

From different perspectives and by using an interdisciplinary approach, this volume addresses one of the main topics of our times: how democratic politics and policies are changing through the New Millennium. Established ways of life, thinking, acting, are undermined by a fast-moving process of globalized transformations forcing us to face new problems and, as it usually happens during historical phases of transition, the new coagulation of social, political and economic forms that will overcome the old ones, seems yet unclear. The economic crisis biting the average family as well as the small and medium enterprise has also brought with it a crisis of the political and institutional authority in many Countries. Creating a climate of uncertainty and distrust that appears to represent a threat for the democratic fiber of these nations. This book analyses different challenges to modern democracies. From the manipulation of institutional processes that leads to the distortion and weakening of legality itself to the rise of religion in Russia turned into the cultural grounds for political normative intervention; from globalized neo-liberalism threatening basic social institutions to the traditional reframing of gender issues from a populist perspective, we are witnessing a reconfiguration of democratic traditions and values that - despite left wing populist experiences' attempt to re-discuss democracy from a more participatory perspective - lays on uncertain, quicksand, premises. But if traditional nation-state politics seem to lose power and decision-making capacity, at a local level, policies based on municipal or communitarian grounds experiment counterreaction forms of resilience. Cities are proving capable of withstanding the populist siege or of organizing movements in support of CEDAW in Countries that haven't ratified the treaty, whereas local communities grassroots initiatives experiment fruitful participative decision-making processes. Not that these local forms of democratic garrisons counterbalance the globalized political, economic and social trend but as social scientists we have learnt the importance of analyzing both levels since Zygmunt Bauman and Joshua Meyrowitz, amongst others, introduced the term "glocality" in the Social Sciences back at the turn of the Millennium.

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Democracy, Power, and Territories

A cura di Flaminia Saccà

Sociologia

FrancoAngeli



Sociotechnics,
Sociological Practice

Democracy, Power, and Territories

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Preface

by Flaminia Sacca^{*}

This book is the outcome of a scientific collaboration between the International Sociological Association, Sociotechnics – Sociological Practice Research Committee (ISA RC26) and the Italian Political Sociological Association and its contributions have been peer reviewed by members of the two scientific societies. Through the years, the two associations have organized joint summer schools -mainly aimed at young scholars from all over the world - and joint conferences organized at an interdisciplinary level in order to give both senior and junior colleagues the opportunity to exchange experiences, ideas and findings from their different research fields.

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From different perspectives, focusing on different sectors of society and by using an interdisciplinary approach, it addresses one of the main topics of our times: how democratic politics and policies are changing with the advancing of the New Millennium.

In a historic phase of liquid modernity as Bauman poignantly defined it, societies undergo through fast and continuous changes. Established ways of life, thinking, acting, are undermined by a fast-moving process of globalized transformations forcing us to face new problems and, as it usually happens during historical phases of transition, the new coagulation of social, political, economic and democratic forms that will overcome the old ones, seems yet unclear. The economic crisis biting the average family as well as small and medium enterprises goes along with a crisis of the political and institutional authority in many Countries. Creating a climate of uncertainty and distrust that appears to represent a threat for the democratic fiber of these nations. Changing social, economic and productive structures entails a change in the

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political sphere too. Social and political scientists are registering a shift in the role of political parties, and new actors and "milieus" appear on the decision-making scene on one hand while on the other, new political cultures, leaders and styles arise in response to a new quest for reassurance from the challenges brought by globalization, economic crisis and the liquidity of the modern condition.

Worldwide the very pillars of democracies, as we have known them throughout the Twentieth Century seem at stake in a process of distortion that is feared to undermine democratic values and practices. But if traditional nation- state politics seem to lose power and decision-making capacity, at a local level, policies based on municipal or communitarian grounds experiment counterreaction forms of resilience. Not that these forms counterbalance the globalized political, economic and social trend¹ but as social scientists we have learnt the importance of analyzing both levels since Zygmunt Bauman² and Joshua Meyrowitz³, amongst others, introduced the term "glocality" in the social sciences back at the turn of the Millennium.

Along these lines, this volume is divided in two parts. The first, *Changing Democracies and Powers in Contemporary Societies*, analyses different challenges to modern democracies. From the manipulation of institutional processes that lead to the distortion and weakening of legality itself to the rise of religion in Russia turned into the cultural grounds for political normative intervention; from globalized neo-liberalism threatening basic social institutions to the traditional reframing of gender issues from a populist perspective, we are witnessing a reconfiguration of democratic traditions and values that - despite left wing populist experiences' attempt to re-discuss democracy from a more participatory perspective- lays on uncertain, quicksand, premises.

In the first chapter Antonio Costabile and Antonella Coco focus on the power relationships and social practices within contemporary democracies highlighting the risks deriving from the manipulation of institutional-normative processes that entail a distortion of the legal rationality and institutional scopes bringing to a weakening of the belief in legality.

¹ Quite the contrary in fact. As Bauman has already evidenced, geopolitical fragmentation makes globalized power even more powerful, for small, local organizations give more room for manoeuvre to those in power. See: Bauman, Z., On Glocalization: or Globalization for some, Localization for some Others, Thesis Eleven, Sage Journals, Vol. 54, Volume: 54 issue: 1, page(s): 37-49, August 1, 1998.

² *Ib.*

³ Meyrowitz, J., "The Rise of Glocality: New Senses of Place and Identity in the Global Village," In: K. Nyíri (ed.), The global and the local in mobile communication, Passagen Verlag, Vienna, 2005.

In the second chapter, Flaminia Saccà and Luca Massidda analyse how the latest Italian election campaign, dominated by two populist parties, has framed gender discourse. How feminist values and culture seem distant from all parties - except for a marginal (in terms of percentages of votes), extreme-leftist one - whereas traditional values that see women mainly as mothers have made their reappearance.

Tradition is also at the centre of *Religion in Public Discourse of Modern Russia*, Nataliya Velikaya's essay, where the author argues how the rise of religious feelings and beliefs is actually linked to political discourse and action. It is the new basis for political identification, subjection and intervention. Supplying the government with the "right" to assert which are the "traditional values of the Russian people" in contradiction to others, supposedly distant from the traditional worldview and therefore considered dangerous for the public *morale*.

In the fourth chapter of the volume's first section, Marco Damiani explores the possibility that not all populisms entail an anti-democratic, conservative nature based on supposedly traditionalist norms and ideals. While analyzing the *Phenomenology of Left-Wing Populism* the author focuses on the Spanish *Podemos* movement as an example of untraditional left-wing experiment that is capable of keeping together different social backgrounds and political cultures, hypothesizing this as one of the reasons for its solitary success within the European left-wing scene. Nonetheless, as a movement with locally rooted leaders it will probably have to face new organizational choices in the future -such as deciding on whether to become a party instead of remaining a movement for example- and only then analysts will be able to seize its actual innovative, lengthy impact and (possibly) exportable capacity. For at present the various leftist movements worldwide (populists and no) have not proven successful even in rising a critical supranational conscience capable of effectively tackling *Globalization and the Neo-Liberal Trend* that are *Jeopardizing Basic Social Institutions*, as analysed by Tatiana Sidorina in the last chapter of the first part of this volume.

The second part, *Territories, Politics and Policies*, deals with different forms of local, territorial or community resilience. In *Withstanding the Populist Siege. New Leaders and the Political Bias of the Metropolis*, Luca Massidda analyses the connection between territories and populism, highlighting how cities (as opposed to rural areas) could play a significant role in contrasting the populist wave. Through the analysis of the recent voting behaviour in three global cities (London, New York and Paris) his essay investigates in depth "the reasons that seem to allow the metropolis's political bias to withstand the siege of contemporary populism".

This sociological emphasis on the city is not new. Cities have historically been considered by social scientists, as pillars of modernity and of emancipation as well as one of the two sides of the recent cleavages in contemporary times. Jan Marie Fritz in her *Cities for CEDAW Movement*, offers a vivid example of how, even in one of the world's oldest and strongest democracies, such as the United States, cities can play a crucial role as garrisons of democratic and civil rights, working on a local level in order to support national and international initiatives towards the reduction of the gender gap.

The relationship -and the tension- between the local and the national level is analysed by Antonietta Cammarota and Valentina Raffa in their *Globalization, Policy, Territory. A postcolonial Analysis*, through a case study on Mexican local communities and their communitarian, participatory procedures, which, if included in the territorial policies at various levels could become a tool to regain sovereignty and exercise resistance to post-colonial powers. But cooperation within local communities, although has the potentiality to enrich local territories through alternative paths to that of the economic growth model - that has left many communities impoverished - may not be enough if grass roots or even individual initiatives are not mediated, supported and implemented by local authorities, as George Tsobanoglou's chapter *Sustainable Local Cooperative Development in Greece* demonstrates.

Globalization, world disorder and the many critical elements of the contemporary world do not only generate phenomena of uncertainty and weakness. In the context of specific policies, as well as in local territorial frameworks, authoritative, competent and effective answers emerge too. In his essay, for example, Michele Negri analyzes the Western Armed Forces in the post-Cold War era, especially in relation to two cases, the Italian and the US one, that have been converging towards a similar organizational and cultural model in the last decade. The first phase of the organizational learning process was uncertain, liquid and experimental whereas the past decade can be described as a fundamental step in the consolidation, formalization and "relative standardization" of what had been formerly learned, both in the national and in the Western military system. The Armed Forces, solid by definition, after having lived a short liquid phase, managed to activate effective mechanisms of adaptation and learning, of diffusion and of imitation, which within a couple of decades or so have brought them back, in a resilient way, to the original condition of "solidity".

A process that might give us an insight of future political dynamics as well.

Part I
Changing Democracies and Powers
in Contemporary Societies

*1. Power Relationships and Social Practices
Within Contemporary Democracies.
The Manipulation of Institutional-Normative
Processes*

by Antonio Costabile, Antonella Coco *

1. Introduction

This essay focuses on the phenomena regarding the struggling for power, which can be observed within the transformations of the contemporary democracies and that lie on the boundary between what is considered legal or illegal. In details, we take social practices and power relationships into consideration, that can be defined and interpreted by employing the category of manipulation, and we try to investigate the extent of its heuristic capacity in comprehending certain social phenomena. We believe that exploring manipulative phenomena also allows us to grasp and interpret social change. In fact, the study of manipulation and of its social legitimacy fully lies within the analysis of modernity and, specifically, in relation to its processes of democracy and citizenship. In this regard, we tend to interpret manipulation in relation to social change, focusing on the transformative capacity inherent to manipulation; that is, the ability to modify relationships, attitudes and social norms. In institutional contexts of advanced modernity, manipulation can, in fact, be a contributory factor of social change. It evolves into a strategic capability which allows an adaptation to the change and simultaneously nourish it. In social contexts where the different types of relationships are plastic and extremely varied, manipulation highlights the ability of individuals to use the resources which they possess, both legally or not, in order to pursue their goals and achieve positions of power.

The category of manipulation is widespread and extensively employed in social sciences and in various field of knowledge, such as: legal studies, power studies, psychology, in communication studies, as well as in anthropological and sociological studies, in accordance to their different meanings and uses. In fact, there is a juridical interpretation of manipulation conceived as a form of deviance (explicit or hidden) from the law. There is also an

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interpretation of manipulation as a power strategy throughout mechanisms of allurements - (such as corruption, exchange, co-optation) - or influence. Furthermore, there is also a psychological interpretation where manipulation is defined as a form of subordination of the interlocutor by producing specific techniques. In addition, there is the socio-anthropological approach that studies manipulation as a specific adaptive model of the construction of societies which face exogenous transformations. In this essay we mainly focus on this approach in order to analyze the manipulation of normative-institutional processes which determine a distortion of the legal rationality and institutional scopes in addition to weakening of the belief in legality.

We note that within sociological literature, the concept of manipulation is used in two different approaches and is therefore defined as a relationship of power - (we can make reference to situations where someone makes someone else do something for them, according to his or her individual goals while utilizing particular forms of influence, allurements and seduction) - or as a social practice (according to the theory of action). Furthermore, in relation to social stratification, we can observe that forms of manipulation arise from the top of the social scale to the bottom, thus from those who hold more power resources towards the ones who possess less or few resources, and also from those who lie at the bottom of the social scale, therefore from the need of the ones who occupy disadvantaged social position. For this reason, we try to demonstrate how manipulation becomes a widespread and pervasive social practice within contemporary democratic States. In particular, we will refer to the Italian State, to its historical evolution and thus to the processes of State building and Nation building during the XIX century, and to the characteristics of its process of modernization, during the XX century.

Thus, in this work, first, we will present the evolution of the concept throughout the different fields of knowledge and then we will focus on manipulation of normative-institutional processes within contemporary democracies. We observe manipulating phenomena within contrasting trends: on the one hand, due to the continual changes of institutions, the need for ulterior regulation of social life emerges, thus adjusting to the new situations which are generated. This leads to the tendency of “incessant regulation” thus to the increasing number of laws (Cassese, 2013; 2018). On the other hand, this trend contradicts the idea of individual freedom and it expresses the will to increasingly blind social action. Therefore, two opposing tendencies emerge: one exalts individual rights and freedoms, while within the other emerges the need to progressively regulate the new situations, which may arise socially. We can express these two trends with several opposing conceptual pairs: the huge surge to de-regulate (Rangone, 2015) opposes the tendency to “ceaseless regulation”; the indeterminacy of every society due

to the complexity is opposed to the normative-symbolic determinacy and to the tendency to “determine” the new or emerging situations (Crespi, 2006); informality contrasts with the tendency to formalize what was once considered informal, up to that point. In this way, the social spaces that were not regulated beforehand, and were considered indeterminate and informal, tend to become regulated, determined and formalized. The manipulation, as we will try to explain, lies at the confines between: determined and undetermined, formality and informality, and regulation and de-regulation.

2. The evolution of the concept of manipulation. Its uses and definitions in social sciences

How has sociology approached the concept of manipulation? To answer this question, let's examine the evolution of this concept in the various social sciences and according to the different uses of the category of manipulation.

First of all, it must be said that manipulation is attributable to the crime of plagiarism. Thus, it pertains to the legal field. In this sense, manipulation is a form of deviance (explicit or hidden), punished by the law. The idea is that, with respect to individual freedom, manipulative techniques cannot be used in order to make others become submissive, or plagiarize against their will, or interfere with personal choices. Positive law intervenes on behalf of behaviours which were not regulated by the law previously and were considered to be “cunning behaviours” or rather “sly” abilities of a particular subject that applied them within a certain relationship. For example, in Italian criminal law, up until 1981, plagiarism was defined as the subordination of a person against their own will, in order to reduce them to a state of subjection. Plagiarism is therefore the capacity attributed by a subject to condition another subject and consequently subjugate them. The concept of crime emerges in positive law and becomes a criminal offence. This assumes a significant relevance from a sociological point of view, since positive law is one of the fundamental elements within the process of modernization. Modernity, in fact, assumes also the meaning of affirmation of liberty and rights with the progressive formation of modern democracies (Habermas 1987 in Martinelli, 1998). Along with the assertion of civil right and freedom, the division of powers within the modern State, the organization of the structures of political representation, the “due process of law” in the administration of justice is one of the main features of the democratization of Western countries. Therefore, discussing plagiarism means analyzing modernity, since, thanks to the affirmation of modern rights and freedoms, it is not permissible to neither

subjugate other people, nor plagiarize them against their own will, or intervene in their choices.

The sociological observation surpasses the dimension of the crime, since it also analyses different forms of social relationships and social actions that are not part of the definition of the crime as stated by law. Political scientists and sociologists define manipulation as a social relationship, specifically as a power relationship, within the studies regarding power. In comparison to the legal approach, the studies on power highlight different forms of manipulation, which not only are crimes, but which lie on the boundary between being considered legal or illegal. There could be forms of power that are apparently legal and consist in conditioning and influencing the choices and the will of other, implemented by those holding higher positions towards those who hold lower ones. Stoppino (1983, p. 624, engl. transl.) defines manipulation as a power relationship in which «A determine a given conduct of B, and at the same time, on the one hand, A does not openly request such conduct from B, but rather hides its true intentions from B in order to obtain it - (or the nature of the intervention to obtain it) -, and on the other hand, B, does not realize that the conduct is desired by A - (that is, the manner which caused A's intervention) -, but rather one believes to have chosen freely - (or knowingly)». According to Stoppino's definition, the two main requirements of social manipulation are the hidden or invisible characteristics and the intentional nature of the manipulation. In fact, «the manipulated subject does not know that he is being manipulated and believe that he freely decides, while his/her behaviour is actually conditioned by the manipulator. Furthermore, «not only does the manipulator intentionally provoke the desired outcome of the manipulation; but also tries, in the same intentional way, to hide the existence or nature of his intervention which causes the behaviour of the manipulated» (*Ibidem*). The hidden characteristic of manipulation allows it to be distinguished from persuasion: «when a person tries to persuade another to embrace a certain belief or to behave in a certain way, he explicitly and openly discloses that belief or behaviour, and formulates the reason for acting in favour of that belief or behaviour, in the same explicit and open way. In this manner, the persuasion is contrary to the manipulation, which seeks to obtain voluntary and conscious consent of the subject to who it is being presented» (*Ibidem*). The occult persuasion, on the other hand, is a form of manipulation. In this case the messages are intended to deceive the recipients, and to plagiarize their choice, without knowing them, through the use of instrument that remain anonymous. Manipulation also differs from coercion: «although this destroys the freedom of the subject, it is not without brutal frankness: it is open and explicit, and seeks to obtain its goal by threatening what is still a voluntary and conscious behaviour. Manipulation, on the

other hand, is subtle and hidden, and treats man like an object: it shapes the behaviour by bypassing one's conscious will. It not only denies freedom, by the same capacity for man's choice» (Stoppino, 1983, p. 625, engl. transl.). Furthermore, the author explains and distinguishes three forms of manipulation: informational manipulation, which adopts different techniques such as: distortion, suppression, or the propaganda; the psychological manipulation, or rather, the activation of unconscious dynamics by means of symbolic instruments; the physical manipulation, or rather, the activation of impulses and various states of mind by means of physical instruments.

Within the studies on power, manipulation as a power relationship has been addressed by other authors such as: Foucault (1993) through the idea of oppressive control, by Bachrach and Baratz (1986) through the idea of non-decisions, and by Lukes (1996; 2007), who defines manipulation as an impediment of free individual choices. In particular, Foucault (1993), through the analysis on total institutions, pays attention to the concealment of power throughout devices and techniques which hide the sources of power, assuming the characteristic of an automatic machine and inducing the act of auto-constraining, while conforming to the power prescriptions automatically. In this manner the system of social control does not need to employ means of force in order to constraint subjects to respect prescriptions. The opposition to the power is de-legitimized and residual, consisting of practices and behaviours which aren't considered normal and treated by prisons and psychiatric institutions. Bachrach and Baratz (1986) highlight a specific dimension of power which consist of the possibility, on behalf of political leaders, to define the political agenda, excluding instances, demands and protests which might arouse social conflicts, from the political arena and from the decisional processes. The non-decision is not a fraud or an illegal procedure, but it consists of the capacity of the political power to exclude problems and issues from the decisional process leaving them at a latent state, employing cultural, procedural and repressive resources. Lukes (1996, p. 725) defines manipulation as the ability that we have on others to conform them to our will through the strategic use of an art or a skill. He then distinguished two types of manipulation: 1) The first one corresponds to allurement or seduction that manifests itself in «the ability to attain one's goals or to ensure the advantages through bids, bribing, subjugation or co-opting another or others» (*Ibidem*); 2) the second one is the influence, or the «possibility of arranging or conditioning the will of the subjects or their desires, preferences and beliefs» (*Ivi*, p. 726). In short, Lukes emphasizes that manipulation is a form of power that works especially in the area of latent and unexpressed conflicts, through a series of mechanisms often prevent the explication of conflicts even in the eyes of the subject who should support them. This is due to a sequence

of impediments that work in the field of thought and communication, inducing a sort of pseudo-voluntary subjection. The Lukes's radical conception of power is based on the idea that the aspect of the power that is more difficult to control is the capacity to influence and to manipulate the scale of values and the order of choices attributed to those subjects which are in a inferior position and are unaware about it. In this manner, the conflict is repressed and occulted to the eyes of the same antagonist subjects (Costabile, 2002). According to Lukes, the highest and most insidious power is the one that structures perceptions, cognitions and preferences of individuals, so that they do not experiment reasons of discontents and they accept the established order, since they do not see or imagine alternative possibilities and since they consider the existing order as natural and not modifiable. Asserting that the absence of discontent is equivalent to spontaneous consensus means rejecting the possibility that a false and manipulated consensus exists (Lukes, 1974, p. 24).

Cavalli (1965) discusses the relationship between democracy and forms of manipulation by taking the role of national political élites into consideration and defining the concept of «manipulated democracy». In fact, within democracies, the risks is that the organized minorities can exercise their domain through out forms of manipulation, in a dissimulated manner. The concept of manipulation is defined as the secret or impersonal exercise of power; he who is influenced does not receive explicit dispositions about what he must do, however, he is subjected to the will of who holds the power (Cavalli, 1965, p. 51, in Bettin Lattes, 2008, p. 271). The manipulative dimension of democracy is produced by the dynamics of the organized minorities animated by their interest to maintain their supra-ordinated condition of élite and their need of domain. In this sense, manipulation is functional to the maintenance of a system of domain, and it is associate to the necessity of the dominant élite to exercise its power in a invisible manner in the eyes of the dominated. In order to establish and maintain the condition of domain by a minority upon the majority, mainly two processes are employed: socialization and the social control by maneuvering some important institutions such as family, school, religions, art, mass media. The practices of manipulation weaken and deprive the institutions of their meaning, thus transforming and manipulating democracy (Bettin Lattes, 2008, pp. 270-271).

The studies focusing on the psychological elements of the political power analysis take manipulation as a specific ability into consideration, which, in addition to the need of deference, produces, as result, an efficient political man able to transfer his private motivations to public objects, in the name of public interest. In other words, he uses public objects - (elements of the secondary environment) - to alleviate his private tensions (Lasswell, 1975).

A further employment of the concept of manipulation comes from the authors of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse), in their “critical theory” of the societies, specifically, in the studies concerning the integration of the working class in capitalism, German Nazism as well as in the analyses of the consumption society. They discuss the concealment of power and the weakening of the critical capacities. The central interest for the “cultural industry” highlights the mechanism of manipulation within the logic of the mass communication, since its message are unidirectional and push subjects to conform to the existing social order (Horkheimer e Adorno, 1947 in Jedlowski, p.1998, p. 198).

The studies on communication related to political power tend to interpret it as a persuasive - (clear or concealed) - manipulator or a selective power. After the Second world war, several theories on communication (Losito, 1995), in the United States. focused more on commercial advertisement than on political communication. They highlight the unlimited power of media, the danger of information, the opinion manipulation, and the fact that idea and meanings can be introduced in the minds of individuals who are exposed to media influence. In this sense, Packard (1958), in “*The Hidden Persuaders*” discusses that, within capitalism, technological means, in addition to the contents techniques of psychiatry and psychology, are employed in order to activate the process of unconscious induction to consume. In other words, the advertising industry employs methods which are licit but also hidden, thanks to the scientific research and technological discoveries. Packard (1958, p. 11) affirms that many of us are influenced much more than we suspect and that our daily experience is subjected to continuous manipulations since our preferences in terms of consumption and our mental mechanisms are influences by some forces which employs hidden mechanisms of persuasions. This occurs in order to advertise several goods, such as objects, ideas, candidates or mental attitudes. Luhmann (2000, p. 63) also discusses the issue of manipulation. He asserts that the advertising tries to manipulate and that it works in a insincere manner, supposing that this is known. Moreover, the author, discussing the “reality of mass media” - (intended both as the operations performed by mass media and as the reality constructed by the mass media as a system which observes throughout a sequence of observations) - highlights how the possibility and the suspicious of manipulation are an internal problematic of mass media as a system, since manipulation can be understood and discussed only within the system by producing further information, and by rendering said information object of further communication. Therefore, although manipulation produces relevant effects in the environment, the most important issue concerns how the system of mass media reacts and coexists with the suspicious that all information can be doubtful.

Castells (2003, pp.341-342) highlights the political role of media and consequences of the new information technologies on the political debate and on the strategies for power. Media are a fundamental vehicle of communication, influence and persuasion, thus they are highly used by politicians. However, he contests the idea that the public opinion is easily manipulable and that passively receive messages from media. The process of interaction between media and their public is biunivocal and those who receive the messages can twist or rather reverse them. This dimension of reciprocal exchange represents an important change within the communication studies, since in the past communication was analyzed in terms of propaganda and was interpreted as a unidirectional flow, directed towards a passive and easily persuadable recipients (Mancini, 2006).

Changing perspective of observation, and moving to the community studies, anthropologists analyze manipulation in relation to the primitive and pre-industrial societies and define it as a capacity of society which faces exogenous transformations. We can refer to the studies carried out on the first form of exogenous change within primitive societies and on the relation between the colonizers and the colonized (Arrighi and Passerini, 1976; Lewellen, 1986; Van Velsen, 1971). In this case, the weaker people – the colonized – used the resources they have to condition the forms of change and to condition those who hold the power – that are the colonizers. The added value of the anthropological approach highlights the fact that manipulation is not just a form of power implemented by a strong subject upon a weak subject. Manipulation can, in fact, proceed in two directions: 1) from the top to the bottom of the social scale, this means that the power belongs to the strongest subjects towards the weakest ones; 2) from the bottom to the top – from the need of the weaker subject towards the stronger subject. For example, kinship can be instrumentally used in order to reach economic, political or prestigious goals. Social relationships can be manipulated in a manner that orients social action towards those finalities which differ from the law and from the formal rules, and which sometimes can be opposed to them.

Subsequently, taking the anthropological perspective into consideration, sociologists also employed the category of manipulation when studying the processes of modernization with exogenous origins, for example when studying the processes of modernization of the South of Italy (Piselli, 1981; Arrighi and Piselli, 1976). In this case manipulation is considered as a form of action or as a social practice.

Furthermore, in sociological studies, the concept of manipulation is employed within the sociological studies of modern societies for analyzing the phenomena of corruption (Pizzorno, 1992; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1993) or on political clientelism (Lapalomba, 1967; Graziano, 1974; Eisenstadt

and Roniger, 1992). In these cases, manipulative practices are considered to be informal activities that intervene within political-institutional processes while deforming their means and structures. Manipulation consists of elements of informality. Induction and allurements, actually, are examples of informal strategies, and represent elements of manipulation. We can address several examples of manipulative power in this sense. An example is the manipulation of policies, in their creation and in their implementation. Research has shown how development and welfare policies in the South of Italy have been manipulated by the logic of clientelism (Fantomozzi, 1993; Trigilia, 1992).

The following discusses the manipulation of normative-institutional processes. This approach also highlights manipulation from the top - (or rather by the power holders) -, and from the bottom. Within democracies in fact, a manipulative logic could arise, from the top, by the power holders, and from the bottom, by those who occupy inferior positions and who exercise their power by strategically using the resources they possess. The most significant resource is the right to vote. People can use it or rather use other resources in order to manipulate. The different actors of democracies when they acquire rights or other resources, can use them in order to manipulate.

3. The manipulation of normative-institutional processes in advanced modernity

In this paragraph, we focus attention on the manipulation of normative-institutional processes, that produces a distortion of their final objectives. In this case, norms, resources and relationships that relate to institutional processes are manipulated. We suppose that within globalization, the weakening of the national and supranational regulatory systems increases the chances for global citizens to try to manipulate norms, relationships and procedures in order to achieve particularistic goals.

The criterion we use to distinguish what is manipulated by what is not is the difference between universalism and particularism. Manipulation is present in modern and legal contexts when there is a gap between the aims of universalistic institutional processes, and the particularistic use of them. In other words, we can say that manipulation exists when characteristics and purposes of norms, resources and universalistic relationships are deviated and distorted in a particularistic way, in order to favour the interests and scopes of the manipulator. The effect created, in any case, is a distortion of legal rationality.

By adopting this perspective, manipulation can be defined as «a set of practices and techniques that are renewed and refined in time through which

norms, rules and relationships with universalistic content and goals are diverted to aims and objectives which are specific, and which derive from a traditional, religious, parental, community, and corporate nature» (Costabile, 2009, p. 34). In this sense, manipulation is defined as a social practice and we refer to all those practices that involve the struggle for power. In fact, normative processes are manipulated in order to achieve position of power. We refer to strategies aiming at the appropriation of resources, (whether it be money, careers, bids, or contracts, etc.) since public resources tend to become an object of the manipulative struggle for the private appropriation. Public resources tend to lose their collective social value as the results of the political redistribution and become objects of appropriation and manipulation (Ivi, pp. 37-38).

There are many examples of manipulative practices. For example, an exchange vote is a manipulative practice. Promises and personal favors are made in exchange of votes. Therefore, manipulation exists on behalf of both parties. The content of the manipulative exchange is the vote. It should be treated as a universal content (related to government projects, ideologies, etc.), but it is used for particularistic purposes. We can refer to the manipulation carried out by expert subjects, who can avoid forms of legal control. Forms of manipulation can take place in the spaces between the political decision and the administrative execution, where the contents of the activities can be oriented towards outcomes that oppose to the goals of the law. A further example of manipulatory power consists of the capacity to determine the formation of laws in order to justify particularistic interests and privileges. In this case, the social actors, who are usually involved in useful social networks, are able to pre-constitute force positions in those sectors characterized by an incomplete regulation. They obtain political decisions which, through a new legislation, legalize those states of facts (Costabile, 2002). Even when it is implemented as a practice, manipulation can be identified as a crime or may be related to various situations of one's social life that are exempt from offenses. We can argue that, in this sense, manipulation has become a widespread and legitimate social practice capable of coexisting and competing with legality.

In Italy, we can refer back to the spread of manipulative practices during the construction of the national State to the nineteenth century, therefore to the processes of State-building and Nation-building. Also, during the twentieth century, we can make reference to the characteristics of modernization in relation to forms of manipulation. Even in these cases, we can observe the dual direction of the phenomenon: 1) from the top of the social scale, or rather by the upper classes, used in order to build their political, economic, and cultural power; 2) from the bottom, or from the lower classes, in order to obtain the bare minimum needed for their life and their well-being.

If we make reference to Italy, from a dynamic point of view, we can track the evolutionary profile of the manipulative phenomena (Costabile, 2009), and we can distinguish between two different phases: the manipulation within the liberal Italian State and the manipulation of the Italian democratic State.

The manipulation of the origins marked the birth and the development of the liberal pre-democratic unitary state. In this phase manipulation assumes a largely elitist characteristic - (visible for example in the “notable clientelism”) - attributable to the predominance of the most powerful social actors. At this stage, the poorest social classes do not possess the right to vote, and therefore have no contractual power to exercise in their favour.

Within the formation of the First Republic we can see how the mass manipulation took shape. This became possible by the transfer of national resources towards the Southern Italian regions, and by the particularistic employment and use of welfare policies. It is the period of the political clientelism, that was linked to a particularistic use and consequently to the manipulation of public resources. It was also the phase of the welfare clientelism, which outlined a model of assistance and dependence (Fantozzi, 1993).

We can observe manipulation at the individual level and at the systemic level. In the first case, Piselli (1981) shows how manipulation has become an individual attitude and capacity. The author analyses the individual manipulation of kinship and the strategic use of family resources. She demonstrates how individuals tend to use kinship and family bonds as the most powerful available tool for integrating themselves into modern society. The system of kinship no longer constitutes a coherent set of norms which regulate individual action, and it is no longer a conditioning structure. On the contrary, the “open” network of kinship is an instrument of manipulation used by individuals for strengthening their position in the job market, or for increasing their prestige or their power. Individual subjects manipulate the communitarian relationships and values in order to pursue their scopes. This kind of manipulation has not weakened the traditional family network and has neither constituted it as a factor of disaggregation, but it represents a new factor of social cohesion between groups. At this stage, we can analyze both the devious actions of the strongest social subjects from the top of the social scale and the actions of those subjects who have a lower social status, and who now have the right to vote.

At the systemic level, we can observe manipulation in relation to political, administrative or rather economic systems. For example, political parties and public administrations employ manipulative mechanisms mainly around political clientelism, as mentioned above. Political clientelism combines the

manipulation of relationships with the manipulation of the legal norms. It precisely regards the manipulation of the solidarity and redistributive State processes, that the political élites, especially in the South of Italy, used to build their clientelist power. Along with the previous stage, manipulation also took on a specific function in relation to the social cleavages (Rokkan, 1982), especially in relation to the territorial one, which prevented a systemic and orderly construction of the unitary State. Manipulation was a mechanism that helped to ensure the unified equilibrium of the unitary State. It became structured as mind-set of knowledge and practices especially typical of the political clientelism and it has become the source of reproduction of the national territorial imbalances for the purposes of political and economic power. It has become an integrative and legitimate factor, along with the law, where the most successful mediators gain the highest powers (Costabile, 2009, p.42). Discussing legitimate manipulation, we can observe the uprising of a framework of actions where, despite formal legality, multiple channels of legitimacy - (partly legal and in part religious, community, territorial, familist or clientelist) - could indeed co-exist with different articulation and prevalence in the different regions and areas of Italy. This could produce a generalized weakening of the belief in legality, and the rise of social and territorial inequalities. Up until the fascist period, during the liberal State, manipulation manifests itself as being narrow and predominantly pertains to the élite. In the post-war period, manipulation soon became a mass political and institutional practice, present in the new democratic State and in the welfare system. For example, the immediate purposes of manipulation concerned employment, bids, careers, licenses, contracts, professional assignments, and subsidies. In this manner manipulation did not allow the conflicting factors to manifest themselves into the potentially disruptive form they could have assumed, but they were continuously rebuilt and reworked.

Manipulative strategies and techniques are also typical of neopatrimonial tendencies defined as the assumption of forms of traditional patrimonial power within modern rational-legal contexts (Eisenstatdt, 1973; Roth, 1990). In details, we refer to those practices that entail the personal use of public and private administration resources in order to gain particularistic advantages. This is widespread in Italy and specially in the Southern regions. This entails the weakening of fundamental principles of modern bureaucracy (Weber, 1968), such as: the separation between power holders private resources and the administrative apparatus means – (thus between public and private interests) -, the “loyalty of service” in relation to public tasks and activities, the impersonal order and its dispositions and commands toward which orienting the administrative institutional action (Coco, 2015).

4. Manipulating the rules within complexity

In the previous paragraphs we have tried to demonstrate how manipulation is not a remnant of pre-modern societies, that face the initial processes of modernization. The sociological literature highlights how manipulation concerns power relationships in contemporary democracies, in addition to the uprising of practices of institutional-normative manipulation implemented from the top and from the bottom of the social scale. In the following, we pay attention to the functions of manipulation in democratic contexts of advanced societies characterized by increasing complexity, new challenges and new issues to be regulated, and by increasing difficulties of the decision making processes. Therefore, new questions emerge. What does manipulation of norms represent in complex societies? Where can manipulation of institutional-normative processes be observed?

In order to answer to the first question, manipulation could be considered as an informal solution to the problems of complexity and, with this regard, we can take into consideration the theoretical approach of Luhmann (1995). We propose to consider the function of manipulation as a mechanism for reducing complexity. Luhmann (1995) attributes the concept of complexity both to the systems and to their environment and he gives two definitions of complexity. According to the first definition, “we will have an interconnected collection of elements that it is “complex” when, because of immanent constraints in the connective capacity of the element, it is no longer possible at any moment to connect every element with every other element” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 24). Also, complexity is defined as a “measure for indeterminacy or lack of information. Viewed in this way, it is the information that the systems lacks fully to grasp and to describe its environment (environmental complexity) or itself (system complexity)” (Ibidem, pp. 27-28). The increasing of information increments the capacity of the systems to adapt to the environment and reduces their internal complexity. The complexity of the environment is always higher than the complexity of the systems, which, constantly cope with the increasing and changing complexity of their environment. In order to adapt, systems need to implement reductions.

We can distinguish between the observation of manipulation as individual capacity or rather as a systemic characteristic, once again. Manipulation, in fact, tends to be an individual capacity, even more. In contemporary contexts of “mature individualism” (Dumont, 1983; Laurent, 1994), we can observe an auto-referential and utilitarian form of manipulation concerning values, norms as well as social and community relationships. In fact, Individuals try to manipulate norms, relationships and administrative procedures, in order to achieve their won goals. Manipulation becomes «a capacity of individuals

to define, use, and consequently mix, any religious, cultural, community, affective, or economic resources, for their own personal use» (Costabile, 2009, p. 47). So far as the institutional and normative processes are concerned, this attitude tends to increase, especially if we take the new features of clientelism into consideration, when political clientelism appears to be particularly linked to the fragmentation of the particularistic demands that it feeds and lives by, but that it cannot adequately satisfy. In this way, the personalization of political power and the oligarchic tendencies tend to increase.

At the systemic level, for example with regard to the political or the administrative system, manipulation can also assume the function of reducing complexity, especially when the regulative capacity of legitimate power appears weakened by conflicts or rather by other situations of crisis. Complexity makes it difficult to make decisions. According to Luhmann, there exists a need for the reduction of complexity. Manipulation, in this sense, could be a response to the complexity of the political decision making processes. The second question regards where manipulation of institutional-normative processes can be observed. According to us, manipulation lies in the spaces arising between two opposite trends, that we can simultaneously observe. In fact, on the one hand, we can see how the need for further regulation of social life emerges; we make reference to the tendency of regulating the new situation that may arise socially. As Cassese (2013; 2018) emphasizes, this corresponds to a process of incessant regulation of the social spheres. In Italy, since 1861th, about two hundred thousand laws have been produced, in addition to the laws and regulation of the twenty Italian regions. Various laws often regulate the same subject; there is a relevant production of waivers and an increasing overlapping of laws. On the other hand, societies tend to exalt individual rights and freedoms. Thus, it is clear that the will to increasingly bind social actions contrasts the enhancement of individual rights and freedom. Within contemporary States, public powers tend to continuously elaborate an increasing number of rules regarding social and individual spheres which were not regulated before. The extension of the regulation corresponds to the progressive penetration of the juridical regulation into those social spheres that were auto-regulated or however not subjected to the juridical evaluation by public powers. The enlargement of the juridical regulation, in addition to the social activities not yet regulated, concerns also those fields already regulated which demand to modify or substitute the existing regulation, often without more pervasive and complex rules. The extension of the regulation is explained also by the enlargement of the functions attributable to the articulated public powers of the States. The public power recognizes and defines, by a juridical perspective, the pertinence of the general public interest, by creating the rules for a controlled execution, or for the inhibition

of specific activities (Amorosino, 1997). Since the 70's and the 80's, the re-trenchment of the public powers induced measures of deregulation, differently emphasized by the several States. Amorosino (1997) underlines the co-existence of both tendencies: on the one hand, the reduction of the regulation (or de-regulation), and its symmetrical continuous increasing, on the other.

As Crespi (2006) highlights, each society can not be completely determined; this would prevent social change. Society are characterized by the coexistence of determinacy and indeterminacy. Social innovation and more in general social change are often produced in the indeterminate spaces of society. In the specific of our analysis, laws change and are produced in order to regulate social situations that are not yet regulated, but that exist as de facto situations. Thus, the law gradually regulates new social conditions, providing solutions to new particular cases and establishing new types of offense. Thus, some behaviours could become crimes, highlighting the shift from undetermined to determined situations. For example, we can think about the introducing of the environmental crimes and the environmental criminal law that regulates them.

Therefore, we propose to observe manipulation between the following opposing pairs: 1) the increasing regulation that opposes the tendency to the deregulation; 2) the tendency to regulate the new arising social situations, opposing the indeterminacy of society; 3) the tendency to formalize what was once informal, up to that point, opposing informality.

In details, manipulation mainly lies within situations characterized by regulatory indeterminacy and in normative contradictions. In the first case, we refer to situations that are not completely regulated by the law. As we mention above, manipulation can also consist in acquiring factual positions, that are then enforced by the law. In this case, manipulation corresponds to the capacity of social power to determine the formation of laws in order to justify specific and particularistic interests or privileges. Social actors are able to pre-constitute position of force in sectors of the social life where the legal legislation is not complete, or it does not exist, in order to obtain political decisions which legalize the new conditions and the new states of facts, throughout forcing the existing legislation or through out creating new laws. An example is the case of the Italian local television broadcaster who initially had the license to broadcast within local territories only. In the 1980's, these broadcasters insisted on transmitting not only within the local territory, in contradiction with the monopoly of the ether held by the public Rai (Italian Radiotelevision). This opened up a conflict that was solved by the issuance of a law in favour of the local broadcasters, which allowed the latter to broadcast throughout all of Italy, recognizing a state of affairs which was already in place. In this case, manipulation consists of a pre-constitution of a factual

power position, which then becomes subsequently regulated by the law.

