

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV–XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPOM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History Sciences.

This Special Issue of *Eastern European History Review* deals with the history of diplomacy and its executors – diplomats (ambassadors, legates, nuncios, internuncios, agents and others) – in the seventeenth century's Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

As a state conglomerate culturally and politically, closely connected to Western Europe, and for its specific institutional form of a “noble republic”, the Commonwealth has created, in the field of diplomatic practice, institutions, principles and ceremonies unique in the European context.

The focus of the volume is the historiographic stream of the *New Diplomatic History*, without withdrawing from classic approaches that remain an important field of research.

Tracing the salient moments and facts of the complex history of the seventeenth century of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the volume – with the participation of authors from different parts of Europe and beyond – constitutes an international opportunity to reflect on issues and topics of old and new diplomatic history.

Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (XVII century) constitutes a result of the research activity and scientific collaboration inherent to the project directed by Dr Dorota Gregorowicz *The Holy See and the crisis of sovereignty of John II Casimir Vasa and Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki's election (1660–1669)*, n. 2018/28/C/HS3/00176, financed by the National Science Centre, Poland.

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DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMACY

IN THE EARLY MODERN POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH (XVII CENTURY)

Edited by

Dorota Gregorowicz and Alessandro Boccolini



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EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: LA RIVISTA

Il Comitato redazionale e scientifico è lieto di presentare al pubblico la rivista scientifica *Eastern European History Review*.

Con un carattere internazionale e interdisciplinare, una cadenza annuale e una fruibilità *open access* la rivista focalizza i propri interessi sulle dinamiche occorse nell'Europa Orientale durante tutta l'età moderna (XIV-XIX). *Eastern European History Review* è espressione del Centro Studi dell'Università della Tuscia CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna) nato nel 1997 per intuizione del Prof. Gaetano Platania, Direttore Emerito della Rivista.

L'iniziativa editoriale che presentiamo nasce dall'evidente mancanza in Italia di una rivista scientifica relativa alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale in Età Moderna, nonostante la penisola abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale per la Storia e la Cultura di una parte integrante del continente, a torto considerata come lontana e periferica.

Consapevoli di questo, il Comitato ha posto quale obiettivo primario della *Eastern European History Review* quello di offrire uno spazio di riflessione e di discussione su temi che appartengono alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale, e insieme alle relazioni - politiche e culturali - che questa vasta area del Vecchio Continente ha avuto con l'occidente d'Europa, e l'Italia in particolare, incoraggiando il dialogo tra studiosi e esperti di settore, e tra differenti approcci della ricerca scientifica.

Il Comitato Redazionale e Scientifico

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: THE JOURNAL

The Editorial and Scientific Board are proud delighted to present the *Eastern European History Review* under the aegis of Sette Città Editore.

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It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History sciences.

The editorial initiative we present comes from the obvious lack of a journal, in Italy, concerning the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the Modern Age, this despite its fundamental role in the history and culture of that part of the continent, wrongly considered distant and peripheral.

Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Main objective of the journal is to create a space for reflection and discussion on topics pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, but also relations with Continental Europe, encouraging dialogue between scholars and experts in the field, and between different approaches of scientific research.

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INTRODUCTION

The crisis of political history, particularly profound since the 1960s and the subsequent cultural turn, has penalised the scientific investigation of “international” relations¹ in the early modern period for many years². Over the last decades, though, there have been several calls for new methodological and conceptual approaches to diplomatic studies, some of them extraordinarily fruitful and inspiring³. Nowadays, as Tracey Sowerby observed, «the *New Diplomatic History*, no longer so new, has become a broad church. It has successfully integrated wider concerns into a field that was once dominated by the study of bureaucracy and foreign policy»⁴. Integrated, but not replaced, which is also essential to emphasise. That is mainly why scholars no longer consider diplomacy and foreign policy making as coterminous, but do assimilate plenty of different aspects diplomatic practice entailed.

One cannot notice that from the point of view of contemporary research on the early modern history of diplomacy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth constitutes an interesting phenomenon that has not been sufficiently developed yet, especially in the international forum of researchers along with their various historiographical traditions. There are still many blank spots in exploring this topic, which remain open to a contemporary historian. This special issue of *Eastern European History Review* seeks to encourage a more profound reflection on particularities and significance of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic practice in the early modern period, especially during the seventeenth century, by conveying into conversation an international set of scholars from Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Australia, interested in various aspects of diplomatic history. By bringing consciousness of diplomatic agency to bear on various areas of cultural and political practice, our authors have pressed their research beyond the horizons of their “national histories” that continue to dominate most treatments of premodernity.

On the threshold of the early modern period, *Rzeczpospolita* found itself among the political entities that adopted the praxis of permanent diplomatic missions exchange very late (only in the eighteenth century), relying on the old system of extraordinary embassies, of medieval provenance. However, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was no exception on a European scale. The general rules for foreign relations’ conduct appeared similar in Portugal, Scotland, Hungary, Scandinavia (Sweden and Denmark), Switzerland, and several German states⁵.

Federico Chabod considered the permanent diplomatic service, next to the professional army and elaborated bureaucratic apparatus, as the basis for the affirmation of the “early modern state”⁶. *Rzeczpospolita* did not possess any of these elements, but can it be denied the character of statehood from a historical point of view⁷? Subsequently, for Matthew Smith Anderson, the history of early

1 I put the word “international” in quotation marks, considering the imperfection of this concept for the analysis of political relations in early modern Europe. Cf. Tracey A. Sowerby, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, *History Compass*, 14, 9 (2016): 444.

2 Stefano Andretta, *L'arte della prudenza. Teorie e prassi della diplomazia nell'Italia del XVI e XVII secolo* (Roma: Binklink, 2006), 7.

3 Karl W. Schweizer and Matt J. Schumann, “The Revitalisation of Diplomatic History”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 19, 2 (2008): 149-86; John Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe”, *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38, 1 (2008): 1-14; Diana Carrió-Invernizzi, “A New Diplomatic History and the Networks of Spanish Diplomacy in the Baroque Era”, *The International History Review*, 36, 4 (2014): 603-18; Dorothea Nolde, “Was ist Diplomatie und wenn ja, wie viele? Herausforderungen und Perspektiven einer Geschlechtergeschichte der frühneuzeitlichen Diplomatie”, *Historische Anthropologie*, 21, 2 (2013): 180-98.

4 Sowerby, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, 441.

5 Giuseppe Galasso, “Le relazioni internazionali nell’età moderna (secoli XV-XVIII)”, *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 111, 1 (1999): 10.

6 Federico Chabod, *Idea di Europa e politica dell’equilibrio* (Bologna: Mulino, 1995).

7 Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society. A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London-New York: Routledge, 1992), 185-86: «The kingdom of Poland had increased its power and influence by a dynastic union with Lithuania and expansion eastward, and had made itself the principal bulwark of Latin Christendom on the eastern marches. But the heterogeneous population, the dual governmental structure of Poland-Lithuania and the practice of elective monarchy prevented its consolidation into an effective stato». Cf. Jan Sowa, *Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z*

modern diplomacy constituted a slow but increasingly evident evolution towards the system of permanent representation. He considered contacts between polities that failed to conform to that model «less developed ones, [...] where diplomacy was less important and diplomatic organisation more primitive». Anderson believed that from the point of view of diplomatic practice, one could speak of two “separate Europes” and that «between these two Europes there were as yet only slender links»⁸. Nowadays, historiography views the issue of permanent diplomatic posts in a significantly different way. As Riccardo Fubini suggests, the general deficiency of institutionalisation of the then diplomacy makes the equality of residency and modernity dubious⁹. Also, Sowerby appropriately stated that «the exchange of resident ambassadors did not extend across all of Europe. Rather, asymmetrical relations were not uncommon within Europe and continued to be so into the eighteenth century»¹⁰.

Therefore, nothing could be more erroneous than assuming the passivity of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the “international” arena of early modern Europe. The young Polish Vasa dynasty, the more as it functioned within the elective monarchy, manifested a strong need to affirm its position on the European forum. Moreover, the necessity to maintain intensive contacts with foreign partners was caused by the continuous involvement of *Rzeczpospolita* in armed conflicts on various fronts. Due to its geopolitical position, the vastness of the territory and the leading role for the implementation of the Catholic Reform, Poland-Lithuania occupied a distinctive part in the entire system of “international” relations of early modern Europe. All the more so, its specific tradition and political practice concerning the implementation of foreign policy, conducting diplomatic activity outside its borders, as well as accepting foreign legations *in loco*, requires further attention of contemporary historiography.

The special issue of *Eastern European History Review*, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (XVII century)*, opens with a group of articles regarding some general institutional and technical aspects of the functioning of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service.

Dorota Gregorowicz (*Diplomacy of the Commonwealth, Diplomacy of the King: the Peculiarity of Foreign Policy Making in the Seventeenth Century Poland-Lithuania*) deals with the topicality of research on the history of diplomacy in the early modern Poland-Lithuania, in the context of scant development of permanent diplomatic missions. The article presents considerations on the subjectivity of the *ius legationis* in *Rzeczpospolita*. Gregorowicz reflects on the competencies of the monarch and of the Commonwealth (personified in the *sejm* and Senate councils) in this matter. To this end, she primarily analyses the content of the sixteenth – and seventeenth-century parliamentary constitutions regarding the conduct of foreign policy. Moreover, the article refers to political practice as a determining factor for the legal structure of Poland-Lithuania.

The Union of Lublin (1569), as the basis for the execution of a joint diplomatic activity of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, is analysed by Marius Sirutavičius (*Partnership in a Union with Diverging Interests: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Diplomatic Activities at the Turn of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*). The author emphasises the initially divergent interests of both states in addressing the directions of the foreign policy of *Rzeczpospolita* (especially concerning contacts with Muscovy) and their influence on the functioning of the diplomatic service. Moreover, Sirutavičius draws attention to the evolution and gradual uniformisation processes of the Polish and Lithuanian visions of conducting foreign policy,

nowoczesną formą (Kraków: Universitas, 2011). According to Sowa, «the concept of the “ghost body of the King” [inspired by Ernst Kantorowicz] marks a notional horizon in which *Rzeczpospolita* presents itself as a non-existent state entity, or in the process of its disappearance, utterly unsuitable for any modern form of social, political and economic organisation, which took shape in Europe from the early modern age, with the nascent capitalism and parliamentarism» (285). Sowa’s perspective is certainly interesting, although historically not sustainable. Translation in English is of the author.

8 Matthew S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London-New York: Longman, 1993), 27–8.

9 Riccardo Fubini, *La “residentialité” de l’ambassadeur dans le mythe et dans la réalité: une enquête sur les origines* (Paris: PUF, 1998); Id., “Diplomacy and government in the Italian city-states of the fifteenth century (Florence and Venice)”, in *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, eds. Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 26–8.

10 Sowerby, “Early Modern Diplomatic History”, 442.

which took place in the initial period of the reign of Sigismund III Vasa, pointing to the multilateral origins of those developments.

The problem of the source material's characteristics for studying the history of diplomacy is discussed by nunciatures' specialists Henryk Litwin and Paweł Duda in a joint article *Correspondence of Warsaw Nuncio Antonio Santa Croce with Roman Catholic Bishops from 1629 – Frequency, Intensity and Content*. The researchers focused on the analysis of "internal" correspondence maintained by the apostolic nuncio with hierarchs of the Polish-Lithuanian Catholic Church, underlining its parallel importance in relation to the mainstream canals of diplomatic information exchange (between the Polish-Lithuanian periphery – nunciature's chancellery and Roman centre – Secretariat of State).

Finally, the first part of the book includes the reflection of Michał Salamonik on some non-institutional structures and mechanisms of diplomatic activity in the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, along with the case study on the diplomatic context of the postal and news-spreading duties of the Gdańsk merchant and postmaster Francesco Gratta [1613–1676] (*News Agents and Postmasters: Background Figures or Active Diplomats?*).

The second part of this book is devoted to diplomacy as to the art of great politics' conduct and to the geopolitical position of Poland-Lithuania in seventeenth-century Europe. The advantages of diplomatic negotiations as an alternative to pursuing *Rzeczpospolita's* foreign policy in the military field are highlighted here. This group of articles may seem of a more traditional topicality. Still, it is significant to accentuate its emphasis on the multilateral character of early modern diplomatic relations, strongly including the subject of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Miguel Conde Pazos analyses the impact of the Catholic Monarchy's diplomacy on the involvement of *Rzeczpospolita* in the pan-European conflict (*Spanish Diplomats in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Thirty Years' War*). This example perfectly illustrates the breadth of political, economic and dynastic interactions that were determined by the diplomatic activities of all major European countries, even those geographically distant from each other. Conde Pazos also draws attention to the personal profile of diplomats sent on specific missions and to their respective political culture, experience, and preparation for dedicated charges.

The role of political nuances and, at first glance, of less important elements in conducting a diplomatic activity is treated by Ryszard Skowron (*Palatinate: the Key to Europe. On the Art of Diplomacy of Władysław IV Vasa*). The author points to the role of a seemingly secondary German state, as well as to the complicated system of ties between single European states at that time, in the perspective of the implementation of the great political and dynastic plans of the Polish-Lithuanian monarch, primarily related to his efforts to reclaim the Swedish throne. In fact, it is worth observing how the interests represented and defended through early modern diplomatic negotiation were primarily dynastic, typical of the sovereign families that divided the European spaces between themselves¹¹. In his article, Skowron has distinguished two basic categories defining Władysław IV's foreign policy: peace tactics (diplomatic activity and matrimonial policy) and war (military involvement in connection with the events of the Thirty Years' War).

The English point of view on the last years of the Polish Vasas' rule and on the election of 1669 is presented by Aleksandra Ziober (*The Last Years of the Reign of John Casimir Vasa and Interregnum after his Abdication in the Light of Reports of Francis Sanderson and Robert Yard*). The author shows how the image preserved in diplomatic accounts of various backgrounds' services allows us to recreate the historical narrative for many research topics with more detail. Thus diplomacy becomes a way of acquiring knowledge about single courts and state entities. Ziober also refers to the degree of understanding of the particular form and functioning of the Polish-Lithuanian political structures in seventeenth-century Europe.

The universalist-political dimension of the Holy See's diplomats' activity during the short reign of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669–1673) is discussed by Alessandro Boccolini (*Diplomacy and Papal Politics during the "Unfortunate" Reign of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki*). The author analysed the

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Claudio Rosso, "Burocrazia, fiscalità, diplomazia", in *Storia d'Europa e del Mediterraneo. Dal Medioevo all'età della globalizzazione*, sez. 5: *Età moderna (secoli XVI–XVIII)*, vol. XII: *Popoli, stati, equilibri di potere*, ed. Roberto Bizzocchi (Salerno-Roma: Salerno Editrice, 2013), 43.

activity of the then apostolic nunciature primarily in the context of the relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the papal vision of *Rzeczpospolita* as *Antemurale Christianitatis*.

As Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger observed, «another major theme within recent reassessments of early modern diplomacy has been non-verbal communication. The early modern diplomatic ceremonial was essential to the expression of hierarchies»¹². In fact, in the third part of the book, we deal with a set of texts referring to the issues of diplomatic ceremonial, as «in early modern European diplomacy, the relationship between the ceremonial symbols and the mechanisms of power was closer and carried more weight»¹³.

In Marta Szymańska's article, *The Ceremonial of Receiving of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł and his Stay at the Courts of Western Europe as a Royal Envoy during the Journey of Prince Władysław Vasa 1624–1625*, the diplomatic role of the Lithuanian magnate, member of the Vasa Prince's retinue during Władysław's educational trip around Europe, as well as the diplomatic dimension of the entire enterprise, seemingly unrelated to the implementation of the Polish-Lithuanian foreign policy, are discussed. One of the key aspects of the study is how the ceremonial applied to the Prince's retinue members indicated the diplomatic nature of the expedition.

Mariusz Sawicki (*The Coronation Parliament of John III Sobieski in French-Language Reports Sent to London*) presents a picture of the anointing act and then the entire coronation *sejm* (1676) of the later victor from Vienna. The author shows the image that French diplomats, present at that time in Poland-Lithuania, created in their reports on the events of Sobieski's coronation: its political, social and ceremonial aspects. Interestingly, those reports were sent in London and not in Paris. Sawicki shows himself fully aware of the strengths and weaknesses of historical interpreting similar creation that any external observers could create.

Ewelina Sikora (*Feasting and Fasting in Moscow: Peace Negotiation Between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy as Seen Through Eating and Drinking Customs*) takes up the theme of feasting as an essential element of Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic practice during the missions to Muscovy. The article constitutes an important contribution for developing further research on material culture in the field of the history of diplomacy¹⁴, also in the context of ceremonial treatments and traditional usages.

Finally, Gaetano Platania draws attention to the institution of obedience missions that Polish-Lithuanian kings traditionally sent to the papal court in order to certify their loyalty to the Catholic Church and its superior (*Michał Radziwiłł's Obedience Embassy in the Rome of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi between Diplomacy and Ceremonial*). The author presents a case study, a picture of the *Rzeczpospolita's* envoy's entry to the Eternal City in 1680, putting Michał Radziwiłł's mission in the large political context of the Holy League's organisation. The ceremonial becomes here an authentic baroque, theatrical representation, still, by no means deprived of its political importance.

The last part of the book is devoted to a series of outstanding personalities of diplomats operating in the context of seventeenth-century *Rzeczpospolita*. Many scholars have adopted an actor-centred approach to inquiry early modern diplomacy, and such career case studies result as extremely useful. Placing ambassadors at the heart of the analysis offers a rich research perspective regarding the relationships they cultivated, their contacts and personal capacities, as well as the individual factor in conducting foreign policy that has always accompanied the great policy's sketches.

Uładzimir Padalinski develops the topic of the diplomatic activity of Mikhayla Haraburda (*Diplomatic Activity as the Basis of Political Advancement and Material Reward in the Sixteenth-Century Grand Duchy of Lithuania: The Case of Mikhayla Haraburda*). It is a specific case study of a multiple envoy of

12 Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger, "Zeremoniell, Ritual, Symbol: Neue Forschungen zur symbolischen Kommunikation in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit", *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 27, 3 (2000): 389-405. Cf. Sowerby, "Early Modern Diplomatic History", 445.

13 Jan Hennings, "The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue: Pomp and Circumstance in Tsar Peter I's Visit to Vienna in 1698", *The International History Review*, 30, 3 (2008), 515.

14 Cf. Harriet Rudolph, "Entangled Objects and Hybrid Practices? Material Culture as a New Approach to the History of Diplomacy", in *Material Culture in Modern Diplomacy from the 15th to the 20th Century*, eds. Rudolph and Gregor M. Metzger (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2016), 1-28.

the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Muscovy and Crimea. Padalinski shows the dynamics with which the involvement in the implementation of foreign policy could determine both the political career and the social status of a diplomat in the noble context of *Rzeczpospolita*. His study also provides an outstanding example of the Lithuanian ambassador's *cursus honorum*.

Krzysztof Zbaraski's Constantinopolitan mission is examined by Tetiana Grygorieva (*The "Decisive Embassy" of Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski to Constantinople (1622–1623) and European Diplomacy amidst the 'Thirty Years' War*). The article rejects the bilateral vision of Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman diplomatic contacts, presenting the image of Zbaraski's expedition in a broad European context, including, *inter alia*, political relations of both countries with Transylvania, as well as their involvement in the events of the Thirty Years' War.

Peter P. Bajer presents a diplomatic career as a path of personal development and one of the ways to build a social position in the early modern *Rzeczpospolita*. The author observes the case of foreign newcomers or/and their families (based on the example of Scottish immigration), the desirable result of who was usually obtaining a noble status in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*The Career of Jerzy (George) Bennet, the Scottish Agent of the Radziwiłł Family*)¹⁵.

The diplomatic mission as a field for the realisation of personal interests of a diplomat, in addition to the tasks provided by representing his political superior, is presented by Aleksandra Skrzypietz (*Between the King's Instructions and the Ambassador's Ambition. Cooperation Between Melchior de Polignac and Polish Magnates*). The author shows how diplomatic feedback could have influenced the evolution of the instructions entrusted to ambassadors and, consequently, had a direct impact on their political activity. Skrzypietz presents Polignac not only as a performer but as a co-creator of the French political program towards the *Rzeczpospolita* ruled by John III Sobieski. Finally, she explains the difficulties encountered by ambassadors of foreign countries in approaching the complex political and social context of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The activities of diplomats of Pope Innocent XI in Poland-Lithuania and at the imperial court, as well as the nature of their regular contacts with the Roman Curia, are presented by Claudia Curcuruto (*Francesco Buonvisi and Opizio Pallavicini. Correspondences and Activities of Two Apostolic Nuncios in the Service of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi. 1676–1689*). The author focuses on the communicative aspects of the activities of the apostolic nunciatures. She presents diplomats as mediators between radically different (geographically, politically, culturally) realities (not only on the line of the royal/imperial court and the papal court but also between local bishops and the Bishop of Rome – the pope). Finally, the issue of mediation, as one of the crucial elements of early modern diplomatic practice, is presented by Béla Mihalik on the example of the activity of a relative of the Polish-Lithuanian monarch Augustus II the Strong (1697–1706, 1709–1733) – Bishop of Győr, Christian August (*The King's Cousin, the Emperor's Bishop. Christian August of Saxe-Weitz as Mediator between Poland and the Holy See*). It is another text that highlights the problem of the personal interests of diplomats in carrying out their missions. In the case of Wettin, these were primarily the efforts to obtain the cardinal's hat. As observed by John Watkins, «the time has come for a multidisciplinary reevaluation of one of the oldest, and traditionally one of the most conservative, subfields in the modern discipline of history: the study of premodern diplomacy»¹⁶. Contemporary research on the history of diplomacy in the early modern *Rzeczpospolita* is doing quite well, but it still requires a reorientation and innovation of methodological approach. The history of diplomacy should no longer be seen as an abstract account of negotiations and treaties, disconnected from parallel social, economic and cultural aspects. Indeed, as this collection of studies demonstrates, historiography is continually discovering new research fields in matter. Among those contained in the presented volume, we can indicate: legal and institutional forms of early modern “international” relations, nature of diplomatic sources and character of the narrative present in the documents, multilaterality and complexity of the early modern interstate connections,

15 Recently on similar issues: Michał Salamonik, *In Their Majesties' Service. The Career of Francesco De Gratta (1613–1676) as a Royal Servant and Trader in Gdańsk* (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2019); Wojciech Tygielski, *Dylematy włoskiego emigranta. Giovanni Battista Jacobelli (1603–1679), śpiewak i kapelan nadworny, kanonik warmiński* (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2019).

16 Watkins, “Toward a New Diplomatic History”, 1.

their religious and confessional nature¹⁷, diplomatic ceremonial and non-verbal communication, tools and techniques used by ambassadors, *people* as direct implementers of the “art of diplomacy”, their *cursus honorum* and mechanisms of social advancement, cultural image expressed in diplomatic documents, social, economic, commercial and dynastic causes that determined political choices, as well as material culture in diplomacy¹⁸. This volume will undoubtedly contribute to the further development of contemporary analysis of these issues. We would like to continue to engage in new methods, ask additional questions, and rethink how early modern Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy is currently being studied.

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¹⁷ Cf. *Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Roberta Anderson and Charlotte Backerra (London-New York: Routledge, 2021).

¹⁸ Cf. Daniela Frigo, “Politica estera e diplomazia: figure problemi e apparati”, in *Storia degli antichi stati italiani*, eds. Gaetano Greco and Mario Rosa (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1996), 117.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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DIPLOMACY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, DIPLOMACY OF THE KING: THE PECULIARITY OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY POLAND-LITHUANIA¹

ABSTRACT

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth clearly stood out from the European institutional and legal systems of the early modern era. One of the elements of its “uniqueness” was the way of conducting foreign policy and, consequently, the organisation of diplomatic service.

The western European historiography does not address the peculiar structure of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy against early modern interstate relations. The only commonly noted characteristic of the diplomatic practice of the Commonwealth seems to be the lack of official permanent representations at European courts, as well as the reluctance to accept foreign embassies within the borders of the state. The Polish historiography does undertake the topic, but the existing works are dated and often overcome, requiring to be complemented.

The purpose of this article is to systematise and determine the specifics of the diplomatic activity of Poland-Lithuania from the institutional and juridical point of view, with particular attention paid to the nature of the *ius legationis* which operated in *Rzeczpospolita* state. Its two potential entities are confronted: the king and the Senate along with the *sejm*. The analysis is based primarily on the parliamentary constitutions, the supreme source of law for the Polish-Lithuanian state. Another goal of the presented study is to highlight the role of political practice in shaping foreign policy, which often stood in opposition to the formal legal structure of the Commonwealth. Finally, the article constitutes a discussion with the voices present in the historiography and an invitation for the scholars to further launch the topic.

KEYWORDS: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Sovereignty; Diplomacy; *Ius legationis*; Foreign policy.

It is a well-known fact that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth stood out from the European institutional and legal systems of the early modern era (although it was not an unusual phenomenon). One of the important elements of its “uniqueness” was the way of conducting foreign policy and, consequently, the organisation of diplomatic service.

In principle, western European historiography does not address the problem of the peculiar structure of Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy against early modern interstate relations. Perhaps the only commonly noted characteristic of the diplomatic practice of the Commonwealth is the lack of official permanent representations at European courts, as well as the reluctance to accept foreign legations within the borders of the state².

The purpose of this article is to systematise and determine the specifics of the diplomatic activity of the Commonwealth from the institutional and legal point of view, with particular attention paid to the nature of the *ius legationis* which operated in the Polish-Lithuanian state. The starting point for this analysis will be a counterposition of its two potential entities: the king and the Senate along with the *sejm*. It will be based on the parliamentary constitutions, the supreme source of law for *Rzeczpospolita*

¹ The paper is a result of the research project *The Holy See and the crisis of sovereignty of John II Casimir Vasa and Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki's election (1660–1669)*, n. 2018/28/C/HS3/00176, financed by the National Science Centre, Poland.

² This was also noted by contemporaries, e.g. Abraham de Wicquefort. Cf. Stanisław E. Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji* (Wrocław-Warszawa: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1971), 58.



state. Another goal of the presented study will be to highlight the role of political practice in shaping foreign policy, which often stood in opposition to the formal legal structure of the Commonwealth.

THE PROBLEM OF RESIDENCY

The emergence of the “early modern states” at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as well as the broader dynamisation of the geopolitical situation in Europe at that time, required an effective system of mutual contact and control. As a result of the process that accompanied these needs, the art of diplomacy was developed. It was created not only as a means to maintain a political balance between the centres of power, which was an alternative to military solutions, but also due to the pressure of economic growth and cultural development, which affected Europe at the turn of the era. The primary purpose of the early modern diplomatic service, just as it is today, was to regulate the multi-level relations between states, plan joint action, reconcile common interests, and gather information.

The common practice characterising early modern diplomacy was its permanent and residential character, developed in the fifteenth century by a number of Italian states, and then adopted, over many years of evolutionary change, at most European courts, even if with numerous exceptions. The Polish-Lithuanian state was one of such, but among others also Hungary, Portugal, Sweden or Scotland need to be mentioned³.

In Poland, the diplomatic development proceeded in a manner analogous to other European countries up to approximately the first half of the sixteenth century. While in most of them the dispatchment and reception of permanent envoys gradually established, in the Commonwealth, the medieval experience was consolidated. The diplomatic practice continued to be characterised by missions launched *ad hoc* for a strict purpose and for a limited duration, in order to solve specific foreign policy issues.

The complex nature of the statehood of the Commonwealth, as well as the possibility of both its members (the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) to act autonomously in the “international” arena, proved problematic for conducting foreign policy. In terms of functionality of the union concluded between the two countries in 1569, one of the fundamental acts determining Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic practice must therefore have been the act of the Union of Lublin, which established a coherent foreign policy for both countries:

Foedera aut pacta, that is – the agreements and alliances with the neighbouring nations, after the Warsaw arrangement cannot be held, nor any envoys can be sent for important issues, without the approval of both nations, and the agreements previously held – should they be harmful to one of the unified states – are no longer in power⁴.

Nevertheless, what is worth noting is that in particular periods, such as the *interregna*, the two states, parts of the Commonwealth, in practice granted each other the autonomous right of legation. Interestingly, «in the case of the Crown [of Poland], the actions taken were treated as the actions of the Commonwealth. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was sidelined, although it also operated as a part of the Commonwealth»⁵.

Unlike European countries which established permanent diplomatic missions, the diplomacy of the

3 Czesław Nanke, *Historia dyplomacji, część 1: Rozwój form dyplomatycznych* (Kraków: Księgarnia S. Kamińskiego, 1947), 66, 83; Adam Przyboś, Roman Żelewski, *Dyplomaci w dawnych czasach* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1959), 37.

4 “O Xięstwie Litewskim przywilej około uniey Wielkiego Xięstwa Litewskiego z Koroną, na walnym seymie lubelskim, od panów rad duchownych y świeckich, y posłów ziemskich roku pańskiego 1569 uchwalony”, in VL, II, 90: «Foedera aut pacta, abo zmony, y przymierza z postronnemi narody, wedle spolney zgody Warszawskiey, napotym żadne czynione, ani stanowione żadni też Posłowie w rzeczach ważnych do obcych stron posyłani byđz nie maią, iedno za wiadomością y radą spolną obudwu narodow: a przymierza, abo stanowienia, z którymkolwiek narodem przedtym uczynione, ktoreby były szkodliwe ktorey stronie, dzierzane byđz nie maią». All the translations from Polish to English are made on behalf of the author. Cf. Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytniej dyplomacji*, 45.

5 Henryk Wisner, “Dyplomacja polska w latach 1572–164”, in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. II: 1572–1795, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1982), 122.

Commonwealth did not develop its centralised foreign affairs secretariat, which would collect and process all information coming from abroad, as well as those sent overseas (or, at least, the sources which could document the existence of such a cell have not survived to this day). Therefore these messages were often scattered and collected in the face of an emerging need. They were managed by a chancellery, which did not seem to have specialised any separate bodies for this purpose, although it was likely to have assembled professionals in specific cultural and linguistic areas in its structures. Diplomats travelling on missions from the Commonwealth were not always obliged to maintain regular correspondence with the court and the chancellery, while for most permanent diplomatic offices, the weekly flow of letters was the norm. Nevertheless, Polish-Lithuanian diplomats were required to submit a final report to the *sejm*, which was then inserted to the Crown Metrica⁶, and in the case of the diplomats sent by the king – a semi-private report. That, however, was not a binding rule but rather an established custom. From a legal perspective, the submission of diplomatic reports to the *sejm* became a duty only in the second half of the seventeenth century, which is confirmed by the contents of *pactorum conventorum* of both Michał I Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669) and John III Sobieski (1674)⁷.

The attitude of nobility towards foreign diplomatic missions to the Commonwealth, and in particular to the institutions of permanent diplomatic offices, should be regarded as distrustful and negative. As early as 1593, in one of the Sejm constitutions, one may find the following record concerning the presence of foreign envoys in the territory of the Commonwealth in the absence of the monarch: «We do not see any reason for envoys of secular princes of the lands adjacent to ours to enter the territory of the Crown, while we are away»⁸. At that time, it clearly referred to the then travels of Sigismund III Vasa to Sweden, but could also constitute an interesting precedent for the future (e.g. for the departure of Władysław IV Vasa to Baden in 1638). It is remarkable to note that this constitution mentions the confessional aspect of the missions, referring to the distinct principles of the diplomacy of the Holy See in the territory of the Commonwealth. The formal recognition of this uniqueness came during the *interregnum* of 1587, when an exception to the earlier provisions in this matter was made for nuncio Annibale Di Capua, through the advocacy of the queen dowager Anna Jagiellon⁹.

Therefore, the practice dictated by political necessity was to dispatch to the Commonwealth seemingly interim envoys, who could then extend their stay under various pretexts. New diplomats usually arrived in the Commonwealth before the end of the previous mission to ensure the office's continuity. Stanisław E. Nahlik considered that this process influenced the formation of *quasi*-permanent¹⁰ diplomatic offices in the seventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania.

Such reluctance was also characteristic of the opposite variant of diplomatic practice: establishing permanent missions abroad. For example, in 1621, a permanent diplomatic office of the Commonwealth was sought in Istanbul. In the negotiation of Khotyn (Chocim), the Polish party agreed to this demand of the Turkish party, but when the treaties were confirmed, the grand envoy Krzysztof Zbaraski was ordered to renounce it. Another envoy to the Sultan's court, Krzysztof Serebkowicz, on the insistence of the Grand Vizier to remain in Istanbul as a resident, replied that this would be detrimental to the Commonwealth. Serebkowicz argued against the validity of the analogies which were supposed to be drawn from the fact that the envoys of England, France or Venice resided in Istanbul:

It's a waste of breath to talk about things, which have never happened and now will not happen, we adhere to the old customs, [...] if you put us on an equal footing with foreign envoys, you are doing

6 Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 41. Cf. AGAD, MK, LL; Ryszard Skowron, *Dyplomaci polscy w Hiszpanii w XVI i XVII wieku* (Kraków: Universitas, 1997), 228.

7 "Articuli pactorum conventorum", in VL, V, 14-5; "Articuli pactorum conventorum", in VL, V, 140. Cf. Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji", 328-29.

8 "Konstytucje seymu walnego warszawskiego, roku pańskiego 1593", in VL, II, 342: «Przyczyny, aby Posłowie od panów świeckich Koronie przyległych, w niebytności naszej tu do Korony wjeżdżać mieli, nie widzimy». Cf. Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów, II: Wojsko Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, dyplomacja, varia* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2004), 246-47.

9 Dorota Gregorowicz, *Tiara w grze o koronę: Stolica Apostolska wobec wolnych elekcji w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów w drugiej połowie XVI wieku* (Kraków: PAU, 2019), 245. Cf. "Konfederacja generalna warszawska roku 1587", in VL, II, 231.

10 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 59.

us harm because they stay at the Sublime Porte for their trade and their commerce rather than for any message¹¹.

22

As in the case of many legations sent to the Commonwealth, which were not permanent, but maintained continuity of operation¹², in some European courts regular agencies of Polish-Lithuanian monarchs were formed (starting with those in Rome, Naples and Madrid, in connection with the case of Neapolitan sums, ongoing for decades¹³). These were permanent (*de facto*, not *de jure*) royal offices, whose character Stanisław Grzybowski described as “semi-private”¹⁴. Their role in shaping the “international” policy of the Polish-Lithuanian state should not be underestimated. These regular and long-term missions provided not only the king but also, in a sense, the Commonwealth, with important contacts and information regarding political, economic, and cultural affairs. In addition to the above-mentioned institutions involved in the affairs of the Neapolitan sums, which were established already in the sixteenth century, the practice of sending permanent representatives to foreign courts became more widespread only in the first decade of the reign of Władysław IV Vasa. However, it should be emphasised that they were royal offices, which were not dispatched on behalf of the Commonwealth¹⁵. More to the point of the permanent mission in Istanbul, due to the political situation, it was established only in 1678, under the constitution of the *sejm* of Grodno. The first envoy of the Commonwealth at the Sultan’s court was Samuel Proski, as evidenced by the payment of his fixed salary from the treasury of state by way of his position¹⁶.

Therefore, there is every indication that the nobility, just as they did not want any permanent diplomatic representations of foreign states at the Polish-Lithuanian court, saw no greater need to dispatch their residents abroad¹⁷. The apogee of the nobility’s disinclination for permanent representations of foreign states fell during the reign of John II Casimir, Michał I Korybut Wiśniowiecki and John III Sobieski, when «foreign envoys used to meddle on behalf of their principals»¹⁸. Under the constitution of the *Sejm* of 1683, all foreign missions were formally banned from permanent residence in the Commonwealth:

Infinitely we resolve that the foreign ambassadors, legates, and by whatever name they are called, not only at our court but also in our states, will not reside. And if in the course of a *sejm*, and in between

11 AGAD, MK, LL 30, *Report of Krzysztof Serebkowicz, HM envoy to the Sublime Porte*, Warsaw 14 March 1624, 43. Cit. Wisner, “Dyplomacja polska”, 133: «Szkoda o tym mówić, czego nie bywało nigdy i teraz nie będzie, my się trzymamy starych zwyczajów, [...] jeśli nas kładziecie z posłami cudzoziemskimi równo, krzywdę nam czynicie, gdyż oni raczej dla handlów i kupiectwa swego u Porty mieszkają, a nie dla żadnego poselstwa». Cf. Abraham de Wicquefort, *Memoires touchant les ambassadeurs et le ministres publics* (Cologne: Marteau, 1676), 386; Władysław Czapliński, “Dyplomacja polska w latach 1605–1648”, in *Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI–XVIII wieku: studia*, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1966), 250.

12 For example, the French and Brandenburg, as well as imperial, diplomatic offices, especially in the second half of the seventeenth century. Cf. Czapliński, *Polska a Prusy i Brandenburgia za Władysława IV* (Wrocław: Wrocławskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1947); Maciej Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej 1618–1648* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1986); Andrzej Kamieński, *Polska a Brandenburgia-Prusy w drugiej połowie XVII wieku: dzieje polityczne* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2002).

13 The term Neapolitan sums (Polish: *sumy neapolitańskie*) refers to a loan made in 1557 by Bona Sforza, dowager Queen of Poland and Grand Duchess of Lithuania, to Philip II of Spain. The debt was never repaid and continued to be disputed between Polish monarchs and the Kingdom of Spain during the entire early modern period. Cf. Klemens Kantecki, *Sumy neapolitańskie. Opowiadania historyczne* (Warszawa: Gebethner & Wolff, 1881); Ryszard Skowron, *Olivares, Wazowie i Bałtyk. Polska w polityce zagranicznej Hiszpanii w latach 1621–1632* (Kraków: “Historia Iagellonica”, 2002), 19–33; Id., “L’eredità di Bona come oggetto di gioco sull’arena internazionale nel XVI e XVII secolo”, in *Bona Sforza. Regina di Polonia e duchessa di Bari*, eds. Maria Stella Calò Mariani and Giuseppe Dibenedetto (Roma: Nuova comunicazione, 2001), 227–47.

14 Grzybowski, “Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej”, 173. Cf. Wisner, “Dyplomacja polska”, 142–43.

15 Czapliński, “Dyplomacja polska”, 250–51.

16 “Konstytucje seymu walnego ordynaryjnego sześciedzielnego w Grodnie, roku pańskiego 1678”, in VL, V, 282.

17 Cf. Wisner, “Dyplomacja polska”, 143.

18 “Konstytucje seymu walnego ordynaryjnego sześciedzielnego warszawskiego, roku pańskiego 1683”, in VL, V, 322: «Posłowie cudzoziemscy interesami pryncypałów swoich mięszać zwykli».

two *sejms*, the legation of any of the foreign senators arrived; then those who arrive we allow to stay for three weeks before the audience; and we ask each of the messengers to depart three weeks after, and we will not permit them to dwell beyond that time. And after the hearing, they should leave the borders of our kingdom within three weeks¹⁹.

It should be emphasised that from Sobieski's perspective, the cited constitution *O Posłach cudzoziemskich* could be a legal solution formulated instrumentally and aimed at discrediting the French representation in the Commonwealth as well as the nobility supporting it. As a result, the king gained support for the idea of war against the Ottoman Empire and for an alliance with the imperial court. Paradoxically, in Sobieski's time, permanent diplomatic outposts began to form, both Polish-Lithuanian at foreign courts and foreign in the Commonwealth. It stemmed from the need to coordinate military activities within the Holy League (in 1686, establishments of permanent missions became one of the conditions of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace)²⁰.

This kind of approach originated from mental and cultural factors; as Grzybowski noted, «permanent legacies are generally unpopular at this time and are considered unnecessary, both by active politicians and by theorists»²¹. It does not seem appropriate to link the nature of the Polish-Lithuanian legations directly to financial matters, although they were certainly not irrelevant²². Also, pointing to the electiveness of the monarchy as a key factor for the failure of the Commonwealth to establish permanent diplomatic missions, is not a convincing hypothesis²³. The cultural aspect of the distrust which the nobility retained of foreign presence and interference in politics seems dominant.

It is worth noting, that although in historiography the apostolic nunciature is generally regarded as the only permanent diplomatic outpost in the early modern Commonwealth²⁴, it was a diplomatic mission accredited by the king and functioning at the monarch's court. If a nuncio was to be accredited to the estates of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the missions of papal diplomats could take place only following the terms of subsequent *sejms*. The specificity of the apostolic nunciature as a permanent diplomatic institution – not established in the Commonwealth, but rather with the king; and countenanced by the nobility, is legitimised by the confessional character of this institution, as well as by the dual nature of papal authority. In this sense, one can adhere to the controversial opinion of Rajnold Przeździecki, who denied the permanent character to the nunciature in Poland-Lithuania²⁵. On the other hand, the apostolic nunciature undoubtedly functioned continuously and permanently, still, only as accredited to the monarch.

IUS LEGATIONIS

Ius legationis was, and still is, one of the primary attributes of state sovereignty. It implies the right of an entity belonging to the “international” order to send its own and receive foreign diplomatic representatives, with the mutual consent of those concerned²⁶. For the early modern Commonwealth, the identification of this entity in interstate or diplomatic relations creates doubts arising from both:

19 “Konstytucje seymu 1683”, in VL, V, 322. Cf. Wójcik, “Dyplomacja polska w okresie wojen drugiej połowy XVII wieku (1648–1699)”, in Wójcik, *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, II, 270.

20 I would like to thank Zbigniew Hundert for joint reflections on the role of the war against the Ottoman Empire in the development of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service.

21 Stanisław Grzybowski, “Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej 1573–1605”, in Wójcik, *Polska służba dyplomatyczna*, 173–74.

22 Cf. Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 59–60.

23 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 58.

24 In the Commonwealth, the Prussian legation, which dates back to the beginning of the sixteenth century, had a unique position as a diplomatic office of a vassal. This mission was continued, however, throughout the whole seventeenth century, even after the feudal relationship between Poland-Lithuania and Prussia ceased to be in force. Cf. Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 58.

25 Rajnold Przeździecki, *Diplomatie et protocole à la cour de Pologne*, vol. 1 (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1937), XX, 19.

26 Cf. Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 37.

the specific republican structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state and its character of a composite monarchy²⁷.

Since the competence in the field of conducting foreign relations is described neither in the medieval statutes of the Kingdom of Poland, nor in the constitutions of the successive *sejms* of the Jagiellonian era, it seems that foreign policy was a traditional monarchical prerogative, in terms of executive power, and did not need an additional legal definition. However, it should be emphasised that in Poland, since the Middle Ages, it had been based, in a sense, on the position of the nobility. As noted by Przyboś and Żelewski, «a striking expression of the dependence of princes in the field of foreign policy was the presence of dignitaries who stood by their side during the conclusion of international agreements, as it were, vouching that the treaties are kept by their sovereigns»²⁸. Yet, it seems that this model did not deviate from the one present in other European monarchies of the time.

Ius mittendi et excipiendi legatos, later called *iur legationis*, underwent an important evolution at the beginning of the early modern era and was strongly associated with the vision of sovereign power. Such concept may be observed in both: the diplomatic practice and the political and legal theory of the time (Pierre Ayrault, Hugo Grotius, Carlo Pasquale, Frederic Marselaer, Abraham de Wicquefort, François de Callières)²⁹. Krzysztof Warszawicki defined an envoy as a man dispatched by one monarch to another³⁰. However, this concept does not fully align with the actual situation in the Commonwealth and throughout Europe. Problems and discussions were caused by the very status of sovereignty in mixed monarchies, as well as the identification of their subjectivity in “international” relations. Modern historiography tends to support the views less prevalent in the discussed era, known from earlier, renaissance works (among others of Konrad Braun and Jakub Przyłuski³¹). It states that *iur legationis* is recognised not only by sovereign state authorities but also by non-sovereign political entities, cities, as well as other types of public organisations³². Also between seventeenth-century authors many agreed to the polycentricity of *iur legationis*, without questioning its connection to power and sovereignty. This view (especially with regard to the Holy Roman Empire) was held by e.g. Herman Kirchner, Johann Ernst Krosnitzki and Gerard von Stöcken³³. Based on the works of these authors, along with the diplomatic practice observed throughout early modern Europe, it seems that it is indeed possible to speak of «the interpretation of law based on political aspirations which can interfere with the coherence of certain political groups, classified by historiography as “composite” or “polycentric” monarchies»³⁴. In the Commonwealth, the subject scope of *iur legationis* was indeed treated liberally, in a way «reminiscent rather of a medieval state of the matter»³⁵, in which the question of sovereignty seems to be of less importance³⁶. In this context, interesting remarks on the “domestic”

27 Cf. John H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies”, *Past & Present*, 137 (1992): 48-71.

28 Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 28.

29 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 37-8; Wójcik, “Dyplomacja polska”, 258.

30 Grzybowski, “Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej”, 171-72. Cf. Bolesław Boczek, “Krzysztofa Warszawickiego nauka o państwie i dyplomacji”, *Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Nauki Polskiej. Historia nauk społecznych*, 1 (1957): 134-35.

31 Konrad Braun, *De legationibus libri quinque* (Mainz: Behem, 1548), I, *passim*; Jakub Przyłuski, *Leges seu statuta ac privilegia Regni Poloniae omnia* (Kraków: Szczucin, 1553), 838.

32 Grzybowski, “Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej”, 171-73. Cf. Boczek, “Krzysztofa Warszawickiego nauka”, 134-35; Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 36; Indravati Félicité, “Droit et pratique diplomatique à l’époque moderne. Quelques réflexions à partir de l’expérience de diplomates du Nord”, in *Esperienza e diplomazia. Saperi, pratiche culturali e azione diplomatica nell’Età moderna (secc. XV-XVIII)*, eds. Stefano Andretta, Lucien Bély, Alexander Koller and Géraud Poumarède (Roma: Viella, 2020), 146; Francesco Senatore, “Le ambascerie della città di Capua”, in *Ambassades et ambassadeurs en Europe (XV^e-XVII^e siècles)*, eds. Jean-Luis Fournel and Matteo Residori (Geneve: Droz, 2020), 150.

33 Hermann Kirchner, *Legatus: eiusque iura, dignitas et officium duobus libris explicata* (Lich: Kezelius, 1604), III, 10-27; Johann E. Krosnitzki, *Exercitatio politica de legationibus* (Jena: Typis Lippoldianis, 1610), 6, 15, 16; Gerard von Stöcken, *De iure legationum dissertatio* (Altdorf: Hagen, 1657), 2. Cf. Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 39.

34 Félicité, “Droit et pratique diplomatique”, 146. Cf. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies”, 48-71.

35 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 46.

36 It is worth mentioning the example of 1609, when during the Zebrzydowski’s Rebellion the nobility acted as a subject in foreign relations. Cf. Agnieszka Pawłowska-Kubik, *Rokosz sandomierski 1606-1609. Rzeczpospolita na politycznym rozdrożu* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, 2019), 420.

diplomacy of the Commonwealth, presented by Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro³⁷, then developed by Zbigniew Wójcik³⁸, should be also mentioned. According to Nahlik:

It is difficult to resist the impression that there was a connection between this liberalism [described above] and the terminology used in Poland, which used the same name – *poseł*, *legatus* – to describe two different functions: internal – political (as an elected member of the *sejm*) and diplomatic (as an envoy)³⁹.

In the context of the European discourse on *ius legationis*, in relation to the Commonwealth, most historians point to the monarch as the entity competent in “international” relations, and to the Polish-Lithuanian foreign policy and diplomacy – as a royal prerogative. However, it is emphasised that with the grounding of the free royal election principle and the introduction of the Henrician Articles (1573)⁴⁰, the royal force in foreign policy was reduced, and this process, due to the current political situation and the general weakening of the monarch’s position, progressed throughout the seventeenth century⁴¹. In the Commonwealth, the control over the monarch in foreign policy was exercised by the Senate council, an advisory body and representation of the estates to the king during the period between *sejms*⁴².

And although – as Henryk Wisner wrote in *Historia dyplomacji Polski* – the monarch remained the supreme figure, he henceforth, could not, or rather: he was not expected to dispatch and receive envoys, declare war and make peace «without hearing the Crown councils of both nations, and without intervening in the matters of *sejm*»⁴³. The problem is that the *passus* from the Henrician Articles quoted by the historian seems to have been not only incorrectly interpreted but also even misquoted. Its full wording is as follows:

In the affairs of the Crown, which shall concern our person and our dignity, our envoys dispatched to other lands, the envoys from others to hear, soldiers to be gathered or received, we and our descendants shall not start or progress, without the **advice** of the Crown councils of both nations, not intervening in the matters belonging to the *sejm*. And those legacies that would not concern the Commonwealth and could be progressed according to their time and needs: therefore, these we will always be able to progress, **informing** the senators of the Crown councils who would live with us⁴⁴.

Thus, Wisner clearly equated the quoted fragment to his construct representing the Commonwealth as an autonomous entity in foreign policy. One cannot agree with his thesis, according to which the Henrician Articles «gave the king the initiative [on foreign policy], but the decision was left to the Senate»⁴⁵. Nevertheless, the classical interpretations of Grzybowski and Wójcik are expressed similarly, though less radically⁴⁶. However, could limiting the king’s position in conducting foreign policy through political practice, rather than a legal act, actually imply diminishment of the formal royal

37 Andrzej M. Fredro, *Vir Consilii monitis ethicorum necnon prudentiae civilis praeludente apparatus oratorii copia ad civiliter dicendum instructus* (Leopoli: Typis Collegii S.J., 1730), 422.

38 Wójcik, “Dyplomacja polska”, 309-10.

39 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 47.

40 Henrician Articles: legal acts formulated during the *interregnum* after the death of Sigismund II Augustus, written during the election of 1573, which contained the most important regulations concerning the exercise of power in the state, and defining the relations between the *sejm* and the monarch. Together with *pactorum conventorum*, they formed the basis of the political system of the early modern Commonwealth. Cf. Dariusz Makieła, *Artykuły henrykowskie (1573–1576): geneza, obowiązywanie, stosowanie: studium historyczno-prawne* (Warszawa: Vizja Press, 2012).

41 Wisner, “Dyplomacja polska”, 115.

42 Urszula Augustyniak, *Wazowie i “królowie rodacy”* (Warszawa: Semper, 1999), 179.

43 Wisner, “Dyplomacja polska”, 115. Cf. “Litterae confirmationis articulorum Henrice Regi antea oblatum”, in VL, II, 150.

44 “Litterae confirmationis articulorum Henrice Regi antea oblatum”, in VL, II, 150-51.

45 Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, II, 236.

46 Grzybowski, “Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej”, 149; Wójcik, “Dyplomacja polska”, 242.

prerogative within *ius legationis*? The fact that the content of the Henrician Articles interfered with the monarch's position regarding the conduct of "international" policy is not disputed. Yet, I would like to show that at least during the seventeenth century, this did not affect the formal subjectivity of the monarch in interstate relations, nor did it disturb his *iuris legationis*.

The Henrician Articles indicated the need to seek the advice of the Senate (for affairs of the Commonwealth) or to inform the Senate council (for royal affairs) in order to take any steps in the field of foreign policy. The confirmation of the restrictions imposed on the monarch in terms of the conduct of foreign policy can be noticed later, in one of the constitutions of the coronation *sejm* of Sigismund III Vasa of 1588. At then, one of the elements of the Henrician Articles was recalled, according to which the monarch had no right «ever to hear, to receive, to dispatch envoys, without informing lords senators especially those at the court»⁴⁷. However, it does not seem likely that, within the letter of these acts, the senators' decisions became formally binding on the king. In this context, however, it should be pointed out that the "advice", Latin *consilium*, in the legal language of the epoch had a much stronger meaning than today. Although the "advice" remained a certain point of view put forward by the said entity, it proved to be binding on the legal practice of the era. The monarch could (and was expected to) accept it, but he was not formally obliged to do so. If he did not follow the "advice", the king had to face the consequences of political nature (e.g. after the Zebrzydowski's Rebellion, the king seemed to pay more attention to the Senate's opinion⁴⁸). Therefore, I agree with Nahlik's statements, according to which «Polish elective Kings **should have** appointed envoys either on the "advice" of the Senate, or after "informing" it, or at least the resident senators»⁴⁹. A similar opinion was expressed by Stefania Ochmann-Staniszevska, who wrote: «according to the Articles, the king committed [...] **to coordinate** foreign policy with the Senate»⁵⁰, as well as by Andrzej Wyczański, when writing that the king «could act independently, but in practice, he **consulted** the so-called Crown council»⁵¹. Nevertheless, the royal obligation to seek "advice" could not constitute the loss of the royal prerogative in the conduct of foreign policy. At the utmost, the practical application of this prerogative could, to a greater or lesser extent, be impeded by the current political situation⁵².

In this context, it is worth recalling that it was the personal decision of the monarch to convene the Senate council. The senators had the right to express their opinion, but there was no discussion during the council meetings. It was the king who made final decisions after summarising the proceedings⁵³. Additionally, until the introduction of the constitution *De reddenda ratione Senatus consultorum* of 1641⁵⁴, the minutes of the Senate councils were not presented in writing and submitted to the *sejm* for discussion, and therefore remained secret. While convening the Senate council, the monarchs also had the opportunity to influence its composition, avoiding unfavourable senators, for example, by postponing the sending of the letters informing about the date of the meeting⁵⁵. Thus,

47 "Konstytucje seymu walnego, koronacyi krolewskiej, roku bożego 1588", in VL, II, 252: «Nigdy pakt y foedera także legacyi słuchania, odprowowania, wysyłania, okrom wiadomości Panow Senatorow, zwłaszcza na dworze będących». Cf. Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, II, 237; Maciej Pieńkowski, *Trudna droga do władzy w Rzeczypospolitej. Sejm koronacyjny Zygmunta III 1587/1588 i sejm pacyfikacyjny 1589 roku* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2020), 184.

48 Czapliński, "Dyplomacja polska", 209.

49 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 126.

50 Stefania Ochmann-Staniszevska, *Dynastia Wazów w Polsce* (Warszawa: PWN, 2007), 40. Cf. 48-9.

51 Andrzej Wyczański, *Polska w Europie XVI stulecia* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1999), 114.

52 Especially in the period between Seyms, the monarch was presented with great opportunities for independent conduct of foreign policy Cf. Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 31; Ochmann-Staniszevska, *Dynastia Wazów*, 40.

53 Cf. Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji w drugiej połowie XVII w.", in Id., *Polska służba dyplomatyczna*, 265.

54 VL, IV, 6.

55 Cf. Tadeusz Wasilewski, "Litewskie rady senatu w XVII wieku", in *Studia z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej*, eds. Krystyn Matwijowski and Zbigniew Wójcik (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1988), 85-94; Jacek Krupa, "Rady Senatu za Jana III Sobieskiego (1674-1696)", *Studia Historyczne*, 35/3 (1992): 307-28; Ochmann-Staniszevska, *Dynastia Wazów*, 48-53; Ead., "Projekty reformy Rady Senatorów Rezydentów w pismach politycznych czasów Jana Kazimierza Wazy", *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne*, LX/1 (2008): 203-13; Pawłowska-Kubik, *Rokosz sandomierski*, 412-13.

Grzybowski and Wójcik correctly drew attention to the fact that with the waning position of the king in the Commonwealth (in various fields), over the seventeenth century, the relationship between his prerogative and the real possibilities for conducting autonomous foreign policy was determined by the current personal political influence as well as the personality of the monarch⁵⁶.

In connection with the risk of undermining the royal authority and bearing political consequences in the case when the autonomous decisions of the king were different from «the **advice** of the Crown councils»⁵⁷, a peculiar duality in the conduct of foreign policy developed: the breakdown into the official diplomacy of the Commonwealth and the unofficial royal diplomacy⁵⁸. Apart from the diplomatic projects commenced with the consent and knowledge of the *sejm* and the Senate council, corresponding activities were undertaken on the exclusively royal orders. Another advantage of the monarch was the ability to give additional (and often secret) instructions to the envoys dispatched abroad on behalf of himself and the Commonwealth, as well as oral instructions given during individual meetings with an envoy, which usually preceded the mission⁵⁹. Wisner, however, reduced autonomous royal diplomacy to dynastic policy, presumably contradicting the laws of the Commonwealth. In fact, the Vasas ran their dynastic policy on a large scale to strengthen the position of the young dynasty, stabilise its authority at European courts, and, on the other hand, build the strength of the royal faction in the Commonwealth. However, this did not mean automatically acting to the detriment of the state. The conclusions drawn by Wisner, who, on the other hand, admitted himself that utilitarianism and the drive to achieve immediate goals were the keys to the seventeenth-century Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy, are all the more surprising⁶⁰. It is obvious that the monarch's autonomous diplomatic practice, independent of the *sejm*, proved to be the fastest and most effective way of conducting foreign policy⁶¹.

In addition to the Senate council, the Royal Chancellery played an important complementary role to the royal prerogative in foreign policy⁶². However, this was not, as it seems, a limiting role, although, again, the Henrician Articles obliged the monarch to use the official seals (Chancellor's or vice-Chancellor's) in diplomatic correspondence instead of the private seal (the so-called "cubiculum seal", used by the royal secretary)⁶³. It was the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor who were responsible for the organisational aspects of foreign policy and diplomacy in the Commonwealth: editing correspondence, receiving envoys, issuing instructions and listening to reports⁶⁴. The position of the chancellery was further strengthened by the fact that a Chancellor was a lifetime office. Thus individuals seeking political emancipation (e.g. Jan Zamoyski) were able to influence the royal policy. On the other hand, the lack of a formal division of competencies between the Chancellor and the vice-Chancellor⁶⁵ significantly weakened the position of these officials in relation to the monarch. The king could use the seal of the one with whom the political cooperation was better at the given moment (e.g. the one he nominated himself) and not the one he "inherited" in the office from his predecessor⁶⁶.

As Wisner emphasised, «invariably, no matter in whose formal name the documents were issued, it

56 Wójcik, "Dyplomacja polska", 244; Grzybowski, "Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej", 145.

57 "Litterae confirmationis articulorum Henrice Regi antea oblatum", in VL, II, 150-51.

58 Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 37; Grzybowski, "Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej", 148.

59 Grzybowski, "Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej", 184-85; Wójcik, "Dyplomacja polska", 245; Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, II, 278.

60 Wisner, "Dyplomacja polska", 153.

61 Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji", 260; Id., "Dyplomacja polska", 243.

62 Cf. Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 31-2.

63 "Literae confirmationis articulorum Henrico Regi antea oblaturum", in VL, II, 152. Cf. "Artykuły pactorum conventorum stanów tey Rzeczypospolitey Korony Polskiej, y W.X. Litewskiego y państw do niey należących", in VL, IV, 95; Augustyniak, *Wazowie i "królowie rodacy"*, 47.

64 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 68; Wisner, "Dyplomacja polska", 125; Wójcik, "Dyplomacja polska", 249.

65 Wójcik, "Dyplomacja polska", 249; Augustyniak, *Historia Polski 1572-1795* (Warszawa: PWN, 2008), 82. Cf. Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 68; Wojciech Krawczuk, *Pieczęcie Zygmunta III Wazy* (Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1993), 3.

66 On the tactics of the Vasas to subdue the Senate council cf. Ochmann-Staniszevska, *Dynastia Wazów*, 51-5.

can be assumed that [their] content was determined by the king⁶⁷. The fact that the monarch did not conduct his foreign policy on his own, and relied largely on trusted ministers is, however, clear, as evidenced by the documents he issued *in blanco*⁶⁸. From a geopolitical perspective, the Lithuanian Chancellery organised the relations of the Commonwealth with Moscow, while relations with Turkey, Crimea, Persia, the papacy, as well as the countries of western Europe, remained in the hands of the Crown sealers. Thus, also empowerments, instructions, letters and documents of all kinds were, or should have been, issued respectively by the Crown or Lithuanian Chancellery, and stamped respectively with the Crown or Lithuanian seal (by the respective Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor)⁶⁹. In the context of the role of the Royal Chancellery in Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic practice, it is important to draw attention to the role of the royal secretaries. From the second half of the fifteenth century, a Great Secretary was appointed to substitute the Chancellors usually absent from the king⁷⁰. This practice continued into the early modern era. The role of the Great Secretary was, therefore, essential. The other secretaries also played an important part being additionally involved in diplomatic activities⁷¹. It strengthened the position of the monarch because it was him to appoint and take a special oath from them personally⁷².

In some cases, dictated by the intensifying war conditions during the seventeenth century, considerable competencies for foreign policy were also transferred to Hetmans⁷³. They referred primarily to the relations with the courts directly involved in the conflicts with the Polish-Lithuanian south-eastern borders: Istanbul, Crimea, Transylvania, Moldova and Wallachia⁷⁴.

Particular to the Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy was the time of the physical absence of the monarch, and therefore, above all, of *interregna*. At that time, the Commonwealth was headed by the Primate, who, however, did not assume the competencies derived from *ius legationis*, but only the functions of the supreme representative. *Interregna* were the only political situations in which *ius legationis* acquired collegial characteristics and was granted to the Commonwealth, or rather to the Senate council, which temporarily replaced the monarch. Wicquefort confirmed such reasoning in his work:

After the death of Sigismund Augustus, the King of Poland, and after the election of the Prince d'Anjou, the Senate of the Commonwealth sent a solemn legation to France, which was recognised as such, and so were the ambassadors treated. One can say that Poland is, in fact, a Commonwealth, because the Senate representing it has the right to dispatch ambassadors; it [the Commonwealth] also bestows its name and powers on the envoys⁷⁵.

The fact that the Senate council temporarily assumed the functions of the central authority of foreign policy during *interregnum* was justified by tradition and, as the only viable solution, was usually met with no opposition. In practice, since the first *interregnum* (1573–1574), one could observe the issuance of all documents of an “international” nature on behalf of the “Crown councils”; only during the activity of the convocation and election *sejms* were they issued on behalf of the “estates”⁷⁶.

67 Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, II, 283.

68 Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, II, 284.

69 Wisner, “Dyplomacja polska”, 125, 129; Id., *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, II, 279–80.

70 Mirosław Korolko, *Poczet sekretarzy królewskich Zygmunta Augusta (1548–1572)* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1986), 145; Augustyniak, *Wazowie i “królowie rodacy”*, 189.

71 Cf. Skowron, *Dyplomaci polscy w Hiszpanii*, 221–22.

72 Grzybowski, “Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej”, 157.

73 Wójcik, “Dyplomacja polska”, 260.

74 Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 32–3; Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 69; Wójcik, “Dyplomacja polska”, 251; Czapliński, “Dyplomacja polska”, 216–17; Wójcik, “Organizacja dyplomacji”, 270. For more general considerations see Przemysław Gawron, *Hetman koronny w systemie ustrojowym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1581–1646* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2010), 107–13, 356–59.

75 Wicquefort, *Memoires*, 41.

76 Grzybowski, “Organizacja służby dyplomatycznej”, 149.

Finally, a few words about the political practice determining the activities of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service, regardless of the existing constitutional forms. As Nahlik aptly noted, «a specific influence on the *ius legationis* was exerted by the gradual restriction of such rights of the king, progressing throughout the entire elective monarchy's period»⁷⁷. It should be emphasised that this restriction was the result mainly of political practice and not of legal evolution. Throughout the seventeenth century, the royal prerogative to conduct foreign policy remained essentially intact, but the constitutions of the successive *sejms* defined political practice increasingly to the detriment of the monarch. Urszula Augustyniak drew attention to this progressive fragility of the monarch's position, stressing that the king in the Commonwealth had no right to make the most important decisions, for example, to declare an offensive war without the prior consent of the estates⁷⁸. Initially, this was not due to the lack of appropriate monarchical prerogatives, but rather to the overlap in this aspect with personal freedom of the nobility and the mechanisms for convening *levée en masse*. Thus, the monarch was *de facto* deprived of the possibility of making autonomous decisions regarding the offensive war from the onset of elective monarchy. This problem was elaborated on by Ryszard Skowron, who noticed the actual paralysis in the conduct of active foreign policy without the possibility of deploying troops overseas. At the same time, Skowron drew attention to the ways to circumvent this problem, for example, by organising the enlistment of troops for campaigns taking place abroad⁷⁹. Moreover, as Czapliński and Wisner noted, the Polish-Lithuanian state has indeed started several wars in its early modern history, although the *sejm* had never given its consent to any of them (e.g. in 1600, with Michael the Brave, in 1601, with Sweden, in 1609, with Moscow). This was when a given conflict was presented as the defense of one's own lands, not the conquest of others⁸⁰. However, it seems that such policy can only be attributed to the reign of Sigismund III Vasa, as it was finally curtailed by the constitution of the *sejm* of 1613 *O podnoszeniu woien y przyjmowaniu woysk*, which read:

We declare and sign what the old statuses and constitutions of the war state, as we want the following to be the eternal and unshakable law: we and our successors, kings of Poland, if there were a need to start an offensive war, or if a foreseen danger reached the Commonwealth and there were a need to hire mercenaries, or a need to gather *levée en masse*; this would not be done, and, additionally, under no pretext a war would be started, without consulting the *sejmiki* and without the unanimous, overt and explicit agreement of the *sejm* of the Commonwealth; this will be the duty written in the law⁸¹.

From the formal perspective, the royal *ius legationis* was questioned only during the reign of John III Sobieski. Present in historiography, the thesis about depriving the monarch of *ius legationis* at the *sejm* of 1683, was introduced by Zdzisław Kaczmarczyk and Bolesław Leśnodorski in 1957, and widely repeated thereafter (among others by Przyboś, Żelewski, and Wójcik). According to it, the act was supported by two constitutions of the *sejm* (one limiting the temporary stay of foreign envoys in the Commonwealth, the other forbidding the king to dispatch and receive legations on his own)⁸². Is there indeed any documentary confirmation for such a statement? The aforementioned constitution O

77 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 46.

78 Cf. Augustyniak, *Wazowie i "królowie rodacy"*, 47.

79 Cf. Skowron, "Preliminaria wojskowe z okresu polsko-hispańskich rokowań sojuszniczych w Neapolu (1639–1641)", *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*, 42 (2006): 237–38.

80 Czapliński, "Dyplomacja polska", 218–19; Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, II, 249–53.

81 "Konstytucje seymu walnego koronnego w Warszawie roku 1613", in VL, III, 80: «Statuty dawne y konstytucje o wojnie deklarując, postanawiamy y waruiemy, za wieczne y nigdy niewzruszone prawo to chcąc mieć: iż My, y Sukcessorowie nasi Krolowie Polscy, gdzieby Nam abo offensivum bellum zacząć przyszło, abo gdyby niebezpieczeństwo iakie na Rzpltą przyszło przez Nas upatrowane, y potrzeba było ludzie służebne przyjmować, a pogotowiu, gdyby pospolite ruszenie uchwalone bydź miało: czynić tego, y prorsus żadney woyny Nullo practextu wszczynać nie mamy, bez proponowania na Seymiki, y bez pozwolenia zgodnego, iawnego, a wyraźnego na Seymie wszech Stanow: a to pod obowiązkiem w prawie wyrażonym». Cf. "Artykuły pactorum conventorum stanów tej Rzeczypospolitey Korony Polskiej, y W.X. Litewskiego y państw do niej należących", in VL, IV, 94–5.

82 Zdzisław Kaczmarczyk and Bolesław Leśnodorski, *Historia państwa i prawa Polski od połowy XV w. do r. 1795* (Warszawa: PWN, 1957), 299. Cf. Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 31; Wójcik, "Dyplomacja polska", 242.

Posłach cudzoziemskich limited the period of stay of foreign envoys in the Commonwealth to 12 weeks, but *de facto*, it did not come into political practice⁸³. The second of the laws mentioned by Kaczmarczyk and Leśnodorski cannot be found in any of the constitutions of the *sejm* of 1683. Therefore, one can speak about a fundamental change in the conduct of the foreign policy of the Commonwealth only with the inauguration of the Wettin rule. Augustus II the Strong circumscribed the royal *ius legationis* in his *pactorum conventorum* of 1697 (although he did not renounce it)⁸⁴ and then shifted almost the entire burden of his diplomatic activities related to the Polish-Lithuanian state to Saxon structures⁸⁵.

SUMMARY

As Nahlik noted, in early modern Europe, two basic concepts have developed around *ius legationis*. According to the first of them (let us call it absolutistic), *ius legationis* was directly connected with the sovereign territorial authority. In line with the second, the prerogatives under *ius legationis* were divided into a number of political entities⁸⁶. The latter concept is, of course, much more relatable to the complex political reality of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian state.

In the seventeenth-century Commonwealth, no specialised bodies for coordinating foreign policy and diplomatic activities were developed. Wójcik writes about the then «decentralisation of government» of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service⁸⁷ and this description must be seen as apt. Indeed, in the political practice of the seventeenth century, the Senate council was able to control the foreign policy of the monarch effectively, and the *sejm* took the critical decisions in the field of war and peace, although its role was limited not only by the cadence of assemblies but also by inefficiency and frequent disruption of the proceedings. However, it seems that from the institutional and legal perspective, one cannot speak of the *ius legationis* of the Commonwealth in the seventeenth century. It belonged to the monarch then⁸⁸, although, in practice, he could not fully exercise it.

Based on the above considerations, it is worth asking if the king, by taking autonomous decisions in the field of foreign policy of the Commonwealth, contrary to the opinion of the Senate council (which, in fact, occurred relatively rarely), went beyond his prerogatives. Wójcik stated it was the case, citing the example of the actions of John Casimir Vasa during the Polish-Muscovite negotiations in Durowicze (1664)⁸⁹. Conversely, in the light of this analysis, it seems that from the formal point of view, the king did not exceed his powers at that time but only opposed the generally accepted practice.

As Skowron noted, early modern Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service had a number of characteristics specific to its functioning, but also a lot of typical features⁹⁰. Among the main differences, one should mention the lack of formal permanent missions (both foreign in the Commonwealth and Polish-Lithuanian ones abroad), the lack of diplomatic service secretariat (which entails research difficulties due to the lack of institutional sources), as well as the legal distinction between the king and the Commonwealth (and, as a result, the «duality of the diplomatic network»). Among the similarities can be identified the ceremonial aspects of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service, a similar system of

83 "Konstytucje seymu walnego ordynaryjnego sześćniedzielnego warszawskiego, roku pańskiego 1683", in VL, V, 322

84 "Articuli pactorum conventorum, inter status Serenissimae Reipublicae Polonae, tam sentorij, quam equestris ordinis Regni et Magni Ducati Lithuaniae omniumque ad eadem dominia annexarum, ab una, et Serenissimum Principem Fridericum Augustum", in VL, VI, 16-7.

85 Jerzy Gierowski, "Dyplomacja polska doby saskiej (1699–1763)", in Wójcik, *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, II, 388–89.

86 Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji*, 37.

87 Wójcik, "Dyplomacja polska", 242, 261.

88 Cf. Augustyniak, *Wazowie i "królowie rodacy"*, 110. Although Wójcik challenged this view, writing that «in the Commonwealth, the center of foreign policy and diplomacy in the second half of the Seventeenth century was the Senate council» (Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji", 267–68).

89 Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji", 262–63; Id. "Dyplomacja polska", 244–45.

90 Skowron, *Dyplomaci polscy w Hiszpanii*, 219.

diplomatic ranks, as well as the general purposes of the foreign policy conducted⁹¹.

A present-day historian's view of the early modern interstate relations is often too "institutional", while it would require an almost interpersonal approach, as this was also the nature of these relations, dominated by individual actors – rulers, ministers, diplomats, merchants and couriers⁹². In Polish historiography, however, the situation seems to be converse. Thus far, many historians have been preoccupied with a detailed analysis of diplomatic practice and specific activities of the Commonwealth in foreign policy. In contrast, less attention has been paid to the institutional aspects of the functioning of its diplomatic service (with the notable exception of Nahlik), whereas the latter play a fundamental role in the strategies of conducting "international" policy and diplomatic activity⁹³. Hence the idea of creating this article, which, I hope, will introduce international readers to this insufficiently understood aspect of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's history.

91 Cf. Przyboś and Żelewski, *Dyplomaci*, 59-60.

92 Félicité, "Droit et pratique diplomatique", 143.

93 Cf. Félicité, "Droit et pratique diplomatique", 146.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

MK: *Metrika Koronna*.

LL: *Libri Legationum*.

VL: *Volumina Legum: przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. Pijarów w Warszawie, od roku 1732 do roku 1782, wydanego, 9 vols. Petersburg: Ohryzki, 1859–1889.*

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PARTNERSHIP IN A UNION WITH DIVERGING INTERESTS: COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND GRAND DUCHY OF LITHUANIA IN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES AT THE TURN OF THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

35



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ABSTRACT

The Union of Lublin established the principle of common foreign policy and diplomatic activities of Poland and Lithuania. Nevertheless, due to differing political interests of the Union partners in late sixteenth century it was not always realised. Often the political elites of both countries were not able to agree on the preferred direction of foreign policy; Lithuanian representatives did not show initiative to develop diplomatic relations in the Western direction, while Polish politicians ignored the interests of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania while solving the problems of relations with Muscovy. Therefore, the cooperation when organising diplomatic contacts with particular countries was not constant. States acted separately mostly during *interregnum* periods, but the coordination of actions was not always successful when a common ruler was in power, countries were relatively independent when engaging on a lower level – parallel diplomatic contact sphere. However, during the last decades of the Sixteenth century we can observe certain changes – increased cooperation of the political elites of both states in the diplomatic sphere, especially after the *interregnum* of 1587. Analysis of these changes is the main topic of this article. By basing the research on the practice of diplomatic communication with Muscovy, we will examine various organizational aspects of diplomatic relations (preparation of diplomatic missions, receptions of envoys, preparation of documents, etc.) in order to answer these questions: what caused these changes? Were these changes caused by the integration following the Union and generational changes in Lithuanian elite? Were these changes caused by the increased Polish interest in the East?

KEYWORDS: Grand Duchy of Lithuania; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Muscovy; Diplomacy; Radziwiłłs.

The Union of Lublin established the principle of common foreign policy and diplomatic activities in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This principle had to be based on cooperation and mutual compromises between the two states. Nevertheless, due to differing political interests political elites of both countries were not always able to agree on the most important goals of the foreign policy and the diplomatic activities that were conducted to realise those goals. The lack of common interest and the domination of the earlier tradition of statehood became clearer during the *interregnum* periods after the death of the monarch of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Sigismund August in 1572. During the first (1572–1573) and the second (1574–1576) *interregnum* periods union partners often took separate decisions to maintain diplomatic relations. Even when there was an agreement on the principle of common legations, there was sometimes no consensus on the goals of these diplomatic missions¹. This was caused not only by different political interests, but also due to lack of experience in cooperation with union partners, which became a serious issue when both states did not have a common monarch unifying them².

¹ Political conflicts between Poland and Lithuania, which created different outlooks on foreign policy and diplomatic activities were discussed by Polish historian Henryk Lulewicz. Most in-depth analysis of these problems are analysed in his monograph: Henryk Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy. Stosunki polsko-litewskie w latach 1569–1588* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2002).

² This problem stems from the Act of Union of Lublin itself, which did not describe the method how the diplomatic

During the reign of Stephen Báthory conditions were more favourable to the evolution of a common tradition of diplomatic activities. Special attention was given to relations with Muscovy, where traditionally the Grand Duchy of Lithuania played the most important role. But during the military campaign which began in late 1570's and in the ensuing process of the pacification of interstate relations, Polish political community participated in these relations on a much grander scale than previously³. This is an important indicator, which shows the changes to separate Lithuanian and Polish diplomatic orientations and interest priorities in spheres of diplomatic activities. According to the usual practice, the Polish Crown curated diplomatic activities in the West and the South, while the Lithuania dominated the Eastern direction.

This paper analyses the effects of these trends for later period by making an assumption, that the strengthening of integrational factors deepened the cooperation of the union partners in the diplomatic sphere. The main topics for this analysis were the ability to reconcile interests, inclusion into diplomatic spheres where the states previously did not participate in and trust in union partners. More attention will be given to extraordinary situations – the experiences of *interregnum* of 1587 or the diplomatic activities when the monarch of the Commonwealth Sigismund III Vasa left the country. This way we analyse the situations when the union provisions were challenged or changes in diplomatic activities. The narrative is constructed from the perspective of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, by evaluating the transformations of the traditions of its diplomatic at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth century.

It could be stated that the experience of the *interregnum*, which began after the death of Stephen Báthory in late 1586 in the Commonwealth became the most important stimulus to look for signs of integration in Polish and Lithuanian diplomatic spheres. This experience shaped changes for the coming decades. During the first two *interregnums*, Lithuanian political elite showed relatively independent positions in organising and maintaining relations with foreign countries, thus creating a conflict with the political community of the Polish Crown. However, at the beginning of the third *interregnum* we can observe new trends. Lithuanian officials, when maintaining relations with Muscovy vital to the state's interests sought the support of their union partners for their actions and decisions. In early 1587 the highest officials of the state gathered to the diet of Grodno (Hrodna), independently took a decision to send a legation to Muscovy; however, it was envisioned as a common Polish and Lithuanian diplomatic mission. When nominating diplomatic representatives the principle of parity was followed, thus the Commonwealth was to be represented by a Polish representative with the diplomat agent from Lithuania⁴. The goals of the mission was negotiated by the delegates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which were sent to the Warsaw convocation *sejm* – a meeting of the parliament to prepare the election of the new ruler⁵.

Union partners succeeded in coordinating their positions in regards to the Muscovite legation, which was sent in the winter of 1587 to present the official proposal to elect the Muscovite monarch Fyodor

activities had to be organised and conducted in the new polity – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As the Polish researcher Henryk Wisner noted, the Act of Union, allowed each of the Union states – Poland and Lithuania to send diplomatic legations after it informed the Union partner, and received consent. However, the act does not specify whom has to take decisions related to the goals of the mission, and in whose name the diplomatic representatives had to be performed. There was no question that it had to be done in the name of the ruler, but there was a confusion whether it had to be done in the name of both states in the Commonwealth. Henry Valois in his 1573 Treaty (the so-called *pacta conventa*) with Polish and Lithuanian communities formulated clear principles of organisation and responsibility for the diplomatic activities. In it the initiative for diplomatic relations was given to the monarch, but it had to be conducted with the consent and the knowledge of the common institution for Poland and Lithuania – the Senate –. See Henryk Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów, t. 2: Wojsko Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, dyplomacja, varia* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2004), 236.

3 There was an exceptional case – negotiations conducted in 1581–1582 after a military campaign with Muscovite diplomatic representatives. They were conducted not by high level Lithuanian officials, who traditionally organised and conducted negotiations with the Muscovites, but by the Great Hetman of the Polish Crown and Chancellor Jan Zamoyski: Marius Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinės veiklos organizacija Lietuvos Didžiojoje Kunigaikštystėje 1569–1604* (Kaunas: Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas 2018), 76–8.

4 Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy*, 359.

5 *Dyjaryjusz sejmowe r. 1587: sejmy konwokacyjny i elekcyjny*, ed. August Sokołowski (Kraków: Czcionkami Drukarni Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1887), 233, 236, 239–40.

Ivanovich to the throne of the Commonwealth. Senators gathered in Warsaw granted a mandate to Lithuanian officials to receive Muscovite diplomats in the Lithuania independently and, after hearing them, to send them back. Polish Senators recommended consulting with Polish side should any important questions arise⁶. This shows the relative trust from the Polish side to the political community of the Lithuania, which was lacking during the earliest interregnums. Of course, the union partners did not agree to all Lithuanian initiatives. Poland refused to nominate their representatives to a meeting between the Commonwealth and Muscovy on the border to solve territorial disputes, which was arranged with the Eastern neighbour a year earlier. This decision was interpreted as ignoring the interests of the Grand Duchy. There were proposal in Lithuania to appoint negotiators independently, without the consent of the Poles. However, the only real result from these plans were some rather drastic statements⁷.

These disagreements did not end the cooperation between the Polish and Lithuanian politicians. Grand Duchy of Lithuania officials provided information about the reception of the aforementioned Muscovite legation and sought to share the responsibility for the decision-making with Union partners. The fact that Lithuania consulted with the Polish Crown regarding the proposal of Fyodor Ivanovich as a candidate in the election for the throne was presented by the Lithuanian representatives as an argument that they represent the entire Commonwealth, not only the Grand Duchy. The unity of the political communities of both states was declared by stating that «We with Poland are of a single mind - what we, Lithuanian councillors [think] Polish Council thinks, what the Polish council [thinks], we, Lithuanian council think»⁸. It was not an empty statement and it is proven by the fact that the diplomatic mission was sent only after receiving the approval of Polish and Lithuanian senators for an official reply to the Muscovite proposals.

Relations between Poland and Lithuania went sour during the election *sejm* in the second half of 1587, because of the disagreements about the relations with Muscovy. During the *sejm*, competing parties formed, which supported different pretenders to Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and there was a risk of two separate rulers being elected at the same time. During this political turmoil, only representatives of Lithuania showed interest in negotiations with Muscovite grand envoys who arrived to the election *sejm* in summer of 1587. Polish officials were passive, and, finally, after they rejected the extension of truce with Muscovy, Lithuanian delegates independently decided to complete the negotiations with Muscovite diplomats and to sign a truce for fifteen years. Contrahents of this truce, representing the Commonwealth were the highest officials of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but in the treaty Polish Crown was included as a party of a treaty⁹. After this, *sejm* declared two winners of the royal election – Maximilian III of Austria and the son of the King of Sweden Sigismund Vasa, armed confrontation between both pretenders and their supporters began. This conflict made cooperation between Lithuanian representatives and highly fractured political community of Polish Crown very difficult. Lithuanian political elite independently took decisions regarding the maintenance of diplomatic relations until Sigismund Vasa established himself on the throne of the Commonwealth in early 1588¹⁰.

Historiography on numerous occasions raised the question of the legitimacy of unilateral agreement between Lithuanian senators and Muscovy in 1587 in the name of the Commonwealth. It is obvious that this problem was understood by the Lithuanian delegates who drafted the treaty. They hoped to use the situation of dual election and to trade the acceptance of the treaty with Muscovy for the recognition of the election of the monarch. Despite constant pressure from Lithuanian political community, it was only achieved after several years. As the relations with the Ottoman Empire worsened, the *sejm* of 1590 took decisions to prepare for a military campaign against the Turks. Lithuanian delegates raised an ultimatum by stating that they will not approve the *sejm*'s decisions on war taxes

6 AGAD, AR, II, n. 171, *Polish and Lithuanian senators to K. Radziwiłł*, 25 February 1587.

7 Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinės veiklos organizacija*, 148.

8 RGADA, *Muscovite book of legations*, n. 79, vol. 17, ff. 203r, 424r. AGAD, AR, II, n. 178, *Letters by Polish and Lithuanian senators regarding the official reply to the Muscovite diplomats*.

9 *Dyjuryjsze sejnowe r. 1587*, 131-32, 141-42, 157, 206-07. Treaty texts: LM 593, 89, 92; LM 594, 84, 86.

10 Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinės veiklos organizacija*, 152-57.

until the ruler commits to peace with Muscovy and sends diplomatic envoys to negotiate peace or the confirmation of the truce signed in 1587. Lithuanian representatives received a promise from the King to solve the problem of diplomatic relations with the Eastern neighbour, but as the Poles did not approve of it, they were not able to transform this promise into a commitment in an official decision by the *sejm*. As they did not completely trust the union partners and the ruler, Lithuanian delegates left their representatives in Warsaw, who had to wait until Sigismund fulfilled his promise. As the ruler delayed sending this diplomatic mission, these representatives presented a protest with an ultimatum, that the decisions of the *sejm* will not be followed as long as this promise was not fulfilled¹¹. Finally, Lithuanians achieved their goal – Sigismund Vasa that autumn sent diplomats to Muscovy, who in early 1591 signed a twelve-year truce with the Eastern neighbour¹².

Conflicting interests, which became visible in the *sejm* of 1590, were caused by differing preferences in Polish and Lithuanian foreign policy. Consequently the level of activities in different geographic directions varied greatly. Lithuania continued to prioritise Muscovy, while all other fields of diplomacy remained in the Polish sphere. This caused a lack of common interest when deciding important problems to union partners. However, integrating factors could not be ignored as well – work in common parliamentary structure – *sejm*, attempts by the ruler to interest the political communities of both states in diplomatic activities and personal relations between individual members of Polish and Lithuanian political elites and the effect of these relationships on common policy were all important. The problem of particularism remained, but we can observe certain changes already in the 1590's. Early in his reign, Sigismund Vasa made a lot of effort to include Lithuanian senators to legitimise his own rule during Bytom – Będzin negotiations with the Habsburgs, who still refused to recognise the legitimacy of his election. In a Negotiating Commission, created in 1588, Grand Duchy had to be represented by five high-level officials, but Lithuanian representatives kept avoiding this duty, as they did not want participate in these negotiations due to financial or political concerns. However, the ruler managed to sway a Lithuanian Senator, voivode of Brest Krzysztof Zenowicz to join the Commission. During these negotiations representatives of the Commonwealth gathered in Będzin delegated him to meet Habsburg representatives in Bytom¹³.

When maintaining relations with the Habsburgs, monarch had more success when cooperating with the Lithuanian principal noble family – the Radziwiłłs and in particular with the Catholic branch of the family. Representatives of this noble house were entrusted with important diplomatic missions. In the summer of 1589, Bishop of Vilnius, Jerzy Radziwiłł together with the palatine of Cracow Mikołaj Firlej, was sent to Prague to participate in the ratification of Bytom – Będzin treaty. J. Radziwiłł's brother, the Great Marshall of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Albrycht in 1592 was nominated for the legation to the Emperor Rudolf II. During this mission, A. Radziwiłł and the representative of the Polish Crown, Bishop of Cuiavia Hieronim Rozdrażewski, signed the matrimonial treaty with the Habsburgs, for Sigismund Vasa to wed the daughter of Archduke Charles II, Anna Habsburg¹⁴. The trust of the monarch for the Catholic branch of the Radziwiłł family was shown by the decision to nominate the youngest brother Stanisław Radziwiłł in 1590 for a mission to Rome to state the obedience of Sigismund to the Pope Sixtus V. However, Stanisław refused to participate in this mission due to high

11 Paweł Kasztelan, *Polsko-moskiewskie stosunki dyplomatyczne przełomu XVI/XVII wieku*, (PhD diss. Adam Mickiewicz University: Poznań, 2014), 180-81, https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/bitstream/10593/13943/1/Pawel_Kasztelan_Polsko-moskiewskie_stosunki_dyplomatyczne.pdf. Protest of Lithuanian delegates in the *sejm* of 1590, Władysław Konopczyński, *Liberum veto. Studium porównawczo-historyczne* (Kraków: zapomoga Kasy im. J. Mianowskiego, 1918), Annex, 432.

12 *Sigismund Vasa's truce with Fyodor Ivanovich*, January 1591, in LM 593, 121-26; LM 594, 141-47.

13 Aleksandra Barwicka-Makula, *Od wrogości do przyjaźni. absburgowie austriaccy wobec Polski w latach 1587-1592*, (PhD diss., University of Silesia in Katowice, 2019), 235, 238-39, 255-57, <https://sbc.org.pl/dlibra/publication/100959/edition/95002/content>. Even during these negotiations Lithuanian senators wanted to use them to insure the interests of their country. They aimed to include their main concern into the instruction of the Commission – to ensure that the Emperor did not cooperate with Muscovy against the Commonwealth –, Karol Żojdź, *Stronnictwo Zygmunta III Wazy w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w latach 1603-1621* (PhD diss., University of Warsaw, 2018), 54-5. <https://depotuw.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/item/2837/3100-DR-HI-132515.pdf?sequence=1>

14 Barwicka-Makula, "Od wrogości do przyjaźni", 299-30, 353-55.

costs of such a mission¹⁵. Due to the same reason, the eldest of the brothers: voivode of Trakai (Troki) Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł “the Orphan” also refused the same mission in 1592¹⁶.

These cases show that personal relations with the monarch conditioned the inclusion of members of the political elite of the Lithuania into wider diplomatic activities. This is confirmed by the growing stature of the Chancellor of Grand Duchy of Lithuania Lew Sapieha in the diplomacy of the Commonwealth in the last decade of the sixteenth century. During the early reign of Sigismund Vasa the relations between L. Sapieha and the King were not particularly close, but within a couple of years, the Chancellor became one of the most important confidants of the King. As the head of Lithuanian Chancellery, he was one of the most important organisers of relations with Muscovy. The trust the ruler had for L. Sapieha as a politician, organiser and a diplomat is shown by the fact that he was entrusted with heading the Great Legation to Moscow in 1600¹⁷. Chancellor was also active in directions of diplomatic activities, where Lithuanian officials were usually not that active. In 1593, when Sigismund Vasa was mired in affairs of inheritance of the Swedish throne, the royal court had created plans to send the Chancellor with a mission to Sweden. L. Sapieha motivated his refusal to participate in this diplomatic mission because of poor health or sickness¹⁸. However, at the end of the *sejm* of 1596, he, with other senators participated in preparation of a legation to meet with Swedish political elite. Because of this, a representative of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Mikołaj Sapieha, a relative of the Chancellor, was included in the mission to Sweden¹⁹. In regards to L. Sapieha specifically, the usual separation of official duties between spheres of diplomatic activity between Polish and Lithuanian officials was not followed. After the Union, the maintenance of relations with the Crimean Khanate was transferred to the Polish Chancellery, but Sigismund Vasa occasionally consulted with L. Sapieha in regards to these diplomatic relations. For example, in 1597 monarch forwarded the Chancellor a letter from the Crimean Khan, with a request for L. Sapieha to add to the preparation of the reply and discussed the possible yearly tribute to the Tatars with him²⁰.

L. Sapieha was personally involved in taking decisions of the question Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth joining the anti-Ottoman coalition, and this, most probably included more Lithuanian senators into negotiations to create the Holy League with Habsburgs. In the negotiating commission created during the *sejm* of 1595, M. K. Radziwiłł “the Orphan”, voivode of Minsk Jan Abramowicz, Land Treasurer of Grand Duchy of Lithuania Dmitri Chalecki and several other less prominent nobles from Lithuania were included together with L. Sapieha and Polish representatives²¹. When compared to Bytom – Będzin negotiations, where only one senator of Grand Duchy was present, we can see much greater interest from Lithuanian political elite in the affairs of the Commonwealth. Same Lithuanian representatives were nominated to negotiate anti-Ottoman coalition during the *sejm* of 1596. However, M. K. Radziwiłł “the Orphan” left the commission because of personal reasons. Negotiations failed in both instances, but, it was agreed to include an idea, raised during the proceedings of the Sejm, to include Muscovy into the coalition against the Ottomans, and this was beneficial to Lithuania. With the help of the Chancellery of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, legation documents were prepared, and a Lithuanian diplomatic courier was assigned to deliver these documents to Moscow²².

15 Marian Banaszak, *Z dziejów dyplomacji watykańskiej: poselstwa obediencyjne w latach 1534–1605*, t. 2: *Dzieje poselstw polskich* (Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1975), 219–20; Tomasz Kempa, *Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł Sierotka (1549–1616), wojewoda wileński* (Warszawa: Semper, 2000), 277.

16 Leszek Jarmański, “Trudne starania o wysłanie posła Zygmunta III Wazy z obediencją do papieża Klemensa VII”, *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce*, 41 (1997): 170–71; Kempa, *Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł*, 283.

17 Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinių veiklos organizacija*, 89–90.

18 L. Sapieha to M. K. Radziwiłł, 11 March 1593, in ADR, 213–14; Arkadiusz Czwołek, *Piórem i buławą. Działalność polityczna Lwa Sapiehy, kanclerza litewskiego, wojewody wileńskiego* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, 2012), 96–7.

19 *Dyaryusze Sejmowe r. 1597*, 185–96; Czwołek, *Piórem i buławą*, 111.

20 *Sigismund Vasa to L. Sapieha*, 6 July 1597, in ADS, 237.

21 Decision of the *sejm* to create a Negotiation commission, March 1595: AGAD, AR, II, n. 295; L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 28 March 1595, in ADR, 217; Czwołek, *Piórem i buławą*, 105.

22 Sigismund Vasa’s decision regarding the formation of the Negotiation Commission, [before 8 May 1596], *Elementa ad*

Lithuanian senators were even more active towards international affairs during the *sejm* of 1597. However, Lithuanian delegates were sceptical in regards to possibility of forming a wide coalition against the Ottomans, and proposed sending envoys to the Sultan to sign a new treaty. They regarded normalization of relations with Muscovy as a more important issue, much more important than the question of the Holy League. Lithuanians reminded their Union partners that the truce agreement with the Eastern neighbour is due to expire and encouraged them to send a diplomatic mission to Muscovy²³. These positions show, that even when involved into problems of international politics, Lithuanian politicians strived to find approval for diplomatic actions in the Eastern direction which was a priority for Lithuania, in exchange for support in solving problems more important to Poland, for example relations with the Ottomans or the Crimean Khanate.

Common affairs were more effectively solved with the help of interpersonal contacts between Polish and Lithuanian high ranked officials. During the last decade of the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, we can observe constant collaboration in the fields of foreign policy and diplomacy between several most influential representatives from the political communities of both states. Constant opposition to the monarch brought the Great Hetman of the Polish Crown and Chancellor Jan Zamoyski and voivode of Vilnius and Great Hetman of Grand Duchy of Lithuania Krzysztof Radziwiłł “the Thunder” closer together. These magnates constantly exchanged information about relevant questions of interstate relations and their views on international politics. In order to garner support for military action against the Turks, J. Zamoyski in 1589–1590 periodically provided information to K. Radziwiłł about military threat from and the diplomatic relations with the Ottomans and the Crimean Khanate²⁴. At the same time the idea to send a diplomatic mission to Muscovy in 1597 was realised when voivode of Vilnius and the Chancellor of Grand Duchy of Lithuania closely cooperated with the Polish magnate. Portion of the documents for the future legation was prepared by J. Zamoyski, who was one of the creators of the idea of a union with Muscovy. Following these ideas, future agreements with Muscovites were to be prepared²⁵. Due to various political circumstances, the Great Legation of the Commonwealth headed by L. Sapieha set for Muscovy only in 1600, but J. Zamoyski and K. Radziwiłł with the Chancellor of Grand Duchy of Lithuania played the most active roles in forming its goals. These two magnates were the first ones whom L. Sapieha informed about the course and the results of the legation²⁶.

