

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XV–XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History Sciences.

This special issue of *Eastern European History Review* addresses the complex and intense history of Christian-Ottoman relations in Central and Eastern Europe during the Early Modern Period. Tracing the salient moments and facts with battles, border issues, diplomacy and intelligence, the volume – with the participation of authors from different parts of Europe and Türkiye – constitutes an international opportunity to analyze topics that continually offer new study themes.

Central and South-Eastern Europe between the Christian world and the Ottoman world: conflicts, encounters and compromises (XVI-XVIII centuries), edited by the Turkish historian Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy, is the result of research and scientific collaboration between the CESPoM Study Center and Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group (ELKH-PPKE-PTE).

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Edited by Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy



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**CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
BETWEEN THE CHRISTIAN AND OTTOMAN WORLDS:
CONFLICTS, ENCOUNTERS AND COMPROMISES
(XVI-XVIII CENTURIES)**

Edited by
Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy

Co-edited by
Katalin Nagy

Special Participation of
Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group (ELKH-PPKE-PTE)



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EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: LA RIVISTA

Il Comitato redazionale e scientifico è lieto di presentare al pubblico la rivista scientifica *Eastern European History Review*.

Con un carattere internazionale e interdisciplinare, una cadenza annuale e una fruibilità *open access* la rivista focalizza i propri interessi sulle dinamiche occorse nell'Europa Orientale durante tutta l'età moderna (XIV-XIX). *Eastern European History Review* è espressione del Centro Studi dell'Università della Tuscia CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna) nato nel 1997 per intuizione del Prof. Gaetano Platania, Direttore Emerito della Rivista.

L'iniziativa editoriale che presentiamo nasce dall'evidente mancanza in Italia di una rivista scientifica relativa alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale in Età Moderna, nonostante la penisola abbia giocato un ruolo fondamentale per la Storia e la Cultura di una parte integrante del continente, a torto considerata come lontana e periferica.

Consapevoli di questo, il Comitato ha posto quale obiettivo primario della *Eastern European History Review* quello di offrire uno spazio di riflessione e di discussione su temi che appartengono alla storia dell'Europa centro-orientale, e insieme alle relazioni - politiche e culturali - che questa vasta area del Vecchio Continente ha avuto con l'occidente d'Europa, e l'Italia in particolare, incoraggiando il dialogo tra studiosi e esperti di settore, e tra differenti approcci della ricerca scientifica.

Il Comitato Redazionale e Scientifico

EASTERN EUROPEAN HISTORY REVIEW: THE JOURNAL

The Editorial and Scientific Board are proud delighted to present the *Eastern European History Review* under the aegis of Sette Città Editore.

The *Eastern European History Review* is an international and interdisciplinary annually online and open access peer-reviewed journal about studies on Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern Age (XIV-XIX). The Journal is also the expression of the Study Center CESPoM (Centro Studi sull'età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna – Center Study on the Age of Sobieski and Modern Poland) of the University of Tuscia, born in 1997, from an idea of Prof. Gaetano Platania, today Director Emeritus of this journal.

It publishes articles with significant approaches and original interpretations in all research fields concerning Central and Eastern Europe, with specific attention to the History sciences.

The editorial initiative we present comes from the obvious lack of a journal, in Italy, concerning the history of Central and Eastern Europe during the Modern Age, this despite its fundamental role in the history and culture of that part of the continent, wrongly considered distant and peripheral.

Quite the contrary is true, in fact. Main objective of the journal is to create a space for reflection and discussion on topics pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, but also relations with Continental Europe, encouraging dialogue between scholars and experts in the field, and between different approaches of scientific research.

The Editorial and Scientific Board

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INTRODUCTION

The advance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe in the Modern Age posed a threat to many European states. The conquest of Constantinople (later İstanbul) during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II (the Conqueror) in the XV century, followed by the Otranto expedition and siege, the Ottoman advance in Central Europe during the reign of Sultan Suleyman I in the XVI century, particularly the Siege of Vienna, as well as the successes of Chief Admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha in the Mediterranean and many other similar events generated a sense of anxiety and fear in Europe for centuries. As a matter of fact, the phrase *Mamma li Turchi!*, used by Italians even today in response to negative events, dates back to this historical Turkish threat and the negative feeling it generated, which has its roots in the XV and XVI centuries.

It is rather challenging to cover such a broad subject as the relations between the Ottoman Empire and European states in the Modern Age, especially between the 16th and 18th centuries, in an introduction. However, in order to understand the dynamics between the Ottoman Empire and the Christian world, it would be useful to go back a little further and give a brief overview of how the parties viewed each other as an introduction to the subject. Starting from the Late Middle Ages until the middle of the Modern Age, the East and the West, in other words, the two worlds comprised mostly of Muslims and Christians, were in constant interaction with each other in a relationship that alternated between wars and trade. However, the fear became a dominant emotion in this intense and dynamic relationship from the XV century onwards. Although the world order changed due to geographical discoveries, the main region where the conflict of control and domination took place was the Mediterranean and Central-Eastern Europe. On the one hand, there was the Western Christian world, which had entered a new era with the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia, and on the other was the Ottoman Empire, which had conquered Byzantium and its culture. From another perspective, it can be deduced that the conflict between these two sides evolved from a clash of "civilizations" to a clash of "powers" and gained a stronger political character at least since the XVI century¹. At this point, it is necessary to underline the differences between Western historiography and Ottoman historiography. For a long time, contrary to what Western historiography suggests, the Ottoman Empire did not carry out its conquests with the aim of forcibly converting the peoples of the conquered regions to Islam, however mainly aimed to expand the borders of the Empire². The distinguished Turkish historian Professor Halil İnalcık provided in his works important information on Ottoman conquest policy. For example, how the Ottomans conquered the Christian Balkans and managed to establish themselves there for so long remain a historical question even today. According to the old theory, Ottoman rule was manifested by force and persecution and lasted

1 Franco Cardini, *Il Turco a Vienna. Storia del grande assedio del 1683* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2011), 4.

