by Subhi²⁷.

These two extracts of papers are the earliest dated summaries ever identified. Considering that there was no intense follow-up effort²⁸ as it was during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid I, and there was no note on the piece belonging to the grand vizier or the Sultan, it can be argued that such an effort remained isolated.

Following Abdulhamid I, Selim III, especially through the permanent ambassadors sent²⁹, followed the papers published in Europe, and the increase in the number

23 BOA, HAT 1430/58531; BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1688; BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1644; BOA, AE.SABH.I 4/412; BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1689; BOA, AE.SABH.I 9/798; BOA, AE.SABH. I 369/25757; BOA, AE.SABH.I 4/439.

24 HAT 26/1262-D.

25 BOA, C.HR 55/2737.

26 For more about the family, see the entry “Mavrocordato”, in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol 17/8, ed. Hugh Chisholm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 917.

27 BOA, C.HR 88/4381.

28 Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, *Sultan I. Abdülhamid. Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi (1774-1789)* (Istanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2001), 96.

29 BOA, C.HR 96/4778.

and variety of the papers followed (Frankfurt, Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Strasbourg, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Berlin, Flavin, Warsaw) was worth noting³⁰.

Sultan Abdulhamid I, who seemed to follow the European papers more regularly and steadily, did not consider newspapers only as a military and political source of information, but also followed the social and cultural developments in Europe through them³¹. In this sense, Abdulhamid I wanted attention to be given to the continuity and confirmation of the information given in the notes he took on the intelligence reports delivered to him. Because, as in that period, «intensive, uninterrupted and verified intelligence was of vital importance» in the times of severe conflict both within Europe and around the Ottoman border³².

Although the first half of the 18th century passed peacefully for the Ottomans, the state was quite worn out due to the struggles with the Russian and Austrian empires in the second half. The colonial empires established by France and England in the Americas, and again by the latter in India, face tough tests; Western empires that won in one place were losing power in another. Russia's efforts to expand towards Central Asia and Asia Minor, as well as its plan to dominate the Black Sea and descend towards the Mediterranean, frequently brought the Ottomans and Russians into conflict towards the end of the century.

Many struggles that ended in defeat in the process paved the way for the Ottomans, who forced to admit that they were weak in the military sense, to embark on diplomatic quests. Towards the end of the century, there was a need to establish residence embassies in Europe and to monitor and report the political and military developments on the spot. However, while the embassies were not yet established by Selim III, Abdulhamid I was trying to follow what was going on in Europe through spies appointed by local administrators and newspapers published in various parts of the continent³³. Contrary to some claims³⁴, this pursuit is not just an effort made before the “campaigns”; it was a continuous activity³⁵.

Considering the 39 pieces of “news summaries” found in the Presidential Ottoman Archive, it was seen that Abdulhamid I had followed the European press since the fifth year of his reign. It was certainly no coincidence that 1/3 of these summaries coincided with the first three years of the war declared against Russia (1787) to recapture the Crimea³⁶. In general being good-hearted, mild and pro-peaceful³⁷

30 BOA, HAT 144/6063.

31 BOA, TS.MA.e 560/39.

32 Ahmet Yüksel, “II. Mahmud Devrinde Mısır Krizi ve İstihbarat”, *Yeni Türkiye*, 83 (2016): 461; Akad, *Tarihten Günümüze*, 20.

33 BOA, TS.MA.e 559/66.

34 Klevitsch, *İstihbarat*, 3.

35 Abdülkadir Özcan, “Casus” (Türk devletlerinde), *DİA*, 7 (1993): 169.

36 During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid I, the dates and traditions of newspaper extracts found in the archive were as follows: 2 in 1779; 3 in 1780; 4 in 1781; 2 in 1782; 5 in 1783; 3 in 1784; 2 in 1785; 3 in 1786; 3 in 1787; In the form of 5 separate files in 1788 and 5 separate files in 1789, the news compiled from various newspapers were presented to him by being summarized and translated.

37 Midhat Sertoğlu, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. V (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu

figure, Abdulhamid I was seeking to maintain the "friendship" or the peaceful relations with other European powers, in the face of the war card played by the grand vizier under public pressure, and to know how the Ottoman-Russian conflict was evaluated in their public and political gatherings.

"NEWS IN PAPERS ARE NOT THAT MUCH CREDIBLE!"

It was obvious that Abdulhamid I had been following the newspapers for 10 years. In addition, papers were requested to be found in person, rather than being delivered as they were seized³⁸. As a matter of fact, the Sultan revealed that he wanted to follow the papers personally, with the mandate he wrote on the summarized piece submitted to him by the grand vizier and others conveyed by the *charge d'affaires* ordering them that they would not refrain from getting intelligence on gradual basis³⁹. Considering that the sultan, who worked with a total of nine grand viziers in 15 years, followed the European press for a long time, this should have been a sign of his own interest rather than the ingenuity of any grand vizier employed during his sway.

Despite this, the sultan also knew that newspaper reports would not to be blindly believed, and that the relevant newspapers might be seeking lies, deception, conspiracy and diversion in favor of the states they belonged to. For example, in the news published in the paper *Notizie del Mondo*, which was published in Venice on 3 August 1784 and was translated and presented to the Sultan with the original copy in the middle of the same month⁴⁰ it reads,

The surest way to preserve harmony and friendship with Austria is to let a part of Croatia be annexed by the Emperor. All this was expressed in a very friendly way and had a great impact on the Court. A few days later, Reis Effendi sent a memorandum to the ambassador and said that the Ottoman Empire was not far from showing courtesy to the emperor's request⁴¹.

It was clear that the Ottoman Sultan was forced to make concessions in favor of the Austrians.

In some of these summaries presented to the Sultan, it was recorded to which cities the newspapers belonged and from time to time by whom they were delivered to the palace. It was stated that 15 papers were brought from Austria (Vienna and Cologne), four papers from the Netherlands, two papers from France, another two from Italy and one was brought from Russia.

As the documents show the papers were sometimes sent by the voivodes of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia through their official agents in the capital,

Yayınları, 2011), 2659

38 BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1633.

39 BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1633.

40 BOA, HAT 26/1262.

41 I would like to thank Dr. Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy for her help translating the piece.

sometimes by the pashas serving as the guardians at the borders⁴², sometimes by European merchant ships⁴³, and from time to time by the ambassadors of European powers in Istanbul⁴⁴. The papers brought to the Sublime Porte had by the grand vizier been translated (by the interpreters employed in the Court), then the summarized piece would be presented to the Sultan either as it is or sometimes with the personal notes of the grand vizier written in red ink⁴⁵. One or a few sentences of the sultan's admonition, warning, order or prayer/curse were seen on almost every piece that was presented. For example, in the lines he wrote on the summary, which was submitted to him a few days before his demise (April 7, 1789), he said, «It is my request that you be aware of the correctness of each of the newspaper copies and then submit them to me»⁴⁶. He warned that they should be investigated and that he should be informed of the exact results. On the summary, which was apparently presented to him around the same time, mentioning that Venice had attacked Tunisia, «May Allah, the best of Helpers, damn the heathen both on land and at sea» he wrote⁴⁷.

Though rare, it was also mentioned that the papers were translated by someone other than the translators in the Court. In the summary of an Austrian paper, it was reported that the translation was made and delivered by "Osman Bey". The Grand Vizier also showed the relevant translation to the Court translator, who confirmed that the summary was "as shown". Then, the summary file was presented to the sultan together with the original of the paper⁴⁸. Sometimes, it was recorded that at least some translations (of the news) were corrected by «foreign state translators residing in the Capital», that is, by translators working in the embassies, probably in order to be sure of the job made by the translator in the Royal Court⁴⁹.

Undoubtedly, Abdulhamid I was not only trying to gather intelligence through those papers; it wouldn't be very healthy either⁵⁰. For example, there was an anonymous article published in a foreign newspaper stating that especially military and political content in the news could not be too much trusted⁵¹. When the possibility arose for the Austrians to attack the Ottomans again (1788) in alliance with the Russians, it was said in the newspapers that «[...] it is funny not to believe, but to say, that the French had even dreamed of diverting the Austrian Emperor from his purpose, which may have been concealed at the time being».

42 BOA, HAT 1416/57870.

43 BOA, TS.MA.e 560/75.

44 BOA, HAT 23/1105.

45 BOA, AE.SABH.I 12/1052; BOA, AE.SABH.I 370/25835.

46 BOA, HAT 1451/76.

47 BOA, AE.SABH.I 365/25492.

48 BOA, TS.MA.e 559/66.

49 BOA, TS.MA.e 558/58.

50 Grant, *The Newspaper Press*, 28-9.

51 BOA, TS.MA.e 559/18.

Besides, in the face of the claim that Russia did not have the economic and military equipment to fight the Ottomans, the verdict was made that «what is written in other newspaper documents is completely baseless». After all, the grand vizier stated in his memorandums that it would not be right to rely only on the papers, as they were devised as tools for "cheating, as is the custom of European states"; and the Sultan himself appreciated it⁵².

While Crimea was still kept by the Russians and there was a preparation for a possible attack against Russia (1785), the grand vizier (Şahin Ali Pasha), who presented the news compiled from several papers during the ongoing seek for alliance, expressed his sensitivity on the subject with the following words:

[...] This type of newspaper report is too unreliable; unless it turned out that it appeared time and again, or it was confirmed from other sources/places, or seemed to be compatible with the conditions and interests of the period. Then it is worth to be trusted.

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Thus he put forward three conditions for paper reports to be considered credible:

1. News should have been written at least a few times; 2. It would have to be confirmed by other news sources/channels; 3. It should have seemed appropriate for the time and interest.

The use of newspapers by governments to create public opinion against their rivals and to attract the public for political moves⁵³ was not unique to the 19th and 20th centuries. It was understood from a report sent to Abdulhamid I that papers were used as a propaganda tool in the 18th century. After Russia announced through papers that it was making some plans considering Iran, Suleyman Pasha (guardian of Baghdad and Basra) was asked to investigate the situation and to confirm whether the news in the paper had anything to do with the facts⁵⁴. It is written in the Austrian newspapers that «Ottoman Empire may give up Belgrade besides the sacrifices made for the continuation of peace with Russia». The two states, which frequently formed alliances against the Ottomans on this ground, were trying to discourage the Ottomans from their determination to fight through the news they spread as "rumors"⁵⁵.

Sultan Abdulhamid I was not merely seeking outward intelligence; and also, for example, was trying to get information about the situation of Muslims and non-Muslims in the Aegean Islands, and to be informed about the situation of the people and the treatment of the local government towards the people living in his empire. In this context, a report on nine districts in the region was presented by a man he sent to the Mediterranean islands in March 1784⁵⁶.

52 BOA, AE.SABH.I 12/1052; BOA, TS.MA.e 560/46.

53 Zekeriya Kurşun, "II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Batı Basınında İmaj Düzeltme Çabaları: Matbuat-ı Ecnebiye Müdüriyeti'nin Kurulması ve Faaliyetleri", *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 1 (1999): 105.

54 BOA, HAT 10/348.

55 BOA, HAT 1430/58526.

56 BOA, TS.MA.e, 706/27.

COUNTRIES MENTIONED IN THE NEWS: RUSSIA, AUSTRIA...

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji), which was signed following the war against the Russians, which started in 1768 and lasted for about 6 years, in order to prevent the first partition of Poland between Russia, Prussia and Austria, resulted in heavy conditions in both material and moral terms⁵⁷. Then, between 1776-79, the wars with Iran due to the invasion of Basra also hit a hard blow militarily and economically.