In the second case, we refer to normative contradictions, thus when the laws contradict one another. For example, this occurs when a subsequent rule contradicts the previous one, or when national laws are contradicted by the regional regulation or rather when the draft laws are not enforced by the regulation. Another example is the contradictions that sometime exist at the regulatory level, between the European Union, the States and the Regions. In other words, the situation outlined above indicates that power positions can be constructed both in spaces, which are not yet regulated or not sufficiently regulated and where there are normative contradictions.

In summary, manipulation of normative-institutional processes may in some cases be a functional response to the reduction of complexity, aimed at making decision, and for others, a strategy for the regulation of factual positions, recognized and regulated by the institutional regulatory systems.

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2. Gender Discourse in a Populist Election Campaign

by Flaminia Saccà, Luca Massidda^{*1}

1. Introduction

This essay is the result of an original research work supported by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research, through the Programme for Researches of National Interest (PRIN). *Personalization, institutionalization and deinstitutionalization: the new dynamics of power in the post-democratic society* is the title of the project carried out by a network of Universities coordinated by Prof. Lucio D'Alessandro. The data presented here are part of the working package carried out by the Tuscia University Unit, coordinated by Prof. Flaminia Saccà.

We have analyzed the latest Italian elections, mainly through the social media campaign and, secondarily, through the content analysis of the programmes presented by the various political parties running for election.

The latest political elections (March 2018) have been a turning point for the Italian political scene since they have been characterized by the unprecedented success of two different populist parties now forming the governing coalition: *Movimento 5 Stelle* (5 Star Movement) and *Lega* (League).

Several commentators have identified the victory of M5S and Lega - two differently populist but equally anti-establishment parties- with the end of the Second Republic. Similarly to what happened between 1992 and 1994, when the traditional ruling parties' system was hit by a profound crisis of legitimacy (Morlino 1996; Morlino & Raniolo 2017; Saccà 2013), also in the latest elections the "old" ruling classes have been ousted by political subjects capable of

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intercepting, in their true - or supposedly so - outsider nature (Barr 2009), the anger and the desire for change of the “sovereign people”. Many analyses have already been published in an attempt by the scientific community to “accompany” and understand the ongoing process of political change (Cavallaro *et al.* 2018; Chiaramonte *et al.* 2018; Emanuele 2018; Istituto Cattaneo 2018). Here we will focus on a specific aspect of the last election campaign: gender issues (Saccà & Massidda 2018). This specific thematic perspective will however allow us to intercept all the main variables of the political conflict on which the last election campaign has been played, and decided: labour and family, immigration and security, social rights and civil rights.

Although the campaign has focused mainly on the immigration issue, we have found that the populist fiber of the political debate has affected other topics as well, shifting priorities, adjectives and meanings used until then to frame sensitive topics within the political debate. Indeed, gender issues are one of them.

Although the scientific community has attributed the term *populism* many different definitions and meanings, when analyzing it in connection to gender issues we find that populism is not only a matter of “style” (Kazin 1995; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005) but it influences political perspectives bringing them back to social tradition instead of innovation. So indeed, it seems that at least when it comes to gender issues, populism can actually function as a traditional, conservative – although weak, may be (Mudde 2004, 2007; Kaltwasser and Mudde 2012) –, ideology.

All of a sudden, the political debate over the role of women in society has come to a halt. Their liberation, equal rights, the right to take and keep a good grip over their own lives - whether they choose maternity or not, career or family, or both, to have a free and safe sexual life, the right of abortion, to break the glass ceiling impeding them to reach the same goals as men - well, it is no longer a priority. Actually, not only that. It is simply no longer the way through which gender issues are discussed and framed. Not to mention LGBTQIA rights to be considered equal to any other citizen, with the same rights to love, marry, have children as any other person. This issue has disappeared from the political agenda altogether.

Nonetheless, political debate and political programmes do not always coincide. Especially in the digital communication era, when liquid modernity - as Bauman poignantly described it - has liquified politics, debates, values as well. Political language reveals it clearly. Written words serve a slow path world. They are there to stay and to be remembered. In a fast-forward era, in times of liquid politics, they are there to be forgotten. To be left un-read even. They no longer represent the basis for political debate. Political debate takes place on social networks, that function as a political communication hub. On

Facebook each political leader posts his/her own thoughts, video, television, radio or newspaper interview. As well as their sentiments, slogans, rallies. What happens in the social media has now become grounds for news in the traditional media. But social media are there to solicit sentiments, not reasoning. They have no precise memories. They leave impressions. Words are left in a blurry background, to be soon forgotten. So in a political campaign, such as the last one, where gender issues have been treated in a very traditional manner, depicting women mainly as mothers, as if Italy was stuck in the 1950's (F. Saccà, L. Massidda, 2018a), the various parties' political programmes provided a more varied and certainly a more advanced picture. Uselessly so, if even the 5 Star Movement that had a notably advanced programme for women and gender issues, never focused its campaign on these topics and, worst of all, has accepted to govern with the most conservative party (League) and to appoint a Christian fundamentalist at the Family Cabinet.

Here we will analyze if, how and from which perspective gender issues have been included and pinpointed by the different political parties' programmes during the latest Italian elections (March 2018). They include larger government/opposition parties as well as smaller ones from the far right and the far left. We will analyze the words used by each party to address those issues, their recurrence/frequency and, more generally, their perspective, framing, targeting and finally, their proposals/solutions.

We extrapolated gender related topics within different political areas:

- Labour/Employment.
- Maternity.
- Violence.
- Civil and Biological Rights.
- Welfare State.
- Gender Balance.
- LGBTQIA.
- Family.
- History and Culture.

The objectives that guided the analysis can be summarized as follows:

- Evaluating the overall weight of gender issues in the complex of all the committed parties and in the specifics of each single programme.
- Identifying gender issues' main declinations and recurrent thematizations (in absolute terms, for a political macro-area and for a single party).
- Verifying the validity of the traditional right/left cleavage with respect to sensitivity and methods of treatment adopted by each political force regarding gender issues.

- Identifying the politically more conflicting aspects of gender issues, isolating the topics capable of determining a stronger polarization between the positions adopted by the different parties.

2. Methodology

The role of gender issues in the last election campaign was analyzed by referring to the official political programs presented by all the main parties involved in the “race”:

- The three parties of the centre-left coalition, with the absolutely dominant role of the Democratic Party (the political force that expressed the last three prime ministers), joint with the numerically marginal partners of Civica Popolare (party of Catholic-democratic tradition with a centrist vocation) and +Europa (heir, with an Europeanist suit, of the historic Radical Party)².
- The three left-wing parties that have placed themselves outside the Democratic lead coalition: the new proposal for a left-wing government of Liberi e Uguali; the electoral list Insieme that refers directly to the aggregative experience of the Ulivo and which includes the Italian Socialist Party, the Green Federation and the movement Area Civica; and Potere al Popolo, a significant example of those forms of left-wing populism that in recent years have begun to spread - and to be invoked - even in Western European countries (Damiani 2016; Gerbaudo 2017; Mouffe 2018).
- The four parties that formed the centre-right coalition: Lega, that has abandoned its historical localism for dressing the Italian flag’s three-coloured cloths of nationalist *sovereigns* (Albertazzi *et al.* 2018) and has succeeded in overtaking the leadership of the conservative electorate from Forza Italia, Berlusconi’s personal party (McDonnell 2013). Alleanza Nazionale and Noi con l’Italia complete the centre-right line up.
- The two right-wing neo-fascist parties of Forza Nuova and Casa Pound.
- The catch-all post-ideological, anti-elitist and techno-populist (Bickerton & Accetti 2018) party of the Five Star Movement.

In total, we have analyzed the official political programs of thirteen parties.

The limited number of documents and the relative marginality within them of references directly attributable to the gender issues’ field has allowed

² The single SVP-PATT list, which unites the two movements for South Tyrolean autonomy, has not been taken into consideration because of its specific regional dimension.

us to conduct a systematic human content analysis of the selected texts. It is necessary to state that the different programs represented strongly non-homogeneous texts, in terms of size and depth. These structural differences undermine the possibility of full comparability between the various political proposals, both in terms of measuring the space dedicated to gender issues and of assessing the level of depth of the arguments offered.

After having isolated for each program all the paragraphs related to gender issues, we proceeded to a classification of the discourses by applying a grid of analysis that included nine macro-categories. Each of them was composed of a further series of variables. Those variables - which were distinguished by their politically polarized nature - were given the +/- signs to indicate the ideological direction of the political position taken (e.g. abortion). Some variables are transversal to several categories (e.g. a policy for day nursery support intercepts both the welfare and maternity dimensions). The macro-areas and the categories taken into detailed consideration were the following:

1. Labour & Employment (LAB&EMP): women's employment; labour/family balance; gender pay gap; maternity and paternity leave; mothers' reintegration; working mothers.
2. Welfare State (WS): familiar subsidies; day care; retirement pensions; non-working mothers' subsidies.
3. Maternity (MAT): maternity's protection; mothers' reintegration; working mothers; non-working mothers; birth-rate incentives; birth-rate crisis; mothers' retirement pensions
4. Family (FAM): family's centrality; family's protection; birth-rate incentives; adoption
5. Civic and biological rights (CIV/BIO RIGHTS): right to self-determination; sexual and reproductive rights; pro-abortion; anti-abortion; medically-assisted procreation; family law extension; pro-life rights.
6. LGBTIQ: LGBTIQ violence; LGBTIQ discrimination; homophobia and transphobia; LGBTIQ civil rights; marriage and parenthood: right to self-determination.
7. Gender violence (GEN VIO): gender violence policy; gender violence typologies; gender violence statistics.
8. Gender balance (GEN BAL): women's rights; gender inequalities; cultural discrimination and stereotypes; glass ceiling; gender education; equal opportunities.
9. History and culture of feminism (HIS&CULT): traditions; memories; best practices.

Table 1 summarizes the occurrences recorded in each party's program in relation to the nine selected macro-areas.

Table 1 – Gender Issues distribution for macro-areas/political party

PARTY	LAB & EMP	WS	MAT	FAM	CIV/BIO RIGHTS	LGBTIQ	GEN VIO	GEN BAL	HIS & CUL
PAP (37)	5	1			7	7	7	8	2
INS. (20)	8	4	2				2	2	2
LEU (15)	2	2	1		2	2	2	4	
PD (28)	10	4	6	1		1	5	1	
CIV. POP. (16)	6	5	3	1			1		
+EUR (16)	9	2	2		3			1	
M5S (39)	12	5	3				8	11	
FOR. ITA. (8)	1	4	1	1				1	
NOI ITA. (8)	1	4	1	1				1	
FRA. ITA. (7)	1	2	1	2				1	
LEGA (21)	3	3	3	3			9		
C-RIGHT (8)	1	4	1	1				1	
CP (12)	3	6	2					1	
FN (10)	1	2	3	2	1	1			

Source: PRIN 2015 Personalization, institutionalization and deinstitutionalization: the new dynamics of power in the post-democratic society – Tuscia University Unit, 2018

When commenting the results, we will focus on three areas of analysis: labour and welfare; family and maternity; gender violence. A separate consideration is dedicated to the gender policy in the M5S program. One reason in particular triggered us to isolate the position of the party founded by Beppe Grillo: the M5S programmatically refuses to place itself politically in the traditional left/right ideological axis (Corbetta & Vignati 2013). However, the way M5S addressed gender issues in its program places it, for sensitivity and vision, in a clearly progressive and democratic universe of values. This “positioning” emerges unequivocally from the comparison with the other parties, even the most extremist ones, which instead are immediately linked to the traditional conflict between right and left. This did not prevent the MoVimento from forming a government alliance with the Lega, despite the profound differences on gender issues contained in Matteo Salvini’s party program.

3. Labour and welfare

The strongly correlated areas of Labour and Welfare State are the only ones that all the examined parties have declined in terms of gender issues, at least at some extent. This confirms «the centrality of gender to the transformations of contemporary welfare state» (Laperrière & Orloff 2018, p. 227) and its importance in shaping labour market’s logics, its new features (Brown 1997; Fagan *et al* 2015) and its enduring inequalities (Kalev & Deutsch 2018). However, the different political groups have dealt with these two topics, in relation to the role and condition of women, in a very different way, according to their specific civic culture and political values. In the centre-right coalition (Forza Italia, Lega, Fratelli d’Italia and Noi con l’Italia) the female labour issue is brought back almost exclusively to the need to protect the rights of working mothers, thus insisting on a presumed “biological” equation between women and mothers. A traditional concept that conservative political parties do not seem ready to abandon. The “traditional” family remains the central socio-cultural reference in the construction of the political proposal of the centre-right front. The mother, who biologically represents its family premises, must therefore be protected, when she decides to reconcile home care and professional career, through a maternity support action which, thanks to investments in family welfare measures (childcare, tax relief, maternity leave), facilitates the reconciliation between family and working time. It is also necessary to enhance the choice of those women who decide to dedicate themselves exclusively to family care, establishing a

“mothers’ retirement pension” (Forza Italia) and providing for the “deductibility of domestic work” (Fratelli d’Italia). In practice, it is a matter of recognizing and acknowledging the “professional” nature of reproductive labour.

In the two far-right parties outside the coalition - Casa Pound and Forza Nuova - this conservative view of the relationship between women and the labour market is much more pronounced. Both movements expressly propose solutions to support non-working mothers. According to Forza Nuova, in particular, through a systematic programme for family support, women should be «released from the weight of double work» (FN programme). A “fair treatment” that women would then earn by remaining at home. For the far right domestic work is a woman’s job. Traditional stereotypes are not in discussion here and remain unquestioned. In this way - that is, pushing women out of the productive labour market - the structural problem of unemployment would be solved for «millions of jobs would soon be available») and «society’s fundamental cell» would be protected, thus «guaranteeing greater wealth for families, a greater unity within them and the overcoming of the current demographic emergency» (FN programme). In the framework of this traditionalist view of gender relations, it is interesting to note that, considering the entire political spectrum of the Italian right (moderate, conservative and reactionary), it is only in Casa Pound’s programme that a different sensitivity to the issue of female work emerges: only here we find a reference to the problem of the gender pay gap and to the institute of paternity leave. Two fundamental battles to guarantee fairness and protection for women’s labour (O’Reilly *et al.* 2015; Bosoni *et al.* 2016; Zajczyk & Borlini 2010).

If we move into the field of political proposals linked, in a broader sense and with different intensities, to a left wings value universe, we immediately notice a different centrality assumed by gender issues in defining the areas of programmes dedicated to the themes of labour and welfare state. All democratic political parties have in fact included the problem of women employment (not necessarily mothers) in the sections of their programmes dedicated to labour market. The gender pay gap is also transversal to the left-wing groups, and all the forces of the front are perfectly aligned: from the leftist populism of Potere al Popolo («we fight for [...] the end of wage disparity») to the democratic Catholicism of Civica Popolare (which talks about «the elimination of gender pay inequality»), from the new government left of LeU («we aim to cancel the wage gap between men and women») to the radical liberalism of +Europa (which proposes to «effectively help companies in the future to make equal pay values for men and women concerning the same kind of employment or job carried out»). In this political macro-area also there is no shortage - except for PaP, to which we will return later on - of

references to the protection of working mothers (especially in the PD programme, containing three citations), but that of motherhood is never the exclusive perspective adopted by left-wings parties when they look at the relationship between female employment and labour market. This is shown by the attention, widespread in progressive political proposals, reserved for the issue of reconciliation between working time and family time. This is a problem involving the whole society, not only its women, and it needs to be addressed overcoming traditional gender discrimination and ensuring, for example through the institutionalization and extension of paternity leave³, that «both parents can easily return to work after the birth of their children» (PD programme).

4. Maternity and family

Potere al Popolo is the only political group that systematically refuses to connect women's issues to the frame of motherhood and family. Although a large part of its programme is dedicated to the gender issues - in absolute terms only the M5S presents a greater recurrence of affirmations referable to the female universe -, the populist party of the radical left - with a female leadership - is very careful to avoid any possible "reduction" of the social role of women to the exercise of their maternal function. The equivalence between women's rights and mothers' rights which, although with very different intensities, all the other parties tend, at least occasionally, to suggest, is instead programmatically rejected by PaP. Even in dealing with aspects of gender issues in which the reference to motherhood is inevitable (e.g. the balance between productive and reproductive labour), Potere al Popolo is very careful, starting from the choice of the language used, to always bring the problem back to the frame of power relationships between genders that systematically discriminate women's rights, thus avoiding any possible reference to motherhood as a natural "destiny" to be protected and safeguarded. Against the idea of maternity as destiny (Ottaviano 2015), PaP counterpoises the systematic denial of a bio-deterministic conception of parenthood, recalling on many occasions the centrality of women's right to self-determination. The program reiterates the need to guarantee the right to abortion, a right envisaged in Italy by Law 194/1978 (but often, if not denied, certainly hindered by the proliferation of medical conscientious objectors, even in public hospitals) and expressly takes a position in favour of the «access to

³ +Europa speaks explicitly about the need to «overcome maternity leave in favour of parental leave, which can be enjoyed by both men and women».

medically assisted procreation, even the heterologous one, irrespective of the family status» (PaP programme) and in support of the right to adoption for singles and homosexual couples.

However, if we look at the whole spectrum of political forces due to a progressive and democratic horizon of values, we note how the issue of women's right to self-determination, especially as regards the field of reproduction, has not imposed itself as a value transversally shared by all the different left-wing political cultures. In addition to Potere al Popolo, only Liberi e Uguali (defence of Law 194/78) and +Europa (medically assisted procreation, reform of family law) expressly take a position, within the programme, in favour of sexual and reproductive rights of women. The topic is, if not entirely absent, absolutely marginal in the political programme of the Democratic Party which limits itself to a generic statement on the need to take into account «the evolutions of society and family law» (PD programme) to change the rules on adoptions (dated back to 1983). A very timid position, which has allowed the PD to mediate between the different sensibilities and souls within it, thus preserving its majoritarian vocation, but which has obviously contributed to the loss of a precise progressive political identity (Trigilia 2018). Rather than fighting a battle on the ethics of self-determination and sexual-reproductive rights - issues "surrendered" to the less institutional left (LeU and especially PaP) or confined in the libertarian "niche" of the former radical party (+Europa) - the Democratic Party prefers to contend family and birth-rate support topics with the moderate right-wing. A structural issue in the construction of the political proposal of the centre-right (as reported in the synthesis of the programme shared by the coalition and strongly enhanced also in the autonomous programmes presented by the Lega and Fratelli d'Italia) that the PD tries to "occupy", without wielding a hetero-normative vision of the family, but even without having the courage to clearly and explicitly question its traditional socio-cultural foundations. The image of the family the centre-right wants to defend is much cleaner, while the one represented by the PD is so blurred that do not allow an effective identification of any reality. In short: the traditional family finds in the centre-right programmes a much more precise self-image than a "family" who wants to be and offer an alternative social model of sharing daily life and reciprocal affections can find in the programmatic proposal of the PD. The family of the centre-right is the «natural family» (Fdi programme), «it is the natural society based on the union between man and woman» (Lega programme), «the place of fundamental bonds, the primary nucleus of the community, cradle of new life» (*ibid.*), it is the family of one father and one mother, never of a «parent 1 and a parent 2» (*ibid.*). The PD's family is all

flattened on an economic dimension: its crisis is an economic one, its difficulties are an economic one, its support is an economic one. Nothing is said on the crisis, the difficulties and the socio-cultural support that today a non-natural and non-traditional conception of the family nucleus would need. A lack of courage that we also find when it comes to the little regard given to LGBTQTI rights: it is true that the Democratic Party includes measures for contrasting homophobia in its agenda, but it approaches the issue only in a “negative” way – like the need to defend people from gender violence, in all its forms – never in an “active” way, working for the consolidation and recognition of new civic rights. A battle, once again, left to less moderate parties such as LeU and PaP.

5. Gender violence

In Italy, in recent years, the attention and sensitivity of public and media opinion towards the problem of gender violence has grown enormously (Giomi 2013; Giomi & Magaraggia 2017; Menduni *et al.* 2018). Despite this, when it comes to last election’s political leaders’ self representation, we find that the topic has been treated rather marginally (Saccà-Massidda 2018a). This lack of attention is only partially confirmed by the analysis of the various parties’ electoral programmes for here the differentiation between progressive and conservative political proposals is far stronger and clearer. Within the right-wing, in fact – from the centre to its most extreme margins – the issue of gender violence is completely absent, with the sole notable exception of the Lega. The other forces of the coalition choose shared (Forza Italia and Noi con l’Italia) or very synthetic (Fratelli d’Italia) programmes in which this particular topic does not find any space. The two neo-fascist movements of Forza Nuova and Casa Pound also carefully avoid any reference to the problem of violence against women. In this silence, characterizing the national right programmes, Matteo Salvini’s party’s position actually stands out. It not only addresses the issue, but it does so in a recurrent manner, to the point that Lega’s is one of the programmes that most frequently returns to the gender violence topic. Which is the meaning of this anomaly of interests within the political vision of the Italian right? In the Lega’s programme there are also very detailed references to the gender violence issue (reference is made directly to the 2011 Istanbul Convention, to the 2017-2020 national strategic plan on male violence launched by the last government and to the latest statistics on the rise of stalking crimes) but the overall frame within which the issue is always addressed is that of women’s security.

One crucial thing that the new government will have to guarantee. The problem of violence against women is never framed as a socio-cultural problem inscribed in the depths of the social fabric and rooted in the everyday life of gender relations (Corradi 2008, Mattucci 2017). It's a public security problem. It does not require education, the solution does not come from a strategy of cultural policies aimed at contrasting stereotypes and discrimination but from a promise of security. It lies in harsher penalties that punish criminals (even with chemical castration in the case of rape crimes) and that act as deterrents to crimes, enforced by a judicial system that has to become faster and more powerful. In this way, the framing of gender violence is fully functional to Lega's wider political proposal for it perfectly contributes to the creation of that climate of social insecurity to which a muscular and testosterone-driven government with strong leadership – such as the one proposed by Salvini – can offer an easy answer. Therefore, Salvini and the Lega deal with gender violence in the same way they treat immigration: by tracing the problem back to the security frame (Åse 2018) they cultivate the ideal ground for the success of their securitarian leadership (Farris & Scrinzi 2018; Scrinzi 2017). It is no coincidence that these two flows of social insecurity - kept substantially separate in the programme - will instead often tend to feed each other in the electoral storytelling of the Lega "Captain" (Massidda 2018).

As far as gender violence is concerned, the distinction between progressive and conservative political cultures is actually quite evident: they differ in the way they treat the subject and in the values behind their solutions. If the Democratic Party recognizes the «non-neutrality» of gender for the understanding of violence against women, of which it is the «foundation», *Liberi e Uguali* – like the Lega – recognizes the need to increase the penalties for crimes against women, but it clearly declares that an effective action of contrast to gender-based violence mainly depends on different social policies as the activation of «an extraordinary plan for female employment that would make women free to choose and be confident about their future» (LeU programme). Social emancipation, guarantee of autonomy and independence (even economic) represent the "weapons" that the left, united for once, embraces to fight against gender violence: in addition to LeU, both the Democratic Party and *Insieme* refer to them, while *Potere al Popolo*, adopting an even wider perspective, insists on the «systemic character» and on the cultural dimension of violence against women (Sjoberg *et al.* 2018), on its being immanent to the social relations, on the faults of a society «incapable of calling into question the separation between male and female roles» (Pap programme), on the cultural matrix of a «material and symbolic violence» that arises «in the perpetuation of a male domination unable to deal with the affirmation of women's autonomy and freedom» (*ibid.*).

6. The M5S anomaly

With regard to the fight against gender violence, the more structured and progressive political programme is perhaps that of the Five Star Movement. Here the problem of violence against women is systematically inscribed in a broad thematic socio-cultural frame. The proposal to increase the penalties is also present in this case, but the reference to the need to implement a different social politics able to «promote a culture based on respect for differences (starting from gender) and equal opportunities, for the rights and dignity of women and to fight against the various forms of violence and discrimination» (M5S programme) is much more recurrent. Prevention - before repression - of violent behaviour against women depends on the implementation of an effective cultural policy that can educate, starting from school, to equality and respect for gender differences, fighting against discrimination and the spread of sexist stereotypes⁴. Education (Cavaletto 2017), not punishment, is the determining variable in the vision of the Movement: «Gender education is intended as a starting point for the respect of all differences - including those related to sexual orientation and gender identity - and for overcoming all those cultural stereotypes that underlie violence, abuse and all forms of sexism, homophobia, bullying, racism» (M5S programme). In the Five-Star programme there are also other aspects that reveal a particular sensitivity, democratic and progressive, to gender issues: the inspiration to the principles of international conventions (CEDAW and Istanbul); the explicit de-feminization of gender issues; «the securing and economic support of women victims of violence»; «the financing of the activities and the permanent training of all the operators who come into contact with the victims of violence» (M5S programme). The ambiguity of the political proposal of a post-ideological and populist catch-all party (Bickerton & Accetti 2018), at least in the area of gender issues, is resolved in a view clearly connectable to a progressive universe of values and a democratic civic culture. In the M5S programme, at least in terms of gender issues, there is no element of compatibility with the current Lega partner. This is clearly demonstrated by the opposite way the two populist parties now governing the Country link the problem of immigration to gender issues: according to the Lega immigration entails at least two different threats. That of illegal immigration and that of an increase in rape rates. Whereas for the M5S immigration entails double suffering for women seen both as victims of trafficking and of sexual violence.

⁴ Starting from the linguistic ones. The M5S programme is in fact the only one in which the intention to favour “the differentiated use of the male and female gender in the Italian language instead of the usual male neutral” is expressly stated.

A very distant position from that carried out in the first months of the new government when Matteo Salvini, now Minister of the Interior as well as Lega's leader, started an indiscriminate policy of refoulement and of ports-closure. More specifically, the M5S programme reads as follows: «In the management of migratory flows the protection of vulnerable people is particularly problematic in that they need adequate support and guidance. The 5 Star Movement will support any intervention aimed at safeguarding the inviolable rights of vulnerable individuals (minors, especially unaccompanied persons, the elderly, women, victims of torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence) and at guaranteeing them the necessary assistance, the predisposition of educational projects, of social integration, as well as the adequate training of all the different figures with whom they come in contact during the procedures» (M5S programme).

Apparently such a gender sensitive vision and such an attentive cultural policy to the protection of vulnerable subjects could be easily sacrificed in order to allow the birth of the new "yellow-green people's government".

7. Conclusions

Summing up, from an in depth reading of the electoral programmes and of how they have focused and addressed the macro-theme of gender issues, we can extrapolate the following indications:

Overall, the gender issues are thematized with a significantly greater recurrence in the programmes of the parties attributable to a leftist political culture.

The forces of the conservative area, on the other hand, show that they share a much more homogeneous vision on gender policies - based on the centrality of the traditional family and on the promotion of maternity - than that recorded in the progressive macro-area.

The ideological differences on the most delicate and controversial issues tend, as expected, to become blurred as we approach the more moderate positions of the two fields, while they are radically polarized in the two extreme fringes of the political spectrum (with Forza Nuova suggesting "a programme that provides psychological and material help to the woman who, for whatever reason, does not intend to complete the pregnancy, *determining* her to give birth to the child").

It is important, however, to note that the "non-conflict" in moderate forces is not due to the adoption of similar proposals, but rather - especially as regards the democratic left - to the overcautious choice not to take definite

positions on issues that could be excessively divisive for a generalist electorate.

The structural area of labour, unemployment and welfare is the one that all parties also decline in terms of gender policies. The conservative alignment tends to conduct almost exclusively the theme of women's work to the issue of protection and safeguard of working mothers.

Potere al Popolo is the only political force that systematically avoids to treat gender issues under the motherhood or family care perspective.

Considering the number of references and the recalled universe of values, the Five Star Movement's attention to gender issues is totally comparable to a progressive, reformist and democratic political culture.

Only the socialist-environmentalist programme of Insieme and the radical one of the left-wing populist Potere al Popolo make explicit reference to the history and values of the feminist movement. Whereas in the mainstream left there is no memory of the tradition and values historically brought forward, both nationally and internationally, by feminist struggles.

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3. Religion in Public Discourse of Modern Russia

by Nataliya Velikaya*

Unique religious post-soviet Renaissance which has been initiated by Perestroika has arisen interest in religious studies. After the period of actual restraint of religious liberty representatives and believers of different confessions are now able to freely and openly demonstrate their belonging to certain religious brands.

Longtime dominance of atheistic ideology in scientific researches has influenced the post-soviet period. During the last 20 years the problem of religiosity was considered in terms of “post-secularity”. It must be pointed out that a post-secular society is characterized not only by the rise of religiosity but by religion’s return to the social sphere and public discourse. According to Peter Berger, the most popular theorist of secularization, “religion is not about to disappear, it exists, evolves and comes back into policy”¹.

All these processes fully took place in Russia. During the period of post-soviet reforms Russian social consciousness concerning views of religion and evaluation of value-identification basis of Russian culture changed largely.

According to The European Social Survey (The European Social Survey, ESS, Round 4 –2008-2009) Russian society divides into almost equal parts. 49% of Russian people consider themselves as believers, 48% - as atheists. Most of believers (87%) are Christians. We should stress out that most of the population consider themselves as Orthodox Christians not so much in the context of religious practices as in the context of congeniality to spirit, cultural identity².

The second popular confession is Islam: 11% (6% of all respondents) of

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¹ An interview with Peter Berger/*The Hedgehog Review*/Spring & Summer 06, pp. 153-160.

² For more details: Modern Russian regionalistics and ethno-politics through the prism of concepts / [E.S. Dorofeeva, I.N. Kononov, V.S. Slobozhnikova, V.A. Trukhanov]; edit. by V.S. Slobozhnikova; Saratov: Publ.House FSBEI HPO “Saratov State Law Academy”, 2013 pp.149-157, pp.185-195.

believers consider themselves as Muslims. Less than 1% of Russian people are of some other confessions³. This factor is proved by long-term monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of RAN Center "Religion in modern society". By the way most people in Russia consider religious identification as a socio-cultural one.

During the period of 1991-2015 the Russians religious worldview changed a lot due to the enforcement of the Right for freedom of conscience and religion. Number of confessional tripled and nowadays there are 27626 registered religious organizations⁴. Compared with 1991 the number of religious organizations has increased fivefold. 80% of them are religious organizations of Orthodox confession.

Activity of religious organizations of the last years is connected not only with uniting of believers and forming of their religious worldview, but with determination position according to secular questions, including political ones. 77% of citizens support attendance of priests in the Army. 84% of them support the participation of political organizations in charitable actions. 73% of respondents do not object to the creation of Church children's homes. More than 80% of citizens support the idea to create Church hospitals and old-people's homes. 63% of respondents support Church's participation in the process of creation of youth club. 66% of respondents say yes to the creation of Church comprehensive schools. 82% of them support priest's attendance in places of confinement. 71% of citizens approve the creation of an Orthodox channel⁵.

Religion in Post-Soviet Russia has become one of the main factors of identity under the conditions of a split society. Different representatives of this society cannot identify themselves with any political and cultural ideas and concepts, so they find in religion a stable moral guide and pay more attention to historical and socio-cultural grounds of identity. That's why 80% of respondents consider themselves as Orthodox Christians, but only half of them believe in God. It's rather a kind of belonging, belonging to a culture, to a social and language group, to a territorial community and so on. Moreover, most of them are vague about Orthodox Christianity. It must be added that religion doesn't play paramount role in the society; it summarizes everyday life practices. At the same time religion along with Supreme Power and Army is on the first place among population according to approval rating.

Modern Russian society suffers from variety of trends. On the one hand,

³ Кофанова Е.Н., Мчедлова М.М. Религиозность россиян и европейцев. Мониторинг общественного мнения № 4(98), март-апрель, 2010. – С.201-202.

⁴ Structure and number of religious organizations registered in Russia. // URL: <http://xn---ptblgjed.xn--p1ai/node/2461> (Accessed date 29.11.2015).

⁵Data of All-Russian surveys. FOM.

religiosity, number of believers and religions organizations multiply. On the other hand, the processes of secularization have great impact on everyday life of society; people tend to unreligious aims and values, church by itself plays a small part in everyday life. More than that, social reality of post-secular society is characterized by new determination forms of political identification and political subjectivity. This means that the religious basis is a necessary and sufficient condition for political activities. Such tendencies lead to different kind of latent and manifested conflicts that are reflected in public discourse.

Appearances of clericalization began to arise from the end of the 90's and displayed themselves in different forms:

1. Deepening relationship between the State and the Church. We must pay our attention to the formalization of these relations in terms of which demonstration of "new religiosity" -in compliance with a series of ceremonies with broad media coverage- has become a norm in the secular society. We are talking about the participation of the President, Prime Minister, Cabinet members, heads of regions in a variety of religious services and ceremonies (Christmas, Easter, Epiphany and so on). For example, in January 2018 during the presidential electoral campaign, according to the old religious tradition for the Epiphany, Vladimir Putin submerged himself in the ice hole in the Seliger Lake. These practices began to spread among the grassroots level. In this connection, we can recall the famous anecdotic story connected with Governor D. Ayatskov (from Saratov region) who was depicted in a new church of Stolypino as a saint giving the church model to Virgin Mary.

Leonid Markelov, the Governor of the Republic of Mari El famous for its large scale new-build constructions, more than actively built churches and promoted ROC. The problems arrived after Markelov's arrest. His successor admitted that they didn't have enough resources to maintain the numerous newly built ROC temples in Yoshkar-Ola, most of which have been built during the last 10 years of the 21-st century. The Municipal budget has to provide churches with the necessary money despite the fact that the republic is poly-confessional.

In this year (2018) Mayor of the Yaroslavl obliged all of his subordinates to take the "cold bathes" in the river during Epiphany.

2. Temples and religious sites came under the control of the ROC in the late 90-s and early 2000-s. A little later religious organizations were granted perpetuity use of state or municipal lands for religious buildings (amendments to the Land Code of September 24, 2004). This fact provoked a significant number of conflicts based on property disputes and worldview disagreement. Most conflicts were caused by the disagreement of the residents to build religious buildings. Very often the transfer of some properties was accompanied

by the church's inability to maintain these properties, followed by the protests of the civil society. For example, in 2004 civil protests against the construction of a Mormon temple took place in the Saratov region. In 2015 a protest against the continuing construction of the Orthodox Church was held in Zavodskoy district of Saratov, in 2016 another protest was held against the demolishing of a children's playground and the construction of the Orthodox Church. In 2015 the chairman of the Saratov Public Chamber opposed the construction of a mosque and a synagogue on the territory of the "Alley of Roses" of Saratov.

Serious protests were prompted by the Moscow program "Temples within walking distance", according to which any Muscovite should have a church within a radius of a kilometer from the house. Residents of the district often learn about the possible construction of a temple accidentally, especially if the construction starts in the nature reserved or park area or at the Children's playground. Protests against the erection of churches are held in Kurkino, Khodynka, Kuzminki, Golyanovo, Mitino, Izmailovo, Pechatniki, Ostankino and other areas. In most cases, the discontent of citizens is not caused by the temples themselves or religion, but the places chosen for construction: 77 were located on the territory of natural complexes, in garden squares and parks. However, the opinion of civil society and residents is not taken into account in such conflicts, Orthodox organizations organize cross-opposition protests and construction, as a rule, is continued.

In 2017, a serious conflict erupted between the authorities representing the interests of the church and the society in St. Petersburg. The confrontation was connected with the transfer from the state property of St. Isaac's Cathedral in St. Petersburg, which forced the public to initiate a referendum on this issue, attracting hundreds of people who joined protest actions. In particular, about a thousand people took part in the protest on January 13, which was held in the format of a meeting with the deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the city. At the same time, the issue was considered in court, but the decision of the city authorities (more precisely, the decision of the governor) was not canceled. We must add that Poltavchenko, the Mayor of St. Petersburg, set himself as a believer and a church-supporting person.

3. The idea of inclusion in the school curriculum a course of "the foundations of Orthodoxy" was very actively and persistently pushed (from the mid-90s). Supporters and lobbyists of such practices defined reintegration of religion into school as a way out of the spiritual and moral crisis afflicting the Russian society [Nikandrov] whereas their opponents estimated it extremely negatively, as a violation of the principle of secular education and, finally, as a threat that might cause a recess in pupils' thinking and in the public relations [Toschenko].

In 2007 the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in the Saratov Region

accused the Saratov Diocese of the ROC of clericalism for initiating the introduction of the optional subject “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” in schools. Such conflicts, involving a number of public organizations, parents, political parties, arose everywhere.

In order to prevent social and religious tensions and the development of the educational program in 2012, the Ministry of Education of the region introduced modules of different religious orientations for the primary school: the Foundations of Islamic Culture, the Foundations of Jewish Culture, the Foundations of Buddhist Culture.

Today, after more than 15 years from the first known attempts to introduce the “Bases of orthodox culture” and their analogs at secondary schools in certain Russian regions, it is possible to note that this project was viable. Despite the disputable status of teaching of these subjects in terms of the Russian legislation, imperfection of its educational and methodical support and practical implementation, despite the active and passive resistance of a considerable part of society, experts forecast [Каневский, p. 31] that this aspect would actively develop further on, found confirmation. In autumn 2012 the general introduction of the subject “Bases of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics” to secondary schools in Russia (in fourth class) marked the full official legitimization of confessionally focused practice of education in Russian school.

Later, the Church actively began pushing the idea of expanding the course of the “foundations of religions” and extending it to all secondary school classes - from the fifth to the ninth. In the summer of 2016, experts from the Moscow City Pedagogical University criticized the draft course “Orthodox Culture” developed by the Moscow Patriarchate, nowadays it is sent to modification and voting in the Russian Academy of Education. In the summer of 2017, the ROC offered to add the teaching of the Church Slavonic language to the school’s curriculum, but even the ex-minister of education did not support this idea.

1. Participants, heroes and victims of religious public discourse

Obviously the church intensively explores different forms of participation in Russia as well as in other countries. On the other hand, non-believers fairly reject church’s participation in social life due to the fact that definite political forms of interfaith dialogues, its results focused on socio-political stability in Russia, go beyond all bounds. In recent decades tension has been rising between religious and social secular clusters in Russia. We won’t pay careful

attention to the numerous statements and public appearances of opinion leaders expressing doubts about the validity of rapprochement between the church and the authorities or openly expressing indignation about this. One can remember about the open letter written by Russian Academicians on July 22, 2007. This letter was composed by ten famous Russian scientists to V.V. Putin because they were concerned about the increasing clericalization among Russian society and about the active role of the Church in all spheres of social life; another letter written by the Free Historical Society was against the Ministry of Education's policy to consider the religious approach as possible and normative. The Ministry of Education and Science of Russia offered universities' rectors to use the resources of the exposition of the historical park "Russia is My History", for the organization of extracurricular work of students, as well as for the training and retraining of history teachers. This exhibition was organized under the leadership and with the participation of the Patriarch's Council on Culture, which is the synodal department of the Russian Orthodox Church under the chairmanship of Egoryevsky Bishop Tikhon (Shevkunov). This fact predetermined, according to the authors of the letter, a tendentious and biased nature of the exhibition. The Free Historical Society calls the Ministry of Education for the organization of a public professional examination of such exhibition as "Russia is My History" (similar to the one that school textbooks are exposed to) with the official publication of its results, and until then prohibits any recommendations of these exhibitions as educational material.

The reason for such confrontation is the conflict between traditional virtues and worldview attitudes of modern society, namely, the clash between archaic and innovation, clericalism and anticlericalism. Anticlericalism is the reaction to the fact that churchmen are not only engaged in congregational spiritual direction, but in active intervention in social life up to the government of the state. Anticlericalism as a rule arises as the result of clergy's abuse of power in different areas of everyday life (*Scribner R.W.*, 1987. P. 244).

It must be pointed out that anticlericalism was popular not only among radical youth, but among ordinary people in Modern age in Russia. Ethnographers accumulated rich anticlerical folklore (riddles, tales, proverbs) and very surface and superficial kind of religiousness in the 19-th century (*Афанасьев А.Н.*, 1991; *Домановский Л.В.*, *Новиков Н.В.*, 1961; *Шахнович М.И.*, 1933; *Энгельгардт А.Н.*, 1956.)

At the same time Russian reality shows that when religion does not find a legitimate way to integrate itself into the political system of the secular state, then it starts to radicalize and to seek larger areas of political power participation. It was unexpected but modern art has become one of the most active subjects opposing to the radicalization of religious organizations.

There have always been contradictions between the artist's individual conception and the traditional religious worldview. This old conflict was put to a new level by the introduction of the secular worldview in the 20th-21st centuries.

A. Giddens has suggested that according to the deepening of the secular-ity process in society, resistance to rationality is increased among the bearers of religious consciousness. Numerous facts of sharp confrontation between scientific- positivist and religious-mystical worldviews, which came from the sphere of culture in the field of politics, support this hypothesis.

A series of various artistic actions (the Pussy Riot case, art exhibitions evaluated ambiguous like the "Biblical project", "Caution, Religion" project, "Forbidden art" and so on) have not only been local and international mass media headlines but have led to sharp confrontation between different interest groups and have evoked a response from religious communities, religious clerics and legislators.