Peculiarities of cooperation between the highest ranked officials of Poland and Lithuania are most strikingly revealed in extraordinary situations. These happened when Sigismund Vasa left for Sweden and representatives of the political elite had to take decisions regarding diplomatic activities independently. However, contrary to *interregnum* periods, the provisions made in *sejm* of 1593 regulated these activities. They formulated a legal notion that if a monarch is absent from the Commonwealth foreign legations are forbidden to enter the country. Only exceptions were made to Ottoman, Tatar and Muscovite envoys. The first ones were authorized to be received in Warsaw by the Archbishop of Gniezno, who had to call the closest senators to the audience. Muscovite diplomats had to be received and heard in Vilnius, by the Lithuanian senators. However, official replies to the legations had to be prepared after informing the union partners and receiving their consent²⁷.

fontium editiones, t. 27: *Res Polonicae ex Archivo Mediceo Florentino II pars*, eds. Walerian Meysztowicz and Wanda Wyhowska de Andreis (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1972), 92; Kempa, *Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł*, 286; Czwołek, *Piórem i buławą*, 110–11.

23 *Dyaryusze Sejmowe r. 1597*, 10, 56–9, 62–6, 169, 428–29, 438; Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinės veiklos organizacija*, 58.

24 *J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł*, 16 July 1589, in ADR, 98–9; *J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł*, 1 January 1590, in ADR, 99–100; *J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł*, 1 July 1590, in ADR, 101–03.

25 *J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł*, 13 August 1597, in ADR, 129; *J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł*, 13 September 1597, in ADR, 131.

26 Kazimierz Tyszkowski, *Poselstwo Lwa Sapiehy w Moskwie 1600 r.* (Lwów: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1927), 37; *L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł*, 2 October 1600, in ADS, 252–53; *L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł*, 3 December 1600, in ADR, 227–28; *L. Sapieha to J. Zamoyski*, 16 March 1601, in ADS, 258–59.

27 *Volumina Legum: przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. pijarów w Warszawie od roku 1732 do roku 1782*, vol. II (Petersburg: Ohryzki, 1589), 342.

Situation from early 1594 shows how these provisions were implemented in practice. Despite the prohibitions by the *sejm*, a diplomatic agent of Emperor Rudolf II arrived in Poland to request help in the fight against the Ottomans. Archbishop of Gniezno Stanisław Karnkowski organised a meeting by the senators in Warsaw. The Archbishop began wide consultations, which were to include Lithuanian senators. S. Karnkowski personally informed K. Radziwiłł “the Thunder” about the arrival of the Emperor’s representative and forwarded documents brought by the envoy for him to be acquainted with. He also asked the magnates’ opinion regarding the reception of the future Habsburg diplomatic mission, which was difficult to organise because of the absence of the monarch²⁸. J. Zamoyski and L. Sapieha were included in these talks and they clearly objected to this reception as long as Sigismund Vasa has not returned to the Commonwealth²⁹. At the same time, highest officials were cooperating when receiving an Ottoman envoy. S. Karnkowski urged K. Radziwiłł to come to the reception of the diplomatic mission, because, according the provisions of the *sejm*, Senators from both nations had to be represented. If the voivode of Vilnius was not able to participate, he asked to state his positions and to persuade at least some Lithuanian senators to come³⁰. Although he did not convince K. Radziwiłł “the Thunder” to come, but L. Sapieha arrived at the audience, which took place in Warsaw, and he emphasised the importance of “mutual consilia” principle that was stated in the Union, in a letter to J. Zamoyski³¹. Similar talks and coordination of positions between Polish and Lithuanian officials took place in 1598, when as the monarch left the country and Crimean diplomatic mission had to be received urgently³².

Lithuanian political leaders consulted with the Poles when maintaining relations with the Eastern neighbour, thus following the provisions of *sejm* of 1593. In the spring of 1594, diplomatic courier sent by the the Muscovite monarchs’ council – Boyar Duma arrived in Lithuania. K. Radziwiłł “The Thunder” who took care of the courier intended to use the provision by independently receiving and sending a legation. However, L. Sapieha advised him not to take independent actions and to share responsibility. Diplomatic mission was also addressed to S. Karnkowski and J. Zamoyski, therefore L. Sapieha informed the Archbishop of Gniezno and the Chancellor of Poland about the courier’s arrival. There were no disagreements regarding the acceptance of the audience in Vilnius between Polish and Lithuanian officials. However, positions differed regarding the representative to be sent to the Boyar Duma. The plan by the voivode of Vilnius to send a courier to Moscow, and to later send a reply via diplomatic envoy was rejected by J. Zamoyski. He proposed to keep the Muscovite until the return of the monarch. Lithuanian officials took into account the position of the Polish magnate and the courier was only sent home when Sigismund Vasa returned³³.

This particular episode of relations with Muscovy could be characterised as parallel diplomacy.³⁴ This method handling international matters followed the principles that evolved in early sixteenth century, when a tradition of diplomatic contacts between the Lithuanian highest state officials and members of Council of Muscovite monarch – Boyar Duma began. These contacts were usually used when restarting diplomatic relations, beginning the cycle of diplomatic relations after a military conflict or other types of disagreements, and was sometimes used to solve minor problems. Formally the responsibility

28 AGAD, AR, V, n. 6454, S. Karnkowski to K. Radziwiłł, 14 February 1594, 15-7.

29 L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 26 February 1594, in ADS, 81-2; L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 22 March 1594, in ADR, 215; J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł, 20 March 1594, in ADR, 109-11.

30 AGAD, AR, V, n. 6454, S. Karnkowski to K. Radziwiłł, 12 April 1594, p. 19; AGAD, AR, V, n. 6454, S. Karnkowski to K. Radziwiłł, 13 April 1594, 21-3.

31 L. Sapieha to J. Zamoyski, 25 March 1594, in ADS, 83.

32 J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł, 29 August 1598, in ADR, 137-38; L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 16 September 1598, in ADS, 197-98; J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł, 13 October 1598, in ADR, 138.

33 L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 3 April 1594, in ADS, 85-6; L. Sapieha to J. Zamoyski, 3 June 1594, in ADS, 90; L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 18 June 1594, in ADS, 91; L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 13 December 1594, in ADS, 97.

34 In general, parallel diplomatic practices can be defined as a semi-official activities supporting, complementing, correcting or duplicating the diplomacy between the heads of states. More on the model of parallel contacts see Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinių veiklos organizacija*, 30-4, 92-115.

during these relations was transferred to their participants – officials of Grand Duchy (after the Union – Lithuanian and Polish senators) and the members of the Boyar Duma. Thus, monarchs could disown their actions and decisions at any point in time. This created an opportunity for rulers to change their positions more freely and to maintain diplomatic contacts even during difficult inter-state conflicts³⁵. Parallel diplomatic communication could not be described as independent diplomatic activity, as it was tightly intertwined with diplomacy conducted in the name of the monarchs both in the Commonwealth and Muscovy. The monarch was often the main initiator of these contacts, and the reply to the representatives of the other side was coordinated with the ruler. This could explain why, the senators of Poland and Lithuania did not dare to send back the diplomatic envoy of the Boyar Duma independently, without the consent of Sigismund Vasa. However, intensive consultations by the officials of both sides show changes in this sphere. Parallel diplomatic contacts with Muscovy after the Union of Lublin was an exclusive sphere of activities of the political elite of Lithuania. Although diplomatic missions to the Boyar's Duma from 1590's were sent in the name of Polish and Lithuanian political communities, but Muscovite missions were most often addressed only to the high-level officials of Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Muscovy took notice of the new, post-Union reality only in the last decade of the century, when the representative of the Polish Crown were added as permanent addressees of the missions³⁶.

At this time Polish officials were more actively involved in parallel diplomatic contacts. Therefore, Lithuanian politicians had to coordinate their actions not only with the monarch, but also with the representatives of the Polish Crown. For example in autumn of 1592 only L. Sapieha participated in the reception of Muscovite Boyar's courier in Warsaw. Therefore, the only active participants of the audience were J. Zamoyski and voivode of Cracow M. Firlej. It is likely that they, while consulting with the monarch and the Chancellor of Grand Duchy of Lithuania prepared the official reply to Muscovites³⁷. Growing cooperation of the union partners in this field is demonstrated by the circumstances of the trade conflict with Muscovy, which began at the turn of the century. Disagreements began in 1598, when Lithuanian merchants were captured in Moscow. In order to solve this issue K. Radziwiłł attempted to find support of the J. Zamoyski. The latter advised to send a diplomatic envoy to the Muscovite political elite and promised to get the consent of the monarch to such a diplomatic mission³⁸. This problem remained relevant in later years and could begin serious complications in interstate relations, when voivode of Vilnius in 1602 decided to take retaliatory measures and to arrest Muscovite merchants who traded in Lithuania. L. Sapieha, who persuaded K. Radziwiłł to abandon harsh retaliatory measures, quenched the conflict. The Chancellor coordinated these actions with the Polish Vice-Chancellor Piotr Tylicki, who also maintained the position that these problems were best solved by using parallel diplomatic contacts³⁹. According to information L. Sapieha provided to J. Zamoyski about a courier from Moscow, we can observe that a certain level of cooperation in parallel diplomacy was continued even on the eve of the False Dmitry I adventure⁴⁰. However as the political crisis began in Muscovy the conditions for diplomatic communication changed dramatically and would require a separate discussion.

In summary, we could state that the aforementioned cases prove the trends of convergence in Polish and Lithuanian diplomatic actions. Traditional separation of diplomatic activity spheres and different foreign policy preferences remained on the organisational plane. This caused issues when solving problems of diplomatic relations more relevant to a single union partner. However, a much more active involvement of members of political elites of both states to the spheres of diplomatic activities,

35 Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinės veiklos organizacija*, 92-5.

36 Sirutavičius, *Diplomatinės veiklos organizacija*, 108.

37 RGADA, *Muscovite book of legations*, 79, vol. 22, ff. 259r-63v; LM 593, 187.

38 J. Zamoyski to K. Radziwiłł, 11 July 1598, in ADR, 134.

39 L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 21 August 1602, in ADS, 333-35; L. Sapieha to K. Radziwiłł, 28 August 1602, in ADR, 231; P. Tylicki to L. Sapieha, 5 September 1602, in ADS, 339; P. Tylicki to L. Sapieha, 19 September 1602, in ADS, 344; Czwołęk, *Piórem i buławą*, 172.

40 Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN, MSS, n. 1539, vol. 75, J. Zamoyski to L. Sapieha, 20 August 1604, 171.

where previously members of the elite did not participate is observed. The interest field of Lithuanian political community was much narrower, there was more interest in regional relations with the Holy Roman Empire, Crimean Khanate and Sweden. At the same time Polish participation in the Eastern direction with Muscovy increased significantly, now included the field of parallel diplomacy, where Lithuanian elite previously dominated. Integration processes caused intertwining of diplomatic activities, which, in turn, was stimulated by common parliamentary structures, the monarch, who united two political communities, personal relations between various Polish and Lithuanian officials, and the growing need for interoperability when solving problems of foreign policy.

ABBREVIATIONS

ADR: *Archiwum domu Radziwiłłów: listy ks. M. K. Radziwiłła Sierotki, Jana Zamoyskiego, Lwa Sapiehy*, [...], ed. Polkowski, 1895.

ADS: *Archiwum Domu Sapiehów. Listy z lat 1575–1606*, ed. Prochaska, 1892.

AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

AR: Archiwum Warszawskie Radziwiłłów.

LM 593: *Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 593 (1585–1604)*, [...], ed. Baliulis, 2009.

LM 594: *Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 594 (1585–1600)*, ed. Baliulis, 2006.

RGADA: Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov.

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CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WARSAW NUNCIO ANTONIO SANTA CROCE WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS IN 1629: FREQUENCY, INTENSITY, CONTENT

ABSTRACT

This article is based on source material from the unique collection of correspondence of the Warsaw nuncio Antonio Santa Croce, stored in the Roman *Archivio di Stato* in the *Archivio Santacroce* ensemble under number 774 and containing 846 letters from the year 1629, addressed to the nuncio from various senders. The authors analyze the correspondence of the nuncio from the Roman Catholic bishops of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, consisting of 109 letters. 104 from the ordinary bishops and 5 from suffragan bishops. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the most regular and intensive correspondence was maintained with the nuncio by Archbishop of Gniezno Jan Wężyk and Bishop of Cracow Marcin Szyszkowski (presumably twice a month). Most of the other bishops approached the frequency of one letter per month, and this concerned the bishops of Vilnius, Cuiavia, Poznań, Płock, Samogitia, Łuck (Lutsk), Przemyśl and Chełm. The bishops present at the court, such as Bishop of Chełmno, Chancellor Jakub Zadzik or Bishop of Kamieniec Paweł Piasecki, made less frequent contact with the nuncio by letter. The bishops only sporadically addressed political issues in their letters and this was connected with the preparation for the *sejm*. Some hierarchs were interested in the Brest Union and referred to it in their letters. Most often, however, the bishops raised in their correspondence the issues of nominations for benefices, problems related to the discipline of the diocesan clergy and the issues of dispensations and facultates. The bishops' contact with the nuncio therefore concerned in the vast majority of cases ecclesiastical matters and the secular functions of hierarchs, as senators of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, only occasionally marked their presence in correspondence with the papal ambassadors.

KEYWORDS: Papal diplomacy; Correspondence of nuncio; Roman Catholic bishops; Church Elites; Antonio Santa Croce.

In research on the history of the Polish nunciature for several decades there has been a period of intensive editorial work initiated by the Polish Historical Institute in Rome, acting under the inspiration of Prof. Karolina Lanckorońska and according to the principles developed by Rev. Prof. Henryk Damian Wojtyśka. In the mid 1990s, the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences took over the task of editing the correspondence of apostolic nuncios in Poland and continues it at present. The editions of subsequent volumes of *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae* (ANP) are accompanied by numerous monographs and analytical studies based on the edited materials. The current recapitulation of these works was a scientific conference organized by the Polish Academy of Arts in 2019, the output of which appeared in print in 2020¹. This recapitulation led to the creation of a restrained balance sheet of the work done so far, showing above all the need for further research and development of spaces still little explored. This text is a modest attempt at a reconnaissance of an issue that has been little known so far due to a lack of adequate source material. The undersigned take up the subject of the nuncio's contacts with the local Roman Catholic hierarchy².

1 *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata w epoce nowożytnej i XX wieku. Zbiór studiów*, eds. Krzysztof Ożóg and Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: PAU, 2020).

2 It is worth noting that Polish nunciatures in their research attempted a prosopographical approach to the Polish episcopate based on the correspondence of papal diplomats: for example, see Jan Kopiec, "Nuncjusze papiescy o senacie



In the volumes of *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae* concerning the period 1572–1648 published so far, correspondence between nuncios and bishops has appeared sporadically. Only in the volume devoted to nuncio Germanico Malaspina, prepared by Leszek Jarmański, can we find 29 such letters – 7 written to the Nuncio and 22 sent by him³. Most of these valuable finds (20) come from a manuscript containing registers of Malaspina's outgoing correspondence from the time of his Polish nunciature, held in Rome's Biblioteca Vallicelliana⁴. 5 letters from Primate Stanisław Karnkowski, on the other hand, are known from registers recorded in a volume owned by the Library of PAN-PAU in Cracow⁵. Jarmański found 2 letters from the nuncio to Bishop of Cuiavia Hieronim Rozrażewski in the Diocesan Archives in Włocławek⁶. The other 2 letters from Rozrażewski and Wawrzyniec Gościński, Bishop of Przemyśl, "wandered" into the files of the nunciature kept in the *Fondo Borghese* of *Archivio Apostolico Vaticano*⁷. This fascinating material was discussed in the introduction to the above-mentioned volume, but necessarily in a rather perfunctory manner⁸ and never became the basis for separate analyses.

In other volumes of the ANP from the period 1572–1648, correspondence with bishops does not appear at all⁹, or we find isolated examples of it, such as 4 letters from Bishop Stanisław Łubieński in the volume on Antonio Santa Croce and 8 more from the same hierarch in the volume on the nunciature of Honorato Visconti¹⁰. For the sake of order, we should also mention four letters from Vincenzo Lauro to Polish bishops collected from scattered sources¹¹, as well as one letter from the Archbishop of Gniezno Jan Wężyk, which "wandered" into the files of the nunciature of Mario Filonardi¹².

The continuation of research into the mission of Antonio Santa Croce opens up new possibilities for the analysis of the Polish nuncio's contacts with the local Latin hierarchy.¹³ In connection with the preparation for publication of the second volume of the correspondence of this nunciature, a very

Rzeczypospolitej", in *Senat w Polsce*, eds. Krystyn Matwijowki and Jan Pietrzak (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1993), 148–157; Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, "Elita polityczna Rzeczypospolitej w świetle "ankiety personalnej" nuncjusza Honorata Viscontiego", in *Władza i prestiż. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI-XVIII wieku*, eds. Jerzy Urwanowicz and Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2003), 125–137; Tadeusz Fitych, "Obraz biskupów polskich w oczach nuncjuszów papieskich z połowie XVII wieku", in *Od Kijowa do Rzymu. Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej ze Stolicą Apostolską i Ukrainą*, eds. Dariusz R. Drozdowski, Wojciech Walczak and Katarzyna Wiszowata-Walczak (Białystok: Instytut Badań nad Dziedzictwem Kulturowym Europy, 2012), 469–509.

3 ANP, t. XV: *Germanicus Malaspina (1591–1598)*, vol. 1: (1 XII 1591–31 XII 1592), ed. Leszek Jarmański (Cracoviae: Academia Scientiarum et Litterarum Polona, 2000), 136, 172, 254, 255, 266, 268, 269, 277, 292, 301, 303, 304, 305, 314, 334, 336, 341, 349, 353, 360, 363, 380, 382, 284, 285, 413, 416.

4 Biblioteca Vallicelliana, L. 18, f. II, c. 8–24v.

5 BPAN, 1884, n. 486, 496, 497, 498, 500.

6 Archive of the Bishops of Kuyavia and Pomerania, *Acta Episcoporum*, 11, ff. 320, 321.

7 AAV, *Fondo Borghese*, III 18, ff. 35v–36; III 96 D, f. 209.

8 ANP, t. XV/1, XXXI–XXXII.

9 ANP, t. XVIII: *Franciscus Simonetta (1606–1612)*, vol. 1: (21 VI 1606–30 IX 1607), ed. Wojciech Tygielski (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1990); ANP, t. XXII: *Giovanni Battista Lancellotti (1622–1627)*, vol. 1: (12 XI 1622–29 IV 1623), ed. Tadeusz Fitych (Cracoviae: Academia Scientiarum et Litterarum Polona, 2001); ANP, t. XXV: *Marius Filonardi (1635–1643)*, vol. 1: (12 II 1635–29 X 1636), ed. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel (Cracoviae: Academia Scientiarum et Litterarum Polona, 2003).

10 ANP, t. XXIII: *Antonio Santa Croce (1627–1630)*, vol. 1: (1 III 1627–29 VII 1628), ed. Henryk Litwin (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1996) 16, 182, 194, 215, and ANP, t. XXIV: *Honoratus Visconti (1630–1636)*, vol. 1: (20 IV 1630–26 VII 1631), ed. Wojciech Biliński (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1992) 60, 185, 187, 224, 254, 283, 316, 318; all these letters from both volumes have been taken from manuscript 157 II of the Library of the National Ossoliński Institute.

11 ANP, t. IX: *Vincentius Lauro (1572–1578)*, vol. 1: (25 VII 1572–30 IX 1574), eds. Mirosław Korolko and Henryk D. Wojtyska, (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1994), 213, 270, 296, 340, published on the basis of AAV, *Segreteria Stato. Polonia*, vol. 396, f. 61.

12 ANP, t. XXV: *Marius Filonardi (1635–1643)*, vol. 2: (1 XI 1636–31 X 1637), ed. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel (Cracoviae: Academia Scientiarum et Litterarum Polona, 2006), 66.

13 For more on A. Santa Croce, see Alberto Tanturri, "Santacroce Antonio", in DBI, vol. 90 (2017); Henryk Litwin, *De Antonio Santa Croce nuntio eiusque sociis*, in ANP t. XXIII/1; Henryk Litwin, *Chwała Północy. Rzeczpospolita w polityce Stolicy Apostolskiej 1598–1648* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 2018), 224–27.

interesting collection of documents has been explored, which includes 837 original letters addressed to the nuncio in 1629. These materials can be found in folder n. 774 of the *Archivio Santacroce*, complex stored in the *Archivio di Stato* in Rome. Among other things, there are 103 letters from Polish Roman Catholic bishops. 22 of them from January through March 1629 will be included in the above-mentioned edition of the second volume of the nunciature of Antonio Santa Croce prepared by the undersigned, which appear in print in 2021¹⁴. However, it is already worthwhile to take a look at the whole of this collection and to subject it to at least a preliminary analysis. A complete list of the bishops' letters is given in the table below¹⁵.

Surname and first name	Bishopric	Date	Location	Language	Nr.
Wołłowicz Eustachy	EP. Vilmensis	1629.01.04	Di Besdesa	It.	1
Grochowski Achacy	EP. Luceoriensis	1629.01.05	Janoviae	Lat.	2
Woyna Abraham	EP. Samogitiae	1629.01.07	Miednices	Lat.	3
Nowodworski Adam	EP. Praemyliensis	1629.02.06	Brzozoviae	Lat.	4
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.02.12	Kielciis	Lat.	5
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.02.18	Kielciis	Lat.	6
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.02.19	Kielciis	Lat.	7
Nowodworski Adam	EP. Praemyliensis	1629.02.20	Brzozoviae	Lat.	8
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.03.11	Squiernieviciis	Lat.	9
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.03.07	Kielciis	Lat.	10
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.03.07	Squiernieviciis	Lat.	11
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.03.08	Kielciis	Lat.	12
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.03.09	Kielciis	Lat.	13
Lipski Andrzej	EP. Vladislaviensis	1629.03.14	Volboriae	Lat.	14
Woyna Abraham	EP. Samogitiae	1629.03.15	Vornis	Lat.	15
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.03.16	Viscoviae	Lat.	16
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.03.19	Squiernieviciis	Lat.	17
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.03.20	Viscoviae	Lat.	18
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.03.27	Squiernieviciis	Lat.	19
Tyszkiewicz Jerzy	EP. Suff. Vilmensis	1629.03.28	Vilnae	Lat.	20
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.03.29	Brocoviae	Lat.	21
Konieczpolski Remigian	EP. Chelmensis	1629.03.31	Cumoviae	Lat.	22
Konieczpolski Remigian	EP. Chelmensis	1629.04.01	Cumoviae	Lat.	23
Lipski Andrzej	EP. Vladislaviensis	1629.04.14	Vladislaviae	Lat.	24
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.04.14	Lovicii	Lat.	25
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.04.20	Lubluni	Lat.	26
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.04.21	Lovicii	Lat.	27
Próchnicki Jan Andrzej	AEPP. Leopoliensis	1629.04.28	Leopoli	Lat.	28
Próchnicki Jan Andrzej	AEPP. Leopoliensis	1629.04.28	Leopoli	Lat.	29
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.05.02	Lovicii	Lat.	30
Konieczpolski Remigian	EP. Chelmensis	1629.05.02	In curia Cumoviensi	Lat.	31
Tyszkiewicz Jerzy	EP. Suff. Vilmensis	1629.05.03	Vilnae	Lat.	32
Lipski Andrzej	EP. Vladislaviensis	1629.05.04	Vladislaviae	Lat.	33
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.05.04	Lovicii	Lat.	34

¹⁴ ANP, t. XXIII/2.

¹⁵ Name of bishopric given in Latin; place of dating given according to source text.

Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.05.08	Lublina	Lat.	35
Woyna Abraham	EP. Samogitiae	1629.05.09	Vilnae	Lat.	36
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.05.11	Lovicii	Lat.	37
Lipski Andrzej	EP. Vladislaviensis	1629.05.15	Vladislaviae	Lat.	38
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.05.15	In Wałowice	Lat.	39
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.05.16	Lovicii	Lat.	40
Schenking Otto	EP. Vendensis	1629.05.20	Suleoviae	Lat.	41
Nowodworski Adam	EP. Praemyliensis	1629.05.25	Brzozoviae	Lat.	42
Lipski Andrzej	EP. Vladislaviensis	1629.05.28	Vladislaviae	Lat.	43
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.05.30	Ilzae	Lat.	44
Łubieński Maciej	EP. Posnaniensis	1629.06.01	Posnaniae	Lat.	45
Śladkowski Abraham	EP. Suff. Chelmensis	1629.06.05	Lublina	Lat.	46
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.06.07	Ilzae	Lat.	47
Wołowicz Eustachy	EP. Vilmensis	1629.06.08	Di Vilna	It.	48
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.06.09	Ilzae	Lat.	49
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.06.15	Lovicii	Lat.	50
Wołowicz Eustachy	EP. Vilmensis	1629.06.27	Vilnae	Lat.	51
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.06.29	Lovicii	Lat.	52
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.07.02	Lovicii	Lat.	53
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.07.08	Lovicii	Lat.	54
Łubieński Maciej	EP. Posnaniensis	1629.07.12	Ciążimi	Lat.	55
Baykowski Jan	EP. Suff. Posnaniensis	1629.07.19	Posnaniae	Lat.	56
Woyna Abraham	EP. Samogitiae	1629.07.21	Olsadio	Lat.	57
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.07.23	Lovicii	Lat.	58
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.07.27	Lovicii	Lat.	59
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.07.29	Cracoviae	Lat.	60
Lipski Andrzej	EP. Vladislaviensis	1629.07.29	Chocii	Lat.	61
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.07.30	Lovicii	Lat.	62
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.08.02	Kielciis	Lat.	63
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.08.03	Brocovio	Lat.	64
Grochowski Achacy	EP. Luceoriensis	1629.08.06	Janoviae	Lat.	65
Wołowicz Eustachy	EP. Vilmensis	1629.08.10	Vilnae	Lat.	66
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.08.15	Brocovio	Lat.	67
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.08.20	Lovicii	Lat.	68
Konieczpolski Remigian	EP. Chelmensis	1629.08.20	Andreoviae	Lat.	69
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.08.22	Lovicii	Lat.	70
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.08.23	Pultovio	Lat.	71
Tyszkiewicz Jerzy	EP. Suff. Vilmensis	1629.08.23	Vilnae	Lat.	72
Zadzik Jakub	EP. Culmensis	1629.08.24	ex Castris ad Granfeltum	Lat.	73
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.08.28	Lovicii	Lat.	74
Wołowicz Eustachy	EP. Vilmensis	1629.09.04	Di Vilna	It.	75
Piasecki Paweł	EP. Camenecensis	1629.09.07	Di Varsavia	It.	76
Grochowski Achacy	EP. Luceoriensis	1629.09.08	Janoviae	Lat.	77
Wołowicz Eustachy	EP. Vilmensis	1629.09.12	Di Vilna	It.	78

Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.09.17	Słavcoviae	Lat.	79
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.09.18	Słavcoviae	Lat.	80
Nowodworski Adam	EP. Praemyliensis	1629.09.20	Brzozoviae	Lat.	81
Grochowski Achacy	EP. Luceoriensis	1629.09.20	Janoviae	Lat.	82
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.09.24	Pultoviae	Lat.	83
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.09.24	Kielciis	Lat.	84
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.09.25	Kielciis	Lat.	85
Woyna Abraham	EP. Samogitiae	1629.09.29	Vilnae	Lat.	86
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.10.05	Lovicii	Lat.	87
Łubieński Maciej	EP. Posnaniensis	1629.10.08	Łubnae	Lat.	88
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.10.21	A Bozentin	It.	89
Łubieński Maciej	EP. Posnaniensis	1629.10.21	Ciążimi	Lat.	90
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.11.11	Kielciis	Lat.	91
Lipski Andrzej	EP. Vladislaviensis	1629.11.21	Volboriae	Lat.	92
Nowodworski Adam	EP. Praemyliensis	1629.11.24	Brzozoviae	Lat.	93
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.11.28	Varsaviae	Lat.	94
Konieczpolski Remigian	EP. Chelmensis	1629.11.29	Cumoviae	Lat.	95
Zadzik Jakub	EP. Culmensis	1629.12.01	Varsaviae	Lat.	96
Grochowski Achacy	EP. Luceoriensis	1629.12.02	Janoviae	Lat.	97
Zadzik Jakub	EP. Culmensis	1629.12.13	In villa Jablonna	Lat.	98
Grochowski Achacy	EP. Luceoriensis	1629.12.19	Janoviae	Lat.	99
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.12.19	Squiernieviciis	Lat.	100
Łubieński Stanisław	EP. Plocensis	1629.12.21	Viscovio	Lat.	101
Szyszkowski Marcin	EP. Cracoviensis	1629.12.23	Cracoviae	Lat.	102
Wężyk Jan	AEPP. Gnesnensis	1629.12.26	Squiernieviciis	Lat.	103

These 103 letters from bishops of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth probably do not constitute the complete set of their correspondence addressed to the nuncio in 1629. This is because file 774 is an example of the rather careless work of the nuncio's chancellery. Secretarial annotations are extremely rare here. The letters were not arranged chronologically and were not paginated. It is known from other sources that the folder contained only some letters sent to the nuncio by the Secretariat of State and the Congregation for *Propaganda Fide*¹⁶, which are known from the registers. It must have been the same with the correspondence from other addressees. It is therefore difficult to assess the completeness of the collection in question. However, it must be assumed that it is high and that we have at our disposal material which illustrates in a panoramic way the problem of the nuncio's relations with bishops.

As the list presented in the table shows, almost all ordinary bishops operating in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth maintained with the nuncio correspondence contact. For obvious reasons, the sender does not include the nominal Bishop of Varmia, i.e. Prince John Albert Vasa, who was still a minor at that time. The second lack is more difficult to explain because it concerns Bishop Bogusław Radoszewski of Kyiv, who was a very active hierarch and devoted to missionary matters and support for the union¹⁷, which was, after all, an important object of interest for the nuncio. It is possible that most of the letters related to the Union and missionary issues were kept separately¹⁸. The remaining

¹⁶ Henryk Litwin, "Krag korespondentów nuncjusza Antonio Santa Croce w świetle zbioru listy otrzymanych w roku 1629", in *Nuncjatura Apostolska w Rzeczypospolitej*, eds. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel and Katarzyna Wiszowata-Walczak (Białystok: Benkowski Publishing & Balloons, 2012), 224.

¹⁷ Krzysztof R. Prokop, *Biskupi kijowscy obrządku łacińskiego XIV–XVIII w. Szkice biograficzne* (Białe Dunajce-Ostróg: Ośrodek "Wołanie z Wołynia", 2003), 62-5.

¹⁸ Litwin, "Krag korespondentów", 224.

14 ordinary bishops were the authors of 98 letters. Five more units of correspondence are due to 3 auxiliary bishops.

For the most part, the ordinary bishops maintained regular correspondence with the nuncio. The most active were two hierarchs whose position within the episcopate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was particularly strong: the Primate, Archbishop of Gniezno Jan Wężyk, and Bishop of Cracow Marcin Szyszkowski. We note that their number of letters amounted to 23 and 21 respectively. So both bishops wrote to the nuncio on average once every two weeks. The intensity of contacts between the remaining bishops and the papal envoy was somewhat lower and basically comparable: Stanisław Łubieński, Bishop of Płock, sent 9 letters, Andrzej Lipski, Bishop of Cuiavia – 7, Eustachy Wołłowicz, Bishop of Wilno and Achacy Grochowski, Bishop of Łuck sent 6 letters each to the nuncio, Abraham Woyna, Bishop of Samogitia, Adam Nowodworski, Bishop of Przemyśl and Remigian Koniecpolski, Bishop of Chełm sent 5 letters each, while Maciej Łubieński, Bishop of Poznań sent 4 letters. The frequency of letter contacts with the nuncio of the Bishops of Chełmno Jakub Zadzik and Kamieniec Paweł Piasecki was low (3 and 1 letters respectively). At that time Zadzik held the office of the Deputy Chancellor of the Crown, while Piasecki was appointed a resident senator by the *sejm* of 1629. Both of them therefore spent most of the year in Warsaw and had the opportunity to have direct contacts with the papal representation. Their letters come mainly from the period when Antonio Santa Croce left Warsaw in fear of the plague (20 October–20 December 1629)¹⁹. Only one letter from Otto Schenking, Bishop of Wenden (Cēsis), has survived. It is clear from its contents that this was the first attempt by the hierarch to contact the nuncio, even though he had held the office of bishop for a long time (1593) and resided permanently in the Sulejów abbey, not too far from Warsaw. The matters of the small diocese, almost entirely occupied by the Swedes in 1629, apparently did not require frequent contact. Also, noticeable is the small number of letters (only 2) from the Archbishop of Lviv Jan Andrzej Próchnicki, a person who was strongly involved in the 1629 matter of the so-called “unification council” between the Union and Orthodoxy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was of vital importance to the nuncio. This may be another argument in favor of the hypothesis that the letters concerning the union issues were collected separately and therefore the vast majority of them are missing from the already mentioned file 774 of the *Archivio Santacroce*.

Letters from auxiliary bishops are found sporadically in the collection – one from each of the sufragans of Poznań (Jan Baykowski) and Chełm (Abraham Śladkowski), and 3 from Jerzy Tyszkiewicz of Vilnius, who was one of the nuncio’s most important “experts” in matters of the union and relations with the Orthodox Church, and probably corresponded with Antonio Santa Croce more often than the letters in file 774 suggest.

Let us now turn to the subject of the bishops’ letters to the nuncio. When starting this analysis, it should be noted that in the majority of letters (96 out of 103 in total), the senders (apart from numerous courteous works) deal only with one issue. Only 2 letters dealt with three separate issues, and another 5 with two issues each. In total, 112 issues are raised in 103 letters. Three thematic circles of letters to the nuncio can be distinguished.

Most often, the bishops wrote about matters related to the papal ambassador’s decision-making abilities, resulting from the *facultates* granted to him and the powers defined in the instructions of the Secretariat of State and the Congregation for *Propaganda Fide*. A total of 52 such matters were raised, most often – in 19 cases – related to the nuncio’s prosecutorial and judicial functions. It should be recalled here that in accordance with the powers vested in him, the papal representative was authorized to conduct investigations and trials against disobedient and wicked clergy, to settle disputes in appellate instances in matters in any way falling under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and to impose, but also to release from ecclesiastical penalties²⁰. In the bishops’ letters of 1629, cases of disobedient priests in dispute with the

19 In a letter dated 20 October, Santa Croce informed the Secretariat of State about the plague and his departure from the capital. For the next two months, the nuncio stayed in the provinces on the estates of the Mazovian nobility, and then at the royal residence in Nieporęt, before finally returning to Warsaw and staying at the residence of Jan Wężyk. Barberini, Warsaw 20 December 1629, AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol 42, ff. 121r–22r.

20 For a summary of the *facultates* of Antonio Santa Croce see ANP, t. XXIII/1, 9; they were identical in content to the earlier *facultates* of Vincenzo Lauro, see ANP, t. IX/1, 89–98; the same *faculties* were granted to Antonio Santa Croce’s

bishops appear frequently. Some of them were chronic and returned to the nuncio several times, such as the dispute of Bishop of Chełm Remigian Koniecpolski with his suffragan Abraham Śladkowski²¹, the persistent efforts of the Bishop of Samogitia Abraham Woyna to punish the recalcitrant canon of the Samogitian chapter Mikolaj Powetrius²², or the efforts of the Bishop of Łuck Achacy Grochowski to punish the disobedient parish priest Stanisław Urbanowicz²³. Several cases involved conflicts between laymen and clergymen, for example, over patronage (collation) or disputed rights to own a private chapel²⁴. The expectations of the nuncio to settle disputes over benefices and endowments, including those between diocesan and monastic clergy, were also frequent²⁵.

In addition to jurisdictional matters, the nuncio had the power to grant certain benefices connected with lower church offices and endowed with limited income.²⁶ In practice, this concerned some rectories in specific dioceses. Five times during the year 1629 the bishops turned to Antonio Santa Croce asking for the nomination of certain persons or requesting that the nuncio give them the right to appoint a parish priest in certain parishes²⁷.

A relatively common topic addressed by the hierarchy was the solicitation of dispensations. The nuncio had the authority to dispense from obstacles to priestly ordination and church benefices. In relation to the laity – to dispense from some obstacles to the sacrament of marriage²⁸. The bishops' correspondence more often concerned marriage dispensations for the laity (6 cases)²⁹ than exemptions from obstacles for the clergy (3 cases)³⁰. Hierarchs applied for both kind treatment of the affluent persons of that time (efforts of several bishops for a marriage dispensation for Stanisław Przyjemski, general *starosta* of Wielkopolska), and the little ones (a request of Archbishop Jan Wężyk in the case of Adam Wąsz, a shoemaker from Krzepice)³¹. The requests for dispensations for the clergy concerned the exemption from the obstacle of physical defects and combining benefices.

Facultates of the nuncio also provided for the possibility of granting certain special powers to the clergy – to grant indulgences and privileges³². 6 letters from bishops dealt with such matters. They were related to the granting of two types of authority – *absolvendi ab haeresis* and the consecration of church rooms, paintings and other church equipment. They were to be granted to diocesan priests selected by the bishops³³. We find only letters with requests for granting the powers. No thanks for arranging such requests were present. However, it is hard to doubt that this is a matter of chance. According to the papal nominative brief, matters of this kind should have been handled routinely. This is apparently how the bishops treated them, justifying their requests rather perfunctorily and generally with the needs of the diocese.

In the first half of the seventeenth century, a great deal of attention from the Holy See was focused

predecessor, Giovanni Battista Lancellotti. They have been discussed at length by Fr. Tadeusz Fitych in his work: *Struktura i funkcjonowanie nuncjatury Giovanniego Battisty Lancellottiego (1622–1627)* (Opole: Wyd. Świętego Krzyża w Opolu, 2005); for matters of orchard powers see pages 130–32.

- 21 The letters we refer to here are contained in a folder whose pages are unpaginated. For these reasons, we give the numbers of the letters in the footnotes from the index we publish here. N. 46, 69, 95.
- 22 N. 3, 15, 36, 86.
- 23 N. 2.
- 24 N. 13, 19, 48, 65, 77, 81.
- 25 N. 18, 21, 83, 88.
- 26 ANP, t. XXIII/1, 9; Fitych, *Struktura i funkcjonowanie*, 138–40.
- 27 N. 30, 34, 45, 66, 92.
- 28 ANP, t. XXIII/1, 9; Fitych, *Struktura i funkcjonowanie*, 133–38.
- 29 N. 11, 23, 55, 56, 58, 68.
- 30 N. 4, 23, 39,
- 31 N. 11, 55, 56, 58, 68.
- 32 ANP, t. XXIII/1, 9, Fitych, *Struktura i funkcjonowanie*, 141–44.
- 33 N. 22, 23, 35, 37, 42, 47.

on the reform of religious orders, especially mendicant ones. Nuncios at this time were usually given the authority to visit and reform monasteries³⁴, and their instructions included specific indications of actions that should be taken with regard to particular orders³⁵. Antonio Santa Croce's predecessor Giovanni Battista Lancellotti even received detailed instructions from Gregory XV on the difficult question of reform in the family of Franciscan orders³⁶. The Archbishop of Seleucia was also furnished with special recommendations in the form of instructions from the Congregation of *Propaganda Fide*³⁷. His correspondence on religious matters with representatives of individual congregations, visitators, general superiors in Rome, etc., is very abundant and probably worthy of a separate study. Here we will only note that the nuncio's interest in religious matters must have been known to the bishops, because they not infrequently raised this type of issue (7 letters). The Ordinary of Cracow, Marcin Szyszkowski, devoted as many as three of his letters to the scandalous incidents in the Cracow convent of the Conventual Franciscans, where the friars did not accept the prior assigned to them by the Provincial, and where the unfortunate candidate was thrown into a riot and beaten³⁸. Earlier the same hierarch had dedicated a letter to the reform of the same order³⁹. Bishop Eustachy Wołłowicz of Vilnius and his suffragan Bishop Jerzy Tyszkiewicz wrote to the nuncio about the need to send an inspector to the Lithuanian Bernardines.⁴⁰ In turn, Archbishop Jan Wężyk shared with the nuncio his thoughts about the excessive concentration of monasteries of mendicant orders in his main residence town of Łowicz⁴¹. Another important task of the nuncio, described in the documents initiating his mission, was to support the development of the Union of Brest. In this regard, the Congregation for *Propaganda Fide* prepared for Antonio Santa Croce specific, though perhaps not very detailed, recommendations in two special instructions (*instructio particularis*)⁴². The Archbishop of Seleucia delved into matters of care for the Uniate Church with commitment. Especially in 1629, when a "unification synod" of Greek Catholics and Orthodox was being planned, he devoted much attention to them, and his correspondence on these matters was very extensive. The undersigned will devote a separate analysis to this issue, and in this text we only draw attention to the bishops' consideration of the union theme (6 letters). At the end of the 1620s, the main "specialist" in matters of the union in the Roman Catholic episcopate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a Suffragan Bishop of Vilnius Jerzy Tyszkiewicz. His 3 letters of 1629 addressed to Antonio Santa Croce concerned the preparations for the aforementioned joint synod of Uniates and Orthodox⁴³, which ultimately did not take place due to the nuncio's objections. This issue was also addressed in a letter by Jakub Zadzik⁴⁴, who was at the same time Bishop of Chełmno and Great Crown Chancellor, and in this case appeared rather in the latter capacity. The other two letters concerning the union issue came from Primate Jan Wężyk⁴⁵ and were his reaction to the papal brief received in May 1629 with an appeal for support for the Greek Catholic Church. A separate and important package of correspondence concerned matters related to the nuncio's role as an intermediary between the country of office and the Holy See. Such matters were mentioned in

34 For the Antonio Santa Croce, see ANP, t. XXIII/1, 9; for commentary on typical powers in this regard, see, Fitych, *Struktura i funkcjonowanie*, 129-30.

35 See, for example, General Instruction to nuncio Cosimo de Torres, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregor XV für die Nuntien und Gesandten an den europäischen Fürstenthöfen, 1621-1623*, t. 2, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1997), 700-01.

36 Fitych, *Struktura i funkcjonowanie*, 185-87, 702-04.

37 ANP, t. XXIII/1, 3-7.

38 N. 80, 84, 85.

39 N. 49.

40 N. 72, 75.

41 N. 54.

42 ANP, t. XXIII/1, 3, 6.

43 N. 20, 32, 72.

44 N. 73.

45 N. 37, 40.

39 letters from bishops. Definitely, the most frequent – 21 – were various appeals for support in the matters related to staffing of benefices reserved for the Pope. Most of them (14) concerned canons in diocesan chapters. In addition, bishops asked for support for requests to appoint an auxiliary bishop in their diocese (2), to grant a rectory (2), an abbey (2) or a collegiate canonry (1)⁴⁶. The nuncio was also asked to recommend the granting of powers to clergy in cases belonging to papal competence (3 letters)⁴⁷. In 1629 Primate Wężyk sought the privilege of the provost of Strzelno to wear a mitre and asked the nuncio for support⁴⁸. There were also requests for assistance in contacting the curial circles in Rome in connection with the correspondence or planned travel (3 letters)⁴⁹.

The letters sent by the nuncio to the bishops in August 1629, reminding them of their obligation to visit *ad limina apostolorum*, fall into the same category. Antonio Santa Croce probably sent such a disciplinary summons to all the Ordinaries. The responses of five of them have survived, including that of Primate Wężyk, whose letter generally explained the situation of the hierarchs in the archdiocese by pointing out that the pontificates of most of them lasted less than four years, after which a visit was required, and that, in addition, the war with Sweden and the war in Italy were ongoing, so that the time for the performance of the duty was inconvenient⁵⁰. Bishops from Poznań, Płock, Łuck, and Przemyśl also invoked similar arguments in their letters, but they declared their readiness to travel if their arguments were not understood by the nuncio and Rome⁵¹.

Another group of letters in this category is related to the efforts of Sigismund III Vasa to grant the cardinal dignity to a candidate proposed by him – the previous nuncio Giovanni Battista Lancellotti – which was received with dissatisfaction in Rome. The correspondence on this subject between Antonio Santa Croce and the Secretariat of State was very abundant and lasted for almost the entire mission in Poland⁵². The bishops' letters of 1629 (6) were related to the final stage of the affair, when the cardinal's hat was finally placed on the head of the nuncio in Warsaw, not Lancellotti's but Santa Croce's. Bishops Wężyk, Szyszkowski, Zadzik and Grochowski took note of this finale with goodwill. Paweł Piasecki's letter was written even before the news about the cardinal's post reached Warsaw; moreover, its sender had supported the King earlier in his endeavours for Lancellotti.

Santa Croce also acted as an intermediary, at the request of the Pope, to help a Georgian mission led by Father Nicefor Irubakidze, which was passing through the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth on its way back from Rome. It went to Lviv, where it was helped by the local Archbishop Jan Andrzej Próchnicki, who informed the nuncio about it in his letter⁵³.

Finally, let us look at the third category of letters, related not so much to the nuncio's competencies as to his obvious interest in the internal politics of his country of office and current events that might have affected the situation of the Church in the Commonwealth. 21 letters of this kind can be identified. Only 2 of them (from Wężyk and Wołłowicz) concern matters related to the *sejm*⁵⁴, and there were 2 in 1629. Surprisingly few, considering the rather numerous presence of bishops at both *sejms*. As many as seven hierarchs took part in the January–February one, and four⁵⁵ in the November one. Apparently

46 N. 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 21, 24, 25, 31, 33, 38, 41, 43, 57, 59, 60, 66, 70, 74, 92.

47 N. 31, 62, 68.

48 N. 62.

49 N. 9, 50, 51.

50 N. 50.

51 N. 71, 82, 90, 93.

52 For more on this see Litwin, *Chwała Północy*, 226–27; Tadeusz Fitych, "Rekomendacje Zygmunta III Waza w sprawie kardynałatu Giovanni Battista Lancellotti nuncjusza apostolskiego w Polsce w latach 1622–1627", *Nasza Przyszłość*, vol. 91 (1999): 171–206.

53 N. 28.

54 N. 1, 100.

55 Anna Filipczak-Kocur, *Sejm zwyczajny z roku 1629* (Warszawa: PWN, 1979), 102–04; Jan Seredyka, "Senatorowie Rzeczypospolitej na sejmach 1629–1632", *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej im. Powstańców Śląskich w Opolu*, History XVI (1979): 44–5.

the custom of pre-sejm “retreats” of bishops with the nuncio by letter did not catch on. Perhaps it was replaced by personal meetings during the Sejm. The bishops more often discussed matters related to sessions of the Crown Tribunal than sejm sessions. 4 letters informing about tribunals concerning disputes between the clergy and the laity can be identified, and their authors were twice the Primate and Szyszkowski and Woyna⁵⁶. 4 letters from the Bishop of Cracow were also related to the issue of interference between the clergy and the laity, informing the nuncio about actions taken by the secular authorities to free a nun who had been kidnapped from a monastery in Milan and held in Silesia⁵⁷.

The subject of the bishops’ correspondence was relatively often the war with the Swedes and the damage it caused to the state and the church (5 letters). This issue received most attention from Stanisław Łubieński, Bishop of Płock, who referred to the Swedish War three times in his letters⁵⁸. This was natural, since the Diocese of Płock was adjacent to the war theater and even a part of it. The Bishop of Wenden, Otto Schenking, who was the most severely affected by the actions of the Swedes, also devoted an extensive elaboration to these matters⁵⁹. The Primate also wrote to the papal envoy about the damage caused to the church by the war with the Protestant enemy. Among current events, the plague attracted the most attention of the bishops. This tragedy took place all over the country and claimed more victims than the war. We learn about its effects from 6 letters sent by the bishops of Cracow (2 letters), Płock (2 letters), Chełmno and Łuck⁶⁰.

In conclusion, the problem of cooperation between apostolic nuncio residing on the Vistula River and the hierarchs of the Roman Catholic Church in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the modern era has not yet been studied by historians, mainly due to a lack of extant source material. The compilation of a collection of letters received by nuncio Antonio Santa Croce in 1629, stored in the *Archivio di Stato di Roma* in the section *Archivio Santacroce* in volume 774, opens new avenues of research in this regard. The volume in question contains 103 letters sent by Polish Roman Catholic bishops to the titular Archbishop of Seleucia. Although the collection itself does not contain any letters from the nuncio to the bishops, the content analysis of the preserved material allows us to find traces of such letters. A review of the correspondence leads to the conclusion that the subject of the contacts between the hierarchs of the Polish Church and the papal envoy was primarily ecclesiastical matters closely related to his judicial, procedural and dispensational powers, or the mediation between Warsaw and Rome in such matters. Most frequently, the issues discussed the distribution of benefices and trials before the nunciature’s court. Intrapolitical issues appeared in the correspondence much less frequently – in practice only in cases where there was a clash between the interests of laymen and ecclesiastical subjects. It is symptomatic of the fact that most of the letters concern current affairs and that the mentioned volume lacks any trace of more or less regular reports to the papal envoy on the state of particular dioceses. The problem of contacts and cooperation of papal representatives with the hierarchs of the Roman Catholic Church in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in early modern times still awaits a reliable study. This publication, according to the authors’ assumption, aims at showing the cognitive possibilities of the analysis of source materials connected with the papal diplomatic service.

56 N. 7, 27, 36, 53.

57 N. 5, 26, 44, 63.

58 N. 16, 41, 61, 64, 67.

59 N. 41.

60 N. 89, 91, 94, 96, 97, 101.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANP: *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, t. I-LVII (Romae/Cracoviae: 1990–2021).

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

BPAN: Biblioteka Naukowa PAN i PAU–Kraków.

DBI: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 100 vols (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Treccani, 1960–2020, 100).

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NEWS AGENTS AND POSTMASTERS: BACKGROUND FIGURES OR ACTIVE DIPLOMATS?

ABSTRACT

The present study aims to examine the vital role of the postal and news infrastructure in the seventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania. The main scope of the article is to investigate what role postmasters and newsagents played in diplomatic structures by using the concept of the Black Chamber office. Emphasis is especially laid on diplomatic activities of postmasters and newsagents of Gdańsk, including their active networking, contacts with the Royal Family, the representative role of their residences as well as the intelligence activities. Finally, the article discusses the centralization of the royal power through the analysis of postal activities.

KEYWORDS: Diplomat; Postmaster; The Black Chamber; Network; Commissioner.

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The timely arrival of letters allows for the well-functioning of public councils, the conduct of wars, and is necessary for prosperous commerce and trade¹.

In these words, the first Polish printed newspaper – *Merkuriusz Polski* – informed about the importance of regular postal communication due to its disruption by the postal conflict between Brandenburg-Prussia and Poland-Lithuania in 1661. According to it, public institutions, military activities as well as commerce and trade depended on timely arrival of letters. The disruption in postal communication could destabilise states, negatively influence trade as well as lead to wars. Therefore, the present study aims to examine the vital role of the postal and news infrastructure in the seventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania. The main scope of the article is to examine what role postmasters and news agents played in the diplomatic structures: if they were only extras or lead actors. A specific geographical emphasis lays on the development of the postal infrastructure in Gdańsk as it was the second, after Cracow, news hub in the Commonwealth. Finally, the article aspires to place the postal and diplomatic structures of Poland-Lithuania in a larger European context.

Traditionally, news agents and postal officers were seen in historiography as a “background” to proper diplomacy. However, a call has been recently made not only to view the diplomacy in terms of cultural transfer, but also to discuss and rehabilitate «the associated figures and processes within the diplomatic landscape including agents, spies, information-gatherers, postal officers, staff within the diplomatic household, the communication and preservation of sensitive information and the formalizing of diplomatic representation» as to follow Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, the editors of the volume *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*². Additionally, the call for the *New Diplomatic History*, which focuses on the actor-centered approach, includes even «intermediaries and “non-

¹ *Merkuriusz Polski Ekstraordynaryjny*, issue 8, 25 January 1661, 58: «Odebranie zaś wczesne listów drogę otwiera zdrowym Radom publicznym: Zwycięstwa dodaje pracom woennym: A do szczęśliwego prowadzenia pomaga Commercys i handlom». The newspaper *Merkuriusz Polski* (Extraordinary for extra issues) is digitized and available at the University of Warsaw Library's website: http://buwcd.buw.uw.edu.pl/e_zbiory/ckcp/merkuriusz/start/start.htm, accessed 12 October 2020. All translations are my own.

² *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, eds. Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 8.

state” actors [...] who facilitated diplomatic relations»³. Tracey A. Sowerby and Jan Hennings, in their introduction to the volume on the practices of diplomacy during early modern period, listed merchants, generals, missionaries and translators as such intermediaries and “non-state” actors. In such context, postmasters and news agents are not only to be seen as background actors associated with postal infrastructure itself, but also as active figures in intermediary contacts in diplomatic landscape, who organized the post, transferred the letters and also collected, gathered and published news and newspapers. Hence, their diplomatic activities could include both state functions and their own “non-state” businesses.

Unfortunately, Nadine Akkerman’s article on the postmistress Alexandrine of Taxis is the only one which discusses postal and diplomatic activities in the volume *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*⁴. But even that article does not explain how the postmistress could be called a diplomat. Akkerman presents various activities of Alexandrine of Taxis – collecting news, opening letters and creating alternative postal routes – without broader perspective on postmasters’ function in the early modern world. Indeed, many studies on the seventeenth century postmasters show that the opening and copying the news from the correspondence was a standard practice. However, Akkerman’s article on the Black Chamber office of Alexandrine of Taxis shows how the postmaster’s office could pursue its diplomatic service and own agenda. As the example of Alexandrine of Taxis’s office has shown, the postal offices gathered not only postmasters or postmistresses and their servants, but also copyists, newspapers producers, and other multilingual actors and decipherers⁵.

Therefore, this article also aims to show such local intelligence network in Gdańsk, however with greater emphasis on the diplomacy and diplomatic mission of postmasters⁶. As the place of diplomatic activity is of paramount importance, certain attention will be paid to the city of Gdańsk itself, which formally belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but in some ways was an independent hub on the Baltic coast. Undoubtedly, city’s location and character gave the city’s postmasters broad possibilities to control the correspondence coming from the western part of Europe to Poland-Lithuania and to act as arbiters in ongoing conflicts with the Commonwealth’s neighbors. To sum up, the article discusses some activities of Gdańsk postmasters and news agents which could be described as diplomatic ones, namely, active networking and contacts with the Royal family, the representative role of their residences as well as espionage activities, to follow Akkerman’s main arguments.

THE NETWORK

One may claim that an Italian intelligence network existed in Poland-Lithuania during the early modern period. It was characterized by strong bounds and group solidarity among actors of Italian descent, who served as professional experts: postmasters, royal secretaries, mint masters, traders and factors, often combining several royal and private functions⁷. Francesco Gratta (1613-1676) a Royal Postmaster in Gdańsk, and his network, which included several actors of Italian descent can be taken as an example. Gratta connected all the above-mentioned functions except for mint master, but he obviously granted credit to mints. Interestingly, the order in which he obtained his functions shows that the position of a postmaster was the primary one and allowed him and his family (Francesco’s father, Antonio Gratta was the first Royal Postmaster in Gdańsk) to establish their presence in the city, and to enlarge their personal network in Poland-Lithuania as well as other parts of Europe. Then, thanks to Gratta’s contacts with the royal family, magnates, and Italian traders in Poland-Lithuania,

3 *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c.1410–1800*, eds. Tracey A. Sowerby and Jan Hennings (London: Routledge, 2017), 3.

4 Nadine Akkerman, “The Postmistress, the Diplomat, and a Black Chamber?: Alexandrine of Taxis, Sir Balthazar Gerbier and the Power of Postal Control”, in Sowerby and Hennings, *Practices of Diplomacy*, 172–88.

5 Compare with Akkerman, “The Postmistress”, 183–84

6 Postmasters often ran diplomatic activities and even joined official diplomatic missions. See, for example, Akkerman, “The Postmistress”.

7 Wojciech Tygielski, *Włosi w Polsce XVI–XVII wieku: Utracona szansa na modernizację* (Warszawa: Więzi, 2005), 328.

the family gradually established its position not only as merchants in the city of Gdańsk, but also in the noble society of Poland-Lithuania, which resulted in their obtaining the Gdańsk citizenship, necessary to pursue trade in the city, and the Polish noble title, which was gained by the heirs of Francesco Gratta⁸.

The contacts with royal families included both secretary and representative functions. Francesco Gratta was obliged to influence the Gdańsk city magistrate not to open packages addressed to the queen. However, if Gdańsk's customs officers would open them anyway, Gratta was supposed to be there in person. Additionally, Gratta was even responsible for transferring financial supplies to the royal couple from the Gdańsk City Council. Gratta even stayed in contact with Paris-based French authorities who belonged to the royal couple network and often acted as an intermediary on various occasions⁹. This can be perceived as a network building strategy, but also as a diplomatic tactic, especially in the light of the fact that Gratta informed Paris extensively about political proceedings in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Finally, Gratta was in possession of the Jagiellonian tapestries (Pol. *arrasy królewskie*) after the abdication of the king John II Casimir Vasa, which made Gratta's family even more important in both domestic and international politics. Both the Polish *sejm* and the royal family of de Arquien¹⁰ claimed their rights to the tapestries. One might consider Gratta as a representative of the royal couple in the negotiations about the reselling of the tapestries. In addition, a fact that needs to be mentioned is that Grattas had extensive contacts with high-ranking clergymen in Poland-Lithuania and other European countries. While studying Francesco Gratta's list of debtors and creditors, one can find Evangelical and Catholic clergymen including apostolic nuncio in Cologne, Warsaw (1673-1675), and later in Vienna, cardinal Francesco Buonvisi. Surprisingly, seeing that Gratta was mostly a creditor to several actors and a funder of certain activities, e.g. mints, the fact that he was in debt to cardinal Buonvisi is extraordinary and can be connected to intermediary contacts with other Italians or actors of Italian descent¹¹. In the wake of this, Italian actors accounted for almost a half of Gratta's debtors and only 15 % of creditors¹².

Obviously, when it comes to the transfer of news as well as development of their own trade activities, postmasters had connections and well-established networks. However, their archives are not well-preserved, and the information about these connections is often based on a single document or scant information in correspondence of a third party¹³. Giacomo Fantuzzi can be taken as an example, a former auditor in the nunciature of a cardinal, who received the address to Andrea and Ottavio Tencini in the Netherlands from Gratta¹⁴. Another example is Girolamo Pinocci, who was a diplomat to the English court and had several contacts with Gratta, from postal activity and trade contacts to publishing the first printed Polish newspaper, *Merkuriusz Polski*¹⁵. It should be mentioned

8 It needs to be added that the noble family of Czartoryski took Grattas to their family's coat of arms, Michał Salamonik, *In their Majesties' Service: the Career of Francesco De Gratta (1613-1676) as Royal Servant and Trader in Gdańsk* (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2017), 109.

9 Salamonik, *In their Majesties' Service*, 130-32.

10 BOssol., ms. 11574/II, p. 53: «Przyjechał tu jeden Francuz z Paryża de Arquien, który od Króla i Rzeczypospolitej procurne eliberatorem Potopu».

11 Gratta's debt to cardinal Francesco Buonvisi was 160 florins, See ASL, AS, vol. 123, p. 198.

12 Compare the diagrams, Diagram 6: *Credit according to the actor's origin* and Diagram 7: *Debt according to the actors' origin*. Salamonik, *In their Majesties' Service*, 303.

13 See the sources about Sweden and Swedish postmasters: Heiko Droste, "The Terms of Royal Service: Post Servatnt's Finances, c. 1700", in *Connecting the Baltic Area, the Swedish Postal Century in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Heiko Droste (Huddinge, Södertörns högskola, 2011), 129. About Polish sources, see Salamonik, *In their Majesties' Service*, 48.

14 Wojciech Tygielski, "Razem czy z osobna? Procesy integracji włoskich imigrantów w Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej", *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce*, XLVIII (2004): 14.

15 Gratta may be found in Pinocci's name book: «Al Grata di Danzica [...] Al Molto Illustre Signore mio Signore et Padrone [...] il Signore Francesco Gratta Amministratore delle Regie Poste di Polonia», Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie, Archiwum Pinoccich, 29/650/25, n. 336, *Gratta*, [no date given, probably the mid-1670s], 419. About trade activity, see Salamonik, "New Times Bring New Practices: Girolamo Pinocci and Merkuriusz Polski, Handwritten Newspapers: An Alternative Medium during the Early Modern and Modern Periods", *Studia Fennica Historica*, eds. Heiko Droste and

that *Merkuriusz Polski* was also published in Italian and the Italian issues of the newspaper were sent to the papal court. Hence, it can be observed that Gratta's postal functions, and his personal contacts with Pinocci could result in, among others, postal news from Gdańsk being included in the newspaper. To sum up, Gratta's contacts with the royal family, clergy, and several Italian actors can be understood as his strategy to build a solid personal network. In conclusion, his networking actions and diplomatic activities show the interconnection of private trade activities with public functions. As the example of the Gratta's house in Gdańsk will show later, his private and public activities were tightly interconnected.

THE POST

The undisrupted transfer of letters and couriers' dispatch from country to country is the right of nations. This right not only allows, but also ensures the economic liberty [and grants] the right to a free passage to the Postmasters in times of peace ¹⁶.

The *Merkuriusz Polski* informed about the post several times during its short period of publication (January – June 1661). In 1660, the Treaty of Oliva, which ended the Second Northern War, known as the Swedish Deluge, included aspects of free transfer of letters in each country. The arrangement about postal communication was established according to the Westphalian Treaty, which laid the groundwork for establishing state postal organizations, and regulated borders between European countries. However, several months after signing the treaty of Oliva, a postal conflict arose between Poland-Lithuania and Brandenburg-Prussia. *Merkuriusz Polski* informed about the conflict in the following way:

Even if the King was not present [himself] during the entire case, he remained peaceful and seeing that the ambassador had neither the authority nor sufficient knowledge to resolve the case, he decided [...] to send his commissioners to Gdańsk and make arrangements with the electoral commissioners, in order to facilitate the free transfer of the correspondence ¹⁷.

In general, the conflict was initiated by the arrest of Gdańsk postal couriers by the Electoral officers. In the document dated to 11 November 1660, and later confirmed on 16 March 1661, Gratta is mentioned as one of the royal commissioners to negotiate resolution of the postal conflict¹⁸. One may observe that in the above quote *Merkuriusz* informs about the ambassador, who «had neither the authority nor the sufficient discernment to resolve the case» and, therefore, Gdańsk city authorities (Nicolaus von Bodeck – the mayor of the city, Fredericus Ehler – a proconsul of Gdańsk magistrate, the Adrian von den Linde, Royal Burgrave) together with Francesco Gratta, the Head Postmaster of the Royal Post in the city, were delegated to conduct the negotiations. This diplomatic mission resulted in a temporary settlement in September 1661, however, the tensions around the transmission of post between Poland-Lithuania and Brandenburg-Prussia lasted until 1698¹⁹.

Referring to Gratta's postal career, his engagement in the diplomatic mission with the Electoral officers resulted in his obtainment of the postal privilege. In this way, Francesco Gratta became the Postmaster General of Royal Prussia, Courland, Semigalia and Livonia due to his authority, diligence

Kirsti Samli-Niklander, vol. 26 (2019): 54.

16 *Merkuriusz Polski Ekstraordynaryjny*, issue 8, 25 January 1661, 57: «Przesyłanie wolne listów i wyprawianie kurierów od krainy do krainy iest liquidissimi Iuris gentium, które to prawo nie tylko pozwala, ale intuitu libertatis Commerciorum mieć che, żeby kurierzy pocztowi tempore Pacis mieli wzajemnie przejazd wolny wszędzie».

17 «Kontynuacja *Merkurjusza Polskiego*, od 14 lutego do 6 marca 1661», in Jan Sułowski, «Continuatione del Mercuria Polacco», *Rocznik Historii Czasopiśmiennictwa Polskiego*, 15/4 (1976): 398

18 Salamonik, *In Their Majesties' Service*, 171-72.

19 In 1698, the Brandenburgian postal office was reopened in Gdańsk, see Salamonik, *In Their Majesties' Service*, 181.

and efficiency²⁰. Here, one can see that Gratta's commissioner function resulted not only in the postal title, but also in the government of the northern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and, thence, the opportunity to profit on the control of the entire postal service between the Brandenburgian-Prussian territories.

Another, diplomatic function connected to the organization of the post was, as to follow Akkerman, the opening and control of the correspondence. Here, the most evident example connected with the Gdańsk postal office is the case of Jan Andrzej Morsztyn, the Grand Treasurer of the Crown and ambassador in France. The Gdańsk postal office disclosed Morsztyn's collaboration with French King Louis XIV against the King of Poland, John III Sobieski²¹. Morsztyn's contacts and plans to dethrone Sobieski were disclosed by Paolo Gratta (Francesco Gratta's oldest son who inherited the postal functions after Francesco's death in 1676) and Michał Antoni Hacki, the abbot of Oliva abbey. Hacki knew several languages, deciphered letters and was the ambassador of King Sobieski to the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Therefore, Gratta's network and trust from the royal family could also be seen as arguments for a statement that a local Black Chamber office in Gdańsk existed, as presented in Akkerman's article on Alexandrine of Taxis. This local intelligence network of trust, beside Gratta and Hacki, the great scientists of the time, also included Hevelius in Gdańsk, and Boulliau in Paris. It has come to light in the course of a thorough analysis of their correspondence, which included the matters of the Commonwealth along scientific discussions.

Thence, the organization of the postal infrastructure, creation and growth of local intelligence network combined with the commissioner function show that the diplomatic activity of a postmaster (here: Francesco Gratta) was not limited to the control and the circulation of correspondence. In fact, it stretched much beyond that, and had a real influence on politics, both domestic and international, as well as a complementary function to the ambassador, as shown by the example of the postal conflict of 1660-1661.

THE HOUSE

The King is considering coming again to Gdańsk for the summer and because of that no one wants to rent or buy the house, for the reason that it has become public. [...] [It] needs ten people for administration because it is a public house [publicum Chaus, sic!]²².

The house of Francesco Gratta in Gdańsk was his private home, postal office, and a royal residence in times of royal visits in the city. It became a *public house* according to Caspar Richter, an associate to Francesco Gratta and the guardian to Gratta's sons after Francesco's death. In his letters to Jan Wawrzyniec Wodzicki, Richter often complained that the house was a "dammed nest" since nobody wanted to rent it and it was impossible to sell it due to its function as a royal residence.

20 Biblioteka Gdańska PAN, ms. 719: 29, 576.

21 Salamonik, *In Their Majesties' Service*, 185.

22 BOssol., ms. 11574/II, pp. 81-3: «Latem Król Jego Mość znów zamierza do Gdańska przyjechać, dlatego nikt nie chce tej kamienicy ani wynająć, ani kupić, gdyż jest ona podległa oneri publico, [...] Kamienica potrzebuje dziesięciu ludzi ad regimem, gdyż jest publicum Chaus».



Fig. The Royal residence in Gdańsk from 1698.

The De Grattas House with a sculpture of an eagle on the top.

During their visits to the city, the King and Queen stayed in the residence made of three tenement houses on the Long Market street, in the central location in Gdańsk, close to the City Hall. Even if Gratta's house was not the only one which the royal couple used during their visits, it was where their private chambers were located²³. From Richter's correspondence, one may learn that there was a coffee place where visitors gathered. What is more, the door to the house was open for the whole day during royal visits. In addition, even after the royal couple's departure from Gdańsk, other important figures came to the house to borrow money. In one of his letters to Wodzicki, Richter mentioned refugees, bishops, and voivodes who asked for financial help and accommodation²⁴. This fact clearly shows that the function of the royal postmaster was a representative one. Gratta's house became the central meeting point for Polish-Lithuanian noblemen in the city as well as a royal residence. Finally, one may highlight the fact that the son of Marie Louise d'Arquien and John III Sobieski, Prince Aleksander Sobieski, was born in the house in 1677. Due to that event, the house was renovated and adapted to the needs of the royal couple. Gratta's family incurred the expense of the re-modelling as well as of the royal couple's visit. In fact, the maintenance of the house and its renovation were financed to enjoy prestige and acknowledgments on the part of the royal couple; for their protection and postal functions. In conclusion, Gratta's residence served as a postal office, as a meeting point for persons in financial need, and, finally, as a royal residence at the time of royal couple visits in the city. Finally, even the architecture and interior design of the house, including its decoration and equipment, help to recognize its representative function. There were ten plaster bust statues standing in the

²³ Salamonik, *In Their Majesties' Service*, 273-74.

²⁴ BOssol., ms. 11574/II, p. 65: «Kiedy cały Gdańsk nie może komuś pomódz, to wtedy do Gratowej Kamienicy refugium, biskupi, wojewodowie [udają się, gdy] pieniędzy szukają, poręki potrzebują, jak i innych wygód».

entrance part of the house, some of them depicted Polish kings²⁵. Additionally, in the house main room (*Sala*), paintings of Polish Kings and Queens were hung among others. There was a portrait of King John Casimir Vasa and Queen Marie Louise Gonzaga as well as of King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki and Queen Eleonora of Austria²⁶. Finally, at the top of the house, an eagle, the symbol of the Polish Kingdom, was located²⁷.

FINAL REMARKS

The purpose of the current study was to determine if postmasters pursued diplomatic activities. The article has shown that both the active diplomacy and the term “New Diplomacy” can be understood as the processes of building a network around diplomats and diplomatic missions, the postmasters office and the postmaster function itself. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that postmasters operated in intelligence networks, both locally and internationally, to develop postal service, and their own trade connections, but also for diplomatic reasons. As an example, Francesco Gratta’s commissioner function may be mentioned. In 1661, Gratta helped in resolving the postal conflict with the Electorate of Brandenburg-Prussia. It was clear that the royal ambassador could not intervene in this particular case and, therefore, the commission, with Gratta as a member, was created.

Returning to the hypothesis formed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state that postmasters could even intervene in domestic and international policy. Royal postmasters belonged to the direct jurisdiction of the King and, therefore, we can see the linkage and strong bonds of the royal post service with royal affairs. Gratta was responsible for the King and Queen’s affairs in the city, control over their packages and letters as well as for maintaining their international contacts. This clearly shows that the royal post was used to centralise royal power. As the Grattas’ case has shown, the family belonged to the royal network in the city and it was known as a Polish node in Gdańsk.

One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that the early modern post functioned not only as a background for diplomacy, but it played the central role in pursuing diplomatic activities and missions. While one can take into account that postmasters could open and control letters, it becomes clear that they were central figures in diplomatic contacts on both state and interpersonal levels. The study has provided an example of Morsztyn’s collaboration with French King Louis XIV against the King of Poland, John III Sobieski. This obviously confirmed the espionage of royal postmasters, and their obedience to the King, who granted and appointed to postal offices. Furthermore, Morsztyn’s case confirmed the existence of the local Black Chamber in Gdańsk, with postmasters who controlled the correspondence, and Michał Antoni Hacki who deciphered letters. The current findings add to the growing body of literature on *New Diplomatic History* and to the research on postal history. Finally, this research has raised many questions to be investigated further, for example, the activity of postmasters in diplomatic missions as well as their network strategies, which influenced postal services, royal diplomacy and personal trade businesses.

25 ASL, AS, vol. 123, p. 137. The volume refers to Francesco De Gratta’s probate inventory from 1676.

26 ASL, AS, vol. 123, p. 145

27 See the lithography presenting the Grattas house, G. R. Curicke, *Freuden-Bezeugung Der Stadt Dantzig über die [...]*, (Gdańsk: Jan Zachariasz Stolle, 1698), 21; Biblioteka Narodowa, SD W.4.346 a adl.; <https://polona.pl/item/5609923/20/>, 2020-10-12.

ABBREVIATIONS

ASL: Archivio di Stato di Lucca.

AS: Archivio Sardi.

BOssol.: Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich we Wrocławiu.

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DIPLOMACY AS AN ART OF GREAT POLITICS

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SPANISH DIPLOMATS IN THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH DURING THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

ABSTRACT

The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War meant an increment of contacts between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the war, the Madrid court developed intense diplomatic activity in the area, adapted to the particularities of the Polish political system. In this article we analyse the qualities of the different Spanish envoys in the area, the main characteristics that conditioned their activity and the influence of the different courts that took part in the decisions. Later, we will focus on the case of Baron de Auchy and his last diplomatic mission in Warsaw (1645–1647); a journey that reflects the importance of personal ties in relationships, as well as the different strategies developed by Hispanic diplomacy to regain influence in a period of crisis.

KEYWORDS: Spanish diplomacy; Philip IV; Thirty Years' War; House of Vasa; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

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The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War caused an intensification of the relations amongst the various regions of Europe. For the Spanish Monarchy, it coincided with a change in the orientation of its foreign policy, as consequence of the reincorporation of the Low Countries to the Spanish Crown and the beginning of hostilities with the United Provinces. Therefore, during the first years of the reign of Philip IV the government in Madrid took up a range of projects and memorials with a common objective: to re-establish the Spanish position in northern Europe. This strategy, at the same time political and trade-oriented, resulted in the establishment of closer ties with other regional powers. Among them, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was particularly relevant, the only Catholic power present in the Baltic and one of the main suppliers of raw materials to the continent. For years, the Habsburg of Madrid tried to win the support of the kings of the Polish line of Vasa dynasty, encouraging them to participate in their projects and the broader interests of the House of Austria in the European conflict. To this end, they deployed intense diplomatic activity, sending a significant number of agents to the region.

This diplomatic effort faced numerous obstacles. On top of the great distance between both courts, the peculiarities of the Polish political system and the animosity of broad sectors of the *szlachta* towards the House of Austria compounded the difficulties. All that conditioned the activity of the successive agents, giving way to a peculiar diplomacy, characterised by their discreet profile and the greater visibility of the various princes of the Polish royal family. In this article we analyse the general features of that diplomacy, to later focus on the paradigmatic case of Charles de Bonnières, Baron of Auchy (1595-1668), main artifice of the relationship during the war. As his activity as a Spanish agent in Warsaw was ample, we will focus on his last and less known mission in the region (1646-1647), carried out when the old ties between the Vasa and Austrian dynasties were changing, requiring a profound reevaluation of the contacts.

ELEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The relations between the Spanish Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Thirty Years' War have been studied by several historians. From the Spanish perspective, the Baltic plans of the 1620's have attracted most of the attention¹. Meanwhile, from the Polish side, the studies have

¹ Rafael Rodenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la guerra de los Treinta Años (1624–1630)* (Madrid: CSIC, 1961). José Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618–1639)* (Madrid: CEC, 2001).

been rather eclectic, including subjects such as the participation of Polish troops in the western conflict or the presence of Polish agents in Naples and Madrid². Thanks to the studies such as those by Ryszard Skowron, we have today a rather complete picture of the contacts³. The court in Madrid was interested in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for political as well as economic reasons. Its geopolitical situation, bordering the Empire and with access to the Baltic Sea, placed it in a privileged position at the outbreak of the war. Trade also attracted the Spanish interest. Every year vast amounts of raw materials departed from the port of Gdańsk headed towards the West. Many of them were vital for ship construction and their grain fed a good part of the United Provinces. On the other hand, the House of Austria sourced thousands of soldiers from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the conflict, based on the friendship treaties signed by Sigismund III with the various Emperors – 1613, 1621 –⁴. The geopolitical situation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth also allowed the House of Austria to divert some of their main enemies. When in 1626 the Count of Solre moved to Warsaw as ambassador, his objective was to keep the war with Gustav Adolf active⁵. Twenty years later, in 1646, Spanish diplomacy worked in favour of the diversion carried out by the Venetians against the Ottoman Empire⁶.

We can distinguish three stages in the activity of the Spanish agents in Poland-Lithuania after the initial crisis in Bohemia. The first, from 1621 to 1629, was centered in the Baltic plans, the creation of a Spanish-Polish imperial fleet and an ambitious trade strategy aimed at displacing the Dutch merchants in favour of those from the Hanseatic League⁷. The second stage, from 1629 till 1644, was characterised by the strengthening of family ties – the marriage of Władysław IV and Cecilia Renata of Austria, the signing of a family treaty – and the attempts by the Madrid court to involve the Polish Vasa in the European conflict (Treaty of Naples)⁸. The Queen's death in 1644 was the beginning of the third stage in the relations in which, against a background of military defeats undergone by the Austria, Władysław IV became gradually closer to the French through his marriage with Marie Louise Gonzaga⁹.

The Spanish diplomacy deployed several strategies to gain the support of the Polish to their plans. First, they took advantage of the Vasa's interest to recuperate the Swedish Crown, associating their plans in the Baltic to the war with Gustav Adolf. Madrid also believed that the potential benefits of trade between Spain and Poland-Lithuania would persuade many Polish to support their projects. However, they soon realised the scarce interest that their activities in that region generated. On the contrary, the reports provided by the agents revealed the animosity that the House of Austria aroused in broad sectors of the aristocracy. They also gathered a better knowledge of the peculiar Polish political system, the limited authority of their monarchs and the role played by the parliament, which led them to reconsider many of their strategies. In 1628 the Count Duke de Olivares proposed to offer some money to certain nobles and to invite them to send their sons to the Spanish court to have them raised as pages¹⁰. Between 1639 and 1643, the Viceroy Medina de las Torres pledged important sums with some nobles, as part of the negotiations of the Treaty of Naples¹¹.

2 Ryszard Skowron, "Las levas de polacos para los ejércitos españoles en la época de la guerra de los Treinta Años", in *From Ireland to Poland. Northern Europe, Spain and the Early Modern World*, eds. Enrique García Hernán and Ryszard Skowron (Valencia: Albatros, 2015), 19-37; Id. *Dyplomaci polscy w Hiszpanii w XVI i XVII wieku* (Kraków: Universitas 1997).

3 Ryszard Skowron, *Olivares, los Vasa y el Báltico. Polonia en la política internacional de España en los años 1621-1632* (Warszawa: DIG, 2008); Id. *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hiszpańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632-1648* (Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze "Historia Iagellonica", 2013).

4 Alexander Baran and George Gajecy, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War* (Rome: Basiliani, 1969); Skowron, "Las levas".

5 AGS, Est., K. 195, *Instrucciones al conde de Solre*, 5 January 1626.

6 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Junta de Estado*, 10 January 1646.

7 Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes*, 176-243; Skowron, *Olivares*, 107-59.

8 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 73-257.

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10 AGS, Est., Leg. 1442, *Junta de Estado*, 16 September 1628.

11 Miguel Conde Pazos, "El Tratado de Nápoles: el encierro del príncipe Juan Casimiro y la leva de polacos de Medina de las Torres (1638-1642)", *Studia historica. Historia moderna*, n. 33 (2011): 123-39.

A key element was the role played by the sons of Sigismund III. As descendants of an elective monarch, the political situation of the Princes was weak, and they were economically insecure. Some of them, like John Albert or Charles Ferdinand joined the ecclesiastic career, becoming bishops or cardinals. But others tried to lean on their maternal family, seeking the support of the House of Austria to secure their social status. In 1624, Władysław, future king, embarked on a trip around Europe, which allowed him to get acquainted with the Spanish elites in Europe. During the rest of the decade, he became one of the main champions of Spanish diplomacy in Warsaw. His brother John Casimir, who later became king, capitalised on a great deal of interest during the following decades. In 1638, the Prince embarked on a trip to Spain with the purpose of becoming the Viceroy of Portugal. But his capture by the French, when crossing the Mediterranean, doomed that mission¹². The court in Madrid tried to profit from their interest, promising the Princes money and positions. Władysław received presents and the promise of Spanish protection when carrying out his projects. John Casimir and Charles Ferdinand received allowances from Philip IV¹³. The two older brothers were also awarded the Golden Fleece. All that interest was summed in the Family Treaty of 1637 that pledged the protection and promotion of the Princes by the House of Austria. Philip IV was reluctant, however, to sign it and assume that heavy burden. Of course, there were other limits. For example, the sons of Sigismund III sought a beneficial marriage in Italy, preferably with some of the wealthiest lineages of Naples, which was opposed by the court in Madrid, that did not favour the union between a royal son (with Habsburg's blood) and a local lineage¹⁴.

A feature of the relations was multilateralism. The long distances and the way the Spanish Monarchy functioned led to a dispersion of decisional centres. In the case of the relations with Poland-Lithuania, we must highlight two spaces. The first were the Spanish Low Countries which, after their annexation, became a real window towards the North for the Monarchy. The court in Brussels had ample experience and knowledge after years of autonomous policy in the Baltic¹⁵. At the same time, it was the place the most exposed to changes in trade flows in the region. It is no coincidence that most of the diplomats sent to Poland-Lithuania came from that region – Count of Solre, Gabriel de Roy, Baron of Auchy – or had some responsibilities there – Enrique Teller, Pedro Rouco Villagutierrez –. The views of the Brussels court had great influence on the Spanish diplomatic strategy in Poland-Lithuania, particularly during the governing years of Isabel Clara Eugenia. Their influence, however, was diminished by the instability in the territory and by the differences between Madrid and Brussels over the ultimate objectives of the Baltic policy¹⁶. In 1628, the Count-Duke of Olivares ordered that all correspondence addressed to the Governess by Auchy and de Roy was sent directly to Madrid¹⁷. The internal situation also had a personal impact on some of the diplomats. In 1630, the Count of Solre expressed his frustration for being excluded from the businesses in Brussels. Madrid attributed this situation to the links the noble had with the Count of Bergh, suspect of treason¹⁸. Years later, the Baron of Auchy would consider his link with the Duke of Aarchot, arrested for his involvement in the Flanders' events of 1632, as the possible cause for his first fall from grace¹⁹.

12 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 195-222.

13 AGS, Est., Leg. 2459, *Felipe IV al protonotario*, Madrid 8 July 1633.

14 AGS, Est., Leg. 3833, *Consejo de Estado*, 18 February 1634.

15 Luc Duerloo, *El archiduque Alberto. Piedad y política dinástica durante las guerras de religión* (Madrid: CEEH, 2015), 399-400; Ryszard Szmydki, "Sigismund III and the Netherlands", in *The House of Vasa and the House of Austria. Correspondence from the Years 1587-1668*, ed. Ryszard Skowron (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), 69-94.

16 Robert A. Stradling, *La armada de Flandes. Política naval española y guerra europea, 1568-1668* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1992) 89-92.

17 AGS, Est., Leg. 1442, *Junta de Estado*, 16 September 1628.

18 AGS, Est., Leg. 2044, *Consejo de Estado*, 28 February 1630.

19 BNE, Mss. 2375, *Representación hecha por el barón de Auchy*, 1644.

The second important space was the court of Vienna²⁰. Given its geopolitical position and interests, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was under the influence of the imperial branch of Habsburgs. Thus, for the court in Madrid the priority in its relations with Warsaw was to strengthen the Emperor's position and the defence of his interests in the country. In fact, the diplomacy of Philip IV hinged on the imperial position in Poland-Lithuania. The Spanish never tried to establish a group or a party of their own within the court of Warsaw relying instead on the supporters of the Emperor.

The exchanges took place through the Spanish Embassy in Vienna, which oversaw the activities of the various agents, taking care of the recruiting of troops, under a regime of a tight dynastic collaboration acting under a mutual agreement with the Emperor and his ministries. As a result, the relationship between the Spanish and Polish-Lithuanian Monarchies was severely conditioned by the court of Vienna, and subordinated to the Emperor's interests in the region.

THE QUALITIES OF THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR

The language, the distance, and the differences between the Polish and the Spanish political systems required a specific type of diplomacy. In 1625, Georges Henin wrote a memorandum for the court in Madrid, in which he described the qualities with which the Spanish ambassador in Poland should be endowed²¹. According to the manuscript, the chosen person should be knowledgeable in the matters in northern Europe, its trade and alliances, and especially be able to defend the endeavours of the Emperor. Also, he should be able to interpret the interests of the Polish Kings, as well as to identify the power circles of the court. To that end, he should be able to enter the spaces of socialization, being desirable that he spoke Latin fluently. Also, he should be tolerant in the confessional field, since in Poland he would be bound to negotiate with non-Catholic nobles, without referring to them as "heretics". An interesting remark referred to the custom of Polish Nobles to drink wine during negotiations and banquets. The person assigned to that duty should be a moderate drinker, since the Poles, he wrote, made astute use of beverages at banquets to unveil the real intentions of their counterparties. He should be a liberal expender in gifts and promises. Henin estimated the cost of an Embassy at 200'000 ducats, including presents for the royals and nobles. Despite all those considerations, the key for the diplomat was neither in the spending nor the ostentation, but in keeping secrets. In his view, the arrival of a Spanish ambassador in Warsaw would raise suspicion amongst the enemies of the Austria that would entangle the negotiations. For that reason, he recommended abandoning the old practice of extraordinary embassies. Instead, he proposed sending to Poland an experienced agent to negotiate in a discreet manner. Extraordinary embassies should be reserved for protocolary missions and the signing of pacts previously agreed upon by the agents.

Henin's memorandum proposed a kind of secret and pragmatic diplomacy carried out by middle-level agents. That reduced costs, provided information, and allowed access to the royal sphere without so many obstacles. We find evidence of this diplomacy carried out during the war years with the dispatching of agents with different titles. Many of them had a military background (Auchy, Villagutierrez) or ecclesiastic (Allegretto Allegretti, Enrique Teller). There were also experts such as Gabriel de Roy²². The extraordinary embassies, similar in style to those of 1597 or 1612, were reserved for decisive instances (Solre's missions, 1626 and 1636) or protocol (the embassies of the Count of Siruela and the Prince of Dietrichstein, 1633 and 1645). That provided discreet contacts allowing to establish direct access with the Princes. Most of these embassies were under the wing of the Spanish embassy in Vienna and the itineraries towards Poland-Lithuania often included the courts of Vienna and Brussels.

The advice provided by Henin must have had a limited eco in Madrid in 1625, since they chose the Count of Solre for an extraordinary embassy. The Flemish became the Monarchies' most influencing

20 Rubén González Cuerva, "The Spanish Embassy in the Empire, Watchtower of Poland (1590–1624)", in Skowron, *The House of Vasa and the House of Austria*, 115–44.

21 BNE, Mss. 2359, *Partes que debe tener un buen embajador [...]*; about the Manuscript: Skowron, *Olivares*.

22 Jonathan I. Israel, "The Politics of International Trade Rivalry during the Thirty Years War: Gabriel de Roy and Olivares' Mercantilist Projects, 1621–1645", *The International History Review*, VIII/4 (1986): 1606–61.

noble in the court of Poland. A member of a secondary branch of the Cröy family, Solre always maintained a close link with the Hispanic Monarchy, even before the reincorporation of the Low Countries²³. In 1626, he travelled to Poland under the excuse of communicating the breakup with England. Instead, his trip aimed at setting up the Baltic plans and the Swedish-Polish war active. Once there, he established correspondence with Prince Władysław, who always devoted great respect to him. In 1636 he returned to Poland, this time to strengthen the alliance between the Vasa and Austria²⁴. His passing away, in 1638, represented a great loss for the Spanish-Polish relations.

In 1625 it was decided that, should negotiations continue, the person in charge of staying in Warsaw would be Baron de Auchy. This Flemish noble was the main intermediary between the Polish and Spanish courts during the conflict, carrying out various missions during the decades of 1620 and 1640. The son of the Governor of Lens, Charles de Bonnières started his services to the Monarchy at an early age²⁵. In 1610 he served in Milan as Captain of Infantry. In 1616, in Flanders, he was Captain of Dragons. And in 1620, he commanded 1000 German cavalry soldiers. He managed to conciliate this military career with the life in court. Like the Count of Solre, Auchy became prominent for the close links he established in the Madrid court, obtaining one of the palatine positions that Philip III offered in Flanders. In 1614, he was appointed *Gentilhombre de boca*. In 1623, he received the Governorship of Bapueme thanks to the Spanish intercession. His influence would increase after marrying Ursula, daughter of John Mancisidor, one of the closest Spanish Secretary of the Archdukes²⁶. After the death of Albert, Isabel Clara Eugenia sent him to Madrid, where he made some military proposals. There he was made a member of the *Junta de Población*, an institution of which Count Solre was also a member, linked in turn to the *Almirantazgo* (of which Gabriel de Roy took part). During those years Auchy also assumed some diplomatic missions, visiting various courts in Germany.

Auchy's mission in 1627 has been well researched, so we will only highlight some aspects²⁷. The Baron travelled to Poland undercover. There, he entered Prince Władysław's circle, who appointed him Chamber Gentleman, becoming the main link between the Prince and the Spanish Monarchy. In Warsaw he contributed to the success of the Baltic plans, together with Gabriel de Roy, obtaining 10 of Polish King's vessels for the Wismar fleet. During that time, he also served Prince Władysław. Years later, the Baron proudly rememorate his participation in two campaigns in Prussia next to the Prince²⁸. In 1629, at the Vasas' request, he moved to Vienna to present Ferdinand II a plan to undermine the Swedish successes. A year later he returned to Madrid (via Brussels) to inform on his mission and present new proposals from Władysław.

By then, he was already the best expert of the Polish reality, aided by several confidants. However, despite of the promising outlook for his situation, his career was truncated during the decade of 1630. Immediately after his return to Spain, the court started conceiving a new mission in Poland-Lithuania. In particular, the Count-Duke of Olivares was delighted by the tight relationship that the Flemish had established with the Polish royal family. But Auchy declared himself tired after years of stay in Poland-Lithuania and resisted the new assignment unless he was awarded some compensations. Specifically, he demanded a post as *Mayordomo* of Prince Infant Carlos and a seat in the Council of

23 Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "Afición, entendimiento y celo al servicio de Su Majestad. El Conde de Solre, Jean de Croÿ, y la unión hispano-flamenca en el reinado de Felipe IV", in *Agentes e identidades en movimiento. España y los Países Bajos siglos XVI-XVIII*, eds. René Vermeir, Maurits Ebben and Raymond Fagel (Madrid: Silex, 2011), 195-230.

24 Ryszard Skowron, "Hiszpania wobec polsko-szwedzkiego rozejmu 1635 roku. Misja opata Vazqueza i hrabiego de Solre", in *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII Wieku*, ed. Mirosław Nagielski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2007) 45-57.

25 Alicia Esteban Estríngana, "Élites flamencas y patronato real: gestionar recursos y negociar expectativas en la Monarquía de Felipe IV (1621-1630)", *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, serie IV, t.23 (2010): 59-88.

26 Duerloo, *El archiduque*, 84-5.

27 Skowron, *Olivares*, 189-209.

28 Carlos Bonnières, *Arte militar deducida de sus principios fundamentales* (Zaragoza: Hospital Real i General de Nuestra Señora de Gracia, 1644).

Flanders-positions²⁹ that the Madrid court refused to award. He also requested for better terms for his embassy: more money and the possibility of getting loans. Therefore, when Auchy received the order to go to Poland, he postponed his departure. This disobedience (in the context of instability in Flanders) caused a loss of confidence in the court, especially from the Count-Duke. In early 1635, he was replaced by Fray Alonso Vazquez³⁰. The Baron was retained in Madrid, and his salary was blocked. The court did not require his services again until 1638, and only to send him to Barcelona to welcome the arrival of Prince John Casimir, which, as we know, never took place³¹.

THE LAST MISSION OF BARON OF AUCHY IN POLAND-LITHUANIA (1645–1647)

The decade of 1640 brought significant changes in the Spanish-Polish relations. The rebellions in the Iberian Peninsula triggered a scale-down of the European affairs by the Spanish Monarchy. At the same time, the Austrian armies started to suffer a series of defeats in central Europe. In this context, the relationship between Madrid and Warsaw started to decline, after years of failed projects and plenty of unfulfilled promises, and Władysław IV started to reorient his policy. After the death of Cecilia Renata, in 1644, the king approached to the Paris court, marrying a year later with Maria Louise Gonzaga³². Meanwhile, Prince John Casimir tried to be appointed cardinal with the support of Mazarine³³. The situation was not favourable either in neighbouring Copenhagen; another court considered friendly in the region, which started approaching the enemies of the House of Austria after being defeated in the war with Sweden (1643–1645)³⁴.

In that context, the court of Philip IV started arrangements to send a diplomatic mission to the region. The first moves were made in 1644, following a project of an alliance between Poland-Lithuania, Denmark and Muscovy against Sweden. But the mission only took shape in 1645. To carry it out, they summoned Baron of Auchy, considered one of the best experts in the northern affairs³⁵. The Baron's return to favour had started in 1640, after the outbreak of war in Spain. In 1641 he was called upon by Philip IV to command the first troops that arrived from Low Countries. A year later, he joined the War Council. Then he was appointed General Commissaire of the Castilian Infantry and General Overseer of the royal army. To this military aspect he added a literary one. In 1644, in Saragossa, he published his *Arte military deducida de sus principios fundamentales*, a book based on his experiences in the Flanders and Prussia wars. However, his personal luck did not seem to improve much. In 1642 Bapaume was captured by the French troops. In that same year, the only son he had had with Ursula Mancisidor died when serving in the royal army. His position in the court did not seem to prosper either. Despite the fall from grace of the Count-Duke of Olivares (the main obstacle for his ambitions), the court in Madrid was not keen to give him a seat in the Council of Flanders. In 1644 he wrote a new memorandum to the king where he reminded him that, after 36 years of services, he just received the same assignment of 300 shields that he had been awarded in 1627, when he left for Poland³⁶.

One of the reasons why the court decided to bring Auchy into the scene was his close personal relations with the Polish Vasa. For years, Władysław IV had written to Madrid asking the return of the Baron³⁷;

29 AGS, Est., Leg. 2333, *Consejo de Estado*, 22 January 1632.

30 AGS, Est., Leg. 2336, *Consejo de Estado*, 14 January 1635.

31 Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, Leg. 1350, *el rey al cardenal de Borja*, 8 May 1638.

32 Maciej Serwański, "Polonia y la Guerra de los Treinta Años", in *350 años de la Paz de Westfalia* (Madrid: Carlos de Amberes, 1999), 73–86.

33 Miguel Conde Pazos, "Entre franceses y españoles: el Cardenalato del príncipe Juan Casimiro Vasa y la diplomacia hispana en Italia (1643–1648)", *Libros de la Corte*, 1 (2014), 33–51.