After the loss of Crimea in 1774, the Ottomans tried to take it back for the coming 10 years. In 1777, Şahin Giray was proclaimed khan with the support of the Russian Tsarina. He eliminated his rivals and dominated the whole of Crimea⁵⁸. In 1783, without much resistance, Crimea was annexed by the Russians. Although the situation was traumatic, the Ottomans had to recognize the annexation about a year later, in 1784.

In the following process, the Russian Tsarina Catherine II imposed clauses on Wallachia and Moldavia, which led her to obtain the right to intervene. In addition to the dismissal and appointment of the Wallachian and Moldavian voivodes, she began to actively interfere with the governors of the surrounding provinces, and to apply pressure for some of them to be dismissed and others to be replaced through the embassy. Not satisfied with that, the Tsarina⁵⁹ signed a plan to divide Turkey, called the *Projet Grec* (Greek Project), with the Austrian Emperor Joseph II⁶⁰.

In this conjuncture, the country that was the object of the summaries presented to Abdulhamid I was, as could be expected, Russia. As the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed in 1774 after a 6-year wearisome fight, «made Russia the most important force dominating the Ottoman destiny, and this situation turned into a nightmare that was getting worse as days passed»⁶¹. Next came Austria; England and France followed suit.

It was certainly not out of place that the countries mostly mentioned in the summaries were Russia and Austria. The sultan had a kind of antipathy towards the Austrians, especially the Russians, as they frequently threatened the state, and at almost every opportunity cut off the parts/parcels of the Empire that bordered them, and against the British for her colonial activities aimed at the Islamic community in the Indian sub-continent. He seemed particularly angry with England; he was extremely offended by the fact that they were providing naval support to the Russians. As a matter of fact, when the news that the French and Swedish ambassadors conveyed to the chief effigy through their translators was presented to him by the grand vizier, on the relevant memorandum, «How much did the British infidel help the Russians at sea before? God is just; hopefully she

57 İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, vol. IV (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972), 58.

58 Aksan, “The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind”, 170.

59 For details of the project, see Edouard Driault, *Napoleon’un Şark Siyaseti*, trans. Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları), 12-37.

60 Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı*, 64-5.

61 Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı*, 58.

(the British) will be defeated», he noted⁶². No matter that the intelligence reports of the French ambassador were presented to him and he was told that she was a «400-year-old friend», Abdulhamid I stated that «the Ottomans should not take heed of such words too much, and that it is necessary to be prepared against the enemy at any moment»⁶³.

In 1787, the Ottomans could not tolerate the "brazen Russian demands" and, under the pressure of the public, Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha declared war on Russia⁶⁴. However, things did not go as planned; in the following process, the Ottoman officials seemed to be convinced that the acceptance of the Russian demands would be more reasonable. After the declaration of the war, in April 1879, in the memorandum presented to the sultan himself by the Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha, «all viziers, *ulema*, headmen and statesmen in the advisory council unanimously agreed to issue the Russians a memorandum» considering the lack of communication in the soldiers of the Empire, the inadequacy of the Treasury and the necessities of the situation. It was understood from the expression⁶⁵ that most of the statesmen were not willing to wage a war because of the irregularity of the soldiers and shortage of money⁶⁶, and they thought that the Russians should be given the document (sened) they wanted. In addition, it was clear from the magnate that the Sultan was of the opinion that the Empire was not ready for war, and that he wrote to the grand vizier⁶⁷. He also stated that «the condition of the state is well-known, or else it will be worse»; and ordered that the «treasury, soldiers and other castles should be given a good form first».

In 1788, Austria declared war on Turkey taking side with the Russians due to her word of alliance. In the same year, Sweden declared war on the Russians as she was an ally of the Turks. Yet she succeeded nothing other than capturing of a small castle within a few months and withdrew from the war due to the turmoil in the country. In 1788, the Fortress of Ochakov fell, and the Russians, capturing the city, attempted to plunder and killed 25 thousand non-warriors.

For Sultan Abdulhamid I, who was always meticulous to "see supply", this last war seemed to cost a very heavy bill. He had an enthusiastic but not oppressive nature in state administration. In particular, he instructed the grand viziers to take responsibility for their work; did not follow an imposing and oppressive administrative policy. However, due to various faults, incompatibilities and even the illiteracy of some, many grand viziers were able to serve for very short periods of time. This frequent change had prevented the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and security in the administration and the Sultan, and led to the failure to get the desired results from the reforms undertaken in response to the weaknesses experienced.

62 BOA, AE.SABH.I 4/412.

63 BOA, AE.SABH.I 15/1312.

64 Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı*, 64.

65 BOA, AE.SABH.I 19/1689.

66 Kazım Şinasi, "On Üçüncü Asırda İstikraz İşleri: Abdülhamid-i Evvel ve Selim-i Salis Zamanı", *Yeni Mecmua*, 42/2 (1918): 311-12.

67 BOA, AE.SABH.I 4/388.

CONCLUSION

It was very important for Sultan Abdulhamid I to be wary of his close and distant neighbors at a time when the state was engaged in an intense struggle against Russia and Austria, lost land piece by piece by being constantly threatened, on top of that, it experienced economic and military difficulties and attempted reform movements irrespective of all these adverse conditions. Under those unfavorable times, the Sultan, who had to follow a policy of balance, wanted to evaluate all the sources he could get intelligence from. In this direction, papers, which started to become more widespread in Europe, were an important tool.

Apart from the two pieces of summaries, which are stated to belong to the period of Sultan Mahmud I before Sultan Abdulhamid I, no hints appear that European papers were followed regularly by the Turkish sultans. But with this move, which he almost made a habit of, Abdulhamid I created almost a new way. It is understood from the thousands of documents found in various funds in the Ottoman archives that Sultan Selim III, Sultan Mahmud II and Sultan Abdulmecid, who took the throne after him, and undoubtedly Sultan Abdulhamid II⁶⁸ continued this very way.

The main political motivation of the Sultan, who was on the throne in between two Russian wars, was to take back the Crimea from the Russians, who took an aggressive stance against the Ottomans in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. In this sense, Abdulhamid did not want to be deprived of the news about the region and neither of the news published in the papers launched in various parts of Europe such as Austria, Netherlands, France and Italy; and stressed upon the flux of intelligence. The relevant intelligence-gathering effort was not limited to Russia, of course. Other political and economic alliances in Europe, military preparations, the heads of state's domestic and international trips, the European public views of the Ottomans and Turkish statesmen, etc. were the headlines highlighted in the summaries presented. As a matter of fact, Abdulhamid I did not hesitate to collect information about his near and distant contemporaries and societies and tended to make the most of this information especially in his political moves.

Along with the interest shown to the newspapers, there was a cautious approach both in the sultan and the grand vizier. Although he insisted on compiling news from the papers, the sultan was advising that it was pointless to trust them with eyes blind and that the news should be confirmed by diplomats and other sources of information.

ABBREVIATIONS

BOA: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri-Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi
AE. SABH. I: Ali Emiri Abdülhamid I
TS. MA.e: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı
C.HR: Cevdet Hariciye
HAT: Hatt-ı Hümayûn
A.DVN.DVE: Düvel-i Ecnebiye Belgeleri

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VARIA SECTION



**THE ROLE OF CARDINAL PROTECTORS OF THE POLISH CROWN
IN EMBASSIES OF OBEDIENCE IN THE 16TH CENTURY.
PREPARATIONS FOR MISSIONS, CEREMONIES AND DIPLOMACY¹**

ABSTRACT

Ever since the Middle Ages, embassies of obedience were sent to Rome to take an oath of fidelity to the pope on behalf of Catholic rulers. In the 16th century it became a courtesy visit and a pretext to pursue political goals. Most importantly, such missions had a huge propaganda significance and served as an opportunity to manifest the power of a kingdom and its ruler in Rome. Every embassy of obedience was received in Rome in accordance with the same principles of the papal ceremonial. The organisation of a mission sent to the pope was a very complicated undertaking. Meeting all the requirements for obedience envoys was a major challenge and required the support of the Holy See. Polish monarchs did not keep permanent representatives in Rome, so cardinal protectors of Poland were the key figures during embassies of obedience. Taking care of the representatives of rulers and making sure that they were appropriately introduced and honoured at the papal court were some of the basic duties of cardinal protectors. Their care was visible at every stage of such an embassy, which is reflected by the parts of this paper. The first part is devoted to the protectors' participation in preparing an embassy before leaving for Rome; the second part presents the cardinals' contribution to the ceremonial part of the embassy; the third part describes the assistance that protectors provided to envoys in relation to their diplomatic activity.

KEYWORDS: Cardinals protectors of Poland; Embassies of Obedience; Papal ceremonial; Diplomacy; Polish relations with the Holy See.

Ever since the Middle Ages, embassies of obedience were sent to Rome to take an oath of fidelity to the pope on behalf of Catholic rulers. Such a mission could be caused by a change on the Apostolic Throne of St. Peter and all newly crowned monarchs were obliged to declare obedience to the head of the Church. Obedience was also declared when new land was incorporated into a kingdom². This custom had been adopted in the 12th century and was reinforced at the time

1 The work is the result of the research project No. 2017/25 / N / HS3 / 01285 funded by the National Science Center.

2 Marian Banaszak, *Z dziejów dyplomacji watykańskiej. Poselstwa obediencyjne w latach 1534-1605*, 3 voll. (Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1975); Hanna Osiecka-Samsonowicz, *Ceremonie e feste polacche nella Roma barocca 1587-1696* (Roma: Accademia Polacca delle Scienze Biblioteca e Centro Studi, 2014).

of the Western Schism, when the torn papacy wanted rulers to confirm its power³. Siding with one of the popes entailed paying homage to him, which is why it was referred to as following the Avignon Obedience, the Roman Obedience or the Pisan Obedience⁴. When the authority of the Holy See was restored in the 15th century, embassies turned into lavish celebrations. In the next century, the declaration of obedience became a courtesy visit and a pretext to pursue political goals. Most importantly, such missions had a huge propaganda significance and served as an opportunity to manifest the power of a kingdom and its ruler in Rome. As written by Maria Antonietta Viscelia, in the modern period the Eternal City was a place of rivalry and the formation of an international hierarchy⁵.

In the discussed period, Polish rulers sent fifteen embassies of obedience to Rome. It was started by Alexander Jagiellon, on whose behalf Erazm Ciołek declared obedience to the pope two times: he paid homage to Alexander VI in 1501, when Alexander Jagiellon was the Grand Duke of Lithuania, and four years later to Julius II, when Alexander was the King of Poland. Sigismund I the Old also tried to fulfil this duty towards the papacy. In 1513, he sent Primate Jan Łaski (John à Lasco) to Leo X and a quarter of a century later he sent Tomasz Sobocki to Paul III. Pope Farnese accepted the declaration of obedience made by Sigismund Augustus two more times. In 1545, Mikołaj Myszkowski was sent to make a declaration of obedience to the pope when Sigismund was the Grand Duke of Lithuania and three years later, after his ascension to the Polish throne, he sent Marcin Kromer to Rome. The last king of the Jagiellonian dynasty conscientiously fulfilled his duties, sending embassies to the following bishops of Rome: Julius III (Andrzej Czarnkowski, 1550), Paul IV (Stanisław Maciejowski, 1556) and Pius IV (Adam Konarski, 1560). For elective kings, embassies of obedience were the perfect opportunity to have their rights to the Polish throne confirmed by the papal authority. Stephen Báthory delegated his envoys to Rome three times: two times to meet Gregory XIII (in 1579, Paweł Uchański and four years later, after a victory in a war against Moscow, Stephen's nephew Andrew Báthory paid homage to the pope because Livonia had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland) and once to meet Sixtus V (in 1586, when Jan Dymitr Solikowski was sent to Rome). In 1590, at the end of the pontificate of the Felice Peretti pope, Bernard Maciejowski paid homage to him on behalf of Sigismund III Vasa. A few months later, Maciejowski paid homage to Gregory XIV, the newly elected pope. The last embassy in the discussed period arrived in Rome in 1594. It was then that the declaration of obedience to Clement VIII was made by Stanisław Miński on behalf of Sigismund III. When the above-mentioned envoy returned from his mission, he wrote a guide for his successors, which is an excellent

3 Gaetano Moroni, *Dizionario di Erudizione Storico-Ecclesiastico*, vol. 82 (Venezia: Tipografia Emiliana, 1857), 17.

4 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. 1, 27.