2 Marko Jacov, *L'Europa tra conquiste ottomane e leghe sante* (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana), 255.

as a regime of exploitation under the control of a military class of Sipahi³. However, according to the current historical analysis derived from research based on Ottoman archive documents, the Ottoman Empire was able to persuade the local Christian populations to peace and reconciliation thanks to the principles of *istimalet*⁴ and *aman* which meant looking out for the people, especially non-Muslim subjects, and treating them with clemency. The Ottoman Empire always offered the opponent three chances to surrender, and if the offer was accepted, a sworn “ahdname”⁵ guaranteed the opponent’s security of life and property. These guarantees were rigorously implemented, and many conquests were accomplished by this way. In fact, speaking about the Balkans again, it is known that Orthodox Greeks and Slavs often viewed the Ottoman regime as a protector of their Church. In addition, one of the main reasons for the long-lasting Ottoman rule in the conquered lands was the Ottoman tax-land system. Unlike the old feudal system, this system guaranteed the peasant’s land use through the *mîrî* land (State owned land that was transferred to those who use the right of disposition) regime⁶.

The Ottomans have been called “Turks” by the Western world for centuries. In the Modern Age, fear for the “Turk” has manifested as activities and efforts of “marginalization”, “vilification” and therefore “disparagement”. Turks have been the main representative of the “other” for Europeans for centuries, from the very beginning of Muslim-Christian contact⁷. However, the Ottoman Empire was not only a source of fear for the Western world, but also a source of great curiosity and fascination. In the West, most literary scientific works were written against the Ottomans, who were described as “*infidel*”. Thus, for centuries, the Ottomans were not only unlikeable and feared by Europeans, but also appealing and attractive. In addition to being “foreigners” for historical and geographical reasons, their traditions became the focus of interest for researchers and scholars as they were

-
- 3 The most distinguished group of the household cavalry troops in the Ottoman military system. Erhan Afyoncu, “Sipahi”, *DİA*, 37 (2009): 256-58.
 - 4 The dictionary meaning of “*istimâlet*” is «to predispose, to appeal, to win the heart». In Ottoman chronicles it meant: «to look after the people, especially non-Muslim subjects, and be lenient towards them». Treating the people of conquered places well, protecting them, ensuring the security of life and property against external enemies, granting freedom in religious matters, facilitating taxation are the main elements of Ottoman *istimâlet*. See: Mücteba İlgürel, “İstimalet”, *DİA*, 27 (2001): 362.
 - 5 A document issued by the order of the rulers to grant special rights to certain states, groups and individuals. See: Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu “Ahidname”, *DİA*, 1 (1988): 536-40.
 - 6 Halil İnalcık, *Doğu Batı, Makaleler II* (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2008), 248, 96-110. On Ottoman provincial administration and the fief system, see also Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)*, trans. Ruşen Sezer (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 108-23. The work was first published in English. See Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, Classical Age (1300-1600)* (London: Nicholson Publishing, 1973).
 - 7 Mustafa Soykut, *Papalık ve Venedik Belgelerinde Avrupa’nın Birliği ve Osmanlı Devleti (1453-1683)* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 17, 24.

close or neighbors. In short, many works depicting the Ottomans and providing information about them appeared in the XVI and XVII centuries⁸. In many of these works, when Western historiography tried to explain the success of Ottoman progress, the concepts such as “religious fanaticism”, “oppression”, “persecution” were used, contrary to the information given above⁹.

Today it is still evident that such images persist in Western historiography. However a significant effort in consulting Ottoman and Turkish sources by historians would lead to a more objective perspective on the complex relationships between the Ottoman and Christian worlds.

The issue of Eastern European History Review titled *Central and South-Eastern Europe between the Christian and Ottoman Worlds: conflicts, encounters and compromises (XVI-XVIII centuries)*, contains 14 articles on the topic. This issue presents articles by researchers from different countries such as Italy, Hungary, Romania, Poland and Türkiye and was prepared in collaboration with *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group* (ELKH-PPKE-PTE).

I extend my sincere appreciation to the director of EEHR, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alessandro Boccolini for offering me the special editorship of this issue of the journal.

Dr. PhD. Canan Parmaksızoğlu Aksoy
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8 Giovanni Ricci, *Ossessione turca. In una retrovia cristiana dell'Europa moderna* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), 41; Soykut, *Papalık ve Venedik Belgelerinde*, 19-24.

9 İnalçık, *Doğu Batı, Makaleler II*, 248.

THE VILMOS FRANKÓI VATICAN HISTORICAL RESEARCH GROUP (ELKH-PPKE-PTE)

The *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group* of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Péter Pázmány Catholic University was established in the June of 2012 as the 'Impetus' Church History Research Group in the frame of the Church History Research Institute of the University founded by Rector Péter Erdő in 1999. It carries on independently the latter's publications (*Bibliotheca Historiae Ecclesiasticae Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány Nuncupatae*) and researches in Rome and in Vienna, with the involvement of academic and other funding sources. From 1st July 2017 onwards it performs its activity within the framework of the Supported Research Places Program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences visualizing its goals and professional identity also in its name. The official name from 2022: ELKH-PPKE-PTE *Vilmos Fraknói Vatican Historical Research Group*.

Its examinations concentrate decisively on political, diplomatic, cultural and institutional history. Its priority task is the systematic publication and processing of sources that has been heavily neglected since the age of positivism. The Vatican collections serve as the primary place of research, completed by the relating material – primarily in thematic context – of the Hungarian and Vienna archives and manuscript collections. Its publications provide space to the results of revealing of sources and historiographic works according to their scholarly profile (*Collectanea Textuum et Studiorum*), and separately to the Hungarian researches in the Vatican due to its particular importance (*Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae*). The long-term aim of the research institute is to serve as the professional framework of the establishment and efficient operation of an independent Hungarian institute of history in Rome of purely scientific nature. Owing to its academic background it pays special attention to the education of the future historian generation, to the engagement of students in certain phases of its work.