34 Enrique J. Corredra Nilsson, *Dealing with the North: Spanish Ambassadors in the Scandinavian Kingdoms 1648–1660* (PhD diss., Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2015), 120–21.

35 AGS, Est., Leg. 2346, *Consejo de Estado*, 30 September 1645.

36 BNE, Mss. 2375, *Representación hecha por el barón de Auchy*, 1644.

37 AGS, Est., Leg. 2339, *Consejo de Estado*, 23 July 1639.

a personal key the court was ready to capitalise on. The Baron of Auchy took this new opportunity to ask for new compensations. In this instance, on top of the seat in the Council of Flanders, he demanded a seat in the Finance Council. However, the court of Madrid postponed any new appointment to his return from Poland-Lithuania³⁸. The Baron also requested better conditions for his embassy: a salary of 500 shields per month and a one-time aide of 5'000 or 6'000 shields. He also asked permission to seek loans in Poland and Denmark. Finally, he claimed an aide to accompany him, arguing that he was too old to carry the weight of negotiations on his own. Madrid rejected his demands, establishing a salary of 400 shields plus a one-time aide of 4'000³⁹.

The Baron left for Poland-Lithuania with two objectives in mind. On the one hand, to keep the friendship with the kings of Poland and Denmark, steering them away from the attempts of French diplomacy to have them join the general cause against the House of Austria. It was a difficult mission given the scarcity of means. In 1636, the Count of Solre had travelled to Poland-Lithuania with similar objectives, making a whole range of promises to the king and the princes – help for the war with Sweden, rents –. Even more, he travelled as a special ambassador, accompanied by a numerous entourage. In turn, Auchy had little to offer: the rents had not been paid timely and the court was still due to compensating them for the 10 vessels delivered in 1628. Auchy was instructed to avoid discussing these debts⁴⁰. To make things worst, Auchy did not travel with an ambassadorial title, but with the rank of minister sent by Philip IV⁴¹. The second objective of his mission was to re-establish the Monarchies' position in the septentrional space, establishing correspondence channels in the various courts.

At the beginning, there were some hesitations as to the route to follow and the court he should visit first. Auchy wanted to travel by sea, from Cadiz or San Sebastian, towards England and until the Danish coast. A trip he considered doable in a month at best, or five at worst. However, the court chose to follow the traditional route, though Italy and the imperial territories. The reason was to have him reach a consensus over his mission's objectives with Ferdinand III and the Spanish ambassador in Vienna⁴². After crossing Genoa and Innsbruck, Auchy arrived in Linz. There, a sickness kept him detained for 6 weeks, delaying his arrival in Poland-Lithuania until early 1646.

The court that the Baron visited was very different to the one he had left years before. By then, Władysław IV had abandoned a good part of his anti-Sweden Baltic policy. Instead, he was trying to become a mediator in the Westphalian Peace, for which he expected the recognition of his dynastic rights. That mediation was not supported by the Emperor, who feared interferences with the peace process and his possessions in Silesia. Frictions between Vienna and Warsaw had also taken place because of the territories awarded to the Vasa in Silesia (Duchies of Opole and Ratibor-Racibórz), which had damaged the relationship. The first audience of Władysław IV to Auchy took place during the first weeks of 1646. The king manifested his unquestionable support for the House of Austria. However, he considered that it had been his cousins, the Emperor and the King of Spain that had failed to honour their commitments. In particular, he complained of the abandonment of his affairs in Madrid, not only concerning the payment of rents and the promise of positions for his brothers, but also the payment of the rents in Naples. Auchy blamed Alonso Vazquez, his substitute in 1635, who had made all kinds of promises in his stay in Poland. Władysław IV also expressed his desire to mediate in the universal peace. Moreover, he offered himself to arbitrate a peace treaty to end the war between the Spanish Monarchy and the United Provinces. The Spanish State Council did not accept that proposal, since they considered that talks undertaken by Peñaranda in Münster were well oriented⁴³.

38 AGS, Est., Leg. 2345, *Consejo de Estado*, 6 December 1644.

39 AGS, Est., Leg. 2345, *Consejo de Estado*, 20 December 1644

40 AGS, Est., Leg. 2350, *Felipe IV al barón de Auchy*, 22 April 1645.

41 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 31 January 1647.

42 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 31 January 1646.

43 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 19 June 1646.

The Baron of Auchy could also note the changes in the state of the court. The king's marriage with Marie Luise Gonzaga had given way to the arrival of many French to Warsaw. But, as it was soon learned, there had also been some clashes between various Polish nobles and the French. In one of the audiences, Władysław IV reassured the Baron that he would send back to Paris most of the French as soon as he found the occasion⁴⁴. Despite all that, it was evident that the French diplomacy had acquired an enormous influence in Warsaw. The *sejm* of 1646 discussed, under the influence of Paris, the possibility of elevating the truce of 1635 with Sweden to peace. In that context, Mazarine had started recruiting soldiers in the country. Just a few weeks after his arrival, the Baron of Auchy intervened to stop the envoy to France of 4000 soldiers. The Baron was unable to block the shipment of troops, but he persuaded Władysław IV to divert 1500 for his own army⁴⁵.

As to the ministers, the Baron noticed the enormous influence that Jerzy Ossoliński exerted over the court's affairs. Also discussed the support that Adam Kazanowski continued to provide to the affairs of the House of Austria. But Auchy was not misled by this apparent friendship of this minister, who, in his opinion, was motivated by greed⁴⁶. The rest of the image Auchy described showed a court where the queen's French circle had great influence, attracting key figures previously close to the House of Austria, such as royal secretary Ludovico Fantoni⁴⁷.

Shortly after, Auchy left for Copenhagen, although his absence from Poland-Lithuania was brief. His objective in Denmark was to re-establish the Spanish position in the region, while maintaining the friendship with Christian IV and averting the recruiting of soldiers by the French. This subject – rebuilding the Spanish influence in the area – had already been discussed by the Baron in his meetings with the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of Terranova. In Auchy's opinion, the time had arrived to reformulate the Spanish diplomatic action, making it more flexible and adjusting it to the poor shape of the king's treasure. To that end, he advocated the creation of a low-profile agent network, spread along the Baltic coast and Poland-Lithuania, that should send notices regularly. They would be paid modest sums, 15 to 25 shields per month. In case of needing to negotiate a specific accord, an agent could travel from Vienna with a salary of 50 shields per month (or 400 thalers per year). By this proposal, Auchy copied the French model, that managed its action from Gdańsk where the recruiting and the commercial affairs were overseen, occasionally moving to Warsaw an agent when needed⁴⁸. Auchy tried to set up this network in his trip to the north. In Copenhagen, he hired an army commissary of Spanish origin, Antonio Garcia Vega. In Poland he got in contact with an Italian secretary of the king, who had access to secret correspondence⁴⁹. However, his name was not registered. We just know that he continued to send reports to Vienna regularly, serving as the base for the network of Spanish agents the Spanish embassy kept in the region until the decade of 1650.

Auchy's position in Poland began to get eroded after his return from Denmark (October 1646). At the end of that year, he had to arrange the arrival of Enrique Teller who travelled to Warsaw in a protocolary mission to congratulate Władysław IV for his marriage. But his task was impaired by the internal conflict in the Polish Embassy in Madrid⁵⁰. After this episode, the Baron suffered various humiliations by the Polish ministers and Teller was received by the king only after the intervention of Kazanowski. On the other hand, Władysław IV was upset by the lack of Vienna's support to his plans to crusade against the Turks, a project that Auchy saw collapse in the *sejm* of 1646⁵¹. Also, money

44 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 4 July 1646.

45 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 14 August 1646.

46 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 13 June 1647.

47 AGS, Est., Leg. 2065, *Consejo de Estado*, 22 December 1646.

48 AGS, Est., Leg. 2347, *Consejo de Estado*, 2 February 1646.

49 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 31 January 1647.

50 Skowron, *Dyplomaci*, 146–96; Jan Kieniewicz and Matylda Urjasz-Raczko, "Fathoming Spanish Arcana: The Polish Ambassador Stanisław Mąkowski's Impossible Mission to the Court of Philip IV (1638–47)", in *Ambassadors in Golden-Age Madrid*, eds. Jorge Fernández-Santos and José L. Colomer (Madrid: CEEH, 2020), 173–201.

51 AGS, Est., Leg. 2349, *Consejo de Estado*, 4 June 1647.

began to get scarce. His mission's expenses reached 11'000 shields, and the Duke of Terranova refused to continue diverting resources⁵². Auchy himself considered his presence in Warsaw unnecessary. After the king's failure in the *sejm*, he thought it unlikely that Władysław IV would undertake any action, much less to attack Silesia. But it was the humiliations by the king and Ossoliński that finally convinced him to leave without even waiting for the customary formalities. His decision would later be criticised by the State Council which considered that Auchy had acted under personal feelings⁵³. Auchy's sudden departure from Poland in the summer of 1647 stigmatised his embassy in the eyes of the court's general opinion. Consequently, when the Baron returned to Madrid he was barely considered for new appointments. That did not prevent Philip IV from going back to him to consult on Polish issues. In 1648, Władysław IV died and Auchy was consulted on his possible successors. He recommended supporting Prince Neuburg (with whom he kept old ties and whom he had tried to promote before), leaving aside the royal's brothers⁵⁴. But, in the middle of these consultations, one document he handled ended in the hands of the foreign diplomacy. Weeks later Auchy was arrested for disclosure of secrets. He defended himself from that accusation blaming the Polish ambassador in Madrid, Francisco de Biboni⁵⁵.

CONCLUSION

The jailing during months of the Baron of Auchy in the Castle of Santorcaz may seem an epilogue of the result of the Spanish-Polish relations during the conflict; relations based on a myriad of promises and failed projects, marked by a strong personal character by both, the Princes of the Vasa family and the Spanish diplomats. The latter carried out their duties in a distant and sometimes hostile environment, under a varied set of interests. Despite all that, they managed to establish a series of links and structures that provided information and allowed soldiers to recruit. In the long term, the grand Spanish plans in the region failed, which led to describing Poland-Lithuania as the ally of frustrated hopes. However, the main objective was to safeguard the Emperor's back lines, which was achieved, in part thanks to the links developed by that diplomacy.

The Baron of Auchy played a key role in all that. In 1646, he travelled to Poland-Lithuania with the purpose of rebuilding the Spanish position and adapting it to the new reality, in which the Spanish Monarchy could no longer commit a great deal of resources, and France, under Louis XIV, progressively established its hegemony. If his actions did not have the expected success – at least in the eyes of the court in Madrid – it was the result of a clear incapacity to balance his personal link with the king, in the face of a changing reality in which the House of Austria lost its influence in the continent.

52 AGS, Est., Leg. 2351, *Consejo de Estado*, 1 September 1648.

53 AGS, Est., Leg. 2351, *Consejo de Estado*, 11 April 1648.

54 AGS, Est., Leg. 2352, *Junta de Estado*, 29 July 1648.

55 BNE, Mss. 2359, *el barón de Auchy a d. Luis de Haro*, 6 February 1650.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGS: Archivo General de Simancas.

Est.: *Estado*.

BNE: Biblioteca Nacional de España.

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THE ELECTORAL PALATINATE: KEY TO EUROPE. ART OF DIPLOMACY OF WŁADYSŁAW IV

ABSTRACT

Władysław IV at the time of taking the throne in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had already specified the main goals concerning foreign policy. The expiration of the truce with Sweden in 1635 offered the king new opportunities to negotiate with other European courts, to organize the armed forces and to convince the nobility to accept the idea of an offensive war against Sweden, fought on its own territory. The strategic goal of Władysław IV, which combined the interests of the dynasty and the Commonwealth, was his to return to the throne of Sweden. The realization of that goal required development of diplomatic and military strategies and tactics; preparation of a political plan which would allow the king to become involved in international politics; organization of a diplomatic network covering the most important European courts, both Catholic and Protestant; gaining allies in the war with the Swedes; and maximal implementation of the royal prerogatives concerning foreign policy. Władysław IV pursued his goal using two interrelated strategies: of peace and of war. The peace strategy – the basis for which were two linked projects: peace mediation and marriage with Elisabeth, the daughter of Frederick V and Elisabeth Stuart. The war strategy assumed that in 1635 the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would resume its war with Sweden. The king understood that the war conducted by the Commonwealth alone would not become an instrument for achieving the main goal. Therefore, he sought a joint and coordinated war of the Vasas and Habsburgs against Sweden.

KEYWORDS: Władysław IV Vasa; the Rhine Palatinate; Elizabeth Wittelsbach; Early Modern Diplomacy; The Thirty Years' War.

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In the seventeenth century Władysław must have been the only king so perfectly well versed with the political situation from Moscow to Madrid, which he tried to influence taking into consideration his powerful position in Europe. Even before ascending to the throne he enjoyed a great prestige among European rulers. Beginning with 1610 when he became the tsar elect of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, events that added to his glory and reinforced his myth in the courts of Europe and in the minds of the Polish and Lithuanian nobility occurred every few years. In 1610 he was hailed the Grand Prince of All Russia, in 1615 he received the Order of the Golden Fleece from Philip III of Spain, in 1619 he was offered the Crown of St Wenceslaus by the Bohemian Estates, in 1621 he gained the renown of the vanquisher of Turks, and in 1627 he was offered the command of the Vasa-Habsburg fleet. Irrespective of their purpose, his travels made Władysław familiar with the culture and politics of Europe. He was as close to Moscow as no other European ruler would later be until Napoleon, and he visited Wrocław, Prague, Vienna, Innsbruck, Munich, Brussels, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples. "Watching the world" also meant direct encounters with the master minds of his contemporary political reality including Pope Urban VIII, Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, his son Ferdinand and wife Eleonora Gonzaga, Archduke Leopold V, Maximilian I Duke of Bavaria and Elector of the Palatinate, the Clara Isabella Eugenia, Sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands, Ferdinand of Bavaria, Prince-Elector Archbishop of Cologne, George William Elector of Brandenburg, Ferdinand II Grand Duke of Tuscany, Duke de Alba Viceroy of Naples, and eminent military commanders Ambrogio Spinola, Duke de Feria and Albrecht Wallenstein. Those people and places, as well as the

accompanying events, disputes, negotiations, ceremonial, and propaganda built up the experience, hopes, and disillusion of the future ruler. They honed a prince who, at the moment of accessing to the royal throne, was ready to run a complex game on an international arena, accounting for the strategies and objectives of individual powers, and combining the interests of his dynasty with those of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania.

The purpose of this text is to portray how Władysław IV Vasa ran his strategy and tactics of conducting diplomatic negotiations aimed at returning the Polish Vasa line to the throne of Sweden. It intends to show how, by recognising the Electoral Palatinate the geopolitical pivot during a transcontinental war, the King bound his goals to those of the key players on the international arena. Therefore the portrayal of the “board” of that game and the dynamics of Władysław IV’s diplomatic endeavours in 1632-37 on the vast space stretching from Moscow to Madrid, and from Rome to London is a significant element of this study.

IN THE INTEREST OF THE DYNASTY AND COMMONWEALTH: RETURN TO THE SWEDISH THRONE

The experience from the time of the war in Prussia proved to the Vasas only too well that all and any initiatives linked to their participation in endeavours in the West are torpedoed by Vienna considering the Commonwealth primarily the space for the drafting mercenaries and an ally that needs to be tangled into separate wars on Turkey to hold back its expansion along the Danube Valley¹. That is why after the truce with Sweden in 1629, when Sweden started its intervention in Germany, the Vasas had to embark on actions that forced the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs to provide actual financial and military support for the Polish-Lithuanian state, as only a powerful alliance of the two dynasties gave the Catholic States a guarantee of the decisive solution of the Swedish problem.

Evidently, when elected King of the Commonwealth in November 1632, Władysław IV had precise main objectives for his foreign policy both in service of the state and of the dynasty. The view that the overarching goal for the Władysław IV (and Sigismund III) was to return to the throne in Stockholm dominates the opinion of Polish historians. It, however, fails to account for the fact that, at least in 1621–35, the Swedish problem became the keystone of the interests of the Commonwealth and the Vasa dynasty². Even if a great majority of Polish nobility primarily perceived the war on Sweden the attainment of the domestic goals and not the interests of the Polish-Lithuanian state, they nonetheless had to fight to stop the offensive actions of Gustav Adolf and to reclaim the lost lands. It needs remembering that, on the power of an act of the *sejm* of 1616, the Commonwealth undertook to support the king and his progeny in reclaiming Sweden should circumstances allow³. It is not without reason that, in his *Dyskurs o podniesieniu wojny inflanckiej* (1624), Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian Field Hetman, opposed moving the war to Sweden pointing to the incidental nature of that act, and demonstrating that it no longer remains in force eight years since its approval. At the same time, however, his text also proposed the joint effort of the king and the Commonwealth to obtain the throne in Stockholm for Sigismund III or his sons. In the conclusion of his work, the commander wrote: «even if we agreed to that recuperation of the Swedish kingdom, you would have to do it *ordinate* so as not to make *tumulturie*. For let us go *a vilissimis operariis* to the greatest among the monarchs»⁴. The war in

1 Adam Szelągowski, *O ujście Wisły. Wielka wojna pruska* (Warszawa: Gebethner & Wolff, 1905); Rafael Ródenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la guerra de los Treinta Años (1624–1630)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1967), 83–131; Maciej Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1986), 35–69; Radosław Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej (1618–1635)* (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2004); Ryszard Skowron, *Olivares, los Vasa y el Báltico. Polonia en la política internacional de España en los años 1621–1632* (Warszawa: DiG, 2008), 113–286.

2 See for example: Władysław Czapliński, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warszawa: PW Wiedza Powszechna, 1976); Henryk Wisner, *Zygmunt III Waza* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1991); Stefania Ochman-Staniszevska, *Dynastia Wazów w Polsce* (Warszawa: PWN, 2006), 83–94.

3 *Volumina Legum: przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. pijarów w Warszawie od roku 1732 do roku 1782*, vol. III (Petersburg: Ohryzki, 1589), 133.

4 Krzysztof Radziwiłł, *Sprawy wojenne i polityczne 1621–1632* (Paryż: Wydawnictwo Biblioteki Polskiej, 1859), 493. All the translations from Polish to English are made on behalf of the author.

Prussia, and the subsequent intervention of Sweden in the Empire clearly showed that the main reason behind the wars with the Commonwealth were the efforts of Gustav Adolf to dominate the Baltic Sea, and not the claims of the Polish Vasas to the throne in Stockholm. Expiry of the Altmark Truce in 1635 opened new options for the political play with the European courts to Władysław IV, letting him organise his armed forces and win over the Polish nobility to the idea of an offensive war on Sweden that, in the final stage, would be conducted in its territory. He was too experienced a politician not to realise that the main goal could be achieved by combining international support with the participation of Polish and Lithuanian's armies.

The strategic objective of Władysław IV, which brought together the interests of the dynasty and the Commonwealth, was to return to the throne of Sweden to put an end to the Swedish wars lasting for over 30 years. The power of the dynasty was to vouchsafe safety and reinforce the power of the Commonwealth. The elimination of Sweden from the conflicts in the northeast of Europe meant a significant weakening of Muscovy, and opened a perspective to victorious wars on that front, at the same time strongly reducing the danger of fighting one on two fronts: northern and southern (with Turkey). Attainment of that goal required designing a diplomatic and military strategy and tactics, preparing a political action plan that would make it possible for the king to join international politics, organisation of a diplomatic network extending to both Protestant and Catholic key courts in Europe, and maximum use of the royal prerogatives in foreign policy. Władysław IV pursued his goal by carrying out two interconnected strategies through peace and war.

The foundation for the peaceful strategy were two interrelated projects: peace mediation and the marriage with Elisabeth of the Palatinate, daughter of Frederick V and Elisabeth Stuart⁵. The king believed that, binding in the relationships between the European dynasties, the principle of legitimism provided a solid foundation for European monarchs to confirm the hereditary rights of the Polish Vasas to the Swedish throne, and to have Charles IX and his successors considered usurpers, or, at worst, no more than just elected kings of Sweden. (Charles IX had *Carolus Dei gratia electus Rex Suecie* as part of his official title.) Władysław believed that the peace talks putting an end to the war on the territory of the Empire, with Christina remaining the only surviving scion of Gustav Adolf, the subject of returning his legal heirs living in Poland to the throne in Sweden could be brought back. This, however, would require finding someone to press that subject intensely at the peace congress. The king recognised that it would be best to participate directly in the negotiations by assuming the role of a mediator in the continuing war. That, however, required the acceptance of the belligerent parties. Władysław IV fulfilled all the conditions required for the role of the negotiator perfectly. With a great prestige in European courts and neutrality despite the pro-Habsburg stance in the continuing war, he was furthermore distant from the Catholic fanaticism of the House of Austria. The intention to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate served winning the approval of the Protestant states (Brandenburg, England, the Netherlands, and Denmark) and of France for the king's peace mediation, and was also to provide a means of pressure on the Habsburgs.

The military strategy assumed that the Commonwealth would restart war with Sweden in 1635. The King understood that, conducted independently by the Polish-Lithuanian state, that war would not provide an instrument to attain the main goal. That is why he pursued a joint and coordinated Vasa-Habsburg war in Sweden. The theatre of that war was to extend to Prussia and Livonia in the Polish-Lithuanian state, and to Silesia, Brandenburg, and Western Pomerania in Germany. The condition Władysław IV considered indispensable for that joint arms union (*coniunctio armorum*) was that the Polish and imperial armies ran shared operations in the aforementioned German territories⁶. He believed that running the hostilities in parallel, he would win the Polish nobility's buy-in for an offensive preventive strike, while the military developments would justify actions along the western border. Such a coordination of the military operations against the Swedish not only gave the King

5 Adam Szelański, *Rozkład Rzeczy i Polska za panowania Władysława IV* (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1907), 71-177; Czapliński, *Władysław IV*, 177-223; Ryszard Skowron, *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hispańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632-1648* (Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze "Historia Iagellonica", 2013), 84-149.

6 Szelański, *Rozkład Rzeczy*, 104-19; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 86-102.

high likelihood of victory but also offered him assorted openings in the political and military game, including a direct incursion into the territory of Sweden. Irrespective of the course of events, the fact of participating in the war and having Polish armies on the territory of the Empire, guaranteed the king's participation in the peace talks. Military tactics required obtaining financial and military support from both Vienna and Madrid Habsburgs. Knowing the apprehensions of Emperor Ferdinand II concerning the dynastic ambitions of the Vasas (Silesia, Western Pomerania), Władysław also had to possess tactical instruments to enforce close cooperation of the Emperor with Poland. These on the one hand included the threat of extending the truce with Sweden, and on the other the continuous emphasis on the option of allying with the anti-Habsburg camp through the marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate.

TO FINLAND VIA THE DUCHY OF MOSCOW

The prospect of war with Sweden forced Władysław IV to ensure safety and peace in the western and southern borders of his state in the first two years after entering the throne. The war with Muscovy and the Turkish threat during the *interregnum* and in the first months of his reign required military and diplomatic steps to achieve this goal. The Vasa's personal participation in the victorious Smolensk campaign, and the repulsion of the Turkish onslaught strongly reinforced the king's position in the country and his prestige in the European courts. Again, like in 1621, the pamphlets published in Paris, Rome, and Madrid reinforced the image of the Polish king as a great strategist⁷.

Setting forth to release the siege of Smolensk in August 1633, Władysław not only intended to stop the siege but also to make a deep incursion into the Duchy of Muscovy, to capture the territories that were to be transferred to his brother, John Casimir. Subsequently, the Polish army supported by the recruited Muscovy soldiers was intended to attack Finland along the land via Karelia⁸. However, the king modified his plans under the pressure from the Senators and in the interest of the Commonwealth, and put an end to the war with the Treaty of Polanowo, finally relinquishing his rights to the crown of the tsars. He knew only too well that as long as he did use the title of the tsar, there would be no peace along the border with Muscovy. How some among the Polish nobility construed the decision of Władysław is proved by the gratitude expressed by the *sejmik* of Belz, who thanked the king «not only for relinquishing the tsardom of Muscovy for the Commonwealth, but also for being ready to sacrifice the royal title which was his heirloom for the sake of its unity»⁹. The decision was certainly difficult on the dynastic plane, as it diminished the splendour of the House of Vasa, whose members used the *electus magnus dux Moschoviae* formula in the letters that exchanged with European monarchs. Władysław also renounced the title in the interest of his family and the Swedish heritage, as he recognised Muscovy a potential ally in obtaining political and dynastic goals. That is why, during the negotiations, the Polish commissioners proposed to Muscovite diplomats to establish a personal union, strongly following upon the one presented by Lew Sapieha in 1600. Moreover, early in 1635 the king instructed his legates to Moscow, Aleksander Piaseczyński and Kazimierz Leon Sapieha, to embark on negotiations of an anti-Swedish alliance with the tsar¹⁰. Thus, Władysław endeavoured to open the third Swedish front on the Russian border, which would force the Swedes to fight along the entire southern and south-eastern shores of the Baltic Sea – from the Bay of Lübeck to as far as the Gulf of Finland. However, Michał staunchly rejected the possibility of fighting on the side of the Commonwealth against Sweden. The peaceful negotiations in Polanowo are an important proof

7 Konrad Zawadzki, *Gazety ulotne polskie i Polski dotyczące XVI–XVIII wieku. Bibliografia*, t. 1: 1514–1661 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1977), 105–16; Anna Filipczak-Kocur, “Wojna smoleńska 1633–1634 w ówczesnych gazetach ulotnych”, in *Komunikacja i komunikowanie w dawnej Polsce*, eds. Krzysztof Stępnik and Maciej Rajewski (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2008), 55–79.

8 Władysław Godziszewski, *Polska a Moskwa za Władysława IV* (Kraków: PAU, 1930), 8–42.

9 Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich in Wrocław, ms. 121/74, f. 145.

10 Godziszewski, *Polska a Moskwa*, 33–40; Anna Filipczak-Kocur, *Poselstwo Aleksandra Piaseczyńskiego i Kazimierza Leona Sapiehy do Moskwy w 1635 roku* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2017), 14–6.

demonstrating the king's readiness to align the interests of the dynasty and the Commonwealth to forestall the expansionist policy of Sweden.

THE HENICIUS MEMORANDUM: THE VASA DREAM OR DYNASTIC PLANS?

A document known as the Henicius Memorandum (Pol. *memoriał Heniciusa*), a source frequently discussed in historical literature, laid out Władysław Vasa's detailed political goals in the wake of his father's death¹¹. The researchers agree that the memorandum, in which the Vasas surrender to the protection of the Emperor and present their dynastic claims, is a proof of pro-Habsburg policy of Władysław IV, as the document points that the king's key objective is to reclaim the crown of Sweden, even at the cost of the throne of the Commonwealth. According to the constitutional standards of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, sons of the elected kings did not enjoy the status of successors to the throne, and their rights were highly curbed. Their position was in no way changed by the fact that they were formal heirs to the Swedish crown. They could hold no state offices, be members of the Senate, or own inheritable estates, which closed their path to lay careers in the Commonwealth. While reaching for the crown of Poland, it was a natural family obligation for Władysław IV to take care of the future of his brothers. The more so as Sigismund III limited the dynastic policy to his own marriages only. Therefore the nomination of his two sons, John Albert and Charles Ferdinand, to bishoprics needs to be treated as a way of safeguarding their material standards of life rather than caring for the interests of the family as a whole.

For the Emperor, the Henicius Memorandum guaranteed close cooperation of the entire family, and confirmed Władysław's readiness to reopen the Swedish war. A novelty, and certainly a surprise for Ferdinand II, were the Vasas' territorial ambitions. Could the Emperor accept and entertain a concept that would put the Polish Vasas among the most powerful dynasties of Europe, along the Habsburgs, with John Casimir ruling the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, Władysław IV – Sweden, Alexander Charles – Western Pomerania and Brandenburg (Electorate), with John Albert being the Bishop of Olomouc? It was a very serious warning for Vienna that, to be an ally, Władysław would claim territorial compensations for members of his family, which in the current political reality first meant lobbying to rule the duchies of Silesia. Moreover, the Vasas holding the thrones of German states could be more than just a threat of caused by mingling with the matters of the Empire but also by entering the competition for the imperial crown; a prospect that, by the way, the King was later deluded with by the French. Vienna's great uncertainty as to the King's intentions concerning Silesia was one of the chief obstacles in concluding the anti-Swedish alliance. The best proof to the significance of this area in the Habsburg-Vasa relations are the proposals of the French diplomacy, submitted to the Polish king through the French envoy d'Avaux, and concerning concluding an alliance, in which France would recognise the justification of Władysław's claims to Silesia¹². That vision of the power and westward expansion of the Vasas not only had to be rejected by Ferdinand II but it also made a significant impact on his decisions concerning cooperation with the Commonwealth and its ruler.

THE ELECTORAL PALATINATE: CHARLES I STUART AND THE HABSBURG

Polish historians have frequently investigated Władysław IV's plans to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate, while its international circumstances and the concept of European peace mediation are practically missing from European works¹³. From the point of view of diplomatic strategy, an intention

11 Józef Krajewski, "Władysław IV a korona szwedzka", *Biblioteka Warszawska*, t. 297/3 (1913): 214-16; Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeczy*, 37-8; Czapliński, *Władysław IV*, 98-9; Wisner, *Władysław IV Waza*, 80-1; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 85-6.

12 Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 105, 133-49.

13 Zofia Trawicka, "Projekt kalwińskiego małżeństwa Władysława IV", *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce*, 11 (1966): 93-100; Jan Dziegielewska, *O tolerancję dla zdominowanych. Polityka wyznaniowa Rzeczypospolitej w latach panowania Władysława IV* (Warszawa: PWN, 1986), 93-8; Edward A. Mierzwa, *Anglia a Polska w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Warszawa: PWN, 1986), 147-53; Andrzej Korytko, "Echa znad Wisły. Dyplomaci weneccy o mariażu Władysława IV z Elżbietą Wittelsbach", in *Ad fontes. Studia ofiarowane Księdzu Profesorowi Alojzemu Szorcowi w siedemdziesiątce*

to marry a niece of the King of England was a perfect concept from the point of view of a pan-European conflict as it brought Władysław into one of the strategic centres of the war. It was so as the Palatinate was highly significant both from the military and from the ideological point of view. It was where the interests of Bavaria, Spain, the Netherlands, England, France, and even Sweden crossed. The election of Frederick V Elector of the Palatinate the King of Bohemia transformed local uprisings into a pan-European conflict, and the “Winter King” became the unquestioned leader of the Empire’s Protestants. After the defeat at the Battle of White Mountain and capture of the Electoral Palatinate by the armies of Ambrosio Spinola, deprived of title and power, Frederick V and his family found refuge in the Netherlands. Most of his lands were occupied by Spanish troops until the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, when they were taken over by the Swedish, who controlled them until the Battle of Nördlingen. Beginning with the marriage of Frederick V to Elisabeth Stuart, daughter of James I, in 1613, the Electoral Palatinate was connected to England with especially close ties. Even the occupation of James I’s estates by the Spanish did not interfere with the English-Spanish rapprochement. The aggravation of the relationships between the two countries only lasted for a brief moment after accession of Charles I to the throne. However, faced with the French threat, England and Spain started a new round of talks in 1627. On 15 November 1630 they resulted in the signing a treaty on peace, mutual relations, and trade¹⁴. In the 1630s, Charles I conducted a highly complex foreign policy, negotiating with states involved in the opposing political and military blocks. This to a certain extent was similar to the foreign policy run by Władysław IV, as both the English and Polish kings retained neutrality, allowed the belligerent parties to recruit, and “seized” every opportunity the international situation offered to attain their political and dynastic goals. One of the key goals for the Charles I was to regain the Palatinate for Frederick V, and after his death in 1632, for Charles Louis.

A consequence of the alliance with Spain was the resumption of the diplomatic negotiations between the King of England and the Emperor after a nearly ten-year break. Already in 1630, at the Diet of the Empire in Regensburg, Robert Anstruther, a representative of Charles I unsuccessfully raised the issue of the restitution of the Palatinate. In June of the following year he arrived with a Palatinate diplomat Johann van Rusdorf in Vienna to lobby for the restitution of the Electoral Palatinate for Frederick V and his heirs. In 1630–36 negotiations on the English–Habsburg alliance and trade treaties were conducted by Spanish diplomats (Carlos Colona, Juan de Necolalde) in London and the English ones (Hopton, John Taylor, and Walter Aston) in Madrid, with the English always raising the issue of the Palatinate¹⁵.

The progress in English-Spanish negotiations also forced Vienna to continue talks with Charles I. A new ambassador extraordinary, John Taylor, arrived at the imperial court in November 1635. Working with the Spanish diplomats, he lobbied for the recovery of the Palatinate for the successors to Elisabeth Stuart in exchange for an alliance with the Emperor in Spain. The messages Taylor sent to the English court informed about Vienna’s favourable attitude to England, and prospects of granting Charles Louis at least a part of his father’s inheritance, and thus gave hope for a positive resolve of the issue of the Palatinate to Charles I and partisans of pro-Habsburg policy. However, when a new English ambassador extraordinary, Earl Arundel Thomas Howard arrived in Vienna early in 1636, Ferdinand II rejected the possibility of restituting the Palatinate and the title of the elector to the heirs

urodzin, eds. Zoja Jaroszewicz-Pieresławcew and Irena Makarczyk (Olsztyn: Pracownia Wydawnicza “Elset”, 2006), 177–82; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 110–49. Cfr. Elizabeth Godfrey, *The Sisters of Prince Rupert, Elizabeth Princess Palatine and Abbess of Herford* (London-New York: John Lane, 1909), 70–3; Rainer Pape, “Elisabeth von der Pfalz”, in *Westfälische Lebensbilder*, ed. Robert Stupperich (Münster: Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Westfalen, 1979), 23–41. Catharine Newmark, “Prinzessin Elisabeth von Böhmen”, in *Von Diana zu Minerva: Philosophierende Aristokratinnen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Ruth Hagenruber (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2012), 50–7.

14 Albert J. Loomie, “Olivares, the English Catholics and the Peace of 1630”, *Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire*, 47/4 (1969): 1154–66; Lawrence John Reeve, “Quiroga’s Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy during The Thirty Years War”, *The English Historical Review*, 101 (1981): 913–25; Id., *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 249–57.

15 Reeve, *Charles I and the Road*, 226–91; Porfirio Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia hispano-inglesa en el siglo XVII. Razón de Estado y relaciones de poder durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años, 1618–1648* (Cuenca: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2002), 93–114.

of Frederick V. As far as the transfer of a chunk of the Palatinate to Charles Louis was concerned, he recommended talking to Spain, as these were the Spanish troops that occupied the territory¹⁶.

WŁADYSŁAW IV AND THE PALATINATE: THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA TO MARRY ELISABETH WITTELSBACH

In conjunctions with the war in the Empire started by Gustavus Adolphus, the negotiations between the English king and the Habsburgs presented above were particularly significant for the development of Władysław's political concepts and their fulfilment. For it was only during peacetime, and even a minor political rapprochement of Charles I with Spain and Austria, that the Polish king could continue to plan working with England and conduct negotiations concerning his marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate. For in the face of the English-Habsburg conflict, which at the time would also mean support of Charles I for Sweden and the Netherlands, Władysław would not pursue a rapprochement with England, as that would threaten his relations with Vienna and Madrid.

A view prevailing among Polish historians suggests that the plan of the king's marriage to Elisabeth emerged during the election *sejm* following the death of Sigismund III, or at the latest during the coronation *sejm* of Władysław IV. However, there are multiple indications suggesting that the concept of that marriage was born late in 1631, while Sigismund III was still alive. Its origin needs to be sought in the events connected to the activity of the English diplomacy in the Habsburg courts in 1630-31. The English lobbying for the restitution of the Palatinate made the Vasas aware of the significance of that area in European politics, and it was Charles I with his policy of looking for allies in Madrid and Vienna that opened up options for new stratagems in the game played on the international arena. Sigismund III and Władysław IV found that new situation an opportunity to position themselves in the centre of European politics, as the issue of the patrimony of Frederick V became a catalyst for the construction of a new system of coalitions in the European conflict. This could result in further escalation of the war, but it could equally well support the activities serving the start of international peace talks. These were the circumstances of the birth of the plans to have Władysław marry Elisabeth, niece of Charles I, and slightly later also of the European peace mediation that, if fulfilled, could make it possible for the Vasas to return to the throne in Stockholm or, depending on the circumstances, become instruments of pressure on obtaining the greatest possible Habsburg aid in the war on Sweden, and on obtaining estates and dignities for the brothers in the areas ruled by the House of Austria.

I presented the details and particulars of the concept of King's marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate in a work entitled *Pax i Mars*, in which I pointed to the significance of young Prince Władysław's stay in Prague and Cheb in 1631, and diplomatic missions held in the same year: of Jan Rakowski to London and of Mikołaj Gniewosz to Paris¹⁷. A study of the activity of Polish diplomacy in the last year of reign of Sigismund III in conjunction with the international situation also allows to claim that a draft concept of Prince Władysław marrying Elisabeth of the Palatinate originated as far back as in 1631. The illness and death of Sigismund III and the period of *interregnum*, however, prevented it efficiently. Nonetheless, Władysław IV decided to disclose the plan of that wedding, as discreetly as unofficially, to some European rulers already at the coronation *sejm* in February 1633.

MATRIMONIAL DIPLOMACY: BERLIN – THE HAGUE – LONDON

A few days after being elected king, Władysław started a grand diplomatic campaign, lasting for over five years, sending missions to the West: Janusz Radziwiłł to London, Brussels and the Hague, Gerard Denhoff to Copenhagen, Jan Zawadzki to Berlin, Dresden, the Hague and London, Piotr Gembicki to Vienna, Stanisław Szczucki to Paris, Wilhelm Forbes to Madrid, Magnus Ernest Denhoff to Berlin

16 John H. Elliott, "The Year of the Three Ambassadors", in *History and Imagination. Essays in Honour H.R. Trevor-Roper*, eds. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl and Blair Worden (London: Duckworth, 1981), 165-81; Thea L. Lindquist, *The Politics of Diplomacy: The Palatinate and Anglo-Imperial Relations in The Thirty Years' War* (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 2001); David Worthington, *Scots in the Habsburg Service, 1618-1648* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004), 177-200.

17 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 118-27.

and Dresden, and Jerzy Ossoliński to Rome¹⁸. Their endeavours were supported by the king's residents: Francisco Bibboni in Vienna and Pio Domenico Orsi in Rome. This is how, even with no permanent embassies at his disposal, the king covered the whole of Europe with a temporary diplomatic network. The scope of activity and the objectives of the diplomats varied, as they were adjusted to the relationships of the Commonwealth with the country they were sent to. Other than notification about Władysław IV acceding to the Polish throne, there were two other overarching goals: gaining support for the king's rights to the Swedish crown, and acceptance for the peaceful intermediation during the continuing war. Some of the aforementioned diplomats were also expected to take action regarding the marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate.

The king maintained that network until 1638, entrusting the returning diplomats with successive missions and posting new ones, including Jan Zawadzki to London, the Hague and Paris, Aleksander Przypkowski to the Hague and London, Stanisław Mąkowski to Madrid, Domenico Roncalli to Rome, Mikołaj Korff to Copenhagen, Maciej Pstrokoński to the Hague, Father Valerian Magni and Jerzy Ossoliński to the Emperor and the Diet of the Empire, and Andrzej Rey to London.

Opening the game with the Palatinate marriage gambit, and lobbying for the support of European monarchs for his role of a mediator, the Pole considered strengthening cooperation with Protestant states a priority. In the attainment of this part of his plans, Władysław IV assigned an important role to the court in Berlin. George William, a Prussian vassal of the Polish king was to act as the intermediary in starting and strengthening cooperation with Protestant rulers in a number of areas: mediation between Władysław IV and Sweden, assistance in gaining the support of Protestant states for the peace mediation, and an important negotiator in marrying a Calvinist¹⁹. Elisabeth Charlotte, wife of George William, was a daughter of Frederick IV Elector of Palatinate and Louise Juliana of Orange, sister of Frederick V, and aunt of Elisabeth of the Palatinate. It was not a coincidence that setting forth to the west, Jan Zawadzki took a roundabout way, and first went to Königsberg, to visit the Elector dowager Louise Juliana and Elisabeth Charlotte, to assure them about the king's readiness to lobby in the imperial court for the return of the Palatinate to the Elector's heirs²⁰. However, it is most likely that he did not take up the question of the marriage while staying in Berlin. However, an order to disclose unofficially the king's nuptial plans was given to Magnus Ernest Denhoff, who arrived in the court of George William in April 1633.

The crucial task assigned to Zawadzki, sent to the Hague and London, was to win the favour of the Protestant states for the king's peaceful mediations, the unofficial disclosure of his nuptial plans, and also learning the opinions of those courts on the return of the Polish Vasas to the throne of Sweden. In his journey, the diplomat visited all the members of Elisabeth of the Palatinate's nearest family. As mentioned before he met Louise Juliana and Elisabeth Charlotte. From the Hague he moved to the camp of Frederick Henry, Duke of Orange, laying siege to Rheinberg, where he met Elisabeth's brothers, and certainly Rupert. What was, however, of key importance were the conversations of the Polish envoy with Elisabeth Stuart. Information on their course can be found in the letters she exchanged with Thomas Roe²¹. It proves that the diplomat did not directly refer to the subject of the marriage at the audience. In a letter to the Queen of Bohemia, written just before leaving the Hague, Zawadzki himself reminded her that Władysław IV wanted to be a mediator and bring peace to the Empire. One of the conditions for pacifying the situation must be returning the Palatinate to the heirs

18 Henryk Wisner, "Dyplomacja polska w latach 1572–1648", in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. II: 1572–1795, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1982), 87–161.

19 Władysław Czapliński, *Polska a Prusy i Brandenburgia za Władysława IV* (Wrocław: Wrocławskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1947), 24–80.

20 Marta Szymańska, "Misja Jana Zawadzkiego na dwory Europy Północnej w 1633 roku a geneza polityki zagranicznej Władysława IV", in *Władza i polityka w czasach nowożytnych. Dyplomacja i sprawy wewnętrzne*, eds. Małgorzata Karkocha and Zbigniew Anusik (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2020), 87–106.

21 See *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia*, vol. 2, ed. Nadine Akkerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

of Frederick V, to which end the Polish king shall undertake “certain means” (*quelques moyens*)²². Answering Elisabeth’s letters, Roe clearly stated that the purpose of the visit of the Polish Ambassador to the Hague was to learn the opinions concerning the marriage of her daughter to Władysław IV. After Zawadzki’s arrival in Edinburgh and his first audience, the ambassador of Venice, Vincenzo Gussoni, wrote that everyone in the English court would be glad if the Polish king married the Princess of the Palatinate²³. However, while sojourning in the court and during the audiences with the English King, the envoy did not mention the question of marrying Elisabeth, even though that part of his king’s plans had already been known in England. It was only the mission of Aleksander Przyppkowski, who visited Elisabeth Stuart in the Hague in 1635, and arrived in London in the following month, provided the official opening of the King’s marriage negotiations with the Stuarts.

Charles II fully supported his niece’s marriage to Władysław IV. He believed a dynastic alliance to be more advantageous for both the parties, as it would strengthen the trade between England and Poland, reinforce their position over the Baltic, and let the Polish party recruit mercenaries in Scotland and Ireland as well as purchase arms. Following the principle of legalism, he recognised Władysław’s rights to the throne in Stockholm, however he did not entertain the possibility of England participating in the invasion of Sweden. Realising he had to lend credibility to his actions, and the propagandist significance of contacts with the King of England, the Pole sent his diplomats to the court in London virtually every year from 1633 to 1637. They were Janusz Radziwiłł in 1633, Aleksander Przyppkowski in 1633, Jan Zawadzki in 1633, again Aleksander Przyppkowski in 1635, again Jan Zawadzki in 1636, and Andrzej Rey in 1637²⁴. At the same time he tried to convince the English diplomats staying in Poland, agent Francis Gordon and ambassador George Douglas (one of the mediators in the Polish–Swedish peace negotiations), that his declarations to wed the Princess of the Palatinate are honest and sincere, and do not result from political calculations.

ROME: THE GAME AROUND THE DISPENSATION

The activities of Władysław IV in Rome were important to add credence in the European courts to his intentions to marry Elisabeth. As early as in the spring of 1634 the king used his resident in Rome, Abbot Pio Domenico Orsi, to make the first attempts to acquire the pope’s dispensation to marry the Princess of the Palatinate. Here, the king could not count on the support of nuncio Onorato Visconti, who was an ardent opponent of marrying a Calvinist, and, following the orders from Rome, opposed these plans anyway he could. Fully aware of the significance of the channels of communication used by the papal diplomacy for the transfer of information in Europe, Władysław IV entered a particular game with Visconti, in which he was supposed to be the sender of messages confirming the King’s readiness to marry Elisabeth. Francesco Barberini, heading the Secretariat of State of the Holy See opposed the marital plans. In turn, Pope Urban VIII, whose pontificate involved refocusing the policy of Rome, from unconditionally support for the Habsburgs to a more neutral one with clear francophone sympathies, decided to choose the wait-and-see attitude and kept postponing the final decision concerning the marriage of Władysław IV to a Calvinist²⁵.

The talks on the dispensation sped up significantly in the spring of 1635. Acting on the information

22 Jan Zawadzki to Elizabeth Stuart, s.l. 30 May 1633, in Akkerman, *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, 181–82.

23 Vincenzo Gussoni to the Senate, London 8 July 1633, in *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 23, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London: Published by H.M.S.O., 1921), 123.

24 The diplomatic relations between Poland and England in 1633–37 have been very well researched. Especially worth mentioning are the works of Jan K. Fedorowicz, *England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century. A Study in Anglo-Polish Commercial Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mierzwa, *Anglia a Polska*; Zdzisław Tażbierski, *Związki Polski z Anglią od schyłku XIV do połowy XVIII wieku. Studium z dziejów polityki dynastycznej* (Olsztyn: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna, 1999); Anna Kalinowska, “The Polish Match? British Diplomacy, Poland-Lithuania and the Stuart-Vasa Dynastic Alliance Project”, *Sarmatia Europaea*, 2 (2011/2012): 7–27.

25 Paweł Duda, “Stolica Apostolska a projekt małżeństwa Władysława IV z Elżbietą von Wittelsbach”, in *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata w epoce nowożytnej i XX wieku*, eds. Krzysztof Ożóg and Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: PAU, 2020), 121–40.

received from Count d'Avaux and carrying out his plan to discourage Władysław IV from an alliance with Habsburgs, Cardinal Richelieu decided to support the king's effort to obtain a marriage dispensation from Urban VIII or to have the king marry one of the candidates France found suitable, namely Marie Louise Gonzaga, her younger sister Anna and Anne Genevieve Bourbon²⁶. Moreover, Louis XIII proposed the marriage of Anne Catherine Vasa to Gaston, Duke of Orléans, however, carrying that plan out required the papal annulment of his marriage to Marguerite. The negotiations on the dispensation for the Polish king were conducted by the French ambassador to Rome, François Noailles, supported by the Bishop of Montpellier, Pierre de Fenouillet, and later also by the ambassador extraordinary and Cardinal of Lyon, Alphonse-Luis du Plessis de Richelieu, Armand's brother. The aid of the French diplomacy made Władysław IV send Domenico Roncalli, a Canon of Warmia, on a mission to Rome, to intensify the lobbying for the permission for the planned marriage²⁷. In the several months to come, Rome became the stage of fierce rivalry between French and Habsburg diplomacies (the Spanish ambassador Marquis de Castel Rodrigo vs. the Emperor's ambassador Duke di Bozzolo) concerning the dispensation for the Polish king. Roncalli and Orsi conducted the negotiations with the diplomats of both the parties in a highly skilful manner, most likely in line with the king's guidelines, giving them hopes for the support of their positions. In the wake of the talks between Marquis de Castel Rodrigo and the Canon of Varmia, the court in Madrid instructed Abbot Vázquez and Count de Solre to travel immediately to Vienna and Warsaw, to oppose the French influence in Poland, and negotiate the most favourable conditions for the alliance of Władysław IV with the Habsburgs and his marriage with the Emperor's daughter. The negotiations in Rome were also material for Louis XIII's acceptance of the Polish king as a peace mediator at the pope's side.

Cancellation of Władysław's plans to marry Elisabeth put a natural end to the lobbying for the dispensation, and Urban VIII was not forced to take the a clear position, delegating the duty to the congregation of cardinals, which persistently rejected the petition of the Polish king. Applying to the Pope for a permission to marry a Calvinist, the Polish Vasa did realise the impossibility of obtaining it, even if he inspired the cardinals with a vision of re-Catholicisation of Sweden. That, however, was necessary to present his marriage plants credibly. Even if the fight for dispensation was a mystification, it was perfectly well played, and proved that the king was well-versed in his contemporary complex diplomatic games.

PHILIP IV AND OLIVARES: A WIFE FOR THE VASA

For Spanish diplomacy, Władysław IV was one of the most important figures on the European geostrategic board. Philip IV and Count-Duke of Olivares defined a far more important role for the Vasas and the Commonwealth in their strategic plan than the successive emperors and their councillors, who might construe Poland as an ally in fighting the Turks but also as a rival in central and eastern Europe. After ascension of Władysław IV to the throne, what mattered most to Spain was not as much keeping the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth among the neutral allies but turning it into a military ally that would not only reopen the war on Sweden after the expiry of the armistice but would also provide military support for Habsburgs in Germany, and later perhaps even against France²⁸. In a letter to Philip IV of December 1632, Duke de Feria thus referred to the Polish king attacking Swedes on their own territory:

it would be important for Your Majesty to aid and assist that monarch in the best of possible ways, as with only one daughter of Gustav left, there may be no other opportunity as good as this [...] after providing aid to that prince of blood, and moreover Catholic, the advantages for Your Majesty will be

26 Serwański offers an extensive insight into the subject in his *Francja wobec Polski*, 133-49.

27 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 133-39.

28 For Poland's relations with Spain in this period see Szelągowski: *Rozkład Rzeczy*, passim; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, passim; Miguel Conde Pazos, *La Monarquía Católica y los confines orientales de la cristiandad, relaciones entre la Casa de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia* (PhD diss., Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2016), 306-86.

great, as transferring war [to Sweden – author's note] would remove not only the Swedish commanders but also troops and soldiers from Germany, where they reside today. If, God willing, King Władysław renders great harm to the Dutch, who hold significant trade in the Baltic Sea with that kingdom [...] it will always be a great benefit for us that the Polish king has great power and reputation²⁹.

The best proof to the great hopes that the Spanish vested in Władysław IV is the arrival of ambassador extraordinary Count de Siruel to the coronation of the Polish king in Cracow. The hopes were mutual, as the Vasa considered Philip IV one of his key allies, capable of providing him with a financial and military (fleet) support, and also supporting his relationships with the Emperor. Forbes's and Mąkowski's missions in 1633–34 reinforced the conviction of the court in Madrid that the Commonwealth would resume the war with Sweden after the expiry of the armistice.

From the accession of Władysław IV to the throne, Spanish diplomacy kept a very close eye on the king's new marriage plans. The information about the intended marriage to a Calvinist reached the court in Madrid in June/July 1633 and immediately became subject of debate at the Consejo de Estado³⁰. Philip IV considered the marriage of the Polish king the best means of reinforcing the Vasa-Habsburg friendship, as it would make it possible to further joint interests in various parts of Europe, which is why he openly supported one of Ferdinand II's daughters, ordering Count de Oñate, his ambassador to Vienna, to discuss the matter with the Emperor. Unlike the Emperor, who was absolutely uninterested in the first diplomatic leaks concerning Władysław's marriage, the King of Spain reacted quickly and decisively.

The question of the marriage of the Polish king returned in November 1634, when reports about his intention to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate again reached Madrid and Brussels from various corners of Europe. In his letters to Olivares, Antonio Sarmiento de Acuña residing in Italy on a diplomatic mission, informed that, sojourning in Florence, Charles Ferdinand Vasa shared the news of the idea of Władysław IV marrying Frederick V's daughter with Ferdinand II, Duke of Tuscany. In turn, Don Diego de Saavedra y Fajardo, ambassador to Bavaria, notified that he was informed in a letter from the Elector of Cologne, Archbishop Ferdinand Wittelsbach, about the progress of the negotiations on the marriage of the Polish king to the niece of the King of England³¹. Philip IV again ordered Count de Oñate and diplomats in other European courts to follow the course of negotiations, and thwart them. Even though Philip IV considered Poland a strategic ally, and considered it necessary for Poland to restart the war with Sweden and block the Polish king's option to marry a Protestant, until the spring of 1635, much like the Emperor, he had not undertaken any direct actions at the court in Warsaw. It was only with the war with France being unavoidable that, in April 1635, he sent to Poland a legacy announced for two years. It was entrusted to Count de Solre and Father Alonso Vázquez de Miranda, Abbot of Santa Anastasia. The instructions prepared for the two diplomats contained separate sections devoted to the marriage of King Władysław IV³². Their duty was to oppose strongly the intentions of marrying Elisabeth and have the Pole marry the candidate supported by Philip IV. The King of Spain considered marrying one of the Emperor's daughters or Anna de Medici, sister of the Duke of Tuscany, the best solution. In matters related to that marriage, both the diplomats were instructed to cooperate with the ambassadors at the imperial court: Count de Oñate and Marquis de Castañeda, Capuchin Father Valerian Magni, and one of Władysław IV's trusted ministers.

INDIFFERENTISM AND THE EMPEROR'S FAILED HOPES: FROM CONIUNCTIO ARMORUM TO THE TRUCE OF ALTMARK

During the *interregnum* following the death of Sigismund III, the activity of imperial diplomacy in Poland was low compared to the previous three interregna. A proof of a certain chill in the relations

29 AGS, Est., 3832, *Duke of Feria to Philip IV*, Milan 26 December 1632, f. 103.

30 AGS, Est., 2459, *Philip IV to Duke of Feria and Marquis of Castañeda*, Madrid 13 VII 1633, f. 170.

31 *Diego de Saavedra y Fajardo to Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand*, Braunau 10 November 1634, in Aldea Vaquero, *España y Europa en el siglo XVII. Correspondencia de Saavedra Fajardo*, t. II (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1991), 409–10.

32 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 73–84.

between the Vasas and the court in Vienna is the fact that the Emperor sent no representative to the coronation of the king, which is the more astonishing if the rank of the envoys of Bavaria and Spain is taken into account. Although the imperial agent Clemens Radolt was present at the coronation *sejm*, he did not participate in any official ceremonies as an official representative of Ferdinand II. His mission resulted in the renewal of the alliance treaty from 1613. Nonetheless, this changed little in the mutual relationships that deteriorated even further in March, as some Polish troops enlisted in imperial service began to return to Poland for the war with Muscovy.

Soon after the coronation *sejm*, the Grand Secretary of the Crown, Piotr Gembicki, visited Ferdinand II to ask his consent to the peace mediation in the war on the territory of the Empire. Similarly, the Danish king Christian IV arrived with an initiative of starting peace talks in December 1632. Ditlev Reventlow, Count of Wartenleben, and his mission were favourably received at the imperial court. Ferdinand II expressed his consent to the mediation by the Danish king. That was the reason why Gembicki received two extensive memoranda, *Considerationes pro regno Poloniae in futuro tractatu pacis* and *Circa pacis conditiones*, which were to provide a proof that the king had a well designed concept and an agenda for the negotiations³³. The mission of the Polish diplomat failed. The Emperor made it clear to the Vasa that he saw no option for him to manage the peace talks. The lobbying in support of the mediation had no support from the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg either. Such a position of Ferdinand II came to the king as no surprise. It confirmed the concept developed earlier that Władysław could only count on the actual aid of Vienna in regaining the Swedish throne had he put a powerful pressure on the Emperor by pointing to alternative political options. In fact, it was the Emperor's refusal that made the Polish king start diplomatic endeavours connected to the marriage with the Princess of the Palatinate in Protestant courts.

For nearly two years after Gembicki's mission there were no exchanges of legates between Vienna and Warsaw. However, at that time the Emperor and the king exchanged letters that included subjects connected to Muscovy, Turkey, and the steps taken by the Danish king Christian IV. The two, however, refrained from subjects concerning war with Sweden, peace mediation, and the marriage of the Polish king. A change only occurred in the autumn of 1634, when Father Valerian Magni, entrusted by Władysław IV with a mission to Vienna, arrived in Poland³⁴. Perfectly well versed in the plans and intrigues of the Catholic courts, the Capuchin Father was to obtain Ferdinand's support for the key military and political plans of the Polish king concerning the military and financial aid in the Polish–Swedish war, coordination of actions against Sweden, and consent for peace mediation³⁵.

The arrival of Father Valerian in Vienna, the start of negotiations between the Polish and Swedish commissioners in Pasłęk, and the announcement of convening the *sejm* in Warsaw on 31 January 1635 forced Ferdinand II to start direct negotiations at the court in Warsaw. The mission was entrusted to Mathias Arnoldin von Clarstein, already familiar with Poland. He was given two overarching goals: countering the Polish–Swedish peace negotiations and resumption of the war between the two states, and obtaining a permit for recruitment to the imperial army. Ferdinand II tried to convince Władysław IV and the *sejm* that, after the victorious wars on Muscovy and Turkey, the Commonwealth was perfectly prepared to conduct a war that would provide support for the Catholic armies fighting in the territory of Germany. Therefore, the envoy sent to Warsaw needed appropriate proposals and powers to fulfil the goals of his mission. What were then the arguments and proposals that Ferdinand II intended to use to convince Władysław IV and the Commonwealth to the war against Sweden? A study of the documents on the mission of Arnoldin found in Viennese archives allows a definite statement

33 Szelągowski discusses both the documents in *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 51–3.

34 Jerzy Cygan, *Valerianus Magni (1586–1661), "Vita prima", operum recensio et bibliographia* (Romae: Institutum Historicum Capuccinum, 1989), 68–70.

35 About the tasks to be performed by Father Valerian at the Viennese court see *Malatesta Baglioni to Francesco Barberini*, Wiener Neustad 30 December 1634, 13 January 1635 and 20 January 1635 in *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken*, 4/vol. 7: *Nuntiatoren des Malatesta Baglioni, des Ciriaco Rocci und des Mario Filonardi. Sendung des P. Alessandro d'Ales (1634–1635)*, ed. Rotraud Becker (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2004), 99–100, 116–18, 129–30.

that he had none³⁶. No financial or military support whatsoever was mentioned. He gave no support to the endeavours of Władysław to conduct peace mediation, and he was especially loathed to see him joining the negotiations with Saxony, and that despite the approval of Christian IV King of Denmark, John George Elector of Saxony, and the Roman Curia. Ferdinand II rejected the Polish king's concept of a preventive strike against the Swedish army stationed in Silesia, and gave no approval for the coordination of military actions in Silesia, Brandenburg, Western Pomerania, and Mecklenburg.

The news of the developments of the *sejm* in Warsaw (31 January–17 March 1635) debating and passing resolutions "On supporting war against the Swedish", on taxation and on the *levée en masse*, as well as news of the movements and concentration of the Polish army's³⁷ that kept reaching the imperial court made Ferdinand II recognise the resumption of the Polish–Swedish war unavoidable, and in consequence disregard the mediation efforts of the French ambassador to Poland, Count d'Avaux.

The Polish–Swedish armistice signed in Sztumska Wieś (Stuhmsdorf) with support of mediators from France, England, the Netherlands, and Brandenburg in September 1635, was a major surprise for the Habsburg courts. Soon both Ferdinand II and Philip IV realised the error of their policy towards Władysław IV, whose continuation carried a threat of the Commonwealth of Poland–Lithuania joining the anti-Habsburg camp. The more so, as, taking his intentions to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate and the peace mediation as the starting point, the king started a new game with Habsburg, turning France into an instrument of pressure.

THE FRENCH LEVERAGE

For the French court, the missions of Gniewosz and Szczucki were an important sign of Władysław's readiness to start cooperation on more than just peace mediation, due to the expiry of the Polish–Swedish armistice. The arrival of the news of the royal wedding in Paris created new perspectives and hopes to influence the position of the Commonwealth towards the war continuing in Europe. The main goal of France was not to allow the resumption of the Polish–Swedish war in Prussia. The activity of the Polish diplomacy in Protestant states made Cardinal Richelieu believe that Władysław IV could reorient his politics from supporting the Habsburgs to neutrality favourable for France, with an option of making drafts in Poland. A way to achieve that was seen in the king's marriage to a candidate supported by Louis XIII.

France embarked on talks concerning the Polish–Swedish conflict much faster than the Habsburgs did. Count d'Avaux went on a mission to Denmark, Sweden, and Poland as early as in July 1634. His main task was to convince Swedes and Poles about the detrimental impact of the war on both the countries, and prove that the most beneficial solution was the extension of the armistice. D'Avaux reached Sztumska Wieś in the second half of May 1635, and played an exceptionally important role in the peace talks, cooperating with the diplomats from the Netherlands and Brandenburg³⁸.

Possibly already in the latter half of June the king realised that signing a new truce with Sweden cannot be avoided. However, he had his country involved in intensive preparations to the war, as his political and military tactic required. Władysław knew that it would be impossible to obtain aid from Ferdinand II and Philip IV, as, even if they decided to provide some funds in summer, they could not be used for the autumn campaign, as it took many months to recruit, purchase weapons, and expand the fleet. However, not unlike during the negotiations in Altmark, it was the international situation that had a decisive significance. The political circumstances on the European stage, within which the king had to carry out his plan, changed significantly in May. Having concluded an alliance with Sweden, France waged war on Spain, and Ferdinand II signed peace in Prague with Saxony

36 The files on Arnoldin's mission can be found in HHStA, *Polen I*, 57. See Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 77–119; Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita*, 356–66.

37 Andrzej Rachuba, "Litewskie przygotowania do wojny ze Szwecją w roku 1635", in *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją*, ed. Mirosław Nagielski (Warszawa: DiG, 2007), 33–43; Maciej A. Pieńkowski, "Polskie przygotowania do wojny ze Szwecją w 1635 r.", in *Na z góry upatrzonych pozycjach*, eds. Bartłomiej Międzybrodzki, Magdalena Gajda, Krzysztof Fudela and Michał Przeperski (Warszawa-Zabrze: Inforteditions, 2011), 137–46.

38 Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 94–132.

and now conducted talks with the Elector of Brandenburg. The Polish king never intended to break away from the Habsburgs, and now, when his plans could no longer be fulfilled, he had to adjust them to the current international situation. He started a game that, in the new circumstances, was to bring the largest benefits to the Vasa dynasty and to the Commonwealth. In that battle, France became the main tool. The secret talks with ambassador d'Avaux that Władysław conducted since the early July aimed at making an impact on the Swedes and the Habsburgs. The issue with the first were armistice negotiations, as this was primarily the French diplomacy who could have a decisive influence on the position of Sweden and result in the largest concessions in the negotiations. In turn, as far as Habsburgs were concerned, this was a demonstration of the options stemming from the alliance with France: assistance in lobbying for dispensation to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate to be obtained in Rome, concession to the capture of Silesia, financial support, marriage with Marie Louise or Anne Genevieve, and consent to peace mediation by the side of Pope Urban VIII. To make the rapprochement with Louis XIII more credible, the king agreed to the French drafting, announced his readiness to become a peace mediator on behalf of France and Sweden, and announced sending a legate to Paris. In turn, the French expressed support for Władysław IV regaining the throne in Stockholm by way of a marriage to Christina, granting the Vasas rights to the Swedish crown after her death, or at the least having Finland assigned to John Casimir.

Count d'Avaux and Cardinal Richelieu were easily drawn into the game played out by the Polish king. Both parties presented absolutely unrealistic projects. The French promised Władysław the imperial crown, and he presented visions of conducting grand peace negotiations with the participation of Ferdinand King of Hungary, Cardinal Richelieu, Count-Duke of Olivares, Christian IV King of Denmark, and Secretary of State Barberini, as well as of the Polish army entering the Empire in the force of 25'000 people to separate the belligerent parties³⁹. In the real political dimension, Louis XIII first did not want to allow the Polish–Swedish war, secondly would have the Vasas discouraged from reaching an agreement with the Emperor, and therefore, seeing the king ready for further negotiations, presented a draft of an offensive and defensive alliance.

Conducting negotiations with France, Władysław IV sent signals demonstrating the solidity of the alliance with the Catholic camp to the Habsburgs. Simultaneously with sending Maciej Pstrokoński to the Hague on a mission to convince Elisabeth to convert to Catholicism late in June 1635, he had Prince John Casimir leave for Vienna and join the army of Matthias Gallas, where he fought against the French in the rank of a regimental commander. Throughout spring and summer, the king did not thwart the Emperor's emissaries recruiting in the Commonwealth. Conducting negotiations with Louis XIII, Władysław reached his goal. There is no doubt that France played the role of a lever and made Habsburgs realise that the Vasas could unite with the Bourbons, which forced them to renew and strengthen the friendship with the Polish king.

THE TWO FAMILY TREATIES BETWEEN THE VASAS AND THE HABSBURGs

Władysław IV's plans were thwarted by the armistice in Sztumska Wieś. Conducted on a grand scale for three years, the diplomatic game he played at the courts of London, the Hague, Vienna, Madrid, Berlin, Paris, and Rome failed to obtain foreign financial and military aid for the war with Sweden or to make him a peace mediator. Despite assembling an army of 28'000 people and drawing up plans for military operations, Władysław IV did not break off the peace negotiations⁴⁰. He knew that the majority of senators and nobles opposed the resumption of hostilities. He could not be certain about obtaining the *sejm's* consent for further taxes to continue the war or move it to Sweden either. Therefore his plan was based on the premise of a joint and coordinated military effort of the Vasas and Habsburgs against Sweden. Having failed to achieve it, he gave up rather than took the risk of starting an armed conflict. After signing the truce the king had to start the last stage of the game to ally with the Habsburgs and take care of the future of his brothers and sisters.

39 Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 167-77; Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 113-58.

40 See footnote 37.

Armistices with Sweden and France, and maintaining the intention to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate finally forced Vienna to revise its previous policy towards the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania late in the autumn of 1635 and start the negotiations with the Vasas, to counteract the French influence and re-establish the strong bonds between the Polish monarch and the Habsburgs. The arrival of Alexander Greiffenclau, the Emperor's extraordinary resident, at the autumn session of the *sejm* marked the start of a reset in that friendship. In the speech delivered at the audience on 4 December 1635, the imperial resident emphasised the Emperor's understanding for the conclusion of the Polish-Swedish armistice and the king's and Commonwealth's peace aspirations. However his pivotal task was to obtain the permission for the Emperor to take over some troops recruited during the Polish preparations to the war on Sweden. Władysław IV expressed his consent to such recruitment, and 15'000 soldiers entered the Habsburg service⁴¹.

The Emperor entrusted the main role in rapprochement with the Polish king to Father Valerian Magni. On 23 November 1635 the instruction on the negotiations at the court in Warsaw was ready⁴². It was a reaction to the proposals Władysław made a year earlier. Father Valerian was to convince the Vasa king that the Emperor had always been ready to aid Poland, which was, however, rendered impossible by the international situation and the unexpected conclusion of the Polish-Swedish armistice. Ferdinand II also declared his readiness to provide the Commonwealth with financial and military support should only the *sejm* reject the armistice and war. Moreover, he expressed his readiness to conclude an alliance against Turkey. Magni is also believed to have informed the king that, with Pope Urban VIII assuming the role of the mediator in peace negotiations, the Emperor also approved Władysław IV as the other mediator. The last item in the instruction concerned the marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate. Father Valerian was expected to oppose these plans with all means available. However, the Emperor did not instruct him to conduct talks on the king marrying any other candidate, for example one of his daughters, which was a proof of Ferdinand's lasting and powerful aversion to the Polish monarch.

Magni arrived in Poland in mid-December, his close relationship with the king resulting in the agreement of the fundamental assumptions and the course of future cooperation between the Habsburgs and the Vasas (especially with regard to their common enemies, i.e. primarily Sweden and Turkey) being agreed in a matter of weeks. The Capuchin was keen on starting a very close cooperation between Władysław and Ferdinand that would furthermore be crowned by the signing of an alliance treaty. He was the more eager to achieve these as subsequently the king started intensive lobbying in Rome for having him made cardinal. It cannot be ruled out that the Capuchin suggested that Władysław continued his Palatinate marriage game as it was very useful for exerting pressure on the Emperor. An indication of that could be the mission of Zawadzki who was sent back to the Hague, London, and Paris in March 1636⁴³. He was to inform Charles I that, in the wake of the position of the Polish Senate, the king could only wed the Princess of the Palatinate if she converted to Catholicism. In the French court, the envoy was to seek support for Władysław's peace mediation, and suggest to Louis XIII that the Polish king could marry a candidate proposed by France.

The marriage of the Polish king to one of the Emperor's daughters was to provide the crowning point of the restoration of friendship and cooperation between the Vasas and the Habsburgs. The King of Spain strongly favoured such a solution from the very moment of coronation of Władysław IV. However, despite the pressure from Philip IV, the Emperor did not embark on the subject in contacts

41 HHStA, Polen I, 59, *Ad serenissimum Regem Statusque Poloniae publica propositio Caesarei residentis Alexandri Greiffenclau de Volratz, Novembris 1635*; Ibid., *Jan Wężyk to Ferdinand II*, Warsaw 7 December 1636, ff. 1-5, and Ibid., *Władysław IV to Ferdinand II*, Warsaw 22 December 1635, f. 19. See Ryszard Skowron, "W służbie Filipa IV. Finansowanie i zaciągi żołnierzy z Rzeczypospolitej przez Hiszpanię w latach 1635-1636", in *Hortus bellicus. Studia z dziejów wojskowości nowożytnej. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Mirosławowi Nagielskiemu*, eds. Konrad Bobiatyński, Przemysław Gawron, Krzysztof Kossarzewski, Piotr Kroll and Dariusz Milewski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2016), 261-75; Mirosław Nagielski, "Emperor's recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635", *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski*, 34/4 (2019): 83-100.

42 Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 182-85; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 143-49.

43 Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, 239-41; Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 189-90.

with the Polish and Spanish courts. The change occurred when Count de Solre and Abbot Vázquez, Spanish diplomats travelling to Poland in March/April 1636, reached Vienna. Their main task was to convince Ferdinand II to put a quick end to the disputes with the House of Vasa by having Władysław IV marry one of the Emperor's daughters, which the Spanish court considered the fundamental and necessary condition for the Commonwealth to resume the war against Sweden. However, rather than yielding to the pressure from Madrid, Ferdinand II emphasised that any negotiations concerning the marriage with Archduchess Cecilia Renata could only begin after the conclusion of Jan Zawadzki's mission to England and the Stuarts' rejection of the proposal to have Princess Elisabeth convert to Catholicism⁴⁴. The steadfastness of the Emperor's position on this issue is also borne out by his talks to Jerzy Ossoliński during the latter's mission to the *Reichstag* in Regensburg.

In the latter half of June 1636, Count de Solre and Abbot Vázquez arrived in Poland. Working closely with Father Valerian, they played a key role in closing the links between Władysław IV and not only Spain but also Vienna. Their main task was to make the king's marriage to Archduchess Cecilia Renata happen and to have the war against Sweden resumed. At that time Philip IV considered the Commonwealth the main ally of the Habsburgs, whose support would not only result in having the Swedish driven out of Germany but also in sending armies to fight France by the Rhine. The above were the reasons why the Spanish monarch expected his Austrian relatives to make a quick and decisive change in their policy towards the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania⁴⁵.

The path to the direct negotiations of the marriage of the Polish king to the Emperor's daughter opened when a letter of Charles I of England, in which the king firmly rejected the possibility of Elisabeth of the Palatinate converting to Catholicism, reached the Polish court in the latter half of August. Already in September Władysław sent Father Magni on a mission to Regensburg⁴⁶. The cleric was given the task to conduct negotiations on the Vasa-Habsburg alliance that would be guaranteed by the King's marriage to Archduchess Cecilia Renata. Magni arrived in Regensburg with a list of political and dynastic preconditions (still unknown to us), on whose fulfilment any further negotiations depended. That list provided the foundation for drafting the treaty of alliance.

Ferdinand II was quick to accept the proposals of the Polish king, and the treaty on the alliance between the Houses of Habsburg and Vasa was signed already on 14 December 1636 not only by the Emperor but also by his successor Ferdinand III. Both parties to the contract, that is the Austrian House of Habsburgs, and the elder Sigismund line of the Vasa undertook to cooperate closely and mutually safeguard their dynastic interests⁴⁷. The Emperor pledged political and military aid for Władysław IV to regain Sweden. Should the wars on Turkey be victorious, the captured territory was agreed to become a hereditary or feudal possession of a member of the House of Vasa. The Emperor was to support the Sigismund through marriages, and endowments of titles and dignities. In return, in his capacity of the King of Sweden, Władysław IV transferred the right to the Swedish crown after the extinction of the House of Vasa to the Habsburgs, and, as the ruler of Sweden and Poland, promised not to enter any treaties conflicting with the interests of Austria. The dynastic treaty was accompanied by a document (unknown today) in which Ferdinand II agreed that the dowry of Cecilia Renata, the unpaid dowries of Queens Anne and Constance, and other Emperor's pecuniary dues payable to Władysław IV were secured on the duchies of Opole and Racibórz (Ratibor), and Cieszyn. Both the duchies were to be entrusted into hereditary possession to the sons born from the union of the Polish king with Cecilia Renata. The document was brought to Warsaw by Francesco Magni.

The dynastic treaty and the marriage agreement were the success of Władysław IV. The House of Vasa obtained more than just the confirmation of their rights to the Swedish crown as the Emperor

44 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 149-51.

45 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 151-62; Conde Pazos, *La Monarquía Católica*, 383-86.

46 Vincenzo Criscuolo, "Tre diplomatici cappuccini al "kurfürstentag" di Regensburg del 1636-1637: Valeriano Magni, Francesco Rozdrazewski e Diego de Quiroga", *Laurentianum*, 45/1-2 (2004): 59-107.

47 Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeczy*, 255-65. Cf. Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 173-85; Miguel Conde Pazos, "Relaciones entre los Habsburgo y los Vasa de Polonia. La embajada a Varsovia del conde de Solre y Alonso Vázquez y la firma del Tratado Familiar (1635-1660)", in *Tiempo de cambios: guerra, diplomacia y política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648-1700)*, ed. Porfirio Sanz Camañes (Madrid: Editorial Acts, 2012), 298-301.

pledged to provide military assistance in wars with Sweden and Turkey. In the dynastic dimension, the King received what he had been playing for since the start of his reign: hereditary duchies for his descendants in Silesia, and support in the form of salaries and dignities for the members of his family. The main benefactor of the treaty was the House of Vasa, as it gave hardly anything to the Austrian Habsburgs, save for a potential and limited possibility to assume the throne in Stockholm. The motives behind Ferdinand II's decision cannot be fully understood, as those were the very plans of it was because of Władysław IV concerning Silesia that prevented him from entering into political negotiations in 1633–35. Moreover, the military situation in the Reich at the end of 1636 did not require concessions reaching that far, even despite the defeat of the imperial-Saxon army in October by the Swedish at Wittstock. The Emperor may have accepted what Władysław IV proposed under strong pressures from Spain, as the Habsburgs decided that the time had come to put a stop to the king's negotiations with Louis XIII, as they might soon become too dangerous for them.

After the death of Ferdinand II, his son and successor upheld the dynastic treaty already on 16 March 1637. However, he strongly opposed the provisions included in the marriage contract between Cecilia Renata and Władysław IV securing the dowry of the Archduchess and granting fief rights to the duchies of Silesia to their children⁴⁸. Ferdinand III proposed to have Cecilia Renata's dowry and other outstanding dowry and loan payments secured on the Wittengau (Třeboň) estates in Moravia. Despite the advancing preparations to the wedding, the negotiations of the marriage contract continued until August. The king insisted on obtaining a duchy in Silesia for his family and, after a prolonged effort, in 1645 he managed to convince Ferdinand III to entrust the Vasas with the duchies of Opole and Racibórz, to which all the Wittengau estate mortgages were transferred.

Conducting negotiations with the Habsburgs on marrying the Emperor's daughter, the king endeavoured to maintain good relationships with England. Already during Zawadzki's mission in 1636, the Polish king emphasised that the pressure to have Princess Elisabeth convert to Catholicism resulted from the decision of the Parliament and not from his own will. In August 1637, Władysław IV sent Andrzej Rey on a mission to London and the Hague, to present the English king the reasons why the Polish king could not marry his niece, assure him of Władysław's readiness not only to maintain the friendship but also of his continued support for the efforts of restoring the Palatinate to the sons of Frederick V, and the need for further development of trade between the two countries. The mission ended in failure as, annoyed by Władysław IV, the King of England did not invite the diplomat to an audience, which was tantamount to severing the relations between the two countries.

CONCLUSION

The possibility of attaining Władysław's main political goal, namely his return to the throne in Stockholm, depended on both internal factors and the quickly changing international situation, so that the Polish king had to adjust his political, diplomatic, and the military strategy to such circumstances. The way he ran foreign policy, whose fundamental tools were diplomacy and the military, was defined by the law binding in the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. The crucial limitations of the scope of his liberties resulted from the constitutional principles of the state, in force since the fifteenth century, which gave the *sejm* the right to approve the taxes, summon *levée en masse*, and declare war. Thus the monarch was thus deprived of the two fundamental tools for running international politics, namely money and the army, and yet at the same time he had to ensure the security and integrity of the state. The view that the Henrician's Articles (*Articuli Henriciani*) adopted by the election *sejm* of 1573 strongly curtailed the king's liberty of running international politics and subjected it to the control of the nobility is prevalent among Polish historians. However, the author believes that the document, and especially its Article 3 (in conjunction with Article 6) so often quoted by researchers of modern diplomacy did in no way limit the king's prerogatives to run international politics compared to the reign of the last two kings of the Jagiellonian dynasty. Nor did the resolutions concerning resident senators and Senate councils (*senatus consilia*) passed by the *sejm* reduce the monarch's competences, as the institutions

they set up were only consulting bodies with no power of legal sanctions, given the task of controlling the king and informing the nobility about the current foreign policy of the monarch. The studies of Andrzej Korytko and Artur Goszczyński on the organisation and functioning of the Senate and the *senatus consilia* in the reign of Władysław IV demonstrate that as far as diplomacy is concerned, the king carried out his will with high efficiency⁴⁹. Falling back on the experience of his father and using different stratagems for working with the Council of the Senate, he primarily exploited the latter to legitimise his decisions and activity on the international stage. Władysław IV was the last ruler of the Commonwealth who, furthering the interest of the dynasty and the state, could and knew how to carry out autonomous foreign policy, exploiting the binding laws and efficiently opposing the efforts of the estates to expand their rights to external policy. The decline of the royal authority that began practically at the start of the reign of John Casimir greatly sped up the juxtaposition of interests of the state and the monarch, which was also reflected in the further practical, customary, and normative curtailment of the royal competences in the foreign policy. The process intensified under John III Sobieski, and culminated in the seventeenth century with August II's *pacta conventa* of 1697.

On the strategic and tactical levels, the concepts for international political and military actions and the diplomatic game devised and carried out by Władysław IV in 1632-37 were in no way inferior to those of the greatest strategists of the Thirty Years' War, to mention Olivares and Richelieu. The key distinctive factor was the effective power which, in the case of the Polish king, was limited by the will of the *sejm* and the Senate. The king had no option to make decisions on offensive wars and military operations abroad. If that is put together with the ruler's lack of certainty as to obtaining the Parliament's consent to further taxation to continue the war and to take military action to the territories of Germany and Sweden, the plan to seek persistently ways of allying with the Habsburgs and embroiling the Commonwealth in a pan-European war become understandable. The whole process of designing a plan to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate and peace mediation carried out by the Polish diplomacy proves that, despite its contemporary weakness and lack of professionalism, it retained its efficiency and capacity to become part of pan-European negotiations, which certainly had to be accredited to the monarch himself. The armistice in Sztumska Wieś was a failure not only for Władysław IV but also for the Commonwealth. In his policy geared on the West and the North, the king was left alone and could not count on the political people. From a historical perspective, the king's claim that a given political situation needed "seizing on the fly" is consistent with his actions. Moreover the king must have designed such situations himself not only for the use of the nobility but also European rulers.

49 Andrzej Korytko, "Na których opiera się Rzeczpospolita". *Senatorowie koronni za Władysława IV Wazy* (Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, 2015), 247-70; Artur Goszczyński, "The Institution of Council of the Senate in the Political System of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under the Rule of Ladislaus IV Vasa (1632-48)", *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 122 (2021): 181-207.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGS: Archivo General de Simancas

Est.: *Estado*

HHStA: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna

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THE LAST YEARS OF THE REIGN OF JOHN CASIMIR VASA AND *INTERREGNUM* AFTER HIS ABDICATION IN THE LIGHT OF REPORTS OF FRANCIS SANDERSON AND ROBERT YARD¹

ABSTRACT

The last years of the reign of John Casimir, including the *rokosz* of Jerzy Lubomirski, the abdication of Vasa and the *interregnum* of 1668–1669, still arouses great interest among Polish and foreign historians. The internal situation of the Polish-Lithuanian state interested foreign courts, also this one in London. English envoys staying in Gdańsk, Francis Sanderson and Robert Yard meticulously informed about current events in the Commonwealth. Sanderson and Yard correspondence is an interesting source of information about internal events in Poland in the last years of the reign of John Casimir. It should be stated that most of the messages contained in accounts were accurate, sometimes minor mistakes may be encountered. Some of Sanderson's comments and opinions, although appearing relatively rarely, confirm that English diplomats are well-versed in the intricacies of Polish politics, and on the other hand, prove that he has reliable sources of information and competent collaborators. In some reports, we can find detailed descriptions of some events and political moods in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which certainly proves their usefulness in historical research.

KEYWORDS: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; John Casimir Vasa; Diplomacy; English reports; *Interregnum*.

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The last years of the reign of John Casimir Vasa, including the *rokosz*² of Jerzy Lubomirski, the abdication of the monarch and the *interregnum* of 1668–1669, still arouses great interest among Polish and foreign historians. The internal situation of the Polish-Lithuanian state interested foreign courts (the Habsburgs, Louis XIV, Frederick Wilhelm Hohenzollern and Moscow). The Commonwealth remained an important political player in the arena of Europe, and primarily in all central and eastern Europe. This kind of activity of foreign states certainly gained momentum during the *interregnum*, which was related to the desire to force a supported candidate to the throne. However, other European countries were not passive in the face of the events in the Polish-Lithuanian state. Their envoys were sent to keep track of the current internal situation of the country. In the last years of the reign of John Casimir and during the *interregnum*, the English envoy Francis Sanderson stayed in Gdańsk. His main task was to control trade affairs, but in his reports we can find information about the most important events in the Commonwealth. In 1669, he was joined by the extraordinary envoy Peter Wyche and his secretary, Robert Yard. The last-mentioned left several letters describing the course of the election in 1669. Most of their correspondence (probably all of them) was addressed to Joseph Williamson, Secretary of State for the Southern Department; the head of this department was then Henry Bennet³.

1 The article was made as a result of research conducted as part of PRELUDIUM 12 project titled "Attitudes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania elites towards the election of Władysław IV Vasa and Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki" (project n. UMO-2016/23/N/HS3/00679) financed by the National Science Centre in Kraków.

2 Armed appearance of the nobility against the royal authority.

3 Thomas Seccombe, *Williamson Joseph*, in *Dictionary of National Biography*, t. 62 (London: Smith, Elder & co., 1900), 3; Gary M. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509–1688* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1990), 216; David Worthington, *British and Irish Experiences and Impressions of Central Europe 1560–1688* (Farnham: Routledge, 2012), 146.

The main purpose of the article will be to indicate how the English envoys described the most important events of the last years of the reign and *interregnum* after the abdication of John Casimir. Emphasis will be placed on the *rokosz* of Lubomirski, the abandonment of the throne by Vasa, the *interregnum* period and candidates for the throne. An important issue will be to indicate how Sanderson and Yard understood the idea of the *rokosz* as a rebellion of the nobility against royal power, the abdication of the monarch or the idea of free royal election.

The correspondence of the abovementioned English envoys, which was used to elaborate this text, is collected at The National Archives in London⁴. It should be noted here that Sanderson and Yard received news about the events in Warsaw from people unknown to us (perhaps Adrian Stoderts and Reinhold Widders⁵, or Abbot Cosimo Brunetti⁶). It is also known that the English envoys maintained contacts with representatives of the Polish elite, from whom they probably obtained information about current events in the country. This is confirmed, *inter alia*, by the analysis of letters collected in The National Archives.

Due to the policy of maintaining the balance of power in Europe, which developed after the end of the Thirty Years' War, English diplomacy followed, *inter alia*, the events in the Commonwealth, and it seems that it was particularly interested in issues related to unusual events, such as *rokoszes*, wars or the *interregnum* and election of a new monarch. Forcing a given candidate could have decided about the outcome of the fight for supremacy in Europe between the Habsburgs and Louis XIV⁷. Particular interest in the issue of the election of a new ruler is also confirmed by the fact that most probably from 1641 to 1698 there were no English residents in the Commonwealth, and in February 1669, the aforementioned Peter Wyche was delegated here from Russia for a few months⁸. English accounts may be interesting for another reason as well. England was a state that was not directly involved in the course of the *interregnum*, and its deputies were merely observers, and even not eyewitnesses, of the events. They probably drew their knowledge from direct or indirect messages, which should result in research caution. For this reason, their comments were perhaps more objective. However, it cannot be ruled out that Sanderson and Yard were less aware of Poland's internal politics than diplomats from other courts, such as the Brandenburg envoys Johann von Hoverbeck, the French Pierre de Bonzy or the imperial Christopher Leopold Schaffgotsch.

ROKOSZ OF JERZY SEBASTIAN LUBOMIRSKI

The *rokosz* of the Grand Marshal of the Crown, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, which took place in 1665–1666, was certainly one of the most important events in the history of the Commonwealth in the second half of the seventeenth century. The reasons for the outbreak of the nobility's rebellion include the desire to strengthen the royal power by John Casimir and plans to appoint a French candidate on the Polish throne while Vasa was still alive (*vivente rege* election), as well as Lubomirski's private grudge. Due to the possible consequences that the *rokosz* could bring, internal events in the Commonwealth were tracked by foreign diplomacy⁹.

During the rebellion, we encounter numerous interruptions in Sanderson's correspondence. The first letter mentioning this topic comes from 6 June 1665. The letters did not contain information about

4 The analysed correspondence is stored under signatures: TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11 and SP 88/12.

5 More information about the reports of Gdańsk envoys from the *interregnum* in the years 1668–1669 can be find in: Ferdinand Hirsch, "Zur Geschichte der polnischen Königswahl von 1669. Danziger Gesandtschaftsberichte aus den Jahren 1668 und 1699", *Zeitschrift des Westprussischen Geschichtsvereins*, vol. 25 (1889): 20–63.

6 Edward Alfred Mierzwa, *Polska a Anglia w XVII w.* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003), 222.

7 More information about theory "The Balance of Power": Michael Sheehan, *Balance of Power. History and Theory* (London-New York: Routledge, 1996); Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and model* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

8 Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, 213–16; Mierzwa, *Polska a Anglia w XVII w.*, 230.

9 Seccombe, *Williamson Joseph*, 3; Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, 216; Worthington, *British and Irish Experiences*, 146.

the session of the *sejm*, during which the royal oppositionist was convicted of treason and deprived of offices (December 1664). The first break in sending correspondence took place from mid-June to mid-August 1665, and the second from late August to December 1665. It should be noted, however, that only one letter was sent in August (12/22 August 1665). From December 1665 to February 1666, there was another break in the exchanged correspondence. Sanderson blamed the state of affairs on Secretary of State Williamson for not answering his letters.

In the correspondence, we find information about the movements of Lubomirski's army, his whereabouts and health, as well as propaganda activities. We can also find information about the activities of King John Casimir or the convening and course of the *sejm* in 1666¹⁰. In two letters, Sanderson also described the Battle of Mątwy (13 July 1666), during which Lubomirski defeated the royal troops¹¹. In most of his letters, we see anxiety about the complicated situation in the country, and the delegate was unable to foresee the next steps to be taken by the parties of the conflict. For example, he wrote: «Our Polish news are so various that I scarce know now what to write. The only is certain that his Majesty intended to have marched out against the confederated armie»¹². The letters also contain information about the peace talks between the king and Lubomirski and the end of the *rokosz*, about which Sanderson himself counted very much – «we have great hopes the treatie will have a good event». Sanderson in his relation pay attention to fact, that Lubomirski humble himself before John Casimir. He wrote also that Vasa resigned of plans for the *vivente rege* election¹³.

Interesting is also the approach of Sanderson to the issue of *rokosz* and his comments about the nobility's rebellion against the royal power. It turns out that he was quite well versed in the specificities of the political system of the Commonwealth. In several letters he mentions that Lubomirski urged the nobility to join him and defend common freedoms by his side. Interestingly, the English diplomat described this procedure as «the old incentive to rebellion», which confirms the thesis that he knew quite well the specificity of the relationship between the nobility and the king. Note, however, that Sanderson does not use the word *rokosz* in his correspondence. It is difficult to say whether he did not know this concept or did not want to use it not to complicate the provided information¹⁴.

JOHN CASIMIR VASA'S ABDICATION

The abdication of John Casimir Vasa from the Polish throne took place during the *sejm* on 16 September 16, 1668¹⁵. Sanderson informed about the monarch's resignation from the crown several times before that date. In one of the letters of the English agent, we even find information that Pope Clement IX urged John Casimir to remain on the throne of the Polish-Lithuanian state¹⁶. The frequency of this issue in correspondence shows a completely different approach to the problem of abdication by Sanderson than the rebellion question. London was probably more interested in these issues.

10 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 6 June 1665, f. 31r. Other letter sent by Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson in: *Ibid.*, Gdańsk 13 June 1665, f. 32r; Gdańsk 22 August 1665, f. 34r; Gdańsk 26 December 1665, f. 37r-v; Gdańsk 6 February 1666, f. 40r-v; Gdańsk 20 February 1666, f. 41r-v; Gdańsk 6 February 1666, f. 40r-v; Gdańsk 21 August 1666, f. 49r.

11 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 17 July 1666, f. 44r, and Gdańsk 14/24 July 1666, f. 45v.

12 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 3 July 1666, f. 43r.

13 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Warsaw 30 July 1666, f. 46r.

14 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 6 June 1665, f. 31r.

15 Tadeusz Wasilewski, *Ostatni Waza na polskim tronie* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo «Śląsk», 1984), 268-69; Mieczysława Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2006), 13.

16 Among others: TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 23 June 1668, f. 136r; also *Ibid.* Gdańsk 7 July 1668, f. 144r, Gdańsk 28 July 1668, ff. 145r-v, Gdańsk 11 August 1668, f. 146r. More about attitudes of Holy See towards the election in 1668-1669 you can read in the article of Dorota Gregorowicz, «Problem papieskiej neutralności wobec rywalizacji o tron w Rzeczypospolitej w wyniku abdykacji Jana Kazimierza Wazy», in *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata*, eds. Krzysztof Ożóg and Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: PAU, 2020) 141-61.

Sanderson informed London about the act of abdication and the related ceremonies in a letter from 22 September. According to his message, the ceremony began around 1 pm, and John Casimir delivered «a very pathetick oration». Apparently, he made the audience cry¹⁷. A speech full of compliments for John Casimir on behalf of senators and gathered deputies was given by Archbishop of Gniezno Mikołaj Prażmowski. After all the ceremonies and the destruction of the election diploma, the abdicated-king did not allow those present to escort him to the carriage, claiming that at that moment he was only a private person. He went alone to his residence – «to a garding» (probably the private palace of John Casimir at Krakowskie Przedmieście in Warsaw)¹⁸. The envoy, who was in Gdańsk, also informed that during the session of the abdication *sejm*, an *asekuracja* was established for John Casimir, which was exalted 150'000 złoty (100'000 złoty from the Crown and 50'000 złoty from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). Finally, Sanderson announced in his letter that the primate would set the date of the future convocation *sejm*¹⁹. Unfortunately, Sanderson did not leave any private opinion about the events that took place during the abdication *sejm*, and these letters have only reporting nature.

INTERREGNUM IN THE LIGHT OF ENGLISH REPORTS

During the *interregnum* after John Casimir's abdication, Sanderson's correspondence gained momentum. Letters were sent more and more often, and we find in them more detailed information on internal events in the country. It is obvious that Sanderson described the course of the *sejms* in his correspondence, but I would like to omit these issues because it would be reproductive, and the information that the agent brings in there is largely consistent with the current state of knowledge. Therefore, below I would like to discuss the subject that seems to be of most interest to an English envoy, which, in a way, also shows his attitudes and opinions and his ability to obtain information or issue certain political judgments as a diplomat.

THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE INTERREGNUM²⁰

It is natural that Sanderson and Yard reported on major political events during the *interregnum*. Since most of the information that the English envoys sent to London are generally known, I will limit myself in this part to only a brief description and an indication of what was particularly noted. Significantly, Sanderson, for example, makes no mention about the *sejmiki* (local, political, official meeting of nobility) or their conduct, apparently considering their decisions and composition as insignificant. Sanderson described the course of the convocation parliament in some detail in his letters. Information about it can be found in the correspondence from 29 September (about the date of calling the *sejm*)²¹,

17 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11 Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 22 September 1668, f. 164r. The farewell oration of John Casimir Vasa was sent by Sanderson to London, most probably on September 29, 1668, and its Latin copy is kept at The National Archives in London: TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, *Oratio Serenissimo Poloniae Regis Joannis Casimiro Die 16 Sept. Regno esse solenniter abdicantis ad Senatum Gabita atq ex Poloniae in Latinum translate* Ao. 1668, ff. 179r-180r. The letter in which the envoy staying in Gdańsk informs about the sending of speech of John Casimir: TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 29 September 1668, f. 166r.

18 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 22 September 1668, f. 164r; Witold Kłaczewski, *Abdykacja Jana Kazimierza. Społeczeństwo szlacheckie wobec kryzysu politycznego lat 1667–1668* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1993), 232; Wasilewski, *Ostatni Waza*, 269.

19 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 22 September 1668, f. 164r; Wasilewski, *Ostatni Waza*, 268.