5 Maria Antonietta Visceglia, Catherine Brice, "Introduction", in *Cérémonial et rituel à Rome (XVIe-XIXe siècle)* (Rome: École française de Rome: 1997), 6; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. 3, 198; Stefano Andretta, "Cerimoniale e diplomazia pontificia nl XVII secolo", in *Cérémonial et rituel à Rome*, 201-222.

source on the organisation of such missions⁶.

Every embassy of obedience was received in Rome in accordance with the same principles of the papal ceremonial. The first and the most impressive part of the mission was the envoy's triumphal entry into Rome and the reception of his entourage at the city gates. It ended in the envoy's temporary residence⁷. A few days later the envoy's entourage was welcomed by the pope and cardinals in the Apostolic Palace at a consistory, where the envoy gave a speech and made a declaration of obedience. This was the end the main part of the mission, related to the official presentation and the papal ceremonial. Then the envoy, who was a representative of the ruler, continued to fulfil courtesy duties, such as paying visits to the pope and members of the College of Cardinals. At these meetings, the king's envoy was engaged in diplomatic activity, trying to perform the tasks entrusted to him by the ruler, and when they were completed, he went back to the country.

The organisation of a mission sent to the pope was a very complicated undertaking. Meeting all the requirements for obedience envoys was a major challenge and required the support of the Holy See. It needs to be emphasised that Polish rulers did not keep permanent representatives in Rome, they just periodically sent envoys to stay there for some time. This is why they tried to acquire trusted cardinals from the Sacred College. At the turn of the 16th century, the practice of appointing cardinal protectors by European rulers gained popularity in the Holy See. For adequate remuneration, they defended the rulers' interests before the pope. During the reign of John I Albert and Alexander Jagiellon, Polish diplomats kept in touch with Giovanni Battista Orsini, Juan Lopez and Giovanni Battista Ferrari, but the first historically confirmed protector of Poland was Pietro Isvalies (1505-1513), the former papal nuncio to Hungary and Poland⁸. His successor was Achille de Grassi (1513-1523), who also used to be a nuncio in countries ruled by monarchs of the Jagiellonian dynasty⁹. The next two protectors came from the influential Pucci

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- 6 Stanisław Mińskiego (1563-1607) *Sposób odprawowania poselstwa*, ed. Józef Korzeniowski (Kraków Akademia Umiejętności 1889), 437-65.
 - 7 Henryk Damian Wojtyśka, *Papiestwo-Polska 1548-1563, dyplomacja* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1977), 301-03; *Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej*, vol. I, red. Marian Biskup (Warszawa: PWN, 1980), 747-51.
 - 8 Krzysztof Rafał Prokop, "Od kiedy kardynał Pietro Isvalies był protektorem Polski w Kurii Rzymskiej?", *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne*, 126 (1999): 89-99; Michał Hirsch, "Z dziejów kontaktów dyplomatycznych między Polską a papieżem na przełomie XV i XVI w. – pierwszy kardynał-protektor Polski", *Koło Historii*, 18 (2016), 46-8; Id., "Kardynałowie promotorzy, koronni relatorzy – o początkach polskiego protektoratu narodowego w Kolegium Kardynałów na tle europejskim", in *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata w epoce nowożytnej i XX wieku, zbiór studiów*, eds. Krzysztof Ożóg and Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2020), 33-52.
 - 9 Janusz Smołucha, "Działalność Achillea de Grassisa jako kardynała protektora Polski przy Stolicy Apostolskiej w latach 1511-1523", *Nasza Przyszłość*, 87 (1997):

family of Florence, one of the closest collaborators of the Medici family. Lorenzo Pucci (1523-1531) was replaced by his nephew Antonio Pucci (1531-1545). The next protector was Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the grandson of Pope Paul III. He took care of Polish affairs in the Holy See for the next 44 years. He was one of the most influential cardinals, who served as Vice-Chancellor of the Church and Dean of the College of Cardinals for almost half a century¹⁰. He promoted a custom of appointing cardinals known as Vice-Protectors, who replaced him in his service on behalf of Polish rulers. In over 40 years, there were five of them: Francesco Sfondrati (1545-1550), Bernardino Maffei (1550-1553), Giacomo Puteo (1553-1563), Giacomo Savelli (1562-1587) and Enrico Caetani (1589)¹¹. At that time, the protectorate started to resemble an organised institution, as a result of which a congregation for Polish affairs was established in the Sacred College. Miński mentions this institution in his guide for envoys: «When it comes to Polish affairs, you need to communicate with your cardinal protector and vice-protector, as well as with those [cardinals] who are *de la consulta et de la congregatione di Polonia*»¹². Apart from the protector, the organisation included mainly cardinals vice-protectors, former nuncios and friends of the kingdom. The last protector of Poland in the 16th century was Cardinal Alessandro Peretti di Montalto, cardinal-nephew of Sixtus V, who held this position until his death in 1623¹³. The topic of Polish embassies of obedience in the modern period has been thoroughly studied in Polish historiography. Missions from the years 1534-1605 were discussed in detail in a three-volume work by M. Banaszak and the topic was continued by H. Osiecka-Samsonowicz, who discussed missions organised up to 1696¹⁴. Separate monographs were devoted to individual embassies from the 17th century¹⁵. When it comes to literature on cardinal protectors, only a few

147-65.

- 10 Stefano Andretta, "Farnese, Alessandro", in DBI, vol. 45 (1995) [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alessandro-farnese_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/], (access: 3.03.2020)].
- 11 Wojtyska, *Papiestwo-Polska*, 273-97.
- 12 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 460. It is worth noting that "the Congregation for Polish Affairs" has not yet been examined in Polish historiography.
- 13 Joseph Wodka, *Zur Geschichte der nationalen Protektorat der Kardinale ad der romischen Kurie* (Innsbruck-Leipzig: Verlag Felizian Rauch, 1938), 77-124.
- 14 Hanna Osiecka-Samsonowicz, *Polskie uroczystości w barokowym Rzymie (1587-1969)* (Warszawa: Instytut Sztuki PAN, 2012); Ead., *Cerimonie e feste polacche nella Roma barocca 1587-1696* (Roma: Accademia Polacca delle Scienze Biblioteca e Centro Studi, 2014).
- 15 Tomasz Makowski, *Poselstwo Jerzego Ossolińskiego do Rzymu w roku 1633* (Warszawa: Biblioteka Narodowa, 1996); Gaetano Platania, "Il viaggio politico. Il caso di Michele Casimiro Radziwiłł, principe polacco, a Vienna e Roma nella documentazione d'archivio", in *Il viaggio in testi inediti o rari*, ed. Fernanda Rocetti (Roma: Istituto Nazionale di Studi Romani, 1998), 69-139; Dominika Walawender-Musz, *Entrata księcia Radziwiłła do Rzymu, czyli triumf po polsku*

European countries have comprehensive studies on this topic¹⁶. Polish literature on the activity of national cardinal protectors is scarce¹⁷. Therefore, it seems that in Polish and European historiography, the participation of cardinal protectors in the organisation and course of embassies of obedience in the 16th century has not been adequately specified.

At the papal court, protectors fulfilled functions similar to those of diplomats from foreign countries: they served as the informers of their principals, negotiated on their behalf and, which needs to be emphasised, represented them¹⁸. It seems that the latter task included the obligation to take care of envoys, so due to the fact that protectors were the highest ranking representatives of Poland in the Holy See, they played a crucial role during embassies of obedience. Their care was visible at every stage of such an embassy, which is reflected by the parts of this paper. The first part is devoted to the protectors' participation in preparing an embassy before leaving for Rome; the second part presents the cardinals' contribution to the ceremonial

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(Warszawa: Muzeum Pałac w Wilanowie, 2009); Hanna Osiecka-Samsonowicz, "Nieznane poselstwo obediencyjne biskupa Pawła Wołuckiego do papieża Pawła V w 1613 r.", in *Od Kijowa do Rzymu. Z dziejów stosunków ze Stolicą Apostolską i Ukrainą*, eds. Mariusz R. Drozdowski, Wojciech Walczak, Katarzyna Wiszowata-Walczak (Białystok: Instytut Badań nad Dziedzictwem Kulturowym Europy, 2012), 183-97.

- 16 Joseph Wodka, "Deutschordensprotektorat und Protektorat deutscher Nation", *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte – Kanonistische Abteilung*, 34 (1947): 318-25; Oliver Poncet, "The Cardinal-Protectors of the Crowns in the Roman Curia During the First Half of the Seventeenth Century: The Case of France", in *Court and politics in papal Rome*, eds. Gianvittorio Signorotto and Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Cambridge University Press 2002) 158-77; Michael Cotta-Schonberg, "Cardinal Enea Silvio Piccolomini and the Development of Cardinal Protectors of Nations", *Fund og Forskning*, 51 (2012): 49-76; *Gli "Angeli Custodi" delle monarchie: i cardinali protettori delle nazioni*, eds. Matteo Sanfilippo and Péter Tusor (Viterbo: Sette Citta, 2017); William E. Wilkie, *The Cardinal Protectors of England. Rome and the Tudors before the Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
- 17 Józef Drabina, "Kardynał protektor Polski w czasach Władysława Jagiełły", *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 89/4 (1982): 665-72; Michał Hirsch, "Z dziejów kontaktów dyplomatycznych", 46-8; Krzysztof Rafał Prokop, "Od kiedy kardynał Pietro Isvalies był protektorem Polski w Kurii Rzymskiej?", *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne*, 126 (1999): 89-9; Janusz Smołucha, "Działalność Achilessa de Grassisa jako kardynała protektora Polski przy Stolicy Apostolskiej w latach 1511-1523", *Nasza Przyszłość*, 87 (1997): 147-65. Michał Hirsch, "Działalność Antonio Pucciego jako kardynała protektora Polski w świetle dziennika podróży do Włoch 1540-1541 Jana z Ocieszyna Ocieskiego", *Nasza Przyszłość*, 129 (2018): 39-65.
- 18 Bertrand Marceau, "Cardinal Protectors and National Interests", in *A Companion to the Early Modern Cardinal. Brill's companions to the Christian tradition*, red. Mary Hollingsworth, Miles Pattenden and Arnold Witte (Leiden Boston Brill 2020), 198-211.

part of the embassy; the third part describes the assistance that protectors provided to envoys in relation to their diplomatic activity.