The main international cooperative partners are: Università della Tuscia (CESPoM-Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e della Polonia Moderna), Universität Wien (Institut für Historische Theologie), Deutsches Historisches Institut in Rom, Università Pontificia Gregoriana (Facoltà di Storia e Beni Culturali della Chiesa), Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. The relevant common publications are published by Edizioni Setta Città and Duncker & Humblot

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EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE: FROM THE CRETAN WAR (1645-1669) TO THE ALLIANCE OF 1684 ACCORDING TO OTTOMAN AND VENETIAN SOURCES

ABSTRACT

The Ottoman Empire posed a constant threat to European states in the Modern Age, especially the Republic of Venice. The Republic of Venice suffered a great deal of political, military and material damage with the loss of Crete in the Ottoman-Venetian War between 1645 and 1669. After the war, various negative incidents occurred that would have an adverse impact on Ottoman-Venice affairs. This loss and the events between the two states played an active role in the Republic of Venice joining the alliance established by Pope Innocentius XI between the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Poland in 1684. Thus, the Ottoman Empire had to fight against the aforementioned allies until the Treaty of Karlowitz signed in 1699. The political events that caused the deterioration of Ottoman-Venetian relations and pushed the Republic of Venice to join this alliance before the Venetian Republic joined the Holy Alliance in 1684 will be examined in this article. The narration of these events will be made comparatively in the light of Venetian and Ottoman sources, especially the chronicles.

KEYWORDS: Ottoman Empire; Republic of Venice; Ottoman-Venetian Relations; Bailos; Holy Alliance of 1684.

It was then decided that the Alliance established against the Turks would also be valid with the Republic, that the Pope would be the protector, that Cardinal Pio would be obliged to swear on behalf of the Emperor, Cardinal Barberino for Poland and Cardinal Ottoboni for Venice. The Emperor and the King of Poland would participate with strong armies and the Republic of Venice with a strong navy from the sea and with troops from Dalmatia until peace was established, peace would never be made apart from the Alliance... The Emperor would take back the Hungarian Castles, the Polish King Kamanice, Podolia and Ukraine, and the Venetian Republic would take back previously owned and lost lands¹.

1 «Fu adunque stabilito, che corresse la Lega già scritta contra il Turco anche con la Repubblica, e protettore ne fosse il Papa, esiggendone il giuramento da' Cardinali Pio per l'Imperadore, Barberino per Pollonia, e Otthoboni per Venezia. Cesare, e il Re' di Pollonia dovessero operare con eserciti poderosi, e la Repubblica di Venezia con forte Armata sul mare, e con truppe in Dalmazia sino alla pace, da non potersi mai durante la Lega separamente accordare [...]. Intanto procuri l'Imperadore di ricuperare le Fortezze d'Ungheria, il Re' di Pollonia Caminietz, la Podolia, e l'Ukraina, e la Repubblica di Venezia il perduto, e cio', che si racquisera', sia di quello, a' cui primamente apparteneva». Pietro Garzoni,

That is how the diligent and meticulous historian of the period, Venetian Senator Pietro Garzoni [1645-1735] relays how the Holy Alliance (*Sacra Lega*) established by the Christian allied states between the Austrian Empire, the Kingdom of Poland and the Republic of Venice against the Ottoman Empire with the efforts of Pope Innocentius XI [1611-1689] in 1684 with the aim of driving the Turks from Europe, and in the words of many Western sources, by driving the final nail into the coffin of the Ottoman Empire by “expulsion”.

This article will study the impact of the entry process of the Republic of Venice into the Alliance of 1684 on the overall progress of the Cretan War (1645-1669), which can be considered as a turning point in Ottoman-Venetian relations, the events that took place in this process and the events that took place in the Venetian possessions in Istanbul will be explained through considerations on the bailos. Especially the Venetian chronicles will be used in the narration of the events that took place in this process, and the information given will be compared with the information portrayed by the Ottoman chronicles as much as possible. However, it is important to note one fact. The main subject of this article, the events experienced by the bailos in Istanbul before the participation of the Republic of Venice in the Holy Alliance and the events that had a negative impact on Ottoman-Venetian relations, although they seem to be the reasons for Venice’s inclusion in the Alliance are only the driving force and it should be underlined that they are only reasons reflected by the chronicles of the period. While discussing the real reasons, of course, must be taken into account the sensitivity of Ottoman-Venice relations, its past with wars and rivalries, the political and economic situation of the Republic of Venice, but most importantly the pressure of the Papacy and its European allies on Venice, the fragility of the Papacy-Venice relations at that time and the desire of Venice to reclaim its lost lands.

THE IMPACT OF LOSING CRETE ON VENICE

In 1526 The Republic of Venice obtained most of its financial income from trade, especially from its commercial activities with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, after the Cretan War², which lasted 24 years, the economic situation of the Republic receded to a major degree as this important trade relationship slowed down during the war. Although the Republic received aid from other Catholic states, the effect of the war on Venice was evident in the 1660s. The Ottoman navy, under the command of Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha [1635-1676], made a major military landing in 1667, besieged the main city of Candia, which was considered the heart of Crete, and captured a large part of it³. After a long siege, the city of Candia was

Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia In Tempo Della Sacra Lega Contra Maometto IV e Tre Successori, Gran Sultani Turchi di Pietro Garzoni Senatore (Venezia: Gio. Manfrè, 1712), 57-8.

2 There is a wide range of works about the Cretan War as primary and secondary sources. For example see Andrea Valiero, *Historia della Guerra di Candia* (Venezia: Presso Paolo Baglioni, 1679); Ersin Gülsoy, *Girit’in Fethi ve Osmanlı İdaresinin Kurulması (1645-1670)* (Istanbul: Tatav-Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2004).

3 Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. IV, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli

completely captured by the Ottomans, and Crete became Ottoman territory in September 1669. An agreement with 18 articles was drawn between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire on September 6, defining the conditions for the surrender of the castle and thus Castle of Candia was handed over to the Ottoman Empire with all its ammunition; Suda, Ispirlonga and Granbusa remained with the Venetians while Klis was given to the Venetians which concluded the definitive and official loss of Crete, one of Venice's most important bases⁴. However, with this agreement, the Republic of Venice had to commit to paying 1500 ducats⁵ annually to the Ottoman Empire for the protection of Zante Island⁶. On September 27, 1669, the key of the Castle of Candia was handed over to the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish forces settled in the castle on the same day. The castle, which fell after the siege commandeered by Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and lasted for twenty-eight months and nine days, was defended by Venetian, as well as French and German forces, until a month before the Ottoman conquest; it was also protected from the sea by the Papal, Malta and of course the Venetian navy⁷. Venice immediately accepted the agreement dated 6 September 1669 with a kind of satisfaction that a peace agreement could be made with the Ottoman Empire under difficult conditions after the long and destructive war. Venetian bailo Alvise da Molin [1626-1680] brought the agreement document signed by the Doge of Venice to Istanbul; however, the negotiations between Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and the Bosnian province continued until 1671. The final agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Venice was signed on 24 October 1671⁸.