20 The reports from the *interregnum* have been discussed by myself in a separate article: Aleksandra Ziober, "Francis Sanderson and Robert Yard reports about an interregnum in the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth after the abdication of Jan Kazimierz Waza", *Res Historica*, n. 47 (2019): 139–56.

21 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 29 September 1668, f. 166r.

24 November²², 1 December²³, 8 December²⁴ and 15 December (information about the end of the *sejm*)²⁵. It is worth mentioning that Sanderson devoted a lot of space in his letters to the general confederation (legal solutions aimed at preventing illegal practices during *interregnum*, including collecting bribes), as well as creating factions and the problem of excluding the French candidate from seeking the Polish throne. In the opinion of the English agent, the question of the general confederation elicited «great dissensions» among the debates. Sanderson believed, in a sense rightly, that it was directed against a candidacy supported by France, but it was also detrimental to Philip William Neuburg²⁶.

Unfortunately, we have much more modest information about the course of the election *sejm*, which resulted from the fact that information on this subject was passed to London by Brunetti, who was not mentioned by name, which in a way relieved Sanderson and Yard from this obligation²⁷. At this point, however, it is worth mentioning at least the election of the Marshal of the election *sejm*, who became the Crown Steward Szczęsny (Feliks) Kazimierz Potocki, a Radziwiłł's supporter, as Sanderson writes in his correspondence. He also noted: «I shall only tell you, it's here beleaved that the nobleman whom they have chosen for their marschall is wholly for the Duke of Neuburgh [and next] so that he's like to carry it from the Loteringer». These polls should be considered the most appropriate at this moment in the game for the throne of the Republic of Poland²⁸. Of course, the English deputies also sent information about the election of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, about which I have provided detailed information in the section «Candidates for the throne».

CANDIDATES FOR THE THRONE

For obvious reasons, a large part of Sanderson's correspondence from the *interregnum* deals with the question of candidates for the Polish throne. During the *interregnum* after the abdication of John Casimir, several important contenders²⁹ fought for the throne of the Commonwealth, but, as Francis Sanderson rightly pointed out, at the time of start of the *interregnum*, no candidate gained a definite advantage. At the same time, he argued that there were at least a few pretenders, «but they are all nothing» and that the whole situation should clarify in the next two months³⁰. According to the information obtained by him in September 1668, some announced the election of the famous de Condé, i.e. Henry or his father Louis. According to Sanderson, many of the highest officials represented this political option, and he described them as «frenchified»³¹.

22 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 24 November 1668, f. 171r.

23 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 1 December 1668, f. 173r.

24 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 8 December 1668, f. 176r.

25 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 15 December 1668, f. 177r.

26 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 1 December 1668, f. 173r.

27 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/12, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 25 May 1669, f. 29r.

28 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/12, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 18 May 1669, f. 28r.

29 Above all, the following were mentioned: the princes d'Enghien Louis or his son Henry, the prince of Neuburg Philip William Wittelsbach, the Brandenburg elector Frederick Wilhelm Hohenzollern, the Lorraine prince Charles V, the Moscow tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov and his sons, Alexei and Fyodor. At that time, the idea related to the election of the king of «Piast» also revived; Jan Sobieski, Dymitr and Michał from Wiśniowiecki family, Aleksander Zasławski-Ostrogski and the famous soldier Aleksander Polanowski were most often mentioned in AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 81, *Speculum in electionem Regni Polonie expositum pro casu abdicatione in quo Polonia expedit prendere has necessitates candidatos comitantes*, ff. 370r-71r. Cf. Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski (1629–1696)* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983), 152; Adam Przyboś, *Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki 1640–1673* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1984), 38; Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała*, 63–83; Andrzej Kamiński, «Kandydatura Hohenzollernów brandenburskich do tronu polskiego od XVI do końca XVIII wieku. Realny cel czy też gra polityczna?», in *Miedzy Zachodem a Wschodem. Etniczne, kulturowe i religijne pograniczna Rzeczypospolitej w XVI-XVIII wieku*, eds. Krzysztof Mikulski and Agnieszka Zielińska-Nowicka (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2006), 31–3.

30 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 29 September 1668, f. 166r.

31 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 22 September 1668, f. 164r; Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała*, 60–1; Kamiński, *Kandydatura Hohenzollernów brandenburskich*, 31–3; Joanna Matyasik, *Obóz politycznych Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2011), 23.

In a letter from 23 March 1669, Francis Sanderson mentions the appearance in Warsaw of a Muscovite envoy who was to present Romanov's proposals and seek the crown for his eldest son. He promised that Alexei would «there upon turn catologue» and would additionally fill «great matters» for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - but we do not know exactly what Sanderson meant³². Rumors that one of the Tsar's sons might change religion practically continued throughout the *interregnum*. Information about this can be found in numerous reports both by foreign deputies and residents of the Commonwealth³³. Most, including the Holy See, did not believe these promises. The Tsar had even to promise that his son would convert to Catholicism; otherwise, he would not be able to fight for the election throne at all, as the applicable law forbade it. However, there were references to the benefits that the appointment of Moskal to the king could bring. Some believed that this would guarantee peace with the eastern neighbour and that the Tsar would return the lands seized during the last war³⁴. A separate issue raised in the correspondence connected with the Tsar was his alleged maintenance of the army «besides whole Lithuania»³⁵. Mentions about this subject appeared in the accounts of other people. However, no confirmation of this information could be found, and it seems that it had rather a propaganda dimension.

The news about the Muscovite candidacy was also provided on 31 March 1669 by Robert Yard, claiming that it was supported by the entire Grand Duchy, in contrast to the Poles who feared the introduction of tyranny³⁶. Some Lithuanians indeed supported the Tsar's efforts in the election struggle. The greatest allies of Romanov, at least in 1667 and in the first half of 1668, were to be Michał Kazimierz and Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac. Most researchers believe that their support for Muscovite's candidacy was, however, only a political game³⁷.

Of course, the English envoys informed London of other pretenders to the throne as well. In December 1668, according to Sanderson, the Emperor officially supported the candidacy of the Wittelsbach. The English diplomat inquired about this matter «of those who pretend to know much» and finally stated that Habsburg supported the actions of the young Duke of Lorraine «who begins to be famous amongst the Poles». There were also many private scriptures spreading the reasons for supporting the mentioned candidate³⁸. It must be acknowledged that Sanderson did have access to good informants because the Emperor really wanted to enthrone to the Polish-Lithuanian state, Charles, the prince of

32 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/12, *Francis Sanderson to N.N. [probably Joseph Williamson]*, Gdańsk 23 March 1669, f. 9r.

33 "Respons jm. p. kasztelana liwskiego p. Łuszczewskiemu", in *Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy 1648-1668. Publicystyka, eksorbitanskie, projekty, memoriały*, vol. III: 1665-1668, ed. Stefania Ochmann-Staniszevska (Wrocław-Warszawa: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1991), 273; "Copia listu p. Dąbskiego chorążego zatorskiego do p. Brzychwy chorążego krakowskiego de data 10 Julii 1668 z Rapki", in ead. *Pisma polityczne*, 280-81; "Zwierciadło na elekcję króla polskiego wystawione in casu abdicationis anno 1668, w którym w Polsce trzeba has necessitates candidatos comitantes upatrować", in Ead., *Pisma polityczne*, 315; Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała*, 65.

34 Zbigniew Wójcik, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667-1672* (Warszawa: PWN, 1968), 126-27; Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała*, 63, 65; Konrad Bobiatyński, *Michał Kazimierz Pac. Wojewoda wileński, hetman wielki litewski* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2008), 199.

35 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/12, *Robert Yard to N.N.*, Gdańsk 1 [?] April 1669, f. 21r-v.

36 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/12, *Robert Yard to N.N.*, Gdańsk 31 March 1668, f. 17r-v.

37 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 81, *Stato delle fattioni nel fine del mese d'Agosto 1668 secondo le relationi e notitie che possono haversene*, f. 385r; Zbigniew Wójcik, "Pacowie wobec kandydatury rosyjskiej na tron polski w latach 1668-1669 (misja Połkowa na Litwie, 1668)", *Przegląd Historyczny*, n. 60/1 (1969): 144-45; Konrad Bobiatyński, "Kandydatura Romanowów na tron Rzeczypospolitej podczas elekcji 1669 i 1674 roku. Realna koncepcja, czy też gra polityczna?", in *Проблеми інтеграції і інкарнації у розвитку Центральної і Усхідньої Європи у першій половині Нового часу*, eds. S.F. Sokal and Andrey Yanushkevich (Minsk: BIP-S Plus, 2010), 349-51; Waclaw Uruszczak, "Fakcje senatorskie w sierpniu 1668 roku", in *Parlament, prawo, ludzie. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Juliuszowi Bardachowi w sześćdziesięciolecie pracy twórczej*, eds. Katarzyna Iwanicka, Maria Skowronek and Kazimierz Stembrowicz (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1996). Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, 152.

38 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 24 November 1668, f. 171r. There were many propaganda writing distributed during the *interregnum*. Their numerous copies are kept in the collections of the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw: AGAD, *Nabytki oddział I*, rkps 1244.

Lorraine³⁹.

In Sanderson's letters we can also find many election polls and opinions on the changing chances of success of candidates. For example, in April 1669 he claimed that Philip William, the Prince of Neuburg, had a very good chance of winning the Polish crown – «I shall only tell you it's not doubted here: the Duke of Neuburg will carry the crown of Poland, if the French really intend what they seem to pretend»⁴⁰–, and Robert Yard added that he enjoyed the support of the Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William⁴¹. However, the situation changed in mid-June 1669. Sanderson, referring to the words of a man sitting in the parliament of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, stated that it was most likely the Lorraine who would manage to win the crown. His greatest opponent, however, was still the Prince of Neuburg⁴². Meanwhile (20 April 20 1669) Sanderson reported to Joseph Williamson «that the Poles have some thoughts of choosing the younger Prince Wiesnewitzsky for their King»⁴³. However, the deputy staying in the Republic of Poland did not treat this option as real and feasible. However, the information provided proves that the possibility of electing Michał Korybut as king was taken into account even before the start of the election *sejm*.

Francis Sanderson informed London about the election of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki on 26 June 1669 (it happened on 19 June). In the letter, he also provided a brief description of him. The deputy also informed about Wiśniowiecki's father, Jeremi, who died during the wars with the Cossacks. In his opinion, he owned huge estates in Ukraine, although destroyed by the Cossacks. Some of them were then held by the Tsar of Moscow. The respondent also briefly mentioned the mother of the new king, Gryzelda née Zamoyska. Sanderson received similar information about the result of the election from Königsberg. However, the local informant added that Prince Charles of Lorraine received the most votes, and Philip William was to collect 50 votes less. At the decisive moment, the candidacy of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki «who was then amongst them» was proposed, and this suggestion received general applause. Reportedly, several people who opposed his candidacy were killed⁴⁴. A similar course of events related to the election of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki was described in various relations from the election parliament⁴⁵.

BOGUSŁAW RADZIWIŁŁ IN ENGLISH CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE INTERREGNUM

Quite often in the correspondence of Sanderson and Yard we come across the person of the Lithuanian Equerry, Bogusław Radziwiłł. We can associate this interest with his religion, i.e. Calvinism. In this context Bogusław was most often mentioned as one of the most influential representatives of Protestantism in Lithuania, if not in the entire Commonwealth. However, the interest in Radziwiłł's person may also result from the fact that his ancestors established numerous contacts with the aristocracy and the royal court in London.

Mentions about Radziwiłł also appeared during the transmission of information on religious conflicts, mainly during the convocation parliament. An example can be Sanderson's letter of December 1668, in which he informed that the papal party intended to eliminate Protestants from election games and participation in the *sejms* of the *interregnum* period. The actions were directed mainly against

39 Przyboś, *Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki*, 38-9; Andrzej Kamieński, *Polska a Brandenburgia-Prusy w drugiej połowie XVII wieku. Dzieje polityczne* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2002), 76; Andrzej Kamieński, "Działania dyplomacji brandenburskiej w Polsce podczas elekcji 1674 roku", *Wiek Stary i Nowy*, n. 8 (2015): 30-1.

40 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/12, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 6 April 1669, f. 16r.

41 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/12, *Robert Yard to N.N.*, Gdańsk 9 April 1669, f. 23r.

42 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/12, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 15 June 1669, f. 34r.

43 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/12, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 20 April 1669, f. 25r.

44 TNA, *SP Poland and Saxony*, SP 88/12, *Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson*, Gdańsk 26 June 1669, f. 37r.

45 Bogusław Radziwiłł, *Autobiografia*, ed. Tadeusz Wasilewski (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1979), 97; Jan Antoni Chrapowicki, *Diariusz, część druga: lata 1665-1669*, eds. Andrzej Rachuba, Tadeusz Wasilewski (Warszawa: "Pax", 1998), 508-09; Matyasik, *Obóz polityczny króla*, 29; Mariusz Sawicki, *Dom sapieżyński 1666-1685. Droga do hegemonii w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2016), 52; Konrad Bobiatyński, *W walce o hegemonie. Rywalizacja polityczna w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w latach 1667-1674* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2017), 54.

Bogusław Radziwiłł, who was accused of being dependent on the Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William. The personality of Radziwiłł also attracted the attention of the English respondent, and his political talents were described as follows: «he was so well seconded by some of his persuasion, that they could not accomplish their designs»⁴⁶.

Similar information appeared in the letter of 8 December 1668, when the gathered nobility moved to the topic of depriving Protestants of their existing rights. Even bishops were to oppose such strict behaviour. The quarrels were to last until 9 p.m., and Bogusław Radziwiłł had dissenters. Due to numerous misunderstandings, the session was almost break off⁴⁷. It seems that Sanderson wrote in his letter about 28 November events. The political moods against dissenters were also fueled by political opponents of Radziwiłł–Pac family, who wanted to oust him from the Chamber of Deputies⁴⁸.

Another interesting information about Radziwiłł comes from April 1669. Sanderson informed Williamson that he received a German-language book: «I have procured a book here of the war et state affaires in Poland for the last 100 years, where Prince Radzivills geneologie is discribed et other great families in Poland»⁴⁹). The English envoy wanted to send the entire work by sea: «shall send you per first ship from hence, being too great to be sent per post». At the same time, Sanderson found that it was very valuable reading, «it's in the dutch language et well worth the reading for those that understand it»⁵⁰. Robert Yard also mentioned the abovementioned book and the genealogy of Bogusław Radziwiłł in his letter of 31 March 1669⁵¹.

In the same letter, Sanderson informed that Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł was put forward as a candidate for the throne – «Prince Radzivill was also in nomination et had the votos of 18 counties to be king. Upon condition he would turn Romana Catholika» –⁵². The same number of voivodeships that supported the candidacy of the Lithuanian Equerry is given by *Theatrum Europeanum*⁵³. For various reasons, Radziwiłł's candidacy could not, however, be applauded in general; there was not even general agreement among Lithuanians for it⁵⁴.

SUMMARY

Sanderson and Yard's correspondence is an interesting source of information about internal events in Poland in the last years of the reign of John Casimir. However, it should be emphasised they transmitted to London the most important information, though sometimes unheard of in other reports, concerning this period. It should be stated that most of the messages contained in the accounts were accurate, occasionally minor mistakes may be encountered. Some of Sanderson's comments and opinions, although appearing relatively rarely, confirm that English diplomats are well-versed in the intricacies of Polish politics, and on the other hand, prove that he has reliable sources of information and competent collaborators. The relations of Sanderson and Yard, as well as their predecessors and successors, certainly provide interesting material for analysis. In some reports, we can find detailed descriptions of some events and political moods in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which prove their usefulness in historical research.

46 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 1 December 1668, f. 173r.

47 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/11, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk, 8 December 1668, f. 176r.

48 Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała*, 48.

49 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/12, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 6 April 1669, f. 16r.

50 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/12, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 6 April 1669, f. 16r.

51 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/12, Robert Yard do N.N., Gdańsk 31 March 1668, ff. 17r-v.

52 TNA, SP Poland and Saxony, SP 88/12, Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Gdańsk 26 June 1669, f. 37r.

53 *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 10 (Frankfurt am Mein: Verlag Matthäi Merian [...], 1677) 47.

54 Aleksandra Ziober, *Postawy elit Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego wobec elekcji Władysława IV Wazy i Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka, 2020), 144.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

TNA: The National Archives in London.

SP-Poland and Saxony: *State Papers Foreign, Poland and Saxony*.

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DIPLOMACY AND PAPAL POLITICS DURING THE “UNFORTUNATE” REIGN OF MICHAŁ KORYBUT WIŚNIOWIECKI

ABSTRACT

After a complex *interregnum*, on 19 June 1669, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki was elected the new king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Although the election was unanimous, a political rift soon emerged with a party opposing the new ruler. The internal conflict favoured the Ottomans, who invaded Ukraine. The *Infidels* conquered the Kamieniec Podolski fortress and forced the Warsaw court to sign a shameful treaty in Buchach in October 1672. This tragic news soon reached Rome, alarming the Holy See, which had always followed with great interest the events of that distant kingdom, known to be the last bulwark of Christianity. The article intends to retrace the dramatic phases experienced by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the reign of Wiśniowiecki, in the light of the political and diplomatic actions carried out by Pope Clement X Altieri to support this *Antemurale Christianitatis*.

KEYWORDS: Holy See; Diplomacy; Clement X Altieri; Early Modern Poland; Ottomans.

INTRODUCTION

After a complex and hard-fought *interregnum*, on 19 June 1669, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki¹ was elected king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The news had reached Rome through an extraordinary courier by Monsignor Marescotti²; the nuncio was sent to Warsaw by the Holy See to facilitate a Catholic's election as King of Poland. Marescotti had managed to knock out the schismatic Muscovite candidate with great skill, paving the way for Wiśniowiecki's candidacy.

The election was greeted with great jubilation by Pope Clement IX Rospigliosi, who immediately congratulated the new king. Even the cardinal protector of the Kingdom, Virginio Orsini³, immediately wrote to the Polish sovereign. In particular, the cardinal informed Wiśniowiecki that the election that had just taken place had renewed hopes in Rome of seeing all the problems in that part of Europe resolved. For this reason, the Holy See hoped to:

vedere dalle sue mani gloriose debellato l'inimico commune et anco ad ogni maggior segno avvantaggiata la Religione in un Regno così potente e della quale n'è l'Antemurale, non potendosi scegliere tempo più oportuno di intraprendere con sicurezza di vantaggi e certe Vittorie hora che l'Ottomanno dopo

1 See A. Przyboś, “Wiśniowiecki Michał Korybut”, in PSB, vol. 20 (1975), 605-09. Id., *Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, 1640–1673* (Kraków-Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1984); Ilona Czamańska, *Wiśniowieccy. Monografia rodu* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie 2007). Oreste F. Tencajoli, *L'elezione ed il matrimonio di un re di Polonia* (Milano: Pizzi, 1912), Andrea Honorati, *Michele Korybut Wiśniowiecki re di Polonia 1669–1673* (Ancona: s.n. 1992).

2 The nuncio had sent an *straordinario* on the same day of the election (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 83, Galeazzo Marescotti to Giacomo Rospigliosi, Warsaw 19 June 1669, f. 158r; AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze [...]*, b. 229, G. Marescotti to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 19 June 1669, c. 0036.). A few days later, he sent a letter to the Secretariat of State with more precise information (Ibid., Warsaw 25 June 1669, f. 212r-v). On Galeazzo Marescotti, see Giovanna Motta, *sub voce* in DBI, vol. 70 (2008), 75-8; Henryk Damian Wojtyńska, ANP, t. I: *De fontibus eorumque investigatione et editionibus Instructio ad editionem Nuntiorum series chronologica* (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum, 1990), 267-68.

3 Irene Fosi, “Orsini Virgino”, in DBI, vol. 79 (2013), 215-19. Ead., “Il cardinale Virginio Orsini e la “Protezione” del regno di Polonia (1650-1676): note e documenti dall'Archivio Orsini”, in *Per Rita Tolomeo, scritti di amici sulla Dalmazia e l'Europa centro-orientale*, eds. Ester Capuzzo, Bruno Crevato-Selvaggi and Francesco Guida (Venezia: La Musa Talia, 2014) 229-244, Alessandro Boccolini, “Rzeczpospolita e Curia Romana. L'interregno del 1669 nelle carte di Virginio Orsini, cardinale protettore di Polonia”, in *Gli “Angeli Custodi” delle Monarchie: i cardinali protettori delle nazioni*, eds. Matteo Sanfilippo and Péter Tusor (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2019) 199-238.



lunghe guerre resta notabilmente debilitato [...] e sperare se hora che hora che sono armati li Principi Christiani si crede se attaccato per più parti che simil congiuntura sarà molto difficile che si possi havere in altri tempi di unire assieme tante circostanze favorevoli, onde la Maestà Vostra si renderia immortale con tutta questa gloriosa nobiltà e una natione sempre Vittoriosa. [...] e mentre il PP [*Pater Patrum*] con tanta sollecitudine paterna procura unire tutte le forze Christiane contro l'inimico commune è certo che Vostra Maestà non potria mai far la dimostratione più obligante di questa perché non verrà mai una congiuntura simile né per la Santa Sede, né per l'Universale del Mondo, ond'io che sono antico ed obbligato servitore della Maestà Vostra, e di cotesto gran Regno e che vorrei vedere nella sua persona Reale ogn'augumento di gloria e di estimatione ho preso l'ardire rappresentarli tutto ciò perché si come ha cagionato gran rimbombo di allegrezza la sua felice elettione così le accrescerebbero gran nomi e le saria fondamento di una gran estimatione il vedersi nel bel Principio una intrapresa simile⁴.

After expressing personal congratulations on the election, Orsini reminded Michał of his obligations as a Catholic king with this solemn letter. The priority was the fight against the Turkish *infidels* who were stationed along the southern borders of the Commonwealth for too long, ready to invade the Kingdom and Christian Europe. However, we know that the election of this new ruler did not produce the desired effects, and, as Gaetano Platania wrote, the reign of Wiśniowiecki was “unfortunate”⁵. Immediately after Michał's election to the throne, the hope of peace and internal harmony, prefigured by his unanimous election⁶, was utterly disregarded. On the one hand, the internal political rift re-emerged, even more substantial, with a party opposing the new king, led by Jan Sobieski, who wanted to dethrone Michał; on the other hand, the Ottomans led by the vizier Michel Kaplan Paşa began to threaten the Commonwealth, invading the country and conquering the Kamieniec Podolski fortress – the natural gateway to the entire Polish-Lithuanian –. A military offensive forced the Warsaw court to sign a shameful treaty in Buchach (Bučač, Ukraine) in October 1672⁷.

The echo of these tragic events soon arrived in Rome, alarming the papal capital, which has always followed the events of that distant kingdom, the last Bulwark of Christianity, with great interest: a fear that felt Clement X Altieri, who had recently ascended to the papal throne⁸, but which extended to the whole city of Rome, including ecclesiastics, laity, and ordinary people⁹.

This article intends to retrace the dramatic events in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the reign of Wiśniowiecki, in the light of the interest shown by the Holy See and the actions carried out by Pope Clement X Altieri to help this *Antemurale Christianitatis*. Therefore, Roman and Vatican sources are an integral and fundamental part of this analysis.

4 AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 248, V. Orsini to Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, Rome 8 August 1669, ff. 100r-101v.

5 Gaetano Platania, *Rzeczpospolita, Europa e Santa Sede tra intese e ostilità* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2000), 79-117.

6 The Polish election had a significant impact in Europe and Rome in particular. Several reports on the event were printed. ASR, *Fondo Cartari-Febei*, vol. 82, *Ragguaglio dell'esito che ha havuto alli XIX Giugno la Dieta di Polonia con l'Elettione del nuovo Re* (In Venetia: appresso Gio. Pietro Pinelli, 1669), ff. 106r-07v; BAV, Ottob. Lat., 2494, *Ragguaglio dell'esito che ha avuto alli 19 giugno 1669 la Dieta di Polonia con l'elezione del Nuovo re* (Venezia 1669). Archivio Privato Famiglia Odiscalchi – Roma, II/A/5/, n. 35, *Elezione di Michele Korybut Wisniowiecki a Re di Polonia, 19 giugno 1669*, ff. n.n.

7 According to treaty in Buchach, the Commonwealth ceded territory of Podolia Voivodship and the southern Ukraine (Bratislav and Kyiv Voivodships) to the Ottomans. Warsaw agreed to pay a yearly tribute of 22'000 thalers. The nuncio, Angelo Maria Ranuzzi, defined this treaty as “so disgraceful” due to the clauses imposed by the Turks. [«pace così obrobriosa»]. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 87, *Angelo Maria Ranuzzi a Paluzzo Paluzzi-Altieri*, Warsaw 12 October 1672, f. 269r-v. AAV, *Avvisi*, Warsaw 12 October 1672, f. 432v. In general, on the treaty, see Janusz Woliński, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1983), 21-50.

8 On the conclave of 1670: Ludwing von Pastor, *Storia dei Papi* [...], vol. 14/1: *Dall'elezione di Innocenzo X sino alla morte di Innocenzo XII (1644-1700)* (Roma: Desclée, 1932), 628-44; Gianvittorio Signorotto, “Lo Squadrone Volante. I cardinali “liberi” e la politica europea nella seconda metà del XVII secolo”, in *La Corte di Roma tra Cinquecento e Seicento. “Teatro” della politica europea*, eds. Gianvittorio Signorotto and Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Bulzoni: Roma, 1998), 93-117.

9 The diary of Carlo Cartari, a Roman consistorial lawyer, is particularly interesting about the Romans' interest in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth events. This precious source includes a chronological span that goes from 1642 to 1691: it consists of 32 volumes containing Italian and European news (with attached printed documents of the time), mainly referring to the urban reality of Rome. The State Archives of Rome (*Archivio di Stato di Roma*) collected the entire Cartari collection: the volumes of the Diario nn. 82-84 refer to the years 1669-1673, during the reign of Wiśniowiecki.

BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS: THE ACTIONS OF THE HOLY SEE TO SAVE THE COMMONWEALTH

When in 1672, the Ottoman forces entered the southern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Sultan's decision to act in those territories was not surprising to the most attentive observers of the time.

On the contrary, the danger of a Turkish invasion had been troubling the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom for several years. For example, between 1666 and 1667, a Tatar vanguard, allied with Constantinople, had managed to break through the Ukrainian borders, heralding a subsequent and massive incursion by the Turkish army.

This tragic news had reached Rome in all its tragedy through extraordinary couriers sent by the Warsaw court¹⁰. A privileged observatory to understand the drama of this moment is the figure of Virginio Orsini, as the cardinal protector of the Kingdom, to whom Ludovico Fantoni¹¹ – Italian secretary of the Polish king, and agent in Poland of the protector himself – had sent precise information:

Li Tartari in Ukraina mostrano di volersi render padroni di quella provincia et si ha luogo di sospettare che se l'intendino col Turco medesimo che si vorrà facilmente approfittare delle discordie e sconcerti che regnano fra la nobiltà che si mostra cieca tuttavia di non vedere li apparenti pericoli dell'interito della patria¹².

It is a letter which dramatic content was immediately confirmed by another addressed to the same cardinal by Cristoforo Masini¹³. Inside, the personal secretary of John Casimir Vasa described the extent of what happened to his Roman correspondent, foreshadowing a much worse situation for Poland. The information, dated 4 January 1667, was of the following content:

il turco si è affatto smascherato per mezzo dei suoi tartari, i quali con alcune truppe di Cosacchi hanno tagliato a pezzi 17 compagnie di cavallerie et altre XI, che andavano in rinforzo, sono state disperse [...]. Dicono che quando questi con la preda saranno in sicuro, un altro esercito verrà per fare una grande distruttione. Questo male è creduto improvviso da chi non si è voluto occupare nell'osservar gli andamenti dei Turchi da alcuni anni in qua¹⁴.

The invasion of the Kingdom by the Tatar army – behind which the “common enemy” of Christianity was hidden – had forced the Polish court to send its envoy to Christian princes to explore the possibilities of creating a united front against the Turkish *infidels*¹⁵.

Despite the intense diplomatic efforts made by Warsaw, the Christian powers were utterly indifferent to the Polish situation. To underline that was unheard also the request for subsidies asked the Holy See because already committed to helping Venice in the war of Candia¹⁶. Fortunately for the

10 AVV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 78, Antonio Pignatelli to Giulio Rospigliosi, Warsaw 29 December 1666, f. 339r-v. The same news: AAV, *Avvisi*, vol. 114, Warsaw 29 December 1666, f. 27v.

11 Ludovico Fantoni had been intimate Italian secretary of Władysław IV, then of John Casimir and finally of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki; from 1668 he was an agent of the cardinal protector Orsini. From 1655 to 1681, Canon of Vilnius and dean of Heilsberg Cathedral. Cf. Karolina Targosz, *Uczony dwór Ludwiki Marii Gonzagi 1646–1667. Z dziejów polsko-francuskich stosunków naukowych* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1975), 72–3.

12 AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 224, Ludovico Fantoni a Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 28 December 1666, c. 0295.

13 On Cristoforo Masini, personal and intimate secretary of John II Casimir Vasa: Laura Ronchi De Michelis, *sub voce* in DBI, vol. 71 (2008), 614–16; Domenico Caccamo, “Osservatori italiani della crisi polacca a metà Seicento. La Relazione di S. Cefali e le Replicazioni di C. Masini”, in Id. *Roma, Venezia e l'Europa centro-orientale* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2010), 483–530.

14 AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 225, Cristoforo Masini to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 4 January 1667, c. 0453. The then nuncio Pignatelli sent the same dramatic news: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 80, Antonio Pignatelli to Giulio Rospigliosi, Warsaw 4 January 1667, ff 3–4r.

15 On the sending of Polish envoy to the significant European courts, and also to Rome, see AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 225, Cristoforo Masini to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 4 January 1667, c. 0453, Ibid., b. 226, Ludovico Fantoni to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 11 January 1667, c. 0165.

16 To John Casimir's request for subsidies, in a letter presented by Orsini (AAV, *Lettere di Principi*, vol. 94, John II Casimir

Commonwealth, the pressure on the south-eastern line ceased after the providential signing of the Andruszów¹⁷ treaty between Warsaw and Moscow: the prospect of a Polish-Muscovite alliance against the Turks was decisive in removing the Ottoman pressure from the Ukrainian borders for the moment. However, the Turkish threat would still emerge in 1672 when the king of Poland was Wiśniowiecki: both the failure to respect the clauses established at Andruszów between Poles and Moscovities and the inability of the new sovereign to maintain the internal peace in the kingdom favoured the incursion of the Ottoman forces into Ukraine. The conquest of the Kamieniec Podolski fortress highlighted to all Europe the decision of the Sultan to force entry to the Old Continent from the side of Poland.

Although the southern front of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth remained in constant tension, it should be emphasised that until 1672, the Holy See had lived in terror of a possible Ottoman invasion of the Christian world also by the Mediterranean, along the Adriatic coast of the Italian peninsula¹⁸.

While in the papal capital uncertain news of the Mediterranean front came, increasingly detailed *Avvisi* and letters reported tragic and alarming news from the eastern front: the recipients of these latest communications were the Secretariat of State through the papal nuncio, Monsignor Ranuzzi¹⁹, and the cardinal protector of the Kingdom of Poland, Virginio Orsini, by his Polish correspondent. For example, Ludovico Fantoni – royal secretary but also Orsini's agent in Poland – had represented the *infidels'* threatening presence on the southern border of the Commonwealth, starting from 1670:

Da Jassi di Valacchia con lettere da 20 marzo si ha che li Turchi non desistino dal far preparamenti per la guerra, fabbricando poste e carri per il cannone e monitioni, allestendo altre cose necessarie, continuando sempre la voce, che siano per muoversi contro la Polonia, e che siano per assediare Camenetz di Podolia²⁰.

A couple of months later, Francesco Gramignoli, an Italian merchant resident in Warsaw, and personal informer of Cardinal Orsini, confirmed this kind of news. He had written about the publication in Wallachia of a sultan's edict, which obliged Ottoman troops to march in the direction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth²¹. Therefore, in the southern Ukrainian territories, the gathering of Turkish soldiers was a certainty for some time, as evidenced by the correspondence received from the cardinal himself: the total number was uncertain, but the communications reported thousands and thousands of fighters. Many letters, dispatches, and *avvisi* represented an increasingly tense situation. An Ottoman army of 150,000 soldiers forced men, women, and children residing between Lublin and Lviv to leave their lands²².

The same nuncio in Poland confirmed the alarming situation. According to the nuncio, 70,000 Turks

Vasa to Alexander VII, Warsaw 5 January 1667, f. 4), the pope had replied that the priority of the Holy See was to help Venice, at that moment engaged in the war in Candia. See Alessandro Boccolini, "Un "agente diplomatico" a Roma per la Rzeczpospolita: l'abate Paolo Doni al servizio di Jan II Kazimierz Waza", in *Gli agenti presso la Santa Sede delle comunità straniere e degli stati stranieri*, vol. I: secoli XV–XVII, eds. Matteo Sanfilippo and Péter Tusor (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2020), 249.

17 The easing of the Tatar/Turkish pressure with the treaty's signing was also foreseen by the nuncio when he informed the *Segreteria di Stato* of Peace established between Warsaw and Moscow. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 80, Antonio Pignatelli to Giulio Rospigliosi, Warsaw 1 February 1667, f. 37r. On the treaty: Cfr. Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warszawa: PWN, 1959).

18 As early as 1670 and throughout 1672, *Avvisi* about the powerful armament of the Ottoman navy reached Rome. The fear was that it could attack the Italian peninsula: «L'Armata turchesca tiene in timore la Christianità, essendo certo, che l'armamento è considerabile, et incerti li suoi disegni». ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Lettere di Carlo Cartari 1671–1689*, b. 33, f.n.n.

19 Francesca Boris, "Ranuzzi Angelo Maria", in DBI, vol. 86 (2016), 134–36. On his nunciature in Poland: Wojtyńska, ANP, t. I, 271–72.

20 AC, Archivio Orsini, I serie, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 230, Ludovico Fantoni to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 16 April 1670, c. 0351.

21 AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 231, Ludovico Fantoni to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 4 June 1670, c. 0033. A large part of the diplomatic correspondence exchanged between cardinal Orsini and his Polish correspondents – from the election of Wiśniowiecki to the Ottoman conquest of Kamieniec Podolski – focuses on the Turkish question and the movements of enemy troops along the southern border of the kingdom.

22 AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 232, Francesco Gramignoli to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 5 August 1671, c. 0465.

built a bridge over the Danube and another over the river Dniester²³. Not even the time to learn the Turkish advance on the eastern front, that the news of the Polish capitulation in Kamieniec reached Rome²⁴.

Cattivi avvisi portano le ultime lettere di Polonia e di Germania; cioè che in Polonia habbia il Gran Turco (che di persona si trova nel Campo, composta di dugento mila combattenti) pigliata (come ho accennato) la forte, e considerabile Piazza di Camenizza, e che perciò essendo il Re fuggito con la Regina nella Slesia, si possa dubitare che il Turco faccia acquisto delle altre Città di quel Regno, le quali (no havendo chi comandi, e proceda al bisogno urgentissimo) restano queste abbandonati. Dicesi che nell'istessa Piazza di Camenizza habbiano i Turchi fatta grande uccisione di nobili, e di putti; di quelli, acciò no vi sia chi possa far contrasto, e di questi, acciò non vi sia chi crescendo ne gli anni, possa fargli guerra. Il che si vivrà co timore aspettando d'intendere nuove funeste di altri progressi in quel Regno²⁵.

Having learned of the Ottoman breakthrough, Clement X immediately worked to find solutions that could counter the Turks' advance in that country considered the *Anthemurale Christianitatis par excellence* at the time. A kingdom that Pope Altieri knew well from having been there as the auditor of the papal nuncio, Monsignor Lancellotti²⁶.

Although the pontiff immediately showed himself personally interested in the situation in Poland, he learned of the treaty of Buchach signed by Wiśniowiecki with the Ottomans²⁷: a peace which clauses for Poland provided for the cession of the voivodships of Podolia, Braclaw, part of the territories adjacent to Kyiv, in addition to the obligation to pay a significant annual tax to the Sultan²⁸.

Faced with such a dramatic situation for Poland as for Christianity in general, Clement X implemented a series of actions – spiritual, political, and diplomatic– upon hearing the fatal news.

The first action – of a spiritual nature – consisted in the proclamation of an extraordinary jubilee²⁹. The bull, dated 5 November, is known under the title of *Inter Gravissimas*³⁰, and the reason for its publication is clear from its beginning: «Iubileum universal ad implorandum opem contra Turcas»³¹. In addition to the divine support requested with promulgating this plenary indulgence, Clement X intensified his efforts with other, more concrete strategies to fight the *infidels*.

In the first place, the Pope began to send subsidies to the Polish court, forcing the cardinals of

23 «I turchi avevano perfezionato il ponte sopra il Danubio e che preparavano materiali per farne un altro sopra il Neister e che l'armata ottomana numerosa di 70mila soldati in circa, e d'un grosso treno d'artiglieria ben pro-vista et altri attrezzi militari, si radunava ne' contorni di Baba con disegno di pigliar ben presto la marchia verso questa parte all'attacco di Caminiec». BAV, Barb. Lat., 6408, *Avvisi*, Warsaw 27 April 1672, f. 372r-v. Nuncio Ranuzzi represented the same situation: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 87, *Angelo Maria Ranuzzi to Paluzzo Paluzzi Altieri*, Warsaw 20 April 1672, f. 129r-v.

24 BAV, Barb. Lat., 2595, *Relazione breve e Fedele della presa di Caminiez fatta dai Turchi nell'anno 1673 stesa da Stefano Gradi per relazione di Mattia Gondola, testimone oculare*, ff. 30-3r. Cf. Platania, *Rzeczpospolita*, 105. On Podolia conquered by the Turks: Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Podole pod panowaniem tureckim Ejalet Kamieniecki (1672-1699)* (Warszawa: Polczek 1994).

25 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 112r.

26 Cf. Pastor, *Storia dei Papi*, 645. Laura Ronchi De Michelis, "Lancellotti Giovanni Battista", in DBI, vol. 63 (2004), 297-98.

27 The correspondence sent by the nuncio to Rome (both to the Secretariat of State and the cardinal protector) testifies to the pressure exerted by the Turks on the Warsaw court to sign the treaty. AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenze* [...], b. 234, *Angelo Maria Ranuzzi to Virginio Orsini*, Warsaw 22 September 1672, c. 0561.

28 Cf. Platania, *Rzeczpospolita*, 105.

29 A few days before the call of the papal bull, Clement X wanted to sensitise the Catholic people on the severe events in Poland. On 27 October 1672, an edict was printed. BCasan., *Editi*, t. 12, *Ordine del Cardinal Vicario Gaspare Carpegna, col quale si indicano preghiere per la difesa del Regno di Polonia invaso dai Turchi* (Roma: Stamperia Camerale, 1672), 543.

30 For the full text of the papal bull, see *Bullarium Diplomatum et Privilegiorum Sanctorum Romanorum Pontificum Taurinensis Editio, cura et studio Collegii adlecti Romae Virorum S. Theologiae et Ss. Canonum Peritorum*, (Augusta Taorinorum: A. Vecco et sociis, 1869), 364-67. For the summary of the bull *Giubileo universale concesso dalla Sanità di N. S. Papa Clemente X per implorare il divino aiuto contro il Turco*, see AAV, *Bandi Scioliti*, a. 1672, n.n.; BAV, *Bandi*, t. 204, 139; BCasan., *Editi*, t. 12, 544-46.

31 *Bullarium* [...], 364.

the Sacred College and all the Roman clergy to contribute to the whole sum with a part of their ecclesiastical income³². In November 1672, Pope Altieri's resolution allowed the Roman court to allocate 100.000 florins (ca 27.250,27 *moneta romana*–Roman coin) to Warsaw, with the Nerli family as an intermediary in this operation in Vienna³³. In the following years, Clement X would strengthen this strategy by imposing taxes on all ecclesiastical property in Italy and abroad with a bull of March 1673, then extended for five years starting from 29 September 1674³⁴. In total, the economic subsidy plan wanted by Clement X would have allowed the Holy See to send about 146.731,94 of *moneta romana* to Poland, at least until June 1675: sums meticulously noted in some registers of the “Fondo Camerale” kept in the State Archives of Rome³⁵.

On the political and diplomatic front, the Pope decided to send his emissaries to the most significant European courts to explore the possibilities of creating a league of Christian princes to oppose the advance of the Ottomans in Eastern Europe. This plan – it must be specified – did not materialise: the European powers were not interested in undertaking military action against Constantinople for the moment; indeed, they believed that the war could not extend beyond Poland.

All the European courts consulted by Clement X expressed their refusal motivating their denial to the Pope based on “national” logics and interests. The court of Vienna had already strengthened the borders with the Ottomans in Upper Hungary, convincing itself that the confrontation with the *infidels* was only a “Polish question”. On the contrary, the court of Paris hoped that the Turks could remain threatening on the eastern front and then put pressure on the Habsburg territories, perhaps opening that “second eastern front” to the Empire, so desired by Louis XIV. The *Christianissimo* king continued to press the Holy Roman Empire on the continental side by invading the United Provinces to achieve this goal³⁶.

In this context, one should note the attempt of the Holy See to involve Muscovy in the anti-Turkish league project. There were chances of success if we consider that part of the southern territories of the Grand Duchy, in contrast to the Tsar, had asked the Sultan for protection. The geopolitical premises foreshadowed a diplomatic success for the Holy See because Tsar Alexei Michailovič had sent his ambassador – the Scottish baron Paul Menzies of Pitfodels (known as Paolo Menesio)³⁷ – to Clement X with the task of reactivating contacts between Rome and Moscow and discussing the League.

In the summer of 1672, the arrival of the Muscovite emissary in Rome was an extraordinary event that interested many Roman chroniclers. For example, Carlo Cartari, a consistory lawyer, followed the

32 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 110v. Wiśniowiecki informed the Holy See that the Polish clergy offered the tenth part of their ecclesiastical income for the war on the *Infidel* Turk. AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenza della Corte di Polonia* (sec. XVI–XVIII), b. 64: *Polonia* (1666–1787), *Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki to Virginio Orsini*, Warsaw 29 March 1672, c. 0233.

33 ASR, Fondo Camerale II, *Decime*, b. 2, *Denari che sono stati rimessi in Polonia per aiuto di quella Corte contro l'Armi Ottomane, nell'infrascritta partita cioè dalla Santità di Nostro Signore Papa Clemente X*, ff. n.n.

34 «Il pontefice Alessandro VII aveva di già dati alla Repubblica Veneta per la guerra contro il turco, avendogli mandati la sua galera nel mar Egeo e Truppa ausiliaria nell'Illirico [...] dalli 9 marzo 1661impose sei decime sopra tutti li frutti e pensioni ecclesiastiche all'Italia e all'Isole adjacenti da riscuotersi [...] dentro un decennio in parte uguali ogn'anno [...]. La Santa memoria di Clemente X per riparare li nuovi progressi che minacciavano di fare i Turchi nella Polonia, oltre quelli che avevano già fatto in quel Regno e nell'Ungheria dopo aver mandato in detto Regno di Polonia tutto quel denaro che aveva, si rivolse al Sussidio del Clero d'Italia e dell'Isole adjacenti, onde con sua bolla alli 12 marzo 1673 impose tre decime sopra tutti i frutti de Beneficj Ecclesiastici o pensioni da pagarsi entro un quinquennio nel solito modo e forma non eccettuando dal detto pagamento che li Cardinali ed i caporali Gerosolimitani». ASR, *Fondo Camerale II Decime*, b. 2, *Decime ed impositioni Ecclesiastiche*, f. 1v. The Bull is dated 12 March 1673: ASR, *Bandi*, vol. 34, *Bolla di Clemente X, con la quale, per aiutare la gravissima guerra della Polonia contro i Turchi, s'indice una tassa di tre decime su tutti i benefici e le rendite ecclesiastiche*. The bull was renewed the following year: ASR, *Bandi*, vol. 32, f.n.n.

35 ASR, Fondo Camerale II: *Decime*, b. 2, *Denari che sono stati rimessi in Polonia [...]*, ff. n.n. A copy is kept in BAV, Barb. Lat., 6660, *Denari che sono stati rimessi in Polonia per aiuto di quella corte contro l'Armi Ottomane [...]*, f. 153r-v:

36 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 112v. To this annotated news, Cartari enclosed in his diary (ff. 105r-06v) a printed *Relazione* published in Rome: *Relazione del numero delle piazze che il che il Christianissimo Re di Francia Luigi XIV ha preso fin'ora agli Olandesi ne' Paesi Bassi con una breve descrizione di ciascheduna di esse*.

37 Cf. Gaetano Platania, “Diplomatici Moscoviti a Roma (1673)”, in *Sentieri Ripresi: studi in onore di Nadia Boccara*, ed. Id. (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2013), 299-321.

entire embassy conducted by Menzies, noting all its phases in his diary³⁸:

Venerdì 18 agosto giunse in Roma l'Ambasciator Moscovita alloggiato a spese della Camera (dicono per quaranta giorni) in un palazzetto a Monte Cavallo contiguo all'altro del Florenti. Si dice sia venuto (come è andato a gli altri principi d'Europa) per l'unione delle forze contro l'armi turchesche³⁹.

The lawyer followed Roman diplomacy at work with great interest, also noting the clauses under discussion among the diplomats:

L'inviato del Moscovita non è anco stato a baciare il piede a Nostro Signore. Si dice che faccia istanza che il papa procuri l'unione tra principi cattolici contro il turco, e che esso Moscovita promette di mantener per dieci anni 200 mila soldati. Che per sicurezza delle promesse maritarà quattro sue figlie con i principi di Germania. Che esso vuol corrispondenza col papa e perciò desidera di tener qua un suo Ministro e che il papa tenga colà un suo nunzio che sia superiore delli cattolici di quel regno⁴⁰.

However, after taking note of the audience (28 August)⁴¹ granted by the pontiff to the Tsar's ambassador, it is interesting to underline how the Roman diarist wrote nothing more about this embassy, except a quick note of Menzies' departure for Muscovy⁴². In his diary, Cartari does not clarify the reasons for the sudden departure of the ambassador, nor why it was impossible to conclude a treaty. However, we know that the diplomatic negotiations stopped immediately after presenting the request to the pontiff to recognize the title of Tsar to Alexei Mikhailovič officially⁴³. This request, unacceptable to Clement X, forced him to suspend diplomatic work in this field.

Considering the impossibility of creating a Christian coalition, Clement X decided to send his representative to the court of Warsaw to resolve the political divisions within the kingdom and induce the Polish-Lithuanians Commonwealth to wage war against the Ottomans.

After a long reflection, the pope identified Francesco Buonvisi⁴⁴ as the most suitable person for this mission, immediately sending him to Poland as extraordinary nuncio with precise instructions⁴⁵.

An assignment that the Cardinal Nephew, Paluzzi Altieri, had communicated to him in a letter dated 22 October 1676⁴⁶, specifying that the Pope's choice was motivated by the excellent political and diplomatic skills that he had already demonstrated in Cologne as ordinary nuncio. For Buonvisi, the Polish nunciature would have been divided into two distinct moments: extraordinary nuncio from 23 January to 15 July 1673, and ordinary nuncio until 30 August 1675, when the pope destined him to hold the prestigious position of the papal nuncio in Vienna, where he remained until 1686.

As soon as Buonvisi learned of his new appointment – notified to him in Cologne by the pontifical courier Giuseppe Miselli⁴⁷ –, he took the way to reach Warsaw.

38 See Armando Petrucci, "Cartari Carlo", in DBI vol. 20 (1977), 783-86; *La storia o le storie del Diario di Carlo Cartari avvocato concistoriale romano*, ed. Letizia Lanzetta (Città di Castello: Luoghi Interiori, 2019).

39 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 176v.

40 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 182r.

41 Cartari wrote that the Tsar's envoy carried with him a letter that "is in the Muscovite language" [«è in lingua moscovita»] (ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 183r). Copy of this letter is kept in: BAV, Vat. Lat., *Lettera del Grand Duca di Moscovia a Papa Clemente X*, ff. 103r-106v.

42 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 186v.

43 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. Add. 13, ff. n.n. «no hebbe effetto questa pratica per la repugnanza di darsi al Gran Duca il titolo di Czar ne' Brevi Pontifici».

44 On the Francesco Buonvisi: Alessandro Boccolini, *Un Lucchese al servizio della Santa Sede. Francesco Buonvisi nunzio a Colonia, Varsavia e Vienna* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2018). On his nunciature in Warsaw see *Francesco Buonvisi: Nunziatura a Varsavia*, 2 vols, eds. Furio Diaz and Nicola Carranza (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano, 1965).

45 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/66, n. 1, *Vita del Cardinale Francesco Buonvisi*, ff. n.n.

46 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Colonia*, vol. 220, *Paluzzo Paluzzi-Altieri a Francesco Buonvisi*, Rome 22 October 1672, ff. 224-25r.

47 Giuseppe Miselli [1637-1695] (known as *Burattino*) was one of the most expert couriers of the time. First in the service

Without explaining the route taken by the nuncio – we have the testimony of it in a document preserved in the Vatican Apostolic Library⁴⁸ –, Buonvisi arrived at the Polish court on 28 January 1673⁴⁹, after stopping in Vienna to persuade (in vain) Leopold I to help Poland⁵⁰.

The first audience granted by the king to the nuncio took place in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. In particular, Wiśniowiecki believed that the decision to send an “extraordinary” nuncio to Poland had been too solid and inappropriate interference in the kingdom’s internal affairs by the Holy See. Indeed, the sovereign was perfectly aware that Buonvisi would do everything to induce him to deal with his opponents, even forcing him to mitigate the uncompromising positions he had taken towards them. Soon, the king’s intolerance became a clear and direct aversion towards the papal representative. Buonvisi himself had confessed this feeling to the Secretariat of State when he wrote a long letter about the first audience with the Polish king⁵¹.

Despite this, the extraordinary nuncio represented to the king the urgencies and needs of the kingdom. Then, Buonvisi invited Michał to find a solution with the party of “grumblers” to reconcile the country, avoiding worsening the internal situation with the outbreak of a civil war. He immediately consulted the faction leaders opposing to the king, particularly Sobieski, the Great Hetman of the Polish Crown, and already highly esteemed within the Commonwealth. For Buonvisi, the primary need was to defuse the tensions arising after the request for the king’s resignation presented by the “grumblers” – as Giuseppe Miselli also reports in his autobiography⁵² –. Faced with the possibility of a civil war, the extraordinary nuncio tried to explain to the most influential figures of the kingdom that the political fracture of the country would have favoured the Turkish enemy, by now ready for a massive and total invasion of the southern Polish-Lithuanian territories. Ultimately Buonvisi understood that the protracted clash between Michał Wiśniowiecki and his opponents was inserted in a broader and more critical geopolitical and military context, particularly dangerous for the survival of the kingdom.

Supported by the Bishop of Cracow Andrzej Trzebicki [1607-1679]⁵³, the voivode of Vitebsk Jan

of the Grand Duke of Florence, then of the Holy See, he had crossed Europe several times: from Spain to France, to the Empire, England, Sweden and Poland. In 1674 Miselli was a direct witness of the election of Jan Sobieski. *Summa* of his countless travels is a guide published in 1682: *Il Burattino veridico overo Istruzione generale per chi viaggia [...]* (Roma: Michele Ercole, 1682). On him see *Autobiografia, 1637–1674. La vita di un corriere*. Giuseppe Miselli, ed. Furio Luccichenti (Roma: Leberit, 1993); Gaetano Platania, *Giuseppe Miselli tra la polvere delle strade e il lusso delle Corti* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2014).

48 BAV, Fondo Chigi, ms. R.II.53, *Diario del viaggio di Monsignor Buonvisi mandato da Colonia in Polonia da Clemente X nel 1672*, ff. 42r-50r.

49 In his autobiography Miselli refers to the arrival of the extraordinary nuncio Buonvisi in Warsaw: «due leghe distante, venne questo Monsignore Ranuzzi ad incontrarlo e fatte le solite cerimonie e complimenti, si portorno dentro Varsavia». BAV, Ottob. Lat., 2246, *Raccolta della vita e nascita di me Giuseppe Miselli con alcuni avvertimenti et istruzioni necessarie per ben vivere nelle Corti fatta da me medemo Giuseppe Miselli dedicata ai mei figlioli*, f. 139r. Buonvisi communicated to the Secretariat of State that he had reached the Polish capital only on 1 February 1673. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 89, *Francesco Buonvisi to Paluzzo Paluzzi-Altieri*, Warsaw 1 February 1673, f. 15r.

50 The Emperor showed Buonvisi great apprehension over the affairs of the Commonwealth. However, Leopold I confirmed the need to resolve the open problems with Louis XIV on the Rhine border. Without a continental peace [«pace generale»], the court of Vienna could never have helped that of Warsaw on the eastern front of Europe. Cf. Alessandro Boccolini, “Il viaggio da Colonia a Vienna di un abile diplomatico del XVII secolo: il lucchese Francesco Buonvisi”, in *Il viaggio e l’Europa incontri e movimenti da, verso, entro lo spazio europeo*, eds. Raffaele Caldarelli and Alessandro Boccolini (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2018), 31-45.

51 Regarding the hostility of the king towards him, Buonvisi wrote that «io poco fastidio me ne piglio poiché sono stato mandato non per adulare le passioni ma per rimediare ai mali». AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 89, *Francesco Buonvisi to Paluzzo Paluzzi-Altieri*, Warsaw 1 February 1673, ff. 18r-22v.

52 BAV, Ottob. Lat., 2246, *Raccolta della vita e nascita di me Giuseppe Miselli*, f. 139r.

53 Cf. Patrick Gauchat, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris aevi [...]*, vol. IV: *A pontificatu Clementis PP. VIII (1592) usque ad pontificatum Alexandri PP. VII (1667)* (Monasterii: typis Librariae Regensbergianae, 1935), 167, 175, 288; Piotr Nitecki, *Biskupi Kościoła w Polsce w latach 965–1999. Słownik biograficzny* (Warszawa: “Pax”, 1992), 211; Karolina Targosz, *Jan III Sobieski mecenasem sztuk i nauk* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1991), 55, 60, 66, 251.

Chrapowicki [1612-1685]⁵⁴, and Queen Eleonora Maria Josefa of Habsburg [1653-1697]⁵⁵, the nuncio worked to reactivate communications between the opposing factions. Thanks to his eloquence, he demonstrated how the internal weakness of the Commonwealth would have represented a favourable conjuncture for the Turkish *infidels* to definitively conquer the Kingdom and then penetrate the "heart of Europe".

To avoid this, Buonvisi met the king and the rebel leaders several times, hoping to mediate and find a good agreement for both sides and, above all, that it would be profitable for the country. After protracted negotiations and mediations, the warring factions signed the "internal peace" articles on 12 March 1673, at the castle of Warsaw: a decisive act to reconcile the kingdom and prepare it for war against the Turkish army. Buonvisi immediately informed the Secretariat of State about this remarkable result, with a *straordinario* delivered to Clement X by Miselli: «Col consiglio di monsignor Ranucci ho risoluto di spedire Burattino con l'avviso della pace domestica conchiusa ieri con giubilo universale di tutti»⁵⁶. Just by reading the autobiography of the pontifical courier, we can appreciate the diplomatic work carried out by Buonvisi to achieve peace:

Se non fosse stata l'accuratezza di Monsignor Bonvisi, benché dalla parte del Re vi era il Generale di Lituania et altri amici Cosacchi, che in tutto ascendevano a 20 mila uomini, ma non così buona gente come quella del Sobieski e vedendo Bonvisi in così gran strettezza le cose, et egli non esser in ordine per andare di persona dalli malcontenti e per non ingelosire le parti et il Re, pigliò espediente di mandar me con diversi Brevi del Papa alli malcontenti et arrivato a Loguiz fui accolto benignamente da quei Polacchi e si puol dire che il presente viaggio fosse santo perché l'esortazioni del Papa intenerirono li Polacchi⁵⁷.

In Rome, the pontifical Curia welcomed this long-awaited result with great joy and congratulations. After receiving confirmation of what happened in the "sejm of pacification"⁵⁸, Clement X asked his extraordinary nuncio to focus on the Turkish question. In particular – and according to the instructions he had received before leaving Cologne –, Buonvisi had to prevent the Polish parliament from ratifying the Buchach treaty signed in 1672 and, therefore, declare war on the Ottomans. The papal court knew the difficulties inherent in this affair. For this reason, the pope and the cardinals followed with attention the evolution of the situation in Poland during the following weeks, living in great apprehension and concern. Promptly, Carlo Cartari captured in his diary this particular atmosphere:

È venuto avviso che due giorni dopo concluso l'aggiustamento tra i polacchi, era colà giunto un chiaus mandato dal Gran Turco al Re di Polonia a fargli istanza che in vigore della promessa fattagli l'anno passato (alla quale però non volsero acconsentire i nobili di quel regno), gli consegnasse alcune città e gli pagasse il tributo, altrimenti gl'intimava la guerra. Né fin'ora si sapeva la risposta che gli era stata data, ma si crede che li polacchi vorranno guereggiare trovandosi già con esercito poderoso di cavalleria⁵⁹.

54 Cf. Ryszard Mienicki, "Chrapowicki Jan Antoni", in PSB, vol. 3 (1937), 437-39. Until now, his Diary has been published in three separate publications: J. A. Chrapowicki, *Diariusz*, 1: *lata 1656-1664*, ed. Tadeusz Wasilewski (Warszawa: "Pax", 1978); 2: *lata 1665-1669*, eds. Andrzej Rachuba and Tadeusz Wasilewski (Warszawa: "Pax", 1988); 3: *lata 1669-1673*, ed. Leszek Andrzej Wierzbicki (Warszawa: DiG, 2009).

55 On the Queen Eleonore Maria Josefa of Austria: Kazimierz Piwarski, "Eleonora Maria Józefa", in PSB, vol. 6 (1948), 223-26; *Słownik władców polskich*, eds. Józef Dobosz, Jacek Jaskulski, Tomasz Jurek and Andrzej Kamiński (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1999), 103-04.

56 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/8, *Francesco Buonvisi to Paluzzo Paluzzi-Altieri*, Warsaw 13 March 1673, f. 57r.

57 BAV, Ottob. Lat., 2246, *Raccolta della vita e nascita di me Giuseppe Miselli*, f. 139r-v.

58 Among the documents of the Buonvisi archive, there is a copy of the letter written by Wiśniowiecki to Clement X. The sovereign informed the pope of the kingdom's pacification and the intention to resume the war against the Turks. ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/67, n. 31, *Copia di lettera del Re Michele di Polonia a Sua Santità Clemente X*, Warsaw 12 March 1673, ff. n.n.; ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/67, *Conferma regia alla pace interna seguita fra il Re Michele e i Confederati*, (doc. n. 37), ff. n.n.

59 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 149v.

Despite this, Buonvisi, as a skilled and fine diplomat, knew how to animate the Poles to the Turkish threat. At first, he reminded them of the role always played by Commonwealth as an *Antemurale Christianitatis* against the *infidels*; then, he guaranteed a sum of money to arm the Polish-Lithuanian forces on behalf of the Holy See. On 8 April 1673, Buonvisi's strategy proved to be a success. The Sejm unanimously decided not to ratify the peace of Buchach and wage war against the Ottomans led by grand vizier Fazil Ahmed Köprülüzade [1635-1676]⁶⁰.

Avendo il Turco spedito un Chiaus alli polacchi per dimandargli la ratificazione del capitolato l'anno passato per la consegna di alcune piazze e per la prestazione del tributo, altrimenti proseguirebbe la guerra contro di loro. Questi gli avessero risposto che il regno di Polonia mai era stato tributario del turco, anzi che essi speravano di ricuperare l'occupatogli l'anno passato⁶¹.

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Always in a close and direct contact with the Secretariat of State, Buonvisi had completed his post as extraordinary nuncio in just under three months from his arrival in Warsaw. For this reason, in the summer of 1673, Clement X decided to renew his mandate in Poland, recalling Monsignor Ranuzzi to Rome and appointing him ordinary nuncio. It should note how this decision was very unpleasant for Michał Wiśniowiecki, who had repeatedly asked cardinal protector, Virginio Orsini, to prevent Buonvisi's promotion as "ordinary", preferring Ranuzzi because more inclined to royal politics⁶². Having assumed the new post, Buonvisi gave great impetus throughout the long preparation phase of the war campaign. Testimony of the intense effort made by the Holy See is the correspondence exchanged between Buonvisi and the Secretariat of State, preserved in the Vatican Apostolic Archives.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the actions of the Holy See with the sending of Buonvisi as extraordinary nuncio and the continuous payment of money was decisive in starting the anti-Turkish war campaign: armed the troops, on 11 November 1673, the Commonwealth's soldiers led by Sobieski defeated the Turks in the legendary battle of Khotyn (Chocim)⁶³.

Giunse avviso a Roma per staffetta a ciò spedita che il Sobieschi Generale delle Armi Polacche haveva non solo fatto sloggiare dalle trinciere, e dall'assedio di una Piazza principale in Polonia l'esercito Turchesco, ma che haveva cinta circa ventimila Turchi, fattene prigionieri circa 5 mila, acquistato cento pezzi di cannone, e fatto acquisto di un ricco bottino di Bassà, e di molti principali offitiali, che si trovavano nell'esercito, anzi che haveva perseguitato un altro Bassà, che con gran rinforzo di soldatesca veniva in soccorso dell'esercito Turchesco; e parimente l'avesse sbaragliato, e posto in fuga; restando la Piazza libera dall'assedio, e le Armi Polacche vittoriose⁶⁴.

The announcement of the victory arrived with a *straordinario* in Rome⁶⁵. More precise and detailed news, dispatches, and accounts of the long-awaited event followed this first communication. Cartari mentioned above – always careful to note down the information that reached Rome – becomes a unique

60 Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* (New York: Basic 2005), 278-81.

61 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 176r.

62 AC, Archivio Orsini, I, *Corrispondenza* [...], b. 64, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki to Virginio Orsini, Warsaw 28 June 1673, c. 0192.

63 For a concise but compelling picture of the battle, see Damian Orłowski, *Chocim 1673* (Warszawa: Bellona 2007). On the battle: BAV, Barb. Lat., 6410, *Relazione della vittoria insigne che l'armi Polacche et Lituane hanno ottenuto contro i Turchi alle ripe del fiume Dnistro in Valacchia il giorno di San Martino 1673*, ff. 414r-31v.

64 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 220r-v.

65 «Non poco ha rallegato il palazzo e tutta questa corte l'avviso mandato da monsignor nunzio apostolico in Polonia aver quell'esercito riportata grandissima vittoria sopra li Turchi». BAV, Barb. Lat., 6410, *Avvisi*, Rome 16 December 1673, f. 378r. ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, f. 220r-v.

and precious source to testify to the jubilation felt by the Roman Curia after receiving the good news of the Christian victory over the *infidels*⁶⁶. The Roman diarist noted the official celebrations wanted by Clement X to glorify the Polish military action against the "common enemy" of Christianity. On Sunday, 7 January 1674, Pope Altieri decided to honour the courage and virtues of the Poles with a *Te Deum* in the National Church of Poles in Rome, St Stanislao. The Pope would have repeated this solemn ceremony on 29 April in St Peter⁶⁷.

During this event, Clement X wanted to hang the Turkish banner conquered in battle by Jan Sobieski in the centre of the basilica; a tribute delivered to the same pope by Abbot Jan Chryzostom Benedykt Gniński [† 1715]⁶⁸ as a sign of the Commonwealth's gratitude towards the efforts of the Holy See⁶⁹.

The only one who could not rejoice in this incredible feat was King Wiśniowiecki. Despite having reached the battlefield near Lviv, already very ill, he would have died on 10 November 1673, without witnessing the Turkish defeat⁷⁰. The death of the king and the success achieved in Khotyn would have, forcefully and definitively, launched the figure of General Sobieski on the political scene of the time. Sobieski would be protagonist first in Poland as king elected in 1674, and then in Europe as the *Defensor Fidei* for having freed Vienna from the Turkish siege in 1683⁷¹.

66 Cartari dedicates many pages of his diary to the Polish victory of Khotyn. Among the pages we also find 2 Reports printed in Rome for the occasion: *Nuova, e vera Relatione della Guerra tra il Potentissimo Rè di Polonia, e il Gran Sultano Imperador de' Turchi* (Roma: per Giacomo Menichelli, 1673); *Copia di Lettera Polacca. Tradotta in italiano che serve di Relatione per la grande, e memorabile vittoria riportata dall'armi Polacche contro li Turchi [...], da Giuseppe Elmi*, (Roma: Stampa del Mancini, 1673).

67 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 85, ff. 1v-2r.

68 Cf. Jan Perdenia, "Gniński Jan Chryzostom", in PSB, vol. 8 (1959–1960), 152–53.

69 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 85, ff. 12v-3r.

70 ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 84, ff. 200r-01v. The news noted by the lawyer referred to a specific notice that had arrived in Rome: «è pervenuto corriere in palazzo con l'infausto avviso sulla morte del Re di Polonia, nuova che ha portato gran sentimento a Sua Santità stante le presenti emergenze trovandosi impiegate le armi polacche contro i Turchi». A.S.V., *Avvisi*, Warsaw 26 Novembre 1673. Cf. Platania, *Rzeczpospolita*, 114.

71 I want to point out the latest book by Gaetano Platania, *Scritti Minori (Saggi di storia Sobiesiana)* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2021).

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

ANP: *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, t. I-LVII (Romae/Cracoviae: 1990–2021).

AC: Archivio Storico Capitolino–Roma.

ASR: Archivio di Stato di Roma.

Diario: Effemeridi Cartarie. Diario e cronache degli avvenimenti romani e pontifici in particolare e d'Europa in generale con allegati documenti a stampa e stampe, voll. 73–104.

BAV: Biblioteca apostolica Vaticana.

Barb. Lat.: *Fondo Barberino Latino*.

Ottob. Lat.: *Fondo Ottoboniano Latino*.

Vat. Lat.: *Fondo Vaticano Latino*.

BCasan.: Biblioteca Casanatense–Roma.

DBI: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 100 vols (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Treccani, 1960–2020, 100).

PSB: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, t. I-LII (Kraków: PAN, 1935–2019).

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DIPLOMATIC CEREMONIAL

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THE CEREMONIAL OF RECEPTION OF ALBRYCHT STANISŁAW RADZIWIŁŁ AND HIS STAY AT THE COURTS OF WESTERN EUROPE AS A ROYAL ENVOY DURING THE JOURNEY OF PRINCE WŁADYSŁAW VASA 1624–1625

ABSTRACT

Despite numerous publications regarding the journey of Prince Władysław Vasa to Western Europe (Bohemia, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Italy) in 1624–1625, the topic still awaits its fully elaborated monography. One of the issues requiring in-depth reflection is the broadly understood diplomatic dimension of young Vasa's peregrination. The prince, travelling incognito, was officially a member of Albrycht S. Radziwiłł's diplomatic entourage. This arrangement caused many problems concerning diplomatic and ceremonial procedures in the ambassador-prince-host court triangle. This article aims to present relations in said arrangement, especially those related to preponderance during entries, stay and ceremonies taking place at the courts visited by the embassy. The analysis will be conducted primarily from the perspective of the role and functions of the ambassador. Therefore, its important component will also be the description of the political dimension of the journey, which will show Albrecht S. Radziwiłł's activities in this area, including relations and meetings with the rulers visited, as well as the political elite and ambassadors present at a given court.

KEYWORDS: Diplomatic ceremonial; Embassy; Stanisław Albrycht Radziwiłł; Władysław Vasa; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

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In the years 1624–1625, Prince¹ Władysław Vasa made his grand tour of Western Europe. Officially, the tour's main purpose was to fulfil a vow he had made during his illness at the siege of Chocim (Kotyn). He vowed then that if he survived, he would go to Loreto and make a votive offering in the form of a golden statue of his patron saint². Historians usually perceive this journey as an educational one³ or pay special attention to its aspects related to Vasa's arts patronage⁴. The only person taking part in this trip (apart from the prince) in whom researchers were interested was the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł. This interest, however, focused primarily on his leadership of the voyage, disregarding another function assigned to him by the king – of a diplomat with a specific mission to accomplish.

The only exception is a passage on the voyage of Prince Władysław, which Radosław Lolo included

1 The term "Prince" is used in the main text to refer to Władysław Vasa. In the quotations, however, it appears as a term for Stanisław Albrycht Radziwiłł because he bore the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire and was so titled by Jan Hagenaw and Stefan Pac in their accounts of the journey. In these cases, Radziwiłł's name was added in square brackets.

2 Adam Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza Władysława Wazy do krajów Europy Zachodniej w latach 1624–1625 w świetle ówczesnych relacji* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1977), 14.

3 Władysław Czapliński, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Kraków: Universitas, 2008), 60–6; Zdzisław Pietrzyk, "Przyczynek do podróży królewicza Władysława Zygmunta Waza po Europie Zachodniej", *Studia Historyczne. Kwartalnik* 162, n. 3 (1998): 341–48; Henryk Wisner, *Władysław IV Waza* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2009), 42–7; Stefania Ochmann-Staniszevska, *Dynastia Wazów w Polsce* (Warszawa: PWN, 2006), 246–48.

4 Karolina Targosz-Kretowa, *Teatr dworski Władysława IV (1635–1648)* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 1965), 36; Jacek Zukowski, "Listy Władysława Waza i inne nieznanne źródła do jego europejskiej peregrynacji z archiwami szwedzkich i niemieckich", *Kronika Zamkowa. Seria Nowa*, 68/2 (2015): 61–85; Ryszard Szmydki, *Artystyczno-dyplomatyczne kontakty Zygmunta III Wazy z Niderlandami Południowymi* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2008), 104–10; Id., *Kontakty artystyczne królewicza Władysława Zygmunta Waza z Antwerpią. Misja Mathieu Roulta do Polski w 1626 r.* (Warszawa: Zamek Królewski, 2002).

in his 2004 book on the Polish nobility's stance towards the 'Thirty Years' War'⁵. In this context, the author mentions Radziwiłł as the person who was at the head of the delegation sent by Sigismund III to Vienna on the occasion of the prince's journey. In that passage, Lolo presents Radziwiłł's mission as one of the stages of a diplomatic action undertaken by the king to ease the misunderstandings between him and the Emperor⁶, which arose from the Emperor's enlisting mercenaries from Poland⁷. Przemysław Deles, in his 2001 article outlining the political conditions of Władysław Vasa's travel⁸, also repeatedly draws attention to the "formula of the embassy"⁹ that the journey took on while the prince had to remain anonymous. Thus, the author notes the importance of Radziwiłł's role for the prince, who wanted to conceal his identity and the fact that the Chancellor described himself as an envoy. However, he confines himself to it and does not deal with Radziwiłł further when discussing the political aspects of the trip. The purpose of this article is to analyse Radziwiłł's diplomatic activity, the actual dimension of which has so far escaped the historians' attention. It was undoubtedly interconnected with and dependent on his function as the *director* of the voyage. Still, it cannot be treated solely as episodic activities merely supplementary to his main task. During this journey, Radziwiłł was a royal envoy entrusted with a diplomatic mission *tout court*. Numerous information showing the relations between Prince Władysław, Radziwiłł and the receiving courts, as well as by the fact that he was directly referred to as an envoy by his companions, confirm it. Moreover, he called himself this way as well.

The source base on which the researchers relied primarily consisted of the travel accounts by Jan Hagenaw, Stefan Pac, Samuel Twardowski and Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł collected and published by Adam Przyboś¹⁰. Moreover, correspondence exchanged between the members of the retinue and the royal court as well as letters written by the rulers of the visited countries and their entourage have also been preserved¹¹. This article is primarily based on travel accounts and instruction. What is more, royal letters that Radziwiłł is said to have passed on to various rulers were used. The travel accounts, although they were written down by only three of the prince's companions, contain a variety of information that enables the examination of the relationship between Prince Władysław, Radziwiłł, and the host rulers.

Most information about Radziwiłł's diplomatic activities can be found in Jan Hagenaw's account. According to Radziwiłł's notes, Hagenaw was his servant, whom the prince "appropriated"¹² for the duration of the journey. Przyboś refers to Hagenaw's letter to Sigismund III, writing that Hagenaw kept a travel journal by order of the king and was to hand it over to him on his return¹³. Hagenaw writes about what Radziwiłł did much more often than Pac does. He also pays more attention than Pac to the elements of diplomatic ceremonial applied to Radziwiłł: which hand the host offered to be shaken by the envoy when greeting him, who welcomed him and who the welcoming person was

5 Radosław Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty (1618–1635)* (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. Aleksandra Gieysztora, 2004).

6 Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej*, 246.

7 *Lisowczycy* were mercenaries of Polish origin who were enlisted by Emperor Ferdinand II during the Thirty Years' War. The fact that they were not paid their soldier's pay resulted in them committing robberies in the lands of the Empire. See Adam Szelągowski, *Śląsk i Polska wobec powstania czeskiego* (Lwów: Księgarnia Polska B. Połonieckiego, 1904), 65–6, 119–27; Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej*, 31, 98–100.

8 Przemysław Deles, "Polityczne uwarunkowania podróży królewicza Władysława Zygmunta Wazy po krajach Europy Zachodniej w latach 1624–1624", *Kronika Zamkowa. Seria Nowa*, 42/2 (2001): 87–106.

9 Deles, "Polityczne uwarunkowania", 93–5.

10 Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza*. The book consists of separate accounts by Hagenaw, Pac and Radziwiłł. Przyboś compiled them to form a chronologically coherent text: the description of each day of the journey consists of corresponding fragments of the three accounts. The footnotes refer to a fragment of a particular account found on the indicated page.

11 Żukowski (2015) lists correspondence preserved in: Riksarkivet in Stockholm, *Extranea IX, Polen*, n. 89, 92, 111 (copies of these documents in microfilm form are located in AGAD). See Żukowski, *Listy Władysława Wazy i inne nieznane źródła*, 85–118.

12 Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, "Rys panowania Zygmunta III", in Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza*, 43.

13 Przyboś, "Wstęp", in Id., *Podróż królewicza*, 23.

accompanied by, whether he received refreshments and whether the accommodation offered to him was worthy of his person. Radziwiłł also paid attention to such details in his memoirs. Among other authors, Hagenaw wrote most about the private meetings which Radziwiłł had at foreign courts. Pac's attitude to this type of information is perfectly illustrated by two contrasting notes from 26 May 1624, when Pac stated: «For the last few days nothing worth noting happened»¹⁴, while Hagenaw, in addition to the brief news about Władysław having spent the whole day with Archduke Charles, also records Radziwiłł's audience with him¹⁵.

The collection of accounts published by Przyboś also contains the text of instruction from May 1624, addressed to Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł by Sigismund III Vasa. The king assigned him two functions: the headman of Prince Władysław's journey and royal envoy. Radziwiłł's first and foremost task was to protect the prince from any «danger that might threaten either the person or the honour and dignity of the Prince»¹⁶. The instruction proceeds to say that the main task was to make sure that Władysław, «having gained warlike fame with foreign kings, lords and peoples, despite being absent there, now being there he did not seem lesser to them». However, the majority of the instruction constitutes guideline on Radziwiłł's mission as an envoy.

At the beginning of instruction, the journey's route is specified, passing through Neisse, Prague or Vienna (depending on where the Emperor happens to be staying), Innsbruck, Brussels and Italy «if time and roads permit». A list of countries which travellers were not allowed to «without the express permission of His Majesty the King» was also drawn up. These countries were France, Spain, England, and the Netherlands, where it was dangerous to travel due to the Thirty Years' War's military activities. It is also worth noting the reservation that the king's will regarding the itinerary may change – there are several other passages in the instructions indicating constant contact between the retinue and the royal court –. The exchange of letters between the envoy and the royal court to keep the latter informed and receive new guidelines was the duty of every diplomat and one of the elementary aspects of his activity. Radziwiłł, as evidenced by the explicitly worded order to inform the royal court in detail about the course and effects of the visit to the court of the Infanta, was no exception to this rule.

The instruction sets out specific tasks that Radziwiłł was to perform as an envoy at the courts of the Emperor, the Archdukes, the Infanta, and the Grand Duke and Duchess of Tuscany. Outside of these places, he was bound by a general set of rules focusing on the prince's safety (both in terms of travel dangers and preserving his dignity). These tasks are no different from each other. At each of the courts he visited, Radziwiłł was expected to deliver letters of greetings from the king and queen and assure the hosts in his own words of the affection resulting from kinship.

The instructions regarding Radziwiłł's visit to the Emperor and the court of the Infanta stand out in terms of the number of intricate recommendations. Their detailed character and the use of words explicitly telling the envoy what to say prove that these were the guidelines for the formal diplomatic orations Radziwiłł was to deliver at these courts. At the Emperor's court, Radziwiłł's crucial task was to settle one of the most severe problems between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Empire of that time – the aforementioned issue of taming by Sigismund III the *Lisowczy* troops enlisted by the Emperor –. In his oration, he was to present the Polish nobility's position towards the problem of *Lisowczy* and describe the actions taken by the king, the Great Crown Hetman and the *sejm* to stop their arbitrariness. Radziwiłł was provided with a Latin copy of the *sejm* constitution adopted in this matter to present to the Emperor what solutions would be implemented. He was to end his speech with an assurance that the king would keep his «pacts and alliances», which was supposed to guarantee the enforcement of the treaty on mutual assistance against the rebellious subjects concluded in 1613 between Sigismund III and Emperor Matthias I.

Equally detailed recommendations apply to the audience with Infanta Isabella. Radziwiłł was to

14 Stefan Pac, «Obraz dworów europejskich na początku XVII wieku», in Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza*, 58.

15 Jan Hagenaw, «Diariusz podróży zagranicznej królewicza Władysława, napisany przez Jana Hogenau», in Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza*, 58.

16 «Instrukcja króla Zygmunta III dla Albrychta Stanisława Radziwiłła, kanclerza litewskiego, dana w Warszawie w maju 1624 r.», in Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza*, 421.

bring greetings and assurances of kindness and friendship sent by the royal couple during the private audience. Again, it was written down what specifically the envoy was to say and what he was to emphasise in his speech, namely, how important a role in the close relations between the two courts was played by the support given to the Commonwealth during the war with Turkey by Isabella's late husband, Archduke Albert.

The instruction suggests that Radziwiłł was to interrupt performing his envoy function during his stay in Rome, as he received no instructions regarding his contact with the pope. Apart from a reminder of the extraordinary character of Rome, «the stage of the world», where «all words and deeds of the Serene Prince will be observed and noted down», the only instructions regarding Radziwiłł's duties in the Holy See tell him to make sure that the prince does not meet with anyone except the pope and cardinal Cosimo de Torres, the cardinal protector of the Commonwealth. The recommendations concerning the stay at the court of the Grand Duke and Duchess of Tuscany are described very laconically. The instruction orders Radziwiłł to greet them «in the same way as the other princes mentioned above» and resume the journey as soon as possible¹⁷.

As in any embassy case, Radziwiłł was provided with letters to consign to the rulers to whom he was conducting his mission. Letters from May 1624 addressed to Infanta Isabella, Archdukes Charles and Leopold, Emperor Ferdinand II, and Grand Duchess Maria Magdalena of Tuscany¹⁸, containing greetings and informing of the arrival of Prince Władysław, also mention Albert Stanisław Radziwiłł as the prince's companion. Although these letters' content implies that Radziwiłł was to perform diplomatic functions on behalf of the king, none of them, similarly to the instruction, mentions his diplomatic rank. However, a mention of it appears in the passport issued for him by Sigismund III. In this document, the king calls him *orator noster*¹⁹.

The way Radziwiłł was treated at the receiving courts also indicates that his role as envoy was not just a disguise allowing the prince to travel comfortably. Radziwiłł participated in ceremonial entrances prepared in his honour and typical of royal envoys, and was accommodated in sumptuous apartments. He also took pride of place at the table during public meals, and the first seats in carriages when he had to travel accompanied by the representatives of the host rulers. The scope of his diplomatic functions was most often linked to the degree of the prince's anonymity at a given stage of his journey. Still, this link disappeared at the courts mentioned in the instruction as places where Radziwiłł was to fulfil specific tasks as an envoy, and the prince did not appear incognito.

The entrances to the visited cities took place throughout the journey: the royal envoy entered, the prince entered, or the arrival to a given location was kept secret. Other ceremonial entries of Radziwiłł as an extraordinary envoy took place only in Munich and Brussels. In Stefan Pac's account of 26 July 1624, it is stated that during a meeting with the commissioners sent by the Elector of Bavaria to determine the way the entrance would take place, the prince explained: «that he did not need any entrances and extraordinary honours, not objecting, however, to going and receiving the Prince [Radziwiłł] in the usual way, as is the custom». Pac writes further that Duke Maximilian's marshal met them on their way to Munich with numerous horsemen and carriages; Radziwiłł and the prince took their places of honour in the first of them²⁰. The arrangement of the circumstances of the entrance to Brussels was analogous. When, despite the earlier agreements between Pac and the court of the Infanta, on their way from Leuven to Brussels the prince's retinue met the Infanta's horseman with the carriages

17 "Instrukcja króla Zygmunta III", in Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza*, 421-25. See Henryk Wisner, "Dyplomacja polska w latach 1572-1648", in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. II: 1572-1795, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1982), 31-32.

18 AGAD, MK, LL, 30, *Sigismund III Vasa Waza to Infanta Isabella, Governor of the Netherlands*, Warsaw 15 May 1624, ff. 109r-10v; Ibid., *Sigismund III Vasa to Archduke Charles, Bishop of Wrocław*, Warsaw, May 15 1624, f. r; Ibid., *Sigismund III Vasa to Archduke Leopold V*, Warsaw, 15 May 1624, f. 109v; Ibid., *Sigismund III Vasa to Emperor Ferdinand II*, Warsaw May 15 1624, f. 111r; ASF, *Fondo Mediceo*, II, 4292, *Sigismund III Vasa to Princess Mary Magdalene*, 15 May 1624, p. 486 (497). More letters can be found in Львівська наукова бібліотека імені В. Стефаника НАН України [Stefanyk National Scientific Library of Ukraine in Lviv], fond 5: 201, *Kopiarusz materiałów dotyczących stosunków zagranicznych Polski z lat 1619-1625*, ff. 281-301r.

19 AGAD, AR, II, *Passport issued by Sigismund III Vasa to Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł*, Warsaw May 15 1624, f. 888r.

20 Pac, "Obraz dworów europejskich", 106, 108.

and cavalry, Władysław asked them to «conduct the ceremonial [...] with the Prince [Radziwiłł]». Radziwiłł was given the first seat in the carriage, and this way, the entrance to Brussels took place²¹. The descriptions of his arrival in Munich and Brussels signal the Władysław's resistance to any ceremonies associated with his arrival in these cities. His eventual consent to the ceremonial entrances held in Radziwiłł's honour seems to have been a compromise between the prince's will and the host rulers' desire to manifest their wealth and glory by offering such a magnificent guest a proper reception²². However, the prince's solution could have been as beneficial for himself as it was for the receiving courts. Władysław followed his father's advice to conceal his identity as often as possible and thus avoided the dangers of lapses in his dignity. Prince Władysław's situation was exceptional and challenging from the ceremonial point of view. As the son of the elected king, he had no right to the title of heir to the Polish-Lithuanian throne. In contrast, his other titles, such as the heir to the Swedish throne or the throne of the tsar of Moscow, were subjects of ongoing conflicts and tensions between the Commonwealth and Sweden and Moscow. Besides, even if the Infanta's and Wittelsbach's courts were ready to welcome the prince as the successor to the Swedish and Muscovite thrones, it still constituted a severe problem, as probably no description of the ceremonial of receiving the heir to the throne existed at that time²³. King Sigismund III's entourage, as well as the rulers hosting Władysław, must have been aware of this. Preparing ceremonial entrances and greetings addressed to Radziwiłł as an envoy was a safer solution for both sides.

During his travels through numerous countries of the Reich, it was typical behaviour of their rulers to obey the prince's wishes concerning his anonymity and to receive Radziwiłł as the royal envoy at public ceremonies. In the free cities of the Reich, Radziwiłł was treated «according to the diplomatic custom». Representatives of the city authorities of Augsburg, Nuremberg, Cologne and Aachen welcomed Radziwiłł as a royal envoy and offered him food and wine. Similar welcomes took place in cities belonging to archbishops. Before the arrival in Salzburg, it was agreed that Radziwiłł would enter the city and be received by the archbishop, to whom the prince would only be privately introduced. According to Radziwiłł's account of the welcome in Salzburg, he wrote: «I came as the King's envoy and everyone did great honours to me». From Hagenaw's account, we learn about the five carriages sent for the envoy, for whom the first seat was saved in one of them. Radziwiłł also drew attention to the kindness he received from the Archbishop of Trier, Philip Christopher von Sötern, who greeted him in Koblenz by offering Radziwiłł his right hand to shake. The Chancellor stressed that this gesture was connected with his dignity as a royal envoy. The Bishop of Würzburg, Philip Adolf von Ehrenberg, welcomed Radziwiłł as an envoy as soon as he learnt who had arrived in his city, although the welcome was more modest than in the previous cases. Nevertheless, it was certainly not as inappropriate as the Archbishop of Mainz's reception, who, according to Radziwiłł, received them rudely and far too modestly²⁴.

The arrangements mentioned above regarding greetings exchanged by the prince and the archbishop of Salzburg draw attention to the «exchange of places» that repeatedly took place between the prince and Radziwiłł throughout the journey. It was very smooth and closely linked to the overriding principle organising how these two people travelled, namely that Władysław kept his anonymity as often as possible. The description of the visit to the archbishop's palace vividly depicts this principle of taking on roles, of constantly performing *commedia* as Radziwiłł himself called these actions. The prince made himself known to the archbishop in the latter's private chambers, but when they later visited

21 Pac, «Obraz dworów europejskich», 161-62.

22 Hagenaw, «Diariusz podróży zagranicznej», 105, 153; Pac, «Obraz dworów europejskich», 106, 160.

23 Travelling by heirs to a throne was a rare occurrence at this time. In 1623 Prince Charles of Wales visited the court of Madrid, and from an excerpt from the 1651 code of etiquette for the Spanish court published by Ryszard Skowron, we learn that those visits served as a model for the ceremonies related to them. Thus, there may have already existed tried and tested solutions, but they were certainly not popularized at European courts yet. See Ryszard Skowron, «Znak i liturgia władzy - ceremoniale i etykieta dworu hiszpańskiego», in *Theatrum ceremoniale na dworze księąt i królów polskich*, eds. Mariusz Markiewicz and Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: Zamek Królewski na Wawelu, 1999), 128-29.

24 Pac, «Obraz dworów europejskich», 99, 127-28, 137; Radziwiłł, «Rys panowania Zygmunta III», 10, 120, 125, 127-28, 133, 137; Hagenaw, «Diariusz podróży zagranicznej», 102-3; 127-28; 144-46; 153.

the palace side by side and passed the “porches” where people were gathered, the prince stopped, and Radziwiłł replaced him²⁵.

The situation which occurred at Antwerp offers equally substantial insight into the rules of the play. The accounts of Pac and Hagenaw show that Władysław arrived in that city without preserving anonymity. Their descriptions indicate the solemn welcome made by the townspeople and the city council, the recipient of which was the prince and not the envoy. They entered the city on 22 September. For the next three days, the prince visited its monuments and attractions without concealing his identity. It is evidenced, for example, by his visit to the Cathedral of Our Lady, where Władysław was greeted by «all the clergy and escorted to the choir in a procession». Afterwards, as planned, the prince went to the Spanish military camp near Breda, and Radziwiłł stayed in Antwerp. A day later, he was visited and officially welcomed by the mayor, some members of the city council, and a pensionary. When Władysław appeared in public as a prince, his majesty exceeded that of an envoy representing the reigning king, and it was to the prince that the most honourable treatment was due. However, the moment the prince “disappeared” from sight either by concealing his identity or, as happened in Antwerp, physically leaving a place, these honours were received by the second most important person in the arrangement, the royal envoy Radziwiłł²⁶.

The prince’s anonymity was also connected with the circumstances, and its scope varied depending on the situation. As the instruction indicates, the degree of anonymity was primarily determined by the closeness of kinship relationships with the ruler of the visited lands. The closer was the kinship relationships and relations with a given family member, the lesser the need to conceal prince’s identity. The first opportunity to meet his closest family was a journey across the Empire’s lands. Władysław visited his uncle, Emperor Ferdinand II, and his wife Eleonora, as well as two archdukes, Charles and Leopold. The difference in the way Radziwiłł was treated during these encounters was evident primarily during the greetings. Although both in Neisse and Vienna Radziwiłł performed tasks resulting from his role as envoy, the ceremonial entrances in his or the prince’s honour were replaced there by cordial hugs, and friendly greetings exchanged between Władysław and the members of the imperial family. There, Władysław was not treated “only” as a Polish prince but primarily as a close relative. The entrance to Saverne, the residence of archduke Leopold, took place in a similar fashion, although the archduke rode several miles outside the city to meet the prince, accompanied by his court and numerous noblemen.

At first glance, the circumstances of the prince’s visit to Florence do not deviate from this pattern either. Maria Magdalena Habsburg, Władysław’ aunt, was ruling there on behalf of the minor Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand II de Medici, her son. Although the prince explained to the commissioner sent to welcome him within the Grand Duchy’s borders that he wanted to enter incognito, a ceremonial welcome was prepared in his honour anyway. However, despite the evidence of friendship and respect shown by the Tuscan relatives of the prince, there can be noticed the much cooler feelings associated with kinship than in the case of the earlier meeting with the Emperor and the Archdukes. Although Władysław was greeted by the Grand Duke himself, accompanied by his younger brothers, and later welcomed on the palace’s steps by Archduchess Maria Magdalena²⁷, there is no mention of the warm embraces and enthusiastic greetings that took place in Neisse or Vienna.

The authors of the accounts use three terms when describing contacts between Radziwiłł and other people at the visited courts, and these are: “audiences”, “meetings”, and “conversations”. As already mentioned, Radziwiłł’s actions received the most attention from Hagenaw, who introduces the distinction between these types of interactions. He uses the word “audience” to describe the official interactions during which Radziwiłł fulfilled the tasks assigned to him by the king – both as an envoy and as a “director” of the voyage. Hence, Hagenaw also uses the term “audiences” when he refers to the conversations Radziwiłł participated in before his departure from Neisse to determine the further order of travel for the combined retinues of Prince Władysław and Archduke Charles.

25 Radziwiłł, “Rys panowania Zygmunta III”, 101.

26 Pac, “Obraz dworów europejskich”, 178-79, 183; Hagenaw, “Diariusz podróży zagranicznej”, 179-80, 185.

27 “Instrukcja króla”, in Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza*, 422-26. Cf. Pac, “Obraz dworów europejskich”, 74-6, 209, 334, 336; Radziwiłł, “Rys panowania Zygmunta III”, 209, 337; Hagenaw, “Diariusz podróży zagranicznej”, 75-6, 209.

The vast majority of information about Radziwiłł's audiences is retrieved from Hagenaw's account. These are laconic, one-sentence passages containing information about the time of the day when the audience took place or about its location. Only twice is a piece of information about the course of the audience recorded. One passage, written by Stefan Pac on 29 July 1624, states that during his stay in Munich Radziwiłł had an audience with Duke Wilhelm and his daughter-in-law, the wife of the Elector of Bavaria. At that time, he handed them letters from the king and queen. The second passage is related to an incident that occurred on 5 April 1625, when during Radziwiłł's audience with the Emperor, a bullet hit the window and shattered it, injuring the Chancellor. The description of such an exciting event had to be included in the account of the journey. Yet, the information given by Pac may imply three cases: Pac attended Radziwiłł's audience, the Chancellor himself told him about its course, or simply Pac described the usual course of an audience of a royal envoy at a foreign court²⁸.

According to the prince's tour accounts, Radziwiłł participated in eleven audiences at the courts of Neisse, Vienna, Munich, Bonn, Brussels, and Florence. These are the places designated by Zygmunt III in his instruction. The rule was that the first audience with a given ruler took place the day after the retinue had arrived at the court. An exception is the court of Archduke Charles in Neisse, where Radziwiłł received an audience two days after his arrival. Regardless of the form (as the "head" or the second after Władysław) in which the envoy's entrance into the city took place, a typical order of receiving an envoy at the courts of Western Europe was preserved. Hence, the day of the arrival was the day of adaptation and arranging the first audience's time, which was to officially begin the mission at the visited court.

In most cases, Radziwiłł was granted only one audience during his stay at a given court. Sometimes, however, as in Neisse, Florence and during his first stay in Vienna, the envoy obtained a second audience. In Vienna and Florence, these meetings constituted an opportunity for other retinue members to get to know the ruler and his family. In both cities, such a meeting took place immediately after Radziwiłł's first audience. In Vienna, «other companions and servants of the Serene Prince» greeted the imperial couple. In Florence, other members of the entourage accompanied the envoy at the meeting with Archduchess Maria Magdalena. The audience received by Radziwiłł in Neisse was utterly different. It was connected with the planned merger of the retinues of the Prince and Archduke Charles. During the audience, Radziwiłł was to learn about the «route and order of the journey» to Vienna²⁹.

The circumstances of the audiences at which Radziwiłł was received during Prince Władysław's journey indicate his function as an envoy. No other member of the entourage was granted private audiences with the rulers of the visited countries. A possibility of personal contact with the rulers was related to the role of diplomat. In his account of the stay in Munich, Stefan Pac explicitly indicates the relation between Radziwiłł's audience with Duke Wilhelm Wittelsbach and his role as a diplomat. He wrote that the Chancellor «had an audience with old Duke Wilhelm and his daughter-in-law, handed the letters from the Their Majesties the King and the Queen, and what he had commissioned, he carried off»³⁰. Although this is the only passage in which Pac states that Radziwiłł received an audience in connection with his role as envoy, it has to be assumed that any private audience obtained by Radziwiłł at least a day after his arrival at the court was related to fulfilling the same duty. Pac's lack of other descriptions of this kind is because he generally paid little attention to the activities of Radziwiłł as a diplomat.