1. THE PROTECTORS' PARTICIPATION IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF AN EMBASSY OF OBEDIENCE

Before envoys were sent to Rome, Polish rulers often approached protectors and asked them to help organise the mission. They sought advice on matters related to the person chosen to be the envoy or asked protectors about the planned form of the embassy and whether it would be deemed appropriate by the Holy See. After the tumultuous double election in Poland and the imprisonment of Archduke Maximilian II, Sigismund III Vasa wanted to make a declaration of obedience to Sixtus V as soon as possible to confirm his rights to the throne. Stanisław Reszka, a special envoy, had been sent to Rome beforehand to explain the situation in Poland. On 9th May 1586 at private audience, the pope declared that Sigismund III was the rightful king of Poland, but he also concluded that only the appearance of an obedience envoy from Poland at a public consistory could prevent the Habsburg faction, whose members did not recognise Vasa as king, from objecting¹⁹. However, due to difficulties with finding a suitable candidate for the mission, Sigismund III proposed that it should be done by Stanisław Reszka, who was staying in Rome. In accordance with the king's will, Reszka discussed this proposal with the pope and the cardinal protector. Apart from political reasons, it was also a matter of ceremony, because according to the rules, envoys who resided in Rome were not entitled to an official entry into the city. At the request of Sixtus V, Cardinal Farnese convened a commission of cardinals (Tolomeo Gallio, Girolamo della Rovere, Enrico Gaetani, Gaspare Mattei). The protector revealed to Reszka that in his opinion he should be the one to make the declaration of obedience. However, the pope and the Sacred College did not accept a more modest version of the obedience and decided that an official embassy needed to be sent from Poland²⁰.

The Holy See was interested in who would be chosen to be the obedience envoy. What mattered was his ancestry, titles granted to him in Poland, experience gained during diplomatic missions and his position at the royal court²¹. In 1550, Wawrzyniec Warmuntowski, a courtier and a confidant of Protector Farnese, wrote to the cardinal from Poland that Andrzej Czarnkowski had been chosen to be the envoy. Due to his excellent ancestry, merits and education in Italy, the Polish monarch believed that he would be warmly welcomed by the pope and the cardinal protector²². Similarly, in 1555 Sigismund Augustus regularly informed Alessandro Farnese about preparations for the embassy of obedience that was supposed to be sent to Paul IV and asked Vice-Protector Giacomo Puteo (del Pozzo) to help achieve

19 AAV, Nunziatura di Polonia, vol. 30, f. 96; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. 2, 199–200.

20 *Stanisłai Rescii Diarium 1583–1589. Archiwum do Dziejów Literatury i Oświaty w Polsce*, vol. 15, ed. Jan Czubek (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1915), 243–249.

21 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563–1607)*, 446–47; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. I, 68–75.

22 Augustin Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia [...]*, vol. II (Romae: Typis Vaticanis, 1861), 570.

the objectives of the embassy²³. In 1589, the mission was still being delayed due to Sigismund III Vasa's problems with finding an appropriate envoy. Alessandro Peretti di Montalto, who was the protector of Poland at that time, wrote to nuncio Annibale di Capua, who was staying in Poland, to urge the king to send an embassy, regardless of whether the envoy would be a clergyman or a layman²⁴.

When an envoy was finally chosen, he was given a number of documents before going to Rome. First of all, the king's envoy obtained a detailed instruction, credentials to the pope and recommendation letters to influential people residing in Rome, who could help organise the entry into the city and fulfil the diplomatic purposes of the mission²⁵. Naturally, the addressees of such correspondence were cardinal protectors, vice-protectors and members of the Congregation for Polish affairs.

In the instruction given to Tomasz Sobocki in 1537, he was ordered to visit trusted cardinals who could act as intermediaries in matters entrusted to him. The envoy was supposed to contact protector Antonio Pucci to discuss some political subjects²⁶. In an instruction issued in 1545, Mikołaj Myszkowski was ordered to visit protector Farnese before and after his audience with the pope. Moreover, the document specified the manner in which the envoy was supposed to greet the cardinal²⁷. In 1548, Marcin Kromer received credentials to the pope and protector and was obliged to consult Alessandro Farnese²⁸. Two years later protector Farnese was residing outside of Rome due to his conflict with Pope Julius III²⁹. He appointed vice-protector Bernardino Maffei, as his deputy. According to the instruction and letters of recommendation from King Sigismund, Maffei and friend of Poland cardinal Marcello Crescenzi were supposed to watch over Andrzej Czarnkowski³⁰.

Another strategy was adopted by king Stephen Báthory, who in 1597, gave Paweł

23 AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 12, f. 102v, and vol. 16, f. 185v.

24 AAV, Nunziatura di Polonia, vol. 23, f. 342.

25 The instructions for the legations have been preserved: Tomasz Sobocki 1537 in AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 6, ff. 4-13v; Mikołaj Myszkowski 1545/46 in BCz, Ms.285, f. 31-71v; Marcin Kromer 1548 in *Uchańsciana seu Collectio documentorum illustrantium vitam et res gestas Jacobi Uchański Archiepiscopi Gnesnensis [...]*, vol. II, ed. Teodor Wierzbowski (Drukarnia J. Bergera Warszawa 1885), n. 7, 12; Andrzej Czarnkowski 1550 in AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 12, f. 282v-304; Stanisław Maciejowski 1556 in AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 14, f. 299-300v; Paweł Uchański 1579 in AGAD, MK, LL, 21, f. 232-237v, and Wierzbowski, *Uchańsciana*, vol. III, 292-98; Andrzej Batory 1583 in *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 5: *Alberti Bolognetti Nuntii Apostolici in Polonia epistolae et acta 1581-1585*, ed. Edward Kuntze and Czesław Nanke (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności 1923-1933), 525-27; Bernard Maciejowski in AAV, Nunziatura di Polonia, vol. 30, f. 191v, and Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. I, 76-81.

26 AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 6, f. 4-13v; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. II, 20-7.

27 BCz, Ms. 85, f. 33v-34.

28 Wierzbowski, *Uchańsciana*, vol. 2, n. 7, 12.

29 Wojtyńska, *Papiestwo-Polska*, 278.

30 AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 13, f. 89. Only a letter to Cardinal B. Maffei survived.

Uchański a number of letters to cardinals and several were left without specific addressees³¹. It was the usual practice of the royal chancery in 16th century, which gave the envoy an opportunity to try to win over influential cardinals in Rome³². When Stanisław Maciejewski was sent to Rome in 1590, he had delegated his secretary Paweł Wołucki to the Eternal City before he departed himself because he wanted Wołucki to prepare everything for his arrival. Because of that, he wrote a letter to Cardinal Protector Alessandro Perreti di Montalto, asking him to help his servant make preparations for the arrival of the embassy³³.

One of the most important matters that an envoy had to settle before his departure was securing a temporary residence in Rome. Apart from rudimentary residential functions, it had to meet adequate representative requirements. Stanisław Miński wrote that an envoy's palace should have a large ballroom, a smaller dining room and an audience room with an adequate number of antechambers. Polish envoys had to look for appropriate premises on their own. In a letter from 1583, addressed to Giovanni Andrea Caligari, nuncio to Poland, Cardinal Tolomeo Gallo explained that papal legates were not accommodated for free in Poland, so there was no reason to do things differently when Poles visited Rome³⁴. Therefore, the cost of renting a palace had to be covered by the envoy, and the required sums were substantial. In 1573, Stanisław Reszka wrote that it had cost 360 scudi a year to rent a palace for Hosius in Rome³⁵. A few years later, Paweł Wolski, who came to Rome as the ambassador of the king of Poland, paid 550 ducats for a 12-month lease³⁶. The problem was that Romans did not want to rent palaces by the month and the shortest possible term was six months, but it was preferable to rent premises for the whole year and pay in advance. Stanisław Miński advised envoys to look for houses which had already been rented but were then left early by the tenants³⁷.

This is where cardinal protectors of the Kingdom of Poland came to the rescue because they were the best suited to look for residences. Roman cardinals often

31 AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 21, f. 232. Among the known addressees were Cardinals Giulielmo Sirleti and Stanisław Hozjusz.

32 Włodzimierz Stanisław de Broel-Plater, *Zbiór pamiątek do dziejów polskich*, vol. I (Drukarina Gazety Codziennej Warszawa 1858), 122-24. Such a practice was used in diplomatic contacts by Zygmunt Stary with Erazm Ciołek, who was staying in Rome.

33 AAV, Nunziatura di Polonia, vol. 31, ff. 254, 487; Augustino Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. III (Romae Tipis Vaticanis 1863), 170.

34 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. VI: *Alberti Bolognetti nuntii apostolici in Polonia. Epistolae et acta 1581-1585*. Pars II: 1583, (Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Kraków 1938), 673-74.

35 *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza: listy Stanisława Reszki do Marcina Kromera, 1568-1582*, ed. Jadwiga Ambrozja Kalinowska (Olsztyn: Towarzystwo Naukowe im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego, 1992), n. 45, 54-5.

36 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 4: I. A. *Caligarii nuntii apostolici in Polonia epistolae et acta 1578-1581*, ed. Ludovicus Boratyński (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1915), 306.

37 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 447-48.

had a number of residences in the city. Apart from owning family palaces, which was a matter of honour for every respectful Roman family, cardinals were also given residences assigned to cardinal titles and other functions they performed³⁸. It is confirmed by a message written by nuncio Caligari in 1579, in which he asked protector Alessandro Farnese to prepare an apartment for a Polish envoy in the palace of the archpriest of St. Peter's Basilica or in the palace in Campo dei Fiori, as was customary³⁹. It seems that staying in the protector's palace was free. Cardinal Stanislaus Hosius spent a decade in Italy and for several years he stayed in the palace of the archpriest of St. Peter's Basilica for free, by courtesy of Cardinal Protector Farnese. Hosius also stayed for shorter periods of time in Farnese's family palace in Campo dei Fiori.⁴⁰

An exceptional situation took place in 1583, when Andrew Báthory, the nephew of King Stephan, was invited to stay at the Apostolic Palace in the Vatican by Gregory XIII. Báthory's mission was special in many respects. The envoy was in Rome to pay homage to the pope because Livonia had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland and when the obedience did not cover all the lands of a given country. It was usually treated as less official and envoys were refused certain privileges. However, in this case it was compensated by the fact that the envoy was a close relative of the ruler, which was highly appreciated in Rome. The special treatment of Andrew Báthory was also evident due to the pope's promise to appoint him cardinal⁴¹.

When all matters related to the trip were settled, the envoy could set off for Italy. When the envoy was approaching Rome, he sent his secretary to the city to inform the protector that the entourage would arrive soon. Then the cardinal sent someone from his court to greet the envoy and gave him a carriage, which was necessary to move around Rome in a way which did not offend the dignity of a royal envoy. The journey from Poland was made on horseback and in carts filled with baggage until the entourage reached a temporary residence on the outskirts of the city, in which everyone waited for the official entry. It was usually a suburban villa rented for a short term. In 1501, Erazm Ciołek stayed in a suburban house referred to as *villa*

38 Kalinowska, *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza*, n. 26, 32-33. In a letter to Kromer, Stanisław Reszka wrote that at the consistory held on 9 June 1570, Hosius was awarded the title of S. Anastasio. However, the cardinal's secretary had hoped for S. Pietro in Vincoli or another title associated with a palace or a comfortable apartment.

39 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 4, 127. «Scrivo al Signor Cardinale Farnese, come protettore del Regno, acciò accomodi questo nuovo ambasciatore di casa o dell'archipresbiteriato di S. Pietro o del palazzo di Campo di Fiore, come e suo solito [...]».