The loss of Crete was a blow not only for the Republic of Venice as one of its richest and most strategically important lands had been lost, but it was also a major blow for the entire European Catholic world. This is because Christianity saw the loss of Crete as a defeat of the Catholic religion against Islam. Pope Clemens IX [1660-1669] declared that the loss of Crete was of the greatest peril to all of Europe and Christianity⁹. The Republic of Venice had lost its former power to a great extent

(Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2009), 117-19.

- 4 Abdülkadir Özcan, "Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa", *DİA*, 26 (2002): 261.
- 5 Ducat is the name of two separate Venetian currencies. The first is the silver coin minted around 1202; the second is the gold coin, which was first minted in 1284 by the Venetian Doge Giovanni Dandolo. In later periods, it took the name zecchino. Later, due to its volume and high quality, this currency began to be used in other states as well. For example; the Papal ducat, the Imperial ducat, Milanese ducat etc. Cf., "Ducato", in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti*, vol. 13 (Roma: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 1932), 244-45.
- 6 Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 124.
- 7 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3/1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2009), 418-19.
- 8 Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, 125.
- 9 Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i 'Aliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-III* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 104; Johann Wilhelm

due to the changing balance of power in Europe and especially the loss of Crete, which was strategically very important¹⁰. Although Venice was financially shaken¹¹ by spending a huge budget totaling 150 million gold Venetian ducats during the 24-year war, the navy, political power and wealth of Venice made it valuable for the Alliance against the Ottoman Empire¹². One of the main reasons why the Republic of Venice would join the alliance formed by Pope Innocentius XI against the Ottoman Empire exactly 15 years after the defeat of Crete was his desire to revenge Crete.

After the Cretan War, Venetian-Ottoman relations, although tense, returned to their normal course. Giacomo Querini [1619-1677], who was appointed bailo to the Ottoman Empire in Venice on 16 November 1670, set off by ship on 24 August 1671 and arrived in Istanbul after an 87-day journey. Querini, who had previously served as a member of the Collegio dei Savi and Ambassador in Münster, Madrid and Rome, was considered suitable by the Senate as a candidate to handle the relations between the two states which were sensitive and strained by the war. Although he was a diplomat who had strived not to lose Crete, he was appointed to Istanbul as a bailo, probably because it was thought that the next period of peace would be more critical. Contrary to what was predicted, it is known that this difficult tenure for Querini was extremely interesting and beneficial. The bailo had a close and good relationship with Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha. In the report he presented at the Palace of the Venetian Dukes (Palazzo Ducale di Venezia) on June 6, 1676, after his tenure, he mentioned his good relationship with the Grand Vizier and stated that their positive relationship was based on mutual trust. According to him, the Grand Vizier sincerely wished for peace between the Ottoman Empire and Venice and for the commercial relations between the two states to be robust¹³.

After Querini, Giovanni Morosini [1633-1682], who had previously served as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Savoy, France and Vienna, was appointed to the post of bailo, and the new bailo arrived in Istanbul on June 5, 1675. Although Morosini had some successes in favor of the Venetian Republic after he started his

Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. IV, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, Yeditepe (İstanbul: Yayınevi, 2019), 673-75; Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdar Tarihi*, vol. I, ed. Ahmed Refik Altınay (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928), 235.

10 Amy A. Bernardy, *Venezia e il Turco nella Seconda Meta' del Secolo XVII* (Firenze: Civelli, 1902), 75.

11 Ludwig von Pastor, *Storia dei papi dalla fine del Medio Evo*, vol. XIV/2 (Roma: Desclée & C., 1932), 141.

12 Vilmos Fraknói, *Innocenzo XI (Odescalchi) e La Liberazione dell'Ungheria dal Giogo Ottomano: in Base di Documenti Diplomatici dell'Archivio Vaticano* (Firenze: Bernardo Seeber, 1903), 85.

13 Gino Benzoni, "Querini, Giacomo", in DBI, vol. 86 (2016), 27. A large part of the reports sent from Istanbul to Venice during the Querini period is in the Venetian State Archives in the following classification: *Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato- Constantinopoli*, filze 156-158. For the diplomatic report (relazione) he wrote after completing his duty in Istanbul, see *Le relazioni degli Stati europei lette al Senato dagli ambasciatori veneziani nel secolo decimosettimo*, vol. V/2: *Turchia*, eds. Nicolò Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (Venezia: Pietro Naratovich, 1872), 121-95.

duty, it is generally seen that no significant progress was made in Ottoman-Venetian relations during his duty as a bailo between 1675 and 1679, and that he did not have the relationship of trust with Kara Mustafa Pasha from Merzifon [1634-1683], the Grand Vizier at the time that Querini had had with Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha; in fact on the contrary, there seemed to be a lack of trust as explained below¹⁴.

Pietro Civran [1623-1687], who had previously held important positions in the Venetian Senate and in the Balkan-Adriatic territory of Venice, arrives in Istanbul in 1679 after Morosini completes his duty as a bailo¹⁵. However, this change of bailo had a negative impact on the peaceful relations of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice at that time. During the period from 1679 which coincided with the arrival of the new bailo to 1684, a series of events occurred that would compromise Ottoman-Venetian relations.

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POUCHES FULL OF CASH: THE MATTER OF MONEY DEMANDED FROM THE VENETIAN BAILO

A very interesting event took place with the arrival of Civran in Istanbul on October 23, 1679. This can be accepted as the first incident that generated a problem that would shake the Ottoman-Venice relations of the period. After Civran's arrival in the port of Istanbul, the ships carrying him and his belongings were stopped by Ottoman administrators, suspecting the large cargo they were carrying. As per the rules, the belongings of diplomats cannot be checked. However, Civran's belongings were very valuable in terms of quality, and this aroused suspicion. The Ottoman administrators accused Bailo Civran of bringing commercial goods with his diplomatic goods to avoid paying the customs tax by taking advantage of the rule of not checking his personal belongings. Ottoman author Raşid Mehmed Efendi, one of the most important Ottoman sources of the period, openly accused the Venetians of concealing commercial goods on the ship just to avoid paying customs duty¹⁶. The goods in question were loaded on the ships by Venetian merchants. These goods, allegedly brought by Civran "irregularly", were worth 400,000 *reali*¹⁷. Therefore, Bailo Civran is faced with accusations. According to Venetian sources, Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha, who heard about this situation, summoned Civran and his predecessor Morosini, who was still in Istanbul despite completing his term, to the Court and humiliates them, and in return for not telling anyone about this issue, the vizier demands 50 pouches containing a total of 25,000 *reali*. Civran was told in

14 Gino Benzoni, "Morosini, Giovanni", in DBI, vol. 77 (2012), 140. For the *relazione* of Morosini see Barozzi-Berchet, *Le relazioni degli Stati europei*, vol. V/2, 197-248.