It is interesting to note that actual art is the main subject of the anticlerical movement of modern Russia. It should be pointed out that throughout the whole 20-th century actual art was leftist and the so-called "right-wings" people's well-being was under the threat of its negativistic provocations. So nowadays we have that actual and modern is associated only with something nihilistic and negative.

As Pierre Bourdieu said: "...nowadays the process of integrating politics in art happens almost everywhere. No kind of art is conceivable without social and political phenomena" (Pierre Bourdieu, 2006).

Art problems are one of the main themes in modern public discourse. Russian political art offers its target audience and state (in the role of direct or indirect customer) three possible scripts. The first one is art performance, the second one is any form of material art, and the last one is directional branding by means of any expressional form.

Some authors discover in present cultural and ideological confrontation the strife between official church institutions and alternative religiosity, which is hidden under the mask of Modern Art. In order to confirm this point, they make reference to Russian avant-gardists and futurists of the beginning and the mid 20-th century who defined art as the means of radical world change. It's enough to remember the outrageous claims about the main tasks of modern art made by Kruchenykh, Malevich, Lissitzky. It's interesting to note that society progress was negatively appreciated both by Russian avant-gardists and religious fundamentalists (*Б.Гроÿс*, 2013).

The fact is that problem making propaganda out of directed manipulation of the public conscience is unexamined. Nowadays it's impossible to identify factors of religious purpose concerning modern art from the influence effect

of propaganda campaign on target audiences. It is rather difficult to determine the duration of such influence on different target groups.

2. Problem of believers' hurt feelings has recently arisen as a by-product of government agencies fight against political opponents

This problem exists not only in Russia, but in most countries in one form or another. British writer Salman Rushdie defined the problem as follows: "I do think that one of the characteristics of our age is the growth of this culture of offendedness". In Russia the problem of insulting the feelings of believers has the design of struggle for moral purity.

One of the struggle methods is the model of conceptual ideology that gives the government the right to assert "traditional values of Russian people" in contradiction to some imagined system of values unknown to traditional worldview. These "dangerous" for the public *morale* values include propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation. Corresponding measurements were taken in order to protect sound society from the negative influence of "non-traditional systems of value".

Another question that was raised is connected with the violation of religious feelings. Exhibitions of Russian action art based on religious symbols aroused public discussion. Thus, base for the dispute was ready: the issue of religious feelings violation resulted in a widespread scandal in 2003, when one of the exhibition areas in Moscow held an art event called ("Caution, Religion").

In 2005 stormy and sharp debate was provoked by Russia-2 exhibition organized by the famous gallery-owner Marat Gelman. A little bit later, in 2006, artists were heavily criticized because of the exhibition "Forbidden Art" for some of famous art-objects. In 2010 another action scandal took place and got resonance when artist A. Ter-Oganyan axed the Orthodox icons. It caused a very negative reaction from the Russian Orthodox Church and the indignation of the Orthodox community who organize a lot of protest actions and activities.

The "*Valaam/Dialogue*" exhibition in the vestibule of the Church of St. Tatiana in Moscow State University extravagated the aesthetic disputes. Religion discontent was resulted by the fact that the exhibition was held in a church. It should be noted that the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church harshly criticized some artistic events.

This kind of criticism is understandable and sometime is even relevant, but this criticism was not confined to discursive practices. Step by step insulted believers' protest meeting took place. More than that people went to the law and distributed leaflets appealing to government.

Court awarded a judgment relating to curators of the exhibition “Caution, Religion!”. They were found guilty of incitement of ethnic and religious hatred (part 2 of article 282 of Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). The artist-actionist Ter-Oganyan forced to emigrate from the country to walk free. Scandal was actively fueled by the mass media publications, discussions in social networks. Workers of culture and art appealed to the Patriarch with the following verdict: ““Actual art” is outside the culture and its influence on the society consists in scandals. It is very destructive of culture, society and Church”⁶.

Gallery owner Marat Gelman was forced to postpone the opening of the exhibition of contemporary art “Icons” under pressure from Saint-Petersburg Orthodox activists in 2013.

We can notice that local different conflicts between modern actionist and representatives of religious communities resulted in ideological confrontation involving even the government represented by legal institutes.

It must be noted that close alliance between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church strengthened this confrontation. This imposed demonstrative religiosity induces irony and rejection expressed by a variety of artistic actions. On the 17-th of August in 2012 activists of an art group called «Pussy Riot» were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on charge of hooliganism and rousing hatred to the Orthodox believers.

A number of independent experts, in particular from the center for information and analysis “SOVA”, paid attention to the fact that the text of the condemnatory judgement included a reference to the rules of church councils, which is quite strange for a legal paper of the secular state. On the other hand, according to the data of All Russian survey 37% of respondents supported a sentence with several years of imprisonment and 34% considered it as unfair and too strict⁷.

After this high-profile process a bill of up to five years imprisonment for insulting the feelings of believers and violation of a sacred place was introduced at the State Duma. Maximum punishment for insulting religious beliefs and feelings is three years of imprisonment, fine up to 300 thousand rubles and compulsory community service up to 200 hours. Maximum punishment for the desecration of venerated objects and its destruction is fine up to 500 thousand rubles, compulsory community service up to 200 hours and five years of imprisonment.

The act (law) is named “Protecting the religious feelings”. This act itself

⁶ Official portal Credo.ru <http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=78385>.

⁷ «Pussy Riot в храме Христа Спасителя». Official website of Foundation of public opinion. *Источник: проект «Доминанты», опрос «ФОМнибус», 18 марта 2012 /* <http://fom.ru/Bezopasnost-i-pravo/10365>.

contains many assumptions and omissions. For example, it is not clear what should be understood under the definition of “violation of a sacred place” and what is the difference between this act and the existing article of the Criminal Code, which carries punishment for the violence motivated by religious intolerance and violation of human dignity.

However, public concerns that legally controversial articles of the law will open the way to abuses were not confirmed: **in 2013 and in 2014 the act wasn’t applied in practice.**

The only exception was connected with the artist Artyom Loskutov in Novosibirsk. He was fined 1000 rubles for distributing T-shirts with the portraits-icons of “Pussy riots” members. Then this image was acknowledged extremist and insult to Orthodox believers. But in 2015, criminal charge was launched against the Internet video in the Chechen Republic, which was adjudged as insult to the feelings of Muslims. In the same year the Orthodox activists attempted to launch a criminal charge against theatre director of “Tangeizer” in Novosibirsk, because they saw in the opera signs of insult to Christian ethics.

To the purpose it was Novosibirsk diocese who wrote prosecutor. This precedent has confirmed that cultural Russia is now living in a new reality: in fact, one can call to account for any performance, exhibition or film because of “insulting the feelings of believers.” The prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings under the Administrative Code, regarding the performance as “minor offense”. In the conflict were involved the Ministry of Culture, Governor of Novosibirsk region and Novosibirsk Mayor. Fortunately, Novosibirsk Opera and Ballet Theatre won a temporary victory in court: Judge Ekaterina Sorokina decided to dismiss the case against the director of the theater Boris Mezdricha and opera director Timothy Kulyabina in the absence of “contravention”. The surprise however was the decision of the Ministry of Culture to dismiss the director of the theater, and the newly appointed director excluded the opera from the repertoire. All these events provoked the protest meeting “For the freedom of creativity” on April 5, 2015.

A little bit later on the 5th of May deputies of Regional Legislature of S-Petersburg offered to censor all performances, shows, films and exhibitions to estimate the facts of “insulting of believers”. This initiative hasn’t become the law, but the fact of its appearance is remarkable.

The problem has become more serious because religious activists try to disrupt cultural activities whenever they cannot initiate a criminal case. There were attempts to disrupt “An Ideal Husband” and “The Brothers Karamazov” performances at Moscow Art Theatre, the opening nights of LGBT documentaries, release of asterism works as happened to the film “Leviathan,” directed by Andrei Zvyagintsev (In 2015, Leviathan was the first film

in the history of post-Soviet Russia awarded the Golden Globe Award in the category “Best Foreign Language Film”).

In August 2015 the exhibition “The Sculptures we do not see” was attacked by so-called “Orthodox activists” in the Central Exhibition Hall ‘Manege’ where the work of the famous Soviet sculptor V. Sidura was destroyed. Notice that the criminal offense has been covered by Orthodox slogans proclaiming struggle against blasphemy and defending the Orthodox values. In this case, the Central Exhibition Hall ‘Manege’ files a report against the Orthodox organization “God’s will” and the Union of Museums of Russia issued a statement where the attack on the Moscow’ Manege Exhibit is called “another attack of the marginal forces on the rights of culture”.

Experts point out that in the document “The danger of violation of sacred symbols”, published on the official website of Moscow Patriarchate Russian Orthodox Church, the excessive passion for creativity, ultraliberal ideas and values, recognized by church as blasphemous. Directors, journalists and writers are guilty in spiritual depravity of society.

The political elite notices the negative influence of actual everyday practices (approval of same-sex marriages, etc.) on spiritual development and traditional values of the Russian people. Under these conditions, radical art is doomed to become a “sacred victim” in the war of political ambitions.

Investigating the events of the last few years, associated with the confrontation between religious communities and supporters of radical modern art, we understand that a global conflict between the archaicized religious and mystical worldview and modern secular forms of culture isn’t the point. It would be an oversimplification of the situation. We believe that it’s the “hybrid” conflict, in which the corporate, political and even - the commercial interests of all involved in the conflict parties are prevailing.

Ideological and aesthetic principles and resonance event evaluations are used as the weapons in this confrontation. As the result the struggle about religion became less and less adequate. The most remarkable case of 2017 year was the boycott of the movie “Matilda” which was devoted to the love story of last Russian Emperor Nikolai II. The protest actions were organized by the Orthodox organizations and were led by the ex-Prosecutor of Crimea and Deputy of the State Duma Nataliya Poklonskaya. Though they found in the synopsis and in the screen of the movie signs of insulting believer’s feelings they demanded the Ministry of Culture to prohibit demonstration of this movie in cinema. A lot of different mass actions took places in this long struggle: they wrote statement to General Prosecutor, letters and request to Minister of Culture; they organized Staying with praying and Cross Processions against this movie, meetings and pickets in different regions of Russian Federation and especially in front of cinema. Finally, members of the Committee of Culture

in the State Duma had to organize a special viewing of the film and admitted that there were nothing insulting the believers' feelings in this movie.

Established conservative values for traditional society can serve as means of public moods' political control in favor of a particular power group or active counter-elite corporation in any country. The temptation to choose this political strategy is especially great when the religious factor is successfully used in order to achieve very specific political objectives in a number of Islamic countries.

Whereas the attack on modern radical art is important in religious fight for true spirituality. The position of the representatives of the Orthodox cultural community is in the following quotation: "Blasphemy cannot be compared even with communism: those atheists were befooled and thought that there was no God. Now we face deliberate satanism, it's a new stage".

If you look at photos taken during anti radical art rallies, you may see that art posters with quotes from the Gospels are side by side with the Cold War slogans like "Shame on traitors of the Motherland".

There is a combination of several meanings: Church and government protect spiritual values, dividing the society into those who are patriotic and those who are traitors. Traitors are radical artists and their adherents. Here the secular authorities are vested with sacred religious meaning, and disagreement with it is associated with the godless heresy. So the political opponent becomes Church's metaphysical enemy and hence the Antichrist's henchman.

It must be pointed out that protests are theatrical in nature. All the protest rallies drama consists in the achievement of the maximum visual effect. In some ways, the nature of these activities is very similar to the actions of radical artists against whom these protests are staged.

Pronounced performativity and theatricality of the religious communities' activities discredit the spontaneity of these mass struggle of insulted public. In fact, patriotic fervor and moral rigor of actual are opponents come down to a desire to impress the citizen disturbed by mass media information war. Even though the opponents of the modern radical and experimental art pretend to be a majority, not all the representatives of churches and religious and cultural organizations share this position and approve aggressive actions towards their ideological opponents.

Several priests of the Russian Orthodox Church consider the campaign against modern art as a political mistake from the church's staff. One of these "dissidents" within the Moscow Patriarchate Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev, quite a popular person among church, society and among educated laymen, distanced himself from the accusations of Satanism against artists.

Government institutions are involved in the conflict and legal proceedings against certain artists and modern art exhibition contractors in different ways. However, the government participation in the conflict is not limited to criminal cases. Censorship is strengthened in parallel. The problem is also worsened by the changing public mood: for example, 82% of Russian respondents approve of censorship according to the data presented by news agency "Interfax"⁸.

Pace of conflict development is shown by denunciatory tones and sharpness of mutual evaluations.

The analysis of cases presented in the review of ideological conflict leads us to the conclusion that the conflict of interests between groups of religious conservatives and adherents of radical forms of art has the artificial nature of the conflict of interests. Various political forces are involved in this conflict of interest. They try to achieve social consolidation under the conditions of relationship crisis between Russia and the West, replacing political differences between opponents with a global confrontation between opposite systems of values.

Social and religious communities serve as social triggers in authorities made pseudo-conflict made by authority. Sexual minorities, nontraditional cults (Rodnovery and other), various imaginary opponents (fifth column, foreign agents, destructive elements) become the object of PR attacks as well. Contemporary - art adherents, sponsors of performances and artists - actionists are also included in this group.

The postsecular nature of a society in which multiple interest groups, supporting religious values or anti-clerical attitudes, coexist gives grounds for predicting the deepening and exacerbation of the so-called religious conflicts in the public sphere of Russia.

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4. The Phenomenology of Left-wing Populism. An Ideal-typical Model

by Marco Damiani*

1. Introduction

Whilst the 20th Century was certainly the Century of ideologies, the 21st started in the spirit of Populisms. In this regard, the literature of contemporary politics has paid great attention towards Right-wing Populisms, keeping an eye on and describing the features of a long list of political actors with particular scientific rigour (Mudde 2007, Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2012). However, besides the Populisms of reactionary nature, another type of party came onto the European political scene, defined as left wing populist. Although some of these already existed, the emergence of the main parties of this category can be put down to the critical outcome determined by the financial and economic crisis of the early 2000s. As regards their theoretical framework, these organisations started a progressive drift from the history of traditional socialism, which centred on the class struggle between the proletariat and the capitalists, with the intention of providing new contents and new forms of political representation and organisation to the conflicts which broke out in the post-ideological and post-Fordist age. Although still constituted around egalitarian claims, due to the profound processes of capitalistic redevelopment recorded after the end of “The Short Twentieth Century” (Hobsdawn 1994), the left-wing populist parties proposed a reading of history centred on a new political cleavage (conceived in an integrative form, not as an alternative to the traditional Marxist one), founded on the top/bottom juxtaposition.

In this case, the *top* is identifiable in the political, economic and financial élite and in the great transnational capitals while the *bottom* is made of the majority of the people compelled to withstand the negative consequences of the choices imposed by the top/down logic (Laclau 2005).

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On the basis of these considerations, after having introduced the Left-wing Populism category, in this paper we will focus on an ideal-typical model of the European populist left, with the aim of studying its founding process.

The idea on which this research work is based is that the main features of a party can be identified at the moment of its birth. In particular, the hypothesis is that before any process of transformation and adaptation towards the external environment, the moment of the appearance of any political entity, in this case a left-wing populist party, is symptomatic and revealing of its most important typological attributes.

On an empirical level, we believe that Podemos represents the most suitable case on which to concentrate our observations. Indeed, Podemos appears to be the left-wing political entity better fitting populist requirements. In the next paragraphs we will try to show the most important features of the aforementioned movement-party (Gunter and Diamond 2001).

2. Left Populism. What it is about

Without mentioning the complex and vast literature on Populism¹, and taking for granted the meaning attributed to this concept, we wish to focus on one specific political definition, with particular attention to the parties of the populist Left. In order to do this, it is necessary to refer to the thoughts advanced by Ernesto Laclau (1990, 2005), originally developed together with Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Among the many researchers that have analysed the concept of Populism, these two political scientists have been the most successful in describing and imagining the boundaries and the main features of the 21st Century Left. As mentioned in the introduction, the populist Left category is different from the traditional 20th Century Left which was oriented on overcoming (or partially overcoming) the capital/labour cleavage, founded on the separation between capitalists and proletariat, hence interested to introducing a new content compared to the past.

The starting point from which the abovementioned authors move can be summarised in two fundamental assumptions. The first is aimed at the conception of social conflict as the *conditio sine qua non* for political transformation. Every society can start a path of transformation with a view to progress only in light of the conflict that comes from the competition between

¹ For a first approach to the literature on Populism, reference is made to Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008), De La Torre (2014), Anselmi (2018).

collective actors. According to this approach, the conflict is indispensable, it can renew itself, change its contents and requirements, but it cannot vanish from the spectrum of human and political relationships. The second assumption is that the dynamic of political relations is neither static nor immutable. Every society has the task of finding *its* functional analysis categories, in order to conceive every political phenomenon according to the necessities of its timeframe. According to these considerations, Mouffe and Laclau showed a dual ambition. On the one hand, they propose an analysis of the nature and logic of the formation of the collective identities, and the differences found with the past; on the other hand, they try to lay the foundations of a solid political proposal, to be adopted on the factual reality level.

The framework within which the two authors move is identifiable in the context of dispersion and fragmentation of complex societies, characterized by the ineptitude of the class structure, as in the traditional meaning, to account for the complexity of the social structure. In other words, the consideration of the rearrangement of the capitalist production process and in light of the transformations recorded in the post-Fordist society (Revelli 2013), organised on the basis of a profound social individualism and on a progressive atomization of labour, it would no longer be possible to conceive the international working class and proletariat as the only actors of social change. In particular Laclau underlines:

the decline of the classical working class in the post-industrial countries; the increasingly profound penetration of capitalist relations of production into all areas of social life, whose dislocatory effect [...] have generated new forms of social protest; the emergence of mass mobilisations in Third World countries which do not follow the classical pattern of class struggle [...] [and] the exposure of new forms of domination established in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat (Laclau 1990, 97).

Besides this, another contribution to the transformation is the discredit developed by the countries to the real socialism of the 20th Century. According to the Argentinian political scientist, the premise of a real democratic revolution, capable of reaching the aim of a “radical” and “plural” democracy, founded on the extension of the social conflict to a plurality of the agents involved, would arise from this point. According to this observation, in a globalized scenario, the proletariat and the working class would no longer be capable of organizing (in exclusive autonomy) the revolutionary force necessary to the structural change of the present state of affairs. In the new context of fragmentation, the social struggles become more localized (racial, ethnic, cultural, civic, gender), and are unable to articulate and manage great narratives because they are too specific and heterogeneous, or

simply because they are reintegrated by the established order. According to Laclau, a “radical” policy is not the result

of a subject that can embody the universal, but from the expansion and multiplication of fragmentary, partial and limited subjects who enter the collective decision-making process (Laclau 1990, XIV).

On recognising the indispensable existence of the transformative dimension of the social conflict, on the drive of the reflection produced in literature, between the 20th and 21st Centuries new conditions allowed the pursuit of a political project, autonomous from the past, capable of overcoming the Left/Right contrast (according to this logic now unable to explain the terms of the existing conflict), proposing an interpretation of contemporary society as a conflict between two collective subjects opposed to each other, different from the past and identifiable in “we” (the “people”) and “them” (the “elite” or governing class). All this, clearly, does not require the definitive abandonment of the traditional cleavage between capital and labour, which determined – by action and reaction – a large part of the history of the 20th Century. The clear contrast between the owners of the means of production and the subjects who offer the provision of their labour on the market, both manual and intellectual, remains a dividing line around which the Left parties keep declining the principle of equality (and as a counterpoint that of inequality) and of the necessary redistribution of wealth produced within a political community among all subjects, workers included, who have contributed to producing it. However, in the post-ideological age and after the overcoming of the Fordist production system, besides the capital/labour cleavage another profound social cleavage arose, which this time sees “elite” and “people” in contraposition. Given such transformations, the conflict recorded two new key players in the change: on the one hand, the narrow minority of privileged people belonging to the establishment (including also the capitalists, but not only); on the other hand, the majority of the people forced to surrender to the unfavourable outcomes of the unpopular choices made by the above (besides the proletariat and the employees many other social categories). All this produces a new oppositional dyad, which the progressive movements and parties can use with a different logic compared to the past. In this new social balance, the rhetoric around which it is possible to build the new political proposal is articulated around the contraposition of the “few” that account for a large amount of the wealth produced and the “many” that have to share too scarce an amount of the overall wealth.

In this regard, conversely to the remark made by Carl Schmitt (1842) on the political struggle between friend and enemy, Laclau and Mouffe state

that, in the people/elite dyad (or bottom/top) there is a necessity to pursue a *radical* democratic order, capable of arriving at conceiving the game of political opposition in terms of legitimate differences, without pursuing the mutual extermination of each other. In this perspective, after the fall of the faith in the great theological and political narratives and in the light of the proliferation of numerous conflicts of different magnitudes, according to Laclau and Mouffe, the task of the Left should not be that of rebuilding all the tiles of the mosaic to restart from where the Marxist project was interrupted, nor to give in to the post-modern isolationist flattering. In the pages of *On Populist Reason*, Laclau underlines, in particular, that:

the novelty of modern democracy, what makes it properly ‘modern’, is that, with the advent of the ‘democratic revolution’, the old democratic principle that ‘power should be exercised by the people’ emerges again, but this time within a symbolic framework informed by the liberal discourse, with its strong emphasis on the value of individual liberties and human rights (Laclau 2005, 167).

And adds:

on one side we have the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the defence of human rights and the respect of individual liberty; on the other the democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality, identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty (*ibidem*).

According to the Argentinian political scientist there would not be a relationship of necessary proximity between the liberal and the democratic traditions. If anything, a contingent historical articulation could be identified. Considering the mentioned observations, according to Laclau the aim of 21st Century Left should be that of formulating a new democratic radical program, that is expression of the “general will” of a new “historical bloc”, identified (not anymore only in a single social class, but) in the people.

Within the described context, we hence propose a minimal definition of “people”, in order to clarify the requisites that determine the possibility of rebuilding a new historical bloc, that would no longer be identifiable only in the narrow boundaries of social class as intended in the 20th Century, but that would include the latter within a broader although more heterogeneous container compared to the past. In this regard, what we can state in a first approximation is that, while for liberal ideology the ‘people’ are something that is preconceived, identifiable with the principle of citizenship (one belongs to a ‘people’ since one is a citizen of a state), in the perspective advanced in this reasoning the reference to the people implies the construction of a new form of political representation, to be built ex-novo, through a clear

demarcation between a “we” and a “them”. In particular, in this perspective, the condemnation of the false universality of the pre-existing political order, incapable of representing the renewed and plural popular interests, becomes the premise that the Left parties can use to claim a new form of political universality. Here thence conceived is the concept of structural “equivalence, as a result of which, according to Laclau (2005), demands which are apparently different from each other can lead to artificially composing a sole collective subject, in so far as heterogeneous social groups recognise each other in the same political project.

In this regard, writes Laclau (2005, 70): we will call *popular demands* “a plurality of demands which, through their equivalential articulation, constitute a broader social subjectivity”. In this sense, according to the author, the people can be identified as that heterogeneous collective subject, made by the “logic of equivalence”, that allows the aggregation of several demands in one unitarian political subject. The identification of this people (profoundly different compared to the social class), intended as heterogeneous collective subject since composed of a plurality of social categories, in the intentions of the author would show a capacity of political aggregation around which it becomes possible to conceive the formation of a new generation of political movements and parties.

Passing from theoretical consideration to empirical observation, at the beginning of the 21st century, on these assumptions, in Europe we witness the building of a new collective subject, that can be identified in the concept of “people” expressed by Laclau in so far as it can include the diverse social categories and interests different from each other, but nonetheless reconcilable in the described perspective.

From such considerations, after the differences found with the past, some parties and movements of the radical Left (March and Mudde 2005, March 2011, Damiani 2016) were the first that tried to adopt this perspective of political action presenting a profoundly different anchorage in identity from that of the classical Left parties of Marxist tradition. It is within this framework that we can place the case of Podemos. This political group, when ascending, far from organizing (only) the exploited, the proletariat, the working class or employees, aimed at organizing an alternative and broader political project, capable of combining the different social categories in a political project with high emancipatory ambitions, formulated around the process of “community organizing”. This concept, expressed for the first time by Saul Alinsky (1971) is usually referred to countries with an Anglo-Saxon political culture, although it can be extended to the rest of the Western democratic States. It describes the capability of some public actors to organize a com-

munity of people in battles aimed at the improvement of its social and financial conditions, through collective actions where different categories of individuals merge in order to pursue a common project without questioning their identity and, actually, drawing the capacity of spreading the reasons of their political claim from their very differences. The fundamental feature that led to the birth of Podemos lies exactly in this representation. In accordance with the social and political context within which it is placed in the Spanish history of the first years of the 21st Century, the main political feature of Podemos is that it succeeded in kick-starting the process of community organizing, with the aim of building a new historical bloc, different from that of social class and with the abovementioned features. In the following section, we will present the main peculiarities of this model of political organization, with the aim to analyse the Populist radical Left parties in depth.

3. The Podemos case, an ideal-typical model

Formally, Podemos was born on the 17th of January 2014, at the Barrio Theatre, a small theatre in Calle Zurita, near Lavapiés Square, a multi-ethnic neighbourhood in the centre of Madrid, currently subject of a strong process of gentrification. At the beginning of the 21st Century the area brought numerous youngsters, intellectuals and artists to live alongside many immigrants coming from all over the whole world. Besides south America, many came from Asia and Africa. The 17th of January, in the Barrio Theatre, Podemos presented itself for the first time before an unexpectedly large crowd, that filled the two hundred seats and crowded around the front door, under pouring rain; a sign of good luck in its baptismal ceremony.

Nevertheless, if what we have just described is the official chronicle of the first appearance of Podemos, the new political organization actually owes its birth to a very important previous event in Spanish history, without which it could not have taken on any role in the Spanish political scenario. It was May the 15th 2011 (from here on 15M). That day the celebration of Saint Isidor Labrador, patron saint of the Spanish capital, a small number of people unexpectedly arranged a meeting in Puerta del Sol, the central square of Madrid. In the next few hours and days the number grew until it took over the main squares of the whole country. This movement in the next few weeks took on the name of the *Indignados*, as directly inspired by the plea of Stéphane Hessel (2010), which incited collective indignation. The movement was born to protest against the situation of difficulty, of extreme struggle, in which whole generations of people now found themselves, the young and not

so young, in the most difficult years of the financial crisis of the “Great recession”.

The *Indignados* constitute a proper “people”, with all the features presented in the previous paragraph. They are not proletarians, workers and farmers united in the battles of political claims as in the demands of the struggles and protests seen in the 20th Century. In those days a new political generation, in the technical sense of the term (Mannheim 1929), united to occupy the Spanish squares, made up of numerous social categories, potentially representative of different interests. People that in other conditions could have presented reasons of division, but that in that occasion found a way to unite, giving life to an unprecedented experiment, that was constituted around a “people” both united and heterogeneous at the same time. Who are the *Indignados*? They are students, jobless or unemployed people, workers expelled from the labour market, workers employed with every form of contract: permanent, fixed term, job on call, intermittent, temporary, with temping agencies, work-for-hire, cooperation, part-time, full-time, apprenticeships, in paid or unpaid training, free, zero-hour, seasonal, internships, scholarships, research fellows, in occasional employment and paid in vouchers. Not only. In the 15M there were pensioners and housewives, self-employed workers and freelancers, intellectuals, teachers and academics, artisans and small and medium entrepreneurs crushed by the recession. In the squares of Madrid and many other cities in Spain, in the months most inflamed by the protest, a new collective subject gave itself an appointment, varied and composite at its core, but united in the identification of driving direction. That of the *Indignados* is a movement composed of different social categories, not necessarily in dispute between each other, but united around a common (and different at the same time) battle of social survival. When trying to describe that passage, Carlos Taibo (2011, 7-11) summarizes effectively the reasons of the 15M people:

We are certainly very different people. We have very different ideas and projects in mind. However [the leaders], have achieved that we can agree with a handful of ideas. Which one is the first? We call it democracy, but it is not. The great institutions of the State, the big parties, have demonstrated that they function independently of the people’s needs [...]. The second. We are often victims of large figures that are imposed on us, but we do not even know their meaning. In May 2010, for example, The European Union demanded the reduction of public expenditure by 15.000 million euros to the Spanish government. We can’t even imagine how much 150000 million euro is [...]. Third. If there is one god loved by politics, economists and trade unionists that is the god of competitiveness. However, anyone with any sense knows what competitiveness led to for the majority of the people here. The formidable victories obtained in the last years in the matter of competitiveness are: lower salaries,

longer working hours, diminished social rights, insecurity everywhere [...]. Fourth. I don't want to forget the next generations and, with them, all the species with us on planet Earth. I say this because in this country we confuse growth and consumption with happiness and well-being. I'm speaking of the same country that proudly allowed ecology policies which have determined the break-up of the precarious environmental balance. Fifth. Among the claims pursued by the platform promoted by the demonstrations [of the *Indignados*] there is one explicitly referred to the urge relative to the reductions of the military expenditure².

That of the *Indignados* is a colourful movement, made up of many souls, but with a lowest common denominator, capable of keeping together the most different interests. The core around which the 15M is structured is identifiable in the battle against the government political élite (of both the Left-wing and the Right-wing), which during its political action - in the eyes of the *Indignados* - would have led to emptying the content of effective democracy, reducing it to a mere procedural mechanism, not interested in the principle of equality and the starting conditions, because exclusively attracted by the management of the international economy and finance. In the wake of the neo-liberal ideology, the criterion of competitiveness leads to disadvantage the working class, in favour of the minority of people that are able to take advantage of the international globalization process (Kriesi et al. 2008). Besides such considerations there are two other fundamental claims, capable of holding together the large mesh of the *Indignados*' protest. The first regards the ecology issue and the demand for another economic development model, more respectful of the delicate natural and environmental balance. The second claim, on the other hand, is referred to the reduction of the military expenditure, in favour of an increase in public expenditure oriented towards financing welfare and basic assistance services. When trying to describe the *Indignados* movement, Juan Carlos Monedero, political scientist and professor of political sciences at the "Complutense" University of Madrid, and executive and founder of Podemos, expresses himself in a very evocative form: "*dormíamos y despertamos*" (Monedero 2012)³. According to Monedero, in view of the static quality of Spanish and European politics, the 15 of May 2011 represents a true earthquake, after which the people spilled out onto the streets, although timidly and puzzled, with the hope of regaining all together the democratic space lost in the past: "*y con ese abrazo se nos pasó la angustia*" (*ibidem*)⁴.

The aim of the movement is to give back the floor to citizens (and non-

² Translation from Spanish to English by the author.

³ In English: "We were asleep, and we woke up".

⁴ In English: "and with that embrace the distress was relieved".

citizens that live and work regularly) through public assemblies and mobilizations. The slogan that conquered the squares is aimed at underlining a numeric disparity that carries a strong political content: “we are 99%, you are 1%”. It is that *you* that means exactly the establishment of every political colour that, in Spain and the main European countries, is identified as foremost in responsibility of the problems that the population has to face and solve. From this perspective, the political élite is considered as part of the problem and not as a subject capable of finding solutions to such problems. Given the context and what was stated in the previous paragraph, in this circumstance the 15M can be interpreted as a movement of struggle, that goes exactly in the direction hoped for by Mouffe and Laclau. The movement of the *Indignados* shows the capability of giving an artificial shape to the concept of people, conceived as an “empty signifier” within which, through the demonstrations which started in Puerta del Sol, constituted a group capable of determining a new form of political universality.

Once the strength of the movement and the phase of protest had worn off, according to the well-known scheme regarding the historical relationship between movements and parties (Alberoni 1977), the legacy of 15M was taken over by a new political subject a few years after the events of 2011. Podemos was born on the 17th of January 2014 and presented itself as the candidate for the European elections of that year. The objective was to carry on the action in the rift created by the *Indignados* movement, trying to drag the “people’s” voice and its renewed and collective needs into the political institutions (Pucciarelli and Russo Spina 2014).

Despite the *radical* instances of change claimed by the movement and the requests of direct democracy, Podemos (which translated recalls the Obama slogan “yes, we can”) structured itself immediately around the figure of its leader. Leader of the Spanish movement-party is Pablo Iglesias Turrión, nicknamed “el coleta” (“the ponytail”) because of his long hair tied behind his shoulders. Iglesias is an unusual character. For his PhD he carried out research work on the “white overalls” movement, that at the beginning of the 21st century followed the scene of the no-global protest (Iglesias Turrión 2011). Afterwards “Pablo”, became an untenured lecturer at the “Complutense” University of Madrid, with a personal history of traditional political outsider. Born and raised outside the confinement of the parties, he was the right person take further what had started on the square. After presenting himself to a broad audience, through a very popular program called “La Tuerka”, together with a group of teachers and University lecturers, organized as a think tank of the rising movement-party, Pablo Iglesias founded Podemos with the aim of radically changing the Spanish political system. The political operation immediately attracted great attention and electoral success.

In the following pages we will attempt to highlight the main features of Podemos, as a party of the populist Left, capable of addressing a new “people”, leader of the post-ideological social conflict hence able to innovate the existing power relationships in the Spanish political system.

4. Data and research method

In the attempt to analyse Podemos as a European prototype of the populist Left, our aim is to investigate its main typological features, in particular its organizational structure. In this regard, we will refer to all the data relative to the 2014 enrolment campaign. It is the case of the first Podemos enrolment campaign in the year of its establishment. As mentioned, observing and describing the peculiarities of such a political group means - in this circumstance - trying to understand the operation of the Ideal-typical model of the populist Left.

During the data gathering operations all the information recovered was:

1) compared with those gathered for Izquierda Unida and the parties of the European radical Left in Italy, France and Germany in occasion of the European elections of 2014 (table 1);

2) divided into all the Spanish provincial capital cities with reference to both to the European elections of 2014 and the municipal elections of 2015 (table 2). The possibility to focus on the municipal elections of 2015 allow us to broaden the point of view, so as to consider the territorial roots of the new movement-party in the months immediately following its establishment. The provincial capital cities in Spain are fifty-two, divided into seventeen autonomous communities. However, all the cities considered in this research are fifty-four, because we added to the initial list Mérida and Santiago de Compostela, which although not provincial capitals are the capitals of Extremadura and Galicia respectively.

Table 1 - Comparison of the main radical Left parties at the 2014 European elections.

	Members*	Electorate**	Votes***	Enrolment rate (%)	Membership rate (%)
Podemos	251.998	36.548.150	1.245.948	0,7	20,2
Izquierda Unida	35.000	36.548.150	1.575.308 ^b	0,1	2,2
Parti communiste français	64.184 ^a	46.544.712	1.252.730 ^b	0,1	5,1
Die Linke	60.551	61.946.900	2.167.641	0,1	2,8
Rifondazione comunista	19.712	50.662.460	1.108.457 ^b	0,04	1,8

Source: Author's elaboration

* Source: Party's archive.

** Source: National statistical institutes.

*** Source: Ministry of the Interior of each Country.

^a Number of members is referred to those admitted to the 36th national congress of the party, Aubervilliers 2013.

^b In Spain, France and Italy the votes reported are referred to the data obtained by the coalitions of parties within which are present IU, PCF and PRC. Respectively, Izquierda plural, Front de gauche and L'Altra Europa. In order to deepen the study of such electoral lists see the book of Damiani (2016) on the parties of the radical Left in Europe.

Table 2 - Podemos in numbers in the main Spanish cities

City	Autonomous community	Total electors (Spain 2014)*	Members of Podemos (2014)**	Enrollment rate SPAIN 2014 Members/active electorate (%)	Votes to Podemos EU 2014***	Membership rate European Elections Members/votes (%)	Votes to Podemos MUN 2015***	Rate of accession MUN 2015 Members/votes (%)
Madrid	Madrid	2.549.065	26.773	1,1	121.428 (10,5%)	22,0	519.210 (16,3%)	5,2
Barcelona	Cataluña	1.236.371	8.457	0,7	27.445 (4,7%)	30,8	176.337 (25,2%)	4,8
Valencia	Comunidad Valenciana	603.479	6.178	1,0	26.188 (8,6%)	23,6	40.420 (9,8%)	15,3
Sevilla	Andalucía	560.455	5.608	1,0	24.929 (9,8%)	22,5	28.933 (9,0%)	19,4
Zaragoza	Aragón	512.368	4.385	0,9	26.218 (11,0%)	16,7	22.076 (6,8%)	19,9
Málaga	Andalucía	440.277	3.567	0,8	17.096 (9,5%)	20,9	–	–
Palmas Gran Canaria	Islas Canarias	317.813	2.723	0,9	19.109 (16,4%)	14,2	27.127 (16,1%)	10,0
Murcia	Región de Murcia	317.630	2.175	0,7	11.003 (7,9%)	19,8	18.371 (9,2%)	11,8

<i>Bilbao</i>	Pais Vasco	291.395	1.568	0,5	8.344 (6,8%)	18,8	–	–
<i>Palma de Mallorca</i>	Islas Baleares	286.420	2.412	0,8	11.874 (11,8%)	20,3	22.346 (14,8%)	10,8
<i>Córdoba</i>	Andalucía	267.734	2.005	0,7	8.984 (8,2%)	22,3	–	–
<i>Valladolid</i>	Castilla y León	255.533	1.683	0,7	10.338 (8,1%)	16,3	16.585 (10,0%)	10,1
<i>Alicante</i>	Comunidad Valenciana	245.970	2.355	1,0	10.866 (10,0%)	21,7	–	–
<i>A Coruña</i>	Galicia	224.953	1.961	0,9	11.192 (12,3%)	17,5	–	–
<i>Oviedo</i>	Principado de Asturias	203.550	1.937	1,0	11.277 (14,6%)	17,2	20.514 (19,1%)	9,4
<i>Granada</i>	Andalucía	198.127	2.148	1,1	6.739 (7,6%)	31,9	–	–
<i>Vitoria</i>	Pais Vasco	189.844	1.012	0,5	7.590 (9,6%)	13,3	10.390 (8,7%)	9,7
<i>S. Cruz de Tenerife</i>	Islas Canarias	187.073	1.299	0,7	6.255 (10,3%)	20,8	–	–
<i>San Sebastián</i>	Pais Vasco	157.000	974	0,6	5.023 (7,9%)	19,4	–	–
<i>Santander</i>	Cantabria	156.250	992	0,6	5.652 (8,9%)	17,6	6.029 (6,8%)	16,5
<i>Pamplona</i>	Comunidad de Navarra	154.298	950	0,6	6.138 (9,1%)	15,5	9.701 (9,5%)	9,8
<i>Almería</i>	Andalucía	147.755	1.039	0,7	4.516 (8,1%)	23,0	–	–

<i>Burgos</i>	Castilla y León	142.673	782	0,5	7.541 (11,0%)	10,4	–	–
<i>Albacete</i>	Castilla-La Mancha	133.463	1.078	0,8	6.164 (10,3%)	17,5	–	–
<i>Salamanca</i>	Castilla y León	128.262	819	0,6	3.838 (7,1%)	21,3	–	–
<i>Castellón de la Plana</i>	Comunidad Valenciana	122.271	1.023	0,8	5.004 (8,9%)	20,4	–	–
<i>Badajoz</i>	Extremadura	118.555	719	0,6	3.194 (7,0%)	22,5	–	–
<i>Huelva</i>	Andalucía	115.982	816	0,7	3.674 (8,8%)	22,2	–	–
<i>Logroño</i>	La Rioja	115.936	835	0,7	4.668 (8,7%)	17,9	11.619 (15,5%)	7,2
<i>León</i>	Castilla y León	114.173	875	0,8	4.529 (9,2%)	19,3	–	–
<i>Orense</i>	Galicia	107.384	605	0,6	3.437 (8,9%)	17,6	–	–
<i>Cádiz</i>	Andalucía	106.356	1.073	1,0	7.244 (16,3%)	14,8	–	–
<i>Lérida</i>	Cataluña	95.218	448	0,5	1.413 (3,7%)	31,7	–	–
<i>Tarragona</i>	Cataluña	93.257	546	0,6	2.161 (5,3%)	25,3	–	–
<i>Jaén</i>	Andalucía	93.222	698	0,7	3.050 (7,4%)	22,9	–	–
<i>Lugo</i>	Galicia	88.656	647	0,7	3.270 (9,5%)	19,8	–	–
<i>Santiago Compostela</i>	Galicia	88.319	743	0,8	3.103 (8,8%)	23,9	16.327 (34,6%)	4,6

<i>Pontevedra</i>	Galicia	78.989	504	0,6	3.161 (10,3%)	15,9	–	–
<i>Cáceres</i>	Extremadura	78.164	620	0,8	2.972 (8,7%)	20,9	–	–
<i>Palencia</i>	Castilla y León	67.387	317	0,5	2.262 (7,0%)	14,0	–	–
<i>Gerona</i>	Cataluña	67.181	307	0,5	770 (2,4%)	39,9	–	–
<i>Toledo</i>	Castilla-La Mancha	63.943	547	0,9	2.826 (9,4%)	19,4	7.390 (16,7%)	7,4
<i>Ceuta</i>	Ceuta	61.928	162	0,3	578 (3,7%)	28,0	–	–
<i>Guadalajara</i>	Castilla-La Mancha	61.161	408	0,7	2.491 (8,5%)	16,4	–	–
<i>Ciudad Real</i>	Castilla-La Mancha	58.973	384	0,7	1.824 (7,0%)	21,1	–	–
<i>Melilla</i>	Melilla	57.023	136	0,2	409 (2,9%)	33,3	–	–
<i>Zamora</i>	Castilla y León	56.548	419	0,7	3.664 (16,0%)	11,4	–	–
<i>Mérida</i>	Extremadura	46.257	347	0,8	1.207 (6,7%)	28,7	2.103 (7,1%)	16,5
<i>Ávila</i>	Castilla y León	45.601	226	0,5	1.389 (6,7%)	16,3	–	–
<i>Cuenca</i>	Castilla-La Mancha	42.315	298	0,7	1.793 (9,4%)	16,6	–	–
<i>Segovia</i>	Castilla y León	41.007	277	0,7	5.364 (9,1%)	5,2	–	–

<i>Huesca</i>	Aragón	40.030	282	0,7	2.135 (12,3%)	13,2	–	–
<i>Soria</i>	Castilla y León	30.923	248	0,8	2.311 (18,6%)	10,7	–	–
<i>Teruel</i>	Aragón	27.361	169	0,6	1.032 (9,3%)	16,4	–	–

. *Source*: Author's elaboration.