40 Kalinowska, *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza*, n. 35, 41-43. From his arrival in Rome in September 1569 until the summer of 1572, Hosius was staying in the palace of the archpriest of St. Peter's Basilica. It belonged to Alessandro Farnese, who was the archpriest at that time. As certified by Reszka, this residence was made available free of charge. Moreover, in summer the protector allowed Hosius to stay in his palace at Campo dei Fiori and welcomed the Pole in his residences in Grottaferata and Frascati.

41 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. II, 157-83.

*Alexandri Neronis*⁴². From the second half of the 16th century, the most popular place to stay was a villa built by Julius III (*villa Giulia*), located at via Flaminia. Paweł Uchański⁴³ stayed there in 1579 and seven years later it was occupied by Jan Dymitr Solikowski⁴⁴. At the end of the century, the residence became neglected, which is why Miński advised envoys to find another place to stay⁴⁵.

Soon afterwards, the protector arranged the first courtesy meeting between the royal envoy and the pope. The envoy visited the Vatican incognito and saw the protector for the first time. On the evening of 4 April 1579, Paweł Uchański arrived in the Eternal City and arranged a private audience with Gregory XIII with the help of Alessandro Farnese and Stanislaus Hosius⁴⁶. In 1594, Miński had an audience with the pope thanks to protector Montalto, who had introduced the royal envoy to the pope before he arrived⁴⁷. It was a courtesy meeting whose aim was to establish the date and hour of the official entry into the city and the official meeting with the pope and the Sacred College at a consistory. Then the envoy would go back to his villa on the outskirts of the city. This was the end of the first part of the protector's activity, which was organisational in nature.

2. THE PROTECTORS' PARTICIPATION IN THE OBEDIENCE CEREMONY

According to the ceremonial, the right to an official entry into Rome was granted to all obedience envoys, but there were certain exceptions. This privilege was refused to ambassadors who were permanently residing in Rome and to envoys who had already had the honour of entering into the city⁴⁸. Under this law, in 1560 Adam Konarski was refused the right to an official entry because he had been staying in Rome for a longer period of time as a representative of Sigismund Augustus. Bernard Maciejowski was another envoy who did not make an official entry into Rome when he made the declaration of obedience to Gregory XIV on behalf of Sigismund III for the second time (in 1591)⁴⁹. An exception from this rule was the second entry into the city by Erazm Ciołek in 1505, just four years after his first official entry. However, he ineffectively demanded this privilege in 1518, when he came to Rome as an ordinary envoy of Sigismund I the Old. At that time, despite the support of Leo X and Cardinal Protector Achille de Grassis, he did not manage

42 Johannan Burchard, *Diarium sive rerum urbanarum commentarii* (1483-1506), vol. III, ed. Louis Thuasne (Paris: E. Leroux Paris,), 120.

43 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 4, 158.

44 BAV, Vat.Lat. 12293, f. 237, and Vat.Lat 12326, f. 59-61; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. II, 190.

45 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego* (1563-1607), 448-49.

46 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 4, 163.

47 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego* (1563-1607), 449-50.

48 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. I, 95-6.

49 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12289, f. 140, and Vat.Lat., 12316, f. 220-27; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. II, 234.

to convince the master of ceremonies to grant him this privilege⁵⁰.

The first part of the official entry was the welcoming of members of the entourage in a suburban villa. In the morning on a scheduled date, the envoy welcomed anyone who wanted to honour the representative of the king of Poland. There were usually representatives of the papal court, the families of cardinals, members of households run by envoys who stayed in Rome permanently, Roman barons and nobles and Poles living in Rome. Undoubtedly, their envoys were sent by the cardinals protectors who wanted to receive the Polish ruler's retinue well. It seems that it used to be the duty of protectors. In 1501, Erazm Ciołek was welcomed by household members of cardinals Giovanni Battista Orsini and Juan Lopez, who were believed to be the friends of monarchs from the Jagiellonian dynasty in the Sacred College⁵¹. With time, all members of the College of Cardinals became obliged to send their representatives to welcome obedience envoys. In 1513, Leo X asked Paris de Grassis, his master of ceremonies, to encourage all cardinals to send their household members to greet envoys and to make sure that they are welcomed in the best possible manner⁵². Sometimes it was not enough to ask. Gregory XIII punished officials of the curia for absence in the envoy's entourage by depriving them of their monthly remuneration⁵³. Ferdinando de' Medici, a cardinal who sided with Poland, was very angry when he learnt that twelve of his courtiers had not joined the entourage of a Polish envoy in 1583⁵⁴. Sometimes cardinals boycotted this duty for political reasons. French cardinals and cardinals siding with France did not come to the official entry of the embassy sent by Stephen Báthory because they still believed that the rightful king of Poland was Henry of Valois⁵⁵. Another exception was the welcoming of envoy Andrew Báthory in 1583. He was welcomed by the families of Cardinal Protector Farnese, Vice-Protector Savelli and household members of the following cardinals: Innico d'Avalos d'Aragon, Tolomeo Galli and Filippo Boncompagni. Everyone rode out to meet the envoy far away from the city walls, up to the Milvian Bridge⁵⁶.

When everyone willing to participate in the official entry into the city was present in the suburban villa, the papal master of ceremonies formed the procession in accordance with the order of precedence and then everyone headed towards the city. An official delegation made up of bishops, officials of the curia and other dignitaries, including the Swiss Guard and an orchestra, was waiting for the representative of the king at the gate. On behalf of the pope, the apostolic prefect greeted the entourage and the rest of the welcoming delegation nodded to greet the envoy and then joined the entourage. The route started at the city gate and ended in the envoy's

50 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12275, f. 305; Ałła Brzozowska, *Biskup płocki Erazm Ciołek*, (Kraków: Universitas, 2017), 182.

51 Burchard, *Diarium*, vol. 3, 120.

52 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. I, 82-112.

53 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 4, 163.

54 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 4, 158.

55 BAV, Vat.Lat. 12313, f. 522; *Monumenta Polonia Vaticana*, vol. 4, 157-58.

56 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 6, 686.

residence in Rome. It was led in such a way as to get as close as possible to Castel Sant'Angelo, where salvos were fired to honour the pope's guest. The cannonade continued until the procession reached the residence. The last stage of the official entry was bidding farewell to the guests. The envoy greeted them by nodding his head and standing at the entrance to the house, which was similar to the welcoming ceremony. It was customary not to organise a feast or invite guests on the day of the entry. There was only a meal for Swiss guards and servants. Still another exception was made for Andrew Báthory, who was welcomed at the Apostolic Palace in the Vatican with the following cardinals: Protector Farnese, Vice-Protector Savelli and two cardinal-nephews, Filippo Boncompagni and Filippo Guastavillani. Cardinals also accompanied him at a welcoming audience with Gregory XIII⁵⁷.

The official entry of an envoy ended in his temporary residence in Rome. When it comes to 15 embassies that took place in the 16th century, we know about 9 locations in which Polish envoys stayed. Six of them were made available to envoys by cardinal protectors.

Jakub Burkhard notes that in 1501 Erazm Ciołek stayed in a house that used to belong to Georg Polikarp, former bull register master. The house was located at via Sanguinea, at the foot of Monte Giordano⁵⁸. The location near the main residence of the Orsini family in Rome suggests that it was Cardinal Giovanni Battista Orsini, one of the friends of the Jagiellonian dynasty in the Sacred College, who had found the residence for the representative of Alexander, the Grand Duke of Lithuania⁵⁹. Four years later, the same envoy stayed at *de Maximis* house for the time of his mission⁶⁰. During the protectorate of Cardinal Alessandro Farnese in the years 1545-1589, he provided accommodation for envoys sent by Polish rulers multiple times and in various residences under his care. In 1550, Andrzej Czarnkowski stayed in Palazzo San Giorgio, also known as Cancellaria, which was managed by Farnese as the Vice-Chancellor of the Church. This building was one of the most beautiful Renaissance residences in the Eternal City and the official seat of the Chancery of the Holy See⁶¹. By courtesy of the protector, in 1567 Paweł Barzi resided in the above mentioned palace of the archpriest of St. Peter's Basilica. The residence, erected during the pontificate of Paul II (1464-1471), occupied one wing of the four-sided portico in the atrium of the old basilica⁶². It was not one of the most luxurious residences, which was confirmed by Cardinal Hosius, who lived there for almost three years, but it was compensated by its prestigious location in the proximity of the basilica and the Apostolic Palace.⁶³ In 1579, Paweł Uchański had the honour of staying

57 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 6, 686.

58 Burchard, *Diarium*, vol. 3, 120.

59 Piero Tomei, *L'Architettura a Roma nel Quattrocento*, (Fratelli Palombi Roma 1942), 40.

60 Burchard, *Diarium*, vol. 3, 379.

61 Tomei, *L'Architettura*, 231-59.

62 Tomei, *L'Architettura*, 105-09.

63 Kalinowska, *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza*, 10-2. In 1569, Stanisław Reszka wrote that it was quite comfortable not only for Hosius, but also for his entire

in Palazzo Farnese, one of the most beautiful Roman palaces, by courtesy of the cardinal protector⁶⁴. The construction of the family residence had been inaugurated by Pope Paul III and finished in the 1570s by his grandson and namesake⁶⁵.

In 1586, Jan Dymitr Solikowski stayed in an unidentified residence near Monte della Trinità. A clue as to the palace in which he could have been staying can be found in an entry in the diary of Maciej Rywocki. Two years earlier, he had visited the area near the church of S. Trinità dei Monti and a Roman guide (*cicerone*) showed him a house on a piazza where Cardinal Hosius lived⁶⁶. It was probably palazzo Gabrielli, in which two Polish envoys stayed later in the 17th century: Paweł Wołucki in 1613 and Jerzy Ossoliński in 1633⁶⁷.

The official entry into the city by Bernard Maciejowski in 1590 ended in a residence called *apud Arcum di Portagalli in via Cursus*⁶⁸. This palace was also known as palazzo Fiano and was one of the buildings belonging to the church of St. Lawrence in Lucina. At the turn of the 16th century, this titular church was assigned to Giorgio de Costa, a cardinal from Portugal, who extended the residence. He made use of an antique triumphal arch standing next to the building, which was turned into a connector leading to his residences on the opposite side of the street. This is why the building was referred to as the palace by the Portuguese arch. In 1590, the cardinal assigned with the titular church of St. Lawrence in Lucina and the owner of the residence was Michele Bonelli, a member of the Polish congregation at the College of Cardinals and a friend of Stanislaus Hosius⁶⁹. It was most probably by courtesy of Bonelli that the Polish envoy could stay in that residence. The last of the discussed embassies to Rome took place in 1594 and stayed in a palace of the Orsini family in Campo dei Fiori (*palatium Ursinorum in Campo Floris*) by courtesy of Alessandro Peretti di Montalto, the new cardinal protector of Poland. Most probably, this cardinal asked Virginio Orsini, Duke of Bracciano and his brother-in-law, to make the residence available to the Polish envoy⁷⁰.

Any Roman residence occupied by the representative of the king during his

entourage because it had many rooms. An advantage of the residence was that the ailing cardinal could get inside St. Peter's Basilica without going outdoors.

64 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12313, f. 552v.

65 Clare Robertson, *'Il Gran Cardinale' Alessandro Farnese, Patron of the Arts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 137-48.

66 *Macieja Rywockiego księgi perygrynackie. Archiwum do dziejów literatury i oświaty w Polsce*, vol. 13, ed. Jan Czubek (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1910), 44.

67 Osiecka-Samsonowicz, *Polskie uroczystości*, 73, 85.

68 Osiecka-Samsonowicz, *Polskie uroczystości*, annex n. 1, 124-25.

69 Adriano Prosperi, "Bonelli, Michele", in DBI, vol. 11 (1969) [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/michele-bonelli_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/], (access: 3.03.2020)].