15 For the biography of bailo Pietro Civran see Gino Benzoni, "Civran, Pietro", in DBI, vol. 26 (1982), 120-25.

16 Raşid Mehmed Efendi Çelebizade İsmail Âsım Efendi, *Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli*, vol. I, eds. Abdülkadir Özcan, Yunus Uğur, Baki Çakır, et al. (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2013), 254.

17 It is a gold coin minted by Carlo d'Angio I first in Barletta then in Messina, see "Reale", in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze*, vol. 28 (1935), 937-38. We don't know why the bailo Civran used the Neapolitan currency rather than the Venetian one. We leave this issue for further investigation.

no uncertain terms that he would not be accepted to the city and this office without giving this amount to the Grand Vizier¹⁸. From the information given by the sources, it is not clear whether the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha really wanted these money-filled pouches from the bailo as tax compensation for smuggled commercial goods or was it another excuse created by the Ottoman Government to cause a crisis with Venice and whip up a pretext to declare war in the future. On the other hand, the fact that the Grand Vizier, whom both Senator Diedo and Senator Garzoni often describe as ambitious, money-loving and greedy in their works, demanded financial payment from the bailo to keep this matter quiet does give the impression that the Grand Vizier may have demanded this amount as a bribe.

The second important problem between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire occurred a few weeks after the aforementioned unpleasant incident, in January 1680, when the previous bailo Morosini, whose appointment in Istanbul had ended, was about to board the ship *Venere* in Istanbul to return to the Republic. This time, the cause of the incident was fugitive prisoners. While the Ottoman authorities were inspecting the port, they discovered a fearful Neapolitan prisoner on the ship. This prisoner confessed to them that 30 more fugitive prisoners were hidden on the ship. According to the Ottoman author Raşid, the prisoners who were hidden on the Venetian ship had escaped from Yedikule prison and taken refuge with the Venetians. Raşid even claimed that they were well-known and influential captives¹⁹. After a while the corpses of all other Neapolitan prisoners appeared in the water around the Venetian ships. Ottoman authorities noticed the bodies; accordingly the confession of the Neapolitan prisoner was confirmed. Ottomans came to the conclusion that they were killed and thrown into the sea by the Venetians who were aware of the confession of the Neapolitan prisoner²⁰. This incident caused a serious diplomatic crisis between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. In the letters Morosini and Civran wrote from Istanbul to the Venetian Senate, they explained the importance of the incident and the difficult situation they were in, that their lives and the lives of all Venetians living in the Ottoman Empire were in danger, and that the valuable goods in their two gunships and four merchant ships could be seized at any time by the Ottomans. However, this time, they would be able to solve this critical situation with a large payment made to the Grand Vizier which was resolved by paying an additional 50,000 *reali* for the fugitive prisoner incident²¹. Nonetheless, these two bailos actually committed an error against the Republic; they did not inform the Venetian Senate of this payment. Finally, with the payment of the money, the former bailo Morosini left Istanbul by obtaining the exit

18 Giacomo Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla sua fondazione all'anno MDCCXLVII*, vol. III (Venezia: Andrea Poletti, 1751), 357-58; Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 40-1.

19 Raşid, *Târih-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

20 The Venetian ships and the killing of the Neapolitan prisoners caused a great sensation and was recorded in many chronicles of the period. See Michele Foscarini, *Historia della Republica veneta*, t. X/3 (Venezia: Lovisa, 1722), 83-6.

21 Benzoni, "Civran, Pietro", 122. Venetian Senator Giacomo Diedo defined this amount as 100 pouches. Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 358.

permit²². However, in the meantime, the Senate strictly forbade payments without its consent, did not consider it appropriate to allocate the payments made for the prisoner incident from the state budget, and decided that all payments made to the Ottomans for the prisoners were the responsibility of Civran and Morosini. The Senate punished the bailo both financially and politically. The penal practice that the Senate ruled for Civran was also very harsh, and Civran was ordered to return to Venice, citing his personal reasons to the Ottoman Empire. Civran set out for Venice after receiving this order and reached the Republic on October 16, 1681. In his report Bailo Civran expressed his negative views about the Ottoman Empire, its government and its people and made ugly accusations. Civran, who greatly disappointed the Senate, was dismissed from the position of bailo by the Senate and he never returned to Ottoman territory²³.

Venetian sources describe these events as “usurpation”, but state that the main reason for this attitude of the Ottomans, which will be mentioned below, was the massacre of Turks in Dalmatia and the Ottoman Empire’s desire to take revenge from Venice²⁴.

THE MORLAK ATTACKS AND THE MONEY MATTER AGAIN

Giovanni Battista Donà [1627-1699], who had held prestigious state positions was appointed bailo after Pietro Civran in Istanbul at the beginning of 1680, and arrived in Istanbul on July 2, 1681²⁵. However, the problems in Ottoman-Venetian relations would continue to increase during Donà’s tenure²⁶. The good relations between the bailo and the Ottoman Government deteriorated in a short time as a result of the massacre of the Turks under Hasan Bey, the brother of Bosnian Governor Durak Bey, by a few Morlaks²⁷ who were subjects of the Republic of Venice. This incident occurred in September 1682 in Zemanico (Zemunik Donji) near Zara (Zadar). Bailo Donà became aware of this issue two months after its occurrence. According to Western sources, the Ottomans stated that the Venetians had united with the Habsburg forces and attacked Bosnia, looted the area and killed 200 of Hasan Bey’s troops. However, the Venetians think that the incident was not that serious, it

22 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 358; Benzoni, “Civran, Pietro”, 122.