* *Source*: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.

** *Source*: Podemos' archive.

*** *Source*: Spanish Ministry of the Interior.

Besides the data on memberships we also recovered data relative to the electorate and the outcomes of both the 2014 elections and the municipal elections of 2015. Having found all the necessary figures, the total number of electors entitled to vote and the votes of both the elections, we proceeded to calculate some useful indicators for interpreting the organizational model of Podemos. In this regard we will refer to two numerical rates (or quotients), capable of displaying: a) the relationship between the members and the total number of electors entitled to vote. This is defined as the *enrolment rate*. The enrolment rate is an indicator which gives a measure of the rootedness of a political group within the electorate of a country of reference; b) the ratio between the total number of members and the votes achieved in occasion of the European election of 2014 and the municipal election of 2015. This operation allows us to obtain the *membership rate* calculated in the respective elections. The membership rate is an indicator that gives a measure of the loyalty of the electors towards certain political group (D'Amore 2006; Mulé 2007 e 2009). Below are shown the tables with the figures gathered on the field, proceeding on also to the calculation of the rates of enrolment and membership.

Regarding the Spanish municipal elections of May 2015, it is necessary to be more specific. In fact, the difficulty in recognising and isolating Podemos within the number of lists and coalitions in which the political group ended up, joining from time to time an electoral alliance renamed in different way according to the cases examined, we decided to concentrate our attention only on the autonomous community capitals. Within this territorial framework, Podemos resulted more easily recognizable and measurable in numerical terms.

5. The Podemos case. Another Left is roaming around Europe

Once all the data on the field had been gathered, we can move on to the description and interpretation of the results. First of all, we will put forward a general consideration regarding the information reported in table 1. In this regard, for the year 2014 the absolute value of the citizens-electors members of Podemos was much higher compared to that of the other parties reported. In Spain, among the radical Left forces, Podemos records a number of members over six times higher than that declared by IU. In the same year, with reference to the two parties related to the same political field, there is a substantial numerical difference. The question is why? Why does Izquierda Unida (Damiani 2013), although promoter of the same battles, present a dimension of its membership so different from that of Podemos? The answer

is rather easy. Considering the reference context and its process of political gestation, Podemos was able to translate to a political-institutional alternative the protest and the mistrust of the Spanish citizens and of the *Indignados* movement, adopting a flexible ideological approach and an open organizational model. This allowed it to successfully apply an extensive competitive strategy, also on the membership side. Izquierda Unida, on the other hand, despite the struggle for modernizing its political structure, kept its commitment to a traditional model of organisation with a closed structure and traditional ideology, that allowed it to keep the hard-core members (and electors), but did not succeed in expanding its electorate. Given the considerations described for what regards the two main actors of the Spanish radical Left, let's now look into the rest of the European parties taken into examination. Keeping in mind the analysis of table 1, in terms of members a significant difference is recorded also amongst the parties related to the different cases described. Compared to France and Germany, Podemos showed a number of members close to four times higher than that of PCF (Damiani and De Luca 2016) and Die Linke (Damiani and Viviani 2015). In Italy, the relationship between the members of Podemos and those of Rifondazione comunista, in 2014, is nearly ten to one. This underlines a non-negligible issue.

The parties of the European radical Left, as all the contemporary political groups, experienced a consistent decrease in their members, which starting from the seventies-eighties were of a rather consistent size (Ignazi and Katz 1995; Mair and Van Biezen 2001). The decrease in membership observed for the traditional parties in turn determined the progressive weakening of their role of gatekeepers between institutions and citizens. Despite such considerations, thirty years after the first appearance of the conditions described, the phenomenon of the weakening of participation, although confirmed among the radical Left political forces (in Italy, France and Germany and in the Spain of Izquierda Unida)⁵, seemed to have partially slowed down in light of the political workshop introduced by Podemos starting from January 2014. In our view, such indication, in contrast to the general performance, was made possible thanks to the strategic placement of the Spanish *New Left*,

⁵ Regarding the radical left parties, in Italy, the record of members of Rifondazione comunista reached 130,000 in 1997, the year after the constitution of the Prodi government (when PCR provided its external support to the executive through the *patto della desistenza*) and roughly 280,000 in Germany in 1990 when PDS inherited part of the former SED (the communist party of the old DDR) electors. In Germany, in 1991, the members of the same party went down to 170,000. In 2014 *Die Linke*'s membership (born in 2007 from the merge of PDS and WASG, a political group formed around 2005 around some leaders and active members coming from SPD) counted just above 61,000 members (table 1).

precisely collocated in the political field occupied by the *Indignados* movement, whose political legacy it represented in the relevant institutional bodies and of whose proximity it also benefitted in terms of membership.

Shifting from counting the total number of members to the enrolment rate and membership rate calculated for 2014, other case studies relative to other European countries recorded very different figures to those shown by Podemos. From this point of view, while Rosa Mulé (2009), in her work on *Il popolo di Rifondazione comunista*, calculates the enrolment rate of the former PCR around 0.29 in 1994 and 0.21 in 2007 (reaching 0.34 and 0.32 in 1996 and 2011 respectively), the same quotient (members/electorate), calculated for 2014, in the Podemos case reached 0.7, showing a much higher percentage compared to that reported for the Italian radical Left party (table 1). The enrolment rate displayed for Podemos shows that in Spain, of every thousand electors entitled to vote, seven are enrolled in the same political organization, while until a few years before in Italy, at the top of its historical rootedness, Rifondazione comunista had a much lower rate, reaching just above three members every thousand citizens entitled to vote. What has been said for the comparison of the Spain of Podemos and the Italy of Rifondazione comunista is the same, for 2014, for the rest of the national cases displayed in table 1, where Izquierda unida, the Parti communiste français and Die Linke record an enrolment rate of 0.1, counting one member every thousand citizens entitled to vote. Referring to the other cases mentioned, Podemos presented a higher capacity of political penetration in terms of members compared to the whole electorate.

Also, in the case of the membership rate, the figures relative to the size of the membership describe Podemos as a political subject, which presents a very high rate of loyalty among its electors (table 1). The same percentage calculated for Izquierda Unida is much lower, counting just above two members every one hundred voters. The same proportion grows slightly in the German case (three members every hundred electors of the DL) and in the French one of the PCF (five members every hundred electors of the Front de gauche). In Italy the membership rate for Rifondazione comunista reached its minimum with 1.8 members every hundred electors that voted for the list Altra Europa (within which the PCR also merged), in occasion of the 2014 European elections. Compared to the other national cases, Podemos held a high grade of loyalty, counting on very loyal members and electors⁶.

⁶ If we want to continue to provide a comparative element with other research carried out in this direction, the data continue to show significant values in favour of *Podemos*. In the work by Rosa Mulé (2009), for the Partito della Rifondazione comunista the author quantifies the membership rate between 3.7 of 2006 and 4.9 of 2001. Even in Italy a similar research carried out on the once PDS/DS, also by Mulé (2007), fixes the same parameter to 8.9 in 1996

If we move from a national to a local level, table 2 provides the detail of the most important cities in Spain, divided into provincial capital and capitals of the autonomous communities. In this regard, it is possible to repeat the calculation of the enrolment rate and the membership rate for the 2014 European elections, besides the calculation of the membership rate for the 2015 municipal elections. In regard of the results obtained, we will now show the data. For the 2014 European elections, the highest enrolment and accession rates were recorded, apart from in a few isolated cases, in the demographically larger cities: Madrid, Valencia and Seville. It is here that the membership of the new-born formation of the Spanish radical Left was concentrated. In these cities, also a high membership rate was recorded, underlining the presence of a highly loyal electorate: nearly one elector of Podemos every four is also a member. The most important exception is represented by the “Barcellona case”, that for the 2014 European elections showed a low enrolment rate and a high membership rate at the same time compared to the rest of the main Spanish cities. In Barcellona, in face of a low enrolment rate compared to those recorded elsewhere, there was a very high loyalty rate in occasion of the European election, with nearly one Podemos member every three electors. These numbers show an irreducible constitutive feature in the political balances of Barcellona and the whole of Catalogna. In fact, in the mentioned areas the *partidos no de ambito estatal* (Non-state Wide Parties), namely the regionalist parties (or “national” in the Spanish political jargon), which despite not having coverage of the whole Spanish territory show a strong rootedness in part of it.

It is for this reason that, in light of a historical presence of the independence parties, in Barcellona and Catalogna (the phenomenon repeats itself identically for the rest of the Catalan provincial capitals: in Lérida, Tarragona e Girona), Podemos showed pronounced difficulty of penetration and territorial rootedness⁷. The same thing can be said for another Autonomous community that presents the same features described for Catalonia. In the Basque countries, in fact, the data on the establishment of Podemos (see the figures of Bilbao, Vitoria and San Sebastián) are compatible with those indicated for the Catalan capital, recording also in this case the strong presence of the independence parties, particularly of the Basque Nationalist Party, which caused certain difficulties to the penetration of the political group lead by Pablo Iglesias.

and 9.7 in 2011 (all data are expressed in percentage).

⁷ The rootedness of the Catalan independence parties was confirmed in the elections of September 2015, convened for the renewal of the governing bodies of the autonomous community of Catalonia. On that occasion, the independence front (composed of the parties *Junta pel Si* and *Cup*) achieved nearly 48% of the votes and the absolute majority of the seats, advancing and strengthening claims of independence to the central government of Madrid.

In order to complete the evaluation of the data we come to the analysis of the membership rate calculated in occasion of the 24th of May 2015 elections for the renewal of the regional government bodies. In this case, the numerical evaluation was carried out only for the seventeen capitals of the autonomous communities of the Spanish Kingdom, considering the data on membership, that also in this case is referred to the number of members in 2014. In fact, during the 2015 elections, as the enrolment campaign had just started, the data of the membership recorded the previous year was used. In this regard, the results obtained show a lower value to that of the previous year, but still high if compared to those shown in researches of similar cases (Mulé 2007 and 2009). In the Spanish case, the reason that explains the consistent decrease in the membership rate between the European and the municipal elections can be found in the different number of votes obtained in the two elections. Table 2 shows the huge growth of Podemos that recorded a great increase in electoral terms, determining the decrease of the membership rate calculated for the municipal elections of 2010 compared to that of the European election of 2014.

Referring to the cities examined, for the municipal elections of 2015, the exception is still the “Barcelona case”, this time together with the “Madrid case”. In both circumstances, despite the lower level of penetration and loyalty showed compared to the other capitals of autonomous communities, Podemos achieved excellent results, being able to elect as Mayor its candidate within a composite electoral alliance, made *ad hoc* by a heterogeneous list of coalition, that incorporated numerous parties. This important electoral success, both in Madrid and Barcelona, is also due to the added value provided singularly by the candidates. In fact, Manuela Caramena and Ada Colau reached the governing of the two main Spanish cities, besides the support of Podemos, also due to the visibility and personal authority due to their biography. Caramena is a famous attorney and emeritus judge of the Spanish Supreme Court (court or tribunal correspondent to the Italian *Corte di Cassazione*). Colau, very notorious in Barcelona, is the leader and founder of the *Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca*, a movement of citizens active in the battle against evictions and for the defence of the right to housing. In both cases, and this happened also in other Spanish cities governed by a Podemos Mayor (after the municipal elections of 2015, among the most important cities also Zaragoza, La Coruña and Cádiz should be remembered), what emerged was a generation of *new local leaders*, that within the single territories tried to build solid political foundations certainly connected to Podemos, but at the same time founded on specific territorial issues. This effort perpetrated by a plurality of different actors in as many local contexts was

able, in some circumstances, to modulate Podemos in multiple forms, sometimes successfully also on the electoral side. But who are these *new local leaders*? In this circumstance, we define *new local leaders* a plurality of community leaders that, (apart from a few isolated cases), although not able to gain national fame, have a broad local profile and acceptance, due to personal merit and successes reached in different professional areas, in each of their single home territories. This generation of *new local leaders* was able to aggregate broad political consensus around their name. This phenomenon, reproduced in many Spanish cities in much the same way, clothed in a “light” organizational model such as that adopted by Podemos at its appearance, determined a very interesting political form of functioning, that we will try to explain in the conclusions

6. Conclusions

Considering the originality of its experience and the proximity with the *Indignados* movement, the incubation process that led to the birth of Podemos underlines elements of pronounced organizational interest. On the quantitative side, the members of the Spanish movement-party are more than those of the other European radical Left parties. At the time of its foundation, this political group runs counter to the progressive haemorrhage of members recorded by the traditional parties after the 1970s and 1980s (Scarrow 1996, Ignazi 2012).

In particular, Podemos seemed to work around three concentric spheres. The first is that interpreted by Iglesias’ leadership and his staff of loyalists⁸. Iglesias’ leadership is a predominant constituent element. It is from Iglesias and his inner “magic circle” that the indications were given which conditioned the most important decision at the time of its birth. The second sphere identified in the functioning model of Podemos is that represented by its membership, described according to the features and size discussed in the previous pages. Because of its large number of members, it is possible to point out a

⁸ Among the most important names close to the personal leadership of Iglesias we find that of Juan Carlos Monedero, already mentioned, momentarily resigned from the national leadership, but still an important voice of the political group. Iñigo Errejón, responsible of the electoral campaign of the European elections of 2014. Luis Alegre, in charge of the organization of the national assembly “*Si, se puede*”. Carolina Bescansa, young lecturer at the Complutense University of Madrid. Miguel Urbán, leading member of *Izquierda anticapitalista*, group of the far left merged with Podemos since its first constituent phase. Pablo Echenique, physics graduate and popular character of the *morados*, currently Member of the European Parliament. Teresa Rodríguez, also academic lecturer and MEP.

new political way, that involves a large number of citizens-electors, mobilized on issues of a general character, but also through political mobilisation campaigns organized to claim and defend specific interests, linked to certain local issues. The third dimensional sphere on the other hand, appears to be collocated between membership and leadership, making hence protagonist a generation of *new local leaders*, that starting from a territorial level created the conditions for the determination of a broad political consensus, built (besides political issues in a broad sense) on the personal prestige and on the individual activities carried out in the past by these characters. And this, certainly, is the case of Manuela Carmena and Ada Colau, and - together with them - a long list of other leaders of communities operating in many parts of Spain.

Regarding the three spheres mentioned (national leadership, membership and new local leaders), however, what was lacking was a mutual connection relationship, being - at the moment of its birth - that of *Podemos* a very “light” model of political organization, whose broad popular participation seemed detached from the more rigid logics of political regimentation, typical of the 20th century traditional parties. However, the functioning model adopted by *Podemos* at the moment of its foundation carried a risk, and at the same time, an endogenous advantage. Regarding the risk, the difficulties in building a vertical path of growth internal to its political organization has to be considered. Without making risky predictions, if *Podemos* should continue to grow in the medium-long term (or at least not dissolve quickly), its main leaders will have to face the necessity of dealing with the theme of the construction of an organizational model, not excluding, in that case, the possibility of planning a political subject different from the present one. All this could, however, carry the danger of political normalization, at the same time, potentially critical for the future of *Podemos*.

On the other hand, the model just described, with three concentric spheres scarcely connected with each other, leads at the same time to a relevant political advantage. Thanks to its “light” structure, indeed, *Podemos* is able to maintain an element of originality in the eyes of its electors and sympathizers, that makes it look more like a movement rather than a party, hence allowing it to build around its organizational dimension the fortunes of its first electoral successes.

Therefore, is the dilemma always the same? What to do? Movement or party? Leave things so that *Podemos* continues to have an unstructured structure (or scarcely structured) on the territory, accepting to acknowledge a great deal of leeway to the spontaneous dimension of its participation, or working to organize a more structured organizational model, hence less authentic compared to its movement origins and ambitions? For sure, this is not the question that the leaders of such political group will have to face in the

medium period. Currently, it is impossible to make predictions for those who place themselves in a scientific analytical framework. Hence, we pass the baton to future studies for an assessment with more awareness of the developmental guidelines that the newly created Spanish *New Left* group will be able to follow in the coming years.

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*5. Globalization and the Neo-Liberal Trend Jeopardizing Basic Social Institutions**

by Tatiana Sidorina**

1. Introduction

Special characteristics of modern employment demonstrate serious changes in the character and the content of the labour process. The phenomenon of “the end of labour in its classical sense”, which triggered heated debates in the end of the XX century, was described in details by British sociologist Z. Bauman in his work «The Individualized Society»:

That situation has changed now, and the crucial ingredient of the change is the new ‘short term’ mentality which came to replace the ‘long term’ one. Marriages ‘till death us do part’ are now a rarity: the partners no longer expect to stay long in each other’s company. According to the latest calculation, a young American with a moderate level of education expects to change jobs at least eleven times during his or her working life – and that ‘job-changing’ expectation is certain to go on growing before the working life of the present generation is over. ‘Flexibility’ is the slogan of the day, and when applied to the labour market it means an end to the job ‘as we know it’, work on short-term contracts, rolling contracts or no contracts, positions with no inbuilt security but with the ‘until further notice’ clause [Bauman 2001, p. 24].

Rising on the wave of industrialization, after the transition to the postindustrial, information epoch, labour is losing its past significance. More and more people consider labour as a heavy routine and would like to get rid of it forever. And especially in the circumstances of depressive aggravation of the so called global problems, which have not only been left unsolved since they were identified by the Rome club, but continue to forebode humanity death from ecological catastrophes, depletion of natural resources, incurable diseases, the planet’s overpopulation etc.

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There are obvious dramatic changes in the labour and employment sphere. After the transition to the postindustrial economy, classic labour (as a hard, back-breaking work, focused on achieving a material (embodied) result) ceases determining the sense of human existence.

2. Globalization against labour

The uncertainty of the labour's role, status and significance reflects the crisis in one of the basic spheres of the society's life – the labour sphere. On the one side, there is a change in labour practices, a transformation in the classic labour model, work is no longer a vital necessity – a man can have no work and would not be punished for this. On the other side, labour is still in demand – there is a reduction of the labour market where blue-collar jobs used to be in-demand and more people are losing their jobs. How can we determine the role of labour in these circumstances? How does the change in the role of this basic aspect of the social system impact human life and society?

Most prominent social scientists of our days beat the alarm, considering that the labour crisis will have most negative consequences for social development.

Ulrich Beck thinks that the reasons of the labour crisis lie in the global economic policy of the neoliberal regime. Neoliberalism struggles for a world without borders – not for the labour, but for the capital [Beck, 2005, p. 141].

The global operation of the economy is sapping the foundations of national economics and national states, unleashing subpolitics on a quite novel scale and with incalculable consequences. The next objective will be to shunt the old adversary, 'labour', out of harm's way, but above all to serve notice on the 'ideal aggregate capitalist' (as Marx called the state) so that it is freed from the entanglement with labour and state that developed in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries [Beck, 2000, p. 2].

And the fact that scientific and technical development leads to a decrease of job places and to a change in the labour's character and forms, also plays in favor of the neoliberal regime as a global ideology.

Why is it happening so? What caused the on-going processes in the labour sphere? Why in conditions of globalization has the labour as a basic social institute become the No. 1 enemy of modernity?

Beck is analyzing the general trends of global development, which dramatically change the balance of forces in the society. The development of

the capitalist society goes towards the global capitalism and the obvious formation of the world neoliberal capitalist economy. Beck notes the contradictions of this process, “transnational integration and national disintegration are simultaneous with each other” [Beck, 2000, p. 96].

Transnational organizations excel themselves by record incomes and massive job cuts. At the end of the business year one board of directors after another report fantastic incomes.

But politicians who have to justify scandalous levels of unemployment push for further tax cuts, in the mostly vain hope that at least a few jobs will be squeezed from the new wealth of rich [Beck, 2000, p. 6].

As a result, conflicts are building up, including conflicts in the economic sphere, in particular between virtual and real taxpayers. While transnational corporations can avoid taxation in the framework of the national state, small and medium-size enterprises, which create the major part of workplaces, have to suffer under the pressure of the reorganized tax bureaucracy.

It is an irony of history that the very losers of globalization will in future have to pay for everything – from the welfare state to a functioning democracy – while the winners of globalization post dream profits and steal away from their responsibility for future democracy [Beck, 2000, p. 6].

At the same time, the contradictions and problems of the modern labour market are proclaimed to be one of the reasons of the so called “age stagnation”, the slowdown of the US economic growth, which has been actively discussed in the recent time. According to US economist R. Gordon,

perhaps 25 to 40 years, the growth of real per-capita disposable income of the bottom 99 percent of the U.S. income distribution would average 0.2 percent per year, compared to 2.0 percent per year in the century before 2007 [Gordon, 2014a, p. 1].

He defines four “headwinds” which, in his opinion, “will not let US economy grow as fast as before” [Kapeljushnikov 2015, p. 113].

It attributed the slowness of future growth mainly to such “headwinds” as demography, education, inequality, and government debt Gordon, 2014a, p. 1].

The labour component is present in the first of the “headwinds” – the demographic situation:

The first, demography, reduces hours per capita. It thus drives a wedge between

the growth of productivity and the growth of output per capita [Gordon, 2014a, p. 4].

The dynamics of the number of the worked hours per capita may be presented as the result of four factors: the average working time duration of employed labourers; the share of the employed in the economically active population; the level of economic activity of the working population; the ratio between the working and the total population. According to Gordon, changes in two out of the four factors had a decisive significance: first, the employed started working much less (because of widespread part-time employment – both by the initiative of the companies, and the initiative of the workers themselves), second, there was a dramatic outflow of the population from the sphere of economic activity, which only partially (and insignificantly) was related to the growing involvement of young people in college education. In 1996-2013 due to the first of these factors the number of hours worked per capita annually fell by 0,28% and due to the second factor – by 0,32% [Gordon 2014a; Quoted after: Kapeljushnikov 2015, p. 114].

In the long-term prospective Gordon supposes that

the future unemployment rate returns to its 2004 value of 5.5 percent and the employment rate returns to 94.5 percent, there will still be downward pressure on the other two components of hours per capita, namely hours per employee and the labor-force participation rate. The former has been reduced in part by America's dysfunctional medical care insurance system, which ties medical insurance to employment rather than providing it as a right of citizenship. Firms have increasingly pushed employees into part-time status in order to avoid paying medical insurance costs, and today roughly eight million Americans are involuntarily working part-time while seeking full-time employment [Gordon, 2014a, p. 8].

Thus, the main social institutions turn into a major problem of the postindustrial neoliberal economy and at the same time the sore spot of globalization. To find new spheres of profitable production global capitalism is using less and less labour force and substantiating the need for dismantling the welfare state.

The trends are clear but what is not clear is who will do hard work in the developed countries which shifted their manufacturing sites to the third world countries, concentrating on the information and management of the manufacturing sites? What inflow of immigrants is necessary for that and how will this inflow adjust itself to foreign cultural and political traditions? [Fedotova V., Fedotova N. 2007, p. 445].

And finally, what will happen with the working humanity in conditions when

human labour and the mass organizations that represent it – trade unions and workers' parties – are everywhere losing bargaining-power and social influence. At the same time, a growing number of people are excluded from the labour market and from opportunities for material and social security and integration. Consequently, not only are inequalities on the rise, but the *character* of social inequalities is dramatically changing as ever larger circles of people are excluded as in principle 'economically inactive' [Beck, 2000, p. 97].

3. “The economically inactive”: a new subject of labour relations

The consequences of globalization determine changes in the sphere of labour and production, inequality is growing, the quality of labour is changing.

In the society of global capitalism more and more people – those in the funnel of a bitter competition of talents – are considered “weak”, “balancing on the edge”, “being under a threat” or “inferior”. These are people without secondary education or with a poor certificate of education, sick or disabled people, whose functional abilities (mostly technical) are assessed as poor by the modern ability scale. They are all “in danger of going downhill and joining the circle of those permanently excluded by the rules of access [Beck, 2000, p. 98].

In these conditions poverty is dramatically growing and undergoing multiple fragmentations. In the end of XIX century the notions of absolute and relative poverty were introduced. Situation today is much more complicated.

Global capitalism can get by on less and less human labour-power as it opens up [Beck, 2000, p. 97].

Alongside poverty, the character of social inequalities is also changing. Human “waste material” – “the economically inactive” enter the stage. “The discarded” (according to the sociologist) are the people who live in the risk society and have themselves turned into risk-people in conditions of this society. Unlike the proletariat of the XIXth – early XXth centuries, in conditions of the modern society they are speedily losing influence on the way of events as they are no longer in demand. They have only one lever of influence left – bare violence. This is also underlined by J. Stiglitz in his “Globalization and Its Discontents”: “the prognosis for the future is bleak: extremes of inequality impede growth, particularly when they lead to social and political instability” [Stiglitz, 2003, p. 155].

In modern academic literature there is an active discussion of a new subject of social relations, a man of risk and indeterminateness – the precariat

[Standing 2011; McKay, Jefferys, Paraksevpoulou, Keles 2012; Kalleberg 2009; Zanjatost' 2014].

It is not only the appearance of “the discarded”, “the economically inactive” which demonstrates the change in the character of inequality in the modern world. Analyzing the problem of public order, U. Beck distinguishes constitutive and regulatory principles in the organization of public order:

the first are principles creating a wide scope of behavioral norms, the second are regulatory rules, norms, diminishing the possibilities of choice. The institutions of “reflexive modernity” are predominantly constitutive, and of the first modernity – predominantly regulatory [Fedotova V., Fedotova N. 2007, p. 440].

Analyzing Beck's viewpoint, Russian scholars V. Fedotova and N. Fedotova point out that “in the new, “reflexive modernity” inequality predominates not so much in the form of exploitation, as in the first modernity, but in the form when the authorities and the rich stratum ignore the majority of the population, which the author named as Brazilianization, using Brazil as a typical example of a country where such relations are widespread [Fedotova V., Fedotova N., 2007, p. 440].

4. What can be counterposed to the crisis of labour? Immaterial labour – a means of cultural transformation

More than half a century ago projections in the sphere of employment and human activities for the near future were made by the authors of the post-industrial society concept. D. Bell, A. Toffler, M. Castells, the Rome club experts made forecasts that the future spheres of labour would be - information technologies, education, services, flexible technologies... [See Sidorina 2007; Toffler 1980, Toffler 1990; Fukuyama 1992; Bell 1973; Castells 1996–1997, King, Schneider 1991].

Humanity perceived such prospects with enthusiasm and mistrust. Yet there happened no immediate substitution of labour in its classical sense by postindustrial labour, and the activity performed by people in XX–XXI centuries (even not being exclusively physical) still stays extremely hard, every day, per day, comparable with physical labor by its fatigue.

In this connection there rises a reasonable question of preserving the human capital. And not only for physical labourers, but actors in the innovative spheres of activity, who made labourcentrism their way of life.

Industrial capitalism leaves into the past; instead of investment in ma-

chinery and the organization of labour there comes a new system of accumulation, based on knowledge. The concept describing the specificities of the age in which exploitation of knowledge is the qualitatively predominating form of accumulation, received the name of the cognitive capitalism.

French economist B. Paulre defines the cognitive capitalism as a society of knowledge, controlled and organized by capitalist principles, as a type of capitalism where knowledge is the main source of value, hence comes its counter position to the industrial capitalism [Paulre, 2008].

One of the key transformations in the cognitive capitalism society is the predomination of immaterial labour. What is understood by immaterial labour? How does this labour relate to the process of accumulation? From the neoliberal ideology positions immaterial labour, intellectual resources, knowledge – are all characteristics of one of the stages of economic development. By their destination these seemingly different “immaterial” phenomena all serve the capital and are aimed at its accumulation. But there is also another view on the destination of immaterial labour and its role in public development.

Thus, French philosopher A. Gorz, recognizing the importance of immaterial labour in the forming society of knowledge, turns to the dichotomy of immaterial labour as a means of accumulation and immaterial labour as a means of cultural transformation and overcoming of the crisis processes of modern society [Gorz, 2003, p. 33].

Gorz states that we are living in a transitional period, when several means of production exist at the same time. Industrial capitalism, focused on the use of big volumes of materialized fixed capital, gives way to the postmodern capitalism, the basic feature of which is the use of the so called immaterial capital (“human capital”, “capital of knowledge” or “intellectual capital”) [Gorz, 2003, p. 11].

According to Gorz, the vital factor for the efficiency of the new types of labour is not the scientific or technical knowledge of the actors, but their ability to communicate and cooperate with others, abilities related to overall culture. This makes an important distinction between the workers of manufacturing factories or plants managed by the Taylor system and the workers of the post-Fordism epoch. The first had to reject their overall culture, knowledge and skills to submit to the dumb, boring division of labour with its endless repetition of one and the same operation. The second bring into the production process their whole cultural luggage accumulated in games, team competitions, conflicts, discussions, music sessions, participation in theatrical performances etc. This personal entity is involved into the labour process and exploited [Gorz, 2003, p. 28].

The activity of self-realization turned into an intrinsic aspect of any immaterial labour activity, it mobilizes the same abilities and the same personal aptitudes as free-choice activity in leisure time. In this sense we can talk about a total mobilization of abilities and aptitudes, including feelings and emotions.

Big companies try to transform the relations of hired labour into the relations of participation, offering their key workers stock options – participation in the capital and revenues of the company. But the more labour appeals to the talents of the worker, his ability for self-expression, to what makes him valuable in his own eyes, the more these abilities strive to go beyond the framework of realization just within the limits of the task posed. The worker will be always trying to prove to himself that he is worth more. He will wish to demonstrate his skills in out-of-work or side-line work activity which he will consider as a goal in itself. Thus, journalists write books, artists from advertising agencies paint pictures, and software engineers demonstrate fantastic talent as hackers or free software authors. To save at least part of their life from totally utilitarian use, “the immaterial labour workers” start assigning higher value to their game, sports, cultural and public activities in which self-realization is the end-goal, than they assign to work.

And the subordination of self-realization to capital is facing an irresistible boundary until the difference between the individual and the company is preserved. Yet this boundary disappears with the removal of hired labour relations, the difference between the individual and the company. The individual should turn into a company for itself, it is no longer subordinated to external enforcement, to the contrary, it has turned into its own producer, employer and seller, and has to undertake all the enforcement necessary for the survival and competitiveness of the enterprise which it embodies.

In such conditions a company may limit itself to hiring a small number of staff workers with full-time employment. The employer receives an opportunity to significantly change the volume of work requested from the employee, taking no care of the legal working time, social benefits, dismissals and hire of new employees [Gorz, 2003, p. 16-17].

Theoreticians and practitioners of neoliberalism insist that, alongside the removal of hire relations, unemployment will also disappear. In case of a loss of work the guilty side is the unemployed person. His knowledge and skills are probably no longer attractive in the labour market. Such people should themselves take care of improving the situation. An unemployed person should acquire knowledge which is more in demand in the market than the knowledge he already possesses.

Yet the success of this policy in the fight against unemployment, insecurity of existence and discontinuous employment is rather modest as its main

goal is to strengthen the domination of capital over the workers, to make people believe that they lose jobs by their own fault, and even more, that they themselves need their jobs for self-esteem, but cannot merit those jobs.

In this connection Gorz raises the question of the necessity to introduce subsistence benefits which has been discussed since 1995. It should not only help cope with discontinuity, unreliability, different breaks of employment, but also give people forms of self-employment, the social and cultural value of which is not measured in economic categories.

5. New system of the division of labour. Prerequisites for the formation of innovative labour skills in conditions of a crisis of its classical model

Anyway, should we fear an absolute domination of the economy of knowledge and a full degradation of industrial labour? Is the critically important borderline in the competition between democracies and non-democracies in the possibility of a “breakthrough” in the postindustrial society? It is known that the western countries have advanced most towards the economy of knowledge, in which success is determined by qualified human capital to a greater degree than by labour [Khanna, 2008].

At the same time, the transformation in the sphere of labour and employment in conditions of the postindustrial neoliberal economy, the problems of employment of significant masses of people, provision of their social needs come into a contradiction with chronic overwork, workaholism, which are becoming a mass phenomenon of modern society.

How can the preservation of human capital be ensured? Can other forms of activity replace labour activity, compensate for what is being lost in the result of the crisis of labour in its classical form?

One of the consequences of the attitude to labour in the industrial age was the perception of labour as the main responsibility of a man, one of his needs and, consequently, the formation of the labour-centric way of life. A modern person does not know how to use his free time, how to spend the leisure, while leisure and free time can be used for self-improvement, education, widening erudition, acquiring new knowledge, learning languages etc., and the shift of activity can be quite radical.

US scholar Robert Reich in his popular work *«The work of nations»* (1991) raises the issue of the necessity to transform the labour skills of a modern person. Much attention is paid in the book to the development of information economy and the sphere of services in conditions of a transition

to the postindustrial information society. From this point of view special attention could be paid to the author's analysis of the process of destructing the traditional relations of property and forms of control in conditions when an essential part of public wealth, presented by information and educational in-person services, is becoming indivisible form the active person itself. According to the author, the most vital problem of modern postindustrial societies is the formation of a new social and property stratification related to the increasing role of knowledge as the major production resource [Reich 1991, p. 183].

Reich writes that irrespective of the official category to which your work belongs (the sphere of the processing industry, services, management etc.), irrespective of the sector of industry you work in (automobile, steelmaking, electronics, advertising etc.), your real competitive possibilities in conditions of the global economy are more and more depending on the function you execute.

In the new conditions the most successful are those who deal with analysis and work with symbols, those who expose and solve new problems and perform mediator's activity.

Regardless of how your job is officially classified (manufacturing, service, managerial, technical, secretarial, and so on), or the industry in which you work (automotive, steel, computer, advertising, finance, food processing), your real competitive position in the world economy is coming to depend on the function you perform in it. Herein lies the basic reason why incomes are diverging. The fortunes of routine producers are declining. In-person servers are also becoming poorer, although their fates are less clear-cut. But symbolic analysts – who solve, identify, and broker new problems – are, by and large, succeeding in the world economy [Reich, 1991, p. 208].

The demand for the knowledge and skills of those specialists grows by the measure of the steady improvement of communication means which ensure the availability and fast distribution of the knowledge and skills.

The growth of demand entails the growth of revenues. Irrespective of the form of the revenue – as royalties, author's fees, wages or participation in profits – the economic outcome is practically the same. Besides, this work brings not just money. The most cherished secret of the people doing such work is the fact they like it so much. Much of what they are doing cannot even be considered work in the traditional sense of the word. Workers of the traditional production and the sphere of personal services are doomed to monotonous labour, which makes their body tired and weak, reduces the person's independence, his ability to be free in his actions. "The work" of symbolic analysts, to the contrary, is related to solving puzzles, experiments,

games, requires wide communication, and most often the worker decides himself what exactly he should be doing. Few of those employed in traditional production or personal services would work if they did not need the money. "Many symbolic analysts would 'work' even if money were no object" [Reich, 1991, p. 216].

By the early 1990s the wages of symbolic analysts no longer depended on the size of the national market. Their market spread globally and the conceptual value reached the volumes incomparable with the value ensured by raising the efficacy of mass production.

Reich specially considers, first, the issue of the choice of profession or professional reorientation and, second, the counter-opposition to the challenges of global economy. Surely it is hard to imagine mass reorientation of traditional professions' workers to the sphere of "symbolic analysts". But it is quite possible to undertake some steps towards acquiring new skills, specialization, expanding the practical activities.

In this respect it should be noted that in conditions of a transition to the economy of knowledge, reducing the time spent by a man at work, the threat of the loss of job and other specificities of the modern situation in employment, more relevance is attributed to the person's ability to use the time freed from work.

Moreover, according to Russian scholar M. Majackij, the modern person is often doomed to forced idleness:

Inactivity, freedom from forced, mostly physical labour, leisure time are a mandatory condition for a perceptive, theoretical way of life, knowledge and creativity, but at the same time a trap with a sweet melancholic temptation inside. Out of a thousand-year privilege of the elite, inactivity, in the last century only, has turned into the possession, the winning prize and the nightmare of the masses. It turned out that coping with obstinate matter is much simpler than dealing with your ephemeral and concrete self [Majackij, 2009. p. 26–27].

Modern humanity does not know how to efficiently use leisure time. And this is in conditions of a technical expansion when, under the permanent pressure of time and narrowing space man is painfully longing for free time.

It turns out that leisure and activities by their own choice are conditions available not to everybody. Man, partially relieved from extra work, does not as a consequence receive the ability to make use of the leisure time and dedicate the free time to activities of his own choice. Leisure is not equal to doing nothing. The condition of leisure supposes that a man finds time for spiritual interests which make his life more substantive and fruitful, bring sense and dignity in it, which is the source of any meaningful labour.

Leisure is a precondition of any free idea, any free activity. In the society

of risk and indeterminateness much more important becomes the ability of a person to spend leisure and free time reasonably. A person needs to be diversified and the more skills the person possesses – the greater are the possibilities.

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Part II
Territories, Politics and Policies

6. *Withstanding the Populist Siege. New leaders and the Political Bias of the Metropolis*

by Luca Massidda *

1. Cities and Populism

Populism matters. This sentence opens *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* edited in 2017 by C. R. Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. O. Espejo and P. Ostiguy. This collection is a clear editorial indication of how in recent years the attention on populism has grown enormously in the scientific community (D'Eramo 2013), but also in the media and public opinion). In this context, however, what is striking is the relative attention – often due to the specific analysis of empirical “local” case studies – given to the relationship between populism and territory. Yet, in the long-term history of populism, the urban/rural cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan 1967) played a relevant role, once perhaps even more crucial than currently “hot” variables such as nationality, ethnicity or religious culture¹.

What remains today of this “original” link between populism and territory? The hypothesis that we want to discuss here is that not only this relation maintains an absolute centrality in the definition – and therefore for the understanding – of the current revival of populist policies, but that even urban spaces and metropolitan cultures can be the ideal basis for defining an effective strategy to contrast populism². If this thesis holds, the possibility to resist, materially and symbolically, to the siege of the last wave of populism could pass right from our cities.

If we take into consideration the trends of the three events that in the most

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¹ “While the original populists manifested some anti-Semitic and racist streaks, the distinction between the people and the elite was not primarily of an ethnic or religious nature. Rather, the basis was moral, geographical, and occupational, i.e., between the good, rural farmers and the corrupt, urban bankers and politicians” (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 23).

² The theme of the contrast to populism has recently been widely debated in the literature. Here we refer to Kaltwasser 2017.

recent past have marked the political life of Western societies – the referendum for the exit of Great Britain from the European Union (June 23, 2016), the American presidential elections that saw the Donald Trump's victory (November 8, 2016) and those in France leading to the Élysée Emmanuel Macron (May 7, 2017), we discover in the metropolis an extraordinary ability to resist the siege of contemporary populisms.

In Great Britain, 51.9% voted in favour of Brexit. In the United States, Trump conquered the White House thanks to 304 electoral votes (against 227 of Hillary Clinton). In the second round of the presidential elections, 33.9% of the French people voted for Marine Le Pen and her *Front National*. These three events were strongly marked by the presence of populist rhetoric and strategies. The slogans that have displayed these three electoral campaigns immediately reveal this bias. *Vote Leave, Take Control*: the claim of the pro-Brexit campaign invites the voter to recover the political control of his territory, thus enhancing the nerve centre of populist rhetoric, the need to retrieve the lost popular sovereignty (Canovan 2002; Espejo 2011, 2017; Kelly 2017). *Make America Great Again*: the slogan adopted by Donald Trump, in a nationalistic and nostalgic key, calls for the resentment of the American citizen, who is angry and disappointed for the lost prominence of his country (Inglehart & Norris 2016). *Au nom du peuple*: Marine Le Pen puts the People directly at the centre of her message and presents herself as the only legitimate political subject able to represent their general will (Stockemer & Barisione 2017). This process of mythologizing the popular will is one of the two factors at the basis of the ideational definition of populism as a “thin-centred” ideology (Mudde 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017), together with the core-issue of anti-elitism (Taggart 2000), a variable which is implicitly – but clearly – present in any of the three electoral claims considered.