Apart from the audiences, Radziwiłł also entered other interactions with rulers, diplomats and other people staying at the visited courts. Descriptions of some of these meetings point to their typically diplomatic nature, involving visits first paid by diplomats who happened to be staying at a given court. In Vienna, on 25 June 1624, the prince was visited by «the apostolic nuncio, the Right Reverend Mr

28 Pac, "Obraz dworów europejskich", 110; Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 401; Radziwiłł, "Rys panowania Zygmunta III", 403.

29 Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 60, 79.

30 Pac, "Obraz dworów europejskich", 110.

Caraffa, also the Spanish king's envoy, Count de Ognati³¹, and the Tuscan prince's envoy, Mr Altoviti». Three days later, Radziwiłł visited the apostolic nuncio and the Tuscan envoy. A similar pattern can be observed in Brussels, where on the day of the prince's arrival, he was greeted by the apostolic nuncio and the Spanish envoy. Two days later Radziwiłł paid a visit (only to the Spanish envoy on that day, because he «could not find the nuncio at home»), and in Florence: on 9 February 1625, the apostolic nuncio had an audience with the prince, and two days later Radziwiłł visited the nuncio³². Reciprocal visits by diplomats at foreign courts were a regular feature of diplomatic etiquette. Thus, the fact that Radziwiłł took part in these interactions clearly indicates his role as an envoy of Sigismund III.

These situations present Radziwiłł performing duties characteristic of an envoy carrying out his mission. As in many other aspects of this trip, an exception is Rome, where the prince himself revisited the cardinals who had visited him earlier³³. It was probably since Radziwiłł's function as an envoy completely disappeared in Rome. The descriptions of his stay in the Holy See, which take up much space, show him rather as a high-ranking nobleman. Together with his relatives he had met there, Radziwiłł fulfilled the social duties of a member of a family of international prestige. In his memoirs, as well as in Hagenaw's account, his role as protector and advisor to the prince is emphasized more strongly than before. At his instigation, Władysław asked the pope for the honour of seeing the Veil of St Veronica, which necessitated his appointment as a canon of St Peter's Chapter³⁴.

Apart from these courtesy calls, Radziwiłł participated in several meetings with important personages, which may have involved discussing political matters on the king's behalf. At the court of the Elector of Bavaria in Munich, the envoy met with Duke Wilhelm V Wittelsbach twice more after the welcome audience. On the day of his departure from Bonn for Cologne, Radziwiłł was visited by Ferdinand Wittelsbach, the Elector of Cologne, together with his brother Albert. In Vienna, Radziwiłł met privately with the Spanish envoy, Count de Oñate, and with the Chancellor of Bohemia. During his stay in Brussels, when Radziwiłł was ill and spent all days in his room, he was visited by Duke Arescot, Count Emden, and Cardinal Cueva³⁵. All these meetings were private (except perhaps the dinner with the Chancellor of Bohemia), which created favourable conditions for discussing matters that the king could entrust to Radziwiłł. The very fact that such meetings took place indicates Radziwiłł's role as envoy, which is the only explanation for his access to such top-ranking people and for the possibility of having private conversations with them.

In his memoirs from the journeys with the prince, the Chancellor frequently assessed the way he was received at the visited courts. The appearance of such assessments in Radziwiłł's account may have resulted from the fact that he was fully aware of his representational duties related to the function of an envoy. It can be assumed that he was familiar with Krzysztof Warszewicki's famous treatise *De legato et legatione* from 1595, in which the author included guidelines for diplomats on how best to carry out diplomatic missions in accordance with legal and customary norms. In his treatise, Warszewicki generally recommended modesty to the envoys but also noted that "representative reasons" required that the envoy «surround himself with more splendour than an ordinary man», which involved, for example, «occupying a place appropriate to his dignity». Therefore, Radziwiłł paid attention to

31 Iñigo Vélez de Guevara y Tassis, count de Oñate [1566–1644]. He was Spanish ambassador at the Savoy court (1603–1613), the imperial court (1613–1625; 1633–1637), and to the Holy See (1626–1628). During his mission at the imperial court, he supervised Polish affairs, including the issue of compensation for the Polish fleet sent to Wismar, the matter of Neapolitan sums, and Polish-Swedish relations.

32 Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 82–3, 171, 354. Relatives met by Radziwiłł were his cousins, Alexander Ludwik and Jan Albrycht. Alexander Ludwik Radziwiłł [1594–1654] was the son of Mikołaj Krzysztof "Sierotka", voivode of Vilnius and Grand Marshal of Lithuania. He himself also held the office of Grand Marshal of Lithuania (1637–1654). He was also voivode of Połock and Brześć Litewski. Jan Albrycht Radziwiłł [1591–1626] was the son of Albrycht Radziwiłł, Grand Marshal of Lithuania, starosta of Kowno and Rumbory. He himself bore only the title of starosta of Upita. He died in Vilnius shortly after returning from abroad.

33 Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 169; Radziwiłł, "Rys panowania Zygmunta III", 298.

34 They were his cousins, Alexander Ludwik and Jan Albrycht. Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 293, 302; Pac, "Obraz dworów europejskich", 327.

35 Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 112, 116, 143, 87, 88, 190–91.

whether how he was received corresponded to his dignity, and if he considered that this was not the case, he intervened. In Vienna, he found that the imperial court had placed him and Stefan Pac in a public inn, which constituted an offence to his dignity, so he rented an inn closer to the castle, which «added to their dignity»³⁶.

Nevertheless, the impropriety of this kind did not happen often. In most of the places he visited, Radziwiłł was treated in a way that distinguished him, even if only slightly, from the rest of the retinue. Apart from the question of ceremonial greetings, the specific treatment was also manifested in offering Radziwiłł more sumptuous lodging than one of the rest of the prince's companions or assigning him an honourable place at the table. When describing his stay in Munich, Hagenaw pays particular attention to the splendidly furnished suite in which the prince was accommodated, adding that «Radziwiłł was also given dazzling rooms in the same palace, namely, those in which Archduke Charles had previously lived». The distinction between Radziwiłł and the others is even more evident in the account from Koblenz, where Hagenaw stresses again that only Radziwiłł and Prince Władysław were accommodated in the Archbishop's Palace. At the same time, the rest of the entourage stayed in townsmen's houses. This information is followed by the note that «at the supper, as well as at the following stops, none of us except Prince Radziwiłł sat at the table of the noblest»³⁷, thus completing the image of the exceptional way his master was treated by the Archbishop of Trier.

Nonetheless, most descriptions of the circumstances of meals and lodging do not indicate the existence of a rule in depriving the rest of the prince's high-ranking companions of the access to a residence in palace rooms or the place at the table of the dignified host. Neither in Brussels, Rome, nor in Naples were the travellers offered accommodation of varying quality according to their rank. In all but Saverne, Koblenz and Munich, where the accounts record more ceremonial meals, Radziwiłł and the prince were also accompanied at the table by Stefan Pac, Adam Kazanowski, Łukasz Żółkiewski and Gerard Denhoff. They are not always mentioned by name, as Pac usually writes simply "we", but on the basis of other accounts, it can be concluded that these four people were, apart from Radziwiłł, the most important and the closest companions of the prince on his journey.

This group of individuals ranked just behind Radziwiłł in the hierarchy of importance. Some of the tasks they performed by the prince's orders are further evidence that Radziwiłł was distinguished from them by his high rank of royal envoy. Gerard Denhoff was sent several times as an envoy to discuss the circumstances of welcoming the retinue, for example, before arriving in Mainz and Florence. At the court of Infanta Isabella, Władysław sent Pac to arrange the details of the entrance into Brussels³⁸. If Radziwiłł were only the leader of the journey, nothing would prevent the prince from assigning him similar duties. Nevertheless, this could not be the case, as the dignity and prestige of the royal envoy required that preferably one of the members of the envoy's retinue acted as a runner.

36 Radziwiłł, "Rys panowania Zygmunta III", 77, 101, 135, 163, 307; Pac, "Obraz dworów europejskich", 77. Cf. Krzysztof Warszawicki, *O posle i poselstwach*, trans. Jerzy Życki (Warszawa: Księgarnia F. Hoesicka, 1935), 62, 89.

37 Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 109, 139.

38 Radziwiłł, "Rys panowania Zygmunta III", 133; Hagenaw, "Diariusz podróży zagranicznej", 271, 153, 147.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

AR: Archiwum Radziwiłłów.

MK: *Metryka Koronna*.

LL: *Libri Legationum*.

ASF: Archivio di Stato di Firenze.

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THE CORONATION PARLIAMENT OF JOHN III SOBIESKI IN FRENCH-LANGUAGE REPORTS SENT TO LONDON

ABSTRACT

The coronation parliament in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was always an exceptional event not only for the newly elected monarch but also for diplomats from foreign courts who reported about its proceedings. In their reports, they tried to provide as much information as possible, not only political but also moral, social, and related to the ceremony. Of course, such material needs careful analysis, as the diplomats, often unfamiliar with the reality of the Polish-Lithuanian state, misrepresented the facts or presented them in a wrong context. The analysed manuscript accounts from the coronation parliament of John III Sobieski probably played the role of an additional source of information in London. In addition to the official reports of diplomats, they broadened the recipients' knowledge about the described event, generally informing the reader about events during the parliamentary sessions, but not only that. The information about events in Russia and Turkey as well as about matters of minor importance was also included in these documents. Despite doubts about objectivity of some of the analysed papers, they should be considered an important source of information about the coronation parliament in 1676. They supplemented the official documents, and their congruence with diplomatic reports may have allowed for deepening of the reader's knowledge about the described events.

KEYWORDS: Sobieski; The coronation parliament; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; English diplomacy.

The coronation parliament in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was always an exceptional event not only for the newly elected monarch but also for diplomats from foreign courts who reported about its proceedings. In their reports, they tried to provide as much information as possible, not only political but also moral, social, and related to the ceremony. Of course, such material needs careful analysis, as the diplomats, often unfamiliar with the reality of the Polish-Lithuanian state, misrepresented the facts or presented them in a wrong context. Frequently, their conclusions could be incomplete or even erroneous due to the lack of understanding of the country's specificity or of the prevailing political relations. Foreign envoys often attached to their reports handwritten accounts and leaflets that appeared on an occasion of an important event, in this case, the coronation. The subject of my deliberations will be several of these handwritten accounts, which described not only what happened in Cracow at the coronation session of John III Sobieski in 1676, but also provided political, military and social news from February and March 1676. The London headquarters was interested in any information related to the event, and the transmission of such documents was additional to official diplomatic reports. They are stored in The National Archives in London, in the collection *State Papers Foreign, Newsletters. Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and Poland*, against number 101/44. Unfortunately, we do not know the author of the discussed French manuscripts. The information contained therein must be subjected to scientific criticism, allowing to eliminate factual errors from the communication. They could have arisen for various reasons, of which the main one seems to be the insufficient knowledge of the reality of the Commonwealth and of the people participating in the described events. Therefore, the data provided in the manuscripts must be verified in terms of their information credibility. Of course, the image of the coronation parliament which emerges from the discussed documents would be incomplete if we did not briefly present the election of John III Sobieski as the king of the Commonwealth, which will be the first issue discussed in this article.



JAN SOBIESKI'S ELECTION

The death of Michał I opened a period of a new *interregnum* in the Commonwealth. Various candidates started their efforts to obtain the crown. There were three significant candidates for the Polish-Lithuanian throne: Philip William of Neuburg, supported by France; Charles V Leopold of Lorraine, with Austrian support; and Tsarevich Fyodor. During this time, several other candidacies were put forward, for example of Danish Prince George, Prince Louis Thomas of Savoy, who was initially considered by the French diplomacy, Duke of Modena Rinaldo d'Este, and Charles Emil Hohenzollern (son of Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William). Still, none of these received clear support. The Tsarevich's candidacy also seemed to have no chance because according to the expectations of the influential Pac family, who promoted it, he was to adopt Catholicism and marry the widow of the deceased king, which was unacceptable for the Romanov. Besides, the Muscovite candidate himself was not eager to take the throne of the Commonwealth. Therefore, the most important candidates were the Duke of Neuburg and Charles of Lorraine, who received the support of Rome. On the other hand, the nobility gathered around the Viennese court waited for the declarations of Christoph Leopold Schaffgotsch on this matter. French diplomacy believed that the election in the Polish-Lithuanian state should be carefully observed because it was of great importance for the whole of Europe. The election of a new king in the Commonwealth was indeed a problem of great importance at the court of Louis XIV in connection with his struggle on the Rhine with Emperor Leopold I of Habsburg¹. Apart from the undisguised aversion to the candidacy of the Lorraine, French diplomats also emphasised that his chances of taking the throne were relatively small, precisely because of his connection with the Viennese court and the divergent interests of the Emperor and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth². The campaign of gaining allies for its candidate was also started by the Viennese court, which had strong supporters in the Commonwealth. It is recorded in the visit diary of the imperial diplomat Christoph Leopold Schaffgotsch, who came to Warsaw on 17 April 1674³. During the convocation parliament, which was to set the time and prepare the course of the election, the candidacy of *Piast* (a Pole) was also announced, but John Sobieski was not yet considered⁴. The period between the convocation and the election of 1674 was spent by political parties on strengthening their positions before the decisive clash, which was the election of a new monarch. In Lithuania, the Pac family closely watched their rivals' actions – the Radziwiłł and Sapieha families, who were helped by the French money provided by the bishop of Marseille, Toussainte de Forbin-Janson. Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł was to receive 20'000 écus, and the Lithuanian Court Treasurer Benedykt Paweł Sapieha – 10'000 écus⁵. The wife of John Sobieski, Marie Casimire d'Arquien, who mentioned the crown to her husband in 1670, also became involved⁶. To the envoy of Duke de Longueville to Warsaw, François de Callières, it seemed unlikely that Sobieski, a supporter of France, would support the Great Condé, and King Louis XIV – the candidacy of the Duke of Neuburg. He realised that the

1 "Mémoire pour servir d'instruction au sieur évêque de Marseille allant de la part de Sa Majesté ambassadeur extraordinaire en Pologne, Versailles 30 mars 1674", in *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France: depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française IV-V: Pologne*, vol. 1: 1648–1729, ed Louis Farges (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière et C^e, 1888), 131–32; Mariusz Sawicki, *Dom sapieżyński 1666–1685. Droga do hegemonii w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2016), 95–7.

2 AMAE Fr, CP, Pologne, vol. 44, Bishop Toussainte de Forbin-Janson's report on the conversation with the French ambassador to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, [30] March 1674, f. 27r.

3 Aleksandra Ziober, "Dziennik wizyt posła cesarskiego K. L. Schaffgotscha, jako przyczynek do wyjaśnienia przebiegu elekcji 1674 r.", in *Wokół wolnych elekcji w państwie polsko-litewskim XVI–XVIII wieku. O znaczeniu idei wyboru–między prawami a obowiązkami*, eds. Mariusz Markiewicz, Dariusz Rolnik and Filip Wolański (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), 342–53.

4 AMAE Fr, CP, Pologne supp., vol. 2, *Copie de l'écriture de Warsovie du 2 Février 1674, du 3 Février 1674, du 5 Février 1674, du 13 Février 1674*, ff. 364–68r.

5 Sawicki, *Dom Sapieżyński*, 107.

6 Michał Komarzyński, *Piękna królowa Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien-Sobieska 1641–1671* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1995), 116.

game was about someone completely different, and the conversation with Marie Casimire reassured him that it was about her husband – John Sobieski⁷.

On 20 April 1674, the election parliament began, for which Benedykt Paweł Sapieha was elected the Marshal. At the outset, Lithuanian deputies asked for the exclusion of *Piast* from the possibility of competing for the throne. This issue should have been discussed in the parliament. Eventually, on 30 April, Lithuanians resigned from blocking the proceedings. On 19 May 1674, there were further protests by Lithuanian deputies gathered around the Pac family, who asked for an extension of the proceedings and protested against the election of a king from the Commonwealth. At the same time, choosing a new monarch was already a foregone conclusion, as the Polish crown provinces declared their support for John Sobieski. The elect, initially accepted only by the Crown, then obtained the support of his brother-in-law, Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł, as well as of the Sapieha family. At that time, most Lithuanian voivodeships declared their solidarity with the Poles and supported the election of John Sobieski. Finally, on 21 May 1674, there were no more obstacles to recognise Sobieski as the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania⁸.

At the time of the announcement of John Sobieski's candidacy, French diplomacy also supported his efforts to obtain the Commonwealth's crown. On 11 May 1674, bishop Forbin-Janson had a general audience in the *sejm*, during which he supported the candidacy of the Duke of Neuburg. He did not have much chance of winning at that time, but the bishop did not know about it yet. On the same day, he was welcomed by the Sobieski family, and then the concept of electing John Sobieski was put forward. The French diplomat assessed the idea as feasible and handed over 9'000 livres to Sobieski for distribution in the army, and among the nobility, aiming to win supporters of the new candidacy⁹. On 14 May 1674, John Sobieski and his wife received 30'000 livres from the diplomats of Louis XIV. Most likely, most of these funds were distributed during the election parliament. In addition, Sobieski was handed over 5'000 ducats brought by Antoine de Baluze, and Formont banker¹⁰.

Benedykt Paweł Sapieha, as the Marshal of the election parliament, contributed significantly to the election of John III Sobieski. That influenced the further fate of the *Sapieha* faction, which soon became the royal party. Italian diplomacy estimated that the court of Louis XIV spent around 800'000 écus on the election. Forbin-Janson handed them over or promised to pay them to Polish and Lithuanian magnates favourable to the French candidate. According to the diplomat of the Duke of Modena, Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato, all these actions were dictated by the desire to exclude a Viennese candidate from the election, as well as to win the new monarch's favour. On the other hand, French diplomats informed Louis XIV that, according to the information obtained from Sobieski, 400'000 livres were spent, initially in the form of promises; however, they were confirmed by relevant documents from the Formont banking house in Gdańsk¹¹.

CORONATION PARLIAMENT

In the Commonwealth, the newly elected monarch used to become an effective ruler only after the solemn coronation. Then he could distribute offices, hold courts and have the state goods at his disposal. On the occasion of the coronation act, the so-called coronation parliament would gather. After the solemn ceremony, the most important matters of the state were debated. It was no different with John Sobieski, whose coronation parliament began on 4 February 1676, despite being convened on 3 January of the same year¹². On 29 January, the new monarch officially entered Cracow. On the 31st of the same

7 Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski (1629–1696)* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983), 217–18.

8 Sawicki, *Dom sapieżyński*, 103–05.

9 Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, 218.

10 Sawicki, *Dom sapieżyński*, 106.

11 Sawicki, *Dom sapieżyński*, 109.

12 Władysław Konopczyński, *Chronologia sejmów polskich 1493–1793* (Kraków: PAU, 1948), 157. Konopczyński states that parliament began on February 2 although in reality it was February 4 (*Diariusz*–Stolicki, 3).

month, the funeral of two previous kings, John II Casimir and Michał I was held. They were buried in the Wawel Cathedral¹³. According to tradition, after the funeral of the deceased monarchs, on 2 February, John Sobieski and his wife Marie Casimire d'Arquien were officially crowned. The noble society did not accept the new queen. There were even attempts to prevent her coronation by setting its date purposely, so that the queen, being heavily pregnant, would not participate in the ceremony. Meanwhile, Marie Casimire not only was crowned with her husband, but a month later, she gave birth to her daughter Theresa Kunegunda in the Wawel Castle. When Primate Andrzej Olszowski put the crown on the head of Marie Casimire, murmurs and objections of her opponents could be heard. Still, they were quickly silenced by joyful shouts concluding the coronation¹⁴. Anyway, only a few people were admitted to the ceremony, perhaps for fear of unusual reactions¹⁵.

After the coronation ceremonies, which culminated in an all-night feast, the parliament began. The first account of this event sent to London, which comes from the analysed collection, dates from 16 February 1676. It was a Sunday, i.e. a day without deliberations; therefore, it provides the information of events that took place earlier. The narrative begins by mentioning the events of 11 and 12 February. On the first of these days, the Marshal of the *sejm* (who is not mentioned by name and surname, but we know that it is the crown Standard-Bearer Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski) called on the nobility for a general agreement, and to postpone all controversial issues, finally, to go to the Senate's deliberation place to greet the king. Ultimately, the deputies agreed and went to welcome the monarch and kiss the royal hand¹⁶. Here the report is consistent with reality: the deputies went to the Senate around 3 p.m., and the king's greeting took place by candlelight¹⁷. On 12 February, the monarch waited for deputies in the Senate, where they arrived with Marshal Sieniawski. It was when the Grand Chancellor of the Crown, Jan Leszczyński, presented the royal postulates in his speech (called by the author of the newspaper *une belle propositions*). First, the monarch asked whether he should seek peace with the Turks or continue the war. In any case, it was necessary to contact Venice and check whether the army in Hungary was being gathered and if it could move to Poland in the spring¹⁸. Subsequently, it is recounted that the Chancellor explained that if the nobility decided for peace, it was necessary to consider which measures should be used so that the treaties with Turkey were not humiliating for the Commonwealth. However, it was assumed that the enemy, relying on their forces, would not accept any conditions from the Commonwealth.

The nobility was also to consider who could be asked to act as a mediator in the peace negotiations. Subsequently, the Chancellor discussed the possibility of waging war. Still, he immediately noted that the soldiers did not have their payments settled yet, and the state's situation was terrible – «la Republique estant dans un misérable estat». He asked to think about where to get military reinforcements. In the case of the decision to wage war, the first thing to consider was where to obtain the money to pay the old troops and recruit new soldiers. In his speech, Chancellor Leszczyński lamented about the tax burdens affecting the king's subjects, not only for the other war but also for paying the army, and the state's debts, which he, however, did not mention. Next, the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania, Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac, spoke. In his lengthy speech, he touched upon the need for an alliance with Moscow but pointed out that they did not keep their promises and obligations regarding the subsidies they had been already supposed to provide. He argued that these issues should be resolved during the talks on perpetual peace. At the end of his speech, the Lithuanian wished for a quick and happy conclusion of the parliament¹⁹. Then, after the speech of the Lithuanian Chancellor, the Marshal of the Parliament

13 BOssol., n. 247/II, *Diariusz sejmu koronacyjnego Jana Sobieskiego w 1676 roku*, f. 400r.

14 Aleksandra Skrzypietz, *Królewscy synowie – Jakub, Aleksander i Konstanty Sobiescy* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2011), 39; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, 249.

15 BOssol., n. 247/II, *Diariusz sejmu koronacyjnego [...]*, f. 400r.

16 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 154r.

17 BOssol., n. 247/II, *Diariusz sejmu koronacyjnego [...]*, f. 407r; *Diariusz–Stolicki*, 13.

18 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 154r.

19 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 155r.

went to the Chamber of Deputies. The deputies started talks about the vacancies and demanded their fair distribution, making the point that further discussion of royal proposals depended on it²⁰.

The relations also report the congratulations from the apostolic nuncio Francesco Martelli, and the French ambassador François Gaston de Béthune-Sully. The latter also stated that Louis XIV considered the Polish queen as his daughter and offered the royal couple his paternal feelings: «son principal [Louis XIV] prend la reine pour sa propre fille et offre leurs majestés son affection paternel [...]». This meant an explicit proposal for close political cooperation between France and the Commonwealth. The Polish king replied in French to the expressed courtesy and stated that «il prend bien a Coeur la bonne volonté du roi». In the end of the report, the author also noted that the monarch had dispatched to the Chamber of Deputies the bishop of Chełmno, Jan Małachowski, who was supposed to bring a list of vacancies prepared there²¹. In fact, the king dispatched the aforementioned bishop together with the voivode of Kyiv, Andrzej Potocki, to urge the deputies²².

The above-mentioned account is basically in line with what is known to have happened in the parliament. The novelty is a more detailed description of what the Crown and Lithuanian Chancellors said and placing it in points of the discussed report. In the well-known parliamentary diary, it is only mentioned that Leszczyński spoke briefly and Pac for more than two hours, so it is difficult to verify whether their speeches covered the presented points²³. We know for sure that in his speech, the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania mentioned the necessity of an alliance with Moscow and the preparation of instructions for the Polish legation to the eastern neighbour's capital²⁴.

From one point of view, we can assume that the analysed document brings some new, interesting information. On the other hand, the statement of the French ambassador cannot be verified in any way. However, his courtesy and diplomatic tone make the report seem justified and very probable, and we have no grounds to deny his statements.

Another relation about the coronation parliament of John Sobieski comes, like the earlier one, from Sunday, 16 February. Still, it is written by a different person, as evidenced by the handwriting. In this case, similarly to the first document, the author reported earlier events, this time from another day – 15 February.

At the very beginning, it informs about vacancies which were finally collected and agreed upon and then read to the king in the Senate. The author of the report also noted that the Marshal of the parliament, Leszczyński, in a speech addressed to the king, thanked him, perhaps for taking care of the issue of vacancies²⁵.

The handwritten account from the coronation parliament also mentions that the king of Poland accepted the papal nuncio for a long, secret audience on 14 February. After that, he gave a public audience to the French ambassador, and this information is an extension of that contained in the earlier account. This time François Gaston de Béthune-Sully, in a speech on behalf of his king, handed Louis XIV's letters to Queen Marie Casimire d'Arquien, in which the French monarch referred to the royal alliance with John III Sobieski's wife. In the end, the ambassador in «des termes si fort et si propres» emphasised Louis XIV's respect for the Polish monarch, which could, of course, be considered a diplomatic manoeuvre and considerable artistry of the French court. Then he had an audience with the Queen, where he also gave a speech: «d'une semblable ce remonte avec la même force et élégance». The Polish royal couple expressed their gratitude for the ambassador's words and were also grateful

20 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 155v.

21 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 155v.

22 *Diariusz–Stolicki*, 20; *Urzednicy województw kijowskiego i czernihowskiego XV-XVIII wieku. Spisy*, eds. Edward Janas and Witold Kłaczewski (Kórnik: Biblioteka Kórnicka, 2002), n. 411.

23 BOssol., n. 247/II, *Diariusz sejmu koronacyjnego [...]*, f. 408r; *Diariusz–Stolicki*, 15.

24 Marek Szwaba, *Działalność polityczna Krzysztofa Paca w drugiej połowie XVII wieku* (PhD diss., University of Wrocław, 1987), 224.

25 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 79r.

to the French king for the paid devoirs – «grandes d’amimie, d’estime et de tendresse»²⁶. John III Sobieski also gave an audience to the ambassador of the Emperor Leopold I, Christoph Leopold von Schaffgotsch, who represented the widow of Michał I, Eleonore of Austria. The aforementioned envoy was in the same room where the audience of Louis XIV’s representative was held, and, as the author of the relation noted, he heard everything that was discussed. At the end of the report, it was stated that everyone expected that the queen would go into labour soon after, as she was nine months pregnant. Besides, its author noted that Warsaw often hosted great feasts, both in the royal palace and in senatorial residences. Organised with great splendour, these celebrations of weddings and nuptials occurring at that time astonished foreigners who stayed in the capital²⁷. Perhaps, the person reporting these events in Cracow meant the wedding of Wacław Leszczyński, the voivode of Podlasie, with Princess Zofia Wiśniowiecka. The wedding was attended by the king, albeit without his wife, who was supposedly exhausted, due to the difficulties of the travel and of the parliament’s deliberations²⁸.

The author of the report from 29 February begins with the statement that there was nothing important to write about, as no specific decisions had yet been made by the parliament. Time was spent on discussing vacancies, dignities and offices, and each speaker put forward his ideas about these topics²⁹. It seems that the author of the analysed account was not entirely accurate because, during the deliberations, other issues were also discussed, such as those concerning the army, artillery, and the Ostrogski Ordination. The report also does not mention the senatorial *vota* (opinions), which began on 21 February. Perhaps the author of the account either inaccurately followed the deliberations of the parliament, which is likely, or his attention was exclusively drawn to quarrels over royal offices and estates³⁰.

The analysed manuscript also mentions that the queen had not yet given birth, and everyone was waiting for it. Later, its author provided information about international affairs related to Turkey and Moscow, which he probably heard in the king’s entourage, or in Cracow. According to the news, the king was forced to send troops to the threatened border areas. Unfortunately, nothing is known about the type and strength of these military units³¹.

Another account from Sobieski’s coronation parliament, which is included in the analysed English collection of manuscripts, dates from 23 March. From the very beginning, its author writes about the dispute between the Great Hetman of Lithuania, Michał Kazimierz Pac, and the Field Hetman, Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł, which brought deliberations of the parliament to a standstill, extending them to the following week³². Indeed, the author of the report did not deviate from the truth. Although the agreement between the above-mentioned military commanders was already agreed on 16, it was signed only on March 30³³.

London was also informed that the Polish parliament was still discussing the rates of taxes that had to be implemented to finance the war against the Ottoman Empire. Rumours spread in Cracow that the Ottoman Turks were preparing for another expedition against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the following paragraphs, the author of the report praised the virtues of John III, claiming that everything the king did was in the interest of the Commonwealth and the Catholic religion. He was supposed to personally edit the letters sent to unnamed “princes” about important issues that

26 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 79r.

27 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 16 Février 1676*, f. 79r.

28 BOssol., n. 247/II, *Diariusz sejmu koronacyjnego [...]*, f. 412r; *Diariusz–Stolicki*, 21; Jarosław Stolicki mistakenly gave the date of 17 February twice. Of course, in the first case, it is Sunday, 16 February.

29 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 29 Février 1676*, f. 207r. In fact, the account resembles a letter, as evidenced by its ending and illegible signature, despite being entitled like an ordinary manuscript account.

30 BOssol., n. 247/II, *Diariusz sejmu koronacyjnego [...]*, ff. 414-18r; Krystyn Matwijowski, *Pierwsze sejmy z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976), 100-06.

31 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 23 Mars 1676*, f. 351r.

32 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 23 Mars 1676*, f. 351r.

33 Sawicki, *Dom sapieżyński*, 127-28.

probably concerned a foreign policy problem. The account ends with the information about the death of Francesco Gratta, an Italian living in Gdańsk, where «il écrit General des portes de Prusse». He was famous because of his extraordinary devotion and desire to help all those who asked for it. He was to be particularly helpful to the Polish Monarchs. The author of the report also claimed that Gratta's death would be mourned throughout the country and that there was no one in Poland to replace him³⁴. In fact, the Gdańsk postmaster, merchant and banker was certainly associated with the Sobieski family from as early as the 1660s. It was when he was to purchase property in France on behalf of Marie Casimire d'Arquen, who intended to buy it for her husband³⁵.

The last account of the coronation *sejm* of John III Sobieski, included in the analysed collection, comes from 29 March. At the very beginning, its anonymous author indicated that it provided information from the previous week. He referred to the divine providence, which patronized the actions of the king – «Les nouvelle de cette semaine sont une continuation des bénédictions de Dieu sur les actions du Roi»³⁶. As the unknown author of the report noted, John III also personally developed a financial project plan to assemble a large army of 50'000 people, called the *militia*. For so many soldiers, the king assumed the expenses, which were lower than usual, and it is not described in the report how the monarch wanted to cover them. Nevertheless, the royal speech was received with great attention and satisfaction among the nobility debating at the parliament³⁷. In his beautiful speech, the Primate thanked Sobieski on behalf of the Senate, and emphasised the king's merits to the country. Leszczyński also appointed a meeting place for the day after, expressing his hope for a happy ending of the parliament. This passage mentions the reconciliation of the Lithuanian Hetmans (the Great Hetman Pac and the Field Hetman Radziwiłł), which took place in the royal chambers, in the presence of senators. According to the reporter, the whole event took place the day before, i.e. on 28 March, and was also supposed to contribute to the satisfying conclusion of the parliament. As for the last issue, the Hetmans' reconciliation certainly contributed to the successful conclusion of the parliamentary deliberations. Unfortunately, the settlement is misdated. Besides, the author probably did not know precisely when it happened because he added the word *hier* – “yesterday” above the line and between two dates³⁸. The final document regarding the settlement was signed the day after the report was created, on 30 March. Still, earlier, on 23 March, the agreement was reached in the royal chambers, and the anonymous author of the report probably mentioned this event³⁹.

While still discussing the reconciliation of the Lithuanian Hetmans, the anonymous author of the report noted that the Great Hetman, Pac, gave a humiliating speech about the Field Hetman, Radziwiłł. Later, Michał Kazimierz responded, probably in the same vein. Finally, the king spoke, although what he said was not described in relation. It was, however, emphasised that he spoke in a way befitting a great monarch, and this part was concluded with the statement that John III Sobieski was sent to Poles by God – «ce grand Roi leur a esté donné de Dieu»⁴⁰.

Unfortunately, the information regarding the number and type of troops mentioned in the report is not credible, although it was the king who designed the project plan. Sobieski finally proposed an army of 60'000 soldiers. In his proposal, he was not limiting himself only to the number of soldiers, but he also mentioned a specific type of units⁴¹.

The anonymous author of the report also provided information that the Ottoman Turks were making great preparations to enter the Commonwealth (in Podolia from Wallachia and Hungary). Therefore, the king issued appropriate orders; however, we do not learn about their content from the

34 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 23 Mars 1676*, f. 351r.

35 Komarzyński, *Piękna królowa*, 61.

36 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 29 Mars 1676*, f. 379r.

37 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 29 Mars 1676*, f. 379v.

38 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 29 Mars 1676*, f. 379v.

39 *Diariusz*–Stolicki, 103; Sawicki, *Dom sapieżyński*, 128.

40 TNA, *SP Newsletters*, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 29 Mars 1676*, f. 379v.

41 Matwijowski, *Pierwsze sejmy*, 133–4.

accounts. Sobieski also sent an unnamed colonel and military engineer from Piedmont to review the fortifications in the royal fortresses in Żółkiew, Jaworów and Złoczów, in Ruthenia⁴². Of course, the information about the Turkish threat is correct⁴³. The account is right also when it comes to the aforementioned officer of Italian descent, Francesco Corazzini, who, from 20 June 1661, held the office of the general military architect in the Crown army. He was the head of a group of military engineers, and was directly subordinate to the king⁴⁴.

At the end of the report, the author provided information about the deaths of Tsar Alexei I Nikolaevich, who died on 8 February, and the wife of the Elector of Bavaria, Henriette Adelaide of Savoy (this information was passed to him from Vienna)⁴⁵. In the second case, the information is not valid, as Henriette Adelaide died on 13 June 1676. Perhaps she was ill at the beginning of the year, or her health deteriorated significantly, which led to the spread of misinformation about her death. So it was rather an ordinary rumour, which the author of the report delivered without checking.

FINAL REMARKS

The analysed manuscript accounts from the coronation parliament of John III Sobieski were probably an additional source of information in London. In addition to official diplomatic reports, they broadened the recipients' knowledge, describing the events during the parliamentary sessions. They also informed about what was happening in Russia and Turkey, as well as about matters of minor importance.

The last two analysed accounts were most likely written by people either related to the king or favourably inclined toward him. They comprise the propaganda of the royal successes in the parliament and emphasise the monarch's care of the state and society. Such reports could shape the image of a particular event or people taking part in it, in that case – the Polish king, who was presented in a good light. Of course, the image of the monarch was intentionally fabricated and not entirely accurate. The monarch seemed to believe such depiction to be extremely important as it shaped the image of the Polish king in the eyes of European readers. It cannot be excluded that it was the king *in persona* that inspired these accounts.

Despite doubts about the objectivity of some of the analysed documents, they should be considered an important source of information about the coronation *sejm* in 1676. They complemented the official sources, and their congruence with diplomatic reports may have allowed for deepening the reader's knowledge about the described events.

42 TNA, SP Newsletters, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 29 Mars 1676*, f. 38or.

43 Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, 250-52.

44 Jan Wimmer, *Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII w.* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1965), 350; Marek Wagner, *Słownik biograficzny oficerów polskich drugiej połowy XVII wieku*, vol. 1 (Oświęcim: Napoleon V, 2013), 53.

45 TNA, SP Newsletters, n. 101/44, *De Cracovie de 29 Mars 1676*, f. 38or.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMAE Fr: Archives Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et du Développement International République Française à Paris.

CP: *Correspondance politique*.

BOssol.: Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich we Wrocławiu.

Diariusz–Stolicki: *Diariusz sejmu koronacyjnego [...]*, (ed. Stolicki, 2019).

TNA: The National Archives in London.

SP Newsletters: State Papers Foreign, Newsletters. Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and Poland.

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FEASTING AND FASTING IN MOSCOW: PEACE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN POLAND-LITHUANIA AND MUSCOVY IN 1678 AS SEEN THROUGH EATING AND DRINKING CUSTOMS

ABSTRACT

In 1678, a grand embassy headed by voivode of Wołyń (Volhynia) Michał Jerzy Czartoryski and voivode of Połock (Polatsk) Kazimierz Jan Sapieha set out to negotiate with Feodor III. At that time, the relations between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy were tense. The thirteen-year truce was about to end, talks dragged on, and friendship declarations were punctuated with threats.

By following the Polish-Lithuanian grand embassy of 1678 to Muscovy, as described in *Legatio Polono-Lithuanica* by Bernard Tanner, the article examines practices of diplomacy, paying attention to one particular aspect of embassies' material surrounding, that is food and drink. The goal is not to simply join the feast of the protagonists but to explore a wide range of problems – including those that would otherwise go unnoticed while focusing solely on high politics – to sketch a more detailed image of Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy in the seventeenth century.

KEYWORDS: Food and drink; Practice of Diplomacy; Bernard Tanner; Polish-Lithuanian relations with Muscovy

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<http://hdl.handle.net/2067/46373>

In 1678 French “La Gazette” reported about the arrival of the Polish ambassador to Moscow in an overly optimistic tone, in the following words:

The ambassador of Poland arrived here with a numerous retinue of cavalry. The tsar had made great preparation for his public entry and he ordered the Principals of this Court to appear there with all the splendor that will be possible for them. That marks the design to live on good terms with the King of Poland. It is said that this Ambassador was charged to request the restitution of Smolensk and it is believed that he may be granted that to facilitate the success of negotiation that started with His Polish Majesty¹.

There were, in fact, two ambassadors, one from the Crown and one from Grand Duchy; the return of Smolensk was hardly considered; however, the entry seems to be indeed splendid, with tsar's subjects raising to the occasion. According to the firsthand account of Bernard Tanner, a member of the Polish-Lithuanian embassy, the ambassadors entering the capital were welcomed by Feodor III's officers and courtiers whose «luxury, beauty, and blaze» could barely be faithfully captured in writing².

Embassy received with such pomp was the first grand embassy sent from Poland-Lithuania to Muscovy after John III Sobieski's election in 1674. Although, as Tanner duly noted, it could not equal to the splendor displayed by Muscovites in their capital, its costs and importance were second only to voivode Jan Gniński's embassy to Istanbul dispatched a year earlier³.

1 BNF, *Recueil des gazettes et nouvelles, tant ordinaires que extraordinaires, et autres relations des choses avenues [...]*, (Paris: du Bureau d'adresse, aux Galleries du Louvre, 1679), 473. [La Gazette]. All translations by the author.

2 Bernard Tanner, *Legatio Polono-Lithuanica in Moscoviam Potentissimi Poloniae Regis ac Reipublicae Mandato & Consensu Anno 1678 feliciter suscepta* (Nürnberg: Sumptibus Johannis Ziegeri, 1689). Citations refer to the Polish edition: Bernard Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie do Moskwy szczęśliwie przedsięwzięte, opisane przez naocznego świadka Bernarda Tannera*, ed. Aleksander Strojny, trans. Michał Rzepiela and Aleksander Strojny (Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze “Historia Iagellonica”, 2002), here 164.

3 Zbigniew Wójcik, “Z organizacji dyplomacji polskiej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku”, in *Polska służba dyplomatyczna*

Solemn entries, such as the one reported by “La Gazette”, were the first avenues to showcase the numerosity and richness of ambassadorial retinues that were matched with splendor put on by receiving part. The reception banquet held after the first audience with Tsar Feodor III complemented the welcoming ceremony, providing an excellent occasion for a further exhibition of hospitality, highlighting the gravitas of the mission with gestures and material accessories⁴. It also set the tone for the negotiations, perhaps even to a greater extent than the entry, as it revealed significant differences between Poles and Lithuanians, and Muscovites.

In this article, I focus on one particular aspect of the embassy that rarely receives sufficient attention: eating and drinking. Specifically, I am interested in the place of food and drink in the practice of diplomacy, showing it was not merely an entertaining addition but an integral part of ceremonial of receiving foreign legations. Beyond that, looking into how Muscovy is portrayed through food and drink and how Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors used food, drink, and everything around it to their advantage, can inform us about socio-cultural milieu of the ambassadors, and especially of those who put those descriptions in writing⁵. The basis of my analysis is the Polish-Lithuanian grand embassy of 1678, as it is reflected in a wonderfully detailed in respect to food and drink *Legatio Polono-Lithuanica* by Bernard Tanner.

GRAND EMBASSY OF 1678

At the beginning of John III Sobieski's reign priority of foreign policy, at least as projected by the king, was to secure Poland-Lithuania's south-eastern and eastern border. While the peace with the Sublime Porte had opponents among the nobles, the peace with Muscovy was considered by the majority to be the desired solution⁶. Truce of Żurawno was signed with the Porte in 1676, and a year after Jan Gniński departed to negotiate a peace treaty. Preparations to send the grand embassy to Muscovy were undertaken at the same time⁷.

Poland-Lithuania's relations with Muscovy at the beginning of Sobieski's reign were oriented foremost on normalization following the war of 1654–1667, heightened in the years preceding the expiration of the thirteen-year long truce established in Andrusovo (Andruszów)⁸. As a result of strenuous back and forth negotiation, the Treaty of Perpetual Peace was eventually concluded in 1686, binding Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania in a long-sought alliance against the Porte⁹.

Relations with the Porte were crucial for shaping Poland-Lithuania's overall foreign policy orientation, especially during the first years of Sobieski's reign, making it nearly impossible to disregard “the Turkish background” of exchanges between Warsaw and Moscow¹⁰. For this reason, the starting point for negotiation in 1678 was rather low: Polish-Lithuanian nobles intended to remind about the commitments from Andrusovo in the face of lack of the support of Muscovy's troops in the fight with the Porte, and the truce of Żurawno raised concerns in Muscovy over possible alliance turned

XVI-XVIII wieku: studia, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1966), 300.

4 For more about the importance of the “language of things” in diplomacy see contributions to *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c. 1410–1800*, eds. Jan Hennings and Tracey A. Sowerby (New York: Routledge, 2017).

5 Such accounts are always a dialogue between the culture, habits, and customs of the author and described Others. Albert Meier, “Travel Writing”, in *Imagology: The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters*, eds. Manfred Beller and Joep Leerssen (New York: Brill, 2007), 449.

6 Krystyn Matwijowski, *Pierwsze sejmy z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976), 62–6, 107–08, 178–82.

7 Matwijowski, *Pierwsze sejmy*, 159.

8 Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warszawa: PWN, 1959).

9 Kirill Kochegarov, *Rech' Pospolitaya i Rossiya v 1680–1686 godakh. Zaklyucheniye dogovora o Vechnom mire* (Moskva: INDRIK, 2008). Here citation refer to Polish translation: Kirił Koczegarow, *Rzeczpospolita a Rosja w latach 1680–1686. Zawarcie traktatu o pokoju wiecznym* (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2017), 599.

10 Zbigniew Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976), 3.

against it¹¹. Nevertheless, both parties were willing to enter, as it turned out, challenging and arduous negotiations.

Grand embassy left Poland-Lithuania in February 1678, delayed because of concerns over tsar's reaction to «current transaction with the Porte», the fact that there was no one from the Crown willing to set out to Muscovy, and lastly that it was deemed more appropriate to wait for the *sejm* to be in session to appoint an embassy from there¹². Double-headed embassies were customary in relations with Muscovy, naturally stemming from Lithuanian nobility's greater interest in maintaining good-neighborly relations¹³. Eventually, voivode of Wołyń Michał Jerzy Czartoryski (1621–1691) became an ambassador from the Crown, joining voivode of Połock Jan Kazimierz Sapieha (c. 1642–1720) from the Grand Duchy, and secretary Hieronim Komar, a veteran of negotiations with Muscovy¹⁴.

There are, to my knowledge, at least three accounts of the embassy from the Polish-Lithuanian side in the archives in Poland accessible today. Regardless of their length, all three pay attention to food and drink. For instance, *Opis wjazdu*, a description of the ambassadors' entry to Moscow, informs about wine, mead, and beer provided to the embassy¹⁵. *Diarium Legationis Moschoviticae* names the type of wine used for toasting to the monarchs' health: «we have eaten and drunk lot of Apulian Romania [...] in a toast to tsar's and our majesty's health»¹⁶. Finally, Tanner's *Legatio Polono-Lithuanica* mentions as many as five types of wine offered to the Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors in order of its taste and price – Rhine, Moselle, *petercyment* (type of sweet wine from Spain), Romania, and another unspecified Spanish wine. However, Tanner notes that the most prominent drink on that occasion was vodka (*wińco gosudarskie* or «princely wine») served first, from a gilded cup and traditionally associated with the tsar¹⁷. Such details on drinking vessels and drinks consumed by the embassy members certainly make the account more vivid for those who did not participate in the event in person. Still, from the perspective of the practice of diplomacy, offering drink or food confirmed a hospitable reception, and toasting to monarchs' health from precious cups was a meaningful gesture celebrating the host and the guest, contributing to creating an atmosphere of commonality and congeniality at the table. Importantly, in all three accounts it is emphasized that the food and drink for the reception banquet was sent by the tsar, symbolically extending his table to the ambassadorial court (Rus. *posol'skii dvor*). Tanner, the author of the most detailed out of three accounts, devotes an entire chapter to «Moscow feast», the celebration of tsar's birthday, a peculiar deception involving a feast organized by the Polish-Lithuanian embassy, farewell banquet, and also gives glimpses of everyday meals. Besides recalling those details, the value of this source lies in the perspective of his descriptions. Although he travels to Moscow in Czartoryski's entourage, he is a foreigner who observes both the Crown and Grand Duchy representations with an outsider's eyes. Tanner writes about himself: «Bohemian from Prague, German courtier of Master Prince Ambassador»¹⁸, brilliantly displaying early modern aptitude to layer one's identification inclusively¹⁹. Significantly, the axis on which he draws the line of familiar/

11 Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji*, 79–80, 83–4.

12 BKC, rkps 1696 IV, *Za panowania Jana III, Augustów i Stanisława Augusta senatus consilia*, 7–8.

13 Apart from the right of representation, the Grand Duchy's involvement included chancellery work and partaking in embassies' costs. Andrzej Rachuba, «Osobliwości polskiej dyplomacji w okresie nowożytnym (XVI–XVIII)», in *Cywilizacja europejska. Eseje i szkice z dziejów cywilizacji i dyplomacji*, ed. Maciej Koźmiński (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IH PAN, 2010), 226–27.

14 Aleksander Strojny, «Wstęp», in Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 31–3. See also biography: Kazimierz Piwarski, «Czartoryski Michał Jerzy», in PSB, vol. 4 (1938), 287–88; Andrzej Rachuba, «Sapieha Kazimierz Jan Paweł», in PSB, vol. 35 (1994), 37–48; Zbigniew Wójcik, «Komar Hieronim», in PSB, vol. 13 (1967–1968), 371–73.

15 AGAD, AR, II, sign. 1675, *Opis wjazdu posłów Rzeczypospolitej do Moskwy*, 3–4.

16 BKC, Teki Naruszewicza n. 176, rkps 176, IV, *Diarium Legationis Moschoviticae AD 1678*, 738.

17 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 179.

18 The title page of *Legatio Polono-Lithuanica* reads: «Boemo Pragense, Dn. Legati Principis Camerario Germanico».

19 Following Lucien Febvre, Daniel Riches aptly explains the significance for diplomacy of being at ease with such imprecisions that facilitated movement across borders, including state and «national»/linguistic ones. For historians that means a need to reconsider inflexible modern categories when approaching early modern diplomacy. See Daniel Riches,

foreign seems to be heavily tinted with confessional shades. He is a Catholic and, despite differences he is sometimes painfully being reminded of, that seems to serve as a criterium for recognizing the Poles, Lithuanians, and himself as “we”, in opposition to the schismatic Muscovites, protestant Germans, or Jews encounter during his journey.

While in Czartoryski's service, Tanner was responsible for food distribution and during the travel to Muscovy for supervision over the linen. He travelled among common courtiers (Lat. *ministrii ordinarii*), after a capelan, commander of the hussars, Polish noblemen, hussar officers, chief courtiers (Lat. *aulae primarii ministri*), and before Polish valets, other courtiers, and artisans²⁰. However, during the entry to Moscow, Tanner accompanied a Florentian doctor, certain Ferendini, because he «could not find a place among the Poles» as he was dressed in the German way, just like the doctor²¹. The problems to find a place among the Poles were not limited solely to fashion choices. As a foreigner, Tanner was not especially warmly welcomed as a member of the embassy. Luckily for him, Czartoryski's wife, Joanna Weronika, intercession was enough to secure his place.

Over 750 people travelled in Czartoryski's entourage only, with the entourage of the Sapieha the embassy consisted of about 1500 people²². Tanner, of a middling social standing, records members of the embassy of lower ranks who were often invisible when the account was prepared by someone close to the embassy's head. Thanks to Tanner, we know that, for example, Czartoryski travelled with a master cook, Goliński (a nobleman and a chief courtier)²³; court purveyor Szymon Wielkowolski (common courtier); known only by his first name baker Kazimierz, and Klemens, a *credenziero* (Lat. *praefectus abaci*, Pl. *kredensowy*) (both of them counted among artisans, *mechanici*); and anonymous cooks.

We do not know much about Sapieha's courtiers and personnel, at least not from Tanner's account. Since the two ambassadors were voivodes coming from magnate families and they did not always travel together, Sapieha's entourage must have mirrored that of the ambassador from the Crown, and while staying at the ambassadorial court, their courtiers and servants did not seem to isolate – Tanner mentions that the master cooks were working together in the kitchen²⁴.

The hierarchy among Czartoryski's courtiers was not only marked by their place in a cortege: the closest to the ambassador from the Crown, called a «company», dined together with him²⁵, and among the *hajduks*²⁶ the most trustworthy were allowed to serve at his table²⁷. By contrast, the least reliable among them were, according to Tanner, constantly drunk.

Drunkenness is an exploited trope in travel literature, especially further east one gone, and *Legatio Polono-Lithuanica* is no exception²⁸. Alcohol abuse by some *hajduks* is judged as a character flaw,

Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Brandenburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2013), 16-7.

20 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 122-23.

21 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 161.

22 Strojny, “Wstęp”, in Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 34.

23 Master cook [Pl. *kuchmistrz*] was responsible for the organization of entire kitchen and banquets in a noble or princely household. It was a high rank in court offices, and in Poland-Lithuania it was not uncommon to see *kuchmistrz* who was a noble himself. About an ideal *kuchmistrz* and his duties see Jarosław Dumanowski, “*Compendium ferculorum* Stanisława Czarnieckiego”, in Stanisław Czarniecki, *Compendium ferculorum albo zebranie potraw*, eds. Jarosław Dumanowski and Magdalena Spychaj (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2009), 53–60.

24 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 202.

25 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 122.

26 *Hajduk* was an infantryman in the Polish-Lithuanian army organized following the Hungarian model or a servant at a magnate's court dressed in a Hungarian way. In Czartoryski's entourage, *hajduks* were responsible for the safety of both people and goods.

27 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 125.

28 Tanner was not alone in his opinions about the drinking habits in Muscovy. Thomas Smith wrote that «[d]runkenness is rather here a custome than a vice». After Matthew Smith Anderson, “English Views of Russia in the 17th Century”, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 33 (1954): 146. In general, drunkenness was one of the leitmotifs of the North/East travel throughout the ages. For example, for Fichte staying in Poland-Lithuania in 1791 it was the Poles who were «always

while drunkenness is more of an inherent trait of Muscovites, who «lived to drink»²⁹. In Tanner's account, drunkenness connected with unreliability and inconstancy, vices he attached to Muscovites without exceptions, but there was another side to alcohol consumption. Drinking together during festivities promoted sociability and was a means to gain trust³⁰. Thus, reception banquet for foreign embassy was an occasion to prepare the ground for the incoming negotiations.

Before taking a closer look into the reception banquet prepared for the Polish-Lithuanian embassy in 1678, I would like to bring attention to the most relevant difference between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy in terms of eating and drinking. Knowing the dietary rules that marked feasting and fasting days, it is perhaps easier to understand the reaction to the «Moscow feast», as Tanner describes it.

IEIUNIUM POLONICUM OR POLISH FAST

One of the characteristics of baroque Polish-Lithuanian cuisine – along with the generous use of spices and liking of contrast tastes, especially a combination of sour and sweet – was the way fast was observed³¹. Although the seventeenth century brings relaxation of the rules, the so-called *ieiunium Polonicum* was still more severe and rigorously followed than elsewhere in Catholic Europe. Besides Lent, Advent, and “dry days” every quarter of the year, fast-days include all Fridays, Saturdays, Wednesdays (although less and less commonly), and most eves of Catholic holidays, which accounted for a significant portion of the year³². But the religious-dietary prescriptions in Poland-Lithuania went further than just limiting the number of days one had to restrain from consuming meats. On fast-days, it also was forbidden to eat dairy and eggs, which required creativity from cooks who wanted to keep a certain degree of luxury of the table all year long. The effort to elevate fast-day menu is evident in recipes for «Partridges and miscellaneous birds from salty fish» in which “birds” were shaped out of a mixture of pike, oil, bread, onion, and spices³³ or «Fast-day borsch» with poppyseed or almond milk and “eggs” in which the white is made out of a soup base thickened with flour and pike, and the yoke prepared out of a base colored with saffron, cinnamon, and raisins³⁴. Apart from illusions, we also find less elaborate variants of recipes that simply replaced prohibited ingredients³⁵.

Especially one occasion described by Tanner confirms *ieiunium Polonicum* was in fact custom very much alive among members of the embassy, showing that even within one confession, dietary rules could have subtly differentiated co-religionists coming from different regional traditions. During a journey to Moscow, «[a Jewish housekeeper] proposed bread with butter and eggs. Because it was a fast-day though, the prince [Czartoryski] as a devout Pole did not accept this repast and requested me to eat it as I was a foreigner»³⁶. Considering Tanner's complaints about linseed oil that did not

drunk». Larry Wolf, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 342. See also Dorota Dias-Lewandowska, “Polskie picie oczami Niemców i Francuzów: zmiana czy długie trwanie?”, in *Rzeczpospolita w oczach podróżników z Francji i Niemiec*, eds. Anna Mikołajczyk and Włodzimierz Zientara (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2014).

29 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 158.

30 Dias-Lewandowska, “Polskie picie oczami Niemców i Francuzów”, 140.

31 About more characteristics of Polish-Lithuanian baroque cuisine, see Dumanowski, “*Compendium ferculorum* Stanisława Czarnieckiego”, 60-6.

32 Marta Sikorska, *Smak i tożsamość. Polska i niemiecka literatura kulinarna w XVII wieku* (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2019), 174. In the late seventeenth century Poland-Lithuania, fast on Wednesdays were not practiced consequently anymore. Jarosław Dumanowski, “*Kucharz francuski*. Książka kucharska Jana III Sobieskiego”, in *Sarmacka pamięć. Wokół bitwy pod Wiedniem*, eds. Bogusław Dybaś, Alois Woldan and Anna Ziemlewska (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2014), 99.

33 Stanisław Czarniecki, *Compendium ferculorum albo zebranie potraw*, 148.

34 *Moda bardzo dobra smażenia różnych konfektów*, eds. Jarosław Dumanowski and Rafał Jankowski (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2011), 185.

35 “Mock foods” were not an uniquely Polish-Lithuanian phenomenon. For more examples see Sikorska, *Smak i tożsamość*, 182-86.

36 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 135.

agree with his stomach but was used by Poles on fast-days, it must have been a welcomed request, one that certainly did not compromise Bohemian's devotion: «anywhere I could, I ate dairy according to my native custom, but carefully, not to give ardent Poles an occasion to take offense»³⁷. And indeed, travelers to seventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania report experiencing outrage for breaking the rules of fasting³⁸.

Although it should be noted that fish was not exclusively a fast-day food, as it could have been prepared with butter or stuffed with meat, it nevertheless carried connotations of restraining rather than celebrating. It seems that holding a banquet on a non-fast-day was in itself an effort in honoring guests appropriately, and exceptional occasions overruled even the religious dietary prescriptions. Arranging for a dispensation from the Catholic hierarchy elevated the celebration, as was the case with, for example, Prince Jakub Sobieski's wedding³⁹. The reception banquet held for the Polish-Lithuanian embassy after their first audience with the tsar was undoubtedly a special occasion that called for an exceptional setting, but surely not in the way the Poles, Lithuanians, and a certain Bohemian from Prague expected.

MOSCOW FEAST

In a ceremonial description for receiving ambassadors from Muscovy in Poland-Lithuania written down in 1674, three out of 16 points provide details on the banquet held after the first audience and an additional two on the farewell banquet⁴⁰. Besides clarifying when the feast happens, who is accompanying the ambassadors, what type of carriage is sent, where the banquet is held, how many tables have to be prepared, and what is the seating order, it also describes precisely what kind of cups should be used to drink for the tsar's health, specifying they should be gold, costing 100 red złotych (Polish ducats) and afterward offered as gifts (smaller and cheaper could be given to «younger» ambassadors)⁴¹. However, it does not mention what kind of food and drink is to be served, leaving this part of the banquet to be planned according to needs. Ceremonial for receiving ambassadors from Muscovy in Warsaw mirrored the ceremonial for receiving ambassadors from Poland-Lithuania in Moscow in many respects, in a way that it was molded by years of custom, supported by the logic of reciprocity⁴². Following the customs provided for certain predictability, for example, after the first and last audience, a banquet was expected.

The spectacular entry of the Polish-Lithuanian embassy to Moscow reported by "La Gazette" and described in detail by Tanner, preceded by two days of preparation, happened on the 17 May. The first audience with Tsar Feodor III took place on the 20 May. The food promised by the tsar at the end of the audience was sent almost immediately. Tanner mentions four carriages with food and kitchen equipment arriving shortly after the embassy reached their court, followed by a number of wardens who carried

amphoras, cups, and huge, richly gilded and silver-plated jars of various types and trimmings, which, they say, came to the possession of the Grand Duke [tsar] as gifts from the envoys of various rulers. We all thought they contained excellent liquors, but as soon as we discovered that they were completely empty, then we realised that they were carried through the city for a show to emphasize

37 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 130.

38 Probably the most cited in this regards is diary of Ulrich von Werdum, *Dziennik podróży 1670–1672*, ed. Dariusz Milewski (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2012), 61.

39 Giovan Battista Fagiuoli, *Diariusz podróży do Polski (1690–1691)*, ed. and trans. Małgorzata Ewa Trzeciak (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2017), 133.

40 AGAD, APP, *Silva rerum Jana Wielopolskiego, starosty bieckiego*, sign. 45-4, *Sposób Przyjmowania Posłów Wielkich Moskiewskich*, 442-445.

41 AGAD, APP, [...], *Sposób Przyjmowania Posłów Wielkich Moskiewskich*, 445.

42 Jerzy Wojciechowski, "Opinie o ceremoniale dyplomatycznym w Rosji na podstawie relacji uczestników poselstw Rzeczypospolitej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku", *Wiek Stare i Nowe*, 14/19 (2019): 71-84.

respect for the ambassadors⁴³.

Although the guests from Poland-Lithuania seem to be disappointed by the fact the vessels did not contain liquors, they seem to understand and appreciate the intention behind this parade, suggesting that oddities were quite easily accepted when they fit into the embassy's idea of what is appropriate. And since "the kitchen parade" resembled the ambassadors' entry, or more broadly a triumphant procession during which the spoils were presented, the message seems to be clear enough.

As Tanner notes, after the equipment, the cooks and master cooked arrived with an iron grate for reheating the dishes, for they were prepared almost entirely in the tsar's kitchen. The ambassadorial court was equipped in its own kitchen, however, on this occasion, it was important that the food is not simply a provision.

The first significant discrepancy in eating customs was related to the way the table was prepared. Tsar's servant put a table cloth only on the head of the table intended for the Czartoryski and Sapieha. When Nikita Semyonovich Urusov, who was acting as Feodor III's representative during the banquet, turned to the ambassadors to ask them to invite the rest of the embassy to join at the table, Czartoryski answered that «Polish nobles are not used to eat at a table that is not laid with the cloth»⁴⁴. Quickly, Urusov explained that he now knew Polish customs well enough and sent for a table cloth to the tsar's palace. Only after the entire table was covered with cloth, the rest joined the table.

Ceremonial conflicts were not uncommon; the embassy of 1678 already had to resolve a dispute over precedence during the entry to Moscow⁴⁵. However, the incident with the table cloth is not a "typical" violation of ceremony in which the *maiestas* of the king and *Res Publica* was at stake, since it was not affecting the ambassadors directly. Especially Czartoryski's reply seems to point to something else: the equality of Polish-Lithuanian nobility, at least *de iure*, who enjoyed as an estate all the privileges that in Muscovy are reserved for few. In this context, Urusov's excuse about insufficient knowledge of Polish customs extends beyond table manners.

Besides the cloth, silver cutlery and sculptures were put on the table. The sculptures reproduced towers, walls, «and other things», with two-headed eagles on top⁴⁶, and were nothing unusual, although they were more often made out of sugar paste than flour mixed with linseed oil like in this case. Such ephemeral "architecture" provided an excellent opportunity to make a statement at the dinner, staging one's virtues⁴⁷. For example, during the wedding of Prince Jakub Sobieski, the sculptures depicted him as a Hercules⁴⁸, and during a banquet held in 1680 for Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł by the pope, the tables were decorated with eagles, a tribute to the Polish emblem⁴⁹. Here, an emblem of the tsar unmistakably reminded who the host was.

Tanner mentions plenty of food, 200 raw dishes, and warm dishes reserved for the ambassadors. Nonetheless, Czartoryski and Sapieha ate them reluctantly because «apparently, for the unaccustomed

43 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 177.

44 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 179.

45 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 166-67. The conflict over precedence, however briefly described, was recognized by Tanner as serious for good reasons as claims to precedence connected directly with the sovereign's status. See Jan Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe. Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648-1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 15-22.

46 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 178.

47 Marcia Reed, "Court and Civic Festivals", in *The Edible Monument. The Art of Food for Festivals*, ed. Marcia Reed (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2016), 60.

48 Using the figure of Hercules fits into the pattern of imagining Jakub as partaking in John III's glory, additionally pointing to the potency securing dynastic continuity. On the symbolism of the figure of Hercules see Katharina N. Piechocki, "Sincerity, Sterility, Scandal: Eroticizing Diplomacy in Early Seventeenth-century Opera Librettos at the French Embassy in Rome", in Hennings and Sowerby, *Practices of Diplomacy*, 116.

49 Dominika Walawender-Musz, *Entrata księcia Radziwiłła do Rzymu, czyli triumf po polsku* (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2009), 95.

Polish palate, the dishes were prepared with ingredients not exquisite enough»⁵⁰. Tanner believes that, in general, the Poles are more «magnanimous», «dignified», and «noble» when it comes to their physical appearance and character, so it is not a surprise they also have, in his opinion, more sophisticated palates. In *Legatio Polono-Lithuanica*, Muscovites are portrayed as uncultivated, cruel, fickle schismatics of superficial faith; their eating and drinking habits – involving abuse of alcohol, consuming raw or even spoiled meats, and common fish – resonate perfectly with vices attached to them.

Overall, the main problem with the feast prepared for the Polish-Lithuanian embassy in 1678 was that «there was plenty of food, but everything was made only of fish, which not only was impossible to eat, but even difficult to look at». Tanner even adds a description of the dishes, insisting that they looked better than tasted, as if his reader may have been convinced that it reminds elaborate food illusions prepared for fast-days in, among other places, Poland-Lithuania:

Muscovites have saltwater fish in abundance, and therefore certainly not to get overwhelmed by the costs, we were always offered fish. Some of the fish, called beluga because of their white flesh, are compared in size to an ox. It was from these fish, cut into pieces, that all the variety of dishes was prepared ... Meat of this species produces a sticky juice or liquid that thickens easily. From this pulp, which takes any shape given to it by the fingers of a cook, geese, turkeys, chickens, and other creatures were formed. When they were placed in front of us, it was better to look at than eat them.

Czartoryski's courtier seems to have some appreciation for the illusion, but still, he judges the fish was served out of stinginess, undermining the efforts to showcase the variety of dishes expected on such occasions.

Failed expectations of what classified as a celebratory food, especially in opposition to a fast-day food for Poles and Lithuanians, informed the unfavorable opinion on the dishes, and by extension, the Muscovites. Another description of the feast, Tsar Feodor III's birthday, gives more clear indications why the dishes offered to the Polish-Lithuanian embassy were considered inferior, precisely mentioning their fast-day character: «we are counting that for it was Monday, they will feed us at least meat. But on seeing fast-day almost raw dishes, although in the number of 200, seasoned mostly with linseed oil, our hopes were gone». Tanner goes even further, expressing an opinion that such raw dishes were suited more for cannibals. However, he is not entirely dismissive of food and drinks consumed in Moscow, not sparing the praise when his expectations about what food and drink are appropriate were met. During the reception banquet especially two dishes attracted his attention:

on another bowl there was another wonder: various fruits cooked in sugar and flavored with aromatic spices unknown to us, all prepared so elaborately that they resembled a folded red cloth. There was even quite a serious dispute among the courtiers who stood nearby as to whether it was a cloth or food. Also, I cannot omit the pumpkins cut in half, cooked in what I believe was sugar and pepper, sweeter than you might imagine.

Sugar in the late seventeenth century was still an expensive commodity, and fruits preserved in sugar and confitures had a special place on the table. In the time (and space) when fruits were available seasonally, the ability to preserve them was a sought-after skill and a fashionable novelty. Here, they are additionally prepared in a way that seems to resonate well with the baroque aesthetic of illusion and surprise⁵¹. Apart from the entertainment value and appreciation for the cooks' (or perhaps *confiseurs*) skills, the use of sugar and aromatic spices indicated the tsar's wealth, commercial outreach, and generosity, unlike the fish in abundance at his disposal.

Besides sugar and spices, wine was another imported commodity, demonstrating further the host's remarkable generosity. It was expensive, hard-to-reach because of the modes of transportation and the

50 This and the following quotations refer to: Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 177.

51 Jarosław Dumanowski, "Nowe źródło do dziejów kuchni staropolskiej", in Dumanowski and Jankowski, *Moda bardzo*, 57-9.

frequency in which it went bad⁵². As I mentioned before, Tanner counted five types of wines offered to the embassy served after «princely wine», that is, vodka, beer, and mead. All drinks were served after the meal, perfectly in line with how drinks were served in Poland-Lithuania⁵³.

Urusov providently made sure there are no complaints about the insufficient amount of drinks. «Know[ing] well Poles are keen on vodka», he ordered to put a barrel of it in the middle of the ambassadorial court. One member of the embassy, a *hajduk* called Strzyga, particularly proved him right, drinking so much that it caused an unfortunate servant to internally burst into flames and blow out puffs of black smoke⁵⁴.

Another, although definitely less spectacular incident involving alcohol at the feast was connected to attempts of adulteration. Apparently, some Muscovite servants «thinking more about their profit than about the ambassadors' satisfaction»⁵⁵ mixed inferior wines hoping that they could keep the finer ones for themselves. Their deception was discovered as the guests either spit the drinks or pour them on the ground. The incident is as much illustrative for what Tanner thinks of Muscovites as of Poles and Lithuanians: the former were greedy and deceitful, the latter could not be tricked into drinking adulterated wines because they could distinguish bad ones from good ones – in other words, demonstrating their good taste. And as time showed, Poles and Lithuanians also could not be tricked during the negotiations that followed. Moreover, they were the ones who managed to outwit Muscovites.

DECEPTION FEAST

Until the first audience with the tsar, the ambassadors could not meet anyone but appointed *pristavs*⁵⁶. After the entry to the capital, the audience with the tsar, and the reception banquet, the negotiation entered into a more mundane phase. Czartoryski, Sapieha, and Komar were meeting with council members, sometimes in the tsar's presence, establishing the details of a future treaty. Tanner counted 32 conferences between the 23 May and the 17 of August. As it was customary, after confirming plenipotentiary powers, the talks started with handing in a list of grievances⁵⁷.

The talks were dragging on, threats to break off negotiations were repeated. One particular instance on which Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors resorted to deception to break the deadlock is fascinating. According to Tanner, on the 5 July, the disagreement over the return of Smolensk, Kyiv, and the starosty of Velizh or financial compensation turned into a heated exchange. Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors threatened that Sobieski might want to recapture those territories with armed forces if the agreement is not met. The tsar replied that he as well may send an envoy to the Porte to enter an alliance against Poland-Lithuania, and since Czartoryski is too stubborn, he can be taken as a hostage until the agreement with the sultan is sealed. The ambassadors did not take this escalation lightly and, as Tanner reports, gathered their closest aides and came up with a solution:

to suppress the fear, the trumpeters and drummers were placed at the top of the palace, so that their joyful notes could flow from there [...]. Additionally, wine was served generously. At that time, none of us knew what this extraordinary outburst of joy meant, so it seemed strange to us⁵⁸.

52 Dorota Dias-Lewandowska, *Historia kulturowa wina francuskiego w Polsce od połowy XVII do początku XIX wieku* (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie, 2014), 24-6.

53 Dias-Lewandowska, *Historia kulturowa wina francuskiego w Polsce*, 161-62.

54 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 180.

55 Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 180.

56 Wojciechowski, "Opinie o ceremoniale dyplomatycznym w Rosji", 74. The institution of a *pristav* [Pol. *przystaw*] evolved under the Muscovy's example also in Poland-Lithuania. Interestingly, with time they were appointed only for Muscovite, Turkish, and Tatar legations. The task of a *pristav* was to escort the incoming legation from the border, secure its safety and provisions, but also to control with whom they could interact. Stanisław E. Nahlik, *Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1971), 132.

57 Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji*, 154.

58 This and the following quotations refer to: Tanner, *Poselstwo polsko-litewskie*, 204.

After few hours of this concert, *pristavs* came to inquire what is the reason for such unusual joy. Received by Czartoryski and Sapieha, they were offered a toast to the tsar's health with big gilded cups, which they could not refuse. The ambassadors then explained that they are bidding farewell to Muscovy, intending to leave soon, and Czartoryski is relishing his last moments of freedom before being taken into custody.

The loud celebration continued long until midnight, until the intervention of the tsar's servant, the embassy stopped their revelry. Day after, the ambassadors received an invitation to a confidential conference and went there «still intoxicated with wine». Although the feast put for the show did not resolve the impasse entirely, it took four more meetings and an ostensible preparation of the carriages to departure to reach a provisory agreement (setting financial compensation for disputed territories), it was nevertheless presented by Tanner as a turning point and prove of «Lithuanian-Polish genius». Outcomes of the embassy headed to Muscovy by Czartoryski and Sapieha in 1678 were perhaps not spectacular but still favorable for Poland-Lithuania: the truce was prolonged, the border was slightly corrected, and 200'000 rubles (1'000'000 złotych) financial compensation was granted⁵⁹. Many issues were left unresolved, put aside for later commissions, and grand embassies to come, and it took eight more years to reach a “perpetual peace”. Yet, the account from Muscovy by Bernard Tanner brilliantly reflects on the course of the embassy from a unique perspective, providing fascinating material for inquiry on the role of food and drink in the practice of diplomacy, serving both as a binder of the community that met at one table and a distinct marker of difference: religious, ethnic, and social.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.
 APP: Archiwum Publiczne Potockich.
 AR: Archiwum Warszawskie Radziwiłłów.
 BNF: Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
 BKC: Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich.

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AGAD

APP: *Silva rerum Jana Wielopolskiego, starosty bieckiego*, sign. 45-4

AR, II: *Opis wjazdu posłów Rzeczypospolitej do Moskwy*, sign. 1675.

BKC

Za panowania Jana III, Augustów i Stanisława Augusta senatus consilia, rkps 1696 IV, Teki Naruszewicza n. 176, rkps 176 IV.

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MICHAŁ RADZIWIŁŁ'S OBEDIENCE EMBASSY IN THE ROME OF POPE INNOCENT XI ODESCALCHI BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND CEREMONIAL

ABSTRACT

In 1680 Michał Radziwiłł arrived in Rome to kneel at Innocent XI Odescalchi. Sent by Jan III Sobieski to pay homage to the pontiff and thus renew the obedience of the *Rzeczpospolita* to the Holy See, in reality, the king had commissioned him to plead the cause of an anti-Turkish crusade given an imminent attack by the *Infidels* on the Christianity. A *sui generis* character, Michał Radziwiłł would, however, have stood out for his extravagant requests, in stark contrast to the Roman ceremonial, and for his inability to conduct the diplomatic negotiations for which he had been sent.

The article intends to retrace all the phases of the Polish Prince's stay in Rome: from his *incognito* arrival in the Eternal City to the long and maniacal preparation of the expensive *Cavalcata d'Obbedienza*, up to the failed negotiations with the pope and the Roman Curia. Moments analyzed through the use of printed and manuscript sources preserved in Roman archives and libraries. In particular, the printed *Relazione* of the Solemn Entrance to the city by Radziwiłł, and the *Diary* of the consistorial lawyer Carlo Cartari, who left us long and detailed descriptions of the entire Roman stay of this *fanfarone* Polish prince.

KEYWORDS: Michał Radziwiłł; Innocent XI Odescalchi; Rome; Ceremonial; Carlo Cartari.

INTRODUCTION

Rome, the capital of the Papal State and the centre of Christianity and, most importantly, the centre of memory and monumental ruins of the classical world, was the meeting place for travellers, pilgrims, high prelates, diplomats, politicians, artists and intellectuals, princes, kings and/or sovereigns of the seventeenth century.

This phenomenon resulted from a continuous movement from the Middle Ages throughout the Modernity, and contributed to stress the international vocation of the city. During the early modern age, the pontifical Rome continued, even materially, to present itself as the continuation of classical Rome, towards which people from all over the world converged¹.

Variegated groups of people had travelled in different ways: from the medieval skin-grins², who moved on foot along the famous *Via Francigena*³, relying on the system of religious hostels on the roads leading into the city, to those number-less sovereigns who arrived surrounded by their splendid court entourages, accompanied by dozens of carriages, so transforming their political and diplomatic visits into spectacular events involving the whole urban area, with solemn cavalcades, ephemeral triumphal constructions, and feasts hosting both nobles and plebeians.

These journeys, which have become part of the city's chronicles and popular culture, have also reshaped the imagery of the city of Rome, «vero teatro di tutto il mondo»⁴. Thus, alongside the images of ruins, we find these tourists past lovers in paintings, showing them in the proximities of monuments and

1 Cf. Cesare de Seta, ed., *Imago Urbis Romae. L'immagine di Roma in età moderna* (Milano: Electa Editore, 2005).

2 In general, see Pierre-André Sigal, *L'image du pèlerin au Moyen Age et sous l'Ancien Régime* (Gramat: Rocamadour, 1994); Norbet Ohler, *Vita pericolosa dei pellegrini nel Medioevo. Sulle tracce degli uomini che viaggiavano nel nome di Dio* (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1996).

3 Cf. Paolo Cacucci von Saucken, ed., *Francigena. Santi, Cavalieri, Pellegrini* (Milano: Serra, 1999).

4 Giuseppe Miselli, *Il Burattino veridico o vera Instruzione generale per chi viaggia [...]*, (Roma: Michele Ercole, 1682), 7. See Gaetano Platania, *Giuseppe Miselli tra la polvere delle strade e il lusso delle Corti. In appendice "Il Burattino Veridico"* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2014).



in the squares of Rome, painted in their majestic splendour and magnificence, crowded of the nobles and travellers' carriages⁵.

THE ROMAN EMBASSY OF RADZIWIŁŁ BETWEEN CEREMONIAL AND DIPLOMACY

Such practice plunged its roots in the dawn of time and concerned all the Catholic princes and rulers of Poland. Of particular importance was the great and solemn cavalcade of Michał Radziwiłł⁶, who met Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi⁷ in 1680⁸. The visit's main objective was to homage the Pope and renew the strong bond that had always connected the Holy See and Poland. Another reason was to advocate a possible anti-Turkish crusade, given the imminent attack by the armies of the Sultan to Vienna, in the very heart of Europe⁹.

That event was presented in print¹⁰ and recorded, down to the tiniest details, by a curious news collector of the time, Carlo Cartari¹¹, a well-known consistorial lawyer. A typically seventeenth-century spirit, he loved to record in his diary not only personal and family events or Italian and European news of political relevance, but also anything that he thought might seem extraordinary, new and above all "unusual".

And it is because of his curiosity that he could not fail to report on the presence in the Pope's capital of such a bizarre character as Radziwiłł. Therefore, he brought the event to the attention of the Roman *popolino* and took note of the complex ceremonial prepared to assign the places in the neverending procession of several Polish nobles on horseback with vague and rich clothes'. In contrast, others were "with curious armour" in Polish style. And it is because of his curiosity that he could not fail to report on the presence in the Pope's capital of such a bizarre character as Radziwiłł. Therefore, he brought the event to the Roman *popolino* and noted the complex ceremonial prepared to assign the places in the neverending procession of «several Polish nobles on horseback with vague and rich clothes» or «with curious armour» in Sarmatian style. Cartari described the Polish prince's suit as «the colour of moss, all covered in vague embroidered lace with large diamond buttons, which could also be seen in the girdle of his hat, which caused not ordinary astonishment». According to the papal ceremonial, the ambassador was placed «in the middle, between Monsignor Butler, on his right, and Monsignor Archbishop Brancacci, on his left». Then, followed a «large number of footmen and pages. The latter richly clad in golden wool jackets and the others in crimson velvet wrapped in several colours, as well

5 Gaetano Moroni, *Dizionario di erudizione storico ecclesiastica da San Pietro sino ai nostri giorni* [...], vol. 82 (Roma: Tipografia Emiliana, 1857), 17.

6 On him see Jan Jaroszek, "Michał Radziwiłł Kazimierz", in PSB, vol. 30 (1987), 292-99.

7 On Pope Innocent XI see Ippolito Menniti, "Innocenzo XI papa", in DBI, vol. 62 (2004), 478-95; Richard Bösel, et al., eds. *Innocenzo XI Odescalchi. Papa, politico, committente* (Roma: Viella, 2014). On the pope's anti-Turkish policy see the essay contained within the aforementioned volume: Gaetano Platania, "Un acerrimo nemico dell'infedele Turco: il beato Innocenzo XI Odescalchi", 221-43.

8 Cf. Gaetano Platania, "Il viaggio politico. Il caso di Michele Casimiro Radziwiłł, principe polacco, a Vienna e Roma nella documentazione d'archivio", in *Il viaggio in testi inediti o rari*, ed. Fernanda Rossetti (Roma: Istituto Nazionale di Studi Romani, 1998); Dominika Walawender-Musz, *Entrata księcia Radziwiłła do Rzymu. Czyli triumf po polsku* (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałac w Wilanowie, 2009).

9 «Non essendovi voluto dare l'avviso in Roma al Radzivil mandato Ambasciatore dal Re di Polonia per dimandare aiuti al papa contro il turco, avendo esso Radzivil mandato qua il dispaccio regio al cardinale Vidoni Protettore del Regno, si è tenuta Congregazione di Stati e dicesi che Nostro Signore gli abbia promesso per ora cento cinquanta mila scudi con esibizione di più secondo l'occorrenza». ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, f. 179r-v.

10 BCor., misc. 41, CCC.D.2, *Copia di lettera scritta da N.N. nella quale si legge la Relazione distinta dell'ingresso, cavalcata e cerimonie fatte in questa città di Roma nell'occasione della venuta del Signor Duca di Radzivil Ambasciatore d'obbedienza appresso la Santità di Nostro Signor PP. Innocenzo XI l'anno MDCLXXX* (Roma: Per Michel' Ercole, 1680); also in ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, ff. n.n.

11 On him see Armando Petrucci, "Cartari Carlo", in DBI vol. 20 (1977), 783-86; *La storia o le storie del Diario di Carlo Cartari avvocato concistoriale romano*, ed. Letizia Lanzetta (Città di Castello: Luoghi Interiori, 2019). He was usual to write down the information that arrived in Rome from all over Europe and those in the Eternal City.: his diary is a precious source includes a chronological span that goes from 1642 to 1691 (32 volumes in total). The *Archivio di Stato di Roma* collected the entire Cartari collection: the volumes of the *Diario* n. 87 refer to the year 1680 when Radziwiłł stayed in Rome.

as two heads dressed in the order's jackets, the first holding a stick in his hand and the second carrying a fine axe»¹².

On Thursday, 8 August, the cavalcade of honour through the city streets was replicated, this time starting not from Porta del Popolo, but directly from Palazzo del Bufalo in Piazza Colonna, where our guest had temporarily lodged¹³.

The second manifestation of such greatness, that once again involves the entire Roman *popolino* that lived the festive occasion as a moment of diversion from everyday life¹⁴, becoming not only passive spectators but also the "witnesses" of the event, participants in the scenical performance, in its theatre¹⁵. The ceremonial thus became an accurate theatrical representation and a perfect scenic organisation¹⁶. Innocent XI Odescalchi met with this *fanfarone* (boastful) prince at the Quirinal Palace at the end of this second parade. Cartari annotated the meeting, writing: «colà entrato il Signor Ambasciatore, fu introdotto nelle solite camere della foresteria. Venne il Papa nella sala Regia preparata per il Concistoro publico, cioè in quella avanti la cappella, e ricevette l'obbedienza dai cardinali»¹⁷. Indeed, the ride was not unusual itself but undoubtedly far more representative from a political-religious stance. Radziwiłł, in fact, once completed his primary task, that is to pay homage to the Pope by renewing the close bond uniting Poland to the Holy See, was to discuss with the Curia a possibility of an anti-Ottoman league. Challenging and meaningful was the moment of the habitual reading of the Latin oration of the ambassador, when an unexpected event occurred. Almost completely voiceless since his entry into the eternal city, our orator had difficulty in being heard by Innocent XI Odescalchi, except «by those who were very close to him» («non da quei che gli erano vicinissimi»)¹⁸.

The astonishment and wonder were great. The Pontiff was not so amazed as he was annoyed by the unedifying scene. So much so that Monsignor Spinola, Master of Ceremonies, intervened promptly, speaking on behalf of the Pontiff and responding to the few comprehensible words read by the ambassador that completed the formal ceremony by kissing the Pope's foot.

This action concluded the public aspect; soon, the more strictly political meetings, already scheduled for the following days with the representatives of the Curia, were to begin.

Prince Radziwiłł's solemn entry was undoubtedly a massive success in the celebratory event. Of less importance were the political talks that the ambassador had with the Roman Curia and Pope Odescalchi, who was negatively impressed by the Polish representative and his lack of ability to handle diplomatic matters during their meetings¹⁹.

Extremely sick²⁰, and, above all, inconsistent, Radziwiłł was to return to Poland without fulfilling any of the tasks John III Sobieski was hoping for, particularly the anti-Turkish agreement with the Holy See. The latter was, in fact, the real goal that the Polish ambassador in Rome was supposed to pursue and achieve. According to the new policy adopted after Grodno (Hrodna) and the king's decision to fight against the Infidel Turks, he had to plead the cause of the Commonwealth for the imminent war.

12 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, 4 August 1680, f. 235r.

13 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, *Copia di lettera [...]*, c. 7.

14 Flavia Matitti, "La Festa come «laboratorio» del Barocco", in *La Festa a Roma dal Rinascimento al 1870*, ed. by Marcello Fagiolo (Torino: Allemandi Editore, 1997), 86.

15 The unusual baroque paraphernalia attracted the attention of Marquis Capponi, who did not fail to report it in his diary, describing to the smallest detail the eccentricity and the number of participants. Archivio Storico Capitolino, *Fondo Capponi*, cat. IV, sez. 22, t. 64: VI/2, *Giornali di Casa Capponi*, "Roma 8 agosto 1680", ff. n.n.

16 Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *La città rituale* (Roma: Viella, 2002), 42.

17 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, 4 August 1680, f. 242r.

18 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, 4 August 1680, f. 243r.

19 On 16 February, Cartari wrote that the Polish ambassador went again to the audience of Our Lord and stayed for five hours. ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, f. 249v.

20 «Dicesi che il Radzivil partirà da Roma lunedì 7 di ottobre, benché si trovi infermo dal suo male d'aver perduto la voce e grandemente si dubita che per distillazione dalla testa possa aver contaminato le viscere e perciò si dice che difficilmente giungerà vivo in Polonia. L'istesso giorno di venerdì dovevasi, dopo desinare, tener consulto di medici per detta infermità». ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, f. 256v.

The journey to Rome was initially intended to inform the Pope about Sobieski's new anti-Ottoman intentions, and, at the same time, to try to find solutions to more specific religious issues, such as the old-standing matter of the *jus patronato* claimed by the King of Poland.

These were all the essential political and diplomatic knots of great importance to undo in the new strategy adopted by Sobieski, also concerning ancient conflicts that had long been waiting for a satisfactory solution. So that, to better assist the Polish ambassador in his mission abroad, the Royal Chancellery had prepared precise instructions on the matters to discuss at the Roman court. More specifically, it recommended that Radziwiłł would attest to the Pope the obedience of the King and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, implying Poland's prompt availability to resume the war against the Turks, a readiness closely linked to the financial "aid" that Rome would bestow upon that occasion. The Polish prince was to present the "Kingdom's state" to the Pope, the damage inflicted by the infidels in the past, and the present circumstances. He recalled the Turkish conquest of the fortress of Kamieniec Podolski, the occupation of Podolia and the siege of Lviv. Thus, presenting the desolation and devastation the country was experiencing, notwithstanding «the present king had given more defeats to the Turks», it was not possible to create more favourable conditions for solid and definitive stability. On the contrary, the Kingdom succumbed and accepted unfair peace conditions, which the Poles considered highly detrimental.

By instructing his ambassador, Sobieski hoped to persuade Pope Innocent XI to support an anti-Turkish European coalition, based on the Vienna-Warsaw-Moscow axis, to prepare a great "crusade" with the intervention of the rest of Christian princes. Thus, given a shared vision of the problem, John III Sobieski considered it fundamental to win a precise "categorical response" from the Roman diplomats on the ways and times of the operation. All this was connected to another problem of the Roman financial commitment during the war steps. What and how much support Pope Innocent XI was willing to offer? How long would the Roman court commit to the cause?

Sobieski asked the Holy See for certainties, not hiding his doubts. The Polish sovereign did not want to be abandoned "amid the war" once the tremendous anti-Turkish enterprise had begun. Accordingly, in the instruction given to Radziwiłł, he had stressed the need to understand the Pontiff's intentions on such an important matter. In addition, there was the question as to when Rome would have paid these sums. Sobieski had clearly illustrated to his representative the necessity of implanting in the Pope's mind the possibility for Poland of having a lump-sum cash payment due to the need to make the necessary arrangements immediately, since the war was to begin next autumn²¹. The instructions often return to this point. According to the Polish king, the Pope was the only one who could, at that moment, ensure financial support for the anti-Turkish enterprise. Also, he was the only one who could spend all his authority to urge the other Christian princes to participate in an offensive crusade because Poland was too weakened and impotent on its own²².

The second issue that Sobieski held so dearly should have been the core of the discussions between Radziwiłł and the representatives of the Roman Curia, concerned the *jus patronato* on the abbeys in the Kingdom, another long-standing dispute concerning the so-called "neapolitan sums". The latter was related to the inheritance at the centre of a conflict between the court of Warsaw and Sweden, which concerned the estates formerly belonging to Bona Sforza and the famous loan made by the former sovereign to Philip II, king of Spain. These "sums" had become a complex matter, turning from a financial to a political-legal issue, originating a clash between the Warsaw court, embodied by the Polish sovereign and Queen Christina of Sweden. The queen – by then residing in Rome – was the direct heir of Władysław Vasa, natural son of the late Władysław IV Vasa sovereign of Poland, who had succeeded in asserting his claims on the duchies of Bari and Rossano, which already belonged to the Italian²³.

21 The need for money was really urgent «per il bisogno di far immediatamente gl'apparecchi che occorrono dovendosi cominciar la guerra nel prossimo autunno». AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. Add/4, *Lettere diverse. Estratto di alcuni punti principali della Istruzione del Re e della Repubblica al Signor Duca Radziwiłł di trattare alla Corte Romana la riassunzione della guerra contro il Turco*, ff. n.n.

22 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. Add/4, *Lettere diverse. Estratto [...]*, ff. n.n.

23 On this intricate affaire, see Giovanna Motta, "Guerra turca e "negoziato napoletano". Un episodio dell'attività diplomatica della Polonia del XVII secolo", in *Fra spazio e tempo. Studi in onore di Luigi de Rosa*, ed. Ilaria Zilli, vol. I (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1996), 569-600. More generally, on the whole "question" of "Somme Napoletane" see

The controversy concerning the Neapolitan dispute did not find the solution that the Polish side hoped for. Tommaso Talenti's correspondence with Carlo Barberini, in his capacity as cardinal protector²⁴, demonstrates this. The subject will be recalled obsessively in his letters, nor will the questions concerning *jus patronato*, and who was to appoint the heads of the vacant abbeys be resolved. Problems, as Alderano Cybo²⁵ wrote to the nuncio in Varsavia, to which Sobieski's special envoy showed himself to be "very passionate" but utterly incapable of finding any solution²⁶.

Radziwiłł, who had claimed, on behalf of the sovereign, royal jurisdiction over abbey appointments, was, therefore, unable to convince either Innocent XI or the Roman Curia of the validity of the requests made by the king of Poland concerning the right of *jus patronato*.

Nevertheless, in the face of the ambassador's insistence, the Pope decided to wait for the decisions of the Sacred Congregation of the Consistory (*Sacra Congregazione Concistoriale*). This institution had been entrusted with finding the solution to the now long-standing *impasse* in the dispute.

The Congregation, mainly composed of cardinals and prelates, could not immediately resolve the conflict. The work would probably have lasted much longer than the stay of the Polish prince, who, aware of this, raised a timid protest, convincing the Pontiff to refer all decisions to an extraordinary Congregation composed of four cardinals and six prelates.

The case was then brought to the attention of the particular Congregation, which, having learned about the theses presented by Monsignor Ignatius Gniński, Abbot of Koronowo (reasons found in the archives and deduced from memoirs, various letters and papal briefs, after the purely doctrinal, juridical and historical discussions) decided that it could not accept the request made in the name and on behalf of Sobieski.

This decision was motivated by the fact that the Holy See did not recognise the existence of the *jus patronato regio*, since no relevant argument had been put forward concerning these matters by Poland. In fact, Cybo wrote to Pallavicini that it does not seem practicable to give any specific answer in such a general matter, resulting from parts of different nature²⁷. The Congregation suggested that the Pope should have examined the individual abbeys whenever they remained vacant. Only in that case, it would be possible to investigate the existence or otherwise of "royal law".

The Holy See protested against the *Rzeczpospolita's* request, not so much for the *jus patronato* as such, but for the concessions that the Polish sovereign had used to make in favour of secular prelates *in commenda*. According to the Roman Curia, this was merely a grace that fell to the Pope and not to the sovereign²⁸.

While the discussions were still underway, after indulging in parties and receptions²⁹, on 16 August

Stanisław Cynarski, "Il ruolo del cardinale Hosio nell'azione diplomatica condotta dalla Corte Reale negli anni 1558–1572 per riacquistare l'eredità della regina Bona", *Studia Italo-Polonica*, n. 3 (1987): 29–41; Paola Pierucci, *Pastorizia e fiscalità in Abruzzo. Secoli XVII–XVIII* (Bari: Grafica Sud, 1984), 105–11.

24 Cf. Gaetano Platania, *Polonica e Curia Romana. Corrispondenza del lucchese Tommaso Talenti segretario del Re di Polonia con Carlo Barberini protettore del regno (1681–1693)* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2004).

25 On him, Cardinal Secretary of State during the pontificate of Innocenzo XI odescalchi, see Enrico Stumpo, "Cibo Alderano", in DBI, vol. 25 (1981), 227–32.

26 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, Alderano Cybo a Opizio Pallavicini, Rome 12 October 1680, f. 387r-v.

27 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, Alderano Cybo a Opizio Pallavicini, Rome 5 October 1680, ff. 387r–88r.

28 The Holy See did not intend to settle the matter definitively and dramatically. At a particularly delicate moment in the history of Christianity, Pope Odescalchi, hoping to activate the league of Christian princes, did not want to antagonise Sobieski's Poland. The pope, seeing «calamitoso stato di cotesto Regno e quanto importi alla salute pubblica della cristianità il confermarlo, può credere Sua Maestà che la Santità Sua non lascerà alcuno dei modi più opportuni e più propri per incontrar le giuste soddisfazioni di Sua Maestà. Né vorrà mai che per sua colpa avvenga che il Re Giovanni non inferior di merito e di virtù ad alcuno de' suoi chiarissimi predecessori, goda minor prerogative da questa Santa Sede di quelle che essi godarono». AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, Alderano Cybo a Francesco Martelli, Rome 5 October 1680, ff. 387r–89r. The same issue is also referred to by the new nuncio Opizio Pallavicini who had taken over from Monsignor Martelli who had returned home. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 100, Opizio Pallavicini to Alderano Cybo, Warsaw 22 April 1682, ff. 143r–46r.

29 «Domenica 11 di agosto l'Ambasciatore Polacco diede lauto desinare ad alcuni de' Signori Cardinali, cioè Cybo e Vidoni: alle 22 ore si vide Sua Eccellenza per il Corso in carrozza a due cavalli, incognito con due Camerate, alle fenestre del Palazzo erano esposte belle portiere di velluto, ed altre di damasco cremesi con trine e frangie d'oro; rendeva anche

1680, Michał was again received by the Pope³⁰, this time without grand ceremony. The time had come to discuss the pressing issues on the table seriously.

The Polish prince visited the papal residence repeatedly throughout his stay in Rome. The talks lasted until 10 September, when the ambassador ascended the Quirinal for the last time to take leave of Innocent XI. From that date to the Pope's actual departure from the capital, Sobieski's representative spent days in *incognito*, by then ill and tired.