70 Stefano Boero, "Peretti Damasceni, Flavia", in DBI, vol.82 (2015) [[https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/flavia-peretti-damasceni_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/flavia-peretti-damasceni_(Dizionario-Biografico)/)], (access: 3.03. 2020)].

diplomatic mission served as the Polish embassy in the Eternal City. The facade of the building was decorated with the coat of arms of the ruler and national colours. All representative rooms were supposed to be decorated with fabrics, which served as the lining for the walls and the ceiling. The reception hall was supposed to be lined with a cloth of gold and the dining room with sheets, light silk or leather, depending on the season. It was very expensive, so Miński advised envoys to buy fabrics in Naples, where they were significantly cheaper and of a better quality than in Rome⁷¹. It seems that in terms of interior fitting, Polish envoys could count on the help of Polish protectors. When in 1572 Catherine of Austria, Queen of Poland, the walls of Hosius's palace were covered with black fabrics borrowed from Cardinal Farnese and Francesco Sforza (Sti Georgii)⁷². The aim of all this was for the envoy sent by the king to retain adequate prestige. The official declaration of obedience started and ended in the residence and it was also the place in which the envoy received guests and organised parties. The houses of obedience envoys in Rome were also accessible to the public, whose members could admire the design of the rooms⁷³.

2.1 THE DECLARATION OF OBEDIENCE AT THE PAPAL CONSISTORY

Similarly, to the official entry into the city, the reception of Polish envoys coming to Rome to make a declaration of obedience usually took place at a public consistory. It was the highest honour for the pope's guest and such consistories were organised only in six cases: at the end of the canonisation process, when monarchs were received, for *pro fide et pace* envoys, for cardinals returning from the nunciature, for newly appointed cardinals and for embassies of obedience⁷⁴.

However, a public consistory was not allowed when only a part of the state declared its obedience. This privilege was refused to Erazm Ciołek in 1501 and to Mikołaj Myszkowski in 1546 because they were the envoys of the Grand Duke of Lithuania, and to Andrew Báthory, who came to Rome to declare the obedience of Livonia, which had recently been incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland. In such situations, envoys were received when a secret consistory was over, in the presence of cardinals, but without the participation of the public. A sensation was caused by Erazm Ciołek, who demanded to be received at a public consistory in 1518 even though he was an ordinary envoy. His efforts were supported by Cardinal Protector Achille de Grassis. However, the master of ceremonies did not find any reason to honour Ciołek in this way⁷⁵.

Being received at a public consistory had its political meaning, because it amounted to recognition of the legality of the power by the Holy See. It caused a lot of controversy in the case of Polish elected rulers. Gregory XIII's decision to welcome Stephen Báthory's envoy at an open meeting was opposed by Luigi d'Este and Nicolas de

71 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 448.

72 Kalinowska, *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza*, n. 101, 117-118.

73 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 450-451; Osiecka-Samsonowicz, *Polskie uroczystości*, 48-50.

74 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. I, 112-13.

75 Brzozowska, *Biskup płocki*, 182.

Pellevé, two cardinals siding with France. One day before the meeting, they went to Alessandro Farnese, the protector of Poland, and tried to convince him to persuade the pope to change his decision. They did not succeed, but they did manage to appoint a committee of cardinals (A. Farnese, G. Morone, T. Galli, F. Orsini, A. Sforza), which decided that a representative of France should be allowed to publicly protest at the consistory before the envoy arrived. However, cardinals rejected the demand for the pope to say that he accepted the declaration of obedience made on behalf of Stephen Báthory “without prejudice to the rights of the king of France”⁷⁶. Returning to the public consistory, on the date of the solemn meeting, nobles who were supposed to join the envoy’s entourage gathered in his residence at the appointed hour. According to the opinion of one of the papal masters of ceremonies, on the date of the consistory, the envoy was accompanied mainly by the friends and supporters of a given ruler, who came voluntarily. It always included the families of cardinals who had the closest ties to Poland, including members of the protector’s family. Similarly to the official entry, the cavalcade went next to Castel Sant’Angelo, where salvos were fired to honour the envoy and if the route was too short, there were illuminations on the way. This was the manner of honouring Paweł Barzi in 1567, who had a very short route from the Archpriest’s Palace to the Apostolic Palace⁷⁷.

During the official cavalcade of envoy Stanisław Miński in 1594, certain misconduct was observed by Cardinal Alfonso Gesualdo. He pointed out to the papal master of ceremonies that the envoy had ridden to the consistory accompanied by two lay officials rather than clergymen, as was customary. The master of ceremonies defended himself by stating that there were no suitable candidates. It was because only one bishop wanted to join the entourage and he was dressed too modestly. In this case, Cardinal Gesualdo laid the blame on Alessandro Perreti di Montalto, the protector of Poland, who should have found 8-10 notable prelates to assist the envoy on his way to the consistory⁷⁸.

Polish envoys were usually welcomed in the royal hall of the papal residence in the Vatican, but two Polish legates declared obedience in Palazzo San Marco (T. Sobocki in 1537 and Marcin Kromer in 1548), whereas one Pole did it in Lateran (Bernard Maciejowski in 1590)⁷⁹.

When the envoy arrived at the papal residence where the consistory was about to take place, he went to the apartments of one of the cardinals to change and get ready for the most important part of the ceremony: the official declaration of obedience. It usually took place in an apartment of a cardinal who was friendly disposed towards the envoy. In 1501, Erazm Ciołek stayed in the rooms of Cardinal Juan Lopez⁸⁰. In 1567, Paweł Barzi stayed in the apartment of Vice-Protector Giacomo Savelli. In the next years, Paweł Uchański stayed in the rooms of Vice-Protector Marcantonio

76 *Uchańciana*, vol. III, 306.

77 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12312, f. 459v.

78 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12318, f. 7v.

79 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. I, 115-16.

80 Burchard, *Diarium*, vol. 3, 120.

Maffei, whereas four years later Filippo Boncompagni, a cardinal-nephew, welcomed Andrew Báthory in his apartment⁸¹.

At that time, the pope, cardinals and other attendees were waiting for the envoy in the consistory hall, where the consistorial advocate was presenting one of the cases on the docket. When a sign was given by the master of ceremonies, four archbishops brought the envoy to the royal hall. Approaching the pope, the representative of the king bowed down three times and then climbed the ascended platform with the throne, where he kissed the foot and hand of the bishop of Rome. Then the envoy said some words of greeting and gave the pope credentials from the king, which were read out by the secretary of the Holy Father. This was the time for the culminating point of the ceremony: the official speech of obedience. The speech was usually given by king's envoy personal or professional orator. Among Polish diplomats sent to Rome in the 16th century, only two of them (Miński and Barzi) hired an orator, whereas all the others gave a speech themselves⁸².

When the oration was over, the papal secretary usually gave a response, in which he stated that the Holy Father and the College of Cardinals had accepted the monarch's declaration of obedience. However, in 1560 Pope Pius IV personally responded to the speech by Adam Konarski, which was regarded as extraordinary grace. In 1579, Alessandro Farnese tried to convince Gregory XIII to honour a representative of Stephen Báthory in this way, but in vain⁸³.

Then the master of ceremonies gave a sign for cardinals friendly disposed towards the envoy, led by the protector, and cardinals invited by the envoy to approach the papal throne. Sources refer to them as "confidentes" or "protectores" and their presence near the papal throne was supposed to honour the envoy and the ruler who had sent him during the declaration of obedience. It was a public manifestation of support and sympathy for the monarch and his kingdom by the members of the Sacred College. The number and rank of cardinals had an impact on how the embassy was assessed. Surrounded by friends and supporters of the kingdom, the envoy approached the throne once again and kissed the pope's foot, which resembled the entry ceremony. The pope lifted him from his knees and kissed him on the cheek. Then the pope declared that he was willing to extend his fatherly care to the king, his kingdom and the envoy.

It is worth emphasising that the first cardinal protectors of nations were appointed at public consistories, when envoys made declarations of obedience. When the declaration of obedience was made by Charles VIII in 1485, Cardinal Jean Balue was appointed the protector of France⁸⁴. The official appointment of Francesco

81 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12314, f. 424.

82 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, 107; Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 452.

83 *Monumenta Poloniae vaticana*, vol. 4, n. 161, 4.

84 «Credi jour a esté commande par le roy et de bouche a Mo Jehan Mesme l'expédicon de mons. le cardinal d'Angiers, pour poter à notere sqint père le pappe le pape l'obédience filialle quid lui doit. Item. Lettres pour ledit cardinal, pour estre protecteur en court de Romme, des droiz, fais et affaires du roy, et y avoir l'eul. Et pour ce que ledit cardinal a demande la procuracuion du roy audit Romme, et que le roy l'avoit ja donnee a l'evesque de Lesca, le roy lui a donne

Todeschini-Piccolomini as defender of interest of England in 1492 also took place at a public consistory⁸⁵. Moreover, it is believed that Cardinal Pietro Isvalies was appointed the protector of Poland around the time when Erazm Ciołek visited Rome in 1505⁸⁶.

The first known document mentioning Polish “confidentes” comes from 1567. When the declaration of obedience was made by Paweł Barzi, the throne of Pius V was surrounded by eleven cardinals⁸⁷. Twelve years later, Paweł Uchański asked fifteen cardinals to assist him⁸⁸. However, he was criticised by other members of the Sacred College, who believed that 6-8 cardinals would be enough to appropriately honour the Polish envoy⁸⁹. Nevertheless, in 1591 the throne of Gregory XIV was surrounded by twelve cardinals. Even though Bernard Maciejowski had asked five more to attend, they could not come for various reasons⁹⁰. Three years later, Stanisław Miński invited thirteen cardinals⁹¹. It is worth emphasising that regardless of the number of invited “confidentes”, the most important role in the group of cardinals was always played by the protector and vice-protectors.

When the declaration of obedience was made by everyone from the envoy’s entourage, the pope retired into what was referred to as the parament room. If the representative of the king was a lay man, he was given the privilege of carrying the Holy Father’s cape. If the representative was a clergyman, he followed the bishop of

ladite charge de protecteur». *Procès-verbaux des séances du Conseil de régence du roi Charles VIII pendant les mois d’août 1484 à janvier 1485*, ed. Adhelm Bernier (Paris: Imprimerie Royale Paris, 1836), 126-27.

85 Wilkie, *The Cardinal Protectors of England*, 18.

86 Hirsch, “Kardynałowie promotorzy, koronni, relatorzy”, 49.

87 Alessandro Farnese, Giacomo Savelli, Gaetano Morone, Gianantonio Capizucchi, Marco Sittico Altemps, Innico d’Avalos d’Aragona, Marcantonio Colonna, Guido Ascanio Sforza, Giovanni Francesco Commendone, Francesco Abbondio Castiglioni and Michele Bonelli. BAV, Vat.Lat., 12312, f. 459v;

88 Alessandro Farnese, Stanisław Hozjusz, Enrico Gaetani, Tolomeo Galli, Innico d’Avalos d’Aragona, Guido Ascanio Sforza, Gianfrancesco Gambara, Marcantonio Colonna, Flavio Orsini, Giulielmo Sirleto, Giovanni Francesco Commendone, Filippo Boncompagni, Ferdinando de’ Medici, Giovanni Vincenzo Gonzaga, Andrea di Austria. BAV, Vat.Lat., 12313, f. 522v.

89 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12313, f. 522v.