However, if we move from the national to the metropolitan context, we immediately notice the different power of seduction that these slogans – and the political forces behind them – have been able to exercise towards an “urban” electorate. In London, 59.9% voted for “remain”. In New York City, just over a third of voters (36.5%) has been persuaded by Trump's message. In Paris, only one out of ten citizens granted his preference, in the presidential ballot, to Marine Le Pen's *Front National* (see Table 1).

The “electoral distinction” of the great metropolises of the Western world is certainly not new, but now this “political resilience” of urban cultures becomes particularly significant. Today the epicentre of the anti-politics tsunami – whittled by its populist manifestations – should be located precisely in the big cities. It's here in fact that the most explosive conditions of the contemporary social system – globalization, immigration, violence, crime, inequality, terrorism, bureaucracy, pollution, corruption, etc. – manifest themselves

with the greatest intensity (Sassen 2016). If the big city can therefore be considered the touchstone of our liquid modernity (Bauman 2013), why the *unpolitical* nature of our times (Rosanvallon 2014) does not find its most fertile ground in the urban environment?

Table 1 – National vs metropolitan populist vote

	NATIONAL VOTE	MAIN CITY VOTE
PRO-BREXIT VOTES	51.9%	40.1% (London)
TRUMP'S VOTES	46.1%	36.5% (New York)
LE PEN'S VOTES	33.9%	10.3% (Paris)

Source: Wikipedia.com

A possible objection: London, New York, Paris aren't ordinary metropolises, they in fact permanently occupy the summit of the *Global Cities Network* (Taylor & Derudder 2015)³. The most precious resources of the new neoliberal global order are concentrated in them: business activity, human capital, information exchange, cultural experience, and political engagement. So, if London, Paris and New York represent the privileged spaces of neoliberal globalization, they obviously reject the anti-elitist assault of populist parties. According to this hypothesis, Noah Toly proposes to consider in some way the Brexit vote a territorial reaction against the privilege of the global cities (Toly 2017). There are two reasons for me to only partially agree with this thesis: first of all, global cities – as clearly underlined by Toly – have an ambivalent, contradictory, dual nature (Sassen 2016). In their environments, a large part of the population at risk of poverty and with a dramatic rate of unemployment lives side by side with the highest standards of living. The main winners and the worst losers of globalization share the same space together. Properly because global cities are the flashy house of the elites, they could be the ideal ground where an anti-elitist movement can gain consensus (Harvey 2012). Indeed, this has been the case, for example, with the *Occupy Wall Street Movement* protesting in New York against the 1% privileged elites. Secondly, because – as we will see now – this spatial resilience to the populist sex appeal is spread in different urban contexts, so that we can locate it also in cities which are very far away – for their economic, political and socio-cultural status – from the summit of the *global cities ranking*.

Let's stay in Europe and consider three hard dimensions of the contem-

³ Taylor is the director of the *Globalization and World Cities Research Network* (GAWC), the leading think tank on cities in globalization. The GAWC research activity is available here: <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/index.html>.

porary crisis (we know populism proliferates in a “critical” ground): 1) unemployment rates; 2) crime and violence diffusion; 3) migration rates. Reading these parameters along the urban-rural continuum, according to the degree of urbanization of the territories, we immediately understand that urban places are not so privileged spaces. According to Eurostat, both in the United Kingdom and France “the unemployment rate involving people living in cities was at least 3.0 percentage points higher than that recorded for people living in rural areas” (Eurostat 2016, p. 41). At the same time, “the proportion of people (...) who were living in an area with problems related to crime, violence or vandalism was considerably higher among those living in cities than it was for the inhabitants of towns and suburbs or rural areas” (*ivi*, p. 46). The flows of immigrants are concentrated, following selective patterns, in relatively few large cities, first of all the metropolitan regions of London and Paris, “which tend to receive a disproportionate number of immigrants”, recording the highest rates of net immigration and the highest number of foreign-born⁴. Despite this tendency of the crisis to localize itself, with its major indicators, in urban spaces, not only the cosmopolitan London, but all the major English cities – except Birmingham (almost perfectly split) – voted to *remain* (Table 2). While inner-city urban areas typically have higher levels of resident foreigners and social deprivation, populist voting support is rather concentrated in rural villages and suburban communities (Inglehart & Norris 2016, p. 27).

Table 2 – Urban vote for Brexit


	LEAVE	REMAIN
BIRMINGHAM	50.4%	49.6%
BRISTOL	38.3%	61.7%
LEEDS	49.7%	50.3%
LIVERPOOL	41.8%	58.2%
LONDON	40.1%	59.9%
MANCHESTER	39.6%	60.4%
ABERDEEN CITY	38.9%	61.1%
EDINBURGH CITY	25.6%	74.4%
GLASGOW CITY	33.4%	66.6%
CARDIFF	40.0%	60.0%

Source: Office for National Statistics, 2016

⁴ Greater London was the most cosmopolitan capital city in the EU: with almost three million of its inhabitants born outside the United Kingdom, followed by Grand Paris with more than one million and half foreign-born population (*ivi*, p. 231).

If we cross the Channel, in the distribution of the 2017 French presidential vote we find the same trend observed in the United Kingdom: the traditional cleavage between urban and rural creates a clear separation between environments sensitive to populist charm and lands hostile to its rhetoric (Emanuele 2017) (Figure 1).

Figure 1 – Vote trends for Le Pen and Macron by demographic size of towns, French Presidential Election 2017, First round




Source: CISE. Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali (Emanuele 2017)

2. Inside London

Let's take a look to the London vote for Brexit. As we have already seen, the 59.9% of Londoners voted to remain in Europe. Twenty-eight out of the thirty-three boroughs of the capital chose to reject the Brexit option. In the first district, City of London, more than 75% of citizens voted to confirm their European membership. But what evidences emerge, if we go into the details of the territorial dimension of the London vote and we try to compare the boroughs that in the English capital registered, respectively, the highest and lowest levels of consensus for the Brexit option?

Figure 2 – Pro-Leave vs Pro-Remain London Boroughs



Source: Data processing based on *UK Office for National Statistics*, 2016

Lambeth (78.6%) and Hackney (78.5%) were the areas that most clearly tried to oppose the Brexit hypothesis. On the other hand, the boroughs of Havering and Bexley pushed to leave the European Union with a proportion higher than the national average: 69.7% in the first case, 63% in the second. Such a clear difference between these two political positions, both located inside the administrative borders of Great London, does not seem to be exclusively attributable to socio-economic parameters. Compared to the variables related to unemployment and social marginality, Havering and Bexley recorded similar, or even slightly lower, percentages than those shown by Lambeth and Hackney (Figure 2).

The difference between the pro-leave and the pro-remain boroughs can't be easily explained according to simply socio-economic parameters. The unemployment rates and the proportion of citizens in the lower social grade show a low power of correlation with the vote for leave. The determining variables to understand and differentiate the electoral patterns followed by these districts are rather factors relating to the socio-cultural dimension of the living conditions: the population density and the level of ethnic mixing in the neighbourhood. These two variables record the deepest distance between the pro-leave and pro-remain boroughs: Havering and Bexley have respectively an urban density of 18.6 and 32.5 inhabitants per hectare, while Lambeth and Hackney reach 102.2 and 121.3 inhabitants per hectare⁵. As regards the presence of foreigners born in the territory, the two pro-Brexit boroughs present a level of multiculturalism three or four times lower than that recorded in the vote of the two most favourable communities to confirm the English presence in the European Union: in 2011 in Lambeth, one out of four citizens were not English; in Hackney one out of five; in Havering and Bexley the percentage of foreign population is markedly lower: 5.8% in one case, 7.5% in the other (Eurostat 2016, p. 235).

Heterogeneity and density were two of the three variables individuated in 1938 by Louis Wirth to define the *Urbanism as a Way of Life*. The cleavage that separates these different areas of the London territory is more cultural than economical. Within London, the pro-Brexit option seems more like the vote of a community that feels its cultural identity threatened, rather than the political reaction of a social class that feels itself put at the margins of an economic model that does not protect it. The cultural clash that at the global level is taking place between *populist nationalism* and *liberal cosmopolitanism* (Norris & Grömping 2017) also crosses the administrative borders of Great London. It is therefore a deficit of urbanism, of metropolitan culture, to explain the populist drift of Havering and Bexley.

⁵ <https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/>

3. Inside New York Vote

Now let's fly to New York. In 2016 United States presidential election, the Big Apple granted Donald Trump 36.5% of its preferences. Four years earlier, the Republican candidate chosen to oust Obama from the White House, Mitt Romney, had reached 36%. The populist invective of the Tycoon-President does not seem to have changed in any way the New York size of the Republican vote. Focusing on some city's districts, we can see how in Queens more than three voters out of four chose Hillary Clinton. In Manhattan and Bronx, the future President convinced less than one citizen out of ten. Here again, as regards the territorial sensitivity to the populist message, we can see how the sharing of a common urban culture is stronger than any socio-economical variable: in Bronx and Manhattan, two different social structures converge in an almost identical electoral behaviour (Table 3).

Table 3 – Bronx vs Manhattan

	BRONX	MANHATTAN
TRUMP'S VOTES	9.5%	9.7%
CLINTON'S VOTES	88.5%	86.6%
POPULATION % CHANGE (2010-16)	+5.1%	+3.6%
PERSON IN POVERTY	30.3%	17.6%
PERSON WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE	11.1%	7.9%
WHITE ALONE	44.9%	64.6%

Source: New York Times, 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016

If we extend our view to the whole nation, we can immediately see how US Presidential vote has been a radically space-oriented vote. Here some evidences about this: 72.5% of *urban cores* voted for Clinton, but 84.6% of people living in rural areas trusted the *Make America Great Again* promise. A deep centre / periphery cleavage split the United States in two countries (Wallace 2016):

Trump's America, territorially immense, stretched to occupy 85% of the territory, three million square miles (in which, however, only 146 million people live, 46% of the total population of the United States); and Clinton's America, incredibly dense and concentrated, very restricted in terms of space, just 15% of the territory, 530,000 square miles, but very populated (174 million inhabitants, almost thirty million more than the other 54% of the American population). Two worlds anthropologically, economically, socially and culturally unrelated, whose difference seems to revive a cleavage – a fracture line – that the political scientists had used extensively

in describing the process of *State building* (and in part also of Nation building) [...] and that seemed relatively disused in mature modernity: the centre / periphery cleavage (Revelli 2017, *our translation*).

Trump's America is a huge monolithic land. Clinton's America is a high fragmented "archipelago" of urban nodes. If we overlap the US urbanization map to the Clinton's America map we immediately recognize the strength of this spatial correlation.

Let's move now to the West Coast. Los Angeles and San Francisco show an electoral pattern similar to that observed in New York, but with an even more unbalanced tendency in favour of the Democratic candidate: Hillary Clinton reached 71.8% of the vote in the City of Angels and rose to 84.5% in the Bay Area. But once again these are data that are not surprising and that can be connected to the privileged nature of two metropolises that represent perfectly integrated hubs into our globalized network society.

But what happens if we move to a State which capital is one of the western main losers of post-industrial globalization? Detroit is plunged into a long-term structural crisis, started many years before the global one in which, since 2008, we seem irremediably bogged down. The Michigan Capital is a *shrinking city* (Pallagst *et al.* 2013; Ryan 2008) which continues to lose its inhabitants (since 1950 over one million inhabitants have abandoned it, in a downward trend that did not stopped in recent years: -5.8% since 2010). It records a percentage of people in poverty of 40.3%. Two-thirds of its voters chose Hillary Clinton. Here an economic inequality perspective doesn't work. It's State, Michigan, is in better condition. And vote populist. Four out of ten people, among those who remained, live in poverty. 18.9% of its citizens don't have access to health insurance. But two out of three electors voted for Hillary Clinton. The State to which it belongs, Michigan, is in much better socio-economic conditions. And it chose Trump, even if with a minimal gap (Table 4).

Table 4 – Detroit vs Michigan

	DETROIT	MICHIGAN
TRUMP'S VOTES	29.3%	47.3%
CLINTON'S VOTES	66.4%	47.0%
POPULATION % CHANGE (2010-16)	-5.8%	+0.4%
PERSON IN POVERTY	40.3%	15.0%
PERSON WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE	18.9%	6.3%
WHITE ALONE	10.6%	47.3%

Source: New York Times, 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016

The relationship between post-industrial urban areas and their State remains substantially the same even if we move to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania or Cleveland, in Ohio. The large industrial metropolises of the Rust Belt have worse socio-economic parameters than those recorded overall in their State, but they show a greater resiliency to the rhetoric of charismatic populism (Tables 5 and 6).

Table 5 – Pittsburgh vs Pennsylvania

	PITTSBURGH	PENNSYLV.
TRUMP'S VOTES	39.5%	48.2%
CLINTON'S VOTES	55.9%	47.5%
POPULATION % CHANGE (2010-16)	-0.7%	+0.6%
PERSON IN POVERTY	22.9%	12.9%
PERSON WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE	10.3%	6.7%
WHITE ALONE	66.0%	82.4%

Source: New York Times, 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016

Table 6 – Cleveland vs Ohio

	CLEVELAND	OHIO
TRUMP'S VOTES	39.5%	51.3%
CLINTON'S VOTES	55.9%	43.2%
POPULATION % CHANGE (2010-16)	-2.7%	+0.7%
PERSON IN POVERTY	36.2%	14.6%
PERSON WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE	16.0%	6.6%
WHITE ALONE	37.3%	82.5%

Source: New York Times, 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016

Now let's move to Kentucky to find a counterevidence. Post-industrial crisis isn't an urban exclusivity. The small community of Elliott County had voted for the Democratic Party's candidate in every presidential election since it was formed in 1869. But in the 2016 presidential campaign it voted 70% versus 26% in favour of Donald Trump (Revelli 2017).

Its territory is affected by a deep crisis (in the traditional cleavage labour / capital) – probably more dramatic than the one that hit Detroit and the other American industrial metropolises – and Elliot County chooses to vote populist. With a much greater conviction than the one registered in its State, Kentucky (Table 7). What is the main difference with Detroit, Cleveland or Pitts-

burgh? The absence of urban “antibodies” that at least partly defend the social organism from the virality of a populist political strategy⁶.

Table 7 – Elliott County vs Kentucky

	ELLIOTT COUNTY	KENTUCKY
TRUMP’S VOTES	71.2%	62.5%
CLINTON’S VOTES	26.3%	32.7%
POPULATION % CHANGE (2010-16)	-3.4%	+2.2%
PERSON IN POVERTY	34.4%	18.5%
PERSON WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE	7.3%	6.0%
WHITE ALONE	95.1%	88.0%

Source: *New York Times*, 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016

4. Inside Paris

Last trip. Let’s go back to Europe. May 2017: Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen face off in the second round of the French presidential elections. The leader of the *Front National* reaches, in the municipality of Paris, only 10% of the votes. It is exactly the same percentage of consent that her father, Jean-Marie, obtained in 2002, in the run-off against Jacques Chirac⁷. On that occasion, however, at national level, the *Front National* had not exceeded 17.8% of the preferences. This time it stopped at 33.9%. Fifteen years later, the growth that the right-wing populist party recorded (+16.1%) is therefore completely built outside of the Parisian territory.

As already happened in New York, the areas in Paris with a profoundly different socio-economic background also seem to show a political attitude of equal diffidence towards the populist invective. According to the INSEE data of 2012, the two *arrondissements* that occupied, with respect to the unemployment rate variable, the two extreme poles in the continuum of the Parisian territory were the 19th and the 8th. The 19th *arrondissement*, located in the north-east suburbs of the city, in fact, showed a double rate of unemployment (16.2%) compared to the 8th *arrondissement* (8.2%), a central and

⁶ In the case of Brexit, a similar trend can be seen in the small city of Stoke-on-Trent: this urban industrial heartland, historically considered a “a ‘safe seat’ for the Labour Party” has been in 2016 “the city with the highest percentage of Brexit votes” (Evans 2017, pp. 215-219).

⁷ For a comparative analysis of the political performances of FN under the leadership of Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen you can see: Stockemer & Amengay 2015.

upper-middle-class neighbourhood that hosts the Élysée and the Ministry of the Interior. Despite this deep socio-economic fracture, the two districts recorded practically identical voting behaviours: Marine Le Pen did not reach 10% in the north-eastern suburbs and stopped at 11.7% in the more affluent neighbourhood of the *Rive droite*.

Even in this case, however, beyond its internal geography, in which marginality and centrality coexist, Paris represents a privileged urban space of contemporary economy, perfectly placed in the network of global cities. What happens if we take into consideration two of the French regions – the Département du Nord and the Hérault – economically more vulnerable and where there is an important urban centre? The relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and electoral behaviour in these two French contexts seems to confirm the feature we have already found in the United States and Great Britain. In Lille as in Montpellier, urban cultures, beyond the difficult situations faced by their *départements*, show a specific capacity to resist the populism's appeal. Within the boundaries of the two cities the viral load of populism wave loses half its power (Table 8).

Table 8 – Unemployment and populism in Lille and Montpellier

	LILLE	NORD
LE PEN'S VOTES	21.7%	43.1%
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE	17.0%	12.5%
	MONTEPELLIER	HÉRAULT
LE PEN'S VOTES	22.3%	40.8%
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE	17.4%	13.9%

Source: Ministre de l'Intérieur, 2016; Eurostat, 2016

5. Urbanism against Populism?

The city has thus historically been the melting-pot of races, peoples, and cultures, and a most favourable breeding-ground of new biological and cultural hybrids. It has not only tolerated but rewarded individual differences. It has brought together people from the ends of the earth because they are different and thus useful to one another, rather than because they are homogeneous and like-minded (Wirth 1938, p. 10).

The words used by Wirth to describe the city immediately reveal the plural DNA of its way of life. Cities are the places of complexity, they support hybrids and boost differences. Populism on the other hand, as a degraded form of political action, tries to sustain its weak ideology by legitimizing

itself on the basis of an anti-pluralist prejudice⁸. Urbanism and populism could only configure two ways of living and two world views, if not compatible, surely highly conflicting. The characteristics of the urban milieu – as Wirth still argues – precipitates its inhabitant into a sophisticated and cosmopolitan social structure, where *the acceptance of instability and insecurity in the world at large as a norm*:

The social interaction among such a variety of personality types in the urban milieu tends to break down the rigidity of caste lines and to complicate the class structure, and thus induces a more ramified and differentiated framework of social stratification than is found in more integrated societies. The heightened mobility of the individual, which brings him within the range of stimulation by a great number of diverse individuals and subjects him to fluctuating status in the differentiated social groups that compose the social structure of the city, tends toward the acceptance of instability and insecurity in the world at large as a norm. This fact helps to account, too, for the sophistication and cosmopolitanism of the urbanite (Wirth 1938, p. 16).

The *sophistication and cosmopolitanism of the urbanite* resist the advance of the populist “troops”. The habit of instability, the familiarity with the crisis, the spontaneous tendency toward promiscuity have allowed urban organism to develop socio-cultural antibodies capable of counteracting populist infection. So why not try to synthesize the vaccine capable of eradicating the virus of populism from contemporary societies starting right from the body of our cities?

But there is another resilience that historically the cities have shown. Practically the same characteristics that allow the *urban* not to cede to the simple narrative seductions of populism – according to Henri Lefebvre – allowed the city, unique among the “objects” of industrial modernity, to resist the all-encompassing process of commodification set in motion by capitalism, to contrast its totalizing ability to reduce every *oeuvre* to product. Urban society does not accept this process of degradation of its complexity, in the spaces of the city the *use value* does not accept to be reduced to a simple *exchange value*:

it is on this shaky foundation that urban society and the *urban* persist and even intensify. Social relations continue to become more complex, to multiply and intensify through the most painful contradictions. The form of the urban, its supreme reason, namely simultaneity and encounter, cannot disappear. [...] As a place of encounters, focus of communication and information, the urban becomes what it always was: place of desire, permanent disequilibrium, seat of the dissolution of normalities and constraints, the moment of play and of the unpredictable (Lefebvre 1996).

⁸ “The core claim of populism is thus a moralized form of antipluralism” (Müller 2017).

The play and the unpredictable. The urban core elements that have allowed the city to survive the Market today allows it to withstand the populist siege. What's behind the strange similarity between these two *resistances*? In what relationships are today capitalism and populism? Several authors suggest, from a progressive perspective, that in order to contrast the spread of extreme right-wing populism, it is necessary to design a symmetrical left-wing populism capable of subtracting the argument – and the value – of popular sovereignty from reactionary and xenophobic political forces (Gerbaudo 2017). Instead, our short urban tour seems to suggest a different challenge: the problem is not so much in having left the domain of populism to the right but in having left the domain of cosmopolitanism to the neoliberal hegemony. If this is true then the path to victory over populism passes through our cities and their culture.

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7. Cities for Cedaw: Notes on the Road to Effective Intervention

by Jan Marie Fritz*

The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on December 18, 1979 after the First World Conference on Women (1975) “witnessed the call for a treaty” (Al Shraideh 2017:18). CEDAW, often called the international bill of rights for women, gives direction to UN Member States that have ratified the treaty.

The treaty was adopted decades ago, but many problems still remain. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations (U.N.) and the Executive Director of UN Women, says that “progress for women and girls remains unacceptably slow” (UN Women 2018:3) and Holly Fechner, Chair of the Board of the Institute for Women’s Policy Research (2015:7), commenting specifically about the United States (U.S.), writes that women:

...still face a wide wage gap that has not budged much in the last decade, disproportionate poverty rates, and wide disparities in health outcomes and experiences with violence, all of which is even more stark for women of color.

This chapter¹ focuses on a movement - Cities for CEDAW - in the United States (U.S.) that seeks to improve the situation of women and girls in a variety of U.S. communities (e.g., cities, counties, states). Local initiatives, like this one, can provide support for national and international efforts of many kinds and so it might be helpful for researchers, community activists and policymakers - in the U.S. as well as other countries - to discuss some of the lessons that have been learned in putting this particular local initiative in

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¹ This chapter is based in part on Fritz 2008, 2014, 2018a, and 2018b.

place. To encourage this discussion, the chapter provides basic information about CEDAW, introduces the Cities for CEDAW effort, identifies the levels of intervention that may be involved in a change initiative and discusses some of what has been learned about the road to effective intervention on a local level.

1. CEDAW

CEDAW, described as the “pre-eminent legal instrument on women’s rights” (Campbell 2018: 5), has “been credited with evolving the concept of substantive equality... that women can be different from men but still equal to them” (Jain 2005). CEDAW defines discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field” (UN CEDAW 1979).

The treaty (U.N. CEDAW 1979) covers a wide range of topics. The thirty articles focus on areas such as educational opportunities; sex trafficking; women’s rights in political and public life; access to health care; rural women; women’s economic and social rights; and equality in marriage and family life. Some topics are not mentioned (e.g., abortion)² or are only mentioned in the preamble (e.g., poverty)³. The expectation is that the specifics in CEDAW should be incorporated into national law in order to fully realize women’s rights.

CEDAW was adopted 130 to 0, with 10 abstentions. Of the 193 UN Member States, more than 50 of the countries that ratified the treaty have done so specifying certain reservations and objections. This makes CEDAW one of the most (and possibly the most) heavily reserved human rights treaties (Al Shraideh 2017:18). Only a handful of countries (Iran, Somalia, Sudan,

² Al Shraideh (2017:22) notes “the convention is viewed by its opponents to promote abortion, as it might consider it as one form of discrimination against women in their access to health services.” However, the Convention does not make any reference to abortion and, in fact, “some countries, such as Ireland and Rwanda, have ratified the Convention despite criminalizing abortion in their domestic laws...”

³ Campbell (2018:5) notes: “Throughout the world, women disproportionately live in poverty... There is no specific obligation in CEDAW on gender-based poverty. There is only a passing reference to women’s poverty in the preamble.”

Tonga, Palau and the United States) have not ratified the treaty. U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed the treaty in 1980, but the U.S. Senate never ratified it. And as Al Shraideh (2017:18) has commented, “What is strange to digest... is the fact that the United States is one of (a few) countries that have yet to ratify the Convention.” The U.S. is the only economically developed country not to have ratified the treaty.

While Member States are responsible for enforcing the Convention, Article XVII established a monitoring body - the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee). CEDAW expects Member States that have ratified the treaty to provide reports at least every four years⁴ about their goals and progress regarding the central inclusion of women and girls in their societies (e.g., Hungary 2006; Hungary 2013). In addition, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can provide supplementary (shadow) reports that can challenge the government reports (e.g., Hungarian Women’s Lobby and the European Roma Rights Centre 2013). The CEDAW Committee then responds to a government (e.g., CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2013) about its written and oral presentations taking into account any supplementary statements. The CEDAW Committee “does not have an authority to carry out any action against self-reported non-complying Members other than submitting an annual report to the United Nations’ General Assembly” (Al Shraideh 2017:19). However, some reports - those submitted by the country, the shadow reports and the Committee’s response - are publicly available on a website usually connected to the U.N. or an interested organization.⁵

2. Cities for CEDAW

In addition to CEDAW’s formal review process, there have been other CEDAW-related activities. For instance, Taiwan, although it is not a UN Member State, has accepted CEDAW standards, developed CEDAW reports and put a review process in place that involves outside experts assessing Taiwan’s plans and progress⁶ (Zeldin 2011, Taiwan Today 2017).

⁴ Countries that don’t meet a deadline – e.g., Hungary, 2013 – may file combined periodic reports.

⁵ See, for example, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm>; <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/iwraw/proceduralguide-08.html> and <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/CEDAWIndex.aspx>.

⁶ “Following the signing of a presidential order in 2007, a law implementing the CEDAW was promulgated Jan. 1, 2012, requiring the government to deliver a national report every four years and revise all relevant laws and administrative measures that contravene the convention

Also, the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP, 2018)) has a localization process in place that “is a bottom-up approach to policymaking... to ensure local ownership, participation and links among communities, civil society organizations and government” that support their UN Security Council Resolution 1325 National Action Plans (for women and girls). GNWP (2018) says the main points of its localization program are (1) “convening local authorities and other key local actors... to formulate local legislation and integrate UNSCR 1325... into community development plans” and (2) developing “Localization Guidelines (as a) practical guide that assists local authorities.” GNWP (2018) says this is being implemented in a number of countries including Burundi, Columbia, Serbia, South Sudan, Liberia, Philippines and Sierra Leone. Countries’ National Action Plans as well as information about localization efforts can be included with countries’ CEDAW reports.

In the United States, there has been a campaign, since 2013, that initially hoped to have 100 cities declare themselves as CEDAW cities by the end of 2015.⁷ This initiative received the support of the United States Conference of Mayors in 2014. This kind of effort raises awareness about CEDAW, provides a framework for community action⁸ and calls attention to the fact that the United States is one of a very small number of nations that has not ratified the treaty. Disappointed and/or angry that the US Senate has not ratified CEDAW, advocates hope this initiative will help lead to U.S. ratification.

As of May, 2018, twenty-five communities have passed a resolution⁹ and eight cities have passed an ordinance or two.¹⁰ Over 30 communities (e.g.,

within three years... Although Taiwan is not a signatory to the convention, the passage of the enforcement act makes its regulations effective as domestic law” (Taiwan Today 2017).

⁷ The Cities for CEDAW “campaign is spearheaded by the Women’s Intercultural Network (WIN), the NGO Committee on the Status of Women (NGO/CSWNY), the San Francisco Department on the Status of Women, and the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights.” (Och 2018a).

⁸ Some actions are taken within the community and others within city administration. For instance, Eric Garcetti (2015), the mayor of Los Angeles, California, “issued a directive for each city department or office to have a Gender Equity Liaison, established a Gender Equity Coalition and required each head of a city department/office to submit a Gender Equity Action Plan for the central inclusion of women and girls as part of the city’s CEDAW initiative” (Fritz 2018b).

⁹ Nugent (2002) provided the following definitions of a municipal ordinance and resolution: “A municipal ordinance is a rule, law or statute adopted by a municipal legislative body. A municipal ordinance generally means that a municipal act is adopted that has the force and effect of a law... Ordinances go into effect 30 days after adoption, unless they are enacted as an emergency ordinance. A resolution is a formal expression of the opinion or will of an official municipal body adopted by a vote... Resolutions go into effect immediately upon adoption.

¹⁰ Ordinances vary in length and complexity. Cincinnati, Ohio, for instance, passed two short ordinances; the first establishes a Mayor’s Task Force on Gender Equality and the second calls for a gender analysis.

cities, counties, states) “are making serious progress towards ordinances and resolutions” (Och 2018b:6).¹¹ While the national campaign is to get governments “to effectively implement CEDAW within their city, county and/or state to address barriers to full equality for women and girls” (Och 2018b:6) the cities’ efforts can look quite different. They could, for instance, focus on what is going on in city administration and/or the broader community; they can discuss and prioritize different topics; they may have – or not - a women’s department/commission as part of the city government; they may have a lot of government support or just enough to put this initiative in place; they may have varying degrees of grassroots support for this effort; they may – or may not – want CEDAW or the U.N. to be mentioned; and the local governments may see this as a continuing effort or one that would last for a rather short period (e.g., one or two years).

3. Levels of Intervention

Intervention refers to the creation of new systems as well as to the change of existing systems and this can include prevention or promotion (such as health promotion) activities.¹² Intervention can occur on one or more levels. Intervention levels (from individual through global)¹³ are depicted in Figure 1 as circles and without a hierarchy.¹⁴ While this chapter is about intervention at the local level (e.g., neighborhood, city, county, state), no intervention level (e.g., individual, small group, organization, local community, region, nation, international and/or world¹⁵) is assumed to be inevitably the most important one. Each situation needs to be viewed to determine the importance of each level and the interventions that are needed. Groups and individuals (usually in combination) can be the drivers of change at each level.

Local intervention, in a structurally conducive setting,¹⁶ usually will be more effective if it involves a number of levels. It is difficult for change to

¹¹ Current information about the resolutions and ordinances can be found at www.citiesforcedaw.org/resources

¹² This section is based on information found in three chapters by Jan Marie Fritz (2008, 2018a and 2018b).

¹³ Depending on the situation, more (e.g., regional) or fewer levels could be designated.

¹⁴ See Fritz “The Basics,” (2008:9-10).

¹⁵ The global (world) level refers to work done on a worldwide basis as well as to a time when other worlds may be involved with this world (Fritz 2014:5).

¹⁶ *Structural conduciveness*, in this instance, would be when a local community has the necessary authority, a good communication network and open administration which sets the stage for changes to be considered and implemented in the local community and in its subdivisions and/or its organizations (Fritz 2014:18).


occur if the political-economic-social setting is not open to that change and political will is not there to support action.

The UN Secretary-General (2012:8) stressed the importance of national action, but indicated this must be done in conjunction with work on other levels:

Governments retain the primary role for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their populations. At the same time, the crises of recent years have sharpened the focus of the international community on those threats that are beyond the control of any individual Government or Governments. These threats have highlighted the need for greater collaboration among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society and community-based actors.

Becoming a Community for CEDAW can open doors for greater collaboration and could increase the effectiveness and speed of change in a community.

Figure 1 - Levels of Intervention



4. The Road to Effective Intervention

The process of improving the situation of women and girls does not end with passing a resolution or ordinance; saying nice things about women and girls; agreeing to conduct a gender analysis; or establishing a gender equality committee or task force. The goal is the central inclusion and safety of women and girls. To get to that goal, a process needs to be put in place and supported by elected government officials. The road to getting government support may be easy (e.g., many of the city council members are women and have taken ownership and/or are strong supporters of this effort) or difficult (e.g., council members do not think there are problems facing women and girls or they think the problems are not severe enough to require special attention).

Based on my experience as a founder of a City for CEDAW Community Coalition and conversations with those who have put a Community for CEDAW initiative in place or are trying to do so, eleven points should be given early consideration in developing a program that can lead to effective intervention:

1. Identify needed community partners for a coalition. It is very important to look for partners in the community that will help get the government to move forward on this effort. In some communities, the major civil society organizations (CSOs) dealing with issues faced by women and girls are already talking. They can serve as the base for a coalition. In other communities, all the organizations are not easily identified. In that case, have a class of students or members of a community organization identify a list of possible coalition members. Find what those organizations are concerned about regarding the situation of women and girls by reading their websites and then interviewing leaders of the groups. Ask the leaders if their organizations would like to be involved in a coalition. As a City for CEDAW effort needs government action, make sure at least some coalition members easily “have the ears” of those who will vote on this initiative.

Not all organizations will have the same kind of interest in the issues or time to be involved in the coalition’s activities. Organizations should have room to decide whether they just want to be connected (hear what is going on) or be centrally-involved. In tobacco-control coalitions, for instance, often the major organizations in a community that are centrally concerned with tobacco-control (e.g., health care organizations with paid staff working on tobacco-control) provide the central leadership or staffing for the community effort. Another example (Fritz 1999) is the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), an environmental justice coalition that was formed in South Africa in

1992. The coalition had more than 550¹⁷ organizational members from different kinds of groups – “trade unions, women’s associations, youth groups, rural organizations, (and) religious groups”. This work even led to the formation of a coalition of civil society organizations in the Southern African region. While a very large number of groups were identified with the EJNF coalition, these groups were not all active in an intense way.

2. Emphasize a human rights basis for this effort. Cities for CEDAW is all about gender equality in a human rights context. The expectation is that basic human rights documents - such as CEDAW and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - will be strongly connected to the work in a local community.¹⁸ Some of those deciding on whether there will be a Cities for CEDAW initiative in their community may not be aware of or easily accept UN documents as basics. (One decision maker was initially opposed to this effort because he thought that CEDAW said abortion was acceptable. He needed to receive a copy of CEDAW and confirm that abortion is not mentioned.) Someone putting a City for CEDAW effort in place might need to just mention the UN documents in a preamble or introduction to the local effort and use other U.S. human rights documents as your starting point. The idea is not to forget to introduce at some point the UN work in connection to what is being done in the local community. For some communities, this will be the effort from the beginning; other communities may need more time.

3. Discuss girls as well as women. CEDAW, adopted in 1979, focuses on women; girls are mentioned only once in a discussion of female student drop-out rates. The 2016 U.N. Sustainable Development Goals include a gender equality goal (#5) and mention girls “explicitly in seven targets” (Albrechtsen 2018). A City for CEDAW effort should explicitly include girls. Years ago, a National Action Plan for women (based on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Women and Peace and Security) had a footnote when women were first discussed. The footnote said that any time the word women was used that girls were meant to be included. Many people do not read footnotes. Girls should be mentioned, in appropriate places, throughout a community’s documents (e.g., media releases, gender analysis, resolution, ordinance).

4. Look for and encourage political will. Political will, in which leaders prioritize the central inclusion and security of women and girls, is extremely important in change initiatives (Fritz 2018). Decision makers (e.g., council

¹⁷ Some have said there were 600 or 700 organizations that were coalition members at one time.

¹⁸ The effort also could be paired with an effort to become a Human Rights Cities. For more information see, for instance, Blau 2014; <https://www.pdhre.org/projects/hrcommunity.html> or <https://groups.google.com/a/ushrnetwork.org/forum/#!forum/hrcitieslist>

members) have to be the ones to put this initiative in place. You need to find one or more champions to make this happen. In one city, for instance, the mayor (the top elected officer in the community) did not have a vote, but used her friendly efforts with each council member to get someone to put this issue forward and others to vote for it. (The mayor's bargaining chip with the person who agreed to sponsor the issue was that the mayor would personally contact all the other council members to get the needed votes. The mayor did this enthusiastically.... and successfully.) In some other cities, members of the city's coalition have been very helpful. In one city, the new co-chairs of the city coalition were chosen, in good part, not only for their enthusiasm for this effort but because one had been a donor to many of those on council (and could easily talk with them) and the other used to work for the city administration at a high level. It is important for those running the initiative to remember that coalition members and those with political will need to have as much information as possible to help convince decision makers to start and continue this effort.

5. Consider developing "right-sized," appropriate basic drafts of documents. If a community is starting a City for CEDAW effort or is further developing what it has been doing, reviewing documents [e.g., media releases, resolutions, ordinances, gender analyses, executive orders, reports, requests for research proposals (RFPs)] developed by other communities can be very helpful. This process allows you to think about what you would like to do... or not do. A coalition also needs to decide what kind of draft (e.g, complete draft; drafts of options; draft of points to be covered) would be helpful in their community. They also need to think about who should be involved in the drafting committee. For instance, should one or several government representatives be involved in the drafting and at what stage. If a draft is not provided to government representatives, the effort may go in unexpected directions and the government representatives who took the time to draw up the draft may now think they have the best way to do things and are not open to changes.

6. Provide adequate financing. In the beginning of the Cities for CEDAW effort, there was some advice about what needed to be in an ordinance (e.g., conduct a gender analysis, have a community or community/government group that would monitor progress). One of the other suggested requirements was that there be guaranteed financing, and a formula was even suggested that would set the amount based on the number of women and girls in the community.

Many communities may struggle with setting a definite financial allocation because of a number of reasons such as (a) a report needs to be submitted before discussing allocation, (b) a bad economic situation in the community

and/or (c) competing demands for a limited amount of money. Some communities will find sufficient funds and may do so whether financing is part of the ordinance or not. Communities also may raise funds to support an initiative. One city, for instance, made sure that the government had a definite amount allocated, but also raised funds (much of this was done by Coalition members) to have enough money to fund a Gender Analysis.

There also probably will be an additional cost to conduct a gender analysis. While an analysis might be done by a government department (or departments) and funded through the existing budget, a community-wide project might be seen as too big of an undertaking for a department. The size of the budget for the study will be determined in part by available resources, the scope of the project and the size of the community. One community put an ordinance in place thinking that a government office would do the gender analysis and costs would be covered by the department's current budget. Others have allocated, for instance, \$20,000 - \$25,000. In one case the initial allocation was to hire a half-time coordinator for the initiative and that person, after studying the situation, would submit a budget request for the study. [About \$40,000 was allocated and that higher amount may be because a Request for Proposal (RFP) approach was going to be put in place.] Some communities have used an RFP to look for organizations to do the gender analysis, while other have not issued an RFP and used local organizations to do the studies.

7. Put an Advisory Committee/Task Force in place. Communities are advised to put some kind of advisory committee or task force in place (at the highest level possible) even if there is a government department focused on women and girls. Communities need to think about what kind of group they want to have and about the length of terms. One community decided their advisory group members should represent certain sectors of the community (e.g., a person representing the community coalition that initiated the drive to make the community a CEDAW city, someone who represents labor, someone who represents migrants). Some communities want a number of government representatives on the committee and others want only one or two. There can be reasons for the different strategies. The advisory board members can (to varying degrees) set priorities and timelines, assess the evolving funding situations; provide updates and media plans for the decision makers and the public and, most importantly, plan for community monitoring of the process and the outcomes. Committee members should have staggered terms and so initial appointments might differ in that they are, for instance, one, two or three-year appointments.

8. Conduct a Gender Analysis. A community should know what kind of reports have been already conducted concerning the women and girls in the community. This will help determine if a new general analysis is needed and,

if so, what needs to be covered. It also is very important that the community representatives look at other communities' gender analyses to discuss what they would like to do in their own community.

The existing analyses are quite different; for instance, they can have different areas of focus. One, for instance, is starting its work mainly by looking at a city administration while others have some information about city administration, but focus more on the community. A community might plan to do a general report every so often and focus on specific areas in different years. The analysis should determine what data are available for consideration and what needs to be provided in the future; it also needs to see to what extent gender budgeting is in place. It is important that a gender analysis not only cover what needs improvement; it should provide information and analysis about what is going well.

A gender analysis can be conducted by a local government department (or departments), a local research group or an outside group. The group selected to do the research might be invited to do this work based on existing knowledge about the research group or responses to a Request for Proposal (RFP). There are different reasons that lead to the choice of a research team. These reasons might have to do with a track record for doing this kind of work, the amount of available funding, political considerations and/or the desire to have the work done by those in the community or a group with no ties to the community.

9. Have short-term and long-term goals. Government representatives and the community need to see periodic reports about what is being done and see some improvements. If only long-term goals are chosen, the government representatives and the public may not feel the time and money invested in this effort are worthwhile. It is important, then, to choose some goals which can be accomplished well and in a short time as well as other goals which may be difficult and require long-term commitments.

10. Look for opportunities to use the different levels of intervention to support this initiative; Those who are initiating Cities for CEDAW activities should periodically discuss intervention levels. The chart of intervention levels provided in this chapter could be helpful when discussing what is being done at the different levels. The levels of intervention for any project may need to change over time in order to make the project more effective.