In the meantime, his departure from Rome was set for 15 September, after he had taken leave of the Pope, as reported by Cartari in his daily diary:

Domenica 15 di settembre, alle ore 22 partì da Roma l'Ambasciatore di Polonia, apparentemente però per trattenersi anche in Roma qualche giorno incognito. Uscì per Porta del Popolo con quest'accompagnamento tutto di persone in abito da campagna. Forieri a cavallo. Guardie con casacche rosse n. 25, camelli 3 sopra uno de' quali stava un moro. Cavalli a mano n. 13. Trombetti e timpano e questo batteva con la solita bizzarria di gesti col capo e colle mani. Molti a cavallo armati e con pelli di tigri. Molti altri polacchi a cavallo. Palafrenieri, lacché e guardie in truppa. Carrozza da campagna a sei nella quale erano il Cardinale Vidone al primo luogo, al secondo l'Ambasciatore e quattro prelati. Altre cinque carrozze a sei dell'istesso Ambasciatore e circa altre dieci di cardinali. Gli abiti e la comparsa furono gl'istessi che nelle altre cavalcate, solamente qui non si videro le carrozze di velluto. Qui è da notarsi che essendo venuto questo Signore a Roma con pretenzione di avere titolo d'Altezza e qua dal Palazzo negatoli, dicendo non doversegli benché sia cognato del Re di Polonia, la di cui sorella è sua consorte, e perché viene in qualità d'Ambasciatore e perciò non può pretendere di più che l'Eccellenza. Perciò dal Palazzo (e l'Ambasciatore se ne contentò) fu pigliato per mezzo termine di trattarlo in terza persona, ed il primo a dargli del lei fu il Signor Cardinal Cibo. Fu poi quest'esempio seguitato da sei altri Cardinali, cioè Ludovisio, Ottoboni, Pio, Vidoni, Carlo Barberini e Maidaichino, e questi furono visitati dal Signor Ambasciatore (consapevole del trattamento) da' quali fu visitato ed a' quali egli volle far anche la seconda visita prima della partenza³¹.

This time the exit from the city through the *Porta del Popolo* was under the banner of modesty, as seen in the annotation mentioned above, of the well-known consistory lawyer. Indeed, the procession did not resemble the solemnity of the entrance, which had brought Radziwiłł to kiss the Pontiff's foot to renew the "obedience" of *Rzeczpospolita* to the Holy See.

Upon this occasion, either because of the protagonist's severe illness or the negotiations' failure, the departure was in a minor key. In some ways, the ceremonial organisation was reminiscent of that prepared for the departure from Vienna. In that case, the political negotiations had come to a standstill, without determining anything concrete. Similarly, as in Vienna with the Emperor, even in Rome, Radziwiłł could not report anything to Pope Odescalchi about the offensive/defensive anti-Turkish league.

A true *déjà vu*, Sobieski's representative had once again demonstrated he was not a great diplomat, nor possessed any particular gift of eloquence. He was not able to interact with the papal diplomacy, as it had been the case with the imperial diplomacy, on a common strategy aimed at stopping the hegemonic aspirations of the Ottoman Porta in the Danubian-Balkan area and in the heart of continental Europe. The unique concession obtained by Pope Odescalchi was the veiled promise to send 500'000 thalers to Warsaw, if the Christian League would be gathered³².

allegrezza il suono delle trombe, de' timpani e delle piffare dalle finestre; il sorgente della fontana era di vino; alle finestre ardevano torce di cera bianca, e si vedeva innalzata una bella machina di fuochi artificiali, la quale si sparò alle due ore di notte [...]. ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, ff. 252r-v.

30 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, f. 253v.

31 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, Rome 15 September 1680, ff. 255v-56r.

32 Indeed, part of the promised sum was sent to Poland in September 1680. Cardinal Cybo wrote to Monsignor Martelli, the nuncio in Warsaw, before the latter left his position for Pallavicini and returned to Italy: «Subito che da Vostra Signoria Illustrissima si abbia il rincontro che dai corrispondenti di questoi Signor Depositario Generale della Camera, sieno a lei sborsati i fiorini 100 mila polacchi di buona moneta che Nostro Signore ha ordinato le si rimettono a buon conto delli 500 mila promessi dalla Santità Sua in aiuto della Polonia contro il Turco, non si lascerà qui di darlene gl'opportuni riscontri

In his egocentricity and eagerness to “count” and be “recognised” as a sovereign, Radziwiłł had failed his essential political and diplomatic mission. Moreover, he had not even grasped the apparent irritation of Innocent XI. The Pope, called upon to support the anti-Turkish war with subsidies, found himself in the presence of a man who lacked diplomatic tact, unregulated in his expenses, arrogant, punctilious on the ceremonial matters, and – what is even more critical – lacked any strategic vision. His evident arrogance prevented him from taking leave of some members of the Sacred College who had denied him the title of *Altezza* (Highness) upon his arrival in the Eternal City. He had repeatedly requested a title but in vain: in fact, the Roman authorities had been opted for *Eccellenza* (Excellence), believed to be more appropriate and in line with the indications of the court ceremonial:

Qui è da notarsi che essendo venuto questo Signore a Roma con pretenzione di avere titolo d'Altezza e qua dal Palazzo negatoli, dicendo non doverse gli benché sia cognato del Re di Polonia, la di cui sorella è sua consorte, e perché viene in qualità d'Ambasciatore e perciò non puol pretendere di più che l'Eccellenza. Perciò dal Palazzo (e l'Ambasciatore se ne contentò) fu pigliato per mezo termine di trattarlo in terza persona, ed il primo a dargli del lei fu il Signor Cardinal Cibo. Fu poi quest'esempio seguitato da sei altri Cardinali, cioè Ludovisio, Ottoboni, Pio, Vidoni, Carlo Barberini e Maidalchino, e questi furono visitati dal Signor Ambasciatore (consapevole del trattamento) da' quali fu visitato ed a' quali egli volle far anche la seconda visita prima della partenza.

Essendosi dunque trattato per molti giorni con gli altri Signori Cardinali e stando questi saldi in volergli dare dell'Eccellenza, e quello in non volerla, ma contentarsi del *lei* finalmente partì da Roma l'Ambasciatore senza averli visitati, e perché aveva le lettere del suo Re per ciascun Cardinale, a questi le mandò per il Signor Cavalier Caispoldi, reatino, che si è ingerito nella sua Corte. Li Cardinali che risiedono in Roma (essendo gli altri o alli Vescovati o alle Legazioni) quali non sono stati visitati, sono i seguenti. Homodei, Albrizi, Chigi, Caraffa, Altieri, Rospigliosi, Carpegna, Nitardi, Colonna, marescotti, Rovi, Alberici (infermo però), Spada, Huvad, Azzolino, Savelli, Felice, Rospigliosi, Casamatta e Basadonna che sono al numero di 19³³.

In the meantime, his illness was worsening. Suffering from a tumour, probably of the throat, which was devouring him and had «contaminated his bowels» («aveva contaminato le viscere»), he was given up for dead by the doctors called to his bedside. For this reason, the departure scheduled for 15 September had to be postponed for the first time to 7 October, then again to 27 October, and finally to 2 November 1680.

Despite everything, Michał desired to get to Warsaw as soon as possible. Against the advice of his doctors, convinced that «he would not get there alive, he was in such a bad state of health»³⁴, he decided to set out on his way back, stopping first in Florence to pay homage to the Grand Duke Cosimo de' Medici. The decision was harshly criticised by the cardinal protector Pietro Vidoni [1610–1681]³⁵, and by the Secretary of State Cybo himself, who did everything in their power to persuade the Pole to postpone such a visit, which, in reality, was not particularly appreciated by the Florentine government either. Once again, the protocol and the ceremonial requests made by Radziwiłł were the cause of embarrassment, so much that the Grand Duke made it clear that he would never grant an audience to this “impertinent” Pole.

intorno al modo che dovrà da lei tenersi in tal proposito». AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, Alderano Cybo a Francesco Martelli, Rome 28 September 1680, ff. 384v–85r.

33 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 78, Rome 15 December 1680, f. 256r–v.

34 ASR, Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87, Rome 19 Nov. 1680, f. 268r: «Vivo non vi sarebbe giunto, talmente era ridotto in stato di cattiva sanità».

35 Pietro Vidoni, already appointed to the Warsaw nunciature from 1652 to 1660, then cardinal from 5 April 1660 and finally protector of the Kingdom of Poland from 1675 to January 1681, the year of his death. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 94, Alderano Cybo to Opizio Pallavicini, Rome 11 January 1681, f. 46r. Cf. Fernand De Bojani, *Innocent XI. Sa correspondance avec ses Nonces (1676–1684)*, vol. III (Paris: Picarde, 1912), 482. On 5 February the nuncio replied to Cybo that he had received the news of Vidoni's death. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 94, Opizio Pallavicini a Alderano Cybo, Warsaw 5 February 1681, f. 46r., later deciphered on 6 March of the same year. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Nunziature diverse*, vol. 221, f. 86r–v. Cf. Maria Domin-Jačov (ed.), *Acta Nuntiaturae Poloniae*, t. XXXIV, *Opitius Pallavicini (1680–1688)*, vol. I: (10 VIII 1680–29 III 1681) (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1995), 154, 191.

Sobieski's representative abandoned the idea and headed for Bologna, the city where he found death waiting for him. Immediately, Alderano Cybo informed the nuncio in Poland Martelli, attempting to mitigate the Pole's overweening personality in his informative note, recognising merits that – in truth – the prince did not possess:

La morte del Signor Duca Radzivil, che sia in gloria, seguita in Bologna ha recato a Sua Santità una immensa afflizione, come richiedevano le nobilissime qualità e il merito illustre di quel Signore, e la preclara memoria ch'egli ha lasciata in questa Corte delle virtù e dell'ereditaria divozione verso la Santa Sede. Quello che più affligge la Santità Sua è il pensare che Sua Maestà possa gravemente sentire il colpo, perdendo un sì valoroso e fedel Ministro, il qual anche per ogn'altro rispetto poteva contribuir molto alla gloria di Sua Maestà³⁶.

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Death, as they say, erases everything. After his death and out of pure Christian piety, Michał, who had appeared in the eyes of Roman authorities as a fanatical rabble-rouser, became an interlocutor with whom it had been possible to engage in a "negozio" of extreme importance for the Christian world: the birth of a defensive/offensive anti-Turkish league. Radziwiłł had failed to achieve such goal because of his character and lack of preparation. Nevertheless, it did not stop the idea of a new crusade so dearly held by Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi³⁷. The project could be realised in other ways, with different interlocutors, with the patient work and mediation of people of great diplomatic ability (see the nuncios Francesco Buonvisi in Vienna³⁸, Opizio Pallavicini in Warsaw, and those in Madrid or Lisbon)³⁹. We know that the project would have been realised only in 1683, though reduced in its initial inclusive vision of the Christian world, with a simple league between Poles and the Imperial.

For strictly financial reasons, the name of Michał remained a vivid memory for the Pontiff and the Curia members for a long time. The solemn cavalcade through the Eternal City, extraordinary enough to cause a stir among the Roman people, had been financed with money borrowed by the Polish prince from the *Banco di Santo Spirito*, with the obligation to repay the money within a short time. Such a request had quite irritated the Pontiff, but Innocent XI finally had granted it, due to the higher interests of building an anti-Turkish league. Now that the prince had died in Bologna, the demand for the return of the money became more and more urgent, especially given the imminent opening of the military campaign against the enemy of Christianity.

No later than four months after the sad event, as we learn from correspondence between Cybo and Martelli, the time had come to ask his widow, Katarzyna Sobieska⁴⁰, to return the sum advanced to his spouse «to these Depositaries of the Apostolic Chamber» («a questi Depositari della Camera Apostolica»). As expressed by Cybo, it was almost an order to be obeyed urgently and without further delay: a will that we clearly understand from the closing sentence of the same letter: «so that I have nothing more to add» («onde non ho al presente alcuna cosa da aggiungere»)⁴¹.

In the meantime, the 72'000 florins initially requested by Michał had become 112'000 after the second payment of 40'000 florins granted for his return in Poland escorted by his ever-increasing retinue. It was up to Martelli to get the whole sum back and thus close a business that had become highly delicate:

È riuscita materia di particolare gradimento a Nostro Signore, il sentire che Vostra Eccellenza Illustrissima abbia impiegate coll'attenzione che conveniva le sue diligenze per il rimborso delli fiorin i 112 di buona moneta dovuta dalla Signora Duchessa Radziwilla per altri e tanti che in due volte e

36 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, Alderano Cybo a Francesco Martelli, Rome 23 November 1680, ff. 405v-06r.

37 Cf. Gaetano Platania, "Innocent XI Odescalchi et l'esprit de croisade", *XVII Siècle. La reconquête catholique en Europe centrale* 199, n. 50/2 (1998): 247-76.

38 On the figure of this very important and capable diplomat of the Holy See, very dear to Pope Odescalchi, see Gaspare De Caro, "Buonvisi Francesco", in DBI, vol. 15 (1972), 319-25; Alessandro Boccolini, *Un lucchese al servizio della Santa Sede. Francesco Buonvisi nunzio a Colonia, Varsavia e Vienna* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2018).

39 In general see the already cited: De Bojani, *Innocent XI*.

40 Cf. Jan Jaroszk, "Radziwiłłowa Katarzyna", in PSB, vol. 30 (1987), 392-96.

41 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, Alderano Cybo a Francesco Martelli, Rome 22 September 1681, f. 429r.

d'ordine della Santità Sua sono qui stati sborsati al Signor Duca Radziwiłł suo consorte, sì come apparisce dalle sue richieste [...]. Tutto ciò ho stimato a proposito di significare a Vostra Eccellenza Illustrissima pur ad oggetto ch'ella non prenda errore nella somma precisa che è appunto di fiorini 112 mila di buona moneta divisa in due sborsi: cioè uno di 72mila fiorini e l'altro di 40mila⁴².

In the letter, we have a confirmation of the former Polish envoy's wife's intentions to settle the debt as soon as possible⁴³. Anyway, to do this, the nuncio had to be well informed about the precise amount paid and under what circumstances.

However, things did not turn out as expected. Documents in the Vatican Archives and the historical libraries of Rome tell, as a matter of fact, a different story. The repeated requests to Katarzyna to close the unpleasant case once and for all inform us that it could not be solved in a short time as promised. Part of the debt was repaid many years later, always following repeated requests from Rome.

⁴² AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, *Alderano Cybo a Francesco Martelli*, Rome 5 April 1681, f. 435r-v.

⁴³ In fact, the Duchess had promised and was obliged to repay the entire sum. In particular, she promised «ancora di far l'accennato pagamento di tutta l'intera somma dentro lo spazio di un mese, ovvero d'un mese e mezzo al più lungo. Onde non par verisimile anche per tal cagione che la Signora Duchessa voglia più oltre procrastinarne l'esecuzione». AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183/A, *Alderano Cybo to Francesco Martelli*, Rome 5 April 1681, f. 435v.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

ASR: Archivio di Stato di Roma.

Diario: Effemeridi Cartarie. Diario e cronache degli avvenimenti romani e pontifici in particolare e d'Europa in generale con allegati documenti a stampa e stampe, voll. 73-104.

BCors.: Biblioteca dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei e Corsiniana-Roma.

DBI: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 100 vols (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Treccani, 1960–2020, 100).

PSB: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, t. I-LII (Kraków: PAN, 1935–2019).

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PRIMARY SOURCE

AAV

Segreteria di Stato. Polonia, voll. Add. 4, 100, 183A

ASR

Archivio Cartari-Febei, *Diario*, vol. 87.

Archivio Storico Capitolino–Roma

Fondo Capponi, cat. IV, sez. 22, t. 64: VI/2, *Giornali di Casa Capponi*, "Roma 8 agosto 1680", ff. n.n.

BCors.

Misc. 41, CCC.D.2, *Copia di lettera scritta da N.N. nella quale si legge la Relazione distinta dell'ingresso, cavalcata e cerimonie fatte in questa città di Roma nell'occasione della venuta del Signor Duca di Radziwil Ambasciatore d'obbedienza appresso la Santità di Nostro Signor PP. Innocenzo XI l'anno MDCLXXX*, Roma: Michele Ercole, 1680.

DIPLOMATS IN ACTION

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DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AS THE BASIS OF POLITICAL ADVANCEMENT AND MATERIAL REWARD IN THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY GRAND DUCHY OF LITHUANIA: THE CASE OF MIKHAYLA HARABURDA

ABSTRACT

In the second half of the sixteenth century, there was a sharp struggle for geopolitical hegemony in Eastern Europe. In order to protect its interests, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had to pursue an active foreign policy, especially during the Livonian War. So diplomacy opened up wide opportunities for public service. The paper shows how diplomatic activity influenced the political career and material status of the nobility. The study is based on the case of Mikhayla Haraburda, who implemented the priorities of the Grand Duchy's foreign policy in practice for almost thirty years. From 1559 to 1586 he participated in 12 diplomatic missions to the Muscovite state and the Crimean Khanate. He rose through all the stages of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania diplomatic service: a messenger (1559, 1560, and 1561), a secretary of the grand legations (1563/1564, 1566, 1581/1582, and 1582), envoy (1571/1572, 1573, 1579, and 1580), and finally a grand envoy (1586). In the 1570s and 1580s, Haraburda was the most experienced diplomat of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. His career was related with the Grand Duchy Chancellery, where he served as a scribe (1559–1566) and a chief clerk (1566–1585). In 1585, he was appointed the castellan of Minsk and became the senator of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Moreover, due to his activity, Haraburda received from the rulers numerous landed estates. As a result, he earned a high position within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania noble society. It may be stated that it was Mikhayla Haraburda's diplomatic activity that ensured his significant political career and land grants.

KEYWORDS: Diplomacy; Grand Duchy of Lithuania; Public service; Political career; Material status.

INTRODUCTION

There was a sharp struggle for geopolitical hegemony in Eastern Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century. To protect its interests, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had to pursue an active foreign policy, especially during the Livonian War (1558–1582). The difficult foreign policy situation provided great opportunities for the public service, including the diplomatic one. The article examines the influence of diplomatic activity on the political career and material status of the middle nobility of the Grand Duchy. The research is based on the case of Mikhayla Haraburda, who had been putting into practice the priorities of the foreign policy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for almost thirty years. From 1559 to 1586, he participated in 12 diplomatic missions to the Muscovite state and the Crimean Khanate.

Despite such an outstanding public service, Haraburda's life and political activity have been barely been explored by historiography. Belarusian and Polish encyclopedias contain relatively detailed biographical articles about him¹. Mikhail Spirydonau, a Belarusian historian, used the example of the *Svisloch volost* gifted to Haraburda by the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania Sigismund Augustus in 1568 to show the expansion of his land holdings². The main stages of his public service

1 Valeryy Pazdnyakow, "Гарабурда Міхаіл Багданавіч (?–12.7.1586)", in *Вялікае княства Літоўскае: Энцыклапедыя*, vol. 1, ed. Hyenadz' Pashkow (Мінск: БелЭн, 2005), 495; Kazimierz Lepszy, "Haraburda Michał h. Abdank (zm. 1586)", in *PSB*, vol. 9 (1960–1961), 288–90.

2 Mikhail Spirydonau, "Наданне Свіслацкай воласці Міхаілу Гарабурду: (Да праблемы скарачэння дзяржаўных уладанняў у Вялікім княстве Літоўскім у XV–XVI стст.)", in *Штогоднік Інстытута гісторыі Нацыянальнай*



are reflected in one of my articles³. However, the correlation between Haraburda's diplomatic activity, career progress, and material status strengthening has never been the subject of a special study. This article is based on various sources, both official documents and narrative sources. The materials from the Archive of the Grand Duchy – the *Lithuanian Metrica* – have played a key role among the primary sources⁴. Let it be stressed that several Haraburda's letters have survived, which provide important additional material for examining his role in the implementation of the foreign policy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth⁵.

THE BEGINNING OF A DIPLOMATIC CAREER

Mikhayla Bahdanavich Haraburda came from an Orthodox Ruthenian (Belarusian) noble family, whose main estates were located in the territory of modern Belarus – in voivodeship of Polatsk (Połock) and Slonim district (voivodeship of Navahrudak/Nowogródek)⁶. Mikhayla had four brothers: Lukash, Siamyon, Antsuta, and Ivan. Such a large number of sons threatened the noble family with a significant subdivision of the land property. Apparently, it was this threat that pushed some of the brothers to active public service, namely, service in the Chancellery of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1559, Mikhayla Haraburda, like his brother Lukash, worked as a scribe of the Chancellery⁷.

The beginning of Haraburda's public activity coincided with the beginning of the Livonian War⁸. The war gave the nobility an opportunity to prove themselves to the monarch in a wide scope of activities, not only in military operations. And diplomacy was one of such activities. Since the Chancellery performed some of the functions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's diplomatic service⁹, it was a perfect "springboard" for a political career during the war. In 1559, Mikhayla Haraburda was sent as a messenger to the Crimean Khanate¹⁰. Although messengers usually performed only current assignments in foreign policy, this mission was extremely important in the context of the outbreak of the war. Haraburda brought back a letter from the Crimean Khan Devlet Geray, which confirmed peace between the two states. Thereafter, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was able to actively engage in the struggle with the Muscovite State for Livonia¹¹.

For the successful fulfillment of the mission and for the material losses incurred on the way from the Crimea, in March 1560, Sigismund Augustus granted the hereditary possession of the *putny*

акадэміі навук Беларусі, ed. Mikhail Kastsyuk (Мінск: ІГ, 1999), 124-37.

3 Uladzimir Padalinski, "Міхайла Гарабурда–выбітны дыпламат Вялікага Княства Літоўскага другой паловы XVI ст.", in *Дипломатия Беларуси: прошлое и настоящее. Сб. материалов научного семинара*, ed. Andrey V. Rusakovich (Мінск: БГУ, 2016), 21-6, <http://www.elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/156210>

4 Both archival and published books of the *Lithuanian Metrica* are referred to in the article.

5 AGAD, AR, V, n. 5019, 5020.

6 Pazdnyakow, "Гарабурда Міхаіл Багданавіч", 495; Spirydonaw, "Наданне Свіслацкай воласці", 125.

7 Pazdnyakow, "Гарабурда Міхаіл Багданавіч", 495; Darius Baronas, ed., *Lietuvos Metrika. Knuga Nr. 37: (1552–1561)* (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2011), 262, 282–283. I would like to note that later, in 1570, Haraburda's nephew Afanas Antsutavich Haraburda also became the scribe of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Chancellery: Нацыянальны гістарычны архіў Беларусі ў Мінску (НГАБ/NGAB), фонд КМФ–18, воп. 1, спр. 257, арк. 2 v.

8 On the causes and the beginning of the Livonian War, see Andrey Yanushkevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна 1558–1570 гг.* (Мінск: Медисонт, 2007), 21-32.

9 Alyaksandr Hrusha, *Канцылярыя Вялікага княства Літоўскага 40-х гадоў XV–першай паловы XVI ст.* (Мінск: Бел. навука, 2006), 41-2, 166-71.

10 Mikhail Obolenskiy and Ignatiy Danilovich, eds., *Книга посольская Метрики Великого княжества Литовского*, t. 1: 1545–1572 (Москва: Университетская Типография, 1843), 157-61. Back in 1558, his brother Lukash went to Moscow as a messenger of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It is known that Lukash Haraburda had been participating in diplomatic relations with the Muscovite state since the 1530s: Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, t. 1, 146-47; Andrey Radaman, "Арганізацыя і склад полацкага земскага суда ў другой палове XVI–першай трэці XVII ст.", *Геральд-Літэранд*, n. 18 (2011): 27.

11 Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, t.1, 161-63; Yanushkevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 29.

boyars' lands in Polatsk voivodeship to Haraburda¹². Thus, the royal grant was not only a reward for the successfully completed assignment, but also a material incentive for further service. And in September 1560, the Chancellery scribe was entrusted with a new diplomatic mission. This time Mikhayla Haraburda was sent as a messenger to Moscow. He was to convey Sigismund Augustus' proposal for the cessation of hostilities in Livonia and peace negotiations to the Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan IV. It was an attempt to drag out time in order to strengthen the position of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the military conflict. The attempt proved to be unsuccessful¹³. In the next year (1561), Haraburda again went to the Crimean Khanate to persuade the Tatars to march against the Muscovite state. However, he failed to fulfill his task, because he was intercepted by the Muscovite voivode Daniil Abashev and did not get to Crimea¹⁴. Nevertheless, I believe that it was these missions, during which he faced unpredictable and unfavourable circumstances that helped Haraburda to show his potential and lay the foundation for the further diplomatic and political career.

IN THE FOREGROUND OF THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LITHUANIA

Meanwhile, the position of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Livonian War seriously deteriorated. In February 1563, Muscovite troops led by Ivan IV captured Polatsk, which was of strategic importance in this battle-ground¹⁵. The Muscovite state took the initiative in the war. The loss of Polatsk showed the weakness of the military organization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It needed a break to prepare for revenge. Already in the spring of 1563, the states concluded a temporary truce. Vilnius began the preparations to send the grand legation to Moscow. The Incisor (Pol. *krajczy*) Yuriy Chodkievich and the Hospodar Marshall Hrehory Vollovich were appointed as envoys, and Mikhayla Haraburda became the secretary of the legation¹⁶. Thus, Haraburda rose to a new higher level of the Grand Duchy's diplomatic service¹⁷. On the one hand, Haraburda's inclusion in the grand legation proved both his diplomatic skills and Sigismund Augustus' confidence in him. On the other hand, Mikhayla had a personal interest in participating in this mission. In February 1563, his brother Lukash with his whole family, as well as his nephew Aliaksandr Siamyonavich Haraburda were captured in Polatsk¹⁸. The mission opened a possibility to release at least some of the captives of war, including his relatives. The grand legation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was in Moscow from December 1563 to January 1564. However, the negotiations on a new truce ended in vain due to the fundamentally different requirements of both sides. The attempt to free Lukash Haraburda also failed, as Ivan IV demanded a huge ransom¹⁹.

Gradually the situation in the Livonian War stabilised. The Grand Duchy's troops defeated the Muscovite army at the Battle of Ula in January 1564, but they could not win Polatsk back. In 1565–1566,

12 Spirydonaw, "Наданне Свіслацкай воласці", 125; Baronas, *Lietuvos Metrika. knyga Nr.*, 37, 359.

13 Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, t.1, 189-91, 192-95; Yanushkevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 42-5.

14 Lepszy, "Haraburda Michał", 288.

15 Yanushkevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 53-71.

16 Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, t.1, 227-41, 242-44, 247; Yanushkevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 71.

17 In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, diplomatic assignments were carried out by great and minor envoys, secretaries of the grand legations, and messengers: Uladzimir Kananovich, "Дыпламатыя", in *Вялікае княства Літоўскае*, ed. Hyenadz' Pashkow, 610-11; Marius Sirutavičius, "The Phenomenon of Clientage and the Organisation of Diplomatic Activities in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century", *Legatio. The Journal for Renaissance and Early Modern Diplomatic Studies*, n. 2 (2018): 67.

18 Radaman, "Арганізацыя і склад полацкага земскага суда", 27; Al'bina Alyaksandrava, Vol'ha Babkova and Iryna Bobyer, eds., *Тастаменты шляхты і мяшчан Беларусі другой паловы XVI ст. (з актавых кніг Нацыянальнага гістарычнага архіва Беларусі)* (Мінск: БелЭн імя П. Броўкі, 2012), 379-81.

19 Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, t.1, 247-51; Yanushkevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 73-4; Lepszy, "Haraburda Michał", 288.

the hostilities turned into local skirmishes and treks to the frontier lands²⁰. Both sides needed a lull to prepare for further decisive actions on the fighting front. Diplomatic relations between the states were resumed. In the summer of 1566, another grand legation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was sent to Moscow. The castellan of Trakai (Troki) Yuriy Chodkievich and the voivode of Brest Yuriy Tyshkievich joined the legation. Haraburda was again appointed as the secretary of the legation. This time, the envoys were ready to seek a compromise to conclude a long-term truce, or even an everlasting peace, with the Muscovite state. However, Ivan IV's territorial claims, especially his claims on Livonia, resulted in declaring a truce between the states only until January 1567²¹. Moreover, the envoys were not able to secure the release of the captives. Despite Mikhayla Haraburda's personal efforts²², his brother Lukash and his nephew Aliaksandr still remained in Muscovite captivity.

On the eve of the 1566 mission, Haraburda was appointed to one of the highest posts in the Chancellery of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – the post of the chief clerk²³. It was strong evidence of his achievements in public service and, first of all, in diplomatic activity. Moreover, throughout the 1560s, Sigismund Augustus granted him a lot of lands. Thus, in 1565, Haraburda received the village of Klimavichy as security for 36'000 Lithuanian *groszes*, and, in 1567, the villages of Klimavichy and Uhryn of Slonim district passed into his ownership. At the beginning of 1566, he lent 60'000 *groszes* and became the holder of the *Svislach volost* – a pretty large state estate in the Belarusian Dnieper region²⁴. In the fall of 1567, during the census of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Haraburda provided 19 armed horsemen and 9 infantry soldiers from his estates and his wife's possessions. It allowed ranking him as a member of the middle nobility²⁵. And on 1 June 1568, during the General *sejm* in Hrodna, Sigismund Augustus gave the Svisloch volost to Mikhayla as hereditament²⁶. Haraburda's merits in diplomatic activity and his participation in important missions to the Crimean Khanate and the Muscovite state were especially emphasized in the privilege. This granting brought the clerk of the Grand Duchy closer to the wealthy nobility.

Mikhayla Haraburda, due to his career development, land grants, and good attitudes from the monarch, strengthened his position in the noble community. He maintained close contacts with the leaders of the Chancellery of the Grand Duchy: with the voivode of Vilnius Mikołaj Radziwiłł “the Red” and the Court Marshall Ostafiej Vollovich. In 1566–1579, they were a Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, respectively²⁷. Part of his correspondence with Radziwiłł dated 1568–1570 has survived. Mainly, he conveyed information about events in foreign and domestic policy to the voivode of Vilnius²⁸. The chief clerk of the Grand Duchy repeatedly acted as a witness in various Ostafiej Vollovich's property transactions in 1567–1568²⁹. Haraburda, undoubtedly, enjoyed the authority and confidence of the

20 Yanushkyevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 74–96.

21 Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, t.1, 255–58; Yanushkyevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 97–9.

22 Radaman, “Арганізацыя і склад полацкага земскага суда”, 27–8.

23 Antoni Gąsiorowski, ed., *Urzednicy dawnej Rzeczypospolitej XII–XVIII wieku: Spisy*, t. 11: *Urzednicy centralni i dygnitarze Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XIV–XVIII wieku. Spisy* (Kórnik: Biblioteka Kórnicka, 1994), 131–32.

24 Spirydonaw, “Наданне Свіслацкай воласці”, 125.

25 Stanislav L. Ptashitskiy, ed., *Русская историческая библиотека*, vol. 33: *Литовская Метрика. Отдел третий*, part 3: *Книги публичных дел. Переписи Литовского войска* (Петроград: Типография Главного Управления Уделов, 1915), 458. The criteria for division of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania nobility into material categories, see Uladzimir Padalinski, *Прадстаўніцтва Вялікага Княства Літоўскага на Люблінскім сойме 1569 года: удзел у працы першага вальнага сойма Рэчы Паспалітай* (Мінск: А.М. Янушкевіч, 2017), 150–53.

26 Spirydonaw, “Наданне Свіслацкай воласці”, 125–26, 129–32.

27 Gąsiorowski, *Urzednicy dawnej Rzeczypospolitej*, t. 11, 52, 147.

28 AGAD, AR, V, n. 5019, 1–8; n. 5020, 1–2. See also Tomasz Kempa, “Sekretarze królewscy na służbie u Radziwiłłów w drugiej połowie XVI wieku”, in *Patron i dwór: magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, eds. Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz and Jerzy Urwanowicz (Warszawa: DiG, 2006), 257–58; Raimonda Ragauskienė, *Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės kancleris Mikalojus Radvila Rudasis (Apie 1515–1584 m.)* (Vilnius: Seimo leidykla “Valstybės žinios”, 2002), 168, 309.

29 Flavian Dobryanskiy, ed., *Акты, издаваемые Виленской археографической комиссией*, t. 31: *Акты о литовских татарах* (Вильна: Русский Почин, 1906), 17–8, 20–2.

upper circles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Thus, the voivode of Smolensk Vasil Tyshkievich, in his will drawn up in 1570, appointed Mikhayla as one of the guardians of his wife and children³⁰. In October 1570, the clerk was among those people who confirmed the transfer of the village of Birzheli by the castellan of Navahrudak Hrehory Vollovich to the property of his third wife Duchess Magdalena Sangushko³¹. By the way, in 1563–1564, Mikhayla Haraburda and Hrehory Vollovich together went to Moscow as part of the grand legation of the Grand Duchy. One may assume that the joint fulfillment of the diplomatic mission helped to strengthen the informal networks between them.

Meanwhile, the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe had changed significantly. The representatives of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland signed the Union of Lublin on 1 July 1569. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was created. Pretty soon, during the Diet in Lublin, the personnel of the first grand legation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Muscovite state were determined. The legation had an important task – to inform Ivan IV that the union had been signed and to conclude a temporary truce with him. Initially, Haraburda was supposed to become the secretary of the legation, as he had already performed these functions twice and, of course, he had the relevant experience. However, the chief clerk flatly refused to go on that mission. In July 1569, the Land Treasurer Mikolaj Narushevich reported that Mikhayla Haraburda «in no way wants to go to Moscow, because he has already been there three times»³². As a result, royal secretary, the chamberlain of Navahrudak Andrej Kharytanovich-Obrynski was appointed as the secretary of the grand legation³³. The reason for such a point-blank refusal might have been Haraburda's fear that participation in another long and dangerous mission could negatively affect his economic conditions. In the spring of 1569, his brother Lukash was finally rescued from captivity and received material compensation at the Diet of Lublin³⁴.

In the winter of 1570–1571, the rumors about Ivan IV's death began to spread in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Sigismund Augustus decided to send an envoy to Moscow, who could verify this information, and started a political campaign for his election as the Grand Prince of Moscow. Mikolaj Radziwiłł “the Red” suggested that Mikhayla Haraburda had to carry out such a delicate task³⁵. Although the rumors were not confirmed, at the end of 1571, he went on a new diplomatic mission to the Muscovite state. This time Haraburda already had the status of a minor envoy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Negotiations with Ivan IV covered the territorial disputes on Livonia and the violations by the Muscovite side of the terms of the truce concluded between the states in June 1570. Since the truce was already expiring in the summer of 1573, Haraburda had to raise the issue of concluding an “eternal peace” between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Muscovite State. However, that mission did not produce any concrete results³⁶. It must be stressed that the Grand

30 Yulian Krachkovskiy, ed., *Акты, издаваемые Виленской археографической комиссией*, т. 22: *Акты Слонимского земского суда* (Вильна: Типография А.Г. Сыркина, 1895), 302-06, 400-08; Alyaksandrava, Babkova, and Bobyer, *Тастаменты шляхты і мяшчан Беларусі*, 355-66, 373-79. At the end of 1578, Haraburda became one of the guardians and defenders of the wife and son of Wojciech Paluski, the Hospodar Marshall and the chamberlain of Ashmiany: Alyaksandrava, Babkova, and Bobyer, *Тастаменты шляхты і мяшчан Беларусі*, 398-403.

31 Krachkovskiy, *Акты, издаваемые Виленской археографической комиссией*, т. 22, 318-20.

32 Pyotr Gil'tebrandt and A. Mirotvortsev, eds., *Археографический сборник документов, относящихся к истории Северо-Западной России*, т. 7 (Вильна: Печатня А. Сыркина, 1870), 48.

33 On the organization of the grand legation and the results of its activities in Moscow in 1570, see Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, т.1, 284-85, 290-301; Padalinski, *Прадстаўніцтва Вялікага Княства Літоўскага*, 66, 77-9; Yanushkevich, *Вялікае Княства Літоўскае і Інфлянцкая вайна*, 112-17.

34 Nevertheless, Lukash' family still remained in captivity: Vladimir Podolinskiy, “«И выступил с речью довольно искренней и горестной»: индивидуальное измерение Люблинского сейма 1569 года”, *Российская история*, п. 4 (2020): 101-02; Radaman, “Арганізацыя і склад полацкага земскага суда”, 27-8. M. Haraburda's nephew Aliaksandr returned from captivity, probably, only in the summer of 1570: Alyaksandrava, Babkova, and Bobyer, *Тастаменты шляхты і мяшчан Беларусі*, 380.

35 Irena Kaniewska, ed., *Listy króla Zygmunta Augusta do Radziwiłłów* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999), 587-89, 591-92, 594-95; Sirutavičius, “The Phenomenon of Clientage”, 78-9.

36 НГАБ, ф. КМФ–18, воп. 1, спр. 56, арк. 10v-11; Obolenskiy and Danilovich, *Книга посольская*, т.1, 312-13; Kaniewska, *Listy króla Zygmunta Augusta*, 600-03, 607-08; Lepšy, “Haraburda Michał”, 289.

Prince of Moscow expressed his wish that Ostafiej Vollovich and Mikhayla Haraburda should be the envoys of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the further negotiations on eternal peace. One can only agree with the opinion of Kazimierz Lepszy, a Polish historian, that by the end of the reign of Sigismund Augustus, Mikhayla Haraburda had already been a real expert in relations between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Muscovite state³⁷.

THE INTERREGNUM OF 1572–1573: A NOTORIOUS MISSION

Sigismund Augustus died in July 1572. After his death, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth entered the first *interregnum*. A fierce political struggle over the candidacy and conditions for the election of a new King and Grand Duke broke out in the state, especially in the Kingdom of Poland³⁸. In such circumstances, the political elite of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had to independently and promptly solve the problem of ensuring external security. Moreover, the term of the truce with the Muscovite state was coming to an end. Already in September 1572, during the Congress in Rudniki, a part of senators of the Grand Duchy decided to start negotiations with Moscow to discuss the possibility of electing Ivan IV's son Fyodor Ivanovich as a new King and Grand Duke. At the end of December 1572, the Congress of senators and noblemen of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania met in Vilnius. The Congress, without the consent of the Polish side, as it was required by the Union of Lublin (1569), sent a special envoy to negotiate with Ivan IV³⁹. Mikhayla Haraburda had to perform this extremely important mission. Obviously, he had not been chosen the envoy by accident. He had already accumulated a rich experience of diplomatic contacts with the Muscovites, enjoyed the confidence of the political elite of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially of Mikołaj Radziwiłł "the Red", and had a relationship of trust with Ivan IV⁴⁰.

The negotiations between Haraburda and Ivan IV took place in February 1573 in Novgorod. No specific agreements had been reached. On the one hand, the conditions on which Vilnius was ready to support the Muscovite candidate were unacceptable for Moscow. On the other hand, the territorial and political claims of the Grand Prince of Moscow were unacceptable to the ruling circles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. And the envoy returned to the Grand Duchy in March 1573⁴¹. However, this diplomatic game allowed to neutralise the threat of military invasion by the Muscovite state into Livonia. Nobody seriously discussed the candidacies of Ivan IV and Fyodor Ivanovich for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth elections in 1573⁴². And in this regard, Haraburda's visit should be called successful.

However, this diplomatic mission caused much speculation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For the sake of his political interests, Jan Hlebovich, the castellan of Minsk, provided the Polish side with false information about the purpose of Haraburda's visit to the Muscovite state. As a result, in the Kingdom of Poland, the political elite of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was accused of secret contacts with the Muscovite state and attempts to elect Fyodor Ivanovich to the Grand Duchy's throne separately⁴³. I doubt that the upper circles of the Grand Duchy seriously considered the Muscovite

37 Lepszy, "Haraburda Michał", 289.

38 Tomasz Kempa, *Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Sierotka" (1549–1616), wojewoda wileński* (Warszawa: Semper, 2000), 68–73.

39 Henryk Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy (Stosunki polsko-litewskie w latach 1569–1588)* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2002), 91–105, 109–12; Antanas Tyla, "The Formation of Lithuanian Eastern Policy: the Dietine of Rūdninkai. September 24–7, 1572", *Lithuanian Historical Studies*, n. 1 (1996): 22–37; Stanisław Grodziski, Irena Dwornicka, and Waław Uruszczak, ed., *Volumina Constitutionum*, vol. II (1550–1609), part 1: (1550–1585) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2005), 236.

40 Kempa, "Sekretarze królewscy", 257–58; Lepszy, "Haraburda Michał", 289; Sirutavičius, "The Phenomenon of Clientage", 79–80.

41 AGAD, AR, II, n. 89, 1–2; Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię*, 112–13. The diary of negotiations, written by Haraburda, has survived till now: Władysław de Broel-Plater, ed., *Zbiór pamiętników do dziejów polskich*, t. 3 (Warszawa: Drukarnia Gazety Codziennej, 1858), 58–65.

42 Kempa, *Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł*, 79; Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię*, 114.

43 Kempa, *Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł*, 73–8; Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię*, 96–102, 127–31; Tyla, "The Formation of Lithuanian Eastern Policy", 31–4, 36.

candidate: his election could result in the restriction of political freedoms in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Most likely, the negotiations with Ivan IV were aimed solely at preventing large-scale fighting in Livonia. Moreover, there is no reason to talk about any real plans to break the union with Poland⁴⁴. Mikhayla Haraburda was even forced to make a detailed report on his mission at the election *sejm* of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the spring of 1573⁴⁵. The accusations of secret negotiations with the Muscovite state for the purpose of a separate election were extremely serious. They could end his diplomatic and official career. It might have been this scandal that prevented Haraburda for a long period, more than six years, from participating in the diplomatic missions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

A NEW RISE DURING THE REIGN OF STEPHEN BÁTHORY

In 1576, Stephen Báthory, the voivode of Transylvania, became the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania. The new king began his preparations for decisive military action against Ivan IV, whose troops occupied most of Livonia in the summer of 1577. In 1578, the General Diet of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth decided to renew the war with the Muscovite state⁴⁶.

In that situation, Haraburda's diplomatic experience and abilities could not remain unclaimed. Initially, however, he was sent to the southern direction. Haraburda went with a legation to Khan Mehmed Giray in June 1579. As a result of the mission, a truce was concluded with the Crimean Khanate, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth concentrated all its forces on the fight against the Muscovite state⁴⁷. Nevertheless, Stephen Báthory counted not only on the neutrality of the Tatars, but also on their participation in the war against Ivan IV. Therefore, at the beginning of 1580, the king asked Haraburda to go to Crimea again. Due to the unstable situation on the southern borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, he had to go there through Moldavia and Wallachia. However, he stopped for several months in Vinnitsa because of some organizational problems. He negotiated with the Crimean envoy there⁴⁸, but it is not known whether Haraburda managed to get to Crimea that very time. Although the Tatars did not organize a large-scale campaign against the Muscovite State⁴⁹, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth managed to maintain peaceful relations with the Khanate during the final stage of the Livonian War. At that time, Haraburda also managed to prove himself in military operations. During the military campaign of 1581, he commanded the Tatar detachments of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. He also participated in the campaign of the castellan of Trakai, Vice-Chancellor Krzysztof Radziwiłł "the Thunderbolt" and the voivode of Smolensk Philon Kmita-Chernobylski in the distant lands of the Muscovite state⁵⁰. Apparently having earned Stephen Báthory's full confidence, Mikhayla Haraburda was soon again involved in diplomatic contacts with the Muscovite state.

Defeats in the military campaigns of 1579–1581 forced Ivan IV to seek a way to reconcile with Stephen Báthory. In December 1581, both states started peace negotiations mediated by Antonio Possevino, the

44 Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię*, 101-02, 107-08.

45 Lepszy, "Haraburda Michał", 289; Tyla, "The Formation of Lithuanian Eastern Policy", 36.

46 Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię*, 308-18. Let it be stressed that the clerks of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Chancellery M. Haraburda and A. Kharytanovich-Obrynski, who had already had the experience of diplomatic missions to the Muscovy, were specially invited to participate in the work of the *sejm*: Ivan I. Ларро, *Великое княжество Литовское во второй половине XVI столетия. Литовско-русский совет и его сеймик* (Юрьев: Тип. К. Маттисена, 1911), приложения, 116.

47 Marek Ferenc, *Mikołaj Radziwiłł "Rudy" (ok. 1515–1584). Działalność polityczna i wojskowa* (Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze "Historia Iagellonica", 2008), 572-73; Jan Natanson Leski, *Epoka Stefana Batorego w dziejach granicy wschodniej Rzeczypospolitej* (Oświęcim: Napoleon V, 2014), 43.

48 AGAD, AR, V, n. 5019, 9-11; Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN, rkps. 1538, *akta do panowania Batorego*, k. 34.

49 Natanson Leski, *Epoka Stefana Batorego*, 67.

50 Reyngol'd Geydenshteyn, "Записки о Московской войне (1578–1582)", in *Рейнгольд Гейденштейн. Записки о Московской войне (1578–1582). Альберт Шлихтинг. Новое известие о России времени Ивана Грозного. Генрих Штаден. О Москве Ивана Грозного*, ed. Aleksandr Tsepkov (Рязань: Александрия, 2005), 213-14, 240-42; Natanson Leski, *Epoka Stefana Batorego*, 80, 84-5.

envoy of Pope Gregory XIII. The voivode of Bratslau (Braclaw) Janusz Zbarazhski and Court Marshall Albrycht Radziwiłł became the grand envoys of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Mikhayla Haraburda was appointed as the legation's secretary. On 15 January 1582, the negotiations ended with the signing of the Truce of Yam-Zapolsky for a period of 10 years. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth retained the northeastern lands of Belarus and almost all territory of Livonia⁵¹. However, the truce did not resolve all the contradictions in Livonia, in which not only the Commonwealth and the Muscovite state but also Sweden were involved. Therefore, in the spring of 1582, Stephen Báthory sent a new grand legation to the Muscovite state, and Haraburda was appointed its secretary for the fourth time. The negotiations took place in the summer of the same year. Their results, in general, satisfied the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth⁵². For a long time, the Muscovite state was excluded from the struggle for influence in the Baltic region.

Haraburda's active participation in the diplomatic missions of 1579–1582 was rewarded. In April 1582, the king issued a privilege to return the villages of Haradzets and Kolbcha, previously granted to some Polatsk noblemen for temporary possession, to the *Svislach volost*⁵³. Haraburda also made a huge step forward in his political career. In February 1585, during the General Diet, he was appointed the castellan of Minsk and, thus, he became a senator of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth⁵⁴. By the way, during this *sejm*, Haraburda took an active part in negotiations with Muscovite envoys⁵⁵. In the 1580s, he was undoubtedly the most experienced specialist in diplomatic relations with the eastern neighbour of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The renowned chronicler, diplomat and lawyer Reinhold Heidenstein in his "Notes on the Muscovite War", published in 1584 in Cracow, described Mikhayla Haraburda as «a gifted person and a proficient one in the Muscovite affairs»⁵⁶.

In 1584, after the death of Ivan IV, Stephen Báthory made plans to subjugate the Muscovite state, and primarily by military means⁵⁷. In December 1585, the Senate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was convened in Hrodna. The monarch and the senators decided to send a «man of ability» to Moscow, who could not only skillfully conduct negotiations, but also scout out the sentiments of the Muscovite political elite⁵⁸. And Mikhayla Haraburda was such a person. A special instruction was drawn up in Hrodna. He was supposed to act in negotiations with the Muscovite state according to it. The envoy also received individual instructions from Stephen Báthory. But during the negotiations, he had to use his own «wise discretion», relying on his own «intelligence and sharpness»⁵⁹.

In April 1586, Haraburda was in Moscow already as the grand envoy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The negotiations covered a wide range of issues: from the return of the confiscated goods to the merchants of the Commonwealth to the possibility of signing a union between the two

51 Geydenshteyn, "Записки о Московской войне (1578–1582)", 250, 256–69, 278–79; Mikhail Pogodin and Dmitriy Dubenskiy, ed., *Книга посольская Метрики Великого княжества Литовского*, том 2: 1576–1583 (Москва: Университетская Типография, 1843), 209–45; Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię*, 339–40; Natanson Leski, *Epoka Stefana Batorego*, 91, 97–107. In addition to it, in 1578–1579, Haraburda's nephew – Pyotr Antsutovich – went as a messenger to Moscow: Geydenshteyn, "Записки о Московской войне (1578–1582)", 81, 97; Pogodin Dubenskiy, *Книга посольская*, t. 2, 38–41.

52 Pogodin Dubenskiy, *Книга посольская*, t. 2, 248–74; Lepszy, "Haraburda Michał", 289; Sirutavičius, "The Phenomenon of Clientage", 80–1. During 1581–1583, Haraburda participated in the audiences of Muscovite envoys, as well as negotiations on the exchange of the war captives: Pogodin Dubenskiy, *Книга посольская*, t. 2, 136–39, 274–75, 280–83.

53 Spiridonaw, "Надання Свіслацкай воласці", 125–26.

54 Józef Wolff, *Senatorowie i dygnitarze Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego (1386–1795)* (Kraków: Druk. Anczyca i Spółki, 1885), 110.

55 Aleksander Czuczyski, ed., *Dyaryusze sejmowe roku 1585. W dodatkach: Ułamki dyaryusza sejmowego roku 1582, akta sejmikowe i inne akta odnoszące się do sejmu 1585 r.* (Kraków: Nakładem Akademii Umiejętności, 1901), 254, 256–57.

56 Geydenshteyn, "Записки о Московской войне (1578–1582)", 250.

57 Natanson Leski, *Epoka Stefana Batorego*, 133–34.

58 Michał Grabowski and Aleksander Przedziecki, ed., *Zróżdła do dziejów polskich*, t. 1 (Wilno: Nakł. i druk. J. Zawadzkiego, 1843), 63.

59 Algirdas Baliulis, ed., *Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 593 (1585–1604). Diplomatinų reikalų knyga* (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2009), 19–25.

states⁶⁰. Although the negotiations had not produced concrete results, it was an important stage in the formation of Stephen Báthory's policy in relation to the Muscovite State. On 24 June 1586, Mikhayla Haraburda reported to the king on the results of his mission. But the same year, on 12 July he suddenly died of pneumonia⁶¹. That mission had certainly become the peak and final chord of his bright diplomatic career.

CONCLUSION

Mikhayla Haraburda's case was quite unique in the history of diplomacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the second half of the sixteenth century⁶². During his life, he passed all the levels of the diplomatic service: from a messenger to a grand envoy. Thanks to his activities, being a representative of the middle nobility, he managed to climb the career ladder from the scribe of the Chancellery to a senator. Numerous land grants were also a direct consequence of Haraburda's public service and implementation of the foreign policy objectives of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. At the same time, diplomatic missions that were carried out in emergency situations and had a general public outcry could put an end to all his career achievements.

60 Baliulis, *Lietuvos Metrika*. Knyga Nr. 593, 30-7; Lepšy, "Haraburda Michał", 289-90; Uładzimir Padalinski, "Szlachta Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego w misjach dyplomatycznych Rzeczypospolitej (ostatnie trzydziestolecie XVI w.)", in *Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie nowożytnej. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV-XVIII wieku*, ed. Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: "Societas Vistulana", 2009), 248. I would like to note that there were no representatives of the Kingdom of Poland in the legation.

ABBREVIATIONS

НГАБ: Нацыянальны гістарычны архіў Беларусі ў Мінску [NGAB: Nacyjanalnyj Gistarycznyj Archiu Biełarusi, Minsk].

AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

AR: Archiwum Warszawskie Radziwiłłów.

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THE “DECISIVE EMBASSY” OF PRINCE KRZYSZTOF ZBARASKI TO CONSTANTINOPLE (1622–1623) AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AMIDST THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR

ABSTRACT

The embassy of prince Krzysztof Zbaraski (1622–1633) is traditionally considered purely in the context of bilateral relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire for several reasons. First, the main goal of this embassy was to gain an imperial ‘ahdname after the first substantial military conflict between the parties in the previous year. Second, because in such terms this embassy is pictured in the two major sources documenting this mission. These are the official report by Zbaraski and the epic poem by his secretary Samuel Twardowski “Przeważna legacja” (“The Decisive Embassy”) (1633). Yet, prince’s diplomatic performance was closely observed by European residents and *ad hoc* ambassadors in Constantinople. Their dispatches give a perspective completely different from the one expressed in the official report of the prince. Specifically, they discussed whether the treaty between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire should include the paragraph regarding obligation of the Polish king to keep peace with the Transylvanian prince Bethlen Gábor. It was reported that this condition could impact Bethlen Gábor’s decision-making about resuming war with the Emperor Ferdinand II Habsburg after the Peace of Nikolsburg (1621). This article contextualises the embassy of the Prince Zbaraski within European political landscape amidst Thirty Years’ War and contrasts the results of the embassy to the tasks outlined in the ambassadorial instruction.

KEYWORDS: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Ottoman Empire; Transylvania; Diplomacy; Thirty Years’ War.

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On 9 November 1622 the grand ambassador of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Ottoman Empire, Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski entered Constantinople to start his four-month long diplomatic mission. On this occasion, the French resident Count Philippe de Cesy remarked about prince’s exceptionally splendid entrance into the city¹. On his shift, the English resident Sir Thomas Roe pointed out that the prince entered the city with «great (perhaps too much) trayne»² amounting to about 1200 people. Although some other observers claimed that the prince’s escort counted to no more than 700 people³, this anyway was nearly an unprecedented occasion for Constantinople to welcome such a numerous embassy. By way of contrast, escorts of the Habsburg ambassadors generally did not exceed 150 people with the exception of Hans Ludwig Küfstein (1628) who was followed by 400 cavaliers⁴. Prince Zbaraski had several reasons to surprise Constantinople with his numerous escort. First, he was obliged to his status of a Ruthenian prince who belonged to the richest people of his country⁵.

1 Aleksandr Turgenev, ed., *Historica Russiae monumenta ex antiquis exterarum gentium archivis et bibliothecis deprompta ab A. I. Turgenevio*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: Pstratz, 1842), 422.

2 Thomas Roe, *Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in his embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the year 1621 to 1628 inclusive* (London: Printed by Samuel Richardson, 1775), 115.

3 Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black Sea frontier and the relations of the Porte with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622-1628* (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1989), 25, footnote 5.

4 Maria Pia Pedani, “The sultan and the Venetian bailo: ceremonial diplomatic protocol in Istanbul”, in *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Ralf Kauz, Giorgio Rota and Jan Paul Niedercorn (Wien: Vöaw, 2009), 288. Ernst D. Petritsch, “Zeremoniell bei Empfangen habsburgischer Gesandtschaften in Konstantinopel”, in *Ibid.*, 318.

5 Zbigniew Anusik, “Książęta Jerzy i Krzysztof Zbarascy wobec problemów południowo-wschodniego pogranicza

Second, he needed to manifest strength and power of his king after the peace concluded between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire one year before, in October 1621, near the fortress of Khotyn (Chocim). The siege of Khotyn had ended indcisively and the conditions of the peace, which original copies were lost, could be interpreted differently, so that each party believed to be victorious⁶. Michał Wasiucionek incisively pointed out that ceremonial aspects of embassies, ceremonial entrance being one of them, were no just a performance but the very *raison d'état* of the early-modern diplomacy⁷. So Prince's Zbaraski pompous entrance into Constantinople was strategically important as it allowed to demonstrate richness and strength of the Commonwealth. Indeed, in 1622, Constantinople hosted a number of European permanent and *ad hoc* embassies⁸. So Zbaraski's performance could be observed not only by the Ottoman hosts but also by European ambassadors, who took a keen interest in diplomatic relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire.

The aim of the present article is to place Prince Zbaraski's embassy and its principal results within the context of this network of political interests amidst the ongoing Thirty Years' War. To do so, first, we will consider official tasks defined for the ambassador in the set of his diplomatic instructions. Second, we will analyse the attitudes of the European diplomats towards the prospective peace to be concluded between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire. Third, we will compare and contrast available evidence documenting negotiation process between the prince and the Ottoman high dignitaries. Finally, we will assess how the imperial 'ahdname delivered to Prince Zbaraski related to the interests of powers engaged into the developments of the Thirty Years' War.

THE GOALS OF PRINCE ZBARASKI'S EMBASSY

There are two diplomatic instructions, which allow one to assess the set of tasks put in charge of prince Zbaraski during his mission to the Ottoman Empire. The first one is undated⁹, the second one is divided into an official and a secret parts and dated 6 August 1622¹⁰. Yet, both the instructions are nearly identical, the differences are scarce and unsubstantial, and so one may regard these documents as a consolidated complex revealing the goals of the embassy.

First of all, Prince Zbaraski was supposed to negotiate a peace treaty to substitute the one concluded in the military camp near Khotyn and to cancel its two most irritating conditions, namely the plan to conduct a demarcation between the two countries¹¹, and the obligation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to keep its resident ambassador in Constantinople¹². The instructions underlined

Rzeczypospolitej w drugim i trzecim dziesięcioleciu XVII wieku", *Przegląd Nauk Historycznych*, 15/2 (2016): 128-33.

- 6 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th centuries): an Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 130-33. Id., "Traktat Chocimski jako przykład dyplomacji wczesnonowożytnej", *Revista de istorie a Moldovei*, 57 (2004): 74-8. Tetiana Grygorieva, "Performative Practice and the Ceremonial Rhetoric of Peacemaking: The Process of Peacemaking between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire after the Khotyn War", in *Osmanischer Orient und Ostmitteleuropa: Perzeptionen und Interaktionen in den Grenzzonen zwischen dem 16. und 18. Jahrhundert*, eds. Robert Born, Andreas Puth (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014), 240-45.
- 7 Michał Wasiucionek, "Diplomacy, Power and Ceremonial Entry: Polish-Lithuanian Grand Embassies in Moldavia in the Seventeenth Century", *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 105 (2012): 56.
- 8 On "parade of embassies" in Constantinople see Geoff R. Berridge, "Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620s", *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, 92 (2004): 7.
- 9 BK PAN, rkps 326, 535-47.
- 10 BK PAN, rkps 326, 548-64. Previously, this document was analysed by Stefania Ochmann: "Sprawa traktatu Chocimskiego", *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis: Historia*, XII (1966): 66-70.
- 11 On the unsuccessful attempt to conduct demarcation in 1542, see Mykola Krykun, *Administratyvno-teritorial'ny ustrij Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy v 15–18 st.: kordony voyevodstv u svitli dżerel*. (Kyiv: Akademiya Nauk Ukrainy, 1993), 104-05. Kołodziejczyk, *The Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations*, 58-9.
- 12 On the commitment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the *ad hoc* diplomacy in its relations with the Ottoman Empire see Tetiana Grygorieva, "The Trick and Traps of ad hoc Diplomacy: Polish Ambassadors' Experiences of Ottoman Hospitality", in *Diplomatic Cultures at the Ottoman Court, c.1500–1630*, eds. Tracey Sowerby and Christofer Markiewicz (New York: Routledge, 2021), 194-216.

that commissaries appointed to engage into negotiations near Khotyn had no powers to spoil “olden peace” with any new conditions such as those providing for demarcation and resident. The ‘ahdnames of 1598 and 1619 were named the apparent best examples of the “olden peace”¹³. Specifically, a clear reference to the ‘ahdname of 1598 can be found in the claim for «Hungarian fortresses»¹⁴. In 1598, the sultan, who was engaged into the Long War (1591–1606) with the Habsburgs, agreed to recognize the right of the King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the fortresses of Košice, Hust and Munkács¹⁵ if the king would manage to conquer them prior to the sultan himself¹⁶. In such a way, the sultan recognized “historical” rights of the king Sigismund III Vasa for the territories formerly belonging to the Jagiellons¹⁷. This condition was lost in the subsequent ‘ahdnames of 1607 and 1619, and so now Sigismund III tried to take the occasion and strengthen the precedent that would allow him or his descendants to justify claims to the mentioned fortresses in the future.

Second, the ambassador had to ensure that prospective ‘ahdname would be bilateral and included neither the Ottoman tributary, the Principality of Transylvania (which had been previously mentioned in the ‘ahdname of 1619) nor the Kingdom of Hungary. In such a way, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would secure its independent foreign policy and would not be obliged to neutrality in the possible conflict between the sultan or the Transylvanian prince and the king’s brother-in-law, the Emperor Ferdinand II Habsburg.

Third, Zbaraski was expected to secure the “right” of the king to “suggest” the sultan the candidacies of the Moldavian voivodes. He was also to claim dismissal of the present Moldavian voivode Stefan Tomşa (as well as the beylerbey of Silistra Khan Temir-Kantemyr) and to instead promote the candidacy of Petru Movilă¹⁸. The representatives of the Movilă family, who were most strongly connected to the powerful Polish and Ruthenian magnates with patronage and family ties¹⁹, controlled the title of the Moldavian voivodes in the last decade of the sixteenth – the first decade of the seventeenth century. Thus, by promoting yet another representative of the Movilă family for the Moldavian voivodship and by claiming the “right” of choosing Moldavian voivodes in the future, Zbaraski was supposed to formalise Ottoman recognition of Polish influence in this principality.

Fourth, the Prince was prescribed to claim all the Polish prisoners released rather than ransomed as it was apparently specified «in all the previous treaties». The ambassador was instructed “to remind” the sultan about the practice of mutual releasing prisoners and to point out that his honorable ancestors always «released and presented prisoners» on request of Polish kings. Indeed, the previous ‘ahdnames included a condition that royal agents were allowed to search for king’s servants who remained «Poles and infidels» (i.e. Christians). However, it was specified that only those who became prisoners after issuing of ‘ahdname were to be released without remuneration. In practice, such releasing prisoners without remuneration happened only rarely. The Polish ambassadors occasionally obtained prisoners as a special gift for their king, but to claim such a gift was by no means an easy task. For example, the ambassadorial allowance of Piotr Zborowski (1568) was immediately halved after he had mentioned

13 Kołodziejczyk, *The Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations*, 313-23, 354-62.

14 BK PAN, rkps 326, 547.

15 Today the city of Košice in Slovakia and the towns of Hust and Mukachevo in Ukraine.

16 Kołodziejczyk, *The Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations*, 312-23.

17 The three mentioned Hungarian fortresses were in possession of Władysław III Jagiellon (of Varna) (1434–1444), who was both the king of Poland and of Hungary. The fortresses were claimed by Isabella Jagiellon, the widow of the Hungarian king John I Zápolya (1526–1540) and the regent under her young son John I Zápolya. After the partition of Hungary in 1547, initially the fortresses became a part of the Principality of Transylvania, but during the 1650s they were conquered by the Habsburgs and annexed to the Royal Hungary. On Polish diplomacy in defense of the dynastic rights of Isabella Jagiellon and her son see Andrzej Dziubiński, *Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polsko-Tureckie w latach 1500–1572 w kontekście międzynarodowym* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2005), 58-167.

18 Petru Movilă, son of the former voivode of Moldavia Simion Movilă, future Metropolitan of Kyiv.

19 Michał Wasiucionek, *Politics and Watermelons: Cross-Border Political Networks in the Polish-Moldavian-Ottoman Context in the Seventeenth Century* (PhD diss., European University Institute, 2016), 79-87.

to the grand vizier the “right” of the king to extradite prisoners free of charge²⁰. As prisoners were considered slaves and private property of those, who captured them, the sultan needed first to redeem them at the expense of imperial treasury if he wished to present them to the king. Noble prisoners were considered particular asset as the proprietors could account for hefty ransom from their relatives²¹. After the Battle of Cecora (1620), a number of Polish dignitaries such as Prince Samuel Korecki, Crown Field Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski, two sons of the former Polish Great Crown Hetman Stanislaw Żolkiewski, and many other members of prominent noble families were detained in Istanbul as prisoners²². Consequently, prince Zbaraski was supposed to persuade the sultan to make an extremely expensive present to the king.

Finally, the ambassador was expected to ensure that diplomatic gifts intended for the sultan would not be perceived as a tribute or any duty. To meet this expectation, Prince Zbaraski was to handle these gifts not in public, but in some discreet place (for example, in the garden). This assignment to avoid public demonstration of the gifts revealed firm intention to underline that these were actually gifts and no tribute²³. In case the Ottomans referred to these gifts as to a tribute, the prince would not give them at all. This latter prescription should be perceived as the last resort because the rejection to deliver gifts would fail princes’ mission at once. In the Ottoman Empire, it was nearly impossible to carry out a diplomatic mission without gifts or to present them privately. Delivering gifts to the sultan was an essential part of the reception ceremony of both the Ottoman high dignitaries and foreign diplomats.

Finally, the ambassador was expected to ensure that diplomatic gifts intended for the sultan would not be perceived as a tribute or any duty. To meet this expectation, Prince Zbaraski was to handle these gifts not in public, but in some discreet place (for example, in the garden). In case the Ottomans referred to these gifts as to a tribute, the prince would not give them at all. However, in the Ottoman Empire, it was nearly impossible to carry out a diplomatic mission without gifts or to present them privately. The ceremony of delivering gifts was integrated into the palace ceremonial: the gifts were to be brought into the palace on the eve of the audience and publicly demonstrated during ambassadorial reception²⁴.

To conclude, the ambassadorial instructions set out an extremely ambitious program for the future diplomatic mission. The ambassador was expected not only to conclude lasting peace between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, but also to do a root and branch review of the terms of the agreement reached near Khotyn (1621). He was also supposed to gain Ottoman recognition of the influence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Principality of Moldavia. Next, the prince was entrusted to claim Polish prisoners released rather than ransomed that would «manifest to the entire world the firmness of the peace» between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire. On his shift, the king himself intended to pass gifts to the sultan quietly, so as not to be suspected of doing so out of duty. In sum, Zbaraski’s success with the mentioned tasks would have asserted his king’s superiority over the sultan.

20 Janusz Pajewski, “Legacja Piotra Zborowskiego do Turcji w 1568 r: materiały do historii stosunków polsko-tureckich za panowania Zygmunta Augusta”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, 12 (1936): 60.

21 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: the Northern Black Sea Region in the 16th to 17th centuries”, *Oriente Moderno*, n.s. 25/1 (2006): 153-54. Will Smiley, *From Slaves to Prisoners of War. The Ottoman Empire, Russia, and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 23-38.

22 Ryszard Majewski, *Cecora – rok 1620* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1970), 219-20.

23 Previously, some European ambassadors had tried to avoid public demonstration of the gifts to claim these gifts were no tribute. Tracey Sowerby, Christopher Markiewicz “Languages of Diplomatic Gift-Giving at the Ottoman Court”, in *Diplomatic Cultures at the Ottoman Court*, 56.

24 Sowerby and Markiewicz, “Languages of Diplomatic Gift-Giving”, 55, 65-71. For the importance of the gift giving at the Ottoman court also see Pedani, “The Sultan and the Venetian Bailo”, 294. On the importance of gift giving in the early modern Ottoman political culture: Hedda Reindl-Kiel, “Luxury, power strategies, and the question of corruption: gifting in the Ottoman elite (16th-18th Centuries)”, in *Şehrâyîn. Die Welt der Osmanen, die Osmanen in der Welt Wahrnehmungen, Begegnungen und Abgrenzungen / Illuminating the Ottoman World, Perceptions, Encounters and Boundaries. Festschrift Hans Georg Majer*, ed. Yavuz Köse (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012), 107-20. Ovidiu Christea, “Diplomacy and Gifts in Constantinople: the Book of Accounts of bailo Piero Bragadin (1524–1526)”, *Revista istorică*, 29/1-2 (2018): 15-31.

FOREIGN AMBASSADORS AND THEIR ATTITUDES TO THE ZBARASKI'S EMBASSY

A number of European ambassadors in Constantinople were anxious to know whether Prince Zbaraski would be successful with his mission. Specifically, the English resident Sir Thomas Roe was instructed to most strongly support his diplomatic aspirations²⁵. In exchange for diplomatic support to Prince Zbaraski in Constantinople, the English king James I counted for mediation of the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Sigismund III in his negotiations with the Emperor Ferdinand II Habsburg²⁶. In 1619, James I's son-in-law, the Elector Palatine of Rhine Frederick V, contested Ferdinand II's title of the King of Bohemia. After having lost the Battle of White Mountain (1620), he was forced to flee Prague to Netherlands. At the same time, Frederick V lost control over Palatinate, which was occupied by Spanish forces, recruited by the Emperor. Thus, Sir Thomas Roe was expected to well serve to both the Habsburgs and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by preventing from possible conflict between the Ottomans and any of them, to allow for negotiations on returning Palatinate to Frederick V.

On the contrary, the *ad hoc* ambassador of the Transylvanian prince Bethlen Gábor²⁷ together with the representative of the mentioned Elector Palatine and "alternative" King of Bohemia Frederick V, Count Mathias von Thurn, hoped that Prince Zbaraski would fail his mission. Both Bethlen Gábor and Frederick V were interested in resuming war with the Emperor Ferdinand II Habsburg in the next year. To fulfill this plan, they needed, first, to secure support of the sultan and to gain military help by efforts of the pasha of Buda²⁸. Second, they strived to ensure neutrality on the part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth believing that Ottoman threat would best discourage the Polish king from helping the Habsburg Emperor. Another foe of the prospective peace between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire was Dutch resident Cornelius Haga²⁹, who assisted Count von Thurn and the Transylvanian ambassador³⁰. In the course of the Eighty Years' War, when the Netherlands hoped to finally get their independence from the Habsburgs fully recognised, they inevitably supported any anti-Habsburg initiative. At the same time, according to von Thurn, his most evident opponent, was French resident Count Philippe de Cesy «so devoted to the [Emperor] Ferdinand that he had forgotten all politeness and Christian love»³¹. Indeed, as of 1622, France, which had suffered from the Huguenot uprisings, could have no positive attitudes to the Protestant countries. Finally, two weeks after Prince Zbaraski solemnly entered Constantinople, there arrived Muscovite embassy of Ivan Kondyrev and Timofej Bormonosov. Prince Zbaraski, the English resident Sir Thomas Roe, and the French resident Philippe de Cesy were all convinced that the Muscovite embassy aimed at ruining Polish-Ottoman negotiations and at concluding an offensive alliance with the Ottoman Empire to jointly attack Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. These contemporary assessments does not match with later scholarly opinions. In particular, ambassadorial instructions to Kondyrev and Bormonosov do not reflect any intention of the tsar to break the Truce of Deulino (1618) and to resume war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To this one should add a reasonably modest range of gifts brought by the Muscovite embassy³².

25 Roe, *Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, 3.

26 Anna Kalinowska, "Rzeczpospolita w działalności ambasadora angielskiego w Konstantynopolu sir Thomasa Roe", in *Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie nowożytnej. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych*, ed. Ryszard Skowron, (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2009), 310-12.

27 The name of this ambassador is not directly mentioned in the available sources, but it is supposed that it was the mission of Mihály Tholdalagi. Bíró Vencel, *Erdély követei a portán* (Cluj-Kolozsvár: Minerva, 1921), 121. For this reference, I am indebted to Gábor Kármán.

28 Otakar Odložilík, "Ze zápasů pobělohorské emigrace", *Časopis Matice moravské*, 56 (1932): 51-2.

29 On Cornelius Haga's mission: Alexander H. de Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: a History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 1610–1630* (Leiden/Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut, 1978), 83-109.

30 Otakar Odložilík, ed., *Z korespondence pobělohorské emigrace z let 1621–1624* (Praze: Nákladem Královské české společnosti nauk, 1933), 82-3, 87-8.

31 Odložilík, *Z korespondence*, 87.

32 Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier*, 37-8.

Yet, Kondyrev and Bormonosov cannot be considered indifferent to the proceedings of the Zbaraski's embassy. They arrived to Constantinople accompanying former Ottoman ambassador to Muscovy Foma Kantakuzin (1621)³³. Foma Kantakuzin belonged to the most influential Greek families in Constantinople, he was son-in-law of the Wallachian hospodar Radu Mihnea, and close associate of the Patriarch of Constantinople Cyrill Lukaris. The choice of his candidacy as an ambassador to Muscovy revealed contextual alliance between various networks of power and Ottoman political elites striving to weaken Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On the eve of the siege of Khotyn in 1621, Kantakuzin was supposed to persuade the tsar to support the Ottoman offensive and step against the Commonwealth. However, he arrived to Moscow late, when the Ottoman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had already stopped confrontation and achieved peace agreement. Now, Kantakuzin, who was evidently hostile to the idea of peace between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, was the chief intermediary for Kondyrev and Bormonosov in Constantinople. One of the important goals of Kondyrev and Bormonosov was to file a complaint on the raids by the border community near Azov subordinated to the Ottomans³⁴. On their shift, the Ottomans used to condemn the raids of the Don Cossacks subordinated to the Muscovy. In their attacks of Black Sea coastal towns, the Don Cossacks were occasionally strengthened by the Ukrainian Cossacks formally subordinated to the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. So the tsar regularly accused the king that he intentionally spoils tsar's relations with the Crimean khan by encouraging Ukrainian Cossacks' migration to Don³⁵. In sum, the Muscovite ambassadors were interested to persuade the Ottomans to help them cut the flow of Ukrainian Cossacks to Don, and Prince Zbaraski's embassy was a good occasion to promote this interest.

In sum, Prince Zbaraski inevitably had to conduct his mission within a complicated network of interests, when some part of foreign diplomats had their own reasons to support his diplomatic aspirations and some other strongly opposed the very idea of peace between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire.

NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR RESULTS

The embassy of Prince Zbaraski is documented in detail in two major sources. The first one is the narrative ambassadorial report³⁶, the second one is the epic poem *Przeważna legacja*³⁷ ("The Decisive Embassy") composed by the ambassadorial secretary Samuel Twardowski and first published in 1633, 10 years after the embassy took place. To this one should add two letters written by the ambassador when in Constantinople, both the letters are addressed to his brother, castellan of Cracow, Prince Jerzy Zbaraski³⁸. All these sources present the negotiations between the ambassador and the Ottoman dignitaries as principally bilateral.

The ambassadorial report stresses how difficult it was to obtain any peace from the Ottomans due to personal hostility of the grand vizier Gürgü Hadım Mehmed pasha to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The major reason for this hostility was named vizier's patronage over the Moldavian

33 On Foma Kantakuzin's mission to Moscow see Boris Floria, "Foma Kantakuzin i jego rol' v razvitii russko-osmanskikh otnoshenij v 20-30 gg. XVII v.," *Rossija i pravoslavnyi Vostok*, voll. 2-3 (Moscow, 2004), 250-52. Mariia Telegina, *Ceremonial Representation in Cross-Confessional Diplomacy: the Ottoman Embassy of a Christian Ambassador to Moscow in 1621* (MA thesis, Bupapest: CEU, 2017), 56-69.

34 Floria, "Foma Kantakuzin", 253.

35 Andrei Papkov, *Porubezhie Rosijskogo tsarstva i ukrainskich zemel' Rechi Pospolitoj (konets XVI-pervaja polovina XVII veka)* (Belgorod: Konstanta, 2004), 137.

36 Leon Rogalski, ed., "Poselstwo Krzystofa księcia Zbaraskiego do Turcji w roku 1622", *Dziennik Wileński, Historia i Literatura*, vol. 2 (1827): 3-27, 101-25, 237-73, 339-71.

37 Roman Krzywy, ed., *Samuel Twardowski, Przeważna legacja Krzystofa Zbaraskiego od Zygmunta III do Sołtana Mustafy* (Warszawa: IBL, 2000).

38 Anna Filipczak-Kocur, ed. *Korespondencja Krzysztofa księcia Zbaraskiego koniuszego koronnego 1612-1627* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2015), 117-23.

voivode Stefan Tomşa and the beylerbey of Silistra Khan Temir (Kantemyr)³⁹, whom Zbaraski strived to dismiss. From the very beginning, the vizier is reported to show his unfavorable attitude towards the ambassador by postponing his solemn entrance into the city, and by demanding that merchants, who arrived together with the ambassadorial escort, paid customs from the money they brought with them⁴⁰. After the initial conflicts seemed to be resolved and the ambassador entered the city, Zbaraski insisted on complaining for unfriendly behavior of Stefan Tomşa and Kantemyr. Defending his proteges, the vizier put forward counterargument that the real challenge for the peaceful relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire were Ukrainian Cossack naval raids to the Ottoman territories⁴¹. This sharp exchange of opinions grew into a real quarrel so that the prince demonstratively left the meeting exclaiming «the ambassadors of the king, my lord, are not to meet with such a reception, and I will not stay at such an audience»⁴².

The French resident Count Philippe de Cesy believed that getting into a sharp conflict with the grand vizier Prince Zbaraski demonstrated that he was strongly determined to defend the interests of his monarch⁴³. On his shift, English resident Sir Thomas Roe, who struggled to reconcile the parties, claimed that the demarche of the prince revealed his ignorance of the vizier's shadow play. According to Roe, the vizier consciously provoked conflict aiming at postponing negotiations until arrival of the beylerbey of Kanije, Mehmed Deák⁴⁴, who was supposed to deliver fresh news about political situation in both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Transylvania⁴⁵. Indeed, Prince Zbaraski knew that the vizier was waiting for Deák Mehmed pasha as well as about the close connections of the latter with the Transylvanian prince claiming Hungarian crown, Bethlen Gábor⁴⁶. Yet, in his report he does not demonstrate any understanding of the impact of Transylvanian diplomacy on the proceedings of his embassy.

The prince claimed that in the conflict with the vizier, he took the most active stand contacting a number of Ottoman high dignitaries including former grand viziers Kara Davud pasha (1622) and Damat Halil pasha (1616–1619), grand mufti, janissary agha, kethüde agha, kızlar agha, and the head of the imperial chancery with rich presents – gold, sable furs and clocks. Zbaraski reported that this strategy let him leverage over the grand vizier, as the latter was publicly accused of groundless ruining negotiations with the prince at the Imperial Council. So the vizier agreed to reconcile with the prince and to arrange the latter's reception in the imperial palace⁴⁷. Yet he insisted on the ambassador's announcing the list of gifts intended for the sultan and on paying tribute of 300'000 thalers supposedly promised by the Polish-Lithuanian commissaries, who concluded the preliminary peace near Khotyn. On his shift, Prince Zbaraski claimed to follow his ambassadorial instruction: he

39 Balázs Sudár, "Iskender and Gábor Bethlen: The Pasha and the Prince", in *Europe and the Ottoman World: Exchanges and Conflicts (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries)*, ed. Gábor Kármán and Radu G. Păun (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2013), 153.

40 Firstly, the Ottomans encouraged the import of coins into the Ottoman Empire and usually exempted European merchants from related customs. Secondly, the exemption of Polish-Lithuanian merchants from custom duties on imported money (in particular, silver coins) was recorded in the 'ahdname of 1598, and the subsequent 'ahdnames of 1607 and 1619 manifested that no new customs should be imposed on these merchants. Sevet Pamuk, *Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 74; Kołodziejczyk, *The Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations*, 186, 322, 342, 358.

41 On the Cossack naval raids to the Ottoman territories see Victor Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids", *Oriente Moderno*, 81/1 (2001): 23–95.

42 Rogalski, "Poselstwo Krzysztofa księcia Zbaraskiego", 114–15.

43 Turgenev, *Historica Russiae monumenta*, 422–23.

44 Deák Mehmed pasha was of Hungarian origin, a son of a Transylvanian pretender Pál Márkházi, who converted to Islam. Sándor Papp „From a Transylvanian Principality to an Ottoman Sanjak: The Life of Pál Márkházi, a Hungarian Renegade”, *Chronica*, 4 (2004), 57–67.

45 Roe, *Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, 109, 115.

46 Rogalski, "Poselstwo Krzysztofa księcia Zbaraskiego", 109. On the connections between Mehmed Deák and Bethlen Gabor: Balázs Sudár, "Iskender and Gábor Bethlen", 167–68.

47 Sudár, "Iskender and Gábor Bethlen", 116–18.

demonstratively looked surprised to hear such a request. He then claimed that «the most precious gift» of his monarch was his friendship and suggested to deliver some gifts for the sultan in his own name to meet the following response: «if [the ambassador] is the king, then we will accept his gifts, but we will not accept [gifts] from the king's servant»⁴⁸. Prince Zbaraski claimed that although he finally agreed to deliver gifts in the name of his king, he, however, negotiated that they would not be displayed publicly but, brought into the palace discreetly, at night. The sultan allegedly was to send reciprocal gifts to the king accompanied with a letter justifying the conduct of the prince⁴⁹. This optimistic account is not supported in the report of Sir Thomas Roe, who argues that to finally gain the reception in the imperial palace of Topkapı, the prince had to renounce his demand of dismissing Stefan Tomşa and Kantemyr and to offer additional gifts to the grand vizier in the amount of 60'000 thalers. The version of the English resident can be reinforced with the observation that the prince would no further mention dismissal of these governors in his report. In any case, the official reception in the imperial palace did not help to break a stalemate, and several subsequent vizier's audiences brought no fruits. However, Sir Thomas Roe did not doubt that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire would conclude lasting peace. In his judgement, none of the parties disposed with sufficient resources to resume war. The real question, in his opinion, was when exactly this would happen and under what conditions. Roe argued that actual negotiations would start no sooner than the next messenger from the Transylvanian prince Bethlen Gábor would reach Constantinople. Reportedly, Bethlen Gábor strived to have a peace guarantee from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by being mentioned in the prospective 'ahdname. Yet, the Ottomans intended to name him the vassal of the sultan, and this would be a powerful blow to the autonomy of Bethlen Gábor's policy, because nobody would "treat with him in that condition"⁵⁰.

The importance of Transylvanian stand for the negotiations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire can be further confirmed with the observation that actual negotiations with the vizier resumed no sooner than Prince Zbaraski requested the mediation of the mentioned beylerbey of the Kanije eyalet Mehmed Deák, who finally reached Constantinople in the company of a Transylvanian messenger. On this occasion, Count Mathias von Thurn was satisfied to remark that Mehmed Deák disposes with sufficient «authority, understanding and desire» to achieve a positive outcome. Count von Thurn definitely meant that Mehmed Deák would manage to defend interests of his patron Friedrich of Rhein and the latter's associate Bethlen Gábor⁵¹.

Mehmed Deák managed to quickly "persuade" the grand vizier that Prince Zbaraski is a credible ambassador, who wishes nothing but peace. So the next meeting of the prince and the grand vizier proceeded with the double mediation of Mehmed Deák and of Sir Thomas Roe. The prince reported about this new round of negotiations in a very sketchy manner, presenting them as a formal dispute, whether both the parties intend for peace⁵². However, due to the mediation of Roe, one can inquire about the details of this dispute. According to the English resident, the negotiations focused on three major issues. First, both the parties agreed to put an end to the raids of both the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars. Second, Prince Zbaraski rejected the proposal to maintain a royal resident in Constantinople claiming that he had no authority to decide about such an important issue. Third, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would confirm its peaceful attitude to Transylvania by not helping the Habsburg Emperor. Yet, the prince reportedly agreed to meet this request only if in the 'ahdname it would be formulated in a "traditional manner", namely that the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth should «be a friend to the friends and an enemy to the enemies» of the sultan⁵³. The latter agreement was also no secret to Count von Thurn, who expected that the Ottoman Empire

48 Sudár, "Iskender and Gábor Bethlen", 118-19.

49 Sudár, "Iskender and Gábor Bethlen", 238-39.

50 Roe, *Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, 115-16.

51 Odložilík, *Z korespondence*, 106.

52 Rogalski, "Poselstwo Krzystofa księcia Zbaraskiego", 255-57.

53 Roe, *Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, 120-21.

would secure «the confederate lands» in its new treaty with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth so that the Polish king will not be able to help the Emperor with «people, money, amunition and any other way»⁵⁴.

Thus, as of January 1623, the grand vizier together with his ally Mehmed Deák managed to impose a new agenda on negotiations with the Prince Zbaraski. Now the focus of peace talks changed from securing loyalty of the Principality of Moldavia to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the relations of the latter with the Principality of Transylvania, which impacted the perspectives of the latter for participation in the Thirty Years' War. This agenda was also preserved in the negotiations with the new grand vizier Mere Hussein pasha (1622, 1623) appointed in the beginning of February, 1623. The prince reported that at the very first audience Mere Hussein pasha «burst into tears» regretting previous vizier's ill conduct with Zbaraski, and rendered the ambassador all the due honors. Zbaraski seems ignorant that although Mere Hussein pasha belonged to the rival power group within the Ottoman political elites, he, like his predecessor, belonged to the patrons of Bethlen Gábor⁵⁵. So Prince Zbaraski was happy about vizier's promise to quickly finish the negotiations and let him back home⁵⁶.

The ambassador gained further scope for his optimism as he was finally allowed to ransom Polish captives. In his poem dedicated to the prince's embassy, Samuel Twardowski claimed that to be able to ransom as many captives as possible Zbaraski gave out all the money he disposed with and even sold out his silver cutlery⁵⁷. It is difficult to find out whether the prince actually had to sell everything to redeem the captives or Twardowski's remark was a part of his artictic conception. However, one cannot but acknowledge that after four months in the Ottoman capital, when the prince needed to feed his numerous escort and to buy favorable attitude of various Ottoman dignitaries, he spent a fortune. Sir Thomas Roe reported that he lended the prince a considerable amount of money so that he could eventually go back home⁵⁸. From this perspective it is understandable that Zbaraski was strongly motivated to finish negotiations as soon as possible.

Indeed, Zbaraski's peace talks with the new vizier proceeded much faster than with the previous one. Now, the ambassador reported about three negotiation topics. The first still were the mutually destructive raids of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars, whom both the parties promised to control. This was the first time when the prince also mentioned the Don Cossacks as the negotiation subject. Yet he believed he negotiated that his king would not be responsible for Ukrainian Cossacks who join the campaigns of Don Cossacks. Zbaraski also chose to content himself with the vizier's promise that the Moldavian voivode and beylerbey of Silistra would be ordered to observe the peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and not to insist on their immediate dismissal. Finally, the vizier argued that the traditional formula «to be friend to the friends and an enemy to the enemies of the sultan» meant that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth should not assist the enemies of the Ottoman tributaries, in particular Bethlen Gábor. The prince shot back with an argument that it would be highly inappropriate to mention a minor ruler such as a Transylvanian voivode in the treaty between such «great» monarchs as the king and the sultan. Zbaraski claimed that he managed to agree on a neutral wording on this subject, namely that if the sultan informs the king of the war on his behalf, then the king will not help his enemy⁵⁹.

The ambassador was happy when the 'ahdname was finally issued and did not observe one of the prescriptions of his instruction, namely not to accept the treaty until he gets a copy of its text for the final check up⁶⁰. He found a skillful translator who was able to read the text of the treaty no

54 Odložilik, *Z korespondence*, 112-13.

55 Odložilik, *Z korespondence*, 114.

56 Rogalski, "Poselstwo Krzysztofa księcia Zbaraskiego", 541-42.

57 Krzywy, *Samuel Twardowski, Przeważna legacja Krzysztofa Zbaraskiego*, 217-18.

58 Roe, *Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, 129.

59 Rogalski, "Poselstwo Krzysztofa księcia Zbaraskiego", 349-53, 355.

60 BK PAN, rkps 326, 547

sooner than he crossed Danube to find out that although in general the document was modelled upon the 'ahdname of 1619 (as it was outlined in his diplomatic instruction) yet it included several new conditions contrary to the ones he believed he negotiated⁶¹. Firstly, the king's obligation to control the Ukrainian Cossacks was specified by the requirement to prevent their joint campaigns with the Don Cossacks:

As from the side of the Polish king, his governors, commanders, Cossack brigands, dependents, and other mischief-makers no meddling or interference should touch my well-protected dominions, my border fortresses, my towns and other boroughs, villages, and lands belonging to my well-guarded dominions, the name of the Cossacks should disappear from the Black Sea, and if any damage is done by the Cossack brigands, one should not find a [false] excuse saying "the Cossacks of Muscovy have done it"; and as one should not permit the Polish Cossacks to form companionship and bring mutual aid to the Cossacks of Muscovy, [but] they should be firmly restrained and those who trespass the prohibition should be punished [...]⁶².

This specifications looks as the result of the diplomatic efforts of the Muscovite ambassadors Kondyrev and Bormonosov with the help of their promoter Foma Kantakuzin.

Secondly, contrary to the agreements, the 'ahdname included the principality of Transylvania as the area of effect of the newly concluded peace treaty. What is more, it was specified that the king was expected not just to keep the peace with Transylvania, but not to provide any assistance to the enemies of the Transylvanian prince. This condition directly forbade Sigismund III from assisting the Emperor Ferdinand II in the future conflict with Bethlen Gábor:

As particularly the present ruler of Transylvania, the pride of the great Christian princes Gábor Bethlen (may his latter moments end with good!), is a loyal and faithful servant of my felicitous threshold, and Transylvania belongs to my domain through the inheritance and transfer from my magnificent grandfathers, [royal relations] with the aforementioned should also be based on sincere amity; and if his [i.e. Bethlen's] enemy appears, no help should be given to his enemy from the Polish side, either secretly and openly⁶³.

This condition seems to be the fruit of Bethlen Gábor's inclusion into patronage networks within the Ottoman political elites.

To sum up, the "decisive" embassy of Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski was planned as a diplomatic effort that would allow the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to capitalise on successful withstanding the Ottoman attack in 1621. Ambassadorial instructions set out a number of ambitious tasks for the prince to fulfill, Ottoman recognition of royal patronage over the Principality of Moldavia being one of the key expectations. Yet, the Ottomans in the person of both the grand viziers – Gürgü Hadım Mehmed pasha and Mere Husseyin pasha – followed contrastingly different agenda, which they managed to bring in the limelight of negotiations. In the center of this agenda, promoted by Transylvanian envoys, the ambassador of the "alternative" King of Bohemia Frederick V, Count Mathias von Thurn, and indirectly by the Dutch ambassador Cornelius Haga, was the place of the Principality of Transylvania in the prospective 'ahdname for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Inclusion of Transylvania into this 'ahdname was reported to be among decisive factors for Bethlen Gábor who intended to resume war with the Emperor Ferdinand II Habsburg after the Peace of Nikolsburg (1621).

As a result, in contrast to the existing historiographical consensus that the Ottoman Empire avoided direct participation in the events of the Thirty Years' War⁶⁴, such a strategy seems to become relevant only after its resuming war with the Safavid Persia in fall 1623. At the beginning of 1623, the Ottomans

61 Rogalski, "Poselstwo Krzysztofa księcia Zbaraskiego", 354-55.

62 Kołodziejczyk, *The Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations*, 397.

63 Kołodziejczyk, *The Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations*, 398.

64 Maria Baramova, "Non-Splendid Isolation: the Ottoman Empire and the Thirty Years' War", in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years' War*, eds. Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 116-17.

seriously considered taking advantage of the predicament of the Habsburg Emperor. At the end of January 1623, Sir Thomas Roe reported that he was being pressured by the vizier to write to his king with a proposal to support both the Bethlen Gábor and Frederick V. In February 1623, the Principality of Transylvania was included as the area of effect of the new 'ahdname for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In April 1623, Count von Thurn, who had been staying in Constantinople for already about 8 months, was finally officially welcome to the imperial palace⁶⁵. One could assume that von Thurn's official reception was a final marker of the Ottoman decision to support Bethlen Gábor's ambitions in Hungary. In July, this decision was reinforced with the order to the Ottoman serdar, the beylerbey of Bosnia Ibrahim pasha to join Bethlen Gábor in his offensive. Thus, willingly or not, the "decisive embassy" of Prince Zbaraski seems to contribute to this course of events.

65 Alexander Schunka, "Böhmen am Bosphorus: Migrationserfahrung und Diplomatie am Beispiel des Grafen Heinrich Matthias von Thurn", in *Migrationserfahrungen–Migrationsstrukturen*, eds. Eckart Olshausen et al. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 82-3.

ABBREVIATIONS

BK PAN: Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN.

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PIAE ET FORTITER: THE CAREER OF JERZY (GEORGE) BENNETT, THE SCOTTISH AGENT OF THE RADZIWIŁŁ FAMILY

ABSTRACT

Among the many Scots who migrated to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the seventeenth century were numerous merchants, craftsmen, military men, members of the clergy and diplomats. A number of them rose to prominence and were admitted to noble estate and high office. Some became members of the royal court or confidantes of the wealthiest and most powerful Polish aristocrats. This paper examines the career of Jerzy (George) Bennett who became an agent and close confidant of Duke Bogusław Radziwiłł, one of the wealthiest and most influential magnates of the Commonwealth. Although, strictly speaking, Bennett was not a diplomat like his more famous compatriots: Sir Patrick Gordon (1610–21), James VI and I's agent to Poland and Prussia, or his nephew Francis Gordon (1625–c.1642), envoy and merchant factor to Poland-Lithuania and Gdańsk, nevertheless, his diplomatic skills played a significant role in representing his patron. The correspondence between the Duke and Bennett, including letters and reports preserved in the archives of Vilnius and Warsaw, demonstrate that Bennett represented Radziwiłł's interests not just in Kiejdany (Kėdainiai), where the Duke appointed him a *starosta* (territorial administrator), but also in Birże, Kaunas, Vilnius, Warsaw and Königsberg. His experience and skills gave him a distinct advantage as a suitable agent to represent Radziwiłł in everything, from small business matters to complex financial transactions. Acting in his name, Bennett was to be the embodiment of the Duke's authority over his subjects. The collaboration with the Duke helped Bennett to increase his wealth, improve his social standing and, ultimately, become a member of the Polish nobility.

KEYWORDS: Scots; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; the Radziwiłłs; Factors; Agents.

Among the many Scots who migrated to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the seventeenth century were numerous merchants, craftsmen, military men, members of the clergy and diplomats. A number of them rose to prominence and were admitted to noble estate and high office. Some became members of the royal court or confidantes of the wealthiest and most powerful Polish aristocrats¹. Among the diplomats were a number of envoys, negotiators, factors and/or agents, delegated either by the state, church authorities or their families to travel to Poland-Lithuania with specific missions. While some like, James Bavington Jeffereys (British resident agent in Gdańsk, active between 1719 and 1725)² arrived there directly from the British Isles, others such as Dr William Bruce (British resident agent in Poland, active between 1604 and 1610)³ or Sir James Murray (Stuart's envoy to the Polish-

1 For the most comprehensive account of Scottish migration to Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth please refer to: Peter Paul Bajer, *Scots in the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, 16th to 18th Centuries: The Formation and Disappearance of an Ethnic Group* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Waldemar Kowalski, *The Great Immigration: Scots in Cracow and Little Poland, circa 1500-1660* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Michael Broun Ayre, *The Scottish Community in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 1630-1750* (Kaunas: Humanitas, 2020). See also Zenon Guldon and Karol Krzysztanek, "Żydzi i Szkoci w Sandomierzu w XVI-XVIII wieku", *Studia Historyczne* 31, n. 4 (1988): 539-41; Rimantas Žirgulis, "The Scottish community in Kėdainiai ca. 1630-ca.1750", in *Scottish Communities Abroad In The Early Modern Period*, eds. Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

2 Adam Heymowski, "Udostojnienie herbu Jakuba Dziafry (Jamesa Jeffereys'a) przy pasowaniu na rycerza złotego w 1676 r.", in *Materiały do biografii, genealogii i heraldyki polskiej*, vol. 10, eds. Andrzej Stanisław Ciechanowiecki et al. (Warszawa: DiG, 2005), 241-44.