90 Alfonso Gesualdo, Nicolas de Pellevé, Giulio Antonio Santori, Giovanni Antonio Facchinetti, Agostino Valier, Vincenzo Laureo, Ippolito Aldobrandini, Paolo Emilio Sfondrati, Francesco Sforza di Santa Fiora, Alessandro Peretti di Montalto, Ascanio Colonna, Federico Borromeo and invited but absent: Giovanni Antonio Serbelloni, Tagliavia d’Aragona, Gabriele Paleotti, Enrico Gaetani i Scipione Gonzaga. BAV, Vat.Lat., 12289, f. 142v.

91 Alfonso Gesualdo, Pietro Aldobrandini, Cinzio Passeri Aldobrandini, Alessandro Peretti di Montalto, Francesco Sforza di Santa Fiora, Innico d’Avalos d’Aragona, Enrico Gaetani, Tolomeo Galli, Federico Borromeo, Michele Bonelli, Odoardo Farnese, Anton Maria Salviati, Antonmaria Sauli. Cf., Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 453.

Rome, preceding prelates from his entourage⁹². This is how Archbishop Jan Dymitr Solikowski assisted the pope during the exit ceremony⁹³. When the pope took off liturgical garments, the envoy saw him off to the door leading to his apartments. This was the end of the official meeting, but sometimes the Holy Father invited the legate for dinner when the consistory was over. This exceptional honour was enjoyed only by Andrzej Czarnkowski (1550) and Stanisław Miński (1594). The former was invited to a meal by Julius III along with vice-protectors Maffei and cardinal Crescenzi. According to the custom described by Miński, the envoy had the honour to serve the pope during the meal; he gave the pope a towel to wash his hands, got down on his knee to pour his wine and when the dinner was over, he had the right to have a private conversation with the Holy Father⁹⁴.

On the way back from the consistory to the residence, the envoy was accompanied by an entourage made up of friends and officials from the papal court⁹⁵. Sometimes representatives of kings were invited for dinner by one of the cardinals right after the consistory or they organized the party themselves. The first case happened in 1505, when protector Pietro Isvalies hosted a dinner for the entourage of Erazm Ciołek at his palace⁹⁶. Whereas in 1579, after returning from the consistory, Paweł Uchański invited all of his friends to a party in Palazzo Farnese, which was illuminated with fireworks. To celebrate it, Cardinal Protector Farnese gave the envoy 30 barrels of wine⁹⁷.

At the end of the official ceremony of making a declaration of obedience, the envoy had to pay a specific amount to everyone who had their share in organising the official entry and the consistory. The master of ceremonies prepared a list of officials and made sure that everyone was paid a specific amount. In 1556, Stanisław Maciejowski paid the master of ceremonies 30 scudi in gold⁹⁸. Barzi wanted to give the master of ceremonies 100 scudi, even though he should have been given only half of this amount. To the displeasure of the master of ceremonies, Cardinal Farnese, who protected the envoy's finances, did not agree to this extravagance⁹⁹. Protectors were also awarded for their participation in embassies of obedience. In 1537, Tomasz Sobocki gave Protector Antonio Pucci 300 florins for his help during the embassy¹⁰⁰. In his guide, Stanisław Miński calculated in detail how much should be paid and to whom. In his opinion, at least 400 scudi ought to be spent on

92 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 453.

93 BAV, Vat.Lat., 1246, f 61.

94 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 453-54.

95 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. I, 152

96 Brzozowska, *Biskup płocki*, 118.

97 *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol.4, 162.

98 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12294, f. 133.

99 BAV, Vat.Lat., 12312 f. 459v.

100 Kazimierz Hartleb, *Jan z Ocieszyna Ocieski jego działalność polityczna i dziennik podróży do Rzymu*, (Lwów: Towarzystwo dla popierania Nauki Polskiej, 1917), 129.

tips (*manice*) for palace officials from the papal court and for cardinals. The most eminent figures received gifts brought from Poland, in particular sable fur, which was highly appreciated in Rome, other types of fur and horses. One of the best horses was given by Miński to Cardinal Protector Montalto. The envoy who visited Rome in 1594 spent a total of around 5000 scudi on gifts¹⁰¹.

3. THE PROTECTORS' PARTICIPATION IN THE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF THE ENVOY

In accordance with the practice followed by the Curia, at the consistory officials arranged the time of a private audience with the Holy Father, which was an opportunity for the representative of the king to explain the purpose of his mission. Then the envoy could start performing his tasks, which included private audiences with the pope and meetings with cardinals. The bishops of Rome usually devoted one evening a week to audiences with envoys who resided permanently in Rome. Ambassadors waiting for the meeting entered in accordance with the order of precedence. When there was some urgent business, Polish envoys could communicate with the pope thanks to cardinal protectors, who acted as intermediaries¹⁰².

In the 16th century, matters which envoys were supposed to present to popes reflected the current policy of the Kingdom of Poland towards the Holy See. In the beginning of the century, it was predominantly political matters, in particular the conflict with the Teutonic Order, which was being settled in Rome. Two missions, led by Erazm Ciołek and Jan Łaski, were sent to the Eternal City to discuss that matter. The next envoys, such as Sobocki, Myszkowski and Kromer, followed the intentions of Jagiellonian rulers and tried to convince the Holy See to grant the Kingdom of Poland revenue from annates and Peter's Pence. During the reign of Sigismund Augustus, when the ideas of reformation were spreading in Poland and when there was an internal religious conflict, envoys brought up mostly religious matters. Andrzej Czarnkowski, Stanisław Maciejowski and Adam Konarski urged popes to resume the Council of Trent, asked them to send new nuncios to Poland, presented their demands for convening a national council in Poland and addressed other religious issues. For elective kings, who needed the Holy See to confirm their rights to the throne, the acceptance of the declaration of obedience was a goal in itself. This is why Paweł Uchański and Andrew Báthory were sent to Rome: the former to confirm the lawfulness of the election of Stephen Báthory and the latter to confirm the incorporation of Livonia into the Kingdom of Poland. The task of Bernard Maciejowski and Stanisław Miński was to confirm the ascension of Sigismund III to the throne of Poland and Sweden, respectively¹⁰³.

The embassy of obedience was the first contact between rulers, which is why it always served as a unique opportunity to fulfil the requests of the king, the queen, members of the episcopate and all subjects. Envoys always addressed numerous

101 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 461.

102 Hartleb, *Jan z Ocieszyna*, 115. In 1540, Jan Ocieski, an envoy sent by Queen Bona, had to arrange an audience with Protector Antonio Pucci first in order to meet the pope. The cardinal presented the matter to the bishop of Rome and arranged the date of the visit.

103 Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. II, 236-45.

requests related to granting benefices, privileges and indulgences, as well as minor court cases and matters related to the canonization of Polish saints. Envoys often tried to obtain benefits for themselves from the bishops of Rome.

Returning to ceremonial matters, the envoy brought into the audience hall by the cardinal protector got down on one knee to greet the pope and then, when a sign was given, sat next to the pope and started a conversation. As stated by Stanisław Reszka, if the bishop of Rome got up and started to walk around the room, the envoy had to follow him, making sure not to overtake him. When the pope made a favourable decision, it was customary to kiss his foot as soon as possible, which symbolised a confirmation of his will¹⁰⁴. When it comes to benefices, Stanisław Miński advised envoys to collaborate with the cardinal protector and vice-protector, as well as other cardinals from the congregation for Polish affairs. To achieve the objectives of the mission determined by the Polish king, it was important to win the support of other influential cardinals. According to the advice given by Miński, it was necessary to pay frequent visits to the most important cardinals: cardinal-nephews, the vice-chancellor and the secretary of state. It was also in the interest of the envoy to maintain good relationships with the apostolic prefect, the papal datary and the governor of the city¹⁰⁵.

Courtesy duties of an envoy included visits to the most eminent figures in the Eternal City. It befitted a representative of the king of Poland to greet all members of the Sacred College and ambassadors of other kingdoms on behalf of the monarch. In Miński's opinion, visits were supposed to start with the dean cardinal and then the cardinal protector¹⁰⁶. On the date of the consistory, Andrew Báthory paid his first visit to F. Boncompagni, F. Guastavillani, cardinal-nephews of Gregory XIII, T. Galli, Secretary of State, and G. Boncompagni, Governor of the City. On the next day, he visited Protector Alessandro Farnese and Vice-Protector G. Savelli and other cardinals who were friendly disposed towards him¹⁰⁷. Luigi d'Este, Protector of France, did everything in his power to avoid the visit of Andrew Báthory due to the fact that Henry of Valois had protested against the election of the new king of Poland¹⁰⁸.

The splendour of the envoy required appropriate servants. Some of them came from Poland and others were hired in Rome. Miński advised envoys to take along no more than 14 officials (high-ranking courtiers). They were all supposed to be characterised by good manners, the knowledge of languages and customs and to be Catholics. When it came to officials, Miński mentioned a majordomo, a master of the house (*maestro di casa*), two secretaries, a doctor and a chaplain. The following servants were indispensable: a marshal (*scalco*), a cup-bearer (*trinciante*), a cupboard-keeper (*credentier*), a carver (*dispenser*), two cellar-keepers (*cantiner*, *bottiglier*), a steward (*spenditor*), a servant (*scopator*), a water-carrier (*facchino*) and two drivers. Apart

104 Czubek, *Stanisłai Rescii Diarium*, 30-32.

105 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 460.

106 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607)*, 454-55.

107 Czubek, *Stanisłai Rescii Diarium*, 7-8. P.D. Cesi, G.F. Commedone, G. Rusticucci, F. Sforza, A. Gesualdi, G.A. Gambarà, G.V. Gonzaga.

108 Czubek, *Stanisłai Rescii Diarium*, 687, 6; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. 2, 175-76.

from that, it was necessary to hire ten equerries (*palafrenieri*) and ten page boys, a coachman and a solicitor who would know how to get things done in Rome¹⁰⁹.

All servants were supposed to wear clothes in national colours. When officials and servants were chosen, the envoy should rely on the advice of the cardinal protector, because there were many swindlers and thieves in Rome. Cardinal Hosius was well aware of this fact. During the ten years he spent in the Eternal City (1569-1579), he often dismissed cooks¹¹⁰ and majordomos¹¹¹ guilty of misconduct.¹¹² In 1583, the matter of choosing a majordomo for the court of Andrew Báthory reached the pope himself. Stanisław Reszka, the secretary of the embassy, sought Sixtus V's advice on whether this function should be entrusted to Virgillio Crescenzi, a Roman patrician, a friend of Poland and a relative of Vice-Protector Marcello Cresenzi. The pope backed this choice and promised to support the efforts of Reszka¹¹³.

Returning to the courtesy duties of an envoy, when he paid an official visit to a cardinal, he surrounded himself with an entourage of officials, servants, Polish nobility and curial prelates, who eagerly volunteered to accompany him¹¹⁴. The envoy rode in a carriage and the entourage followed him. The cardinal's family welcomed the guest at the gate to the residence, whereas the cardinal himself was waiting for the envoy in the sitting room or the third room from the entrance. The cardinal usually greeted the guest by nodding and they sat together in a separate room, in which they could talk freely, whereas the family of the cardinal and members of the entourage occupied a different room. On the way out, the host saw the envoy off to the last door of the residence and servants saw him off to the carriage. Visits to ambassadors and other officials were very similar. It was considered proper for a cardinal or an ambassador to visit a Polish envoy who had honoured him earlier. As a representative of the king of Poland, the envoy could participate in a number of ceremonies at which the pope was present. A special distinction was allowing the legate to serve in liturgy. Envoys gave the Holy Father water to wash his hands during the mass or accompanied him by his throne. When the pope wanted to honour the representatives of the Polish king, he often granted them various titles. Lay men

109 Korzeniowski, *Stanisława Mińskiego* (1563-1607), 460.

110 Kalinowska, *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza*, 54-5. In letters to Kromer, Reszka mentioned «the disaster of the house». The cook Tomasz, who abused alcohol and wasted food, but it was difficult to hire someone better in Rome. This is why he asked Kromer to send a good cook from Poland.