23 Benzoni, “Civran, Pietro”, 122-23.

24 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 358.

25 His real surname is Donato (also known as Donado); however, in Venetian sources it is commonly seen that it is written as “Donà” in its abbreviated form. For the biography of Giovan Battista Donà, see Giuseppe Gullino, “Donà, Giovanni Battista”, in DBI, vol. 40 (1991), 738-41.

26 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 43.

27 The Morlaks are a Balkan people originating from the Velebit mountain range in Dalmatia. In the 6th and 7th century, they took an active role in the Slavic invasions that deeply affected the Balkan society. In the 15th century, some Morlaks were settled and Croatized by the Republic of Venice in the region of Istria devastated by epidemics. Cf. “Morlacchi”, in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze*, vol. 23 (1934), 858-59.

was exaggerated by Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha and was reflected as a grave incident. According to them, the Ottomans burned the houses of the Morlaks to seize their lands, and the Grand Vizier propounded this so-called reason to extort money from the Republic just as he was preparing to move towards Vienna. In response, the Ottoman Government demanded that Donà surrender 224 Venetian subjects, possibly in response to the Turks massacred in Dalmatia or Istanbul and killed in Bosnia. Donà negotiated with the Ottoman Government, especially Hüseyin Pasha²⁸, to solve this problem with a financial payment, but in the end, it was decided that Donà would deliver 600 bags of gold coins, as well as 100 thousand Venetian gold coins (*zecchini*)²⁹ and the bailo had to accept this decision³⁰. According to the information conveyed by the Venetian Senators, before the negotiations, the Grand Vizier reprimanded the bailo and exaggerated the incident by telling the bailo that he and his family would be locked up in Yedikule. Upon this, the Şeyhülislam announced that the spilled blood could only be replaced with gold to be paid. In the end, it was decided that Sultan Mehmet IV would be paid 175 thousand *reali*, the Grand Vizier and Hüseyin Pasha would receive 25 thousand *reali* each and other administrators would receive different sums. However, this payment to be made by Venice, which broke the agreement with the Ottoman Empire, would never bring peace again³¹.

The fact that the Venetians massacred the Turks on the Bosnian border is also confirmed by Ottoman chronicles. The Venetians were described as deceitful, treacherous and «nakz-i ahd ü misak» (broke their promises) by Ottoman historians³². Although they had promised that they would behave by begging for mercy with the agreement made with the Ottomans during the siege and surrender of the Castle of Candia, they concealed their goods to avoid customs duty³³. The

28 This person is thought to be Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha (†1702). He is the son of Hasan Ağa, the younger brother of Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. He became famous with the nickname Amcazade during the grand viziership of his uncle's son, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha. He participated in the Vienna expedition in 1683, and after holding many positions such as vizier, he was appointed admiral in 1694 and Belgrade guard in 1696. Between 1697 and 1702, he occupied the office of Grand Vizier. see Münir M. Aktepe, "Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa", *DİA*, 3 (1991): 89.

29 In the Italian source, the term *zecchini* is used as a plural. *Zecchino*, is a name that has been used since the middle of the 16th. It is a gold coin. Cf., "Zecchino", in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze*, vol. 35 (1937), 910-11.

30 Gullino, "Donà, Giovanni Battista", 740.

31 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45. Senator Diedo stated that 170,000 *reali* would be paid to the Sultan. See Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 359-60.

32 «Efrenç-i şekâvet-sencmekr ü hîle-vühiyânetlemevsûf ve nakz-i ahd ü mîsâk ile ma'rûf, mekkâr ü hîle-kâr tâife-i dalâlet-şi'âr [...]». Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekayiât (1066-1116/1656-1704)*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), 164.

33 Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

Venetians who were described as «known for their tricks and deceptions, known for breaking agreements and accustomed to betrayal»³⁴ attacked the Ottoman subjects on the Bosnian border of Venice and caused the death of many Muslims. Moreover, Venice did all this despite the agreement that had been made with the Ottoman Empire after the Crete Campaign and had promised not to take any action against the Ottomans³⁵. Sultan Mehmed IV [1642-1693] was very angry with this situation and ordered that the Venetian Ambassador be detained in 1682³⁶. In other words, the bailo was held accountable for these events. The bailo apologized, asked for forgiveness, confessed his crimes, was remorseful and offered 500 pouches of coins to compensate for the massacred people and the events that followed. This compensation offer was accepted by the Ottoman Government and what happened was overlooked and the issue was closed for the time being³⁷.

When we look at the information provided by the Ottoman and Venetian sources, it is clear that the arrest of the bailo was ordered by the Ottoman Sultan, but later this order was turned into a financial compensation that the Republic had to pay to the Ottomans. However, the first difference between the information provided by Ottoman and Venetian sources is the amount of compensation to be paid. As stated above, this amount was claimed to be 600 pouches of gold coins, as well as 100,000 Venetian gold coins (*zecchini*). However, Ottoman sources claim that this amount was 500 pouches. The second difference is which party demanded this compensation. As mentioned above, it was stated that the bailo offered to pay compensation to the Ottoman Empire³⁸. However, Venetian sources emphasize that this payment was demanded by the Ottoman Empire³⁹.

Moreover, according to Raşid Mehmed Efendi, the fact that the Ottomans agreed to be paid these 500 pouches of coins and overlooked Venice's faults was essentially a distraction policy. Kara Mustafa Pasha advised the Sultan not to get into a state of war with Venice while the war with Austria was still going on. He suggested that Venice should be handled with tolerance until the Austrian issue was resolved, and said Venice was up for revenge once Austria was taken care of⁴⁰.

According to Venetian sources, the Venetian Senate, which was aware of this unpleasant incident, condemned the above-mentioned payment that had to be made to the Ottoman Government, and with its decision on 15 May 1683, the Senate accused Donà of abusing and misusing his power, and dismissed him from the bailo position and ordered him to leave Istanbul immediately, citing personal reasons. Sources state that the Senate summoned the bailo to Venice to put him in

34 «Öteden beri hile ve dalavereleri ile tanınan, anlaşma bozmakla bilinen hilekâr ve hıyanete alışkın Venedik keferesi [...]». Efendi, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

35 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

36 Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

37 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 233, 254.