3 Stanisław Kot, "Bruce William", in *PSB*, vol. (1937), 3-4; Gary M. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*



Lithuanian Commonwealth, active circa 1601 to 1603)⁴ came to represent English or Scottish interests because of their prior experience at the court of the King of Poland.

The missions of these high-profile diplomats are documented reasonably well. Far less is known about the Scots working at the courts of most prominent Polish-Lithuanian aristocratic families. Yet, the backgrounds of such individuals, the roles they played, and the skill sets they needed to possess in order to fulfil their various functions were not that dissimilar from those displayed by their more celebrated counterparts. A thought-provoking case study of such activity is the career of *Jerzy (George) Bennett* (Benet, Benett, Bennet), a personage noted in the *Polish Biographical Dictionary*⁵, who became an agent and close confidant of Duke Bogusław Radziwiłł (1620–69)⁶, a member of one of the mightiest and most influential families of Poland-Lithuania at that time (Fig. 1)⁷.

The Duke was born in 1620 in Gdańsk. He was the son of Janusz I Radziwiłł of Birze and Dubinki (1579–1620) and Princess Elisabeth Sophia Hohenzollern von Brandenburg (1589–1629), daughter of Johann Georg, Elector of Brandenburg⁸. Bogusław's father possessed an enormous fortune, which incorporated lands inherited from his ancestors and acquired through his first marriage to Princess Zofia Olelkowicz Słucka. On her deathbed in 1612, she left him a vast estate, including 7 castles and 32 villages. Janusz I died when the Duke was only an infant, making him his sole heir⁹.

Duke Bogusław was raised by his uncle Krzysztof II Radziwiłł and remained under his tutelage until he was 16 years old. He then became a courtier of King Władysław IV Vasa and began his independent political career. Between 1637 and 1648 he travelled around Europe, taking part in the fighting in Flanders in 1640 on the side of the Netherlands, and in 1642 in the Dutch war against Spain under

1509–1688, (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1990), 214; Anna Biegańska, "In Search of Tolerance: Scottish Catholics and Presbyterians in Poland", *Scottish Slavonic Review*, n. 17 (1991): 47; Anna Biegańska, "The Learned Scots in Poland", *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 43/1 (2001): 18–9.

4 Jan Pentek, "Murray James", in PSB, vol. 20 (1975), 278–79; Cf. Anna Biegańska, "James Murray: A Scot in the Making of the Polish Navy", *Scottish Slavonic Review*, 3 (1984): 1–9.

5 Ryszard Mielnicki, "Bennet Jerzy", in PSB, vol. 1 (1935), 428. Note: Although most contemporary records referred to him as Bennet, he and later his sons all signed as "Bennett". His first name was recorded as "George" during his first years in Kiejdany (1650–1654); but since 1655, it was rendered into Polish as "Jerzy". LVIA, fond 606, B 144–145, *Metryka Zboru Kiejdańskiego w której są zapisane chrzty y śluby w parafiey tej odprowadzane od roku MDCXLI [...]*.

6 There is no contemporary biography of Duke Bogusław Radziwiłł. The only published work in 1878, written by Bernard Kalicki, is now regarded as mostly obsolete as Kalicki did not have access to many primary sources. Cf. Bernard Kalicki, *Bogusław Radziwiłł, koniuszy litewski* (Kraków: Czas, 1878). More reliable sources of information about Radziwiłł include: Tadeusz Wasilewski, "Zarys dziejów Bogusława Radziwiłła", in Bogusław Radziwiłł, *Autobiografia*, ed. Tadeusz Wasilewski (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1979); Tadeusz Wasilewski, "Radziwiłł Bogusław", in PSB, vol. 30 (1987), 161–72. Most recent articles about Radziwiłł include: Rafał Degiel, "Cudzoziemcy w zarządzie dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", *Barok: historia, literatura, sztuka*, 16/2 (2009): 65–86; Karen Friedrich, "Sługa dwóch panów? Bogusław Radziwiłł jako gubernator Prus (1657–1669)", Paper delivered at "The Princes Radziwiłł – Lithuania's richest magnate dynasty" Conference, Vilnius, Lithuania, November 2015; and Marek Miłunski, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła w latach 1636–1669", in *Administracja i życie codzienne w dobrach Radziwiłłów XVI–XVIII wieku*, ed. Urszula Augustyniak, (Warszawa: DiG, 2009), 195–285. Of interest is also manuscript: BK PAN, sygn. BK00354, *Żywot Jaśnie Oświeconego [...] Bogusława Radziwiłła świętego państwa rzymskiego xiążęcia na Birżach, Dubinkach, Słucku i Kopylu etc etc [...]*, (1727). The work has been transcribed and printed in 1840: Antoni Popliński, *Żywot książęcia Bogusława Radziwiłła [...]*, (Poznań-Trzemeszno: Księgarnia Walentego Stefańskiego, 1840). Cf. Adolf Hutten-Czapski, "Nagrobek Bogusława księcia Radziwiłła i małżonki jego, Anny Marii w kościele katedralnym ewangelickim w Królewcu", Part 1, *Przyjaciel Ludu*, 15 (1840): 113–16; Part 2, in *Ibid.*, 16 (1840): 122–23; Andrzej Rachuba, "Sprawa dóbr Radziwiłłów birżańskich w latach 1655–1662", *Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica*, 7 (2006): 51–70.

7 For information about the Radziwiłł family please refer to: Peter Paul Bajer, "Short history of the Radziwiłł Family", *The Annals of the Polish Museum and Archives in Australia*, vol. 4 (2011): 15–27; Peter Paul Bajer, "Rijkdom, invloed en prestige: En korte geschiedenis van de familie-Radziwiłł", *Oost Europa Verkenningen*, 162 (2000): 39–53; Sławomir Górzyński, *Radziwiłłowie herbu Trąby* (Warszawa: DiG, 1996); Teresa Zielińska, *Poczet polskich rodów arystokratycznych* (Warszawa: WSiP, 1997), 303–48.

8 Tadeusz Wasilewski, "Janusz Radziwiłł", in PSB, vol. 30 (1987), 202–08; Leopold von Zedlitz-Neukirch: *Neues preussisches Adels-Lexicon: oder genealogische und diplomatische Nachrichten von den in der preussischen Monarchie ansässigen oder zu derselben in Beziehung stehenden fürstlichen, gräflichen, freiherrlichen und adeligen Häusern*, vol. 4 (Leipzig: Verlag Gebrüder Reichenbach, 1837), 82.

9 Wasilewski, "Janusz Radziwiłł", 202–08; Górzyński, *Radziwiłłowie*, 7; Zielińska, *Poczet polskich rodów*, 307–08.

the command of Frederik Hendrik, Prince of Orange. For a short period of time, as a Colonel, he also commanded a unit of foreign mercenaries in France¹⁰.

Upon his return to the country in 1648, Bogusław engaged in political activities and took part in several military campaigns. He fought against the Cossacks during the uprising in Ukraine, where he commanded an *autorament cudzoziemski* (regiment of foreigners) and participated in the siege of Mogilev during the Polish-Muscovite war. Craving more political power, during the Swedish invasion of Poland-Lithuania, together with his cousin Janusz II Radziwiłł, Bogusław entered negotiations with Karl X Gustav of Sweden. Aiming to break up the Commonwealth and the Polish-Lithuanian union, he signed the Agreement of Kiejdany, a treaty according to which a union between Sweden and Lithuania was founded. In line with the pact, Bogusław and Janusz II were to become rulers of two duchies carved up from the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Swedish defeat ended the Radziwiłłs' plans. Janusz II died at Tykocin Castle, besieged by forces loyal to the Commonwealth, and Bogusław fled to East Prussia, where he became an ally of Friedrich Wilhelm von Hohenzollern, Elector of Brandenburg, and supported him against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Radziwiłł's forces were decimated at the Battle of Prostki (1656), and he himself was captured. Despite all these setbacks and being regarded as a traitor in Poland-Lithuania, Radziwiłł, thanks to the intercession of von Hohenzollern, secured an amnesty for himself and his followers, and regained his position and lost estates¹¹.

The Duke's immense fortune was boosted through marriage to his second cousin, Anna VI Maria Radziwiłł (1640–67), daughter of Janusz II and granddaughter of Janusz I. The nuptials made Duke Bogusław the master of all the property of the line of Birże and Dubinki, and, according to Miłtuński, the greatest land holder in the whole Poland-Lithuania. Among the most important estates belonging to him were Bielica (Belitsa), Birże (Biržai), Dubinki (Dubingiai), Kiejdany (Kiejdany, Kėdainiai), Kojdanów (today Дзяржынск), Kopyl (Копыль), Nowel (Невель), Nowe Miasto (Žemaičių Naumiestis), Sereje (Seirijai), Solec, Słuck (Слуцк), Węgrów, Wiżuny (Vyžuonos) and Żuprany (Жупраны), located in Wileńskie (Vilnius), Nowogródzkie (Navahrudak), Trockie (Trakai), Witebskie (Vitebsk), Mińskie (Minsk), Podlachia and Volhynia voivodeships¹².

From the late 1650s, Duke Bogusław spent most of his time either travelling for his political and business interests, or in Königsberg with his court of around 100 people¹³. It was from there, in 1658, that he began implementing the process of an administrative reform of all his war-ravaged estates¹⁴.

In order to implement an efficiently functioning administration and rebuild his properties, the Duke was in a desperate need of trustworthy representatives who would perform, on his behalf, diverse functions, responsibilities and missions. The group that he initially gathered around himself was small and consisted mainly of members of the Polish nobility. Radziwiłł, however, also needed well-educated, competent and confident agents who could not only act in his name, keep accounting books and submit regular written reports, but who preferably also had a knowledge of Polish, German and Latin, the languages used in the administration of Radziwiłł's estates. It seems that the decisive competency from the Duke's point of view was the candidate's commercial and/or administrative experience¹⁵.

The dearth of local talent forced Radziwiłł to seek out suitably qualified immigrants from Livonia, Courland and Western Europe. His prior contacts with such foreigners made him believe in the great value of employing individuals of that ilk. In his treatise *Observatie pewne circa Politica, Œconomica y rzędu dobrego* [...] (*Observations regarding good political and economic governance*), the Duke

10 Wasilewski, "Radziwiłł Bogusław", 161-72; Górczyński, *Radziwiłłowie*, 12-4; Zielińska, *Poczet polskich rodów*, 310-11.

11 Wasilewski, "Radziwiłł Bogusław", 161-72; Górczyński, *Radziwiłłowie*, 12-4; Zielińska, *Poczet polskich rodów*, 310-11.

12 Miłtuński, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", 202. Cf. Wasilewski, "Radziwiłł Bogusław", 161-72; Górczyński, *Radziwiłłowie*, 12-4.

13 A register of all his courtiers who accompanied him in Königsberg at the moment of his death in 1669, lists names of 95 individuals. AGAD, AR, XI, n. 51, *Regestr tych Sług Xięcia Jm S. P. którzy aż dotąd ieszczce odprowieni przy Dworze zostaię [...]*, 181-183. Cf. Miłtuński, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", 231.

14 Miłtuński, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", 209-12.

15 Degiel, "Cudzoziemcy w zarządzie dóbr", 67; Miłtuński, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", 239-42.

presented a view that the position of a fortress commander should be entrusted to foreigners, as they «have no home nor family»¹⁶. According to him, such persons were more loyal, dependent and willing to defend the Duke's interests and property than locals. It is highly likely that similar characteristics were taken into consideration when filling other positions and, specifically, when inviting George Bennett into his service.

George Bennett was born in Scotland, probably between 1620 and 1630¹⁷. His coat of arms, granted in 1671, indicates that he descended, most likely, from the Bennets of Chesters or, more precisely, from a Presbyterian branch of this family that settled in the county of Fife¹⁸. George's father was William Bennet (c. 1580/90–1647), minister of the congregations of Monimail (Fife) and Trinity College Kirk in Edinburgh, a member of the Commission of Assembly (1642–46) and his mother was Jean Bonar¹⁹. It is also likely that he was closely related to the Bennets of Grubet. This is evidenced by the similarity of Sir George Bennett's coat of arms to the armorial bearings granted in 1670 to Sir William Bennet of Grubet²⁰.

It is unknown when and under what circumstances George Bennett arrived on the continent, but it has been documented that he was in the service of John II Casimir Vasa, King of Poland²¹. Assuming that, like other Scots, he emigrated at the age of about 16 or 17 years old, he probably arrived in Poland between 1635 and 1645²². His fluency in Polish, as shown through his correspondence, presupposes that he was brought up in the Commonwealth. The documents submitted for naturalization in 1673 suggest that he enlisted in the Polish army soon after arriving in Poland-Lithuania. At that time, another "Bennet", perhaps George's relative, served under the Polish banner. This Bennet commanded an 800-strong unit of German infantry and dragoons during the Polish-Turkish war (1633–34)²³.

George Bennett's name appears for the first time in Polish sources in the records of the Evangelical Reformed Church in Kiejdany, where there was a sizeable Scottish colony from the 1630s until the

16 AGAD, AR, XI, n. 51, *Observatie pewne circa Politica, Œconomica y rzędu dobrego [...]*, 343–56. The document has been published as "Informacja domowa i polityczna Xięcia Bogusława Radziwiłła koniuszego WXL", in Władysław Syrokomla, *Przyczynki do historii domowej w Polsce*, (Wilno: Nakładem A. Assa, 1858), 43–60. Cf. Degiel, "Cudzoziemcy w zarządzie dóbr", 68.

17 Mielnicki mistakenly suggests that Bennett was an Englishman. Mielnicki, "Bennet Jerzy", 428.

18 The coat of arms of Bennets of Chesters was: Gules, a cross patée Or, between three mullets Argent. Robert Riddle Stodart, *Scottish Arms: Being a Collection of Armorial Bearings A.D. 1370–1678*, vol. II, (Edinburgh: William Paterson, 1881), plate 107.

19 Hew Scott, *Fasti ecclesiae scoticanæ: the succession of ministers in the Church of Scotland from the reformation*, vol. I, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1915), 131–32; George Edward Cokayne, *Complete baronetage*, vol. IV: (1665–1707), (Exeter: W. Pollard & Company, 1909), 283.

20 Both coats of arms were recorded in the Lion Register. Sir William Bennet's of Grubet coat of arms was: Gules, on a chevron between three stars Argent, a cross patées of the First. Crest: a hand issuing out of a cloud, holding forth a cross patée fitched. Motto: *Benedictus qui tollit crucem*. Cf. Alexander Nisbet, *A system of heraldry: speculative and practical: with the true art of blazon, according to the most approved heralds in Europe: illustrated with suitable examples of armorial figures, and achievements of the most considerable surnames and families in Scotland*, &c.: together with historical and genealogical memorials relative thereto, vol. I (Edinburgh: Alex Lawrie and Co., 1804), 125; vol. II, plate XII. The coat of arms of Sir George (Jerzy) Bennett was: Gules, on a chevron between 3 mullets Argent, as many cross patées of the First; on a canton Azure, a saltire Argent charged with an escutcheon of the Royal Arms of Scotland. Crest: a demi-lion Or, holding, in its dexter paw, a cross patée fitched Gules. Motto: *Piæ Et Fortiter*. – ДАХО, фонд 230, Op.1, Spr.1143, *Wypis z Ksiąg Szlacheckich Gubernii Litto-Wileńskiej Wyvodu Familii Uuch Bennetów* (21 IX 1805), ff. 6–7. Note that this coat of arms has been mentioned in Nisbet, but the blazon given there did not include the information about the canton. Cf. Nisbet, *A system of heraldry*, Vol. I, 125.

21 NAS, C2/63, *The Register of the Great Seal of Scotland*, f. 23: *The grant of baronetcy to George Bennet*, 28 July 1671.

22 Bajer, *Scots in the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth*, 129.

23 Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Akc. 1949/0439, *Zbiór aktów, instrukcji sejmikowych, diariuszy sejmikowych, mów etc.*, 16–17 w., ze zbioru Steinwehra, f. 338: *Comput Wojska Korony w Obozie pod Kamieńcem przeciw Cesarzowi Tureckiemu będącego R. 1634*. Note that Anna Biegańska mistakenly identifies them as one and the same person. Cf. Anna Biegańska, *Wielka emigracja Szkotów w Polsce druga połowa XVI–koniec XVII wieku*, (PhD diss., Uniwersytet Śląski, Katowice, 1974), 236–37; Id., "Żołnierze szkoccy w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej", *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojsk*, 27 (1984): 95, 103. Perhaps this unidentified Bennet was the same as Jerzy Bennett's brother Robert who, according to Scott, was a lieutenant in the Polish Army in 1666. Cf. Scott, *Fasti ecclesiae scoticanæ*, vol. I, 131–32.

middle of the eighteenth century²⁴. In 1650, he was recorded there as a godfather of Judith Mollison, and in 1652 on the baptismal record of George Robertson²⁵. In the same year Bennett married Sophia Arnet (Arnott), daughter of Jan (John), a local merchant and fellow countryman, and Katarzyna²⁶. He may have already begun developing his trading business, possibly planning to permanently settle in the town. In 1655, he was appointed a *ławnik* (lay member of the judiciary) of the municipal council²⁷. In the same year he faded from the records, only to reappear in 1659. His disappearance coincided with the Swedish and Muscovite invasions of the Commonwealth, and the chaos caused by internal conflicts among the various magnate factions. During that period, Bennett most likely re-entered military service. When the hostilities ended, Bennett obtained the title of secretary to the King (*Sekretarz JKM*) from John II Casimir Vasa in 1660²⁸. The King had a tendency to employ foreigners as his secretaries, however, the documents do not reveal if Bennett has actually worked for the monarch, or if his title was conferred purely as an honour. Bennett was also given property rights and tax exemptions from Bogusław Radziwiłł in 1661²⁹, and made an *administrator of cełł szlacheckich WXL* (Collector of Customs Duties of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1662³⁰. All these generous grants suggest that he must have played an important role in the campaigns during the late 1650s and had rendered significant service both to the Crown and the Radziwiłłs³¹.

Although it is difficult to establish the exact circumstances under which Bennett commenced his cooperation with the Radziwiłłs, the tax exemptions privilege letter of 1661 testifies that he worked for them even before the Second Northern War. Duke Bogusław stated that he wanted to reward Bennett for his «loyalty, kindness and steady continuation of services to [Radziwiłł himself] and his ancestors not only in fortunate years but also during the times of disturbance in the Commonwealth of the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania»³². This may suggest that, initially, Bennett served under the command of Janusz II Radziwiłł, who led a successful campaign against the Cossacks in Ukraine (1649). Later, the Scot may have joined the regiment of foreign troops led by the Duke himself. They may have also fought side-by-side at the Battle of Beresteczko (1651) and with the Confederates during the drive to expel the Muscovites from Lithuania and Livonia (1654–55).

Bennett's proven service record, educational level, commercial experience and religious denomination would have made him a prime candidate to represent Radziwiłł's interests. The patron-client relationship that ensued was the closest, it seems, during the last nine years of the Duke's life, from 1660 to 1669. An exchange of 34 letters between the pair, dating from 1663 to 1669, survives in the archives in Vilnius and Warsaw (Fig. 2). The correspondence reveals much about Bennett's responsibilities and character, as well as the frequency of contact between the Scot and the Duke; on average, Bennett dispatched a

24 Ayre, *The Scottish Community*, 51-134; Linas Eriksonas, "The lost colony of Scots: unravelling overseas connections in a Lithuanian town", in *Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States, c. 1350–c.1700*, eds. Allan Iain Macinnes, Thomas Riis and Frederik Jakob Galster Pedersen (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 173-87; Žirgulis, "The Scottish community in Kėdainiai", 225-45; Cf. Bajer, *Scots in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth*, 277-81.

25 LVIA, fond 606, B 144-145, *Metryka Zboru Kieydanskiego [...]*, (27 September 1650), f. 9; Ibid. (10 September 1652), f. 11.

26 Lietuvos Mokslų Akademijos Biblioteka-Vilnius, Rankraščiu skyrius, fond 9-3040, *Collecta Zboru Kieydańskiego: To jest rachunek wszystkich recept i expens zborowych zaczęty roku 1628 dnia 20 novembra*, (typescript) Wilno: 1939, 37, 45, 66, nn.; LVIA, fond 606, B 144-145, *Metryka Zboru Kieydanskiego [...]*, *Certificate of marriage between Georgius Bennett and Sophia Arnott (11 II 1652)*, f. 63 v.

27 Antanas Tyla, "Decemviratas, arba Tertio ordo communitatis Kėdainių savivaldoje (XVII–XVIII a)", in *Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 1999 metai* (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2000), 72.

28 LVIA, fond 708-2-1, *Zbiór wywodów familiynych szlacheckich gubernii litewsko-wileńskiej*, f. 63v: *Wypis z Ksiąg Szlacheckich Subgubernii Litto-Wileńskiej Wyvodu Familii Urodzonych Bennetów* (20 December, 1819). I am most grateful to the late Michael Ayre for providing me with a copy of this document.

29 VUB, fond 4, A 212, *Copya Przywileiu S.P. Xcia Jmci dana nieb. P. Bennetowi na Kamienice w Kieydanach leżącą [...]*, (27 May, 1661), f. 16640.

30 This privilege was subsequently confirmed in 1663 by the Polish sejm. LVIA, fond 708-2-1, *Zbiór [...]*, f. 63v: *Wypis z Ksiąg Szlacheckich Subgubernii [...]* 1819, f. 63v.

31 Cf. Ayre, *The Scottish Community*, 256.

32 VUB, fond 4, A 212, *Copya Przywileiu [...]*, f. 16640.

letter to Radziwiłł every 10 to 12 days. The Duke replied with similar regularity³³.

As is evident in their papers, Bennett represented the Duke in a wide range of functions. His role oscillated from mundane administrative tasks, like reporting on the state of particular assets (e.g. the Duke's residence, the local mill or the grange)³⁴, returning loans³⁵, paying wages and fees³⁶, issuing receipts or forwarding letters³⁷, to matters which required taking initiative and displaying specific practical skills. For instance, Bennett acted as an intermediary in the assessment of assets belonging to the Duke³⁸, the purchase of properties³⁹, recovery of debts, tax and rent collections⁴⁰, settling renovation costs and recovery of the property of the Radziwiłł family⁴¹. It appears that in many of these transactions the Scot was required to assess their feasibility and profitability independently of his patron. In one of his letters, he asked the Duke to show compassion «nad tym ubogim kalectwem poddanemi wizunskiemu» («to those wretched subjects residing in Wizuny»). He reasoned that some 150 households were so impoverished that they would be in no position to pay any contributions⁴².

Some of the tasks Bennett was entrusted with demanded first-class negotiating skills and being impervious to contentious situations such as those sparked by difficult custom matters, i.e. rents, debts and tax collections⁴³. In one of his letters to Radziwiłł, Bennett expressed his exasperation regarding the citizens of Kiejdany. He reported that the debtors not only ignored his instructions to obey the Duke's orders and repay their debts, but «śmiechem i żartem mnie zbyli» («mocked and laughed at him») and «wielka mi niewdzięczność oddaia» («showed him great ingratitude»). The same document demonstrated that Bennett was capable of skilfully refuting unjust accusations⁴⁴.

The letters reveal that, as Radziwiłł's agent, Bennett was in contact with a wide range of people, from the burgers and Jews of Kiejdany⁴⁵, to administrators and fortress commanders, and dignitaries such as the Bishop of Vilnius, among others⁴⁶. The correspondence shows that he was considerate and looked after the subjects under his control, regardless of their rank or religious denomination. For example,

33 Of the substantial collection of correspondence between Bennett and the Duke that once must have existed and was kept in the Radziwiłłs' archives, there are currently only 50 letters remaining. Of these: 14 from Bennett to Radziwiłł are in the VUB and further 19 in AGAD; while the VUB houses also 11 letters from Radziwiłł to Bennett. Additionally, in AGAD, there are also 6 letters from Bennett to others. Cf. *Bennet to Radziwiłł (1663–1670)*, VUB, fond 4 (A213) 16732, (A214) 16814, (A216) 17087, (A223) 17521, 17522, 17523, 17526, 17529, 17530, 17532, 17537, 17547, 17550, 17552; *Radziwiłł to Bennet (1668–1669)*, VUB fond 4 (A223) 17533, 17535, 17536, 17541, 17544, 17553, 17554, 17556, 17557, 17558, 17559; and *Correspondence of Jerzy Bennet (1667–1676)*, AGAD AR, V, n. 532, 1–60.

34 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17529, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Liberyszki 23 November 1669.

35 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17533, *Radziwiłł to Bennet*, Königsberg 14 December 1669. Bennett was asked to return a sum of 1600 zł to Morsztyn on behalf of the Duke.

36 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17535, *Radziwiłł to Bennet*, Warsaw 9 July 1669. Bennett was asked to pay *jurgielt* (a salary) to Jabłoński and to Rymwid, cup-bearer of Mozyr district.

37 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17544, 17553, 17554, 17556, 17557, 17558, 17559, *Radziwiłł to Bennet*.

38 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17526, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, 6 November 1669: Bennett reported on his trip to Kaunas where, on the Duke's instruction, he assessed the state of Radziwiłł's *kamienica* (tenement house). Bennett conducted a similar appraisal of the estate Sereje: Ibid., 17530, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Bergaszki, 29 November 1669.

39 VUB, fond 4 (A223), 17541, *Radziwiłł to Bennet*, Königsberg 26 February 1669. Instruction to purchase a Świerociszki grange.

40 AGAD, AR, V, n. 532, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Koronów 19 November 1661, f. 1–3; Ibid., *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Nowe Miasto 8 January 1668, ff. 14–6; VUB fond 4 (A223) 17537, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Kiejdany 16 April 1669; Ibid., 17552, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Kiejdany 16 December 1668.

41 VUB, Fond 4 (A223) 17526, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, 6 November 1669.

42 AGAD, AR, V, n. 532, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Kiejdany 17 March 1668, ff. 34–7.

43 Cf. AGAD, AR, V, n. 532, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Koronów 19 November 1661, ff. 1–3.

44 VUB, fond 4 (A213) 16814, *Bennet to Radziwiłł (1664)*.

45 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17552, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Kiejdany 16 December 1668.

46 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17522, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Wizuny 23 August 1669.

he was involved in organizing a new vicar for the local Roman Catholic parish (Fr. Kossakowski)⁴⁷ and, in 1669, paid dues for the poor of Kiejdany, Nowe Miasto and Wiżuny, who were themselves unable to pay *podymne* (hearth tax)⁴⁸.

Bennett played two other important roles. Firstly, he provided local political intelligence⁴⁹ and reported on troop movements⁵⁰ in the lands surrounding the Duke's estate. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Bennett was required, as were all high-ranking officials working for Radziwiłł, to represent the Duke's authority over his subjects, as he himself seldom visited his vast domain⁵¹. Bennett travelled widely in the Duke's service, journeying even as far as Cracow, a distance of some 770 kilometres from Kiejdany⁵².

The considerable service provided to the Duke resulted in Radziwiłł's decision, in January 1668, to appoint Bennett a *starosta kiejdański*⁵³. Such offices were, mostly, leased to people who had the means to pay for them, providing Radziwiłł with one of his main sources of revenue, but the most important grants, like that bestowed on the Scot, were given only to the most trusted of the Duke's confidantes⁵⁴. The military service, commercial activity and assistance rendered to the Radziwiłłs brought Bennett other profits, too. Around the middle of the seventeenth century, he built a brick tenement house in the main market square of Kiejdany, with warehouses located in the basement, an inn on the ground floor and residential quarters on the first floor⁵⁵. He also owned another tenement house near the market square which he purchased from Trzeciak (1661), as well as a shop, or perhaps a stall, adjacent to the Town Hall⁵⁶.

Bennett was strongly connected to the Scottish community in Kiejdany. In 1658 he served as a *szafarz* (treasurer) and in 1661 was elected an elder of the Calvinist congregation. During this time, Bennett financed various repairs and projects related to the church building. In 1663, he ordered the construction of a family grave in the church's crypt⁵⁷. Five years later, in 1668, he sold one of his tenement houses to a countryman, Jerzy Anderson, the mayor of Kiejdany. Probably at that time he moved to his country estate and began the process of applying for Polish nobility⁵⁸.

In 1670, Bennett petitioned the Privy Council of Scotland for a birth brief. In his application, he wrote that for a number of years he had served in the Commonwealth's army, held the office of Secretary to the King of Poland, and permanently resided in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Bennett's petition was supported by evidence confirming his ancestry, supplied by the Laird of Moncrieff and other Scottish noblemen⁵⁹. Next, the Scot applied to the Stuart king, Charles II, to be granted the hereditary

47 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17087, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Wiżuny 4 January 1670.

48 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17537, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Kiejdany 16 April 1669.

49 AGAD, AR, V, n. 532, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Kiejdany, 24 December 1667, f. 7-10; Ibid., Rosienie, 25 July 1668, ff. 45-6.

50 AGAD, AR, V, n. 532, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Kiejdany, 24 December 1667, ff. 53-6.

51 Cf. information about the Duke's expectations in regards to his officials: Miłunski, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", 230.

52 VUB, fond 4 (A223) 17522, *Bennet to Radziwiłł*, Wiżuny 23 August 1669.

53 Andrzej Rachuba, "Udział 'Inflantczyków' i oficerów cudzoziemskiego pochodzenia w życiu publicznym Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego w latach 1569-1732", in *Rzeczpospolita państwem wielu narodowości i wyznań. XVI-XVIII wiek*, eds. Tomasz Ciesielski and Anna Filipczak-Kocur (Warszawa-Opole: DiG, 2008), 437; Miłunski, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", 271 – erroneously noted Bennet as "Jan" (John).

54 Miłunski, "Zarząd dóbr Bogusława Radziwiłła", 209-12.

55 Algirdas Juknevičius, *Scottish Heritage in Kėdainiai: A study of the Scottish Community in Kėdainiai, Lithuania during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Vilnius: Savastis, 2015), 17; Žirgulis, "The Scottish community in Kėdainiai", 247; Eriksonas, "The lost colony of Scots", 178.

56 VUB, fond 4, A 212, *Copja Przywileiu* [...]; "Plan rynku wg. rysunku Wawrzyńca Kochańskiego (ze zbiorów prywatnych)", *Kwartalnik Architektury i Urbanistyki* 4 (1959): 1-2.

57 *Collecta Zboru*, 108, 113-15, 120.

58 Juknevičius, *Scottish Heritage in Kėdainiai*, 17.

59 Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, "Scotland, Scandinavia & Northern Europe, 1580-1707", database available at <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne>, SSNE n. 5307; Cf. *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, 3rd series, III, 374.

title of baronet of Scotland. The request provides information about Bennett's wealth – an applicant was required to pay 2000 Scottish merks to the King's Exchequer or to support six colonial settlers for the period of two years. His application was successful and, on 28 July 1671, Charles II created him a baronet⁶⁰. The rank of baronet was unknown in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and this is probably why Sir George Bennett was wrongly designated a "baron" in the confirmation of nobility status documents issued to Bennett's descendants⁶¹.

Bennett probably returned to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth soon after this successful mission as his name appears on Hetman Michał Kazimierz Pac's [1624–1682] *Uniwersał* (proclamation). According to this document, in May 1673 Bennett offered to raise 300 dragoons for the Khotyn campaign against the Ottoman Empire⁶². It was a significant and valuable offer, as evidenced by the rivalry between Hetmans Pac and Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł [1625–1680], who wanted to attract Bennett to side with them⁶³.

Bennett not only raised «two hundred well-equipped dragoons» but, as a major, led his unit in the Battle of Khotyn (11 November 1673). According to the Lithuanian army register from that campaign, Bennett's two dragoon companies consisted of 90 and 84 horses⁶⁴. His participation in this victorious battle was immortalised in a poem *Virtus dexteræ Domini* (God's Righteous Forces) written by his son Jakub (James) Bennett⁶⁵. According to Ulčinaite, Jakub Bennett combined an account of the real battle, based most likely on his father's testimony, with ancient mythology. He described the heroism of 48 individuals (executors of God's will), including the courageous deeds of his father (Fig. 3)⁶⁶. Sir George Bennett's bravery and magnanimity was noticed by King Michał Wiśniowiecki who, in return for his service, rewarded him with an *indygenat* (grant of nobility to foreign nobles). By the same act, Wiśniowiecki granted Bennett a tenement house at Końska Street in Vilnius⁶⁷.

Like other foreigners applying for admission to the Polish nobility, Bennett was granted his "naturalization" on condition of providing a proof of nobility and lineage issued by a foreign court, and taking an oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth and the King⁶⁸. He successfully fulfilled all

Unfortunately, a description of this document has not been transcribed into the *The Register of the Great Seal of Scotland*. According to dr Alan Borthwick, Head of Medieval Records at the National Records of Scotland [NRS], Bennett most likely received the birth brief with the Great Seal attached, but the document itself was not copied into the Great Seal Register. Dr Borthwick has identified a similar case in GD2/124. In this instance the *Birth briefe granted to Sir Gabriel Wood, son of David Wood, M.A., of Aberdeen, by Charles II, dated at Edinburgh on 21 August, 1672, and written to the Great Seal 8 April, 1673*, held by NRS was, likewise, not included in the Register of the Great Seal. I am most grateful to dr Borthwick and Ms Alison Lindsay, Head of Historical and Legal Search Rooms (NRS), for their invaluable assistance.

60 NAS, C2/63, *The Register*[...] f. 23: *The grant of baronetcy to George Bennet*; Cokayne; *Complete baronetage*, vol. IV, 283; John Burke and John Bernard Burke, *Encyclopaedia of Heraldry or general Armory of England, Scotland and Ireland, comprising a registry of all armorial bearings from the earliest to the present time, including the late grants by the college of arms* (London: H. G. Bohn, 1847), 65.

61 Cf. ДАХО, фонд 230, Оп.1, Spr.1143, *Wypis z Ksiąg Szlacheckich Gubernii [...] (1805)*, ff. 6-7r.

62 VUB, фонд 7, n. 29/14481, *Uniwersał hetmana Paca*, Wilno 6 May 1673, f. 70-70v; Cf. Konrad Bobiatyński, *Michał Kazimierz Pac-wojewoda wileński, hetman wielki litewski* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2008), 285. I would like to thank Dr Zbigniew Hundert for referring me to this article.

63 Konrad Bobiatyński, "W drodze pod Chocim. Litewskie przygotowania do wojny przeciwko Turkom w 1673 roku", in eds. Mirosław Nagielski and Sławomir Górzynski, *Studia z dziejów Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XVI-XVIII wieku*, (Warszawa: DiG, 2014), 35.

64 Bobiatyński, "W drodze pod Chocim", 45.

65 Eugenija Ulčinaite, *Lietuvos renesanso ir baroko literatūra* (Vilnius: VUL, 2001), 211-13; Cf. Vytautas Ališauskas, *Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštijos kultūra. Tyrinėjimai ir vaizdai* (Vilnius: Aidai, 2001), 310.

66 Jacob Bennet, *Virtus Dexteræ Domini: In Virtute Polonorum Litvanorumq; Ostensa: Atqve Illustrissimo Domino D. Michaeli Casimiro Pac [...] Et Illustrissimo Ac Excellentissimo Domino D. Michaeli Casimiro Radziwił [...] Nec Non Toti Exercitvi M. D. Litvanie [...] Dicata A Iacobo Bennet* (Wilno: Typ. Acad., 1674), 23-4.

67 VL, V, 152 n. 28 and VL, V, 440 n. 60.

68 Jan Michta, "Nobilitacja i indygenat w szlacheckiej Rzeczypospolitej", *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio F, Historia*, 45 (1990): 355-63; Cf. Tadeusz Szulc, "Indygenat w Rzeczypospolitej w świetle konstytucji sejmowych w latach 1588-1793", *Sprawozdania z Czynności i Posiedzeń Naukowych ŁTN*, 15 (1980): 1-10.

the conditions three years later, in 1676⁶⁹. The death of the monarch and the *interregnum* that followed were probably responsible for a delay in completing the naturalization process. It seems, however, that Bennett was already recognised as a nobleman by his peers. In 1674, together with the nobility of the Wiłkomirski district, he took part in the election of King John III Sobieski⁷⁰. He was also in charge of Wiżuny estate, given to him by Bogusław Radziwiłł as a bond⁷¹. Around the same time, using the dowry of his wife (15'000 złotys), Bennett bought Jaswonie (Lit. Josvainiai) in Samogitia⁷².

The Scot's family life was equally successful. Bennett was married at least twice. His first wife was the aforementioned Zofia Arnet, who died in Kiejdany around 6 February 1661. He then married Anna Zofia Castelle (Kasztelle), née Rauter of Elbląg⁷³. Of his seven children, three sons, Jan (John), Hugo Benjamin (b. 1661) and Wilhelm (William) (b. 1665), continued their father's tradition of military service. All were referred to in the documents as *towarzysz* (companion, comrade). This designation was reserved for Polish or Lithuanian noblemen of means – junior cavalry officers, who with their mounted retainers, served under the Commonwealth's banner⁷⁴. While nothing is known about Wilhelm's fate – it is possible that he was killed in action – the other two brothers rose further in social standing. Jan became *podstoli braclawski* (Master of the Pantry of Braslav)⁷⁵ and Hugo *stolnik drohicki* (Pantler of Drohicz). Another of their brothers, Jakub (James) received the post of *stolnik mozyrski* (Pantler of Mozyr). Jakub and Hugo became the ancestors of the two branches of the family whose descendants lived in the territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and confirmed their nobility in the nineteenth century (Fig. 4)⁷⁶.

Bennett died in 1677⁷⁷. He had been a perfect settler, distinguishing himself as an effective military officer, a successful merchant, a competent official in town and church administration, an important leader of his community and a trusted agent of the Radziwiłł family. The Scot had shown commitment to his patron and valour in defence of the Commonwealth, as proclaimed in the motto that adorns his coat of arms, *Piæ et fortiter* (Dutifully and Bravely).

ABBREVIATIONS

AGAD: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

AR: Archiwum Warszawskie Radziwiłłów.

BK PAN. Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN.

LVIA: Lietuvos Velstybes Istorijou Archyvos–Vilnius.

NAS: National Archives of Scotland.

PSB: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, t. I–LII (Kraków: PAN, 1935–2019).

VL: *Volumina Legum: przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. Pijarów w Warszawie, od roku 1732 do roku 1782, wydane*, 9 vols. Petersburg: Ohryzki, 1859–1889.

VUB: Vilniaus Universiteto Biblioteka.

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FIGURES



Fig. 1 – Portrait of Bogusław Radziwiłł (1654), Engraving by J. Falck, published by G. Förster, Biblioteka Narodowa, Warsaw.




Fig. 2 (2a & 2b) – Letter from Bennett to Radziwiłł (Liberyszki, 23 November 1669), VUB, Vilnius Fond 4 (A223) 17529.




Fig. 3 – Front page of the *Virtus Dexteræ Domini: In Virtute Polonorum Litvanorumq; Ostensa: Atqve Illustrissimo Domino D. Michaeli Casimiro Pac [...]* by Jacob Bennet (Wilno, 1674), VUB, Vilnius BAV 5.2.40/3.



Fig. 4 – Front page of a document confirming nobility status of George Bennett's descendants - "Wypis z Książ Szlacheckich Subgubernii Litto-Wileńskiej Wywodu Familii Urodzonych Benetów (20 December, 1819)", in "Zbiór wywodów familiinych szlacheckich gubernii litewsko-wileńskiej", LVIA, Vilnius, Fond 708-2-1, f. 63v.

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BETWEEN ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS AND AMBASSADOR'S AMBITION. MELCHIOR DE POLIGNAC'S COOPERATION WITH POLISH MAGNATES

ABSTRACT

Melchior de Polignac was a French ambassador in Poland whose task was to carry out a few political aims, including the most important one – starting cooperation with the royal couple, especially with Marie Casimire de la Grange d'Arquien, in order to prepare the election for one of her sons. Louis XIV wanted to see one of John III Sobieski's sons on the throne, assuming that this would maintain good relations between Poland and France without spending money on a costly election fight. Initially, the ambassador pursued a lively cooperation with the court and he enjoyed the queen's trust, but towards the end of John III's life, he began cooperating with the magnates who convinced him that none of the princes would win the throne. From then on, Polignac started efforts for the election of a French prince. Louis XIV gave in to his arguments and put forward the candidature of Francis Louis, Prince de Conti, but he announced that he would not get financially involved in the election fight, he would not pay any gratifications until his cousin was enthroned. Polignac did not pass this information to his followers and tried to encourage them to take action by promising the payments. This was ongoing until the election when the bifurcated sympathies and strong support given to the Saxon, Frederick Augustus, triggered concerns of French supporters whether the payments would take place; at that moment, fantasies that Polignac used to feed his party were exposed. As a consequence, the party fell apart and Prince de Conti's chances were lost. The aim of this article is not only to present the activities of Melchior the Polignac in Poland, but also to draw attention to the fact that the magnates did not betray the French candidate, but fell victim to the false assurances of the ambassador who took advantage of both the king's trust as well as the French supporters in Poland.

KEYWORDS: Ambassador; France; Poland; Election; Money.

Melchior de Polignac (1661–1742) was well educated. Teachers valued highly his skills; he knew how to discuss matters effectively, but without stubbornness¹. In 1689, together with Emmanuel Théodose de La Tour d'Auvergne, Cardinal de Bouillon, he went for a conclave and tried to bring France closer to Alexander VIII, who was enchanted by him². He tried to ease tensions between France and the Holy See with the next Pope, Innocent XII³.

In 1693 he was sent to Poland. His task was to win over the royal couple to cooperate – Louis XIV would be ready to support one of Sobieski's sons, the one designated by Marie Casimire, at the election⁴. He was expected to persuade the king to Polish-Turkish treaty in order for the struggles with the High Porte to fall upon the Habsburgs.⁵ Polignac was to encourage John III to get closer to Denmark and

1 August de La Force, *Le grand Conti*, (Paris: Émil-Paul Frères, 1922), 143; Otto Forst de Battaglia, *Jan Sobieski król Polski*, trans. Krystyna Szyszkowska (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983), 334-35; Pierre Paul, *Le cardinal Melchior de Polignac, 1661–1741* (Paris: Allégre 1922), 1-5.

2 de La Force, *Le grand Conti*, 143; Jean-Christian Petitfils, *Louis XIV* (Paris: Perrin 2002), 468-71.

3 Paul, *Le cardinal Melchior de Polignac*, 6-19. Petitfils, *Louis XIV*, 468.

4 *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la révolution française IV–V: Pologne*, vol. 1: 1648–1729, ed. Louis Farges (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière et C^e, 1888), 210-11; Karol Boromiesz Hoffman, "Historia upadku dynastii Sobieskich z nowych dokumentów", *Gazeta Polska*, n. 258 (1862).

5 Jacek Staszewski, "Elekcja 1697 roku", in *"Jak Polskę przemienić w kraj kwitnący..." Szkice i studia z czasów saskich*, ed. Jacek Staszewski, (Olsztyn: Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego, 1997), 15-6.



Sweden through the accession to the alliance of the Crowns of the North, which was meant to revive trade between Poland and France; in particular, there were hopes to increase grain supplies to France struggling with the cold and poor harvest. Polignac was supposed to win over the queen's favour and support by awakening her hopes for her daughter's marriage⁶. The ambassador's main task was to work on preparations for the future election and making sure that in case of John III's death, Poland would not fall under the Austrian influence; therefore, cooperation with the Polish magnates also had to begin, but he had to start it carefully because he had been warned that they are very whimsical in their political sympathies⁷. The instruction clearly stated that the ambassador was expected to rely on the queen's advice and instructions, who was an experienced person, and knew the reality of Poland. Her knowledge in the political situation and the money that the Sobieski family should engage in the election were to facilitate the ambassador's efforts⁸. Moreover, Polignac also received an order to use the money carefully. The ambassador's first steps in Poland ended in failure; he did not manage to win the support of the castellan of Chełmno, Jan Jerzy Przebendowski, for the development of commerce, and failed to win the interest of the Primate, Cardinal Michał Radziejowski⁹. The first unofficial meeting with the queen went much better. Marie Casimire received the ambassador privately, in the garden, and only then a formal audience with the king took place¹⁰. After getting settled in the capital, where he arranged his place lavishly, trying to make an impression, Polignac tried to get in touch with the Polish magnates; he visited them, gave them gifts, tried to win over women's favour hoping that this way he could affect their husbands¹¹. He rendered small favours to them, acting as a go-between in contracts with France. He brought down from Paris a watch for Karol Stanisław Radziwiłł and flattered his mother, the king's sister, Katarzyna. He sought contact with Konstancja Lubomirska and her husband Hieronim, the Grand Treasurer of the Crown¹². However, not all of the ambassador's efforts were effective and not everyone was interested in meeting him and cooperating.

Still present at the court, the ambassador appeared in the king's company, whom he brought news from the world, descriptions of interesting events and phenomena, presented new books¹³. He flattered the queen and she made him her confidant even with the state matters, but she also required benefits from him¹⁴.

Social successes did not make it easier for the ambassador to carry out his tasks. Polignac encouraged the Poles in vain to increase the grain export to France¹⁵. Only Marie Casimire, who was interested

6 Farges, *Recueil des instructions*, 218-19.

7 Farges, *Recueil des instructions*, 211-16, 218; Forst de Battaglia, *Jan Sobieski*, 355-56.

8 Farges, *Recueil des instructions*, 216.

9 Roman Kawecki, *Kardynał Michał Stefan Radziejowski (1645-1705)* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Świętego Krzyża, 2005), 76; Paul, *Le cardinal Melchior de Polignac*, 21, 27-9.

10 Michał Komasyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska królowa Polski (1641-1716)* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1983), 136-37.

11 Kazimierz Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego. Dziennik i relacje z lat 1691-1696*, ed. Janusz Woliński (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1958), 55; Michel de Mongrillon, *Pamiętnik sekretarza ambasady francuskiej w Polsce pod koniec panowania Jana III oraz bezkrólewia i wolnej elekcji po jego zgonie (1694-1698)*, ed. Łucja Częścik (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk-Łódź: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1982), 52-3; Jacek Staszewski, *O miejsce w Europie, stosunki Polski i Saksonii z Francją na przełomie XII i XVIII wieku* (Warszawa: PWN, 1973), 42.

12 Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego*, 118, 254, 269; Stanisław Edward Nahlik, *Narodziny nowoczesnej dyplomacji* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1971), 85; Karolina Targosz, *Sawantki w Polsce XVII wieku. Aspiracje intelektualne kobiet ze środowisk magnackich* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Retro-Art, 1997), 266; Staszewski, *O miejsce w Europie*, 42.

13 Farges, *Recueil des instructions*, 217; Karolina Targosz, *Jan III Sobieski mecenasem nauk i uczonych* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1991), 97, 100-05.

14 Chrysostôme Faucher, *Histoire du cardinal de Polignac, contenant des détails sur ses différents négociations, tirés du dépôt des affaires étrangères, pour servir d'éclaircissement à une partie du règne de Louis XIV. et de Louis XV*, vol. I (Paris: D'Houry, 1777), 197; Komasyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska*, 136-37; Michał Komasyński and Aleksandra Skrzypietz, "Z działalności ambasadora Wersalu na dworze Jana III (1696 rok)", in *Ojczyzna wielka i mała*, ed. Idzi Panic (Cieszyn: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne o/Cieszyn, 1996), 63.

15 Biblioteka Naukowa PAN i PAU, Kraków, *Teki Waliszewskiego*, vol. 6, 5016-19; Michał Komasyński, *Jan III Sobieski a Bałtyk*, (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie 1983), 96, 98-9; Id., *Polska w polityce gospodarczej Wersalu 1661-1715* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1968) 82-107.

in it financially, tried to organise some deliveries¹⁶. The treaty with the Crowns of North was also not approved of in Poland. Although the queen signed the agreement, John III did not make effort to ratify it afraid of the opposition's counteraction¹⁷. The ambassador was also unsuccessful with convincing the king to the idea of a separate peace treaty with Turkey. Political rivalry was expressed through the fight for John III's favours – while keeping him entertained, seeking his attention and approval – between the papal envoy, Maurizio Vota, and the Venetian resident, Girolamo Alberti, against Polignac¹⁸.

Wishing to strengthen his position and influence, the ambassador got involved in finalising the marriage of Princess Theresa Kunegunda to Maximilian Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria. Initially Polignac was against this marriage, assuming that Sobieska's dowry would benefit the treasury of France's enemy, but Louis XIV demonstrated his foresight and a greater political sensitivity, and supported the idea of this matrimony¹⁹.

John III's deteriorating health made the ambassador, as well as Marie Casimire, prepared for the impending election. When an attempt was made to reconcile the conflicted Lithuanians in 1695, Polignac advised the queen, as a mediator, to seek agreement with the opposition and, first of all, with the Sapieha family who was hostile towards the Sobieski clan. It is unknown if he honestly thought that this was a route for strengthening the Sobieski family's position, or whether he tried to use the queen to reach the Sapieha family – who cooperated with the emperor – through the queen; they were the ones who blocked the project of a separate peace agreement with Turkey²⁰. The ambassador wanted to join the talks personally, but this offer was rejected by Primate Radziejowski and the Sapieha family. Polignac unsuccessfully tried to win them over for Louis XIV; they demanded a huge remuneration, but this proposal was rejected by the king who did not trust the Sapiehas²¹.

Rumours appeared at the time that Marie Casimire was going to marry the Great Hetman of Lithuania, Kazimierz Sapieha, who was still married, in order to ascend the throne together with him after the death of Sobieski. It is not known where these stories came from, but they were harmful to the royal family's interest because they triggered tensions between the queen and her husband, and the eldest son who feared his mother was ready to do so. Polignac received reports from Versailles that it would be most convenient for France if the queen remained on the throne. However, this was never Marie Casimire's intention²². It should be emphasised that the eldest prince, James, was married to the emperor's sister-in-law and his election would threaten Poland's future cooperation with the Habsburgs, and additionally it seems that Polignac could not stand him from the very beginning. Therefore, when Louis XIV accepted the support for James at the election, Polignac decisively rejected such option and assumed that this would be unfavourable for French interests. Meanwhile, the preserved documents indicate that the prince sought cooperation with Versailles and declared an

16 Ryszard Wołoszyński, *Polska w opiniach Francuzów w XVII wieku* (Warszawa: PWN, 1964), 21-2.

17 Komarzyński, *Jan Sobieski a Bałtyk*, 80-118; Komarzyński, *Polska w polityce gospodarczej Wersalu (1661-1715)*, 28-35.

18 Philippe Dupont, *Pamiętniki historii życia i czynów Jana III Sobieskiego*, trans. Beata Spieralska, ed. Dariusz Milewski (Warszawa: Muzeum Pałac w Wilanowie, 2011), 323; Woliński, *Kazimierz Sarnecki. Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego*, 69; Komarzyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska*, 129-34; Aleksandra Skrzypietz, "Zabiegi posła francuskiego o odrębny pokój polsko-turecki w latach 1693-1697", *Balkanica Posnaniensa*, vol. 13 (2003): 95-100.

19 Woliński, *Kazimierz Sarnecki. Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego*, 51, 96; Komarzyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska*, 146; Michał Komarzyński, *Teresa Kunegunda Sobieska* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1982), 21-3; Id., "Tajna misja ambasadora Jana III Sobieskiego w Brukseli (1695)", *Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny. Sobótka*, nn. 1-2 (1992): 54.

20 Forst de Battaglia, *Jan Sobieski*, 356-59; Komarzyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska*, 137-40.

21 Farges, *Recueil des instructions*, 218; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski (1629-1696)* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1994), 504.

22 Aleksandra Skrzypietz, "Trzecie małżeństwo królowej Marii Kazimiery – u źródeł legendy", in *Maria Kazimiera Sobieska (1641-1716). W kręgu rodziny, polityki i kultury*, (Studia i Materiały, n. 6), eds. Anna Kalinowska and Paweł Tysza, (Warszawa: Zamek Królewski w Warszawie-Muzeum, 2017), 113-35.

agreement²³. However, Polignac encouraged Marie Casimire to abandon the interests of the eldest son and to support her middle son, Alexander. These encouragements which were rejected by the queen were sufficient for historiography to reproach her that it was that the youngest son would become a king. However, Alexander's candidature during the *interregnum* and election did not emerge at all²⁴. At the beginning of 1696 Polignac was not estranged from the queen, but he sought for contact with the opposition circles. It was most probably at that time that the Grand Treasurer of the Crown, Hieronim Lubomirski, convinced him that it was not worth supporting the Sobieski family at the election. Regardless of doubts expressed by Versailles, the ambassador put his trust in the magnates and started to pressure Louis XIV to appoint a French prince who could take over power in Poland²⁵. The Roman mission and first diplomatic experiences made Polignac adopt specific means of acting and implementing goals. He assumed that it was the most important to reach the representatives of the elites. He spoke to cardinals and the Pope in Rome. He believed that personal contact, charm, and skills in persuasion had the greatest significance and would bring results. He knew how to use his knowledge which he constantly developed, thus becoming an interesting conversationalist. He also probably knew how to listen and entertain with conversation, and therefore he was a welcome participant of chats and disputes. It is known that he discussed passionately and almost to tears, and since he was considered a polite and moderation-driven adversary, one can suspect that these emotions had a bit of meticulously directed theatricality. Thus, through knowledge and skills he won John III's friendliness.

In the ambassador's opinion, contacts with the senators were a path leading to success; he assumed that they would decide about the course of the election²⁶, though the instructions he had received from Versailles warned him against an excessive trust²⁷. Everyone forgot about the election of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki who had been considered a candidate of the noblemen and who had been chosen against carefully prepared scenarios²⁸. Polignac assumed that it was enough to win the support of the senators in order to make impact on the noblemen, and achieve the planned goal. He had been convinced that nothing could be achieved through the noblemen. It does not seem that the ambassador observed Poland's internal affairs and examined the course of previous elections. It seems that he relied on the experience of his friend, Cardinal Toussaint de Forbin Janson, whose mission brought success to France since John Sobieski became the king, but the circumstances of that time had been different. Polignac did not look around for conversationalists presenting various opinions, he did not accept the opponents' opinion. The most important matter was to convince everyone to his own arguments and every judgement which was in line with his own opinions was considered correct. This was also where the sources of his failure were located. Polignac was inclined to use lie or at least a convenient bending of truth, but it is difficult to understand how a man capable of double-dealing could not suspect his conversationalists of duplicity.

Polignac did not cease his efforts to convince Louis XIV to proposing a candidature of a French prince. The king emphasised that this notion would entail considerable expenses. However, the ambassador did not rest in his efforts to obtain consent for changing the existing plans to support the Sobieski family, with a clearly defined presupposition that France would provide them with diplomatic effort

23 NGAB, fond 694, opis 12 ms 291, *James Sobieski to Louis XIV, [s.l., s.n., s.d., f. 4; Aleksandra Skrzypietz, Jakub Sobieski, (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2015) 229-30.*

24 Aleksandra Skrzypietz, *Królewscy synowie – Jakub, Aleksander i Konstanty Sobiescy* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2011), 288-92, 302.

25 SSA, loc. 14339, con. 19, *Melchior de Polignac do Forbin Jansona*, Warsaw 28 February 1696; Woliński, *Kazimierz Sarnecki. Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego*, 320, 324, 337, 388; Aleksandra Skrzypietz, *Francuskie zabiegi o koronę polską po śmierci Jana III Sobieskiego* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2009), 58-59.

26 Skrzypietz, *Francuskie zabiegi o koronę polską*, 74, 78.

27 Farges, *Recueil des instructions*, 216-218.

28 Mieczysława Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego 1669 roku* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2006), 59-91; Aleksandra Skrzypietz, *Franciszek Ludwik de Bourbon, książę de Conti – "obraný król Polski" Saga rodu Kondeszów* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2019), 127-51.

and they would have to bear the election costs. Polignac assured Louis XIV that the benefits of a Frenchman's enthronement in Poland would be enormous. Nevertheless, the king demanded that the ambassador won Marie Casimire over for the plans of proposing a French candidate. He was ready to designate remunerations for the French supporters, but their beneficiaries – apart from the Primate, the Crown and Lithuanian Treasurers – were supposed to be selected by the queen²⁹. However, the money was to be paid out only after the election. This reservation was a result of events from 1669 when some of the magnates took money from a few candidates at the same time³⁰. This decision protected France from expenses, but at the same time reduced chances for success because, according to the ambassador, the success was to be brought through money³¹.

Polignac did not treat the king's recommendations quite seriously and stated that Marie Casimire did not want to cooperate with him³². Still full of doubts, Louis XIV authorized a small amount of 600'000 livres to be allocated to the Frenchman's election – paid after the election! Finally, he also named François Louis de Bourbon, Prince de Conti, as the candidate. Simultaneously, Louis XIV warned the ambassador to show restraint and not prevent Prince James to win the throne and not turn him into a enemy of France³³. He also insisted that Polignac did not break ties with Marie Casimire completely, but he did not listen to the king³⁴. This was the goal of the Polish magnates who started cooperating with him.

According to the ambassador, the Polish senators were delighted with Prince de Conti's candidature, but they feared the reaction from the noblemen. Therefore, it was decided to keep it secret for the time being, but Polignac insisted to have the money paid to the army, which was to make the noblemen grateful. He also complained that the lack of money did not allow him to act and he hoped that – in spite of the announcements – the king would send it. He also incurred debts in order to give gifts to his closest associates³⁵.

News of the ambassador's debts reached Versailles; Marie Casimire – full of regrets and eager for revenge – made sure of that³⁶. Wishing to control the diplomat's activities, Louis XIV sent François de Castagnères, the abbot of Chateaufort to Poland. The arrival of a new envoy did not hurt Polignac either in the eyes of the magnates, or the Sun King. The abbot, poorly informed on the situation on the election fight, accepted Polignac's messages that all the activities served the interests of France, and he sent this notion of affairs to Versailles, naively commending the ambassador's efforts and confirming their validity³⁷.

29 *Depesze księdza de Polignac posła francuskiego po śmierci Jana III króla polskiego. Z rękopismu cesarskiej biblioteki w Paryżu*, vol. 1-2, 41, 51 (Poznań: Księgarnia J. K. Żupańskiego, 1855), 5-9; Aleksandra Skrzypietz, "Ludwik XIV wobec kandydatury królewiczów Sobieskich do tronu polskiego", in *Polska-Francja-Europa. Studia z dziejów Polski i stosunków międzynarodowych*, eds. Maciej Forycki, et al. (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Historii UAM, 2011), 172-73.

30 *Wyjątek z pamiętników hrabiego de Chavagnac legata do Polski po abdykacji króla Jana Kazimierza i w czasie elekcji króla Michała roku 1668*, in Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawnej Polsce z rękopismów, tudzież dzieł w różnych językach o Polsce wydanych wraz z listami oryginalnymi królów i znakomitych ludzi w kraju naszym*, vol. IV, (Lipsk: Breitkopf and Haertel, 1838), 217, 221.

31 Aleksandra Skrzypietz, "O pieniądzach, których nie było na wojnę, której miało nie być", in *Pecunia nervus belli. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV-XVIII wieku*, eds. Mariusz Markiewicz and Ryszard Skowron, Filip Wolański (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), 146-64.

32 *Depesze księdza de Polignac*, vol. 1, 4-9; Skrzypietz, "Ludwik XIV wobec kandydatury", 173-74.

33 *Depesze księdza de Polignac*, vol. 1, 5-9; Léon de Bastard: *Négociations de l'abbé de Polignac en Pologne concernant l'élection du prince de Conti comme roi de Pologne (1696-1697)* (Auxerre: Gustve Perriquet, 1864), 18.

34 Komaszyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska*, 181.

35 *Depesze księdza de Polignac*, vol. 1, 15, 29-34.

36 Komaszyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska*, 200-01.

37 *Depesze księdza de Polignac*, vol. 1, 65-8; Farges, *Recueil des instructions*, 231-43; de La Force, *Le grand Conti*, 150-51; Mariusz Sawicki, "Partia francuska na Litwie w latach 1696-1697 w świetle dokumentów i rachunków dyplomatów Ludwika XIV: przyczynek do dziejów elekcji Augusta II", in *Wokół wolnych elekcji w państwie polsko-litewskim XVI-XVIII wieku: o znaczeniu idei wyboru – między prawami a obowiązkami*, eds. Mariusz Markiewicz, Dariusz Rolnik and Filip Wolański (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), 373-87.

Having no money, Polignac decided to refer to the promises which should attract the supporters of France. He promised that Prince de Conti would make sure that the Turks returned Kamieniec-Podolski to Poland before he was crowned. When Louis XIV pointed out that it was infeasible, Polignac explained with brutal honesty that it was possible to persuade the Turks to hand over the fortress and that they would be able to take it back after the election. These words are the evidence for the ambassador's dishonesty, but his behaviour confirmed that, while being guile, he did not understand that others could fight with the same weapon. Similarly unacceptable promise was a declaration that Prince de Conti's wife would give up on her retinue if her husband was enthroned in Poland. Louis XIV reacted to this with outrage. He clearly stated that moral rules and keeping promises were extremely important for him. Such unrealistic promises deprived the ambassador of trust of the more critical voters and they discredited Louis XIV in the eyes of the Poles, damaging opinion about him³⁸. The ambassador acted in Poland almost in a political void. There are no traces of his interest in the activities of other foreign diplomats. The election triggered keen interest of many countries. Their representatives were in Poland and carried out a wide-ranging activities. In the meantime, Polignac showed no interest in their plans, he trusted the magnates who assured him they would choose the Frenchman. Only once Polignac wrote about a Bavarian envoy, Pompeo Scarlatti, accusing him of careless attitude towards the elector's choice for the throne, even though Maximilian Emanuel did not declare his candidature for the throne, and it was the envoy's task to support James Sobieski³⁹.

Meanwhile, the magnates waited for the payment and started to doubt France's good will, and Polignac position was being undermined by Marie Casimire who spread the news that no money would arrive from Versailles⁴⁰. Polignac thought that extending the time of the electoral battle would exhaust resources of the Sobieski family, but even France's supporters lacked patience and money; i.e. the Sapieha family really could not handle the expenses without the financial support. Thus, the French party started to fall apart⁴¹.

A blow to the ambassador's efforts was the emergence of Frederick Augustus Wettin's candidature, who – already in the election field – turned out to be the hope for many of those tired with the fierce rivalry between the Sobieski and de Conti⁴². When it turned out that the election was bifurcated – some of the noblemen spoke in favour of Prince de Conti and some others supported Frederick Augustus (James Sobieski's candidature was virtually lost), the supporters of France demanded payments in order to confirm French goodwill. Meanwhile, Louis XIV's order – that the promissory notes previously sent to Gdańsk would be paid only when Prince de Conti was enthroned – was still in force and in France nothing certain was known about the election, news about the split reached the country and it was not clear who had won. Therefore, the elect did not leave, waiting for the information from the ambassador whose contacts with Versailles were interrupted by Marie Casimire⁴³. The queen-widow, forced by the supporters of France to leave Warsaw, went to Gdańsk, got settled in the house of a postmaster and took over French letters. It is surprising that the only means of contact for the French ambassador with Versailles was the official post, but this was in fact the case.

Polignac still tried to get more cash to strengthen his followers and he tried to win over Marie Casimire's support, whose interests he had betrayed earlier, acting against her son's candidature at

38 Depesze księdza de Polignac, vol. 1, 44, 48-9, 50, 56; Skrzypietz, *Francuskie zabiegi o koronę polską*, 115-16.

39 SSA, loc. 14339, conv. 19, *Melchior de Polignac do Forbin Jansona*, Warszawa 4 December 1696; Stanisław Orszulik: "Kandydatura elektora bawarskiego Maksymiliana III Emanuela do korony polskiej po śmierci Jana III", *Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny*. Sobótka, n. 2 (1974): 234.

40 Komarzyński, *Maria Kazimiera d'Arquien Sobieska*, 200; Skrzypietz, *Francuskie zabiegi o koronę polską*, 169.

41 Aleksandra Skrzypietz, "Sapiehowie wobec elekcji księcia Conti", in *Sapiehowie epoki Kodnia i Krasicyzna. Obrazy kultury polskiej*, ed. Krzysztof Stępnik (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2007), 371-90.

42 Electoral struggles was very brutal, *ad personam* arguments were used. Stanisław Orszulik, *Pisma polityczne bezkrólewia po śmierci Jana III Sobieskiego (1696-1697)*, Kraków, 1982 [typescript in Jagiellonian Library].

43 Centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve, Pologne, *Correspondance* 97, *François de Castagnères to Louis XIV*, [s.l.] 3 July 1697, f. 244; NGAB, fond 694, opis 12, ms 310, *François de Castagnères and Melchior de Polignac to Louis XIV*, Warsaw, 16 August 1697, ff. 1r-2r; NGAB, fond 694, opis 12, ms 154, *Maria Casimira to James Sobieski*, [s.l., s.d.] ff. 9r-12v; NGAB, fond 694, opis 12, ms 155, *Maria Casimira to James Sobieski*, [s.l., s.d.] ff. 1r-12r.

the prompting of the magnates. No wonder the queen-widow ridiculed these offers, presenting empty envelopes of the Versailles letters she had taken over.

The ambassador tried to console himself and explain that Wettin's supporters violated the law because their victory was announced not by the primate, but by Bishop of Cuiavia, Stanisław Dąbski, and the elect did not have the election diploma at his disposal because it was meant to be issued by the election's marshal, the Crown Chamberlain, Ludwik Bieliński, who was a supporter of the French candidate. Polignac assured that as soon as the Poles have a look at Prince Conti, they would immediately abandon his rival in order to accept the man worthy of the crown. He deluded either himself, Louis XIV, or his own supporters with hope that everything could be still saved even though he saw that his followers were withdrawing their support and many of them did not wait any longer for the arrival of the king-elect since they had considered the election of the Frenchmen as a lost case. There is no doubt that through manipulating his adherents and the king, presenting them the situation how he saw it, or how he wished to see it, insisting on putting forward the French candidature as certain, and then conducting a ruthless electoral fight, Polignac thwarted James Sobieski's changes for the throne; and it should be assumed that these chances were not inconsiderable and there are many indications that the prince enjoyed support among the noblemen. Polignac's personal ambitions to place the French candidate on the Polish throne, to win over his and Louis XIV's gratitude, to gain the magnates' support and to set the tone of political events, made the ambassador act against the orders he had received from Versailles and compromise the mission he had received.

The election of 1697 are encircled by a black legend⁴⁴. There is talk of enormous amount of money paid for supporting the French candidate and treason committed by the Poles who accepted gratification from France and did not support its candidate decisively enough. In the meantime, the ambassador squandered no money, but empty promises. France did not involve much money in this election and thus Polish voters abandoned its representative. Polignac's deceptive assurances unsupported by money were answered with the lack of readiness to put Poles and their own interests at risk, as well as their own position in the face of chaos and general uncertainty which emerged after the bifurcated election.

All these characteristics – a mix of foresight and readiness to choose easy routes, intelligence and naivety, and, most of all, dangerous self-confidence based on proneness to manipulation – made Polignac as much a dangerous opponent as a great loser. However, it should be added that even though he moved in his life between diplomatic success and royal disfavour, he eventually reached for high offices. It was his skills and personality that were giving him hope for triumph and, at the same time, were becoming a reason of his failures. Polignac was considered highly talented both in France and Poland. He had a gift of being liked, based on his personal charm and thorough education, which he zealously broadened⁴⁵. His knowledge in literature and eloquence were praised⁴⁶.

The mission in Poland presented talents, but also uncontrollable ambitions of Melchior de Polignac. In accordance with the instructions, he initially started cooperation with the royal couple and he tried to fulfil his ongoing tasks without greater success. He demonstrated decisively less intuition and skills in predicting than Louis XIV, which is indicated even by their approach towards Theresa Kunegunda Sobieska's marriage plans. At the beginning of 1696 the ambassador gave into the narratives of the Polish magnates who did not want to see any of the Sobieski family's princes on the throne. Polignac noticed an opportunity for the enthronement of the French candidate, and he most likely dreamt of playing a significant role by his side or winning Louis XIV's gratitude. Despite spending four years in Poland, Polignac probably did not notice that the ruler's position, and even the laws he had, did not let him pursue unhampered politics, and thus nothing guaranteed that he would be able to rule in accordance with France's expectations. Nevertheless, the willingness to achieve his own ambitions, to block the election of James Sobieski as a supporter of the Habsburgs' influences, made the ambassador

44 Władysław Konopczyński, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej*, vol. 1 (Warszawa: "Pax", 1986), 506.

45 Saint-Simon, *Pamiętniki*, trans. Aleksander i Maria Bocheńscy, vol. 2 (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1961), 31-5.

46 Sévigné, *Listy: wybór*, trans. Michał Mroziński and Anna Tatarkiewicz (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1981), 374.

insist on the idea suggested to him by the magnates, and he probably believed that they were going to carry out his plans without realizing that he became a tool in their hands. He gathered around himself the followers representing the most important – although not all – magnate families and he stayed under the impression that he would bring his own elect to the throne due to their help. He did not pay attention to the noblemen's preferences, convinced that they would let the magnates lead. He did not quit his own projects even though their implementation was erasing the instructions he had received and orders coming from Versailles. These ideas required to overcome the resistance of Louis XIV who correctly assumed that the victory of one of the Sobieski family's members, willing to cooperate with France, would be the best solution and would give hope for securing French interests, as long as they could be carried out in the constantly weakening Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Sobieski's election would also release Versailles from considerable expenses required for the election fight. However, the ambassador's insistence, prompted the king to present the French candidate. He also stipulated that no money would be sent to Poland until the Frenchman is enthroned, and this decision was met. He sent to Gdańsk promissory notes paid after the election, which Polignac could not cash in, and thus the payouts did not happen. Ultimately, this compromised the chances of Prince de Conti who left for his crown with a long delay. When he arrived in Gdańsk, his rival Augustus II had already been crowned. Some of the French supporters were ready to start a fight for placing their own candidate on the throne, and effectively break out a civil war, but only on the condition that they would be given the money and military support from France; quite conveniently, Prince de Conti had no intention to win the crown by shedding blood. Therefore, Polignac's mission ended in a failure. After returning to France, he was exiled from the court, which lasted for three years.

ABBREVIATIONS

NGAB: NGAB: Nacyjanalnyj Gistarycznyj Archiu Bielarusi, Minsk.

SSA: Sächsisches Staatsarchiv–Dresden.

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FRANCESCO BUONVISI AND OPIZIO PALLAVICINI: CORRESPONDENCE AND ACTIVITIES OF TWO APOSTOLIC Nuncios IN THE SERVICE OF POPE INNOCENT XI ODESCALCHI (1676–1689)¹

ABSTRACT

Based on the correspondence of two apostolic nunciatures this investigation aims at exploring the relationship between two papal diplomats who were in office under Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi (1676–1689). The Roman Curia and the apostolic nunciatures are both considered as a centre for processing information and a place for the exchange of information with communication being a central, governmental tool of the Church. Focusing especially on the apostolic nunciature at the imperial court and the *Nunziatura di Varsavia* in the second half of the seventeenth century or rather on two great papal diplomats in this century namely, Cardinal Francesco Buonvisi (1675–1689) and Cardinal Opizio Pallavicini (1680–1688), it becomes evident that the apostolic nuncios are the most important mediators and indispensable agents between Rome and the local level. To examine the roles of the two papal diplomats as actors themselves undoubtedly offers a way to a better understanding of the strategies of communication, dynamics and the interplay between the nunciatures and the Roman Curia, the Pope and resp. to other actors of this period and represents a specific feature of papal diplomacy.

KEYWORDS: Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi; Francesco Buonvisi; Opizio Pallavicini; Apostolic Nunciature; Correspondence.

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INTRODUCTION

Non posso esprimere il giubilo di questa Corte, [...] e non posso nemmeno tacere le grandi, e strepitosi applausi che si fanno a monsignore Pallavicino, acclamando ognuno la sua prudente condotta, la sua indefessa applicazione, e l'infinito suo vigore d'animo per superare tante difficoltà che ci sono state fino all'ultima hora, in modo che tutti lo stimano degno della più alta ricompensa, et io posso essere testimonio delle sue belle, e virtuose operazioni².

On 24 April 1683, the papal diplomat at the Vienna nunciature³, Francesco Buonvisi (1626–1700) sent a letter from Vienna to the Cardinal Secretary of the State Alderano Cybo (1613–1700)⁴, expressing his praise and appreciation for the work of his colleague in Warsaw, Opizio Pallavicini (1632–1700).

¹ This article is based on recent research as part of the ongoing PhD thesis by Claudia Curcuruto, *Tridentine Ideal and Ecclesiastical Realities. The Congregation of the Council and the Apostolic Nuncios under Pope Innocent XI (1676–1689)* (Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz) and an incipient project to edit the nunciature's correspondence of Francesco Buonvisi during his time as papal representative at the imperial court in Vienna (1675–1689).

² AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 207, *Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo*, Vienna 24 April 1683, ff. 307r-v, here f. 307r.

³ An overview of the papal legations is provided by Knut Walf, *Die Entwicklung des päpstlichen Gesandtschaftswesens in dem Zeitabschnitt zwischen Dekretalenrecht und Wiener Kongreß (1159–1815)* (München: Hueber, 1966); and Erwin Gatz, "Gesandtschaftswesen, Päpstliches", *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, 12 (1984), 540–47.

⁴ On the office of the Cardinal Secretary of the State cf. Birgit Emich, "Die Karriere des Staatssekretärs. Das Schicksal des Nepoten?", in *Offices et papauté (XIV^e–XVII^e siècle), Charges, hommes, destins*, eds. Armand Jammé and Oliver Poncet, (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 2005), 341–55. Specifically on the Cardinal Secretary of the State of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi cf. Enrico Stumpo, "Cibo Alderano", in *DBI*, vol. 25 (1981), 227–32.

Five days earlier, the nuncio Pallavicini had informed the Pope and Buonvisi (18 April 1683)⁵ of the approval of the treaty between Leopold I⁶ and John III Sobieski⁷ by the Polish *sejm* during the night between the 17 and 18 April 1683. Certainly the repeated interventions of the Polish head of state, but also the incessant mediation and negotiation work⁸ of Pallavicini were decisive for this, as well as of the nuncio at the imperial court, Francesco Buonvisi, which in the end was so essential that it was generally recognized⁹.

The essay does not aim at going into detail considering the various and diverse political-ecclesiastical topics of correspondence that became the subject of communication between the two diplomats. Rather, it is intended to present a corpus of sources that is still little known and that were important for the history of Poland and Europe in the early modern period and in the religio-political relations between the *Curia romana*¹⁰ and the respective representations of the Holy See. Instead, this paper draws attention to phenomena that have not yet been sufficiently illuminated in research on early modern foreign relations and diplomatic actors¹¹ meaning the dynamic, written interactions and regular reporting practices between the representatives of Pope Innocent XI's Odescalchi¹², Francesco Buonvisi and his colleague *ad Regem Poloniae* Opizio Pallavicini between 1680 and 1688¹³.

The translation and exchange of knowledge¹⁴ is therefore not only based on the Cardinal Secretary of

5 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 101, *Opizio Pallavicini to Alderano Cybo*, Warsaw 31 March 1683, ff. 138r-48r.

6 On Emperor Leopold I [1640–1705] cf. especially John P. Spielman, *Leopold I. Zur Macht nicht geboren* (Graz-Wien-Köln: Styria, 1981) and Jean Béranger, *Léopold I^{er} (1640–1705). Fondateur de la puissance autrichienne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004).

7 For general information on John III Sobieski [1629–1696] see the revised new edition of Otto Forst de Battaglia, *Jan Sobieski, König von Polen* (Graz, et al.: Styria, 1982); Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski (1629–1692)* (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983), and at last *L'Europa di Giovanni Sobieski. Cultura, politica, mercatura e società*, ed. Gaetano Platania (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2005). For a biography of the Polish ruler that focuses particularly on the Vienna event, see Gerda Hagenau, *Jan Sobieski: der Retter Wiens* (Wien et al.: Amalthea, 1983).

8 On the concept of negotiation cf. Jean-Claude Waquet, “Verhandeln in der Frühen Neuzeit. Vom Orator zum Diplomaten”, *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen. Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, eds. Hillard von Thiesen and Christian Windler (Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau, 2010), 113–31. See here fundamentally *Paroles de négociateurs: l'entretien dans la pratique diplomatique de la fin du moyen âge à la fin du XIX^e siècle*, ed. Stefano Andretta (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 2010); Christian Windler, “Praktiken des Handelns. Zur Einführung”, in *Praktiken der Frühen Neuzeit. Akteure-Handlungen-Artefakte*, ed. Arndt Brendecke, (Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau, 2015), 509–13.

9 In this regard, the secretary of the Polish King Sobieski, Tommaso Talenti, wrote: «Devo pure far giustizia a monsignor nunzio col significare a Vostra Eminenza che questo gran prelato si immortala in questa dieta non dormendo, ne riposando per redur gli animi alla concordia e al dovere, e resta scandalizatissimo a vedere le presenti stravaganze et eccessi». BAV, Barb. Lat. 6424, *Tommaso Talenti to Carlo Barberini*, Warsaw 14 April 1683, ff. 260r–63r, here f. 260r.

10 On the Roman Curia cf. most recently Mario Rosa, *La Curia romana nell'età moderna. Istituzioni, cultura, carriere* (Roma: Viella, 2013).

11 Fundamental to this is the study by Sabina Brevaglieri and Matthias Schnettger, eds., *Transferprozesse zwischen dem Alten Reich und Italien im 17. Jahrhundert. Wissenskonfigurationen-Akteure-Netzwerke* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2018). An overview of the state of research can be found at Hillard von Thiesen, *Diplomatie und Patronage. Die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in akteurszentrierter Perspektive* (Epfendorf: Bibliotheca Academica-Verlag, 2010), 4–27.

12 An anthology on the pontificate of Innocent XI has recently been published, cf. *Innocenzo XI Odescalchi. Papa, politico, committente*, eds. Richard Bösel et al. (Roma: Viella, 2014), in particular see Gaetano Platania, “Un acerrimo nemico dell'infedele Turco: il beato Innocenzo XI Odescalchi”, 221–43. On the Pontifex, see also the article by Antonio Menniti Ippolito, “Innocenzo XI, papa”, in DBI, vol. 62 (2004), 478–95.

13 A regular and punctual correspondence between the Secretary of the State and the nuncios had already been ordered by Pope Paul III in 1537 (cf. Hans Kramer, “Forschungsberichte. Die Erforschung und Herausgabe der Nuntiaturberichte”, *MÖStA*, n. 1 (1948): 492–514, here 495). Cf. generally on the correspondence of the apostolic nuncios Fridolin Dörner, “Der Schriftverkehr zwischen dem päpstlichen Staatssekretariat und der Apostolischen Nuntiatur Wien in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts. Erschließungsplan, Kanzlei- und Aktenkundliche Beobachtungen”, *RHM*, n. 4 (1960/1961): 63–246.

14 In the conception of Olaf Breidbach, knowledge is «nicht einfach ein Mehr an Information, sondern es ist strukturierte Information, [...]» and furthermore «interpretierte Information. Es bestünde nicht einfach in der Aneinanderreihung von Informationen, sondern in der Form, in der diese Informationen zum Teil eines Ganzen werden, aus dem heraus und auf das hin wir agieren. Wissen ist demnach durch die Ordnung bestimmt, in der wir es präsentieren», (Olaf Breidbach, *Neue Wissensordnungen. Wie aus Informationen und Nachrichten kulturelles Wissen entsteht*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 12–26).

the State Cybo as the central authority of papal diplomacy, but also between the papal representations in Europe in the early modern period. This so-called semi-official correspondence, preserved in the personal archive of the apostolic nuncio Buonvisi in Lucca¹⁵, is based on an extensive fundamental constituted dialogicity. The continuous, high-frequency rhythm of correspondence, as well as the establishment of a shared context of knowledge that keeps the procedure of negotiation up to date¹⁶, serves as a guide for the apostolic nuncios in their (independent) diplomatic activities on the local level. This information-based policy addressed to the apostolic nunciature, as well as towards his colleagues at the other papal representation¹⁷ created space of action for the papal envoys. Thus this became a guideline for both nuncios in their political actions¹⁸. The two directives “to negotiate” and “to inform” cannot be separated in the curial practice of reporting¹⁹. The viability of this methodological approach will be illustrated below using the example of the correspondence between the two actors in early modern diplomatic history in the second half of the seventeenth century²⁰.

INTERTWINED LIVES OF TWO PAPAL DIPLOMATS: FRANCESCO BUONVISI AND OPIZIO PALLAVICINI

In a relation to the papal court of Count Orazio Elci of the year 1699²¹, the apostolic nuncio at the imperial court Francesco Buonvisi's²² *grand'habilità politica*, the *vivacità di spirito* and the great ability for any negotiation is praised – no matter how difficult it might have been. Just like «his counterpart in Vienna» (*suo omologo a Vienna*)²³, Opizio Pallavicini²⁴, was held in high esteem for his diplomatic skill, which was mainly due to his diligence (*prudenza*) and steadfastness (*costanza*) in his service at

- 15 Francesco Buonvisi had built up a circle of permanent correspondence partners during his long time at the various nunciatures. The distinction between the official exchange of letters with the Secretary of the State and the semi-official correspondence with other correspondence partners outside the Secretariat of the State proves to be unambiguous in this case and thus meaningful for identifying the nuncio's letters with the various recipients.
- 16 Cf. Lars Behrisch, “Zu viele Informationen! Die Aggregierung des Wissens in der Frühen Neuzeit”, in *Information in der Frühen Neuzeit: Status, Bestände, Strategien*, eds. Arndt Brendecke, Markus Friedrich and Susanne Friedrich (Berlin: LIT, 2008), 455-73, here 426.
- 17 Matthias Pohlig, “Informationsgewinnung und Entscheidung. Entscheidungspraktiken und Entscheidungskultur der englischen Regierung um 1700”, in Brendecke, *Praktiken der Frühen Neuzeit*, 667-77, here 669.
- 18 Cf. on this already Claudia Curcuruto, “... la buona corrispondenza de gl'animi è quella che facilità tutti i negozii. Die Wiener Nuntiatur als Institution der Informations- und Wissensressource (1675–1689)”, *QFIAB*, n. 98 (2019): 303-25.
- 19 Paolo Prodi, for example, opposes a separation of diplomatic “negotiation” and “informing” in the case of papal envoys, Paolo Prodi, *Diplomazia del cinquecento. Istituzioni e prassi* (Bologna: Riccardo Pàtron, 1963), 51.
- 20 On the actor-centred approach cf. Hillard von Thiesen, “Diplomatie vom *type ancien*: Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens”, in *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen. Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, eds. Hillard von Thiesen and Christian Windler (Köln: Böhlau, 2010), 471-503, in particular 475-77.
- 21 The treatise by the Count Orazio d'Elci is devoted to biographies of the cardinals and bishops considered *papabili* and is entitled: BAV, Ottob. Lat. 2686, *Relatione della corte romana composta dal Conte Orazio d'Elci per servizio di Sua Eccellenza signor marchese Clemente Vitelli ambasciatore straordinario al Sommo Pontefice Innocenzo Duodecimo per Sua Altezza Reale il Gran Duca di Toscana Cosimo Terzo felicemente dominante*, ff. 106r-11v. On the work and the edition of the relation cf. Sabrina M. Seidler, *Il teatro del mondo. Diplomatiscche und journalistische Relationen vom römischen Hof aus dem 17. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996).
- 22 On the *vita* of Cardinal Francesco Buonvisi [1 September 1626 in Lucca–25 August 1700], cf. the biographical article by Gaspare De Caro, “Buonvisi, Francesco”, in *DBI*, vol. 15 (1972), 319-25. To Buonvisi last Alessandro Boccolini, *Un lucchese al servizio della Santa Sede. Francesco Buonvisi, nunzio a Colonia, Varsavia e Vienna* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2018).
- 23 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/52, n. 136, *Opizio Pallavicini to Francesco Buonvisi*, Warsaw 26 March 1681.
- 24 On Cardinal Opizio Pallavicini [13 October 1632 in Genoa–11 February 1700 in Rome] cf. Antonio Menniti Ippolito, “Pallavicini Opizio”, in *DBI*, vol. 80 (2014), 541-43 and lastly Jyri Hasecker, “Pallavicini Opizio”, in *Personen und Profile 1542–1700*, eds. Hubert Wolf, Jyri Hasecker and Judith Schepers, vol. 2: *L–Z* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2020), 1140-41. A biographical overview of the nuncio is also provided in the introduction to the edition of Pallavicini's nunciature correspondence with the Secretariat of the State in Rome by Maria Domin-Jáčov in *ANP*, t. XXXIV: *Opitius Pallavicini (1680–1688)*, vol. I: *10 VIII 1680–29 III 1681*, (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1995), V–XVI. On the family history of the Pallavicini and their family archive, cf. *Gli archivi Pallavicini di Genova* vol. I: *Archivi propri. Inventario*, ed. Marco Bologna (Roma: Ministero per i beni culturali, 1994).

the Polish nunciature between 1680 and 1688²⁵. Also, the historiography praises the diplomatic skills of the two nuncios²⁶.

The time of Francesco Buonvisi as apostolic nuncio at the imperial court between September 1675 and August 1689, as well as the office of his colleague at the Polish nunciature between September 1680 and September 1688, are both astonishing in several respects: the term of office of the Viennese nuncio were not only formed the bracket between two pontificates (Clement X Altieri/Innocent XI Odescalchi), but he also worked for a total of 18 years in «*scabrosissime nunziature*»²⁷, as he himself retrospectively described this period in his autograph *vita*²⁸. Furthermore, the diplomat, who had already proven himself in Cologne (1670–1672) and Poland (1672–1675), remained at the Viennese nunciature for 14 years²⁹. The extremely above-average duration was compounded by the peculiarity that Buonvisi remained at the imperial court for fourteen years even after his promotion to the rank of cardinal on 1 September 1681³⁰.

Just like Francesco Buonvisi, Opizio Pallavicini exercised a long diplomatic activity for the Holy See, first at the nunciature of Florence (1668–1672), then as nuncio *ad Tractum Rheni Coloniae* (1673–1680)³¹ and subsequently as nuncio at the Polish Nunciature³². Just like the nuncio of Vienna, Pallavicini was a *creatura* of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi; he received the cardinalate on 2 September 1686³³. After completing his term of office, Buonvisi returned to Rome following the death of Pope Innocent XI on 12 August 1689 to take part in the conclave as a cardinal; he also served in various congregations

25 BAV, Ottob. Lat., 2686, ff. 114r–16v.

26 Gaetano Platania describes the apostolic nuncio as the «diamond point of papal diplomacy», who proved himself «by his actions to be an attentive representative of Rome's interests». (Gaetano Platania, «Asburgo d'Austria, Santa Sede e area danubiano-balcanica nelle carte del nunzio Francesco Buonvisi», in *Gli archivi della Santa Sede e il mondo asburgico nella prima età moderna*, eds. Matteo Sanfilippo, Alexander Koller and Giovanni Pizzorusso (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2004), 227–93, here 228). The praise and appreciation for Buonvisi can likewise be adopted for the nuncio Opizio Pallavicini, cf. for example Gaetano Platania, «Santa Sede e sussidi per la Guerra contro il Turco nella seconda metà del XVII secolo (Opizio Pallavicini nunzio a Varsavia e la liberazione di Vienna)», in *Il buon senso e la ragione. Miscellanea di studi in onore di Giovanni Crapulli*, eds. Nadia Boccara and Gaetano Platania (Viterbo: Sette Città, 1997), 103–38, here 112.

27 Tommaso F. Trenta, *Memorie per servire alla storia politica del cardinale Francesco Buonvisi, patrizio lucchese*, 2 vols (Lucca: Tipografia Bertini, 1818), here vol. I, 256–57.

28 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/66, n. 1, *Vita del Cardinale Francesco Buonvisi*.

29 An overview of his time as a papal diplomat in the three nunciatures is provided by Eugenio Lazzareschi, «Le Nunziature del Cardinale Francesco Buonvisi a Colonia, a Varsavia e a Vienna», *Notizie degli Archivi di Stato*, n. 3/2 (1943): 124–29. The publication of the correspondence of his Cologne nunciature period can be found by Furio Diaz, ed., *Francesco Buonvisi: Nunziatura a Colonia*, 2 vols (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano, 1959), and his nunciature in Warsaw, Furio Diaz and Nicola Carranza, eds., *Francesco Buonvisi: Nunziatura a Varsavia*, 2 vols (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano, 1965).

30 Buonvisi received the notification of his promotion on a Saturday morning, 13 September 1681 (cf. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 204, *Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo*, Vienna 13 September 1681, f. 606r). In a personal letter of thanks from Buonvisi to Pope Innocent XI, he describes himself as «suo humile, e riverente servo, e creatura» (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 204, *Buonvisi to Cybo*, Vienna 14 September 1681, ff. 606r–07r).

31 At the age of 36, he was appointed by Pope Clement IX Rospigliosi with the title of an Titular Archbishop of Ephesus on 27 February 1668 and sent as nuncio to Tuscany on the following 1 June (cf. AAV, *Epistolae ad Principes*, vol. 67, f. 369v). He stayed in Florence from 14 June 1668 until 27 December 1672, when he was nominated nuncio to Cologne by Clement X Altieri on 29 November 1672. Pallavicini thus succeeded Buonvisi, cf. ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/27, n. 201, *Paluzzo Paluzzi-Altieri to Francesco Buonvisi*, Rome 22 October 1672: «Già si è dichiarato il successore a Vostra Signoria in cotesta carica, ed è monsignor l'arcivescovo Pallavicino, hora nunzio in Fiorenza, la cui sufficienza accreditata in questa Corte ne renderà plausibile la elezione». Buonvisi instead is appointed extraordinary nuncio in Varsavia, cf. Ibid. II/7, n. 121, *Francesco Buonvisi to Paluzzo Paluzzi-Altieri*, Siegburg 13 November 1672: «Quando più haverei bisogno di esprimere con efficacia l'infinita obbligazioni che professo a Nostro Signore et a Vostra Eminenza per havermi destinato nuntio straordinario in Polonia per occasione così importante a quel regno et alla christianità».

32 See the letter of Cardinal Alderano Cybo to Opizio Pallavicini, Rome 10 August 1680, AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Colonia*, vol. 221, ff. 250v–51v: «[...] che venendo hora la vacanza della Nunziatura in Polonia a cagione del male di monsignor Martelli e della necessità che perciò egli tiene di far ritorno in Italia, ha subito posto l'occhio Sua Beatitudine nella Persona di Lei, destinandola a tale impiego». Pallavicini left Cologne on 12 October 1680 and arrived in Warsaw on 12 November (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 98, f. 544r; ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/49, n. 23).

33 On 2 September 1686, Pallavicini was elevated to the cardinalate by Pope Innocent XI, along with 26 other prelates, at a secret consistory meeting in the Quirinal's Palace, cf. AAV, *Archivio Concistoriale*, Acta Camerarii 23, ff. 190v–91r.

at the Roman Curia³⁴. After the election of Pope Innocent XII Pignatelli in 1691³⁵, Buonvisi finally left the Curia in November and transferred as bishop to his diocese of Lucca, where he died on 25 August 1700³⁶. He is buried in the family chapel of Sant'Anna in San Frediano in Lucca³⁷.

Pallavicini, unlike Buonvisi, did not return to Rome immediately, but took up his legation in Urbino after his nomination on 12 July 1688 (until 1690)³⁸. It was not until the pontificate of Alexander VIII Ottoboni in November 1689 that he returned to Rome, where he was assigned both the titular church (14 November) and his functions at the papal court in several congregations³⁹. Pallavicini resided as bishop in the diocese of Osimo, where he devoted himself to diocesan government until 1700⁴⁰. He then died at his home in Palazzo Buratti on 11 February 1700 and is buried in his titular church of San Martino ai Monti in Rome⁴¹.