111 Kalinowska, *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza*, 40-1. Venturellus Metellus, the Italian majordomo at Hosius's court, wrote denouncing letters about his employer to Sigismund Augustus, describing wastefulness and extravagance at the cardinal's house. As a result, Hosius fell into disfavour with the monarch and the majordomo was fired.

112 Kalinowska, *Z dworu Stanisława Hozjusza*, 61-2. In a letter to Kromer, Reszka informed him that a thief who had stolen a silver plate and a candlestick from Hosius's court at the beginning of 1570 was caught. He was a member of the cardinal's household and nobody expected that from him.

113 Czubek, *Stanislai Rescii Diarium*, 8.

114 Czubek, *Stanislai Rescii Diarium*, 7.

were usually granted the title of a knight and clergymen the title of a protonotary apostolic.

On Maundy Thursday in 1501, Erazm Ciołek participated in a papal mass celebrated by Cardinal Orsini, during which Iwan Sapiecha was made a knight by Alexander VI. Four years later, the bishop of Płock gave the pope water during the Easter Sunday mass and he had received a palm from the pope on Palm Sunday¹¹⁵. In 1513, right after the declaration of obedience, Pope Leo X made Stanisław Ostrogski a knight of St. Peter's¹¹⁶. Tomasz Sobocki was supposed to be granted the same title by Paul III, but he could not afford a gold chain which was required to be promoted. Protector Antonio Puccini helped the envoy by buying him the chain because he believed that it was not proper to ask the pope to do that¹¹⁷. In 1556, Stanisław Maciejowski was invited by Paul IV to the first anniversary of the pope's coronation¹¹⁸.

270 When the envoy settled all matters as instructed by the ruler, he could make preparations for his return. However, before leaving Rome, he had to ask the pope for permission to leave. Then he paid his last visits to cardinals and ambassadors and finally attended the last audience with the Holy Father. As a farewell gift, he received a special papal brief for the king and letters of recommendation from the pope and the protector. When Ciołek left Rome in 1501, Pope Alexander VI, Cardinal Orsini, Cardinal Ferrari and Cardinal Bernardino Lopez de Carvajal sent letters to prince Alexander to thank him for the declaration of obedience and to praise the envoy. It should also be noted that when envoys returned from their missions, rulers expressed their gratitude to protectors for their help provided during the embassy¹¹⁹. Sigismund Augustus sent letters to cardinal protectors Cresenzi and Maffei, in which he thanked them for their kindness and help provided to Andrzej Czarnkowski¹²⁰. Protectors exchanged letters with the ruler in which they thanked each other. It was the last element of the protectors' activities related to embassies of obedience.

CONCLUSION

In the 16th century, cardinal protectors of Poland were the key figures during embassies of obedience. Taking care of the representatives of rulers and making sure that they were appropriately introduced and honoured at the papal court were some of the basic duties of cardinal protectors. They advised and helped Polish rulers ever since the idea of a mission was born. Rulers sought their advice on the manner

115 Burchard, *Diarium*, vol. III, 381.

116 *Il Diario di Leone X di Paride de Grassi*, eds. Pio Delicati and Mariano Armellini (Roma: Tipografia della Pace di Filippo Cuggiani Roma 1884), 4.

117 Hartleb, *Jan z Ocieszyna*, 143.

118 *Relacye nuncyuszów apostolskich i innych osób o Polsce od roku 1548 do 1690*, vol. I, ed. Erazm Rykaczewski (Berlin-Poznań: Księgarnia B. Behra, 1864), 29; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. II, 84.

119 *Akta Aleksandra króla polskiego, Wielkiego Księcia Litewskiego (1501-1506)*, ed. Fryderyk Papee (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1927), n. 39, 38.

120 AGAD, MK, LL, vol. 14, f. 32; Banaszak, *Z dziejów*, vol. II, 69.

of paying homage and on choosing the appropriate envoy. Prior to departure, representatives of the king wrote to them to discuss renting a temporary residence in Rome, which protectors often made available to guests at their own expense. It is worth noting the hospitality of Alessandro Farnese, who hosted royal legates in his residences three times. When an envoy was approaching the Eternal City, he received a carriage from the protector, who also acted as an intermediary in arranging the first audience with the pope.

At official celebrations, when the declaration of obedience was made, protectors had to make sure that Polish envoys were appropriately honoured and advised them on the intricacies of the papal ceremonial. On the day of the official entry into the city and when the envoy was seen off to the papal palace to participate in the consistory, the protectors' courtiers were the core of the envoy's procession. Just before the meeting with the bishop of Rome and the Sacred College, the envoy prepared himself to enter into the consistory in apartments belonging to the cardinal who defended Polish affairs. Finally, when the envoy was paying homage to the pope, which was the culminating point of the ceremony, the protector and trusted cardinals surrounded the papal throne, thereby expressing their support for the Polish ruler and his entire kingdom.

When the official part of the mission was over, protectors acted as intermediaries and supported the representative of the king in his diplomatic activity. They arranged the envoy's meetings with the pope and usually took care of minor matters related to benefices and church affairs. Apart from matters related to the organisation of a mission and ceremonies, cardinals supported envoys in less formal matters, thanks to which envoys felt protected. For example, Cardinal Farnese gave Uchański 30 barrels of wine for his party and prevented wastefulness when the master of ceremonies was being paid. Similarly, Antonio Pucci bought Sobocki a gold chain required for the accolade ceremony.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano

BAV: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana

AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt dawnych w Warszawie

MK: Metrika Koronna

LL: Libri Legationum

BCz: Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie

DBI: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani

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I BARBERINI E L'EUROPA, Acta Barberiana 5, Viterbo, Sette Città, 2022, pp. 7–322. Edited by Tusor Péter and Boccolini Alessandro

The publication, the fifth volume of the Acta Barberiana, came to light through the contribution of the Ministero della Cultura, Direzione Generale Educazione, Ricerca e Istituti Culturali and the Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna (Study Center on the Sobieski Age and of Modern Poland, CESPoM). The *I Barberini e l'Europa* provides a multifaceted approach to the complex and intricate system of Baroque Papal diplomacy,

The wide spatial perspective that the *I Barberini e l'Europa* represents allows the reader to delve into the extended network of the Barberinis, ranging from Muscovy to Portugal, however, even surpassing this border, connections to North America are under the scope as well. A series of thematically different chapters constitute an overarching chronological frame, leading the reader from the rise of the Barberinis in the late 16th century throughout their golden era, the 17th century, to the eventual fading of their influence.

The volume begins with a clear, throughout list of abbreviations of the various archives utilized by the researchers. Counting significant collections, such as the *Archivio Barberini*, *Archivio Apostolico Vaticano*, *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana*, or the *Archivio di Stato* of various cities, such as Rome, Modena, Genova, and Parma, with no claim to being exhaustive, the source material on which the works are based reflect the magnitude of the scope of the *I Barberini e l'Europa*.

The book is structured into twelve chapters, all of them following the main theme of the volume, examining a certain connection of the Barberinis to a part of Europe.

The first, chapter, Francesca De Caprio's *Il mercante Raffaello Barberini e la sua "Relazione di Moscovia"* provides an insight into one of the farthest connections of the Barberinis, namely Raffaello Barberini's diplomatic journey to Muscovy between 1564-1565. De Caprio lays the foundations of this chapter by starting with a biographical approach and then elaborates how the main subject of his research came to the diplomatic voyage. The analysis fulfills a wider approach too, the relation between the Barberini family and Muscovy is analyzed from the perspective of North-European diplomatic relations as well, including England and the Spanish Netherlands as well.

The second chapter, *The unsuccessful election of Rinaldo d'Este to the throne of Poland (1674)*, by Alessandro Boccolini, examines the background to the election of the new Polish king, where the author shows how Rinaldo d'Este almost came to the throne of Poland. We can also learn more about the extensive network of the Barberini family, Cardinal Barberini's key role in the election, and from the correspondence the role of Lucrezia Barberini as a mother who sold her jewelry just to support her son in becoming king. In the end, as we know, eventually, Jan III Sobieski became king and not the patron of the Barberini family. Economic,

diplomatic and political points of view, as well as magnate mobility, contributed to this.

The chapter written by Gaetano Platania, *Carlo Barberini e l'Europa di Centro* follows the theme of examining the Central European connections of the Barberinis, albeit from a different perspective. The author created various categories in the examination of the correspondence of the Barberinis with the various figures of contemporary Central Europe.

Péter Tusor describes the relation between the Barberinis, the Papal State and Hungary in relation to the domestic affairs of the latter. A complex political and diplomatic system is put into analysis here, including the Habsburg dynasty's relation to Hungary, the Ottoman occupation, and how the Papal State itself viewed Hungary in this age.

276 That the relation between the Barberinis and the Habsburgs is a recurring point of interest along the work is not surprising, given how both of them played cordial roles in the shaping of 17th century Europe. Silvano Giordano's *Urbano VIII e Ferdinando II (1628-1635). Verso una ridefinizione dei rapporti tra papato e impero durante la guerra dei Trent'anni* explores this aspect of the Barberini's history exactly, in which the author analyses the interconnecting web of pope Urban VIII's diplomatic dealings during the time of the Thirty Years' War.

The following chapter, *Les Barberini et la Franca, e Henri IV á Mazarin*, written by Olivier Poncet, examines the other side of the coin, namely the relation of the Barberini's to the greatest rivals of the Habsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire; the Kingdom of France.

Dalma Frascarelli's chapter, titled *Un "Seneca" e l' "Et in Arcadia Ego" di Guercino nella Quadreria di Antonio Barberini*, is a step away from the political and diplomatic connections of the Barberini and instead focuses on two magnificent works of art and approaches the family's history from this aspect.

The *Dopo Urbano VIII. Le reazioni Spagnole alla disgrazia dei Barberini* by Giuseppe Mrozek Eliszezynski analyses the Spanish reaction to the death of pope Urban VIII., and how the Barberini family itself dealt with the crisis that followed this event.

Isabella Iannuzzi and Gaetano Sabatini put emphasis on the network of relationships that tied the Barberini family to Portugal in the chapter *I Barberini e il Portogallo: strategie politiche, economiche, religiose e culturali per tessere relazioni con il mondo iberico*, analysing the connection not only between the family, but the Pope and the Papal State and the Iberian peninsula itself.

Matteo Binasco's chapter, *I Barberini e il Regno Inglese* shifts the focus on the connection between England and the Barberini family, which is a highly interesting topic of choice, considering the religious situation of Britain in the era.

The following chapter of the book, *I Barberini a Propaganda Fide: appunti biografici per una ricerca*, by Giovanni Pizzorusso, turns inwards and instead of focusing on the family's relations to various European states or political entities, examines the Barberini's role in the reshaping of the Papal State and the Congregation of Faith.

In the final chapter of the *I Barberini e l'Europa*, Matteo Sanfilippo crosses the previously established geographical boundaries, as the chapter *I Barberini e le colonie Europee in Nord America durante il seicento* explores the truly global reach of the Barberini family's network by focusing on the North American connections.

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