38 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

39 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 359-60; Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45.

40 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

the dungeons of *Avogadori di Comun*⁴¹.

Some letters in the Vatican Apostolic Archive confirms the information given by Venetian and Ottoman sources about the payment to the Ottoman Government and the punishment of the bailo. For example, in the letter dated 15 May 1683 sent from the Papal Secretary of State to the Papal representative in the Republic of Venice, Senor Iacobelli mentions the money to be paid to the Turk (Sultan) due to the turmoil caused by the bailo. Accordingly, the majority wanted the bailo to leave Istanbul, but this was very difficult because the “Turk” did not allow it. However, it was necessary to wait for the next bailo to arrive in Istanbul. At the same time, it was necessary to show the whole world that the obligatory payment caused by the bailo was made by the Republic of Venice, probably to enhance Venice’s reputation. That is why the bailo had to be punished publicly. However, the letter mentions the Alliance against the Turks with the Austrian Emperor and the Kingdom of Poland, and that the Alliance would be realized with the participation of other Christian Princes⁴². According to another letter sent to the same person on 17 July 1683 from the Papal Secretary of State, there was a great debate in the Consiglio dei Pregadi, also known as the Venetian Senate, on whether to send public funds to be paid to Istanbul or not, and for this reason, the members of the Venetian Senate – the *savii* (wise men) – voted on this issue. Almost all the members except for the wise men of *terra ferma*⁴³, Mocenigo and Grimani, expressed an opinion that these funds should be sent to Istanbul. However, increasing the number of soldiers that would constitute the army and navy in the war to be started was also mentioned⁴⁴.

The information in these two letters shows that the Republic of Venice feared the “Turk”, but even when the Siege of Vienna and the possibility of an Ottoman Empire victory continued, the Republic of Venice had started to contemplate joining the counter-alliance against the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the Republic of Venice had started to recruit troops suggests that actually some kind of decision had been taken on this issue in the summer of 1683, but this was intentionally hidden from the Ottoman Empire, the Pope, the allied states and other Christian kings and princes. A correspondence between the Papal Secretary of State and the Papal representative in the Republic of Venice dated July 3, 1683, supports this line of thought. This letter shows that the establishment of a communication network with the Papacy and also the structure of the Turkish army was discussed at the Consiglio dei Pregadi. Some letters of the Grand Vizier are also mentioned in this letter. Moreover, it is suspected that the Ottoman army would attack Dalmatia. Therefore, it would be beneficial for Hungary if the path of Pope Pius V [1504-1572] and Clemens IX was followed to form an alliance between the European Princes and a joint land army and navy. There is information that a clandestine Senate meeting was held in the Venetian

41 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 360. Gullino, “Donà, Giovanni Battista”, 740. For the *relazione* (diplomatic report) written by the bailo after the termination of his duty see Barozzi-Berchet, *Le relazioni degli Stati europei*, II, 287-351.

42 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Venezia*, vol. 126, f. 99 r-v.

43 One of the three parts that Venice is divided into: the land part.

44 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Venezia*, vol. 126, f. 128r-v.

Senate to discuss how to help the Austrian Emperor⁴⁵.

As a result, tension arose again between the Istanbul Bailo and the Ottoman Government. This kind of humiliation of the bailo and the Republic of Venice could be considered as a political error on the part of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha at this sensitive period when the siege of Vienna was about to take place. From a broader perspective, these events and the large sums that the Republic was obliged to pay to the Ottoman Government, would play a role in the inclusion of the Republic of Venice in the Holy Alliance only one year later. After the events, a new bailo was not appointed to the post of bailo in Istanbul to replace Bailo Donà⁴⁶. However, Giovanni Cappello [1632-1701], the Secretary of the Council of Ten (Consiglio di Dieci)⁴⁷, was appointed to Istanbul to remedy the situation. At this point, it should be noted that after Donà, the Venetian bailo position in Istanbul would remain vacant for 17 years due to the approaching war⁴⁸.

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REVOLT OF MORLAKS IN DALMATIA AND THE INVITATION TO VENICE TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE

According to Venetian sources, the Morlaks were in Dalmatian territory at this time and wanted to take their lands back. The Morlaks, who gathered an army to rebel against the Ottomans, set fire to many places in Dalmatia and started a rebellion. The Turks are of the opinion that the Venetian Republic provoked the Morlaks. Faced with this grave situation in Dalmatia and Bosnia, the Pope invites Venice to join the alliance with Poland and Austria against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, if the Turks were defeated, Venice would be able to take back the lands that had been lost to the Turks⁴⁹.

THE TENSE RELATIONS AND THE ESCAPE OF SECRETARY GIOVANNI CAPPELLO FROM ISTANBUL

The main task of Secretary Giovanni Cappello⁵⁰ was to pay off the debt caused by Donà as soon as possible. Cappello, who had previously been in Istanbul as a secretary during the time of Bailo Alvise Molin, encountered a tense atmosphere when he arrived in the city. The Ottoman Government did not hesitate to display its displeasure because the Republic had appointed a diplomat who had a lower rank and title compared to the previous bailo to their country. In addition to the tense relations, news spread in the Ottoman Empire that Venice was negotiating to join the Alliance, which was founded and supported by the Pope. This alliance

45 AAV, *Segreteria di Stato. Venezia*, vol.126, ff. 122-123r.

46 Most of the letters and reports sent to Venice by Donà, the Istanbul bailo, are in the Venetian State Archives in the classification of *Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato – Constantinopoli*, filza 162.

47 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 45-6.

48 Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991), 274.

49 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 47-8; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 360-61.

50 For a comprehensive biography of Giovanni Cappello see Gino Benzoni, "Cappello, Giovanni", in DBI, vol. 18 (1975), 789-91.

against the Ottoman Empire was perceived by the Ottomans as a Christian union and a religious war against the Muslims, so the possibility of Venice's involvement in this union further deteriorated the Ottoman-Venetian relations. According to the information given by Secretary Cappello during his stay in Istanbul⁵¹, a call was made to recruit troops to join the Ottoman army and new ships were being built for the navy. On June 11, 1684, a letter was sent from the Doge of Venice to the Secretary, stating that the Republic of Venice had joined the Holy Alliance; the Secretary should inform Venetian merchants to hide their capital and tell the Ambassadors of other states that Venice had joined the alliance by explaining them the justified reasons of this participation and he was ordered to leave Istanbul⁵².