11. Establish an up-to-date website. While there are many ways that should be considered to provide information to the public, I will only discuss websites here. There are a number of choices to consider regarding websites. One choice is to have no website as the community does not have the resources to have one or to keep it up-to-date. It may be that both of these problems can be addressed. For instance, the community government may offer a place on

the government website. Some may find this fine, while others might want to also have a website through the community coalition. It may be that one of the coalition members would agree to host a website that might be open to different kinds of conversations. However the website is established, it absolutely has to be up-to-date and monitored. It can be an excellent way to let the government representatives (and their staff) know what is going on and to provide information to and from the public. In addition to providing information about the work connected to the community's effort, the website can list resources, have a section with answers to frequent questions, provide important links as well as information about relevant community events. There needs to be discussion about how questions will be answered by those who visit the website. (One government website outside of the U.S. allowed comments but was not monitored correctly; information was showing up on the site that was not at all appropriate.) Just as a website has to be up-to-date, those responsible for the website need to find a way to quickly respond to questions from the public.

Conclusion

The central inclusion of women and girls is among the world's most important topics. This chapter has covered some of the basics in regard to beginning and developing a City for CEDAW initiative that can support international efforts for change. The main points learned are that there is no "one right way" of moving forward, but there are some general considerations (11 are listed here) that might be discussed before a community initiative is put in place as well as during the different stages of development. Working effectively on a local level can improve the prospects for a national or international initiative to be successful.

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8. Globalization, Policy, Territory. A Postcolonial Analysis

by Antonietta Cammarota, Valentina Raffa *

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to deal with the political effects of what Bauman defined “Liquid Modernity”, focusing on the transformations regarding policies and territories in consequence of globalization processes.

To this purpose, we are going to use a method of analysis inspired to a postcolonial perspective based on the deconstruction of Western thinking (leading to a monolithic and ethnocentric vision of the world) and that proposes new perspectives which, coming from colonial and cross-breed cultural experiences, open new theoretical interpretations and social practices through which societies reorganize their daily life.

After some theoretical analysis, we are going to dwell on the analysis of a case study of the political-administrative organization of indigenous communities in the Mexican state of Oaxaca and of the relations among institutions, territories and local communities in consequence of the radical transformations that globalization processes are causing.

1. Policy and Territory in Liquid Modernity

In Bauman’s words, referring to modernity as “liquid” also implies the “conviction that change is the only permanent thing and that uncertainty is the only certainty”. Therefore, *Liquid Modernity* indicates an age where society and its structures undergo a process of “fluidification”: in consequence of global phenomena, any entity moves from its solid state to a liquid state, losing its clear and defined outlines. Acting exactly as fluids - that do not have their own shape but adjust to that of their container - also classic categories produced by modernity (from the concepts of place, borders, identity,

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to the ones of politics, territory, economy, etc) keep on transforming and their shape is constantly redefined by what happens. These multiple transformations affecting human condition today, as Bauman wrote in his essay “Globalization: the human Consequences”, are now commonly indicated with the term “globalization” and can be included in the sentence “time and space compression”.

Globalization divides while joining. If on the one hand a new kind of economy, finance and information is arising at a global level, on the other, a process of localization imposing spatial constraints is taking place. The close interconnection between these two processes brings about a huge gap in life conditions of entire populations and of segments within single populations. For some people globalization means the achievement of freedom, for some others instead, it implies a reduction in their own local dimension; some of us, according to what Bauman said, become global in the true sense of the term, acquiring the main values of late modernity like mobility for example, others are trapped in their being local, bowing to rules imposed by “global ones” (being “local” in a globalized world is a sign of inferiority).

Polarization among “global” élites and “localized people” becomes more radical and concerning as the first group represents the extraterritorial centre where meanings and values without local constraints are produced but which have the claim to be universal. As this polarization is based on a different freedom of movement, gains several dimensions. For example, the new centre attributes different meanings to ancient gaps between rich and poor, nomadic and sedentary, normal and abnormal or criminal.

In his essay “Globalization: the Human Consequences”, Bauman analyses different ways in which aspects of this polarization tangle and are mutually affected.

In this essay we will concentrate on the following: 1) the independence gained by global élites thanks to local political and cultural powers in controlling territories; 2) the forms of constitutions and self-government that local communities have been able to give themselves within the framework of globalization of economy, finance and information. In particular it’s interesting to look at the difference between the space where decisions are made and institutionalized and the universe in which the necessary resources to make these very decisions are produced, distributed and implemented.

1) élites’ extraterritorial feature arises from a reset from zero of space and time through cyberspace reshaping the space of modernity. This concept used to be solid and impenetrable, formed by a hierarchy of wide territories controlled by the State (supra-local entity), the new social space is composed of elements without a spatial dimension inscribed in a temporal instantaneity. With new technologies, in particular with internet, space and time

distances have no longer a meaning and local place, separated by distances, lose their meaning as well. Bauman wrote (1999, p. 22): “it happens today that some can leave freely their local places [...] while other are instead looking desperately at the fact that the only place they really belong to and live in, is disappearing under their feet”. “Mobile” élites’ power is losing its physical form; it becomes incorporeal and is mainly expressed in the form of financial power, it is extraterritorial and sets its privileged members free from any relation with local territories which, on the contrary, are progressively reduced to physical space and deprived of their social meaning (transferred in the cyberspace). Elites need to be isolated and protected by any interference, translating this in safety policies for people and their houses.

Urban territories, structured upon the logic of safety and control, are transformed into a battlefield for space: those who can’t afford security costs to maintain their own safety are cut off from common areas. Common areas then become *off limits* to them, to which they often react with acts of aggression in the effort to make their claims upon the territory visible but then these are seen and stigmatized as subversive of the public order.

2) Bauman wrote, a State is the set of rules and regulations that can transform chaos in order; that subject then can “keep things under control”. As Weber defined it, the State created by modernity is set as the entity holding the monopoly of the means of coercion and of their use on the territory where it is sovereign, through its bureaucratic and hierarchical apparatus. Sovereignty of the State was based on three pillars: economy, military apparatus and culture. It is working on these pillars that, according to Bauman, globalization determined the crisis of the Nation-State, transforming it in a Weak-State. The first pillar to have broken was the economy: global financial markets imposed their laws to the entire planet and states no longer have neither the strength nor the freedom to stand their pressure, completely losing control on economy. Their function today is limited to the one of a local police station favouring maintenance and reproduction of the new “world disorder”.

2. Postcolonial studies

The upcoming of globalization has reinforced the idea that political, historic and cultural debate is based on the relation between tradition and modernity. Gramsci, and later Said (1999), who was one of the first voices of the postcolonial debate, understood that, on the contrary, the point is the relation between the dominating and the oppressed part of the world. Chambers wrote (2006) “by acknowledging resistance, deviance, drift, alternatives and refusal, some new powers are identified, trying to set and fight with all the

possible means common, or hegemonic, sense of the world we live in". In this sense we should interpret the movements against globalization (No-Global Movement, Occupy Wall Street) or the farmers movement Sem Terra, born in Brazil in 1984, that occupied the land in its fight for agrarian reforms and against multinationals' neoliberal power, or also those social movements fighting to defend local territories from exploitation and expropriation from both economic and political powers (in Italy No Tav, No Muos, No Ponte movement ...).

Postcolonial studies, born in the 70's thanks to thinkers coming from ex colonies countries and formed in European universities, are based on the need to analyze the relation of subordination of colonized people in comparison to ruling classes, the colonizers, starting from claiming the acknowledgement of their subjective values and of their voices silenced by history. Their target break with the Eastern thinking, developing a new way to interpret the world starting from the effects that Western colonialism produced on it and to create the category of cross-breed to define the relation with the other, diverting from the myth of Western superiority. Postcolonial studies unveil the difficult and heterogeneous feature of late modernity, which can no longer be read through a single point of view.

Notwithstanding this, it's fundamental to consider that when we talk about "oppressed people" we don't refer to a unique subject and that, although colonial identities are concepts and not facts (Fanon 1962), subjects are always agents in the process through which identities are formed (Loomba 1998). Therefore, as Spivak underlined, people's own oppression must be testified by an act of taking up responsibility, in order to avoid it being manipulated (Siebert 2012). In this passage we can find the whole influence represented by Gramsci whose theory of hegemony represented a pillar for postcolonial studies. It is power hegemony, achieved through coercion and approval, this very last obtained through ideology. For Gramsci subjects embody ideas and practices of the colonial ruling and transform them. Consequently, colonial power created in local population an élite which reproduced its perverse logics on its own people, giving life to a process defined as "internal colonialism" which has radicalized violence and exploitation and marginalization of the weakest ones.

Every cultural ruling has created its own representation of the Different. Said's main work, *Orientalism* (1978), aims at demonstrating how a certain representation of Eastern World in European literature, in travel writing, has acted as an ideological *aparatus* to legitimize Western colonial power. In other words, mystified representation of the non- Western cultures has the purpose to create confusion between ideology and objectivity, therefore, to falsify understanding. Opposition between Western and Eastern World,

through language, literature, culture, according to Said, has been fundamental to self-define European as civilized and progressed population. If on one hand Said's work has stimulated the creation of a debate among postcolonial thinkers about the fact that he reads colonial ruling through Foucault's category of power, leaving little space to possible forms of resistance or dispute, on the other hand it's undeniable that *Orientalism* has contributed to create awareness on the ways colonial power works and therefore has inspired different attempts to enlist and tell experiences of all those who were hidden by History (Loomba, 2006). Where do these voices and these stories take place?

Postcolonial studies find themselves still trapped in a tense debate between thinkers influenced by Foucault's post-structuralism, according to which subjects have their purpose in the oppressive structures of power, and those who, inspired by Gramsci's commitment in social change, believe in the force of the subject-agent; between thinkers according to which postcolonial thinking is just the result of a Western -raised elitist *intelligentsia* "building the Different" through "first world" post-structuralist language and those considering it vanguardist about the possibility to deconstruct official History stories (Loomba 2007). As Loomba pointed out, the solution to this controversy is probably in the "fertile tension" between both positions, defined by Mallon (1994): a tension willing not to deny contradictions but, at the same time to make postcolonial studies "flexible" and open to new interpretations of our present starting from a new way to read the past. However, what is sure, is that this must take place by the main acknowledgment of the existence of different forms of "oppression" that for centuries have been present in traditional stories; different forms of differences (of class, sex, skin...) between "colonized", each one connected with another. No analysis about the condition of oppression can ignore this acceptance.

3. National powers, local authorities and indigenous communities. Reflections from a study in the Mexican state of Oaxaca

The problem of how local communities can access decision-making processes and influence policies that affect their territories, has been the subject of intense debate for several years in Italy (Donati, 1993; Bobbio, Pomatto, 2007; Colozzi, 2012; Della Porta, Piazza, 2008; Torrigiani, 2009; Lazzari, 2004; De Nardis, 2014). Participation is certainly increasing in contemporary western democracies (Moini, 2012; Lorenz, 2010) and elsewhere.

The participatory turn that informed the theories and practices of democracy dates back to 1990s, both in countries with consolidated representative democracy and in countries recently liberated from authoritarian regimes

(Dryzek, 2000). If in the first case democratic practices were aimed at the production of ameliorative forms of collaborative governance (Newman et al., 2004), in the latter they served the very consolidation of these representative democracies; a “democratization of democracies,” as Sousa Santos puts it (2005), whose goal was to ensure greater social and economic equality and reducing poverty (Gaventa, 2007). Since then, alongside traditional forms of participation based on political representation and vote, new forms of participation are propagating and turning into institutions: citizens become active in policy making to address the needs of their communities.

Participation acquires a new face and differentiates itself from the form of participation that developed since the late 1960s, aimed at rebalancing power relations that were influenced by the authoritarianism of educational, productive and social institutions, while calling for greater social equality (Moini, 2012). New participatory practices do not concern only the relationship between politics and society; they do not intervene solely on the system of political-institutional regulation: they are part instead of the complex relationship between politics, economics and societies in which politics play an increasingly residual role.

The participation models of the late 1960s and those beginning to emerge from the 1990s differ substantially. However, according to Moini’s analysis (2012) which we here adopt, these two models have something in common – albeit with different developments – namely the fact that the moment in which they spread coincides with the transformations of capitalism: from modern capitalism to the advanced capitalism in the late sixties, and from the latter to the global capitalism that took hold since the Nineties.

In the first case, in the 1970s the crisis of the industrial production and its institutional reproduction mechanisms, such as welfare systems, began. The state continued to maintain its role as social and economic regulator, but different collective identities – heterogeneous and strongly cohesive – requested to be involved in the political and institutional decisions in various areas of public life, including the economy. In Italy, these were the years of the labor struggles that challenged the economic-industrial model and the working world.

In the second case, since the 1990s, the globalization of the economy favors capital mobility and causes the deterritorialization of production. Global economic competition is increasingly linked to the choices of local systems (Trigilia, 2005) and territories become the central subjects around which instances of participation develop. In this case, they do not arise from social conflicts, but from opportunities created by political and institutional actors. They are characterized by technical structuring and involve not collective but

rather individual subjects (Costabile, Fantozzi, Turi, 2006; Gelli, 2007; Ruvo, 2008; Moini, 2012).

Furthermore, the profound transformations that globalization processes are producing in contemporary societies – not least the crisis of the authority of political institutions and classical actors such as political parties (Saccà, 2015), and the difficulty of citizens to influence neoliberal policies – call into question the necessity of reconsidering in a global context the issue of the relationship between citizens' needs and institutional policies. It may be useful to analyze the matter in non-Western socio-political contexts, such as indigenous ones, which show articulate political and administrative relationships between institutions and social actors. This would require taking distance from a Eurocentric view of politics and from an interpretation of it in absolute terms.

We will focus on a research carried out a few years ago, which could offer a suitable contribution to the reflection on participatory democracy, which has become central in the current international political debate and for the political agenda of local governments. Based on in-depth interviews, this research considers the political-administrative organization of some pueblos of the Mixteca region, in the Mexican state of Oaxaca. These are mountain and coastal villages inhabited by *mixteche* and *zapoteche* populations, some of them characterized by a system of offices appointed through elections and the mediation of political parties, others through the system of *usos y costumbres*. In the latter case, religious and political positions are assigned by the community during a general assembly and by raising hands; they are unpaid and mandatory, since theoretically they must be held in turn by all the inhabitants.

Adopting in-depth interviews as our research tool, we investigated some relevant thematic issues such as power, responsibility, community participation, collective interests, the relationship between local offices and national institutions, the role of political parties, conflict, community economy. The interviews were addressed to ten officers in charge, five women and five men, both in the pueblos that adopt *usos y costumbres* (Macuixóchitl, Magdalena Jaltepecnochiz, San Juan Copala, Santana del Valle, San Agustínillo) and in those based on “political parties” (Chalcatongo). As anticipated, respondents are of *mixteca* and *zapoteca* origin and live in mountain and coastal pueblos. Two privileged witnesses – scholars and experts of indigenous cultural heritage – were also interviewed. To achieve a more effective participant observation, we also attended the parties and assemblies in which community decisions were taken.

We will reconstruct the organization and operation of the political-administrative structures of pueblos as a useful contribution to the reflection on the

relationship between different levels of power and the relationship between politics and participation. We will focus our attention on the relationship between national powers, local authorities and indigenous communities and how this relationship affects institutions, governmental reforms and the instances of community tradition.

As we will see, the difficulty of creating a dialogue between these two levels could at least be partly resolved by allowing the local elites to manage the variability of the political demand, by introducing adjustments and administering them once established as institutions.

3.1. Analytical tools and possible reading keys

The problematization of the relationship between the modernization processes and the so-called traditional cultures represents a possible theoretical framework for our analysis. Traditional cultures are often constricted within two opposing images: one represents them as backward and passive, belonging to the past (Fabian, 1983), another places them in a different dimension, a primordial and nostalgic paradise that the West has lost due to modernization (Said, 1993; Geertz, 1999). In both cases, we face both the denial of co-evalness (Fabian, 1983) – the ethnocentric practice of denying that other cultures share global contemporaneity – and the colonial idea that “the Other” is lagging behind a dominant modern western culture.

This perspective is functional to the politics of exclusion of indigenous peoples from the right to self-determination and sovereignty on the territories they inhabit and their resources.

Postmodernity emerges as a space of conflict between homogenization processes that point towards a single cultural model, and cultural resistances that claim “tradition” as a crucial element of their present and future. The issue is how this tension is solved.

In our case, this implies understanding how indigenous political organizations shaped and developed when forced to confront the modernizing instances of the nation-state.

Eisenstadt (1997) provides a perspective that does not interpret the matter merely in terms of native cultures that obliterate themselves when facing homologation to a single cultural model.

According to Eisenstadt, modernity is a plurality of models expressing themselves by coming into contact with the social specificity of the different Western and non-Western contexts.

In societies embedded in processes of modernization, local élites receive only partly the cultural premises of the Western cultural program, through a

process of selection and interpretation. The aim is not to be excluded from the global system without being totally absorbed.

From the interaction between the way cultural premises, historical experiences and modernity affect local societies, some new cultural models arise.

The case study which we are going to talk about seems to respond to a similar mechanism. The structure of the particular social and political organization of the communities studied, called *sistema por usos y costumbre* (*customs and traditions-based system*) arose from a compromise between indigenous tradition and processes of modernization of which Nation-State is a symbol. This compromise requires that the social regulatory role of the State is limited in favour of a greater autonomy of the local indigenous groups in the management of the territory.

A good reading key to interpret this peculiar relation between Mexican State and Mixtec communities could be suggested by De Certeau's work "The invention of everyday" (2001). According to it, oppression by power and institutions is not static *a priori*, thanks to the micro-existences moving under macro-powers and achieve spaces of freedom through techniques born from daily practices.

A political-administrative organization inspired by the indigenous tradition inside a federal governmental structure can be read as an attempt by indigenous élites to put into practice strategies of autonomy and freedom from the central government's power.

This is particularly relevant if we take into account the governmental ruthless policy of nationalization since the republican constitution (1824) that produced devastating effects on the indigenous cultural identity and the sovereignty on their own territories (Cammarota, 1990).

Self-determination of these communities is based on a vision where policy is seen as the management of public affairs in the common interest, therefore on an idea very different from the Western one, as defined by Weber (1919) according to which policy was meant as the management (or the influence on the management) of a State.

The autonomy of the Mixtec communities is based on the principle of the *comunalidad* that defines native people's traditional life in the State of Oaxaca (Maldonado, 2010). Some of the main elements of *comunalidad* are: reciprocity based on *ayuda mutual* (*mutual help*); power in the hands of the community, represented by the General Assembly; willingness to serve the community for free, taking on onerous tasks; the defense of their own cultural and historical heritage.

Comunalid can be reproduced only in the community of belonging, that must be seen as a set of families linked one to another by principle of reciprocity (Maldonado, 2002).

It's important to specify that the presence of indigenous political organizations inside institutional structures does not take place without conflicts. The State aims at imposing its constraints through a system of administrative dependence (the municipalities), based on expropriation of communities' power through *caciques*, local élites. And furthermore, market economy tends to interfere on communities' local economies.

In the pre-colonial period the Mixtec region was a woody territory divided in different geo-political areas, each organized in one or more kingdoms with a lot of variations of the indigenous language (Jansen e Van Broekhoven, 2008). Every ancient kingdom was an independent entity, a nation with many resources, a refined civilization and a hereditary government. Important elements of the sovereign community were: reciprocity, community work and faith, actually still existing, even today. First the Spanish and then the Mexican Nation-State have violently imposed their colonial systems on this structure, radically transforming the indigenous social order.

The thesis is that in contemporary Mesoamerica, indigenous people try to combine their life style and intercultural Mexican State's needs, without asking for independence, but claiming autonomy (Grillo, Valladolid e Rengifo, 1993).

3.2. From political parties to usos y costumbres (customs and traditions)

Mixtec is a multicultural territory inhabited by people with different languages and cultures. It's divided in 9.000 communities (*pueblos*). We can define a community as a collective space belonging to all the inhabitants, in which every family has an urban land and a land to cultivate.

Pueblos are managed by *cargos civiles y religiosos*, officers elected to manage community life, each of them with a specific task.

There are two types of communities depending on the election system of the political offices: those in which political offices are elected through party system, and those where elections are based on the system *por usos y costumbres* (*customs and traditions-based system*) (69% of the communities).

In the first one, political parties check and affect the electoral system; in the second one, the whole gathered community (General Assembly) votes by show of hands the person considered skilled to be entrusted with a *cargo* (political office). The person elected is the one taking the highest number of votes. Any citizen of the *pueblo* can be elected.

The General Assembly, that is sovereign and acts in the common interest, is the basis of the organization of the community and it makes the system

similar to a form of direct democracy. It tends to decide unanimously, avoiding the conflict due to the difference of opinion and it's the space in which every citizen takes part in the management of public affairs.

Communities organized according to the system "por usos y costumbres" (*customs and traditions-based system*) are very small (which allows to meet in general assembly) and are characterized by a strong social control.

Those who take a *cargo* are forced to carry out the mandate for free and on behalf of the interest of the community. In the communities where there are political parties, elected candidates are remunerated.

An element arising from the investigation is the fact that communities *por usos y costumbres* (*customs and traditions-based communities*) are more fragmented due to the absence of an institutional policy.

As Maldonado (2010) underlines, any form of fragmentation breaks with the unity of the Assembly.

The electoral system *por usos y costumbres*, legally recognized by Oaxaca State in 1995, is an alternative model to the traditional one prescribed by the Mexican Constitution. It's a hybrid, a product of a constant revision connected to the change in the indigenous society when in contact with transformations of modern institutions.

Since the Thirties in every municipality the election of deputies, at local and federal levels, have constantly taken place in the framework of *Partido revolucionario institucional* (Pri) that directly controlled the electoral processes. The relationship between the State and indigenous communities was «characterized by patronage and corporativism» (Recondo, 2006: 7).

Thanks to the San Andrés Larraínzar agreement between the *Ejército zapatista de liberación nacional* (Ezln) and the federal government (16 February 1996) the idea of a constitutional reform for the rights of indigenous people began to be formalized. The State recognized to native people the right to choose their own municipal authorities according to their legislative and cultural system.

The federal constitutional reform was approved in 2001, but in Oaxaca State the policy of acknowledgement and incorporation of the costumes and tradition system (*usos y costumbres*) in the local electoral system took place in 1995 (Recondo, 2006).

Since then, 400 municipalities have elected their own representatives according to *usos y costumbres* system, without the interference of political parties. For the first time the political indigenous experience has been recognized by the Nation-State and accepted as an expression of local identity (Bartolomé, 1997). The first problem was the difficult co-existence in the same territory of two different legal systems: the local one for municipal

election based on the absolute value of the community (the right to vote depends on the participation in community works) and the conventional one for the governmental and federal election, based on the value of the person (the right to vote depends on the majority and the enrolment in electoral lists).

The legalization of the *usos y costumbres* in Oaxaca State has been object of a national debate between those who saw indigenous autonomy as the claim of a legitimate right and those who interpreted it as a form of institutionalization of the discrimination against indigenous people, and legacy of the Spanish political, religious and administrative system (Recondo, 2006).

Some readings underline the artificiality of this system (Bartolomé, 1997^a; Viqueira, 1995) and interpret it as a creation of the Spanish crown (Bartolomé, 1997^a).

Sierra (1997) writes that the overemphasis of the concept of community ended up justifying traditional practices in continuity with pre-Hispanic past. But it hides the risk to absolutize identity and not to consider it a product of social relations historically negotiated. According to her, interpreting *usos y costumbres* as legacy of the pre-colonial tradition could be counterproductive, as well as denying women the right to take part in political life because this has always been part of ancestral tradition (Peralta, 2005).

The point is that it is not possible to attribute more or less legitimacy to the position in favour of *usos y costumbres*. The results of the research allow us to say that both positions are well-founded and they depend on observers' point of view and their field of strength. Moreover, it sums up the complexity of the relation between different levels of power: the institutional one, and the local one (traditional powers).

Lastly, as Barabas (2006) writes, cultures are not immutable, but change in new forms. It means dealing with the old question: Do indigenous people take part in a changing world or are they excluded in defense of the purity of tradition?

3.3. Political offices

Before Spanish conquest, indigenous society was structured hierarchically, and ruling families were hereditary. Spanish transformed rulers in *caciques* and imposed the hierarchical system of *cargos* (*public offices*) (also called civil and religious offices) on the traditional political system living life to a political framework which, over the time, has undergone a series of institutional adjustments, parallel to the change of the colonial State in a first phase, and of a national State later.

Offices are divided in civil or religious (or traditional) ones and are organized according to a hierarchical structure. The first group manage relations between the community and all the political and social actors outside it, the second, since the colonial age, has been the one meeting the community's internal needs (education, health, public works...).

Both offices are for free and obligatory and can be taken in turn by all the community's members, following a logic according to which every citizen has the duty to cooperate for the good functioning of the community in everybody's interest.

Offices can vary in number and kind, depending on the size of the *pueblo*, and generally last three years. They are held both by men and by women, although these last ones have more difficulty both in striking a balance between family and public life and in being recognized in their role due to the *machismo* widespread in the culture of *pueblos* (Caballero, 2009).

Caballero (2009) wrote that in the community of San Antonio Huitepec, in the last forty years, only widows and single women have had the possibility to have some roles within the communitarian organization, suffering from a discriminatory treatment in comparison to male colleagues. Their tasks, in fact, are discussed by citizens' assemblies in their absence and they must limit themselves to do what the *pueblo* decided (Caballero, 2009).

Women's access to offices of the town government has always been limited and hindered, as they are considered vulnerable subjects and passive beneficiaries to which often the right of active citizenship in the political and social life of the community is denied. However, as pointed out by a study by Barrera-Bassols (2006), in the last twenty years the number of women committed in a public office has increased. According to the data used in this work (National system of municipal information) women *regidoras* (*rulers*), for example, passed from 12% in 1998 to 25% in 2004. There is still a big gap with men, though, especially regarding the highest and most prestigious offices. the 570 towns in Oaxaca in 2004 accounted for 11 women in the role of president, 9 in the role of mayor and 161 in the role of *regidora* (out of a total of 2.505) (Barrera-Bassols, 2006).

This data seems to be confirmed also by a 2010 research carried out in the town of Lachatao (Vázquez García, 2011): out of the 43 public offices more than half (26) were held by women, but only within committees dealing with common goods (*carguitos* -unimportant offices- as defined by one of the interviewed women). Offices of responsibility and prestige were, instead, of men's exclusive competence, a phenomenon that has been analyzed also in other municipalities studied (18 in total).

Indigenous women are victims of the social order which confines them at home, leaving them with just a reproductive function, far from freedom of

speech or of education, making the political arena a purely male space (Barrera-Bassols, 2006). Often female participation to community life is expressed by supporting husbands in their careers.

Barrera-Bassols (2006) identifies some causes that facilitate a greater access of women in municipality offices. First of all, the increasing migration of men from communities to big cities in Mexico and abroad, secondly a higher level of female schooling and women's access to the job market; lastly, the important social role developed by women in supporting families and their needs and their progressive adherence to democratic movements to fight against social marginalization and ethnic discrimination.

The difficult relation between *mujeres mixtecas* and political participation has been well summed up by the *presidente municipal* of Chalcatongo de Hidalgo, who highlights the difficulty of being at the same time worker and mother, apart from having to face prejudice by men and by the same women for which the only possible female role is family care-taker (Barrera-Bassols, 2006; Vázquez García, 2011).

Commonly, starting from 15 years old, a citizen of the *pueblo* who has demonstrated honesty and respect towards the community and towards the elderly, can access the office at the base of the pyramid: the so called *topil de la iglesia*. It is a supervisor having multiple functions, among which delivering messages, involving people to parties, carrying out all the activities indicated by the other officers.

Topil undergoes control, observation and evaluation by higher officers and his period in charge is an important testing moment to access higher levels. Taking the first *cargo* the person becomes *da'a ñuu*, that is «son of the *pueblo*» in Mixtec language, and as such, he has duties and rights towards the community. Throughout the time in charge as *topil* his family assists him, so that the young adult's behavior is impeccable. For the family taking higher positions in the political structure means social prestige and acknowledgment by the other members of the community.

Once he becomes 25, and after the positive feedback by the community, the young adult is ready to form a family and to take offices of greater responsibility. Once he takes the highest office (in most *pueblos* it is *presidente municipal*), the man can be part of the Elderly board (Caballero, 2009; Recondo, 2006), acquiring the *status* of «respectable person» (Cordero, 2001: 47-48).

The Elderly board, in some communities also called *cuerpo de caracterizados*, is the highest office in the community hierarchy. Its function is to give advice to authorities on issues of public interest before they are submitted to debate in the general assembly. the Elderly board has a strong moral

authority and it has also the function to save tradition, keeping it from interferences of factors of modernization. As Caballero explained, the Elderly people of the board are not defined like this because of their age, but because they are assumed to possess particular wisdom and «mental maturity».

Up to the 70's the board of the Elderly had a very strong power within municipalities. Today, instead, it is very weakened, keeping, in most cases, a formal structure. This is believed to be the consequence of the processes of modernization trying to affect the traditional structures of indigenous societies.

An interview with Tereso Mejiá Trinidad, *regidor de educación* of the municipality of Magdalena Jaltepec, gives us an example of communitarian political hierarchy.

At the first place there is the *presidente municipal*; then follows the *sindico municipal*; later the *regidor de hacienda y de educación*, next the *regidor de obras e de salud*; and lastly the *regidor eclesiástico y de vigilancia* (the person in charge of the organization of religious festivals).

Maldonado (2010) points out how this staircase structure is an «ideal» typical one and how it has undergone processes of alteration following some social transformations, first of all migrations from communities. It has become more and more flexible, so that it can happen that an office with more responsibility is given to those who never had minor offices in the hierarchical staircase.

Among different offices, an interesting function is the one of the butler, that is the person who deals with the organization of religious festival with the support of the festival committee.

He pays for all the expenses of the ceremony, including buying food and drinks, although some members of community contribute preparing some food. The function of butler falls into the spirit of communitarian reciprocity: in turn they must all perform this task.

Montes (1998) and Maldonado (2010) agree in considering religious festival as instruments through which the community expresses its identity and reinforces social links.

3.4. Policy and complexity

Carrying out functions in a common interest for free is legitimized by the fact of receiving, within a relation of reciprocity between the individual and the collectivity, the same quantity of resources that are necessary to live

(drinkable water, electricity, paved streets). When a resource is received, the single gives it back to the community as a service, as a performance in the interest of everybody. Therefore, he manages to consolidate his own community identity (Caballero, 2009).

This picture could seem idyllic if it were not for the fact that the acceptance of the office doesn't always take place willingly.

In some case prevails the wish to access the capitalist market outside the community, the will to carry out an activity allowing personal profits to improve the quality of family life. This aspect can be understood as a consequence of the social change characterizing the latest years of the communities (Spivak, 2002; Raffa, 2013; Aravena, 2014).

In the case in which somebody refuses to take an office attributed to him by the assembly, he's invited by authorities to think again about it.

This advice by authority is very important within the communitarian social context, as it endangers the social prestige of the individual and of his own family. A further denial would lead to a sanction and, in limited cases, to temporary prison.

Instead, in cases in which somebody doesn't work well showing irresponsibility towards the community, the General Assembly can take measures such as removing the person from office and putting him in a lower level of the hierarchical pyramid, with negative consequences on his social reputation.

The sovereign organ within the system is the communitarian assembly, which is composed by all members gathered in the community. It takes decisions on important issues of general interest and on offices' attribution.

An interesting criterium in the choice is the ability of the candidate to make public works and communitarian services. Also those who come from different *pueblos* can gain the same rights of the sedentary group by taking part in the communitarian works. Therefore, they can become part of the community.

Some other choosing criteria includes the person's behavior, his social conduct, education in case of the highest offices, a minimum of personal income allowing the individual to keep the family for the period in which he's been dealing with the communitarian service.

This aspect is connected to the need for a further reflection linked to the relation between native communities and their agency, the State and the Market.

In the latest years, Mexican policy has taken measures on territories inhabited by indigenous people, by imposing a development model based on exploitation of resources and workforce. Family from productive unity, where all members provide for their own needs, has become especially a nucleus «needing sale of workforce or marketing their production to meet their consumptions» (Maldonado, 2010: 43-44).

These new needs, together with the difficulty in finding decent working conditions can be considered as a cause of the strong migration processes obliging many persons to leave the communities of origin and to find minimal survival conditions as well, often helped by political parties or by the Catholic Church.

In the 80's regional ethnical organizations formed both by municipality authorities and by young people were born, to protect the environment and natural resources.

Environmental policies implemented by national and local élites, linked to processes of modernization and the need to access to the international system (Eisenstadt, 1997), generated radical conflicts with indigenous organizations, inspired by a cosmovision trying to resist the model of capitalistic development, even if with great difficulties.

The issue connected to the relation between the State and the indigenous communities, could therefore be understood in the light of a difference of powers but also within a different conception of power.

On the one hand there is the governmental dimension, using a legitimate force (Weber, 1922); on the other hand, the indigenous one, that as underlined in the interviews, has the faculty -attributed by authorities- to make decisions legitimated by the General Assembly with the only purpose of the common good. It would be more correct to talk about authority, as on the other hand the *suplente del agente municipal del municipio* of San Mateo Macuilxòchitl points out: "it's something that you receive from your pueblo, a recognition and a kind of bond of trust".

3.5. Reciprocity and the communitarian management of common good

«I'm part of the community and the community is part of me: all and every citizen support it and the community protects everybody, everyone in the same way. Going against it is like going against everybody, therefore against the very same people» (Cardoso de Oliveira, 2004: 66).

This is the relation connecting the community to the principle of reciprocity that, together with the institution of gift and the principle of redistribution of resources represented the basing element in pre-Hispanic society.

The studies of Malinowski (1922), Mauss (1924), Lévi-Strauss (1955) and Polanyi (1974) have contributed to their formulation in relation to the social bonds.

In pre-Hispanic societies in exchange for the attribution of land (necessary for family's sustenance), every person had to contribute to the collective

interest with goods and services (like with the construction of public buildings or of public roads).

Reciprocity meant symmetrical relations where «economic duties meant somebody else's ones in a mutual exchange of giving and receiving» (Wachtel, 1997: 84).

At the level of community, therefore, the organization was peer. This co-existed with a kind of hierarchical organization at the level of the empire, according to which the lands given by the Inca to the community, were paid back to the Inca in the form of labour. Redistribution meant asymmetrical relations between groups. The Spanish replaced this system with one based on the payment of tributes in money which did not include the mutual exchange, totally transforming the system.

Today the communitarian work in the social-political context of the *pueblos* in Mixtec represents a real form of social organization and it mainly consists in *tequio* and in *ayuda mutua*, strategies through which the community faces the expenses of building schools, roads, public buildings (Caballero, 2009).

Tequio is a form of collective operation to create works that are useful to the community (water, electricity, roads and other needs). The *ayuda mutua* is a team work made to benefit somebody and then is given back. For any job a committee is elected whose function is to coordinate and supervise the activities. Due to the transformations of the indigenous society in the latest decades, especially linked to the entry of money as means of exchange and to the paid work, the use of *tequio* is less and less used.

Although indigenous communities start to be exposed to social stratification in connection with market economy, mutual help continues to exist as far as labour is concerned, in events linked to cycle of life, festivals, public and sacred dimensions (Barabas, 2006).

Municipal work is often financed by emigrant's remittances. The increasing of emigration rates from *pueblos* to Mexican or American big cities following the current processes of globalization, has changed the structure of communities both in terms of democracy (because in the villages remain only younger and older people) and both in terms of being more open to the global market. For example, there are a lot of business activities started by immigrants who came back to the community linked to a global economy (cd shops, hot dogs, hamburgers) (Appadurai, 2001; Giddens, 1994). The communitarian system seems to be characterized by a double economy: the communitarian one and the capitalistic one.

3.6. Some concluding reflections

The analysis of the indigenous activities of self-organizations in some *pueblos* of the Mexican State of Oaxaca can contribute to the contemporary analysis of the new ways of accessing decision-making processes by local communities in time of globalization.

It can highlight a relation among national, local powers and indigenous communities that shows the difficulty to give priority to the communitarian instances over the governmental reforms and the adaptations of the indigenous system to the request made by the State of Oaxaca and by the central State.

For sure, the coexistence between a local management of land, inspired by an indigenous culture that responded to communitarian needs, and a governmental administration trying to maintain its control on territories, inspired by a western political model, is in constant conflict. The same *usos y costumbres* system seems to be considered, according to some witnesses' opinion, an instrument to hide conflicts in the relations within the community, characterized by games of power.

Before the Spanish conquest the indigenous system in Mixtec was hierarchical but characterized by the principle of reciprocity: farmer received by the lord the right to own a piece of land in order to receive support for it, in exchange of his labour (Galera Isidoro, 1992).

The violent encounter with western modernity through the Spanish conquest transformed the system by eliminating the principle of redistribution and reciprocity with the central power, and by making the movement of goods and services from the community to the Spanish one-way, without obliging them to give nothing in exchange (Wachtel, 1997; Hobsbawm, 2016).

Indigenous communities had to face a colonial system which didn't guarantee their autonomy and that impoverished them by imposing fees on lands.

With the creation of the Nation-State, indigenous communities were absorbed within the central political organization, typically modern, western and characterized by patronage logics.

Only the intervention of the Zapatist movement in the 90', following the claims of the rights of the indigenous people against policies of exclusion, allowed the acknowledgment of the system *por usos y costumbres* by the State of Oaxaca.

The participation of the communities to the collective life was, again, a moment of resolution of the tensions between powers.

Although the situation of these communities is ambiguous and difficult, it must be said that participation to communitarian life, based on principles

of obligatory and reciprocity, is inspired to a vision according to which the value of community is strong in comparison to the value of the individual. It's probably a cosmovision (Baldini, Zago, 2014) that does not belong to Western culture and where common goods are linked to everybody's responsibility and where the land is a sacred value.

Differently from the European world where the service to the community is commonly recognized as an economic service and where social links are weaker due to the individualism that is typical of organizations where the division of labour is highly specialized (Durkheim, 1893), in that of the *pueblos por usos y costumbres* it's more subjected to communitarian constraints.

If in the western world tasks are distributed in a hierarchical structure, in *pueblos* they are distributed, in turn, among inhabitants.

A model like this, with its history and its peculiarities – that are difficult to reproduce in a big sized society - can inspire some useful inputs to contribute to the debate on the changing modalities of political participation in contemporary western society, whose forms are yet unclear.

Some analysis (Bobbio, Pomatto, 2007) seem to underline that not always participative practices bring with them a full empowerment capacity or are able to limit the self referenciality of political-administrative dynamics. Some others, on the contrary, interpret those new participative practices as instruments of stabilization of the neo-liberal process (Moini, 2012; Vitale, 2007).

What is sure is that in the Western world, as in the whole neoliberal world, citizenship has been progressively deprived of real political power, while the élite's power has grown, and the élites now manages social dynamics within a global economic system which is commoditizing the environment, privatizing the services and limiting the public space (Graeber, 2007).

In this sense the participation of the communities to policies implemented in different territories becomes a great opportunity to gain spaces of sovereignty and of resistance. Which form or which forms should this participation take in order be more effective on institutional and global market decisions it's still matter for debate.

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9. Changing Military Culture(s) in the Hybrid Peace-Support Operations (PSOs) Era

by Michele Negri*

1. Diffusion in the space of the security question: global security and new threats in the postmodern era

The purpose of this essay is to describe and explain the changes that are occurring in the organizational culture of the Italian Armed Forces as a result of interorganizational imitation, organizational learning or interorganizational learning. The theoretical framework is mainly in the field of security sociology, military sociology and organization sociology. The keywords of the analysis are military culture, organizational and inter-organizational learning, diffusion (in its many meanings) and specialization, super-organizations and totalizing adhocracy, and complexity (with regard both to the soldier of complexity and to the soldier in complexity).

Talking about security as a general concept, we can say that postmodern society is increasingly struggling to protect its citizens against classical (such as accidents and diseases, unemployment, social security, disability) and new generation risks (whether actual or just perceived as such): industrial, technological, ecological, natural, health or food related risks, just to mention a few examples. According to Andreatta (2014, pp.7-9¹), a threefold definition of the concept of security is useful for an effective analysis of the phenomenon. The three fundamental aspects are the following:

1. *security issues related to technological development* (threats may come from an ever-expanding range of subjects, not only states, as a result of disseminating technological knowledge and tools availability: new theatres (space, cyberspace) (risks related to dependence on critical infrastructures, risk of militarization of space), non-conventional and mass destruction weapons (with the adoption, on the one hand, of

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¹ N.B.: my translation.

political and legal instruments of non-proliferation and disarmament and, on the other hand, with arms sales less and less strategically oriented) and also technological and instrumental changes in the field of security;

2. *subnational or transnational actors* (threats may come from an ever-expanding range of subjects (not only states, as a result of disseminating technological knowledge and tools availability: new theatres (space, cyberspace) (risks related to dependence on critical infrastructures, risk of militarization of space), non-conventional and mass destruction weapons (with the adoption, on the one hand, of political and legal instruments of non-proliferation and disarmament and, on the other hand, with arms sales less and less strategically oriented) and also technological and instrumental changes in the field of security;

3. *non-state actors as subjects to be protected* (regarding economical dangers (energy sources and resources), dangers related to the protection of the environment (not only climate, but also nutrition and health, with particular regard to the spread of infectious diseases) and also social dangers (economic migration, refugees, etc., and the need for reconciliation between access control and its safeguard, if related to human rights protection). Security encompasses not only state invulnerability, but it is also necessary to assess the security of society - societal security – or of individuals - human security. in this sense, the state could be considered not just as the guarantor of security on a particular territory, but also as part of the problem in case, for example, of an active use of military and police apparatus against the population (Andreatta, 2014, pp.7-9²).