This brief overview already underlines that the curial office careers of the two diplomats correspond to the second half of the seventeenth century⁴². The careers of the two prelates were decisively promoted by their own families⁴³. In particular, Pope Innocent X Pamphilj promoted the rise of the Pallavicini family from Genoa and the pontificate of Alexander VII Chigi exerted a lasting influence to the Buonvisi from Lucca. Previously to their diplomatic activity at the nunciature, the two prelates held key curial offices at the Curia⁴⁴ and both were elevated to the rank of titular archbishop, which was

- 34 Francesco Buonvisi, for example, regularly attended the meetings of the Congregation of the Council between 26 November 1689 and 27 September 1690, cf. AAV, *Congregazione del Concilio*, Libri Decret. 39, f. 371r (26 November 1689) to vol. 40, fol. 653r (27 September 1690).
- 35 On Francesco Buonvisi's participation in the conclave of 1691, cf. the study by Domenico Corsi, "Il Conclave del 1691 ed il Cardinale Francesco Buonvisi di Lucca", *Bollettino Storico Lucchese*, 10 (1938): 165-70.
- 36 Cf. Anna Maria Trivellini, *Il Cardinale Francesco Buonvisi. Nunzio a Vienna (1675-1689)* (Firenze: Olschki, 1958), here 4, 51.
- 37 On the Buonvisi family chapel, see Gino Arrighi, "Sulla Cappella Buonvisi in S. Frediano di Lucca", *Lucca. Rassegna del Comune*, n. 1 (1957): 25-30.
- 38 Cf. the original letters of the Cardinal Legate of Urbino, Opizio Pallavicini, to the Secretary of the State AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Legazione di Urbino*, vol. 2, and the register of letters from the Secretariat of the State to the Legate cf. *Ibid.*, vol. 97.
- 39 This included, for example, the membership in the Congregation of the Index and irregularly in the Congregation of the Council (cf. AAV, *Congregazione del Concilio*, Libri Decret. 39, f. 371r (26 November 1689) and lastly on 22 September 1691, cf. *Ibid.* 41, f. 172r).
- 40 On 28 November of the same year Pallavicini was appointed Bishop of Spoleto, and two years later, on 8 August 1691, he was appointed to the diocese of Osimo. In 1692 he took part in the election of Innocent XII Pignatelli.
- 41 He was buried in the vestibule of the subterranean church of his title, where a magnificent funeral oration could be read above a magnificently decorated panel, cf. Vincenzo Forcella, *Iscrizioni delle chiese e d'altri edifici di Roma dal secolo XI fino ai giorni nostri. Raccolte e pubblicate*, vol. IV (Roma: Tipografia dei Fratelli Bencini, 1874), here n. 75, p. 30.
- 42 On the career of the papal nuncios at the imperial court between 1559 and 1655, see Alexander Koller, *Imperator und Pontifex. Forschungen zum Verhältnis von Kaiserhof und römischer Kurie im Zeitalter der Konfessionalisierung (1555-1648)* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2012), here 287-301.
- 43 Pallavicini moved to Rome during the pontificate of Innocent X Pamphilj, where the Jesuit Sforza Pallavicino from the Parma branch of the family and especially another influential relative, Lazzaro Pallavicino (who was appointed cardinal in 1669), were already active. The protection he enjoyed favoured his access to the Curia, sanctioned by his appointment as *referendarius utriusque signaturae*, which can be dated to 1657 (cf. *Die päpstlichen Referendare 1566-1809. Chronologie und Prosopographie*, 3 vols, ed. Christoph Weber (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 2003-2004), here vol. 3, 231, 238, 242, 786). Thanks to Cardinal Lazzaro, an important marriage between Pallavicini and Rospigliosi was concluded and in June 1667 Pope Giulio Rospigliosi was elected. Pope Clement IX appointed Opizio Pallavicini as apostolic nuncio in Florence in 1668, a few days after consecrating him Bishop of Ephesus. Cf. Bologna, *Gli Archivi Pallavicini di Genova*, 11 and note 11. Francesco Buonvisi instead was summoned to Rome in November 1644 as the nephew of Girolamo Buonvisi (1607-1677). But when Girolamo fell out of favour with Innocent X Pamphilj he retired to Lucca and Francesco Buonvisi followed him. The death of Innocent X and the subsequent election of Fabio Chigi, Girolamo Buonvisi's protector, as pope, prompted the latter and his nephew to return to Rome. Alexander VII Chigi immediately showed his favour towards the two *Lucchesi*, conferring the purple on Girolamo at the first appointment of cardinals on 9 April 1657, while Francesco was appointed *maestro di camera* to Cardinal Flavio Chigi, a nephew of the pope. Buonvisi remained in this office for twelve years. It was certainly to Girolamo Buonvisi's credit that Clement X Altieri chose Buonvisi for the important nunciature in Cologne on 21 July 1670. On this occasion, Clement X installed Buonvisi as Archbishop of Thessaloniki. Cf. De Caro, "Buonvisi Francesco", 319-20.
- 44 Opizio Pallavicini, after his clerkship at the two signatures, was district head (governor) of various places in the Papal

then followed by secondment to the nunciature in Florence for Pallavicini and Cologne for Buonvisi. Cardinal Opizio Pallavicini had thus administered six governorates in the Papal States and three nunciatures (Florence, Cologne, Warsaw) during his career until he received the cardinal's hat in 1686⁴⁵. On the other hand, Cardinal Francesco Buonvisi had acquired a relevant diplomatic practice in France and also administered three nunciatures (Cologne, Warsaw, Vienna) until he was elevated to the rank of cardinal in 1681. While Buonvisi was not recalled from the imperial nunciature after receiving the cardinalate and remained at the *Nunziatura di Vienna* for another seven years, Pallavicini received the red hat after six years of service at the Warsaw nunciature⁴⁶. He was able to leave the Polish nunciature on 2 October 1688⁴⁷ with the appointment of the extraordinary nuncio Giacomo Cantelmo for the *sejm* of Grodno in 1688⁴⁸. The elevation to the rank of cardinal of both nuncios can be seen as a merital mark for their diplomatic success and as a mark of an outstanding nuncio's career⁴⁹.

THE DIPLOMATIC-CURIAL REPORTING PRACTICES BETWEEN VIENNA AND WARSAW

Apostolic nunciatures formed a sub-segment in the curial system of information and knowledge administration and were characterized in particular by their relations with the Secretariat of the State. Following the concept coined by Markus Friedrich in his studies on the administrative organization of the Jesuit order in the early modern period⁵⁰, one can speak of a «papierbasierten

States for seven years, such as the towns of San Severino Marche (1659), Rieti (1661), Fabriano (1662), Orvieto (1663), Montalto (1664), Ascoli Piceno (1665) and Fermo (1666). Cf. Christoph Weber, *Legati e governatori dello Stato pontificio (1550–1809)* (Roma: Ministero per i beni culturali, 1994), 124, 225, 247, 298, 323, 381, 418, 818. Buonvisi took part in the papal legation sent to Paris by Alexander VII in 1664 in the entourage of Flavio Chigi. On his return from this mission, the pope caused the young man to don the ecclesiastical habit and appointed him Canon of the Lateran Basilica of San Giovanni and, on 24 January 1668, Referendary of Both Signatures (cf. Weber, *Die päpstlichen Referendariat I*, nn. 129, 251).

45 Pallavicini himself wrote to Buonvisi from Warsaw on 3 December 1687 that he had been in the service of the Holy See for 30 years, 20 of them as nuncio (cf. ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/52, n. 248).

46 The Polish nunciature is considered second class and ranked behind the nunciatures of Paris, Vienna and Madrid, see Jan Kopiec, "Zur Geschichte der Apostolischen Nuntiatur in Polen", *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte*, 88 (1993): 134–56, here 135. Pallavicini did not work at any of the "great" nunciatures, but after Buonvisi's appointment as cardinal in September 1681 he hoped to be able to transfer to the significant imperial nunciature, as he himself wrote in a letter to Buonvisi: «Io non so se havere la fortuna d'essere successore dell'Eminenza Vostra la desidero bensì vivamente et dove l'Eminenza Vostra col suo credito e favore possa aggiustameci, la supplico ad obligarsi me perpetuamente col farlo» (ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/52, n. 143, Warsaw 24 September 1681).

47 «Era necessaria la missione del nunzio straordinario in Polonia per liberare il signor Cardinale Pallavicino dall'angustie, e per non lasciar la Dieta senza Ministro Apostolico che diriga la nave fra le tempeste; [...] monsignor Cantelmo, come già scrissi, ha qualità da riuscire meravigliosamente e mentre desidero che sortisca buoni successi» (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 214, *Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo*, Vienna 11 January 1688, f. 16r). On 3 December 1687 Pallavicini expressed his hope that they will both soon be able to return to Italy: «Vostra Eminenza avrà intesa la destinatione di monsignore Cantelmi in nuntio straordinario alla Dieta, onde parmi di vedere porto, e così spero sarà anco di Vostra Eminenza e che ce n'andremo insieme in Italia» (ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/52, n. 248).

48 The *sejm* of Grodno was convened on 18 November 1687 and began its work on 27 January 1688. Innocent XI had decided to send an extraordinary nuncio to the Imperial Diet with the intention of promoting preparations for the decisive anti-Ottoman offensive. On the extraordinary nuncio Giacomo Cantelmo, see Vittor Ivo Comparato, "Cantelmo, Giacomo", in DBI, vol. 18 (1975), 267–71 (with further references).

49 Christoph Weber, who made an important contribution to the system-immanent mechanisms of the College of Cardinals in his work "Senatus Divinus", summarizes the two cardinals' life in a central chapter under "Gescheiterte Karrieren" therefore "failed careers". (Cf. *Senatus Divinus. Verborgene Strukturen im Kardinalskollegium der frühen Neuzeit (1500–1800)* (Frankfurt am Main, Wien et al.: Lang, 1996) here chapter 3, 142–67), although the two prelates of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi already received the cardinal's hat during their nunciature and both were given rich dioceses (Lucca, Osimo). On the conclusion of a nuncio's career, cf. in detail Koller, *Imperator und Pontifex*, 297–300.

50 Markus Friedrich, *Der lange Arm Roms? Globale Verwaltung und Kommunikation im Jesuitenorden 1540–1773* (Frankfurt-New York: Campus, 2011); as well as Markus Friedrich, "Delegierter Augenschein als Strukturprinzip administrativer Informationsgewinnung. Der Konflikt zwischen Claudio Acquaviva und den memorialistas um die Rolle von Information im Jesuitenorden", in *Information in der Frühen Neuzeit: Status, Bestände, Strategien*, eds. Arndt Brendecke, Markus Friedrich and Susanne Friedrich (Berlin: LIT, 2008), 109–35.

Informationssystem»⁵¹ (paper-based system of information) with regard to generating information⁵² and communication between the Roman Curia and the nunciatures that is based on written, reciprocal reporting. In addition to the daily correspondence between the nuncio and the Cardinal Secretary of the State, a special feature of the history of the papal representations is an extensive correspondence between the nuncio at the imperial court, Francesco Buonvisi and his colleague in Warsaw – Opizio Pallavicini –. This correspondence that has hardly been analysed so far and is still partly unpublished in the *Archivio di Stato di Lucca*. The regular reporting between the two nunciatures⁵³ on the one hand and between a nunciature and the Secretariat of the State on the other not only enabled the formation of new heterogeneous knowledge, but also created a fundamental dialogicity⁵⁴. Yet only the indexing of the entire correspondence, the “complete information”, as it also became a fixed formula in the nunciature correspondence⁵⁵, represents the key through which a nunciature’s relevant matters are expressed and offers a comprehensive picture on the understanding of a nunciature as a knowledge-processing institution of the *Curia romana*. In the synopsis of the correspondences, therefore, it is possible to understand the involvement of the two nuncios and papal policy between 1680 and 1688, and at the same time the difficult relations between John III Sobieski and Leopold I Habsburg, especially after the victory in Vienna on 12 September 1683. Here, important information were reported on the internal politics of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the politics of the Empire, but also on the relations of the Warsaw and imperial courts with the rest of Europe. The contextualization of the correspondence foregrounds⁵⁶ that duplicity or multiple strands and communication through additional channels had been fundamental principles of written negotiations at the Roman Curia. The extraordinarily cohesive written tradition of the Buonvisi-Pallavicini correspondence, which was conducted between Vienna and Warsaw from 1680 to 1688, shall be examined in the following.

THE WRITTEN RECORDS

From 1680 onwards, which was the year in which Opizio Pallavicini was nominated papal representative *ad Regem Poloniae*, a rich and regular correspondence with the nuncio Francesco Buonvisi began. The considerable number of letters exchanged between 30 September 1680 and 29 September 1688 proves invaluable for historical research, because «rarely, [...], are the correspondences of the nuncios among themselves preserved and discoverable»⁵⁷. It is a fortunate circumstance that the personal archive of

51 Friedrich, *Delegierter Augenschein*, 117.

52 The term generation is used to describe «der gesamte Vorgang von der Datengewinnung über die Informationsaufbereitung bis hin zum Wissen im hier verstandenen praxisbezogenen Sinne verstanden». Winfried Kluth, “Die Strukturierung von Wissensgenerierung durch das Verwaltungsorganisationsrecht”, in *Generierung und Transfer staatlichen Wissens im System des Verwaltungsrechts*, eds. Peter Collin and Indra Piecker genannt Döhmman (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 73–92, here 78.

53 In this context, the instructions and directives issued from Rome prevent uncontrolled initiatives on the part of the papal diplomat. It must be ensured on the part of the Roman Curia that the apostolic nuncio fulfils his task and provides the Secretariat of the State with the necessary information through a continuous, high-frequency correspondence rhythm or keeps it informed about the course of the negotiations, cf. Curcuruto, *Die Wiener Nuntiatur als Institution*, 324–25.

54 On the concept of communication, cf. Susanne Friedrich, *Drehscheibe Regensburg. Das Informations- und Kommunikationssystem des Immerwährenden Reichstags um 1700* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2007), 20–2.

55 «Benissimo informato», «esser informatissimo» or the receipt or possession of «piena informazione» were central vocabulary in the understanding of the nuncios, cf. for example AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 207, f. 181r.

56 However, the interaction is not only shaped by the relationship between the Secretariat of the State and/or the nunciatures themselves, but also by the extensive network of the nuncios with many other partners in correspondence as well as other Roman authorities of the Curia (especially the dicasteries). For example, the relationship of the Vienna nunciature to the ecclesiastical institution of Propaganda Fide, cf. the essay by Rotraud Becker, “Die Wiener Nuntiatur im Dienst der Propagandakongregation. Italienische Franziskaner als Missionare in Ungarn um 1630”, QFIAB, n. 88 (2008): 369–419 and generally Giovanni Pizzorusso, “Per servizio della Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide: I nunzi apostolici e le missione tra centralità romana e chiesa universale (1622–1660)”, *Cheiron*, n. 30 (1998): 201–27.

57 «Selten aber sind auch die Korrespondenzen der Nuntien untereinander erhalten und auffindbar» (Almut Bues, “Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae. Zur Erschließung einer Quellengattung für die osteuropäische Geschichte”, *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, n. 41 (1992): 386–98, here 388).

nuncio Buonvisi⁵⁸ is known, because it contains his very correspondence with his colleague in Warsaw preserved in various volumes and found under its shelf mark *Archivio Buonvisi, II parte*⁵⁹. Although largely preserved, the correspondence has not yet been analysed in its entirety and has received little attention from researchers. Thanks to the *Institutum Historicum Polonicum* in Rome, which since 1986 has been dedicated to publishing the Polish nunciature documents in the series *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, and which since 2003 has been continued by the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cracow, it is possible to access the sources⁶⁰. The term of office of Opizio Pallavicini from 10 August 1680 to 30 June 1684 has been published in eight volumes so far, including Pallavicini's correspondence with Francesco Buonvisi⁶¹.

COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES AND REGULARITIES

As a matter of routine, a postal package (*dispaccio, piego*) was compiled in the Viennese and Polish nunciatures every week⁶². In order to obtain an overview of the correspondence between Vienna and Warsaw between 12 November 1680 (Pallavicini's arrival in Warsaw) and 29 September 1688 (Pallavicini's last letter to Buonvisi), as it is illustrated by the following table:

1680–1688	Buonvisi/Vienna → Pallavicini/Warsaw	Pallavicini/Warsaw → Buonvisi/Vienna
Original of which autograph minutes/ autographs:	— 276 (1686–1687 missing)	457 21
of which cipher/decipher	1 (29 March 1688)	8
Total	276	457
Monthly postal consignment	[46]	57

Based on a statistical analysis it becomes evident that Buonvisi sent up to 276 letters (excluding the years 1686 and 1687, which are missing), while those sent by Pallavicini are a total number of 457; this gives an average of four to five items per month meaning that usually one letter was sent every week, which would have been an exchange of 46 or 57 packages of letters (*dispacci*) between Vienna and Warsaw every year (excluding 1686 and 1687 for Vienna). The language in which the traffic between the nuncios was conducted was Italian. Buonvisi's correspondence was mainly issued in Vienna, but he also issued letters in Schwechat, Linz, Ödenburg, Braunau, Prague and Linz. The letters of Buonvisi to Pallavicini arriving from Vienna were always issued on a Monday; Sunday, on the other hand, was the nuncio's "writing day" for letters to Rome. Pallavicini, on the other hand, wrote his letters largely

58 On the Buonvisi family archive in Lucca cf. *Inventario del R. Archivio di Stato in Lucca*, volume V: *Archivi Gentilizi*, ed. Eugenio Lazzareschi (Pescia: Benedetti, 1946).

59 The originals of the papal diplomat in Warsaw are with all *dispacci* in the Buonvisi family archive, more precisely the volumes ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/21, 35, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 57. The original letters from Buonvisi to Pallavicini between 1680 and 1688, which were in the Central Historical Archives in Warsaw (AGAD), were completely burnt with the fire of 19 September 1944. For this reason, the minutes of Buonvisi, i.e. the concepts for the letters to be sent, preserved in the State Archives of Lucca are invaluable. These *registri* volumes of the autograph minutes sent by the Viennese nuncio to Pallavicini are in the volumes 16 to 20 and 23 to 25. The years 1686 and 1687 have not survived or are not preserved in the State Archives of Lucca.

60 The pilot volume proves to be a *vademecum* for the nunciature correspondence of the Polish nuncios, cf. Henryk Damian Wojtyśka, ANP, t. I: *De fontibus eorumque investigatione et editionibus Instructio ad editionem Nuntiorum series chronologica* (Romae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1990), here especially 3–82.

61 On the nuncio's diplomatic activity and correspondence with the Secretariat of the State, see the important work of Maria Domin-Jačov, ed., ANP, t. XXXIV, 9 vols (Romae-Cracoviae: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae/Academia Scientiarum et Litterarum Polona, 1995–2021), published until 30 December 1684.

62 *Piego* or *dispaccio*, without further definition, refers to any consignment, usually of several documents, contained in a common envelope. Cf. Dörrer, *Schriftverkehr zwischen dem päpstlichen Staatssekretariat*, 209, 216–17.

from Warsaw⁶³ and, like his letters to Rome, they were usually dated on a Wenesday.

Five main points can be identified as the practice of report between Buonvisi and Pallavicini: First, the nuncios are always located where the respective court is⁶⁴. Secondly, the courier (*ordinario*) was probably dispatched on the nuncio's "writing day" (Monday/Wenesday)⁶⁵. Thirdly, information is given on the modalities of writing letters⁶⁶; and fourthly, Buonvisi acted as a hinge for Pallavicini, as the latter had to forward the *dispacci di palazzo* between Rome and Warsaw via Vienna to Rome⁶⁷. Fifthly, special attention is paid to the dispatch of the courier (*ordinario/straordinario*; date of forwarding)⁶⁸. The postal receipt or the letter accompanying to *dispaccio* is considered particularly important⁶⁹. It is a *lettera in piano* that comments on the entire postal item of the day (type, number and sometimes also content), the newsletters (*avvisi*), and the enclosures⁷⁰. In few cases, the correspondence shows that a letter is missing or that entire *dispacci* have not arrived or have arrived late⁷¹. In most cases, however, the punctual receipt of the complete *piego* is confirmed with the *ordinario*. The accompanying letter for each *dispaccio* ensured complete control of all the correspondence.

The frequency of communication between Vienna and Warsaw was linked to the duration of transport and two postal connections were considered for the traffic: the ordinary, somewhat slower public *ordinari* post via Prague⁷², where the letters were forwarded to Wrocław (Vratislavia), and the staffette

63 However, he was also in Cracow (30 July–9 March 1683), Jaworów (16 March–19 July 1684; 1 May–5 June 1686), Żółkiew (26 July–o August 1684; 29 November–19 December 1684; 5 December–11 December 1685), Lviv (o6 August–23 November 1684; 26 December 1684–4 February 1685; 13 September–27 November 1685; 18 December 1685–24 April 1686; o2 July 1686–2 October 1687) and Stryj (o9 June–26 June 1686). The dates are taken from the letters of Pallavicini to Buonvisi.

64 Cf. for example in the autograph letter of Pallavicini to Buonvisi from Cracow of 1 August 1683, ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/45, n. 102: «Giunse Sua Maestà qui giovedì notte et io venerdì mattina».

65 Cf. Dörrer, *Schriftverkehr zwischen dem päpstlichen Staatssekretariat*, 202.

66 Thus, Francesco Buonvisi recommends to Pallavicini, already at the beginning of his tenure in Poland, not to write the letters *per mano propria*, but through a secretary, ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/17, n. 96, Vienna 10 March 1681: «[...] e la prego di scrivere per mano di segretario, perché alle volte scappa qualche parola senz' intenderla e può alterare tutta la sostanza e farmi far degl'errori».

67 Pallavicini often asked Buonvisi to forward the letter packages to Rome («di mandarlo con prima occasione al signor Cardinal Cibo», «a fare passar a Roma con posta di domenica le lettere per il signor Cibo»), cf. the examples in ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/48, n. 65; II/52, n. 132, 137 and 173. Letters to Rome were also sent in the opposite direction to Warsaw via Vienna, cf. ASL, Ibid., II/45, n. 81, *Opizio Pallavicini to Francesco Buonvisi*, Cracow 21 November 1683: «Ho ricevuto il dispaccio di Vostra Eminenza de' 5 e con esso quello del signor Cardinal Cibo, giuntole col ritorno del corriere che portò a Roma l'avviso della vittoria di Barcan».

68 The latter point is always urged on the nuncios by the Secretariat of the State not to omit any courier, even if he has nothing to write. Delays that occurred in the correspondence had to be explained, which represented a deviation from the «Norm des zuverlässigen Antwortbriefs» («norm of the reliable reply letter»: Maria Stüber, *Zwischen Rom und dem Erdkreis. Die gelehrte Korrespondenz des Kardinals Stefano Borgia (1731–1804)* (Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 60 and 186).

69 The cover letter for each *dispaccio* ensured complete control of all correspondence. First, the cover letter confirms the post received from the other side during the week, often with details of the postal route and any delays.

70 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/64, n. 17 (s.d.): «Quando si negotia e si scrive spesso il negotiato si vuole accusare il di della data delle precedenti, ed ancora il contenuto per qual via si sono spedite e perche si manda la presente et me l'ultime, e penultime me furono del primo, e de gl'otto di questa indirizzata a N.N. per N.N».

71 The fact that the "ordinary" mail arrived later was relatively rare and was due to climatic conditions (floods, high water, snow), for example, ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/52, n. 154 (Warsaw 17 December 1681): «La posta è stata trattenuta dalle nevi cadute, [...]». Or, on the other hand, by the late arrival of the courier: «Io non so a che attribuire simil tardanza. Non è male ricedere talvolta i sigilli, perche non mancan de curiosi. Io osservo quelli di Vostra Eminenza, e sin hora mi son parsi sempre intatti», (Ibid., II/57, n. 32, Lviv 4 February 1686) or the negligence or disorder of the post office (cf. Ibid., II/17, n. 292; II/19, n. 366; II/19, n. 383; II/20, n. 23 and 129). Extraordinary mailings due to imperial postal delivery, cf. Ibid., II/52, nn. 132 and 145. Missing letters also occur, cf. Ibid. II/17, n. 292; II/19, n. 366; II/19, n. 383; II/20, n. 23 and 129. «Parmi d'esser all'Indie mancando affatto di lettere esterne, et anco dalla Corte, che è a Visosco», Ibid., II/52, n. 200, Lviv 30 September 1685.

72 Cf. for example ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/20, n. 98, as well as ibid., II/52, n. 178: «Questa la mando per la via di Praga per la qual si spedirà in apresso ogni giovedì». On the transport of postal parcels, cf. the work by Giuseppe Miselli (1637–1695), papal postal official under Innocent XI Odescalchi (cf. «*Il Burattino veridico o vero istruzione generale per chi viaggia [...]*», (Roma: Per Michel'Ercole, 1682), here 167, 169: «Finisce questo dell'Imperio a Praga, Metropoli della Boemia, ove si rimettono le lettere per Egra, e per la Slesia, Lignitz, Glogau, Lubë, Brelsau, o Vratislavia, Olmuz, Troppau, Sagã, Znomo, Iglau Città della Moravia. [...], scrivendo da Roma per Polonia, l'Ordinario lascia il piego a Praga, acciò d'indi

connection (express post) between Vienna and Warsaw via the imperial representative in Poland, Johannes Christoph Zierwosky⁷³.

The same lines were used in the opposite direction. The *ordinari* mail via Prague arrived in Vienna on Saturday or Monday and left the imperial city again on Monday evening⁷⁴. The mail to Warsaw arrived on Wednesday (*colla posta di mercoledì*) and left the Polish residential city again on the same day⁷⁵. In general, the postal connection was quite reliable and brought a consignment from Vienna to Warsaw to its destination in 10 days, the *dispaccio* from Warsaw to Vienna in about 11 days (if arriving on Saturday) or 13 days (if arriving on Monday); the express mail after 8 to 9 days⁷⁶ (see Appendix I).

Thus, Francesco Buonvisi could usually take into account the letters sent from Poland approximately three weeks earlier and vice versa. To illustrate this in more detail: If nuncio Pallavicini received a letter sent from Vienna on 7 April 1683 (Wednesday), dated 29 March, he answered the *dispaccio* and sent the *replica* to the Viennese nuncio, who arrived on 19 April. This means that Francesco Buonvisi did not receive a reply to his letter of 29 March from Warsaw until 22 days later. Such a rhythm of communication was faithfully maintained by both nuncios until the end of Pallavicini's tenure at the end of September 1688.

THE ACTIVITIES OF TWO APOSTOLIC Nuncios IN THE SERVICE OF POPE INNOCENT XI ODESCALCHI (1676–1689)

It is clear that the Polish question formed an integral part of papal diplomacy and European politics. Thus, in particular, it was the persistent threat of the Turks that «gave the Polish nunciature a character of its own that set it apart from the other nunciatures until the beginning of the eighteenth century»⁷⁷. Reading the correspondence, it becomes clear that the two nuncios, Opizio Pallavicini and Francesco Buonvisi, were working to realise Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi's project of a united Christian front against the *comun nemico*⁷⁸. Moreover, the subject of the Turkish problem was so seriously addressed in the Polish-papal negotiations that all other religio-political questions were subordinated in the correspondence between Vienna and Warsaw. Buonvisi, for his part, kept a close eye on what was happening in Poland from Vienna, and as an expert on "Polish things" he reassured his *omologo* in Warsaw by constantly communicating his thoughts on the matter⁷⁹. Pallavicini, on the other hand,

sia inviato a Polonia». For the edition and interpretation of the work cf. Gaetano Platania, *Giuseppe Miselli. Tra la polvere delle strade e il lusso delle corti* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2014).

73 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/57, n. 14, *Opizio Pallavicini to Francesco Buonvisi*, Lviv 13 December 1686: «Spedendo costà il signore Residente Cesareo una staffetta, non ho voluto che venga senza i miei essequii a Vostra Eminenza, e senza le parole nuove, che posso parteciparle».

74 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/19, n. 120, 128 and 147 (Vienna 5 April 1683, 12 April 1683 and 26 April 1683).

75 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/49, n. 22, Warsaw 29 November 1680.

76 ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/19, n. 277 (Passau 23 August 1683): «Dalla lettera di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima delli 15 del corrente e dall'avviso di un Cavaliero habbiamo saputo la partenza del Re, e non ho stimato necessario spedire staffetta col piego di Vostra Signoria Illustrissima per il Signor Cardinal Cybo, perché le lettere che si spediranno mercordì arriveranno in 13 giorni et anderanno più sicure, oltre che già con le passate avvisai Sua Santità che il Re partiva e così haverà havuta la consolazione che Vostra Signoria Illustrissima desiderava di anticiparli. Non lascerò però di accennare il pensiero che ella haveva havuto».

77 Henryk Damian Wojtyska, "Zur Entstehung und Organisation der polnischen Nuntiatur bis 1572", *MÖStA*, n.33 (1980): 58-76, here 63 («der polnischen Nuntiatur einen eigenen Charakter verlieh, der sie von den anderen Nuntiaturen bis zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts abhob»).

78 Cf. on this Gaetano Platania, "Innocent XI Odescalchi et l'esprit de croisade", *XVII Siècle. La reconquête catholique en Europe centrale*, n. 50/2 (1998): 247-76, and the same, "Innocenzo XI Odescalchi e l'idea di Crociata al tempo della liberazione di Vienna", *Est Europa*, 2 (1986): 69-106.

79 See for example AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 183A, *Alderano Cybo to Opizio Pallavicini*, Rome 6 December 1681: f. 498r: «È piaciuto ancora alla Sua Santità ch'ella di tutto habbia fatta intera relazione al signor Cardinal Buonvisi, onde possa l'Eminenza Sua valersene opportunamente in quella corte».

was reassured by the constant advice he received from Buonvisi⁸⁰.

Thus, between 1680 and 1688, both papal diplomats followed the directives from Rome and Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi⁸¹, respectively, on two specific and constant guidelines: first, to form a strong anti-Ottoman alliance with Poland under John III Sobieski⁸² and second to drive the Polish kingdom to war against the Turks or to continue the war against the Turks⁸³, who were then conducting their greatest offensive in Europe. The pope's priority, and therefore that of the nuncios, was to found and maintain the Holy League⁸⁴ and to consolidate the Polish-Imperial union, and to remove all doubts and suspicions that complicated relations between the Polish sovereign and Leopold I Habsburg⁸⁵. The mediation of the Buonvisi *in concerto* with the Polish nuncio Pallavicini proved to be fundamental in overcoming all the difficulties inherent in the relations between the Polish sovereign and Leopold I⁸⁶.

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- 80 Cf. for example ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, III/48, n. 143, *Opizio Pallavicini to Francesco Buonvisi*, Lviv 20 October 1686: «La benignissima di Vostra Eminenza de i 7 è stata per me il filo d'Arianna per uscire da un Laborinto assai intricato».
- 81 Compliance with the directives from Rome concerning the foundation of the Holy League, or before that the foundation of a defensive league (*lega defensiva*), was taken very seriously in Rome. Buonvisi and Pallavicini were called to order by the Cardinal Secretary of the State to always pass on information to Rome: «Forse ho errato in non partecipare a Vostra Eminenza le prime notizie di monsignor Nunzio, ma stimai superfluo il farlo, finché egli non mi mandava le proposizioni digerite» (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 204, *Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo*, Ödenburg 28 December 1681, ff. 839r-v, here 839v.). The instructions of Pope Innocent XI are to be awaited in future negotiations: «[...] essendosegli pur anche di qua scritto di non avvanzarsi più in avvenire a tali negoziazioni, senza preciso ordine di Nostro Signore» (ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/36, n. 6, *Cybo to Buonvisi*, Rome 17 January 1682). The criticism is accepted by nuncio Buonvisi of limiting the autonomy of action in this *negozio*, respectively «che dà noi non si deve fare alcun passo, senza ordine preciso di Nostro Signore, che sa quello che vada fatto» (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 205, *Buonvisi to Cibo*, Vienna 8 February 1682, f. 86r).
- 82 The treaty between Leopold I and John III Sobieski was approved by the Polish Diet in the night between 17 and 18 April 1683, cf. Maria Letizia Siloni, «Il progetto di una *pace perpetua* tra polacchi e moscoviti nell'azione politico-diplomatica del cardinale Francesco Buonvisio, nunzio a Vienna», in *L'ombra della Russia sull'Europa di centro tra storia e letteratura* (secc. XV-XX), ed. Gaetano Platania (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2007), 165-83.
- 83 For example, in the unsuccessful Polish campaign in Moldavia in 1686 and in the subsequent effort of the nuncios to guarantee the preparations for a subsequent campaign, cf. on this unfortunate undertaking for example Maria Letizia Sileoni, «La difficile campagna militare anti-turca in Moldavia di Giovanni Sobieski (1686) nelle carte vaticane», in *L'Europa centro-orientale e il pericolo turco tra Sei e Settecento*, ed. Gaetano Platania (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2000), 173-91, and Fabio Marco Fabbri, «Da Vienna a Buda: il percorso della diplomazia», in Platania, *L'Europa di Giovanni Sobieski*, 337-68.
- 84 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 9, *Opizio Pallavicini to Alderano Cybo*, Warsaw 12 November 1681, ff. 623r-26v, here f. 624r: «Quando toccai qui queste materie, scrissi anco al signor Cardinal Bonvisi, dicendo come hora mi pareva tempo opportuno d'unire questo Re e l'Imperatore per un' fine sì necessario e sì utile ad ambe due. Sopra di che Sua Eminenza mi risponde d'haver parlato con Sua Maestà Cesarea e che la Maestà Sua le havea detto che per la lega difensiva era sempre pronta, ma che l'offensiva ricercava l'istesse considerazioni havutesi altre volte, perché il solo motivarla offendeva il Turco senza la sicurezza di concluderla. Non esserci in Polonia la Dieta né apparir dispositione prossima a convocarla. Sapersi le contradizioni del Regno et il poco segreto del negoziare, e però non poter dire cosa positiva sopra la lega offensiva, assicurava bensì d'esser sempre pronta alla difensiva».
- 85 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 206, *Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi*, Rome 27 November 1683, ff. 41v-2r: «Giungono qua notizie da più parti, che tra cotesta Corte, et il Re di Polonia nascono ogni di più delle diffidenze, e dell'ombre, le quali possono prorompere in manifeste scissure, e troncane nell maggiori urgenze il corso della lega con gravissimo sentimento di Sua Santità la quale non ha cosa, che le stia più a cuore della medesima lega, da cui sono uscite le vittorie e dipende lo stabilimento della sicurezza publica». Pallavicini with explicit instruction from Rome had to reaffirm negotiations around the Holy League, «il proprio zelo a promuovere quest'impresa, la quale sola può apportar la quiete e la sicurezza a quel Regno ed a tutto il remanente della Christianità confinante col Turco [...] al buon servizio di Sua Santità, la quale non ha certamente desiderio, né premura maggiore di questa, cioè di veder la Polonia armata a depressione della potenza Ottomana» (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Colonia*, vol. 221, *Alderano Cybo to Opizio Pallavicini*, Rome 24 August 1680, ff. 259r-v).
- 86 At the express command from Rome, the two nuncios began to work vigorously and together to ensure that the League was signed as soon as possible. Buonvisi told Pallavicini to move «in concerto con Vostra Signoria Illustrissima» (ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/19, n. 47, *Francesco Buonvisi to Opizio Pallavicini*, Vienna 8 February 1683). Alderano Cybo repeatedly emphasized to the two nuncios to work together, so he wrote to Opizio Pallavicini on 11 December 1683: «È stato effetto della sua diligente attenzione e del suo zelo l'haver tutto comunicato al signor Cardinal Buonvisi, con cui dovrà ella intendersi sì in questa come in ogn'altra cosa che riguardi e gl'affari della guerra, e il mantenimento stabile della lega istessa, poiché colla buona corrispondenza e salda unione di queste due potenze gran bene può farsi ai Regni, lor soggetti, et alla Christianità tutta» (AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Polonia*, vol. 185, ff. 124v-25r).

Vuole però Sua Santità che Vostra Eminenza, la quale si è acquistato un così gran merito nella conclusione, nel mantenimento sin hora di detta lega, procuri di ritrovare il fondo, e l'origine di dette diffidenze et usi dopo tutta la sua attenzione, e zelo per impedirne il male, che ne potrebbe nascere, con far riflettere all'Imperatore; et a suoi Ministri, che la liberazione di Vienna, et in conseguenza la salvezza degli stati di Sua Maestà Cesarea è nata principalmente dall'opportuno soccorso, e dal gran valore del Re di Polonia, [...] Vostra Eminenza può continuare ad intendersele con monsignore Nunzio Pallavicini per ricever da lui, e dargli i lumi necessari alla conservatione di un bene così grande, e così importante, com'è l'unione tra l'Imperatore e la Polonia. Di tutto quello che le anderà giungendo a notizia intorno alla diffidenze tra le parti⁸⁷.

As can be seen in the constant instructions of the correspondence, the efforts of the nuncios must always be aimed at achieving a resumption of negotiations in order to be able to turn their forces peacefully against the "common enemy", especially in Hungary, as a common interest of all Christendom⁸⁸. Cooperation between the nuncios is therefore always encouraged⁸⁹, because Cybo or the pope expected communicative action and reporting between the two: «Vostra Eminenza continui ad intendersele con monsignor nunzio in Polonia per dissipar d'accordo tutte le ombre, che potessero insorgere non meno dall'una, che dall'altra parte»⁹⁰.

Additionally, the issue of the continuous subsidies that the Holy See should grant in the fight against the Turks is a recurring theme of the correspondence. The requests for financial support to continue the campaigns are a recurring theme in the correspondence of the two nuncios⁹¹. The task of the two nuncios here was to inform the allies of the pope's constant obligation to send sums of money for the army's expenses or exhaustion of funds and to avoid jealousies between the two allies⁹². It was also due to the extensive mediation of diplomatic negotiations by Francesco Buonvisi in Vienna and Opizio Pallavicini in Warsaw that Innocent XI Odescalchi succeeded⁹³ in having an alliance concluded between Emperor Leopold I and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in April 1683⁹⁴.

The constant effort and the alliance were to lead to a great victory on 12 September 1683, forcing the Turks to flee in haste towards Belgrade: «A memorable victory that not only saved Vienna, the capital of the Empire, but also the whole of Europe, which saw the disappearance of a danger that had threatened it for centuries»⁹⁵.

87 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 206, Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi, Rome 27 November 1683, ff. 41v-2r.

88 This includes gathering information about Sobieski's actual relations with Tököly and to report it to the Emperor in order to convince him of the Polish king's good faith and loyalty, cf. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 38, Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi, Rome 8 January 1684, ff. 274v-75v. Cf. in detail Péter Tusor, "La Santa Sede e l'Ungheria durante il pontificato di Innocenzo XI", in Bösel, *Innocenzo XI Odescalchi*, 209-20 and Agostino Borromeo, "Le direttrici della politica antiottomana della Santa Sede durante il pontificato di Innocenzo XI (1676-1689)", RHM, n. 26 (1984): 303-30.

89 The cooperation is repeatedly evident in the correspondence, for example ASL, Archivio Buonvisi, II/19, n. 352: «Gratissimo mi è stato l'avviso che Vostra Signoria Illustrissima mi ha dato con la benignissima sua delli X del corrente»; Ibid., II/51, n. 82: «Ho la benignissima di Vostra Eminenza de' 13 corrente, e dopo haverle reso humilissime gratie per una communicatione che a me è di sommo gusto e profitto per le gravi e belle riflessioni che fa sulle materie delle quali cade il discorso, risponderò a quel ch'occorre et avviserò quello che so e non stimo immeritevole d'esser partecipato a Vostra Eminenza».

90 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 206, Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi, Rome 11 December 1683, ff. 43v-4r, here f. 43v.

91 Cf. Platania, *Santa Sede e sussidi per la Guerra contro il Turco*, 103-38.

92 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 38, Alderano Cybo to Francesco Buonvisi, Rome 23 February 1686, ff. 655v-56r.

93 It is clearly evident that although the nuncios appeared independently on the political stage and mediated between the two courts with great skill, this was done only with «ordine preciso di Nostro Signore, che sa quello che vada fatto» and no step was taken without his instruction («che da noi non si deve fare alcun passo», cf. AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 205, Francesco Buonvisi to Alderano Cybo, Vienna 8 February 1682, f. 96r).

94 Stefano Pifferi, "Papa Odescalchi dai trionfi del "possesso della cattedra" a quelli della lega santa polacco-imperiale del 1683", in Platania, *L'Europa di Giovanni Sobieski*, 139-78, here 150.

95 Gaetano Platania, "Le fonti per la storia dell'Europa orientale: la Polonia e la Santa Sede", in *Gli archivi della Santa Sede come fonte per la storia moderna e contemporanea*, eds. Matteo Sanfilippo and Giovanni Pizzorusso (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2001), 133-235, here 162: «Una memorabile vittoria che non salvò solo Vienna, capitale dell'impero, ma l'intera Europa: quest'ultima vide così allontanarsi un pericolo che da secoli la minacciava costantemente».

CONCLUSION

Francesco Buonvisi and Opizio Pallavicini perfectly fulfilled the directives of Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi in the course of their legations, which Gaetano Platania defined as a «constructive and indispensable contribution»⁹⁶. Both can be described as the great builders of the Holy League, that is, the maintenance of the League itself and its extension on the alliance to other Christian powers, especially Venice and Muscovy.

At the end of this overall picture, it should be noted that the correspondence between the two papal diplomats from 1680 to 1688 offers far more than a truthful panorama of the religio-political relations between Rome, Vienna and Warsaw during these years. The most striking feature of the volume of letters (from Vienna to Poland and from Poland to Vienna) is the extraordinary richness of detailed information. A serious study of the correspondence produced by the two important papal diplomats during their legations at the imperial court and in Poland therefore seems necessary not only to make a further contribution to the history of the events considering Pope Innocent XI Odescalchi, but also to offer a clearer understanding for the study of the history of the relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the imperial court and the papacy, as well as for the understanding of the political and diplomatic history of Europe in the early modern period⁹⁷.

96 Platania, *Odescalchi e l'idea di "Crociata"*, 93-4. Commenting on her performance, Pierre Blet writes: «La délivrance de Vienne était l'œuvre de la diplomatie du pape Innocent XI et de ses nonces, qui avaient su réunir contre l'envahisseur les armées de la Pologne avec celles de l'Empire». Pierre Blet, *Les nonces du pape à la cour de Louis XIV* (Paris: Perrin, 2002), 398.

97 Cf. Platania, *Le fonti per la storia*, 163, 171.

RHYTHM OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN FRANCESCO BUONVISI AND OPIZIO PALLAVICINI (17 MARCH TO 3 MAY 1683)⁹⁸

Postal consignment	Confirmation of the letters	Buonvisi to Pallavicini	Pallavicini to Buonvisi	Confirmation of the letters	Postal consignment
			17.03. (We), Warsaw		<i>Staffetta</i> (express delivery)
<i>Ordinario</i> (regular delivery)		19.03. (Fr), Vienna			
			21.03. (So), Warsaw	–	<i>Spedizione straordinaria</i> (extraordinary expedition)
<i>Ordinario</i>	10.03.	22.03. (Mo), Vienna			
			24.03. (We), Warsaw	No arrival of letters	<i>Ordinario</i> [24.03. – trattenuta dall'acque]
<i>Ordinario</i>	17.03. (Arrival: 24.03.)	29.03. (Mo), Vienna			
			31.03. (We), Warsaw	14.03. 15.03. 19.03. 22.03.	<i>Ordinario</i>
<i>Ordinario</i>	21.03. (Arrival: 29.03.)	05.04. (Mo), Vienna			
			07.04. (We), Warsaw	29.03.	<i>Ordinario</i>
<i>Ordinario</i>	24.03. 31.03. (Arrival: 10.04.)	12.04. (Mo), Vienna	12.04. (Mo), Warsaw	–	<i>Staffetta</i>
			14.04. (We), Warsaw	05.04.	
			18.04. (So), Warsaw		<i>Spedizione straordinaria</i>
<i>Ordinario</i>	07.04.	19.04. (Mo), Vienna			<i>Ordinario</i>
			21.04. (We), Warsaw	12.04.	<i>Ordinario</i>
<i>Ordinario</i>	14.04. (Arrival: 24.04.)	26.04. (Mo), Vienna			
			26.04. (Mo), Warsaw	–	<i>Ordinario</i>
			28.04. (We), Warsaw	19.04.	<i>Ordinario</i>
<i>Ordinario</i>	21.04.	03.05. (Mo), Vienna			

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Cf. the original letters of Opizio Pallavicini in: ASL, *Archivio Buonvisi*, II/45, n. 70 (17 March); n. 69 (21 March); n. 67 (24 March); n. 58 (31 March); n. 66 (07 April); n. 65 (12 April); n. 61 (14 April); n. 76 (18 April); n. 60 (21 April); n. 103 (26 April); n. 74 (28 April). The autograph minutes of the Buonvisi can be found in ASL, *Archivio Buonvisi*, II/19, n. 94 (19 March); n. 98 (22 March); n. 114 (29 March); n. 120 (05 April); n. 128 (12 April); n. 135 (19 April); n. 147 (26 April); n. 154 (03 May).

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

ANP: *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae*, t. I-LVII (Romae/Cracoviae: 1990–2021).

ASL: Archivio di Stato di Lucca.

BAV: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana.

Ottob. Lat.: *Fondo Ottoboniano Latino*.

DBI: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 100 vols (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Treccani, 1960–2020, 100).

MÖStA: *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*.

QFIAB: *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*.

RHM: *Römische Historische Mitteilungen*.

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Mihalik Béla Vilmos**INSTITUTE OF HISTORY, RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE HUMANITIES,
EÖTVÖS LORÁND RESEARCH NETWORK (HUNGARY)****THE KING'S COUSIN, THE EMPEROR'S BISHOP. CHRISTIAN AUGUST OF SAXE-ZEITZ
AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN POLAND AND THE HOLY SEE¹****ABSTRACT**

Christian August of Saxe-Weitz played a decisive role in the election of his cousin, Augustus II to King of Poland, when he converted Augustus to Catholicism in 1697. Christian August, also a convert, gained the sympathy of the Holy See in the early 1690s, and became Bishop of Győr in Hungary in 1696. After the conversion and the turbulent election of his cousin, the bishop tried to mediate toward the Holy See and helped to consolidate the rule of Augustus II. In return a hope was growing, that Christian August will be elevated to cardinalate with the support of his cousin and the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I. Although Augustus II earlier nominated Johann Philipp von Lamberg, the Bishop of Passau as Polish candidate, the aging Pope Innocent XII admitted also that the cardinalate of Christian August would be "the coronation of his pontificate". The paper examines the intermediary activity of Christian August of Saxe-Weitz and his failed nomination to cardinalate.

KEYWORDS: Diplomacy; Holy See; Poland; Conversion; Election.

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INTRODUCTION

The *interregnum*, which followed the death of John III Sobieski in 1696 and then the election of a new king in 1697 is a well researched period in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth². The thoroughly explored wide-ranging diplomatic manoeuvres shed lights on several protagonists and background actors, who formed the final decision. One of the episode characters stepped in the spotlight, when Frederick Augustus, the Elector of Saxony had to convert to Catholicism for the sake of his election to the Polish throne. This actor was his second cousin, Christian August of Saxe-Weitz, then the Bishop of Győr³ in Hungary and an increasingly important and influential figure of the Viennese court. Christian August was the prelate, in whose presence Frederick Augustus abjured the Lutheranism and accepted the Catholic creed on 1 June 1697 in the Loretto Chapel in Baden, near Vienna⁴.

The conversion of Augustus was a key moment for his election, but his cousin seemingly disappeared from the scene. Still his role was not marginal in the following period, because the sincerity of Augustus' conversion became a major issue. The Polish laws ruled out the election of a non-Catholic sovereign, and many of the participants at the Election *sejm* doubted the conversion. Of course this dubiety was fuelled by the oppositionist party and especially its leader, Cardinal Michał Stefan Radziejowski, Primate of Poland, who supported the French candidate, François Louis, Prince de Conti, a distant nephew of Louis XIV, from a cadet branch of the House of Bourbon⁵.

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2 Gaetano Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit. Dai Sobieski ai Wettin. La diplomazia pontificia nella Polonia di fine Seicento* (Cosenza: Periferia, 1992), 125-71.; Markus Milewski, *Die polnische Königswahl von 1697* (Wien: Studienverlag, 2008); Francesca De Caprio, *Il tramonto di un Regno. Il declino di Jan Sobieski dopo il trionfo di Vienna* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2014) 291-37.

3 Győr was known in contemporary sources as Raab in German, Giavarino in Italian and Jaurinum in Latin.

4 De Caprio, *Il tramonto di un Regno*, 313. Baden is known today as Baden bei Wien.

5 Milewski, *Die polnische Königswahl*, 142, 149-50.

In this delicate situation it was crucial whether the Holy See will approve the conversion of Augustus. At this point the apostolic nuncio, Gianantonio Davia had a decisive role, because *sejm* requested him to confirm the conversion⁶. Abbot Melchior Polignac, the French ambassador to Poland made no scruples to write a denunciative letter to the Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada, that Gianantonio Davia, the apostolic nuncio to Poland supported Augustus almost openly, thus passing the Catholic country into the hand of a heretic⁷.

The question of the Polish succession obviously was not an indifferent issue in Vienna as well. Although the relation with Sobieski was rather cold in the last decade of his reign, the maintenance of the anti-Ottoman Holy League with Poland and Venice was a crucial question for the Habsburgs. Emperor Leopold I found himself in a two-front war in 1688, when Louis XIV attacked the Holy Roman Empire. After 1691, the campaigns against the Ottoman Empire were mostly unsuccessful, turning into a static warfare. From 1695, Frederick Augustus was the supreme commander of the imperial army against the Ottomans, but his efforts were unsuccessful. During the tense days of the election in Poland, the peace negotiation had been already in progress between the Habsburgs and Louis XIV. But the Viennese court obviously needed a friendly ally on the Polish throne, who did not pose a threat on the Habsburgs and continue the war against the Ottomans more vigorously than John Sobieski in his last years⁸.

In that complex international situation the diplomatic activity of Christian August, Bishop of Győr gained smaller attention, but in terms of the consolidation of the rule of Augustus II. was not irrelevant. Christian August's role in the conversion of the king made him important in the trilateral relations between Rome, Warsaw and Vienna and it might had been decisive in the later career of the bishop. Therefore, first we briefly look over the early phase of his career, then we examine Christian August's diplomatic role in 1697, and finally we explore the background of his nomination as cardinal-candidate in 1699–1700.

THE EMPEROR'S BISHOP

Christian August was born on 9 October 1666 in Moritzburg as a younger son of Duke Maurice of Saxe-Weimar and Dorothea Maria of Saxe-Weimar, thus a member of the Wettin dynasty. Although Christian August was the first cousin of John Georg III, Elector of Saxony, the father of Augustus II, the two princes were in the same age, as Christian August was only four years senior to the future Polish king. As the Electors of Saxony were the heads of the Corpus Evangelicorum in the Holy Roman Empire, the Wettin dynasty was a strictly Lutheran family. However, Christian August had already begun to sympathise with Catholicism in his young age, which did not avoid the attention of his guardian, the Duke of Saxe-Eisenach, who ordered Lutheran preachers to oversee the young prince. The duke also threatened Christian August that if he convert to Catholicism, he will lose his inheritance⁹. Anyway as a younger son, Christian August would not had got too much hope for a remarkable inheritance and therefore initially he was interested in a military career. He joined the Christian armies that marched against the Ottomans and he fought in the siege of the Hungarian capital, Buda, in 1686. Three years later he already was at the western front to fight against the French armies. Despite his military career his interest in Catholicism did not disappear. In 1689, after he attended a homily held by a Jesuit priest in Aschaffenburg, he finally decided to convert. His conversion took place in Frankfurt at the Carmelites on 14 July 1689, but for some years he still kept it in secret in regard to his family¹⁰.

6 De Caprio, *Il tramonto di un Regno*, 320.

7 Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 140.

8 Béla Vilmos Mihalik, "Catholics, heretics and the "common enemy". Papal diplomacy and the Great Turkish War during the papacy of Innocent XII, 1691–1700", in *Confessional Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Roberta Anderson and Charlotte Backerra (London-New York: Routledge, 2021), 40, 44–5.

9 Lakatos Adél, "Sachsen-Zeitz Keresztély Ágost", in *Esztergomi érsekek 1001–2003* [Archbishops of Esztergom], ed. Beke Margit (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2003), 326.

10 Kelemen Atanáz, *Keresztély Ágost herceg katolikus restaurációs tevékenysége a győri egyházmegyében* [Prince Christian

Two years later, probably in relation to the death of his cousin, Elector John George III of Saxony, Christian August publicly converted to Catholicism in Cologne in the presence of the Elector-Archbishop Joseph Clemens of Bavaria. At the same year he was admitted to the priest seminary of Cologne¹¹. With his conversion he gained attention immediately both in Vienna and in Rome. Gianantonio Davia, then the apostolic nuncio to Cologne, highly recommended Christian August to Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada, suggesting that Pope Innocent XII (Antonio Pignatelli) should demonstrate his grace toward the young prince with granting him different indulgencies through the *Dataria gratis*¹². During Christian August's tour to Rome in 1692–1693 the pope also issued in his favour a breve of eligibility. Although he was not ordained to priesthood until 1695, beside the Chapter of Cologne he gained in the following years canonry in Liège (Lüttich), Breslau (Wrocław) and Münster also¹³.

Christian August came into consideration as a possible Grand Master of the Teutonic Order in 1694. He had connections with the Order already in the 1680s, because according to the testament of his father, he succeeded the duke in the evangelical Bailiwick of Thuringia, a territorial unity of the Teutonic Order. Following his conversion Christian August lost immediately his incomes from the bailiwick. In early 1694, Ludwig Anton of Pfalz-Neuburg, then the Grand Master of the Order tried to help the Prince of Saxe-Weitz to regain the administration and the income in Thuringia, but he died before the resolution¹⁴. Following the death of Ludwig Anton, Christian August told Gianantonio Davia, the nuncio to Cologne, that even the Palatinate family had recommended him to Emperor Leopold, although a younger brother of the late Grand Master, Franz Ludwig of Pfalz-Neuburg, then the Bishop of Breslau (Wrocław) had a stronger chance to be the successor. Christian August expected himself to be the next Grand Master, considering that the family of the Elector of Palatinate suffered from the lack of children, and therefore, if Franz Ludwig had to marry, he could not have obtained a papal dispensation as Grand Master¹⁵.

Although finally Franz Ludwig became the Grand Master, the good relationship between Christian August and Pfalz-Neuburgs provided him fructuous connections to the Viennese court. Christian August as an offspring of a Lutheran dynasty had a lack of network of supporters in the Catholic establishment. But his friendly connections with the Pfalz-Neuburg family meant an entry to the Habsburg court, since Ludwig Anton and Franz Ludwig were brother-in-laws of the Emperor through their sister, Empress Eleonore Magdalene of Pfalz-Neuburg. This connection opened the door for a further ecclesiastical career, though not as much in the Holy Roman Empire as in Hungary¹⁶.

After the bishopric see of Győr became vacant in 1695, Emperor Leopold I as king of Hungary nominated Christian August¹⁷. In Vienna it was said to be that the royal nomination was in accordance with the

August's Activity for the Catholic Restoration in the Diocese of Győr] (Pannonhalma: s.n. 1931), 11. Other historians disputed the inner urge and personal conviction of Christian August for his conversion, and emphasized the role of major opportunities for a career as Catholic: William Fischer, "Cardinal Herzog Christian August zu Sachsen-Weitz und die Deutschordensballei Thüringen", *Mitteilungen des Altertumsvereins zu Plauen im Vogtland*, 3 (1882–1883): 18.

11 Kelemen, *Keresztély Ágost herceg*, 11.

12 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Colonia*, vol. 72, Gianantonio Davia to Fabrizio Spada (cipher), Cologne 20 April 1692, f. 47r.

13 Jochen Vötsch, "Christian August von Sachsen-Weitz", in *Sächsische Biografie*, hrsg. vom Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V. Online edition: <http://www.isgv.de/saebi/> (27 March 2021). Christian August stayed in Rome in April 1693, mostly managing ecclesiastical affairs: Friedrich Noack, *Das Deutschtum in Rom seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters*, vol. I. (Berlin-Leipzig: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1927) 175.

14 Fischer, "Cardinal Herzog Christian August", 15–7.

15 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Colonia*, vol. 77, Gianantonio Davia to Fabrizio Spada, Cologne 23 May 1694, ff. 399r–400r. Most of the brothers from the Pfalz-Neuburg family entered a church career, while Elector Johann Wilhelm II was childless, and his younger brother, Charles Philip had only one daughter.

16 Alessandro Cont, *La Chiesa dei principi. Le relazioni tra Reichskirche, dinastie sovrane tedesche e stati italiani (1688–1763)*, con prefazione di Elisabeth Garms-Cornides (Trento: Provincia autonoma di Trento, 2018) 140–41.

17 The former Bishop of Győr was the influential Viennese statesman, Cardinal Leopold Kollonich, who became Archbishop of Esztergom and thus the Primate of Hungary in 1695: Mihalik Béla Vilmos, "Kollonich Lipót esztergomi érseki kinevezése és Francesco Maria de' Medici bíboros-protector" [The Cardinal-Protector Francesco Maria de' Medici and the Nomination of Leopold Kollonich as Archbishop of Esztergom], *Magyar Sion*, XIV (2020): 323–38. Francesco Maria Abbati, the auditor of the Viennese nunciatur reported the nomination to Rome on 21 April 1696: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato*.

papal intentions, and even the auditor of the nunciature suggested that in case of Christian August they might be able to dispense with the usual personal examination of the candidate¹⁸. But after the prince arrived to Vienna, he personally asked Abbati to conduct the usual examination to not to become unworthy in the eyes of Pope Innocent XII. The only problem was his age, because he was still under 30. Abbati also proposed to remit all the fees (*annata*) due to the circumstances of the diocese of Győr¹⁹. After the new nuncio, Andrea Santacroce arrived to Vienna, Christian August visited him, and they had a really friendly and confidential conversation, where the new bishop expressed his sincere appreciation toward the Holy See. Nuncio Santacroce also assured the new bishop from the support of the pope, emphasizing that his rapid ascension, his conversion, the priesthood, and then the episcopal title show that God has great plans for him²⁰.

THE KING'S COUSIN

Shortly after the conversion of Christian August the hopes increased that other members of the Saxon electoral dynasty would follow his example. He assured Davia, the nuncio to Cologne, that his brother, Moritz Wilhelm, Duke of Saxe-Weitz would convert to Catholicism, and only the political circumstances hindered him²¹.

While this hope had ultimately not fulfilled, the conversion of the Elector of Saxony seemed much more unexpected. Although the unexpectedness of his conversion quite questionable. Presumably as early as February 1697, Augustus's plan for the candidacy for the Polish throne may have been known in a smaller circle²². This coincides with the information that Abbot Paolo della Stufa wrote to his lord, Cardinal Francesco Maria de' Medici, the protector of the Austrian Habsburg countries a month after the conversion. According to his report, Christian August had obtained secretly a papal faculty for converting any heretics, months before the conversion²³. The information of Abbot Stufa coincided with a report written by Franz Pröller, the Jesuit confessor of Christian August, which claimed, that the thought of conversion had arisen in the elector about a quarter year earlier²⁴. Probably it was a version of the attestation issued by Christian August to the election *sejm*, and which was first validated by the Gianantonio Davia, then nuncio to Warsaw and which authenticity was questioned by Cardinal Radziejewski²⁵.

Germania, vol. 233, *Foglio d'avvisi*, f. 269r-v.

18 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 233, *Francesco Maria Abbati to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 5 May 1696, f. 299r.

19 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 233, *Francesco Maria Abbati to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 2 June 1696, f. 340r-v. The city of Győr situated near Vienna, and the diocese extended along the Austrian and Hungarian border. Contrary to Abbati's claim, the diocese of Győr was one of the richest among the Hungarian dioceses. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the episcopal title of Győr could be the top of the ecclesiastical career in Hungary beside the archdiocese of Esztergom: Molnár Antal, *Magyar hódoltság, horvát hódoltság. Magyar és horvát katolikus egyházi intézmények az oszmán uralom alatt* [Ottoman Hungary – Ottoman Croatia. Hungarian and Croatian Catholic ecclesiastical institutions under Ottoman rule] (Budapest: BTK TTI, 2019) 226, 246.

20 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 233, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 14 July 1696, ff. 430r-31r.

21 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Colonia*, vol. 72, *Gianantonio Davia to Fabrizio Spada*, Cologne 30 March 1692, f. 44r-v. The duke finally converted only in 1717, shortly before his death: Jochen Vötsch, "Moritz Wilhelm von Sachsen-Zeitz", in *Sächsische Biografie*, hrsg. vom Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V. Online edition: <http://www.isgv.de/saebi/> (29 March 2021)

22 De Caprio, *Il tramonto di un Regno*, 311.

23 ASF, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, *Francesco Maria de' Medici*, b. 5725, *Paolo della Stufa to Francesco Maria de' Medici*, Rome 20 July 1697. The cardinal quickly reported that information to the influential Jesuit, Pietro Giuseppe Ederi in Vienna: ASF, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, *Francesco Maria de' Medici*, b. 5647, *Francesco Maria de' Medici to Pietro Giuseppe Ederi*, Florence 27 July 1697.

24 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Narratio Conversionis ad Catholicam Fidem Serenissimi Saxoniae Electoris*, f. 516r-v.

25 De Caprio, *Il tramonto di un Regno*, 319. Davia defended his action that the elector seemed to have lived as a secret Catholic, even if he had not won the Polish throne. Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 133. But it is also true that Davia was obligated to the Elector of Saxon, who had just arranged in these months to ransom the nuncio's nephew

However the conversion seemed to be a surprise in the Viennese court. At the end of June the nuncio informed Rome with noticeable disappointment that the Saxon and Danish troops marched toward Poland to help the election of Augustus instead of joining the forces in Hungary²⁶. Nuncio Andrea Santacroce were informed only on this very same day's morning by the Jesuit confessor of Christian August about the conversion of Augustus. In his ordinary report he just mentioned that Father Pröller visited him and told him that the bishop had met twice with Augustus in early June, they had three hours long meeting each time. The Jesuit father promised that the bishop will inform the nuncio soon about very gratifying developments²⁷. But on the same day Santacroce wrote a cipher to the Cardinal Secretary, in which he already informed the Roman court about the conversion of Augustus based on news from Poland. As former nuncio to Warsaw, Santacroce expressed his fears that such a questionable change of faith will cause dangerous turmoils in Poland²⁸. The Holy See also expressed its concerns about the double election, but in his first reactions the pope praised the Bishop of Győr and the conversion of the Elector of Saxony. No doubts or questions about the conversion were written to the Viennese nuncio in the answers of the Cardinal Secretary²⁹.

Santacroce seemed to be more relieved after he talked personally with Christian August, who secured the nuncio, that the elected king is showing clear signs of being a good Catholic. But in Saxony there was a fear and mistrust about what will cause the conversion of their elector in the religious matters. According to Christian August some Saxon statesmen asked him to travel to Saxony, and also the Emperor asked him upon this³⁰. In Saxony the political situation went indeed upside-down. The Saxon estates resisted to obey to Prince Anton Egon von Fürstemberg, who was deputed as governor in Dresden, and they required Christian August instead of Fürstemberg. The Viennese nuncio was dubious how sincere the request of the Lutheran Saxon estates was, because the bishop was a zealous Catholic and he was the most important actor in the conversion of the Elector. Christian August was urgently called by his cousin to Warsaw, therefore the request of the Saxon nobility could not be fulfilled at the summer of 1697³¹.

The departure of Christian August caused a problem to the Viennese nuncio, because Rome requested Santacroce to acquire an authentic account from the bishop, which described in detail the form of the abjuration and the profession of the Catholic faith made by Augustus³². The hesitancy of the Roman court was caused most probably by the intervention of the French resident, Cardinal Toussaint de Forbin-Janson, who tried to discredit nuncio Davia and the authenticity of Augustus' conversion³³. On the other hand the imperial court was puzzled about the hesitation of the Holy See over the Polish election, if Christian August had already sent a handwritten account to nuncio Davia in June³⁴.

from Tatar captivity with a Turkish pasha who was captured by the Elector: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 20 April 1697, ff. 299r-300r.

- 26 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 29 June 1697, ff. 479r-80r. Augustus as appointed chief commander of the Christian forces left Vienna to Dresden two weeks earlier, promising the emperor, that he would come back soon: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 15 June 1697, ff. 438r-39r.
- 27 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 29 June 1697, f. 475r-v.
- 28 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 221, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada* (cipher), Vienna 29 June 1697, f. 401r-v.
- 29 ASR, Archivio Santacroce, b. 1169, *Fabrizio Spada to Andrea Santacroce* (in two letters), Rome 13 July 1697.
- 30 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 13 July 1697, ff. 559r-60v.
- 31 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 221, *Foglio d'avvisi*, Vienna 20 July 1697, ff. 474r-75r. Christian August left Vienna to Cracow in the first days of August: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Foglio d'avvisi*, Vienna, 3 August 1697, f. 611r-v.
- 32 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 43, *Fabrizio Spada to Andrea Santacroce*, Rome, 20 July 1697, ff. 284v-85r. The nuncio answered the Cardinal Secretary that all the acts of Augustus, and mostly the public abjuration and profession had clarified the situation and therefore he had not yet wrote to Christian August for requiring another authentic account: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, 10 August 1697, f. 630r-v.
- 33 Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 141. Finally in autumn 1697, after the coronation of Augustus and the disembarkment of Prince de Conti in Gdańsk, the Holy See ordered Davia to leave to Varmia, to avoid any involvement in the tense domestic political situation: De Caprio, *Il tramonto di un Regno*, 324.
- 34 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 221, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna, 3 August 1697, ff. 493v-94r. The

The irresolution of the Holy See did not change in the following period either. Although in late July the Cardinal Secretary wrote to Santacroce that the arriving news from Vienna had made the pope and the court to believe in the conversion of Augustus, they still waited for further signs of the new sovereign's filial submission toward the Holy See³⁵. It is hardly surprising that in August Santacroce informed with some satisfaction the Cardinal Secretary through an extraordinary courier that the king's ambassador was on his way to Rome. Augustus II sent his adjutant, Le Jay to Rome, and was ready to assure the pope that he will support the Catholic cause not just in Poland, but also in Saxony. Augustus sent his envoy with letters not only to the pope and the Cardinal Secretary, but other prominent cardinals in Rome, trying to persuade the Sacred College about his conversion and to win their support as well³⁶.

Christian August met nuncio Santacroce again after he had returned from Cracow. The bishop informed Santacroce that the Polish estates wanted him to stay in Poland and be a mediator between the king and the nobility. However Christian August refused it, arguing that as a bishop he was responsible for his diocese³⁷. With this argument he might have wanted to gain the nuncio's support for his request on a papal permission, which allows him to stay away from his diocese for a longer time. Christian August probably already knew by this time that the king had further plans with him, as Augustus II had sent him to Saxony before the coronation in September. At the end of August 1697 the pope issued a faculty to Christian August that let him a six months long absence from the diocese of Győr³⁸.

On the same day the Cardinal Secretary sent an instruction in cipher to nuncio Santacroce, requesting again an authentic account signed by Augustus II, that reflects on his abjuration and the profession. But the Holy See seemingly lowered the demands, because as Cardinal Spada wrote, it would have been enough a letter or a detailed attestation by Christian August, if he could not obtain a signed document from the king. Spada emphasised, that they needed this letter only to keep it in the Secret Archives to prove in present and in future the glorious conversion of Augustus II. Spada also expressed that the Holy See and its representatives must have taken an indifferent position in the tense political situation, which followed the double election. Even Pope Innocent XII showed himself indifferent when he received the envoy of Augustus II. He expressed his joy over the king's conversion, but did not take any sides in the political dispute³⁹.

That kind of politics of the Holy See proved to be sufficiently far-sighted soon. Although Augustus was crowned in Cracow by the Bishop of Cuiavia on 15 September 1697, his reign was still unsolid. Two weeks later the French candidate, Prince de Conti arrived to Poland with a small army, but his case was already lost by that time. The internal tensions and uncertainties were much bigger problem for the new king. Cardinal Radziejowski still opposed his election, and Augustus II could not count on the diplomatic support of the Holy See in this situation⁴⁰. That lack of support from the papal

nuncio did not speak personally with Emperor Leopold I about the Polish election, he heard the Emperor's sentiments from the imperial Capuchin confessor, Marco d'Aviano. Santacroce was also a bit surprised about the conduct of the Roman court that he expressed in a private letter to his brother: ASR, Archivio Santacroce, b. 1226, *Andrea Santacroce to Antonio Santacroce*, Vienna 3 August 1697. Cardinal Secretary Fabrizio Spada defended their position that in Rome they had not received any authentic report about the conversion: AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 219, *Fabrizio Spada to Andrea Santacroce*, Rome 17 August 1697, ff. 369v-70r.

35 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 43, *Fabrizio Spada to Andrea Santacroce*, Rome 27 July 1697, ff. 293v-94r.

36 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 13 August 1697, ff. 637r-40r. Santacroce mentioned in this letter that Christian August of Saxe-Weitz arrived back from Cracow to Vienna on that same day (13 August), but it is not clear, whether he travelled together with the king's envoy, Le Jay. The envoy most probably brought the letter of Augustus written on 6 August, that was answered by the pope only in January 1698: Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 148.

37 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 17 August 1697, ff. 654r-56r.

38 AAV, *Epistolae ad Principes, Registri*, vol. 82, *Innocent XII. to Christian August*, Rome 31 August 1697, ff. 43r-4v.

39 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 219, *Fabrizio Spada to Andrea Santacroce* (cipher), Rome 31 August 1697, ff. 372v-73r.

40 De Caprio, *Il tramonto di un Regno*, 325-26. Nuncio Santacroce in October 1697 informed his brother about such news that in Poland a conspiracy was revealed by the supporters of Augustus II. The originator of the conspiracy was said to be Cardinal Radziejowski. Santacroce did not want to report this to the Cardinal Secretary, because the news were insecure,

diplomacy was balanced only partly by the good connections of Christian August in Rome.

The bishop was also a mediator of Augustus toward the imperial court. Although Vienna initially supported other candidates⁴¹, the Emperor was absolutely satisfied with the outcome of the election according to the nuncio to Vienna. Santacroce wrote to his brother, that the Viennese court had been behind the successful election of Augustus II, and beside him only Emperor Leopold I and Count Franz Ulrich Kinsky, the Chancellor of Bohemia had known the plans, which were kept in absolute secret⁴².

As it was mentioned in the introduction, the most important aim of the Habsburgs was the election of a candidate, who was not a Francophile, but willing to support the Holy League's war against the Ottomans. This became an important issue in Polish-Habsburg relations in the autumn of 1697, after the coronation of Augustus II. The Viennese court was still indebted to Augustus with the service pay of the Saxony military fought on the Hungarian front. They sent the 30'000 florins with Christian August to Poland in September⁴³. After the bishop returned from Poland, nuncio Santacroce assumed that Augustus II sent his cousin back to Vienna for negotiating about the Turkish war⁴⁴. However, Christian August should have discussed in the imperial court mostly about the still labile political situation of the king. But it was clear that the French intrigues hindered Poland to turn against the Ottomans with significant forces. According to Santacroce, it was a real reason of France to help out the failing Ottoman forces⁴⁵. Just in autumn 1697, the Treaty of Rijswijk ended the Nine Years' War that let the Habsburgs to turn against the Ottomans with all their forces. Four days before the coronation of Augustus, the Christian armies led by Prince Eugen of Savoy delivered a devastating blow to the Ottoman forces at Zenta. In 1698, there was no major military movement in Hungary, and in the autumn preparations for peace talks began, which led to the Treaty of Karlowitz in January 1699⁴⁶.

The French and Ottoman threaten noticeably bothered Augustus II, whose letters were still unanswered by the Holy See. According to his information, Prince de Conti had been prepared to disembarkment in the Ottoman Empire, and reach Poland from that direction. Through his envoy to Rome, the king tried to explore, what would be the position of the pope in such case. Abbot Paolo della Stufa, the agent of Cardinal de' Medici reported to his lord, that he had spoken with two cardinals, who claimed that the seemingly neutral position of the papal court was derived from the personal pressure from Louis XIV. The abbot heard that a request of Christian August for apostolic missionary faculties were denied by the Holy See, which in della Stufa's view would have been a clear sign of the complete questioning of Augustus' conversion⁴⁷.

and due to his former conflict with Radziejowski as nuncio in Poland he would have made his report look as simple allegations against the Primate of Poland: ASR, Archivio Santacroce, b. 1226, *Andrea Santacroce to Antonio Santacroce*, Vienna 26 October 1697.

41 The main candidates supported by the Habsburg court were the younger brother of the Emperor, Charles of Pfalz-Neuburg and the nephew of the Emperor, Charles of Lorraine. But even in Vienna they were considered as candidates with lesser chance: Milewski, *Die polnische Königswahl*, 38.

42 ASR, Archivio Santacroce, b. 1226, *Andrea Santacroce to Antonio Santacroce*, Vienna 6 July 1697. Santacroce's information should be treated with caution. In an instruction sent on June 22, three days before the election, Emperor Leopold ordered his ambassador to Poland, Johann Philipp von Lamberg, Bishop of Passau, to support the candidacy of Margrave Louis William of Baden also: Milewski, *Die polnische Königswahl*, 321.

43 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 7 September 1697, ff. 709r-10r. The nuncio described in detail the grave financial situation of the Habsburgs, they had to lend money from Don Livio Odescalchi, the nephew of the late Pope Innocent XI to be able to pay out Augustus II. In exchange they gave to Don Livio the Duchy of Syrmia in South Hungary (now part of Serbia).

44 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 19 October 1697, f. 815r-v. The bishop arrived back to Vienna on 18 October.

45 ASR, Archivio Santacroce, b. 1226, *Andrea Santacroce to Antonio Santacroce*, Vienna 26 October 1697.

46 Mihalik, "Catholics, heretics and the *common enemy*", 44-6. Poland regained the fortress of Kamianets (Kamieniec) and the Podolia region.

47 ASF, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, *Francesco Maria de' Medici*, b. 5725, *Paolo della Stufa to Francesco Maria de' Medici*, Rome 16 November 1697.

However della Stufa's information was probably a bit exaggerated, because the frozen relationship between Augustus II and the Roman court began to melt. We do not want to overstate the role of Christian August, but his negotiations with the Viennese nuncio in mid-October may have played a role in the slow change in the diplomatic relations. After the Bishop of Győr returned in October from Poland to Vienna, his main task was probably not the negotiations about the Turkish war, but to somehow dissolve the indifference had been shown by the papal court toward the king. Santacroce gave him an excellent floor for this, because the first point on their – otherwise friendly and confident – meeting was the signed formal abjuration that the Cardinal Secretary demanded in late summer. Christian August informed the nuncio that the king's letter about his abjuration and a signed profession of the Catholic faith had been already on their way to Rome by the courier. The bishop did not tergiversated, but stormed Santacroce with relentless openness about the complaints against the papal court. He claimed that the pope had never shown out his approving blessing toward the king, neither indirectly, nor directly, at least through a papal breve sent to Christian August. What is more, the letter of Augustus II to Pope Innocent XII remained unanswered and was simply forwarded to France. Even after the coronation, the Holy See did not want to treat Augustus II as king, until he and Cardinal Radziejowski would not come to terms. Christian August angrily claimed, that even a vile man's conversion would meet a greater applause from Rome. Santacroce tried to defend the papal court's politics of neutrality, because the pope as the common father of Christianity, like his predecessors, cannot support either side publicly, until the political turmoil is over in Poland. Santacroce emphasized that Prince de Conti was not treated as a king either for the same reasons, and the papal court gave no such signs toward France in this regard. The Viennese nuncio also tried to explain that the letter of Augustus was not sent to France with bad intentions, but it probably had become known in Paris, due to the usual exchange of information between the nuncios. Slightly calmed down, the bishop was willing to accept the nuncio's arguments about the political direction of the papal court, but he still questioned the almost offensive silence they had experienced about the king's conversion. Finally Christian August suggested that the pontiff would have issue a breve to him, which would refer kindly to the conversion of his cousin as well⁴⁸.

The bishop's proposal was heard, and Pope Innocent XII issued a breve to Christian August in mid-November, which extended his permission to stay away from his diocese, but the pontiff praised the conversion of the Polish king for an unusually long time⁴⁹. This was already a noticeable shift on the part of the papal court, which was also appreciated by the other side. Even the imperial ambassador, Count Georg Adam von Martinitz, who had an increasingly bad reputation at the papal court, thanked the pope for his breve sent to Christian August⁵⁰. The Bishop of Győr wrote to Santacroce a week before Christmas that the papal breve was not just a simply great honour, but caused in the court of Augustus II inexpressible joy⁵¹. In the meantime the king sent two envoys to Rome. Alessandro Salaroli, a Theatin friar was commissioned to negotiate in ecclesiastical affairs. Jerzy Stanisław Dzieduszycki led the "embassy of obedience", although his conduct disappointed the papal court, and mostly Cardinal Carlo Barberini, the protector of Poland⁵².

Eventually the ice was broken and in January 1698 the pontiff sent a letter to Augustus, in which

48 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 221, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada* (cipher) Vienna 26 October 1697, ff. 624r-25v, 628r-30r.

49 AAV, *Epistolae ad Principes, Registri*, vol. 82, *Innocent XII. to Christian August*, Rome 31 August 1697, ff. 52v-53r.

50 ASF, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, *Francesco Maria de' Medici*, b. 5638, *Georg Adam von Martinitz to Francesco Maria de' Medici*, Rome 30 November 1697.

51 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 235, *Christian August to Andrea Santacroce*, 18 December 1697, f. 52r.

52 Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 149. The offensive behaviour toward Cardinal Barberini may have been related to Augustus' view of the cardinal as a friend of France. Christian August in early November told Santacroce that the king did not want Barberini to be the cardinal protector anymore: ASR, Archivio Santacroce, b. 1226, *Andrea Santacroce to Antonio Santacroce*, Vienna 2 November 1697. Eventually Augustus retained Cardinal Barberini in his post. About Barberini's role as cardinal protector: Gaetano Platania, "Carlo Barberini protettore della Polonia e suoi difficili dossier", in *Gli "angeli custodi" delle monarchie: I cardinali protettori delle nazioni*, eds. Matteo Sanfilippo and Péter Tusor (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2018), 177-98.

Innocent XII praised his conversion and acknowledged him as King of Poland⁵³. The pope soon sent another letter to Christian August and to the king, in which Innocent XII announced, that he send Fabrizio Paolucci, then nuncio to Cologne, as an extraordinary nuncio to Poland⁵⁴. Paolucci was urged by the Secretariat of State in an instruction to cooperate with Christian August in every important matters, but especially for the conversion of the electress, and for the Catholic upbringing of the son of Augustus II. The main task of Paolucci was to reach a compromise between Cardinal Radziejowski and the king. The nuncio was successful and in May 1698 the Primate and Augustus II. signed an agreement⁵⁵.

The conversion of the wife of Augustus II, Christiane Eberhardine of Brandenburg-Bayreuth was a hard nut to crack. Christian August admitted to nuncio Andrea Santacroce already in summer 1697 that the electress is a stubborn Lutheran, and there is little hope for her conversion⁵⁶. The Polish estates wanted to crown her as their queen, but they required her conversion to Catholicism before. Therefore in late summer, Christian August was expected to travel to Saxony to convince the electress to attend the coronation in Cracow and probably to convert⁵⁷. Although news popped up from time to time, there was little hope of Catholicization of Christiane Eberhardine⁵⁸. Although Augustus II admitted to Paolucci that there is only small chance for the conversion of her wife⁵⁹, the king commissioned Christian August to obtain a retrospective dispensation on their marriage with the electress, because they were close relatives, which would have been a canonical obstacle in Catholic marriage law⁶⁰. According to the news arrived from Warsaw, Christian August and nuncio Paolucci became friends⁶¹, and they most probably cooperated in the question about the conversion of Christiane Eberhardine as the papal instruction commissioned. However their intention remained unsuccessful, and in this regard the mission of Paolucci was inefficient. Nevertheless, after his return to Rome Paolucci was created cardinal. But he left behind one more open question: the cardinalate for Christian August⁶².

THE POPE'S CARDINAL?

Already in the summer of 1697, rumours had it that Augustus II would nominate his cousin as cardinal. Abbot Stufa, the well-informed Roman agent of Cardinal de' Medici reported his lord that at the next expected cardinal creations the new Polish king will ask the Holy See to grant Christian August the red hat⁶³. It was clear, mostly in the first phase of his reign, that Augustus needed to form a political counterpoint against Cardinal Radziejowski, the Primate of Poland, who opposed his election. Therefore it might have not been practical to nominate his cousin, a bishop of the Emperor. Later the Bishop of Cuiavia, Stanisław Kazimierz Dąbski was mentioned as a potential candidate,

53 AAV, *Epistolae ad Principes, Registri*, vol. 82, *Innocent XII. to Augustus II*, Rome 18 January 1698, ff. 64r-5r.

54 AAV, *Epistolae ad Principes, Registri*, vol. 82, *Innocent XII to Augustus II. and Christian August*, Rome 22 January 1698, ff. 70r-v and 72r-v

55 Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 163, 222-24.

56 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 13 July 1697, ff. 559r-60v. About the family relationships of Augustus II after his conversion: Karl Czok, *August der Starke und seine Zeit. Kurfürst von Sachsen, König in Polen* (Leipzig: Edition Leipzig, 1997) 90-2.

57 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 234, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 17 August 1697, ff. 654r-56r.

58 BAV, Barb. Lat., 6565, *Maurizio Vota SJ to Carlo Barberini*, Warsaw 1 July 1699, ff. 55r-6v. Father Vota informed Cardinal Barberini that the king was expected to visit Saxony, and they hoped that it would have given a chance for the conversion of his wife.

59 Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 167.

60 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 235, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada*, Vienna 20 December 1698, ff. 994r-95v. We do not have any source about whether the dispensation was issued later.

61 AC, Archivio Capranica-Scarlatti, b. 1181, *Foglio d'avvisi*, Warsaw, 1 May 1698,

62 Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 165-66.

63 ASF, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, *Francesco Maria de' Medici*, b. 5725, *Paolo della Stufa to Francesco Maria de' Medici*, Rome 20 July 1697.

although the name of Christian August also remained on the agenda⁶⁴. Bishop Dąbski was a leading opposer of Cardinal Radziejowski, and he had a decisive role in the election, then in the coronation of Augustus II, thus he would have been a suitable “counter-cardinal” against the primate.

By the beginning of 1698, the situation had changed. Augustus nominated as Polish king the Bishop of Passau, Johann Philip von Lamberg, who was the Emperor’s special envoy to the election *sejm*⁶⁵. It was not unusual that a sovereign recommended a foreign prelate to cardinalate⁶⁶. The French Cardinals d’Estrées and Bonzi were nominated by Poland in 1671 and 1673 respectively⁶⁷, and John III Sobieski also nominated his French father-in-law, Henri Albert de la Grange d’Arquien. However, the cardinalate of the latter caused diplomatic issues with the imperial court⁶⁸. It is hardly surprising that the Holy See had to awkwardly pay attention to the balance between the nominations of the great powers of Europe. Mostly during the Thirty Years’ War, the activity of the “national” cardinals became more and more violent in the Roman politics that affected the popes’ policy about creating new cardinals⁶⁹. In the case of Lamberg, his nomination by the Polish king was also a sensible question due to the European political situation and the controversial circumstances of Augustus II. Therefore, Pope Innocent XII answered Carlo Barberini, the cardinal protector of Poland, that there was not an appropriate time and place for creation of new cardinals of the crowns, because he created cardinals on the recommendations of the sovereigns in July 1697⁷⁰. Augustus II argued that the Holy See took in consideration the nomination made by his predecessor, and he expected the same⁷¹. However his efforts proved futile. Finally, the Viennese court took over Lamberg’s nomination, and so he was created cardinal on the consistory of 21 June 1700⁷².

Initially therefore, Augustus II wanted his cousin to be created as cardinal by the pope’s own initiative (*di suo proprio moto*)⁷³. However, the Holy See should have handled the case of Christian August also very carefully, like the nomination of Lamberg. According to some unconfirmed information, Christian August has even felt offended that the king had not nominated him from the Polish crown⁷⁴. However, by the beginning of 1700 it became clear that Augustus did not have enough influence in Rome to carry out his will to create cardinal from Lamberg. Officially, Bishop Lamberg renounced his nomination, and it opened the way to an official recommendation of Christian August by the Polish crown⁷⁵.

Only four days after the renouncement of Lamberg, Christian August sent a short account to the pope about his episcopal activity and the reformation of his diocese⁷⁶. On the very same day, he sent a letter to Lamberg, in which he expressed his thanks for Lamberg’s help and he wished him all the

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- 64 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 221, *Andrea Santacroce to Fabrizio Spada* (cipher), Vienna 17 August 1697, f. 534r-v.
- 65 BAV, Barb. Lat., 6647, *Johann Philipp von Lamberg to Carlo Barberini*, Passau 22 March 1698, ff. 85r-6r.
- 66 About the crown cardinals: Péter Tusor, “Prolegomena zur Frage des Kronkardinalats”, *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae*, 41 (2003): 51-71.
- 67 Joseph Bergin, “Cardinals as National Politicians”, in *A Companion to the Early Modern Cardinal*, eds. Mary Hollingsworth, Miles Pattenden and Arnold Witte (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2020) 213.
- 68 Platania, *Venimus, vidimus et Deus vicit*, 166.
- 69 Gianvittorio Signorotto, “The Squadrone Volante. “Independent” Cardinals and European Politics in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century”, in *Court and Politics in Papal Rome 1492-1700*, eds. Gianvittorio Signorotto and Maria Antonietta Visceglia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) 183.
- 70 BAV, Barb. Lat., 6653, *Carlo Barberini to Augustus II*, Rome 13 April 1698, ff. 36r-7r.
- 71 BAV, Barb. Lat., 6626, *Augustus II to Carlo Barberini*, Warsaw 6 May 1698, ff. 18r-9v.
- 72 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Korrespondenz*, Kart. 80, f. 96r.
- 73 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Principi*, vol. 128, *Augustus II to Innocent XII*, Warsaw 26 February 1698, ff. 44r-5r. On the same day the king wrote a letter to the cardinal protector, Carlo Barberini, also: BAV, Barb. Lat., vol. 6626, *Augustus II to Carlo Barberini*, Warsaw 26 February 1698, ff. 8r-v.
- 74 AC, Archivio Capranica-Scarlatti, b. 1181, *Foglio d’avvisi*, Warsaw 10 June 1698.
- 75 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Varia*, Kart. 15, *Augustus II to Innocent XII*, Warsaw 14 April 1700, f. 107r-v.
- 76 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Prelati*, vol. 92, *Christian August to Innocent XII*, Vienna 27 March 1700, f. 50r-v.

best and success for the imperial nomination⁷⁷. Thereafter Christian August travelled in hurry to Poland to negotiate about his cardinalate, and Augustus II sent his nomination to Rome two weeks later⁷⁸. They sent the letters with the Jesuit confessor of Christian August, Father Franz Pröller to Cardinal Barberini, who represented the nomination to the pope and the Cardinal Secretary during an audience on 18 May. The pope expressed his deep and honest sentiments toward the Bishop of Győr, and expressed his happiness about his nomination, although the aging pontiff was worried about his own fragile health, whether it would have made possible another consistory for creation of cardinals⁷⁹. A few days later, Innocent XII also answered Christian August's report on the diocese of Győr, praising his effort for the restoration of the parishes and counter-reformation activity⁸⁰. Even Emperor Leopold I wrote to Cardinal Barberini to support the Polish nomination for Christian August⁸¹. The Emperor also ordered his ambassador, Leopold Joseph von Lamberg to assist the Polish nomination of the bishop in every possible way⁸². Despite all the favourable signs, the consistory of 21 June yielded a disappointing result. Although Johann Philipp von Lamberg, the imperial candidate won the red hat, Christian August was not among the new cardinals⁸³.

On the advise of the imperial ambassador Lamberg, the confessor of Christian August, Father Pröller asked for an audience at the pope. Returning to the former standpoint, the Jesuit father supposed to the pontiff, that the Bishop of Győr could have been an individual creation by the pope himself, on his own initiative. Pope Innocent XII answered Pröller that he could write to his lord that the cardinalate of Christian August «would have been the crown of our pontificate»⁸⁴. However, the pope admitted that even he was ready to promote Christian August to the cardinalate, he had to be circumspect, since the bishop was already privy councillor of the Emperor, therefore his creation would have angered the other crowns, especially France⁸⁵. The Venetian ambassador to Rome also protested against the promotion of Christian August, presumably because of French pressure and of other political controversies between the Republic and the Viennese court. The imperial diplomats still hoped that probably he was already a cardinal, but reserved *in pectore*⁸⁶. However, the announcement of the two cardinals *in pectore* never took place. The pope was already dying by the end of summer 1700, and there was less and less hope of convening another consistory. All sides were preparing for the papal election conclave; in this situation the counter-interested parties sought to prevent a change in the composition of the Sacred College of the cardinals. Eventually, Pope Innocent XII died on 27 September 1700, without creating cardinal from Christian August of Saxe-Weitz.

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- 77 Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv, Familienarchiv Lamberg, *Akten*, Kart. 67/368, *Christian August to Johann Philipp von Lamberg*, Vienna 27 March 1700, ff. 10r-1v.
- 78 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Germania*, vol. 222, *Foglio d'avvisi*, Vienna 8 May 1700, ff. 588r-89r.
- 79 BAV, Barb. Lat., 6654, *Carlo Barberini to Christian August*, Rome 22 May 1700, ff. 33r-4r.
- 80 AAV, *Epistolae ad Principes, Registri*, vol. 82, *Innocent XII. to Christian August*, Rome 22 May 1700, ff. 303v-04r.
- 81 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Hofkorrespondenz*, Kart. 17, *Leopold I to Carlo Barberini*, Vienna 5 May 1700, ff. 107r-08r.
- 82 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Korrespondenz*, Kart. 82, *Leopold I to Leopold Joseph von Lamberg*, Vienna 5 May 1700, f. 32r-v. The ambassador was a distant cousin of the Bishop of Passau, who was nominated by the Viennese court.
- 83 The new cardinals were, nominated by the three crowns (France, the Holy Roman Empire and Spain): Louis-Antoine de Noailles, Archbishop of Paris, Johann Philipp von Lamberg, Bishop of Passau and Francisco de Borja, canon of the cathedral chapter of Toledo. ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Korrespondenz*, Kart. 80, f. 96r.
- 84 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Korrespondenz*, Kart. 80, *Leopold Joseph von Lamberg to Leopold I*, Rome 26 June 1700, ff. 75r-82v.
- 85 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Korrespondenz*, Kart. 80, *Leopold Joseph von Lamberg to Leopold I*, Rome 24 July 1700, ff. 105r-10v. Christian August became imperial privy councillor after he resigned as Chancellor of Saxony in the summer 1699: ASF, Archivio Mediceo del Principato, *Francesco Maria de' Medici*, b. 5695, *Foglio d'avvisi*, Vienna 8 August 1699.
- 86 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung. Rom, Korrespondenz*, Kart. 80, *Leopold Joseph von Lamberg to Leopold I*, Rome 14 August 1700, ff. 133r-38v. The pope created several cardinals in November 1699, but he reserved two *in pectore*, who were never announced. Many in Rome believed that one of them would have been Christian August.

CONCLUSIONS

Christian August had begun his ecclesiastical career in an internationally taut situation. Although the Nine Years' War ended in 1697, the Habsburg-Bourbon conflict did not come to an end with the Treaty of Rijswijk. For the Austrian Habsburgs it became a matter of life and death to avoid a pro-French king on the Polish throne. Therefore, Christian August gained quickly an important role not just in the conversion of Augustus II, but also in the consolidation of his reign. However, the Holy See tried to take an indifferent neutral position, at least as long as the French candidate Prince de Conti had a minimal chance to reverse the outcome of the election. As the situation became clear, Augustus was acknowledged by the pope without any further particular objection.

The inner consolidation of the reign of Augustus II, and a possible promotion of Christian August were related with each other. Until Cardinal Radziejowski was a relentless opponent of the king, Augustus tried to counterweigh the Primate's position with the nomination of another Polish bishop. But as soon as the Holy See acknowledged his reign, a compromise would be expected with the Primate, which opened the path for other ecclesiastical actors. Most probably the nomination of the Bishop of Passau came from Vienna, therefore a promotion for Christian August was only possible if Augustus II tried to affect the pope's sympathy toward his cousin. However, the Holy See did not want to accept the nomination by the Polish crown, and thus the Viennese court took over the nomination of Lamberg.

But in the background there was a much larger game of the European powers. By the end of the 1690s, the succession of the childless and sick Spanish king Charles II overwrote everything, and the pope was also very old, a papal election was expected soon. Both France and the Austrian Habsburgs tried to strengthen their positions, including in Rome and in the Sacred College. This was also a burning issue for Vienna, because Cardinal Leopold Kollonich declared at the end of 1699 that he would not travel to the conclave because of his age⁸⁷. That would make Vincenzo Grimani the only "Austrian" cardinal in a future conclave. Therefore, the promotion of Bishop Lamberg became a minimal political goal in the following months, and a cardinalate for Christian August would have been a great success for Vienna.

As the identity of the two *in pectore* cardinals remained a secret, any guess on their person can only be a theory. Whether one of them was Christian August or not, the possibility of his cardinalate caused interventions from the opposite side. During the seventeenth century it became a usual political debate in Rome almost in every case of a new nomination. That made the popes to frequently use the *riserva in pectore* promotions⁸⁸. In 1700, the European politics were fragile, and the Holy See should have observed carefully to keep a balance. Even if Christian August had been indeed one of the *in pectore* cardinals in November 1699, the situation did not let to announce his elevation to cardinalate, either Pope Innocent XII sympathized with him, or it was only a political simulation. Otherwise these years, the Polish election, his intermediation between Rome and Warsaw and his nomination for cardinalate gave to his career a boost. Charles II died on 1 November 1700, and the War of Spanish Succession broke out. In the first years, Christian August fulfilled an important diplomatic mission in the vacillant Cologne, where the archbishop-elect was driven to the French side⁸⁹. Finally in 1706, Christian August received the red hat, and in the next year he succeeded Cardinal Kollonich as Primate of Hungary⁹⁰.

87 ÖStA, HHStA, *Staatenabteilung, Venedig, Dispacci di Germania*, vol. 182, *Francesco Loredan to the Venetian Senate*, Vienna 12 December 1699, pag. 308

88 Signorotto, "The Squadrone Volante", 183.

89 Hans Gerig, *Der Kölner Dompropst Christian August Herzog von Sachsen-Zeitz, Bischof von Raab. Seine diplomatische Tätigkeit am Niederrhein zu Beginn des spanischen Erbfolgekriegs im Dienst der Politik Kaiser Leopolds I. 1701–1703* (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1930)

90 Lakatos, "Sachsen-Zeitz Keresztély Ágost", 328.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.
AC: Archivio Storico Capitolino–Roma.
ASR: Archivio di Stato di Firenze.
ASR: Archivio di Stato di Roma.
BAV: Biblioteca apostolica Vaticana.
Barb. Lat.: *Fondo Barberino Latino*.
ÖStA: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv.
HHStA: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv.

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ASF

- Archivio Mediceo del Principato, *Francesco Maria de' Medici*, bb. 5638, 5647, 5695, 5725.

ASR

- Archivio Santacroce, b. 1226.

AC

- Archivio Capranica-Scarlatti, b. 1181.

BAV

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