However, the Secretary fled from the Ottoman Government without obtaining permission to leave the city. Senators Garzoni and Diedo emphasized that Cappello had fled the city simply because he was afraid⁵³. According to them, Cappello, who was obliged to inform the Ottoman Government that Venice had joined the alliance with Austria and Poland in 1684 but could not find the courage to give this news to «these wild people», «first went to Izmir and then fled to Venice and somehow escaped danger». Since Cappello fled, it was up to dragoman Tommaso Tarsia to deliver this difficult task. Sultan Mehmed IV did not hide his disappointment at the news given by Tarsia and told him that a peaceful path could always be found with Venice⁵⁴. Senators stated that the reason why Cappello escaped was that he thought that he would be killed when he said this to the Sultan⁵⁵.

Other sources report that Cappello, unable to obtain permission to leave İstanbul, shaved his beard and head, changed his appearance, boarded a Greek ship and sailed to Çanakkale, where several other employees of the bailo's office had already arrived, and from there managed to escape on a French sailing ship⁵⁶. Ottoman sources, on the other hand, claim that Secretary Cappello escaped by starting a fire at night, and while everyone was busy putting out the fire, he took advantage of the chaos and escaped in a boat⁵⁷.

51 Most of the letters and reports sent by the Secretary Cappello to Venice are ASVe, *Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato. Costantinopoli*, filza 163 in the Venetian State Archives. About Cappello see, *Le relazioni degli Stati europei lette al Senato dagli ambasciatori veneti nel secolo decimosettimo*, vol. V/1: *Turchia*, eds. Nicolò Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (Venezia: Pietro Naratovich, 1871), 10, and vol. V/2, 123, 291.

52 Benzoni, "Cappello, Giovanni", 789-90.

53 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 58; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369.

54 Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369.

55 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 63; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369.

56 Benzoni, "Cappello, Giovanni", 790.

57 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 255.

THE MAIN REASONS OF THE DETERIORATION OF THE RELATIONS ACCORDING TO OTTOMAN SOURCES

Ottoman sources described in detail the process that would result in Venice breaking the peace treaty, turn against the Ottoman Empire and go to war. Ottoman sources emphasized two important events that were not reported by the Venetian sources. We have already mentioned the smuggled goods seized from the ships, which led to the punishment of Donà, Venetian bailo. Firstly, Raşid Mehmed Efendi states that an accidental fire broke out in the cellar where these goods were temporarily confiscated and sealed. The Venetians considered this accidental fire as a deliberate action perpetrated against them by the Ottomans⁵⁸. According to Ottoman author Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Aga a major event that had an impact on Venice's breaking the treaty was the fact that the Ottoman Government had ordered the unloading of 4 thousand bags of merchandise from 10 Venetian galleons to the Kurşunlu Mahzen and forcibly sent these galleons to dispatch troops from Egypt. When the Venetian owners raised their voices about their goods, this merchandise was transported into a cellar and burned to silence them. In retaliation, the Venetians took revenge by confiscating the Bosnian merchants' merchandise and sending a group of bandits to hassle them⁵⁹.

The other event that caused Venice to break the treaty was the capture of a message written by the Grand Vizier to the Sultan when the Austrians invaded Kara Mustafa Pasha's tent in front of Vienna and the events that followed⁶⁰. During this period, the Ottomans actually pursued a certain policy towards Venice. The Ottomans intended to postpone the war against the Venetians until the campaign against Austria took place with the idea that «revenge is a dish consumed cold»⁶¹. In the captured message, the Grand Vizier tells the Sultan that Venice should be treated with false tolerance until the Austrian issue was resolved, and that after Austria was dealt with, it will be the turn of the Ottomans to take revenge on Venice. This message was delivered to the Austrian Emperor, who immediately informed the Venetian Doge of this situation and informed the Venetians of the Grand Vizier's telegram, stating that they should be in alliance. Thanks to this message, Emperor Leopold of Austria finally had a great opportunity to draw Venice into the war on his side. Thus, the true opinion of the Ottoman Empire about Venice became known to Venice. The Venetians were convinced by the Austrians that they had no choice but to enter an alliance⁶². Venice finally responded positively to Austria's offer after the tension over smuggled goods and captives, the 500 coins in compensation, the burning of Venetian merchandise in a fire in a cellar, and the revelation of Kara Mustafa Pasha's

58 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

59 Nazire Karaçay Türkal, *Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Zeyl-i Fezleke (1065-22 Ca.1106 / 1654-7 Şubat 1695) (Tahlil ve Metin)*, (PhD diss., T.C. Marmara University Institute of Turkic Studies, 2012), 924-26.

60 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

61 «Vaktinde intikam alınmak». Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

62 The message is «Venedik keferesinin beynine dahi tefrika düşürmeğe bundan özge münasib iş olmaz». Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 165.

unfriendly designs on Venice in the captured message.

In conclusion, according to the Ottoman sources, three events played a major role in the breakdown of Venice's agreement with the Ottoman Empire and its subsequent inclusion in the Alliance. The first was that Venice hid some trade goods on its ships to avoid paying customs, the second was that Venice hid some prisoners who had escaped from the Yedikule Prison on its ships, and the third was that Venice attacked Ottoman subjects on the Bosnian border and caused the deaths of many Muslims⁶³. On the other hand, according to Venetian sources the main reasons for Venice joining the Alliance were that the Ottoman Government took money from them by force, seized the lands in Dalmatia, collected taxes and constantly threatened Venice and The Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha's humiliating attitude against Venetian bailos⁶⁴. In addition, the fear that the war might one day spread to its territories, the intention of defeating the Ottomans while they were at war and the desire to regain the lost territories were essential elements for Venice to join the Alliance of 1684.

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63 Raşid, *Târîh-i Râşid*, vol. I, 254.

64 Garzoni, *Istoria della Repubblica di Venezia*, 63; Diedo, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia*, vol. III, 369.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV: Archivio Apostolico Vaticano.

ASVe: Archivio di Stato di Venezia.

DBI: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani).

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AA.VV. "Morlacchi", in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti*, vol. 23, 858-59. Roma: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 1934.

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