Andreatta also underlines that

the enemies that threaten the security of a state are other states, criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, and so on (enemies of many states). Nowadays it is not the number of planes or ships you have that can affect counter-terrorism or the fight against mafia. Both the goals and the modes of war have changed in the contemporary era. So Armed Forces need both to be less strong, concentrated and visible (also for deterrence goals) and more branched, widespread, invisible. The main subnational or transnational social actors in the security field are:

- Armed Forces (national and multinational),
- Homeland Security organizations,
- Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,
- Ngo's and Volunteers organizations,
- Private Security organizations (logistics, armed surveillance, intelligence, etc.) (Andreatta, 2014, pp.7-9³).

Considering the issue of diffusion, in the postmodern era the phenomenon certainly concerns the “threatening states”, because “the strongest states have

² N.B.: my translation.

³ N.B.: my translation.

been traditionally considered a threat to international security, but nowadays there has been a shift in the international scenario as the main dangers come instead from the weakest states and their inability to control territories can offer sanctuary to violent organizations” (Andreatta, 2014, pp.7-9⁴). In this context, “states will continue to respect each other’s borders for most purposes, but the range of issues deemed purely domestic shrinking. Militaries will work increasingly with one another, either side by side in combined operations or as part of the same military unit” (Williams, 2000, p. 275).

In a similar way, in the current historical era there is an extension of the sense and impact, and of the experience and perceptions regarding insecurity and of the related expectations of security. This topic will be discussed in the following paragraph, which also analyzes the sociological use of the concept of diffusion.

2. Security cursor and insecurity diffusion

The oversensitivity towards security risks leads to a continuous and endlessly frustrated pursuit of the total security myth, which is, by definition, doomed to failure. According to Castel (2011), “when the most substantial risks seem to be averted, the sensor monitoring risk sensitivity moves up and new dangers emerge. But today this sensor is set so high that it produces a totally unrealistic demand for security”. Hence, the *risk culture* creates dangers. Consistently with emerging security feelings, people demand security anywhere, anytime, in public and in private contexts. The demand is not necessarily addressed to and satisfied by public institutions but is also addressed to and satisfied by associations and other kinds of private organizations, because an effective response must be partly extra-institutional and partly extra-professional (also through technological tools). These dynamics can be analyzed from the perspective of social diffusion.

Given the “lack of diffusion” of the concept of diffusion in the sociological literature, an analysis of the possible meanings of it seems appropriate, before addressing the question of its use in the field of defense and security.

The concept of diffusion is typically sociological (but it has some analogies with the diffusionist theories even though it doesn’t share their ideological matrix) as well as anthropological and it’s related to the so-called “cultural contamination” (which emerged in the late nineteenth century, when it was long criticized, but which was re-evaluated in the age of globalization). The modern era is characterized by the emergence and strengthening of specialized roles

⁴ N.B: my translation.

alongside with or in place of those (diffused) typical of the pre-modern era.

In some areas this specialization is also professionally characterized. Nowadays this trend is still partially present, but we have also to underline the comeback of disseminated activities and roles. This is basically due to various diffusion processes which, on the one hand, have led to the resurgence of *non-specialized roles* and, on the other, have encouraged the emergence of poorly specialized roles and of roles requiring highly specialized skills and widespread expertise. This phenomenon can be analyzed using the concepts of diffused and socialized roles within a continuum instead of a dichotomy. The distinction between non-experts and experts recalls, at least in part, the distinction between those who simply adapt to the environment and others (mainly organizational figures) who are able to determine, or to enact according to a constructivist logic: in both cases they are two sides of the same coin. About this it is useful to remember the analytical importance of social roles by Ferrarotti's definition, in which he underlines that it is a mediator, a flexible concept that can be used both for dynamic and static descriptions. Dissemination processes can develop in the history of professional roles. They can assume both an experimental connotation (experimentation and possible progressive introduction of new soft skills in specialized roles) and a connotation of learning (extended specialized roles, organizational and inter-organizational learning) and, therefore, of consolidation in space (that is to say in terms of capillarity) and, at least for a certain period, even in time, before the next evolutionary leap of the organizational species.

The following are then the main meanings of the concept of diffusion:

- Diffusion as *extended role*, i.e. a role in which the expected behaviors are very numerous and varied (but not improperly defined; there could instead be an extended application of competence and responsibility aimed at professionals) (also in terms of role learning);
- Diffusion as *wide job sharing (a disseminated role)*, i.e. expansion of the kind of subjects that can be defined as insiders (sometimes with very different levels of professionalism and in relation to various activities) (with possible implication in terms of systemic resilience);
- Diffusion as *learning*, in the sense of consolidation of successful experiences from a micro dimension (individual or group) to an organizational, interorganizational or systemic one (also at the role, organizational, and interorganizational species level);
- Diffusion as *capillarity (in the space)*, with reference to an extensive presence at the local level, but also with respect to the causes and effects from the local to the global dimension, and vice versa (with possible positive consequences, in terms of consolidation);
- Diffusion as a *multitemporal and continuous perspective*, in relation

to immediate reality and to short, medium, long, and very long-term reality (also with regard to the temporal range of past events).

The prevalent social roles in the main⁵ Western Societies eras are:

- *pre-modern era*: diffused roles,
- *modern era*: more and more specialized, often new professional roles, played in organizational contexts,
- *present age*: sometimes more specialized, sometimes professional and played in organizational contexts, often new diffused roles.

In the modern era, we have seen the emergence and strengthening of specialized roles alongside or in place of those typical of the pre-modern age. In some areas of work this specialization is also characterized in a professional manner, however, it is possible to detect other significant phenomena of diversified and fragmented identities and roles, consistent with the late modernity's conceptual proposals such as those that emphasize modularity (Gellner, 1996) or flexibility (Sennet, 1999) in the contemporary man.

Nowadays, this trend has not run out. On the one hand, little specialized or diffused social roles reappeared, also in systems where professional roles are already present (sometimes shrinking the distance between its experts and its non-specialized members, as they weaken or not evolve properly with respect to one or more basic aspects for an authentically professional connotation of a social role). What happens in the defense and security system in such a societal and interorganizational context of social diffusion?

On the one hand diffusion is certainly a need, but on the other we must consider that it is also a practice of social division of labour. Regarding the second aspect it is interesting to analyze what happens on the side of the producers of security.


The actors of the security scene can perform many functions and play many roles. There are the social actors from the *demand-side* (who identify the problem and put it on the agenda): like citizens in general or specific components of citizenship (individuals, groups and social categories), civil society (associations and movements), institutions. The *actors of social decision making and regulation* (not just legal, both government and governance): states, EU, local governments (in particular municipalities, through their decision-making power); experts; civil society (governance and substantial social regulation). The *actors of strategic decision-making*: who are involved in social reassurance, inclusion in the political agenda, social prevention, situational intervention and who also produce undesired social effects (alarmism, insecurity). The *supply-side actors* are public security, private security and enterprises (multilevel), institutional organizations, civil

⁵ By size of the historical impact.

and mixed network systems (meso level), public, private and civilian operators (micro level). The *social assets produced* by these organizational and individual actors of the security system are, on the one hand, strategic security, social security, culture of security and social reassurance, and, on the other hand, strategic insecurity, social insecurity, culture of insecurity and social alarmism.

In such a context, it happens that the question of “diffusion” in the field of security and insecurity also impacts more and more on the Armed Forces.

Figure 1 – Diffusion phenomena in the Defence and Security System



3. The evolution of the Armed Forces from the modern to the post-modern era

According to Williams (2000, p. 275), “five major organizational changes were predicted for the Postmodern era: (1) the increasing permeability of civilian and military spheres; (2) a reduction in differences in armed services based on service branch, rank, and combat versus noncombat roles; (3) a change in military purpose from fighting wars to conducting missions not traditionally considered ‘military’; (4) a more extensive use of multinational

military forces authorized or legitimated by supranational institutions; and (5) the internationalization of military forces themselves” and ten years after the end of the cold war “all of these changes are observable to some degree”. Undoubtedly, although many factors pushed in the direction of postmodernism, two main events strongly influenced the evolution of the Western Armed Forces towards the current structure: the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 attacks.

The US military’s dominant mission, by necessity, tremendously influences the organization’s structure and culture, and the variety of post-9/11 missions markedly contributed to the emergence of postmodern US military culture [...] During the Cold War era, the major mission definition for the US military entailed fighting a large-scale conventional war, which focused the military’s modernist culture mainly on destroying large and clearly definable military enemies and associated structures [...] The post-9/11 era, including two prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, provided an impetus for cultural change in the US military. This period demanded cultural innovations and adaptations in the military: the irrefutable need for an effective multimission military materialized. (Hajjar, 2014a, pp, 131-132).

The change has been realized in a mainly incremental way, even if different specific aspects have changed revolutionary. Since the beginning of the last decade, the distinction between an old and a new season for the Armed Forces has appeared to be absolutely appropriate. As shown in the following table, the keywords of modern military were courage, strength, control, command, and the keywords of postmodern military are flexibility, smartness, knowledge, communication, decision making. Some Armed Forces have been forerunners in this evolutionary process, but, according to Williams (2000, p, 275), “over time we expect more nations to display the characteristics identified with the Postmodern era and those nations already identified as Postmodern to move even further in that direction”.

The organizational model of peace support operations (PSOs) can be described as a totalizing adhocracy. This concept refers to non-institutional temporary organizations characterized by strict rules concerning space and time, limited resources and aims, and ad hoc means, temporary and limited commitment of the individuals. Examples of this concept are temporary organizations producing a film, an advertising spot or another creative and innovative product, but also the task forces for security, national and multinational contingents involved in PSOs (since this operative context requires the armed forces to assume their typical connotation of total institutions, according to Goffman’s concept). The two following paragraphs analyze the changes in the Italian and US military cultural orientations.

Table 1 - From modern to postmodern military organization and culture

VARIABLES	MODERN MILITARY	POSTMODERN MILITARY
<i>Nation-State</i>	Associated to	Loosed ties with
<i>Human Resources</i>	Conscripted Mass Army	Smaller Volunteer Force
<i>In Mission</i>	War-oriented	Multipurpose
<i>Make-Up and Ethos</i>	Masculine	Increasingly androgynous
<i>System</i>	Closed (Total Institution)	Open
<i>Military Culture</i>	Highly Differentiated from Civilian Culture	Greater Permeability with Civilian Culture
<i>Loyalty</i>	Hierarchic	Towards Citizens/Society
<i>Keywords</i>	Courage, Strength, Control, Command	Flexibility, Knowledge, Communication, Decision Making
<i>Identity</i>	Citizen and Professional	Citizen in Professional

Source: Compare with Hajjar (2014a, p. 136); Moskos, Williams, Segal (Eds) (2001, p. 15); Negri (2017)

Nowadays Western military professionals have a rich body of knowledge and skills. Organizational segments engaged in international peace and security building contingents, continue to take absolute risks and an extra-organization life is basically non-existent. what emerges from this context is not a total institution (Goffman, 1980), but a sort of *totalizing adhocracy*. We can use this concept to describe the global situation emerging in non-institutional contexts characterized by space and time limitations as well as by limited resources, aims and ad hoc means (see Mintzberg, 1985). Hence the organizational model of PSO's can be described as a totalizing adhocracy.

Furthermore, in the current phase the Western D&S⁶ System and its new *inter-individual and inter-organizational division of labour* could be described in terms of a learning system. For this purpose, an analysis of the institutional, associational, professional and *non-professional participation* to security policies in Western countries was carried out (Negri, 2014b). According to the results of the analysis, in the emerging context there are many relevant security policies changes (and the related organizational learning) to focus on, among others:

⁶ Defense and Security.

- a) the extension of the mission (and its possible new operations),
- b) the extension of the range and the number of individual and organizational experts (expanded professionalism, emerging amateurism and new forms of intermediation),
- c) the new relational needs (new intra- and inter-organizational relationships),
- d) new methods of recruitment, training and management of professionals and individuals,
- e) new modes of accreditation and legitimation of associations and organizations,
- f) widespread as fundamental phenomena to build a resilient D&S system.

Regarding the last aspect, it is useful to underline that the resilient D&S systems are those whose citizens, associations and institutions can face insecurity problems and insecurity shocks in an effective way, totally recovering from them. This strength must permeate all local, national and international levels of society. It requires the expansion of the insiders' group, sometimes with very different levels of professionalism and in relation to various activities. A similar kind of system (with its organizations and professionals) seems to be particularly appropriate and promising for a successful application of the widespread organizational model, because it manages to be everywhere, thanks to its ability to fill all the local spaces and is constantly present, as a 24/7 year-round presence, to use a military metaphor. It knows and learns from the past, oversees and monitors the present, is mobilized in time to act in the future and to predict it. Such description may seem neither more nor less than a utopian organization. Actually, it is a common post-modern organization, which aspires to efficiency and, above all, to be fully effective. The diffusion added to the specialization can be interpreted in terms of the construction of a socio-cultural system (societal level) organized in such a way as to be facing challenges of ecological and socio-economic extremes not only in adaptive mode, but rather as a truly resilient social aggregate. In this sense, the diffusion can be seen as the factor that determines the systemic resilience and the specialization may represent, in turn, the premise of the diffusion itself (if the individuals and organizations who are its bearers shall endeavor to achieve it). In addition to try to develop reactive and resilient capabilities, the widespread organization sets preventive goals, both social and situational. The scope of *social prevention* is to control the environmental factors (quality of social life, urban decay, poverty, social atomization) capable of facilitating criminal activities. The *situational prevention* tries to contain threats to individual security through forms and instruments of deterrence (surveillance systems, alarm, formal and informal control) able to

increase the difficulties and the risks of criminal practices, as well as to decrease their efficiency.

The reconciliation of preventive and reactive skills can be summarized in terms of complexity and diffusion in space and time. In a complex context such as the contemporary one, one could make the mistake of considering modern organizations totally inadequate to achieve the emerging systemic goals. In fact, just the traditional organizations and institutions that are able to evolve are called to play a fundamental role in the governance of security, implementing functions of dissemination of learning (concerning operational, informational and relational skills).

In the postmodern era, the traditional extreme connotation of the military organization evolves. The contemporary Armed Forces' organization is no longer called to live exclusively in the simple (however dramatic) context of "battle and death" (of their own or of the other organizational members), but it has to face a complex reality, fulfilling a complex mission, carrying out many tasks, interacting with various individuals and organizations, no longer able to rely more on its ability to control or even to activate its operating environment.

4. The US Armed Forces case study

What's a military culture? A military culture can be described as a way of thinking, feeling and acting (i.e. a way of living) the military profession in a military organization. Therefore, it is structurally a hybridization between organizational culture and professional culture.

The following table describes in detail the modeling evolution of the Armed Forces up to the postmodern era (and not going further, because the analysis stops in the year 2000), attributing a general and paradigmatic value to this classification, even if in reality it refers to only one specific case, the US one. This is an analytical choice that inevitably runs the risk of being qualified as ethnocentric, limiting its significance and heuristic scope.

Table 2 - Characteristics of the Armed forces in the three eras after the Second World War: the US case study

Forces Variable	Modern	Late Modern	Postmodern
[Eras]	Pre-Cold War (1900-1945)	Cold War (1945-1990)	Post-Cold War (Since 1990)
Perceived Threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational (e.g., ethnic, violence, terrorism)
Force Structure	Mass army, conscription	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major Mission Definition	Defense of homeland	Support of alliance	New missions (e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian)
Dominant Military Professional	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier-statesman; soldier-scholar
Public Attitude toward Military	Supportive	Ambivalent	Indifferent
Media Relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted
Civilian Employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major component
Woman's Role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial integration	Full integration
Spouse and Military	Integral part	Partial involvement	Removed
Homosexuals in Military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious Objection	Limited or Prohibited	Routinely permitted	Subsumed under civilian service

Source: C.C. Moskos (2000), *Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm*, in C.C. Moskos, J.A. Williams, D.R. Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 15

Describing the “numerous changes in American military culture unfolded over the past few decades”, Hajjar (2014a, p. 119) observes that “contemporary military culture possesses tremendous complexity, fragmentation and harmony, traditional and current features, and multiple overlapping spheres of influence including professional and institutional, bureaucratic, occupational, warrior, peacekeeper–diplomat, leadership and followership, multi-role versatility, and myriad other cultural influences, orientations, and tools”. Hajjar’s conceptualization of postmodern military culture is based on

a cultural toolkit concept filled with myriad tools and orientations required by the organization [, which] provides greater conceptual flexibility and comprehension of how individual military service members, groups and units, and the military at large pragmatically adapts (and sometimes fails to adjust) to the increasingly incoherent, confusing, unstable, and conflicted nature of their work and environments in a post-modern landscape [...] In response to [the...] contemporary challenges, the armed forces continue to create a more flexible and agile military structure and associated culture in order to better accomplish a growing set of diverse missions in a world characterized by rising vagueness and instability (Hajar, 2014a, p. 121-122).

Furthermore, “The emergent new cultural tools, soft skills and orientations in US military culture bear qualities that significantly oppose the cultural orientations and skills required for direct combat missions” (Hajar, 2014a, p. 133).

To better understand the US case of transition to the postmodern organizational-cultural model, it can certainly be useful to consider the comparison, described by Hajjar, between the modern and post-modern cultural trends, which can be associated with two prestigious officers, General Patton and General Petraeus.

The hard-charging and bullheaded General George Patton serves as the archetype for the modern US military’s cultural warrior identity. The emerging peacekeeper-diplomat role instigates the formation of cultural orientations and tools linked to building, developing, mentoring, cross-cultural competence, diplomacy and ambassadorship, flexibility (suppleness), teaching, learning from and empowering diverse people, creating and inventing, agency, and other related cultural tools [...] General David Petraeus, well known as both a physically tough combat commander and an effective, crossculturally competent diplomat and leader, serves as the prototype for a dominant postmodern military professional [...] General David Petraeus, well known as both a physically tough combat commander and an effective, crossculturally competent diplomat and leader, serves as the prototype for a dominant postmodern military professional [...] The military’s evolving postmodern cultural toolkit enables service members and units to draw on and create tools from these (and other) disparate cultural orientations based on the needs of their unique missions and conditions; the pragmatic cultural toolkit provides sufficient balance and coherence among the sometimes conflicted and fragmented but ultimately necessary unique cultural tools. (Hajjar, 2014-a, p. 134-135).

This innovative organizational configuration did not arise from unilateral decisions or experiences of the US military, because “the [...] impact of increased multiculturalism involves ongoing cultural changes and innovations that enable the US military to successfully perform in more frequent cross-

cultural interactions with diverse international military peers, host nation governments, security forces, and populations, and other unique people worldwide” (Hajar, 2014a, p. 123).

Hajar (2014a) refers to the famous work by Moskos, Williams e Segal (2000) to describe the evolution of the military culture from the early years of the last century to the present day, and outlines an additional, hybrid, phase, subsequent to those described in their volume. During this phase the learning process initiated in the previous decade consolidates and the model currently applied takes shape

Figure 2 - Comparison of two major influences and sets of tools in US military culture: the Warrior & Peacekeeper-Diplomat

Comparison of Two Major US Military Cultural Orientations and Sets of Tools: Warrior and Peacekeeper-Diplomat		
Era	20th Century Modern Culture (1900 – 1990)	Emergent Postmodern Culture (1990 – Present) (New Cultural Toolkit)
Major Identity (Role)	Warrior Identity	Peacekeeper-Diplomat Role, Warrior Identity (& Other Cultural Orientations)
Associated Cultural Orientations and Tools	Command Orientations: -Actively Direct, Order, Impose, Tell, Demand, Take Charge Traditional Combat Orientations: -Break, Destroy, Kill, Capture, Incapacitate, Dominate -Dehumanize: Systematic “Othering” Process Facilitates Insensitivity and Fighting Conformist Orientations: -Rigid Rule Enforcement Ethnocentric Orientations: -US-Centric Lens Encouraged: “Our Way or the Highway”	Cross-Cultural Competence: -Multicultural Worldview: Sufficient Cultural Relativism -Humanize / Sensitivity: Develop Commonality, Trust, Relationships -Listen to, Follow, Work with, Learn About and From Diverse People Build/Teach: -Mentor, Teach, Train, Advise -Build/Preserve/Sustain -Empower Diverse People & Units Political Agent: -Diplomat/Ambassador Adaptability/Suppleness: -Stretch Rules: Unconventional Tasks -Agency: Invent/Create
Archetype	General George Patton	General David Petraeus

Source: Hajar, 2014a, p. 134

Figure 3 - The transition towards the hybrid organizational model in the Western Armed Forces

Forces Variable	Modern	Late Modern	Postmodern	Hybrid
Eras	Pre Cold War (1900-1945)	Cold War (1945-1990)	Post Cold War (1990-2001)	(2001-present)
Military Culture (Major Orientations)	Warrior Identity	Warrior Identity	Warrior Identity	Warrior Identity
			Peacekeeper - Diplomat Role	PKer-Diplomat Role
				Cross Cultural Competence
	Modern Technology	New Technology	Info Age Technology	Info Age Technology

Source: Hajjar (2014a), p.136

The table above provides a detailed description of the different models of Armed Forces from the modern to the postmodern period and highlights the progressive enlargement of the military toolbox of the US military, maximized in its most recent form, that is qualified by Hajjar as a hybrid type.

5. The Italian Armed Forces case study

“After the Cold War, Italy profoundly modified institutions and doctrine, making its military contribution through the constant commitment of forces in multinational operations abroad” (Coticchia and Moro, 2015). Obviously, this involved that there were significant changes in the typical social roles of the military organization almost immediately. About this, over twenty years ago, Negri and Colucci (1996), tried to define the soldier (both conscript and professional) of the Italian Armed Forces engaged in the missions of the first post-Cold War years, developing a reasoning based on the dichotomy which

distinguishes specialization from flexibility. Today it is substantially outdated. The flexibility, in fact, from temporary need in a phase of functional experimentation has gradually developed into a real constitutive element of a specialization that has progressively widened, up to assuming the current extremely composite and complex connotation.

Table 3 - Characteristics of the Armed forces in the three eras after the Second World War: the Italian case study

Variables	Late Modern	Post-modern	Hybrid
<i>Era</i>	Cold War (1945-1990)	First Decade Post-Cold War (1990-2001)	(2001- Today)
<i>Main Perceived Threat</i>	Nuclear War	Distant Threat (In Time and In Space)	Subnational or Transnational (International terrorism, Criminal Organizations, both National and International)
<i>Systemic Model</i>	Closed System	Open System	Sliding Doors System
<i>Force Structure</i>	Mass Army and Conscription	Large Professional Army	Small Highly Professional Army
<i>Fundamental Purpose</i>	Nato Cooperation	Pko-Pso, Security Building and Security Resilience, Cooperation in Civic Protection (both National and International)	Pso and International Security
<i>Dominant Military Professional</i>	Mechanic (Standard, Disciplinary) (Specif Role)	Complex Soldier (Diffused Role)	Soldier in the Complexity (Specific Role)
<i>Public Attitude toward Military</i>	Multiple (Consensual, Neutral/Indifferent, Conflictual)	Theming, More Consensual, Less Conflictual	Normalization, Inattention
<i>Media Relations</i>	Medium-Low	Medium	Medium-Low
<i>Woman's Role</i>	Excluded	Partial integration	On the road to Full integration

1 Theoretical-conceptual table

2 Classification resulting from the analysis of research results on Italian peace support missions in Albania (1993), Somalia (1994) and Bosnia (1997) (v. Battistelli, 1996; Ammendola, 1999; Battistelli, Ammendola e Galantino 1999).

3 In the present column is given a description of the characterization of the explanatory variables indicated, updated in light of a free interpretation of the meaning ascribable to the complex contents of the White Paper on International Security and Defense. Source: synthetic adaptation with additions of the typology described by Battistelli (cfr. Battistelli et al., 2008, pp. 25-26).

The organizational learning carried out by the Italian Armed Forces in the era of post-Cold War peace support missions would seem, presumably, to be a prelude to a further change, albeit not in a revolutionary sense, but rather in a reinforcement of trends already under way. The wide range of operational contexts in which the specific relational competence of the Italian Armed Forces has been put in place (crisis situations, cooperative support, protection of defenseless populations for the affirmation of fundamental human rights, gender issues, service female military, civil service) has contributed to accentuate their complex dimension.

However, the present period appears to be characterized by a consolidate military culture – i.e. the way of living, thinking, feeling and acting – that is more and more specialized and professional. It is a specificity that presents a typical characterization for an organization model that is both mechanical and rational on the one hand, while being at the same time adaptive-natural on the other, since it is founded on opening, relational and integrative mechanisms rather than on the tracing of borders. A system, the latter, that clearly separated the military expert system from citizens. Looking instead at the single belonging to the organization, being open to organizational learning means being integrated into the institution in such a way as to represent an element of cultural transmission, both as subject and as object of this process.

6. Super-organizational aspects of the military culture: different experiences for one result

Notoriously, isomorphism is a strong similarity of the processes or structure of one organization to those of another, be it the result of imitation or independent development under similar constraints. This feature is fundamental for a critical analysis of Coticchia and Moro's (2015; 2016) standpoint. In the field of professions, the classic sociological reference author is Weber. Indeed, he has certainly influenced most of the subsequent theoretical proposals on this concept. Other authors, however, seem to better adapt to the analysis herein developed. Huntington (1957) considers competence, responsibility and corporatism as the fundamental characteristics of a profession. In other words, Huntington identifies three types of professional knowledge: *knowledge tout court* (cognitive) and *know-how*, which are included in the concept of competence, and finally *knowing how to be*, which is expressed in terms of responsibility and team spirit (ethics). It is possible to add a fourth kind of knowledge to Huntington's typology: we are referring to the need for a Continuous Learning (at an individual and scientific community level). Olmeda Gomez (1990), whose theoretical analysis is based on

Huntington's, considers also the communicative aspects of a profession, described as a linguistic community (since it is not only a practice community). Greenwood (1957), instead, adds further characteristics, such as social recognition and the sanctioning power exercised by non-professionals on professionals. Over thirty years ago, Moskos (1977) introduced the famous institution/occupation dichotomy to describe how military people take part in its professional organization, which has proved to be a highly effective heuristic interpretation of military sociological phenomena. In terms of motivation, in the new post-conscription era, the Italian Armed Forces seem marked by a kind of aseptic employability. The image of the profession, with the gradual disappearance of the conscripts, has been gradually normalized. not only the officers but all human resources have significantly improved their level of education, digital and language skills (thanks to euro-training defense experience), thanks to theoretical and academic learning and also training on the job. Furthermore, according to Collins (1992), professions may be also considered structurally isomorphic and are a typical kind of super organization (because they are transversally present in different organizations, they constitute in themselves an organizational reality and can represent the fundamental cultural glue of an inter-organizational system).

An interesting socio-organizational analysis recently carried out by two Italian researchers, on the same cases considered in the present essay, certainly appears useful to examine the emerging hybridization of the meaning and implementation of the military mission in contemporary Western societies. Coticchia and Moro in two essays published in 2015 and 2016 ask a series of questions. "How does military change take place in states that are not able to develop autonomous solutions? How does transformation occur when limited resources are available? What are — to paraphrase the title of a major work by Posen — the "sources of military change" for armed forces that do not possess the (cognitive and material) resources that are essential for autonomous development?" They argue that interorganizational learning constitutes a key element of change and [...] identify the mechanisms by which practices originating in other military organizations are imitated. The focus of this article is on how pressures arising from the field to adjust tactically, operationally, strategically, and organizationally are filtered through the experiences and institutionalized responses adopted by other armed forces (Nato and, more specifically, American)" (Coticchia & Moro, 2016, p. 697). The two authors try to "show how organizational learning through the adoption of externally originated practices takes place by examining how the Italian Army transformed in the period of intensive force employment from 2001 to 2011" (Coticchia & Moro, 2016, p. 697). For our analysis it is very important to stress that "the focus is restricted to the post-2001 era, as

military interventions are qualitatively different - in terms of complexity and scale - from those undertaken previously, and to those elements that shed light on emulation than on overall transformation” (Coticchia & Moro, 2016, pp. 697-698).

Contrary to Rosen’s definition of military innovation⁷, it is possible to consider this kind of change in terms of a widening of the range of options, which emerges from the adaptive redefinition of traditional operational types. It thus happens that soft elements are introduced into typically hard missions and that hard elements gain importance in traditionally and nominally soft missions. In this regard it is very interesting to remember the Italian commitment and experience in an extremely wide range of missions, such as to include those that could be labeled as *totally soft missions*, like, for example, the *Pellicano* mission in Albania, which, in a completely unusual way for the armed forces, was carried out expressly excluding the allocation and use of weapons. These are significant but partial changes that do not completely reconfigure the meaning of the missions, but rather expand it, update it, make it more flexible and adaptive.

Coticchia and Moro (2016, p. 699), also underline that some recent studies “have stressed the importance of “transformation in contact,” highlighting how bottom-up reforms induce topdown ones necessary to produce effective transformation (Foley, Griffin, & McCartney, 2011) [..., but] mechanisms of diffusion of military innovation received relatively less attention”. However, according to sociological neo-institutionalism “militaries thus adopt models (isomorphism) that they perceive as most prestigious, not necessarily the ones best suited to their specific needs (Goldman, 2006). [...] Isomorphism is facilitated by the existence of professional networks through which knowledge and practices spread (Farrell, 2001)” (Coticchia and Moro, 2016, p. 699). Furthermore, “perceptions of organizational similarity create the conditions favoring interorganizational learning [...] Perceptions of working in similar environments, with somewhat similar rules, and of sharing norms, codes, and ethos can more easily lead to absorption of other organizations’ practices (Farrell, 2001)” (cited in Coticchia & Moro, 2016, p. 700-701).

Coticchia and Moro (2016, p. 698) adopt the interorganizational learning lens “to focus on which factors may affect the process of adaptation and learning for medium-sized powers like Italy”. About the questions: “What are the main “novelties” that emerged in the post-2001 Italian operations?”

⁷ As “change that forces one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions” (1988, p. 134).

and “What are key features of the transformation of Italian forces?”, they answer that “both the recent national documents and the existing literature provide the answer, highlighting three basic aspects: *jointness/multinational interoperability*, *digitalization*, and *holistic/comprehensive approach*” (Coticchia and Moro, 2016, p. 702).

Regarding the diffusion processes experienced by the Italian military organization, arising in multinational contexts (both training and operational), the analysis of many official documents carried out by Coticchia and Moro shows that the “Italian military engagement in the post-2001 period provides several examples of how social proximity shapes learning. Generally, close network ties with NATO allies and the United States have profoundly characterized Italian military engagement in the post-2001 era” (2016, p. 703). However, the authors also report a testimony, in which the General Commander of the Folgore Parachute Brigade (in a personal communication of July 17, 2013) seems to be inclined towards a relatively greater role of the learning in the NATO context rather than the one from the US military: “Washington establishes the trend in regard to military technology, but from the Italian perspective, the engine of the transformation is clearly located within the NATO framework” (cited in Coticchia and Moro, 2016, p. 705).

In the work of Coticchia and Moro (2016, pp. 707) there is also a reference to the Unosom mission (in the early Nineties) and to the concomitant presence of Italian and American contingents within a multinational force: “Italy had already implemented on the ground (after the 1992 operation in Somalia) key components of the current U.S. - driven COIN approach, for instance, by developing civil–military units and military – police forces”. However, the two authors make a clarification that seems to support the thesis, supported in this essay, on the need to establish a clear line between the first decade of the post-Cold War and the following, for an adequate analysis of the phenomena of interorganizational diffusion and learning: “these aspects were not part of a wider and coherent COIN doctrine before troops were sent to Afghanistan and Iraq. It is for this reason that most Italian forces considered the COIN approach developed by McChrystal within the ISAF framework to be their main reference in terms of counterinsurgency” (2016, pp. 707-708).

What happened did not have to be read as a simply and automatically emulative process, as the development of a relatively autonomous operating model and cultural identity linked to an *Italian way to peace operations*: “combined use of diplomacy, force, and intelligence; focus on reconstruction and development; proportional use of force for deterrence; effectiveness of communication; quality of training; and readiness and protection. Italy adopted a holistic approach on the ground during Nibbio, which occurred

years before the widespread diffusion of (NATO and United States) doctrinal attention to nonmilitary aspects of contemporary international missions” (Coticchia and Moro, 2016, pp. 708). In the explanation given to the phenomenon, the political, structural and cultural aspects interact in a synergistic way at the national level (the latter dealing mainly with the specific military organizational context).

Maintaining a low-profile approach, also due to the strict constraints imposed by the government to avoid a wider military involvement on the ground, [...] Italian forces showed a *national way to counterinsurgency*, [...] without renouncing] dialog and mediation with local militias, also devoting specific attention to reconstruction, mainly through the CIMIC (Civil-Military) units [...]. The allies openly criticized this soft approach [...] The cases of Nibbio and Antica Babilonia highlight the continuity in how Italian soldiers have focused on relationships with the local population, devoting their primary efforts to economic and social reconstruction [...] The influence of the U.S. doctrine (embraced only in 2007) emerged in Afghanistan and also in other operational contexts (Coticchia and Moro, 2016, p. 708).

With regard to the innovative (and emulative) influence of international regional organizations, Coticchia and Moro observe that “Italy has derived most of its recent doctrinal reflection directly from NATO [and], because of limited resources available in the future [,] in several [other] NATO countries, including France and the United Kingdom, *learning from others* is likely to become even more important” (2016, pp. 712-713). However, the two authors also introduce further interpretative elements that go in the direction of interorganizational and systemic learning: “the Italian armed forces have been able to maintain their capabilities, also in terms of training, largely because of specific decrees issued to finance operations [...] Although it cannot substitute for the lack of resources, the process of sharing lessons learned at NATO level, of which the establishment of JALLC constitutes an important step, can partially compensate” (Coticchia & Moro, 2016, p. 714).

Expanding the analytical perspective to the entire previous decade can however lead to different conclusions. The reference to some exemplary case studies, such as Italian and US, briefly described in the previous paragraphs, can facilitate this reasoning.

In general terms, we could refer to a process of organizational learning that has taken life and has been implemented within a macro military system whose scope goes far beyond an ordinary and traditional national characterization.

The emerging Western Military Culture is clearly influenced by approaches such as the Italian and the U.S. ones, which, albeit not considered

dichotomous alternatives, were for a long time seen as very different cases along the continuum of organizational arrangements, ranging from a relational to a self-referential system. In a manner consistent with the thesis of the isomorphic diffusion in the Armed Forces organizational processes, two radically different approaches, like the Italian and the US's in the Unosom mission in the early nineties, have ended up meeting in a common organizational and cultural dimension. Giving rise to a higher systemic and adaptive level, following an evolutionary process, that is a leap specie of military organization. The learning process implemented in the D&S System can be described by extending Argyris's (1996) perspective (from the single organization to the interorganizational system) as a hierarchically superior level of learning, which can be defined by adding a further loop, that is to say using the triple loop learning concept. This higher level can be considered super-organizational and professional (according to Collins, 1992) or even defined in terms of *organizational species learning* (cfr. Stinchcombe, 1965), which goes beyond the contextual boundaries of a single organization.

In relation to the professional dimension, it is possible to distinguish two forms of learning: the *professional learning* (in the profession) and the *learning of professional species* (of the profession). The sum of these two forms of learning generates what can be qualified as an organizational-professional learning (systemic-professional). All this is made possible thanks to a contemporary sense of the military profession that goes beyond national boundaries, to assume the super-organizational meaning described by Collins⁸.

At the time of the Unosom mission, in Somalia in the early Nineties, the comparison between the organizational models deployed by the Italian and US Armed Forces showed them as strongly differentiated, at the point that the Italian could be considered as an idealtypical adhocratic open system and the Northern American a totally closed and standardized system. Metaphorically, the US contingent seemed to have been built simply by taking a barracks, packing it properly and sending it on mission exactly in the conditions in which it was. If the operation was completely successful it would have been almost miraculous, being a rather cumbersome package and, above all, in the absence of any reorganizational effort to adapt it to its socio-environmental destination.

The premise of these choices consists in the consideration that the material and social endowments would never have put in difficulty the contingent thus constituted and that, after all, if someone, in relations with other subjects, had been forced to adapt, certainly this would have been the organizational environment with respect to the US military contingent and certainly

⁸ See the previous note on the same topic.

not the opposite. Moreover, this military organization considered itself absolutely capable of activating its environment, consistently with a constructivist logic. Like a Mc Donald's sandwich, the same in every part of the world, even the US military could find a way to express itself uniformly in any kind of context. In the meantime, the world (not just the military) has radically changed (after twenty-five years), and so has the US organization, where maximum standardization is gradually leaving the way to a more flexible and adaptive culture. So it happens that today also the US military cultural model has changed in the name of flexibility. Moreover, the current one seems to have been significantly influenced by that which emerged in the Italian Armed Forces of the Nineties. This, however, must not necessarily lead us to think that the opposite has also happened. Thanks to the realization of these dynamics, today we can confirm the affirmation of a true phenomenon of isomorphic development of a new professional super-organization. The tendency to the periodic manifestation of this phenomenon in the military universe (especially on the western side) is thus confirmed. A new PSO's Western Cultural and Organizational Model arose from both differentiation (especially in the Nineties) and emulation (particularly in the last two decades) phenomena.

Going forward with the reasoning concerning the development of cultural-organizational modeling elements, however present also in very different military institutions from a structural point of view, such as the Italian and the US, it seems useful to recall the conceptual elements of the analysis carried out by Hajjar (2014a; 2014b). They highlight an evolution of military professionalism, which tends to become increasingly complex. The point of view adopted is almost totally linked to the US reality, but it appears culturally less distant from the Italian case than one might imagine, considering the many differences that can be found between one organization and another. The complex connotation is reconnected by the American author first of all to the extension of the range of tasks performed. In the theme of MAM (*Military Advising Mission*) Hajjar observes the emergence of a new conception of military culture, which refers to the use, by the post-modern military, of a very varied professional toolbox: "The flexible and pragmatic nature of the military' cultural toolkit allows contemporary service members to practice agency and postmodern cultural entrepreneurship as they create essential new tools and simultaneously help the organization to strike a balance among many discordant cultural orientations and skill sets as the military confronts and accomplishes dynamic, fluid, and challenging contemporary missions" (Hajjar, 2014a, p. 121). This is an absolutely interesting reasoning and a typological description, because it raises issues that are relevant to all those Armed Forces that have been gradually called to take part in a vast array of

missions. In the case of the United States the not so latent cultural influence defined by Moskos' lapidary sentence "*Peacekeeping is not a soldier job, but only a soldier can do it*" would still seem appropriate. Looking at the Italian case, considerations such as these were not lacking in the debate among the experts in the decade at the end of the last century, but they were overcome rather quickly and allowed the adoption of the complex professional model that occurred much earlier than the Armed Forces of other countries and, mostly, of the USA. However, in the case of the aforementioned author, there is a strong awareness of the need to fully adopt the complex and postmodern cultural and organizational model, which draws its strength not so much from control, but rather from an extreme ability to adapt itself to the context. The frequent consideration of the US military organizational case in the present analysis should not induce the reader to think that this cultural-professional model is "paradigmatic". The comparison of the contingents of the two countries involved in Somalia at the beginning of the Nineties should not be read as a real and conscious emulation of the Italian model (which at that time was in an embryonic state: several years had to pass before it could be qualified as a socio-cultural and organizational experiment). It would be more correct to speak about an isomorphic diffusion and convergence towards a largely common model, stimulated by analogous macro-environmental factors to be faced, by belonging to the same alliances (and to the relative supranational organizations) and similar interpretations on the most suitable ways to deal with complexity.

In this respect, it may be interesting to consider the analysis of the phenomenon of organizational culture convergence proposed by Coticchia and Moro (2016). Using the interpretative key of inter-organizational learning, the two authors try to explain how the transformation of the Armed Forces is possible when they present much fewer resources than others (as indeed happens in the Italian case compared to the US, at least materially) and they also try to identify which external sources can be used when an institution is not able to implement a fully autonomous development. The two authors, on the basis of a series of interviews and authoritative opinions, support the thesis that the organizational learning took place through the emulation of solutions adopted elsewhere, with greater resources, making appropriate adaptations to make them applicable even in the presence of resources relatively more limited.

Coticchia and Moro (2015, p.11) use the neo-institutional interpretative key of the organizational fields to argue that innovations in the military world can take place not so much as a result of a real learning process, but rather because of dynamics of emulation. In fact, the organizational choice of the Armed Forces of a country to adopt the institutional and behavioral profile

that characterizes that of another can be linked not only to real interests, values and needs, but also to problems of legitimization, essentially due to two orders of factors, in terms of necessity on the one hand and opportunities on the other. According to the two authors, under the first aspect, the environmental uncertainty not only complicates whatever choice, but also makes difficult the assessment in terms of success or not, of possibility of implementation or not. With regard to the second, the isomorphic connotation of the “organizational species” of the armed forces, especially in the post-Cold War historical phase, develops more easily thanks to the presence of professional networks (or superorganizations, according to Collins’ concept; 1992), through which they can spread knowledge and practices.

Table 4 - Learning from others

INFLUENCING FACTORS			EXAMPLES
Infectiousness	Availability	Size	Diffusion of Innovation regarding netcentric capabilities, large debate on COIN.
	Interpretation	Performance	Perceived success of U.S. COIN strategy in Iraq.
	Status	Status	Petraeus as the winner of the COIN battle in Iraq.
Social proximity	Availability	Network ties	“Afghanistan Mission Network”; Counter-IED practices in Afghanistan.
		Geographical proximity	Joint combat operations in Afghanistan.
	Relevance	Organization similarity	Intra-NATO procedures (Afghanistan and Libya).
Susceptibility	Motivation	Bad performance	Poor performance against insurgents in Iraq.
	Capabilities	Size	Differential change rate between deployed units and “core.”
		Age	Units experiencing in “holistic approach” since the beginning of 1990s (e.g. civil-military cooperation, from Somalia to Lebanon).
		Slack	Extra budget spending as remedy to cuts, but slack resources devoted to deployed units: no spread of innovations across the majority of forces.
		Absorption routines	The establishment of JALLC as a key step in standardizing the approach in lessons learned.

Source: Adaptation from Coticchia and Moro, 2016, p. 713

Note: COIN = counterinsurgency; JALLC = joint analysis and lessons learned center; NATO = North Atlantic treaty Organization

However, if it is true that professional and organizational networks generate opportunities for the dissemination of models (even through simple processes of emulation and adaptation), it is also true that professional and organizational interdependence, on the one hand, ends up generating a wealth of experiences. at least partly socialized even with professionals belonging to other armed forces and, on the other, represents a real cause of the search for shared models. The military institution, in fact, like few others (or perhaps more than any other, Williams, 2000, p. 265) is subject to the influence of both national and international factors. The description of Coticchia and Moro in terms of the emulation (and not of “simple” diffusion) of the US model by the Italian military organization is linked to the period on which they focus the own attention (the post-2001 era) (2016, p. 698). In fact, considering this phase, the description and explanation proposed appear to capture aspects that are certainly very important for the organizational change achieved.

However, expanding the perspective on the previous decade it would have been possible to identify the preliminary moments and factors for the pioneering development of a multidimensional, holistic and comprehensive approach by the Italian Armed Forces (cfr. Coticchia e Moro, 2016, p. 703). Moreover, on the issue of diffusion, Goldman (2004, pp. 1-2) observes that “military organizations are comparative institutions that closely monitoring one another, innovation and diffusion are inextricably linked. New technologies and ideas spread from the setting in which they were originally conceived and developed, yet at the same time, militaries grapple with the application to their particular setting, which may involve unique adaptations and innovations”. However, innovation can also represent the outcome of a civil-military convergence, typical of the post-modern era. this is what has already happened or could happen in the case in question. Indeed, the evolution of the military culture about sources, at the multinational system level is related to the *mutual inter-organizational emulation*. In other words, an *inter-organizational learning* takes shape (at the organizational species or systemic level). It could therefore be appropriate to integrate, with a further line, the table 5, concerning the innovative resources, elaborated by Coticchia and Moro.

The analysis and final comments of the two authors appear acceptable from a two-fold perspective. Indeed, Coticchia and Moro’s line of thinking fits contextualization perfectly well, since their analysis only covers the events of the 2000s, with special emphasis on the last 15 years (from 2003 onwards). The same holds true for the formalization of principles, norms and organizational (both intra-organizational and, mostly, inter-organizational) procedures. However, similar considerations would not be possible, should

this analysis also include the season immediately before the one under exam, aimed at bolstering the great operational efforts of the Italian Armed Forces, deployed in complex, inter-organizational, multinational contexts, in which the quality and quantity of the activities carried out, as well as of the material, human and non-material resources allocated and objectives pursued, are increasingly improving and being extended.

Table 5 - Organizational and multinational sources of military innovation

Sources of military innovation	Domestic	International
<i>Interest/rational</i>	Inter-organizational	Competition
<i>Ideas/Non-rational</i>	Intra-organizational	Emulation
<i>Efficiency/Effectiveness*</i>	Multinational*	Learning*

Source: Coticchia and Moro (2015), p. 10, except for the last row (* my additions)

As a matter of fact, this eventuality appears ineluctable: in order to understand what happens in the second phase it is impossible to disregard the former or in any case not to take it into due account. The first phase can be considered experimental and described in terms of first level organizational learning. It is a prelude to the following step, which sees the consolidation, formalization and “relative standardization” of what has been formerly learned.

The analysis of the socio-organizational features of two important contingents that joined the Unusom⁹ peacekeeping mission of the early 1990s (U.S. and Italian) can help to understand why preference should be given to the thesis of progressive convergence, diffusion, complex emulation (reciprocal, multidirectional and system learning) to the detriment of the thesis of “simple” emulation (unidirectional, with one subject making decisions, introducing regulations and implementing them and another subject subsequently replying; here being uninfluential whether the emulator keeps more or less extensive margins of adaptability and freedom compared to the emulated). If we consider that specific moment and that mission as the starting point in the series of Italian peace-support episodes, we are truly justified in referring to the two subjects under exam as placed in a context as far apart as the poles in terms of cultural and organizational approach. In fact, the two subjects seem capable of symbolizing or at least being oriented towards opposite objectives, with the former heading towards the logics and practices typical of closed systems (as if an entire military base, with its facilities and resources,

⁹ Such being its nature or at least such being its qualification when implemented.

even the human ones, had been lifted by a huge space ship and set on the mission field) and the latter heading towards open systems (relational, adaptive, empathic, contextual, and so forth).

The *Ifor* mission could be considered, at least with regard to the Italian case, both as episode number one, as it launches a containment process of the systemic opening and an operational re-direction towards an increasingly standardized and therefore more traditionally military practice. However, we may even more appropriately talk about experimentation of the Western PS tout court, in the event of an overall convergence, of an inter-organizational and not simply organizational system, at the level of the Armed Forces of a single Country. Indeed, a progressive cultural and organizational change has also been registered in the US Armed Forces and it can certainly, at least in part, be traced back to diffusion or emulation processes, but with a double opposite sign compared to Coticchia and Moro's analysis. It is the Italian case that had constituted the source of inspiration. The US Armed Forces have partially emulated it. The learning process therefore did not go only in the opposite direction, because it was bidirectional or, better said, circular, and it is the country with fewer resources to be imitated by those who have more. Moreover, this contradictory aspect related to Coticchia and Moro's analysis could easily be overcome if only the intangible and cultural resources were taken into consideration rather than simply referring to the material ones. In this case Italy would play the part of the country with a richer heritage in military culture (with specific regard to the PS and its intrinsic, relational component).

The establishment of an organizational model requires a long experimental period to be successful. In the post-cold war era the western armed forces experienced a systemic test, an experimentation by trial and error. In this way, premodern and especially modern warfare have gradually redefined their structures through decades or even centuries. The learning process of national and international peace and security system resulted into a consolidated international model of PSOS in the postmodern and in the hybrid era. This great result, of superorganizational learning, was achieved in a relatively short period of time (only two decades). Therefore, it is possible to talk about the creation and implementation of a widespread superorganization. A similar kind of resilient system can be described by the concept of *widespread organization*, because it manages to be everywhere, thanks to its ability to fill all the local spaces and is constantly present, as a 24h/7days year-round presence (to use a military metaphor) (Negri, 2010).

7. Cultural change process in the D&S System

Which factors proved crucial in the emergence of the new western military culture? Firstly, the operational military activities (due to their experimental contribution), secondly the high degree of convergence on functional military requirements (in relation to new and old forms of aggression to security and new perception and new security demand) and finally the achievements, both in terms of absolute and limited rationality and regarding organizational efficiency (none or few victims) and effectiveness (peace support - peacekeeping - peace-building - peace-enforcement - peace-making). The analysis carried out in this essay, with fundamental reference to the Italian and the U.S. cases, at first extremely differentiated and gradually more and more convergent, is summarized in the following figure.

Figure 4 – Culture change process in contemporary Western Armed Forces



This model is clearly influenced by approaches such as the U.S. and the Italian one which, albeit not considered dichotomous alternatives, were for a long time seen as very different cases along the continuum of organizational arrangements, ranging from a relational to a self-referential system.

In general terms, we could refer to a process of organizational learning that has taken life and has been implemented within a macro military system whose scope goes far beyond an ordinary and traditional national characterization. Organizational models require long learning period, to give success-

ful results. Premodern and especially modern warfare have gradually redefined their structures through decades or even centuries. Western armed forces in the post-cold war have experienced a systemic test. Learning process of national and international peace and security system did not last long. At the end of it an international model of PSOs took shape and consolidated.

When we think about the D&S system, we usually imagine something very *solid*: closed system, rational decisions, automatic behaviors and so on. The emergence of an organizational model or a functional modality capable of assuming a paradigmatic value normally requires a long phase of experimentation, of individual and collective attempts and errors, or of a period of learning, if the experimental process is successful. The pre-modern war and, above all, the modern war have gradually redefined their structures and their approaches, giving rise to various organizational and operational revolutions, strategic and tactical, and so on. The affirmation of such radical transformations has required the patient work of countless experimenters, not always winning, who, one after the other, one with or against the other, have made their efforts for a long time (decades, century or even millennia).

The operational transformation of the Western Armed Forces (and others) in the post-Cold War era can be appropriately interpreted as the result of a phase of cultural and organizational experimentation, which can be considered rather short. At the end of it an international model of PSOs¹⁰ was defined and consolidated. In this model the influence of approaches such as the US and the Italian is evident. For a long time they have represented, if not dichotomous alternatives, certainly very distant cases along the continuum of the organizational types, as they vary from extreme closure to extreme opening. Overall, by rationalizing ex-post what happened, it is possible to talk about an organizational learning process, which took place and was implemented within a military macro system, which extends far beyond an ordinary and traditional national characterization.

The emerging model can be effectively described using a series of oxymorons. It is the model of competent and conscious discipline, that is to say of the disciplined competence. After all, the dichotomous model introduced by Gouldner (1954a and 1954b) described two antithetical approaches and proposed their conciliation in the same organization. One of the first attempts in this direction was that of Thompson, carried out over 50 years ago, in 1966.

The possible multiplication of the organizational configurations that can coexist in the same organization has, moreover, been greatly emphasized by

¹⁰ Or rather, more generally, a model of postmodern military operations for international peace and security.

Mintzberg. If the reasoning is applied to a complex organization, such as the Italian military one, then it will be possible to consider a multiple view of a single member of the organization, able to reconcile and condense in itself the orientation to the discipline and the possession and expression of competence.

It is the model of “natural rationality” or “rational naturalness”. In this case the possible solution of the problem par excellence of the socio-organizational theory (still posed by Gouldner, 1959) is explicitly proposed: that of reconciling the mechanical-rational model with the organic-natural model. This oxymoron could actually be effectively replaced by a definition in terms of *complex rationality*, able to account for the framework within a complex system (not only in terms of context, but also and especially in relation to its organization). In an implicit way, with this expression the dichotomy optimal rationality/limited rationality would be overcome, as happened more than fifty years ago in Thompson’s theory, with the distinction between technical core (internal, protected, optimal) and environmental level (exposed to uncertainty, adaptive), held together by the intermediate, managerial level. Complex rationality is a pragmatic rationality, which takes the most appropriate form depending on the purposes and resources actually available.

It is the model of *institutionalized individualism* (previously described), a concept introduced by Parsons, which can take on a specific connotation, which recalls the classical dichotomy Institution/Occupation of Moskos (1977). It is an expressive-relational individualism, in which the institutional and occupational inclinations can be absolutely coherent, as is appropriate for any ideal-type and, overall, for each typological classification.

Thus, an organizational model of a complex organic type emerges. It represents a conceptual scheme particularly useful for describing organizations as a whole in which the different components can never be fully integrated, if not at a cultural level and in particular (with Schein, 1999, Gagliardi, 1986, and Hatch, 2009) as regards the assumptions and values.

However, in this theoretical approach they not only impact one another, according to dynamics sometimes not entirely predictable, but are, in a complex way, in each other, in the context of global processes of construction of meanings, contexts and of actions. If the theses of complex organicism are combined, however, the globally considered human being is something more and different from the sum of the parts that compose it. In what can be considered as a socio-organizational transposition of the Gestalt psychological concept.

In the case of social systems and in particular of organizations defined as complex, their components are in turn complex systems, which often reproduce part of the organizational complexity. In this regard, the contribution of

complex organism consists also in sanctioning the illusion of organizational separateness¹¹ and in reconciling rationality and naturalness. The complex organization tries to reconcile diffusion and specialization, guaranteeing an adequate level of competence in the first phenomenon and a relative specialization to the second. The problem and the perspective of the relationship between the rational model and the natural model is not that of being synthesized¹², since they can “simply” coexist within a complex model, at a hierarchically superior level.

If we overcome the illusion of organizational separateness, limiting ourselves to the awareness of only the simple organizational distinction, we can then adopt conceptions such as that of the aforementioned organizational field (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), that is an area of institutional life that performs an incessant regulation and social control action on the activities of the bodies of which it is composed. “The aspect on which Powell and DiMaggio and generally the neo-institutionalists focus their attention is no longer, as for Selznick, the betrayal of the original purposes of the organization by external forces, but the capillaries and widespread pressure to comply to recognized standards, the growing isomorphism that permeates social activities and the positive and negative consequences deriving from them” (Bonazzi, 2008, p. 473). Particularly relevant for the purposes of the present analysis appears the distinction, drawn up by the same two authors, concerning the various types of *institutional isomorphism*.

There is *coercive isomorphism* when the organization is subjected to external pressures that oblige it to form itself: typically [in form of] legal constraints [...], but not only]. There is *mimetic isomorphism* when organizations in facing ‘uncertainty in the environment spontaneously start imitative processes. In these cases, not knowing how to develop a given process leads to a process of imitation as a surrogate of certainty (according to the typical reasoning that if everyone does so, it means that there is a reason and it is good to conform). Finally, *normative isomorphism* comes from professionalization processes. In these cases, the organization leaders learn in specialized centers or networks the existence and convenience of new methods of management or new technologies. In *professional isomorphism* the choice of innovation does not therefore derive from constraint or from uncertainty, but from the free and reasoned awareness of the superiority of the new practices with respect to the old ones (Bonazzi, 2008, pp. 474-475).

¹¹ The present passage summarizes the author’s reasoning in themes of organizational boundaries (and of a complex organicist organizational model) object of the volume *L’illusione dell’organizzazione separata* (Negri, 2013 b, pp. 181-183).

¹² As proposed by Gouldner (1959).

8. The military and the complexity

The presence of a shared vision means that an army professional culture is diffused. It emerged in the first post-cold war era (in the Nineties). This “experimental” phase led to the definition of the *soldier of complexity (diffused role)*, with reference to the Italian case. It fortified itself in the second post-cold war era (in the fifteen years following the September 11th terrorist attacks) and as a result of an organizational learning phenomenon. The re-emergence of the separation between civil-military tasks has focused again on the importance of specialization and has created a new profile of military member, the *soldier in complexity (specialized role)*, undisputed protagonist of today’s era in which the armed forces are increasingly involved in peace support operations, giving life to the Western way to PSOs.

Does a Western way to PSOs exist? The correct answer is yes. It arose from both differentiation (especially in the Nineties) and emulation (particularly in the last two decades) phenomena. Now we can talk about an emerging military culture. Paraphrasing Moskos’ sentence “Peacekeeping is not a soldier job, but only a soldier can do it”, we can say that “Peace-support operations are a soldier’s job and only a soldier in complexity can do it well”.

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10. Sustainable Local Cooperative Development in Greece

*by George Tsobanoglou**

Abstract

Since the second half of the 20th century and even more intensively since the 1980s, local societies and the global community have begun to realize that community development has been based on a culture of cooperation. The capacity building by private for profit capital - based on top down processes and defined by the narrow economic growth model of development - has failed in many communities leaving them in the margins, in poverty and misery. Thus, communities that have focused on local cooperation using culture/communication, as a lever of development, and that have utilized local assets have managed to build endogenous social capital.

In Greece a unique such case has been reported amidst a real economic depression. The case of Anavra, Magnesia, is a unique example of how local cooperation can succeed in turning the situation totally in the midst of a real social pauperisation raging in the country. This bright example has been made possible by a synergy developed, firstly, within the local community, engineered by the home-coming of a retired engineer who wanted to support his village. He started a local dialogue, building trust within the community and raising awareness of the power of cooperation. Once the internal understanding for cooperation was established, he was set to build a link with a community design institution (National Technical University). This level processed and analysed the technical aspects required to reach the regional authority for EU funding. The Anavra study case is exemplary in Greece, as all aspects of endogenous productive development have been put in place. The value chain established with the outside environment allowed for the funding of all necessary community assets both on the productive (animal farm parks) and the reproductive domains (facilities for schooling, sustainable energy). This unique example, however, was somehow arrested when local government reform brought about a loss of administrative capacity to

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define community projects, as the greater Municipality (Almyros) has its own different priorities. Different territories lacking organisational standards have difficulties in sharing benefits and learning from each other. It also appears as if mediating capacity from the part of the Regional Authority is not addressing the issue. Anavra has to further adjust to such a situation.

1. Sustainable Local Cooperative Development in Greece

1.1. Local Development

1.1.1. Human-centered development

In the period immediately after the end of the Second World War, there was immense economic and material progress in Western Europe and North America. This was due to the growth of industry and advances in science. The West identified social progress with economic growth, so it adopted economic indicators as its measurement and evaluation systems. Then it lowered the value of culture and put it second, giving it the role of conditional factor of the economy, and, last but not least, it was assumed that the Third World remained underdeveloped because its cultural and religious background was contrary to the new ideas, enterprises and industry (Pashalidis, 2002).

Some events, such as the oil crisis of 1973 and the emergence and the flourishing of IT in the 1980s, led to deindustrialisation and negative growth rates. At that time, the problems of the economic growth development model, such as environmental issues and the deterioration of urban environment, began to be identified, while objections to the degradation of communal values were expressed. The economic growth model was considered to be unsuccessful and outdated, so people had to turn to other solutions. Some Third World countries rallied around nationalism, trying to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This had the effect of excluding everything that was socially, economically and culturally extraneous, depriving their citizens of basic freedoms. In many countries communal culture was brought at the centre of development, based not on material progress and on economic indicators, but rather on human development, which can be assessed on: a) the freedom enjoyed by citizens at the economic, social and political levels; b) equality of services and opportunities for all, care, education and dignity; c) freedom of expression and the possibility of cultural expression; d) equality of all, without any exclusionary criterion; (e) equal treatment in the workplace; and (f) assistance to members of the community who need it

in special or extraordinary circumstances (Kourliouros, 2016; Pashalidis, 2002).

Nowadays, globalization is important in the cultural field, as the flow of information circulated worldwide through new technologies enables many, in recently isolated societies, to interact with others in order to get to know the ideas and values of other societies, promote their own particular values and ideas, but also to establish them, in the face of the risk of alienation. Within this context of the dual expression of globalization, the synergy of culture with local development leads to the promotion of local capital, which, in a way, makes it international. The term that characterizes this phenomenon is: glocalisation (Karachalis, 2007).

Since the early 1980s, major international organizations (UN and UNESCO) have identified the need to move global growth from the economic-centric to the cultural-centric model, bringing both culture and the human person to the forefront. They have defined development as “a process that extends beyond simple economic growth, incorporating all the dimensions of life and all the activities of a community, all members of which are called upon to contribute and are expected to benefit from its benefits” (Pashalidis, 2002).

1.1.2. Development and local communities.

First, let us define all the relevant terms referring to the development of a place, a community and a region.

Whereas Mitoula (2008) defines local development as what is achieved through economic growth coupled with the imposition of the necessary structural changes in order to improve the living standards of members of the local community, Christenson and Robinson (Daoutopoulos, 1997) define a community development as a series of components, which are both indispensable and obligatory, and it is necessary to rank them in a step-by-step manner. Thus, the elements that define community development, Christenson and Robinson’s approach, are: “a) a group of individuals; b) a community; c) making the decision; d) initiating a social action process; e) changing; f) its economic, social cultural or environmental situation”.

Successful regional policy requires cultural decentralization as well as initiatives and actions both from the point of view of local government and from groups or from the whole local community. Cultural decentralization means the balanced cultural development of people and places or, in other words, the elimination of exclusions in the distribution of cultural goods, op-

portunities for intellectual and artistic creation and, more generally, the opportunity to participate in cultural and social events for the whole geographical region and its members (Bitsani, 2004).

From the aforementioned definitions, irrespective of the scientific discipline of each and the form of development it defines, we find that there are common points. These are the non-negotiable principles of equality, participation and action in the field of culture for the benefit of society as a whole.

One of the policies being practised and a tool of cultural development is urban revival. Both the city and all the settlements (villages and towns) in general are the places where people are to be found and social ties, customs, political institutions and technological discoveries are to be fostered and developed so as to make it important for culture and, by extension, for development (Pashalidis, 2002).

Since the 1980s, it has been observed that the development of cultural policies in areas such as tourism, recreation and other “cultural industries”, such as design, cannot only compensate for lost jobs as a result of deindustrialisation but also contribute to overall economic growth and social cohesion (Biankini, 1994).

Although, since the 1990s, the goal of major cities policy has been globally oriented to a more holistic approach - i.e. a global promotion of the positive image of the city - it is preferable for smaller cities that the policy focuses on the local community and aims at: (a) facilitating access for all to the arts, cultural heritage and mass-popular culture; (b) seeking the active participation of all citizens both in decision-making and in the programme¹; (c) fostering local cultural creation; d) promoting local cultural identity; and e) promoting social inclusion (Konsola, 2006).

The means of the cultural sector that shape local development policy are (Psylla, 1992):

- Participation, information and information of citizens in order to promote their political culture.
- Training and offering work in cultural professions to integrate and include socially excluded from the labour market.
- The organization of artistic and educational events and the creation of spaces of intellectual and artistic expression aimed at raising the intellectual level of the citizens.
- Development of recreation areas and participation in amateur and

¹ According to Athanasopoulos, waiting for a community to provide financial support or to organize local actions in the field of culture from others, the actions themselves are to be condemned, even if they fail to have a future. Instead, the local population needs, first, to be mobilized, and, then, to use local means and resources available to the central government for help (1994).

volunteer groups with the purpose both of recreating the citizens and of making use of their free time.

From another point of view, according to Geffe (Karahalis, 2007), local and regional development are influenced in three ways by culture, which:

- creates benchmarks for actors and stakeholders in the development process and encourages them for joint initiatives and actions.
- creates an attractive environment for residents and visitors of the area.
- creates the conditions for the production and distribution of cultural goods but also jobs that combine usability with aesthetics.

It is also very important for development to incorporate all sustainability rules to ensure duration. Culture is not only an expression of the human-induced growth model but is the main pillar of sustainability. Local culture-based development creates the right conditions to ensure the continuity and continuity of customs from generation to generation. In such an environment, independent members, but also institutionalized or informal groups in the community, can make use of the specificities and identity of their place to preserve the existing and develop new economic activities. Achieving economic viability in this case is in line with social sustainability and, in addition, with the entry into the labour market of the community, of its members that for various reasons were excluded from it (Tsobanoglou, 2007a).

Sustainable growth is achieved when the two-way relationship between society, the economy and the environment², in pairs, is equated and without one parameter overriding each other. We could portray the model of sustainable development as an equilateral triangle, with three determinants, society, economy and the environment. If, for any reason, the shape changes, sustainability is impaired (Andriotis, 2008; Tsobanoglou, 2007a). A key feature of sustainable development is that it meets the needs of the present, while ensuring the same rights for future generations (Kourliouros, 2016).

There are some parameters that are relevant to practical issues when local and regional policy are designed and implemented³.

There is a great need for small local projects, which are usually not publicly funded and, therefore, require the mobilization of local potential.

1) The implementation of projects and programs in general, of this magnitude, requires financial investment (irrespective of who will be covered), disproportionately small in relation to the jobs (in construction) and employment (in operation) that will be created. Also through these projects

² Any cultural or artistic activity has no meaningful effect on humans when their relationship to the built environment and nature is disturbed (Athanasopoulos, 1994).

³ For Parameters 1,2,3, see: Daoutopoulos (1997), for parameter 2 see: Karahalis (2007).

preconditions for the development of community consciousness are developed and strong links between members of the community.

2) The inventory of the infrastructures of an area provides the opportunity for proper planning and then implementation of projects for the exploitation of unexploited resources.

3) The existence of a leader, not necessarily in the formal sense of the term, is of the utmost importance to the group and thus to the successful completion of the project as he/she can and should be the source of inspiration for the whole.

Therefore, the issues for the Local Authorities and, more generally, for the stakeholders involved in a local society, are the development and promotion of: a) the cultural capital of the area through the infrastructure and the natural environment, in order to produce its offer place in the cultural field and b) the cultural identity of the region. With appropriate strategies both lead to job creation, the promotion of local products and the influx of visitors, resulting in positive economic implications for the region.

2. Development tools for an area⁴

2.1. Social economy

2.1.1. Social economy and social capital

The term social economy refers to all activities of the private economic sector, the purpose of which may be collective, community or public. It is the so-called third sector-pillar of the economy and moves between the other two; the public and the private. It is usually non-profit, but even when there is business activity, economic profit is not an end in itself. The traditional and widely known forms of social economy organizations are unions, foundations, cooperatives and mutual societies. The most recent form that has emerged in recent years is social enterprises. They offer products and services on the market, usually at very advantageous and competitive prices, and the most important thing is that they aim at achieving their social goals, such as offering new jobs (Nasioulas, 2015; Tsobanoglou, 2007b).

Organizations that operate on the basis of the principles of the social economy are moving, as we have seen, between the public and private sectors of the economy, covering the social, cultural and environmental needs

⁴ The choice of the particular tools was in accordance with their implementation in the following case studies

and sensitivities of citizens, which, on the one hand, the public sector is inefficient or indifferent to cover and, on the other hand, private profitable businesses are not interested in investing in these areas (Nasioulas & Tso-banoglou 2006).

The basic principles governing the social economy are (Salmas, & Nasioulas, 2015):

- Man and society are more important than economy and money.
- Citizens' participation is voluntary and there is equality between them.
- Audit is carried out by members with democratic procedures.
- Values of solidarity and responsibility apply.
- The individual interest is in line with the general one.
- The operation is autonomous and independent of the state.
- The distribution of potential economic surpluses is channelled either to sustainable development investments or to the provision of services to the beneficiaries and the wider community in general.
- The characteristics of organizations operating under the principles of the social economy are as follows: (Salmas & Nasioulas, 2015).
 - They are officially organized organizations created by individuals.
 - They have decision-making autonomy for all market issues, such as goods, services, insurance and finance.
 - The goods produced or the services offered can either be channelled into the free market or are intended to meet the needs of their members.
 - Decision making and distribution of potential profits are not related to the capital or contributions paid by each member, while each of them has one vote in decision making.

In our country, Law 4019/2011 defines the concept of social economy and states that it includes collective actions with cultural, environmental, ecological content as well as those that highlight local products or services for the collective benefit (Gov. Gazette, A' 216/30.9.2011).

For the social economy, the existence of social capital is very important. The term implies relations between members of a formal or informal community when they are governed by the principles of sincerity, law and objective information, resulting in economic equality between independent individuals and groups of the population. For the economy, cultural capital is equally important, both in economic and human capital (Nasioulas & Tso-banoglou, 2006).

In many cases of small and geographically isolated areas, social capital lags behind due to the desertification of the site with the urbanization and immigration of the previous decades. However, linking expatriate members

with the local community and recognizing them as members may lead to an influx of remittances and the creation of infrastructure in the form of investment, sponsorship or donation, or even the repatriation of these members, resulting in growth and development of natural and human capital, which are subsets of the social one (Tsobanoglou, 2016).

A major problem that Greek society faces today, in the context of the prevailing political economy, is that many traditional social organizations have established hierarchical relations with the power to act vertically, which prevents innovation, the exchange of ideas and the changes in the social and cultural environment and, consequently, the development of social capital is made difficult (Tsobanoglou, 2007a).

In Europe, the institution of social economy is more organized than in Greece. This is how the European Network of Cities and Regions for Social Economy (REVES) has been set up. Its members are 80 organizations from all over Europe, which are in line with the principles of the social economy, struggling for a socially inclusive economic development. REVES has direct contact with, and relations with, the European Union institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, and thus participates in the organization of European policies. Among the main objectives of REVES is the exchange of know-how and the constant updating and training of members. While reducing public resources, it tries to find solutions to the funding problem and improves the conditions for its members to have better access to it (Olsson & Nasioulas, 2013).

2.1.2. Social economy and local development

Nowadays, in the era of globalization, and despite world wealth and great supply of goods, large population groups suffer hunger from impoverishment and experience inequality and isolation. It is therefore perhaps more timely than ever to select and apply alternative practices that support and strengthen solidarity and coexistence. Over time, the reasons for adopting such alternative solidarity practices were two, the need to address exclusion and the need for identity and community participation (Vienney, 2008).

In other words, the problem facing the global community as well as each local community is the social integration⁵ of vulnerable population groups. These, as defined in Law 4019 of 2011, are divided into two categories. Initially, ‘vulnerable population groups’ include those who, due to physical or

⁵ “Social integration means the capacity of entering into the paid relationship system, with insurance against unemployment and family allowances system” (Tsobanoglou, 2015).

mental problems (i.e. people with disabilities) or their delinquent behaviour (i.e. addicted or drug-free), have serious difficulties in joining the social and economic life. The second category is the “special population groups” to which belong all those who, due to social, economic or cultural reasons, have difficulty accessing the labour market (Government Gazette A 216 / 30.9.2011).

The social economy, through the combination of charity and entrepreneurship, can make a significant contribution to solving working community problems. Especially in disadvantaged areas due to small population or geographical isolation, the significance of social economy is maximized, as there is no willingness to invest by private individuals due to a lack in profits. Key points for the success of the venture are the creation of business clusters and the exploitation of new technologies and information technology to increase competitiveness through linking the identity of the site and local products to their visitors and urban centres. In this direction, i.e. the exploitation of new technologies and the development of innovations, the interconnection of the area with educational institutions and universities (Tsobanoglou & Vlachopoulou, 2016) is catalytic.

In Europe already two million organizations with 150 million members and partners, representing 6% of employment, are based on the principles of the social economy. But also in Greece we can find applications of the social economy. Indicatively, let's look at two examples. The women's agro-tourism cooperatives⁶ are well-known. There, women of each region create and supply sweets, jams, traditional pasta and other local gastronomy products using local materials and traditional recipes resulting to a promotion of their region, an enhancement of the local production and an increase of their family income. Another case, one of different size, philosophy and starting point – the covering of their own particular needs – has been the establishment of a maritime cooperative where members jointly bought a ferry-boat to connect their place with Piraeus. Local development was being supported in both cases (Olsson & Nasioulas, 2012).

In the two above examples, the stakeholders (women in the Greek province and residents of the island) acted in order to provide solutions to their economic and livelihood problems and thus minimize the chances of conflicts between them. All this lead to the improvement of their quality of life and the social development of the area (Tsobanoglou, 2007α).

⁶ For more information and case examples on the Women's Agricultural Cooperatives, see Andriotis (2008)

3. Anavra of Magnesia⁷

3.1. Presentation - History

Picture 1 - Anavra, Magnesia



Anavra is a mountainous village in Magnesia, at an altitude of 1000 meters in the west of Othry, while the percentage of livestock farmers is 100%. From 2011, with the law of “Kallikratis”, the village constitutes a local community of the Municipality of Almyros. The approximately 500 permanent residents of the village continue their tradition and occupy almost 100% of livestock, small and large free-range animals. Anavra till 1924 was called “Goura” and was the center of the Demos “Othryos”. The settlement was devastated, over the past eighty years, four times. Twice due to war-time activity, during the Second World War and the Civil War that followed. Additionally, the earthquakes of 1956 and 1980 destroyed most of the community resulting to the alteration of the outlook and the traditional character of the village as the need to rebuild both the private infrastructure (houses and

⁷ The data comes from the telephone communications with Mr. Dimitris Tsoukalas, former Mayor of Anavra and current chairman of the Volunteer Organization of Anavra Magnisia for Sustainability, Environment and Culture ANAVRA-ZO, which took place on 8/3/2015 and on 28 / 5/2016. References to web sites, whether they confirm or refer to supplementary information.

workplaces) and the public (community offices, parks), required to be fulfilled. The inhabitants also turned exclusively into livestock farming, while previously were engaged also into the leather trade as well as potato cultivation (Anavra-Zo⁸ – Anavra, Mynicipality of Almyros⁹ – Anavra, Dourvos, L. A' telephone interview with the Former Mayor, Mr. Tsoukalas).

Picture 2 - Anavra's springs



Anavra's springs are interwoven with the community itself. Their significance is evidenced by the fact that they have given their name to the village. (Anavra denotes flow). The springs are located at an altitude of approximately 770 meters in central Othry and 700 meters east-southeast from the settlement. They are the sources of one of the most important tributaries of Pinios, the River Enipeas. In the past years along the river there were many hydro-powered installations, such as mantles, grooves and watermills, which were identified with the economic life of the place. Important festivals include the feast of St. Panteleimon taking place on the 27-28 of July, and Epiphany whereby water is sanctified. The mountain springs and the river have been traditionally the centre of life, both economic and religious) for

⁸ From now on the references of "Anavra-Zo" can be found at www.anavra-zo.gr, whereas for more information see the present bibliography.

⁹ From now on the references of "Mynicipality of Almyros" can be found at www.almyros-city.gr, whereas for more information see the present bibliography.

the locals. Today, it is a point of reference for both residents and visitors, since the natural environment has immense significance for the area during all seasons (Anavra-Zo- sources).

3.2. The Revival of Anavra

The modern history of Anavra is distinguished in three periods. In the first, by 1990, the community was a typical example of a mountainous Greek village where some 300 inhabitants lived with the 30,000 freely grazing animals. Infrastructures were non-existent, as there was no water supply and inland road networks. There was an asphalt road connecting it with the city of Lamia (Region of Central Greece) although it belonged to the Prefecture of Magnesia (Region of Thessaly).

The second phase begins in 1990 when a group of people headed by Mr. Dimitris Tsoukalas took over the community and ended with their departure in 2010. Important was the contribution of Tsoukalas' wife, Prof. Karali, who as an architect (Professor at the National Technical University of Athens-NTUA), conducted all the studies and supervised the infrastructure projects, and acted as a voluntary advisor to the community headed by her husband (Ignatiadis, 2010). The new administration managed to absorb a perfect 100% of both National and European Union funding, but also exploited and highlighted the two comparative advantages of the region, namely livestock farming and renewable. The statement of Mr. Tsoukalas (Dourvos A' tel. interview) is characteristic: *"... it is no coincidence that when a European programme came out, the Region of Thessaly addressed us first and then the Municipalities of the big cities because they knew that we would use the money effectively"*.

Prioritizing the needs, the first concern of the administration of the Anavra community, according to Mr. Tsoukalas (Dourvos A' και B' tel. interview), was the removal of the animals from the settlement. This was achieved by bringing together the inhabitants of the village in 23 popular assemblies in a year, and this implementation of direct democracy continued during the entire mandate of the particular Community authority, as every year 5 to 10 popular assemblies co-decided on the further movements and projects for the community. Financial incentives were also provided for the relocation of livestock to the newly established livestock farm-parks, as the cost of purchasing the units by the inhabitants was very low, and it concerned either community land or others that were provided by the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, three forage parks were developed with eighty livestock farms, which have been engaged in organic livestock farming. They build a model

meat packaging unit, the only such unit in Greece, which bears the international certifications: HACCP, ISO, EU code. It also has a line for processing biological meat. The shift to organic livestock farming has been achieved through the invitation of special scientists who have informed residents about corresponding European programs. Some breeders started first and after they succeeded, the whole of the Anavra community of breeders followed (Giannarou, 2009). The livestock parks were built at a distance of about one km from the settlement. Each livestock unit is connected by a road with the village, it is electrified and water-supplied, while each acre was granted with the symbolic price of 30 euros, so that relocation for all is accessible (Fragopoulos, Karahaliou, Giorntanova & Rahiotis, 2013).

Picture 3 - Livestock parks



Then, as Mr Tsoukalas told us, the focus was shifted to the construction of basic infrastructure facilities. The road connection with Lamia and Almyros was re-established with paved roads matched with an internal road network, plazas were created, a two-storey car park with 50 cars was built for free of charge parking, as well a combined elementary and kindergarten school for as Mr. Tsoukalas notably said he found that: “the children did their lessons in my office”. Likewise a rural infirmary was established. At the same time, free accommodation was provided for the teachers and the doc-

tors. A Citizen Service Centre, as well as two multipurpose halls with a capacity of 100 and 300 people respectively fully equipped to host meetings and other cultural activities was built. Also, a recycling system was set up (Anavra-Zo – Anavra Mynicipality of Almyros-Anavra· Dourvos A´ tel. interview).

Picture 4 - Anavra's meat processing unit



Picture 5 - Anavra's elementary school



Picture 6 - Anavra's Kindergarten



Picture 7 - Multipurpose room



Picture 8 - Parking space in Anavra's square



Picture 9 - Anavra's football stadium



Apart from the basic infrastructure, the Anavra community also proceeded with the construction of sport facilities, the promotion of culture and green development. In Anavra, a football and basketball court, a modern indoor gym (with free access), three libraries with a computer room, free internet access and creative employment of children, a Folk Art Museum of Livestock Life, as well as three climbing slopes in the surrounding area were build (Anavra-Zo – Anavra, Dourvos A' tel. interview).

Picture 10 - Folklore museum of livestock life



One of the most important projects has been the construction of landfill (1994), as well as the “Alogorachi” wind-energy farm, in 2006. The park at an altitude of 1650 meters, is the tallest in the country, it has twenty wind turbines of total power 17 MW, build by the Spanish company Gamesa (Bilanaki, 2011). Two more wind farms are currently in the planning stage. In addition to its environmental value, the existing park, and the two planned ones, contribute to the overall development of the area, as the revenues from electricity generation are providing income to the local community (Dourvos A'tel. interview).

Picture 11 - Alogorahi's wind energy park



The creation of the “Goura” Environmental Cultural Park in the springs of Anavra, which as Tsoukalas (Dourvos A’tel. interview) stated: “... are part of the identity of the village and its history”, expresses the effort to promote and exploit the second comparative advantage of the area, i.e. the natural environment which seems to have a long-lasting effect on the economic and social life of the place.

The objectives that govern the operation of the park are: a) the protection and promotion of the landscape, the preservation of folk build environment culture, such as the bridges and the watermills; b) the recreation of the visitors (c) the provision of information on environmental issues, as well as on the activities of the local population (in collaboration with the Folklore Museum of Rural Life). As a result of these objectives, the basic aim of setting up the park has been to achieve environmental awareness in order to protect the natural resources of both the community and its visitors, especially children.

The total fenced area of the park is about 240 acres and includes the springs of Anavra and the River Enipea. A number of infrastructure projects have been built to allow the park to offer its visitors the combination of hiking with resting, recreation with environmental education, learning with play and acquiring knowledge with the memories of the past. More specifically, a paved central path of about 2 km, a network of footpaths (central branches)

that reach the banks of the river, protective rails for walkers, five bridges, stone walls, stone benches and wooden tables and benches, three playgrounds, sanitary facilities and an information centre. Also a watermill and two mantas have been restored (water softeners for the softening of woollen clothes). All the pathways have been marked with information signs that guide visitors but also provide information on points of interest, flora and fauna.

Picture 12 - Perspective from the path of P.P.P. "GOYRA".



The tour of the area starts at the source gate where there is a dristella (traditional washing machine for clothes), which still works today. Moving on the path, under the shade of the trees, the visitor reaches the springs where it can be seen the first playground in combination with the resting place for the grown-ups. Prior to the eastern gate of the park, there are two churches of the 18th century. In the middle of the route is the "Kanatoula" Plateau, where there is a traditional wooden house, the information centre and a playground. The total distance of 2 km is along the river banks. The tour of the park ends at the Zangana Gate, where the restored watermill dominates, but there is also a playground with a recreation area. The tour can also take place in the exact opposite direction (Anavra-Zo - Anavra; PPR Fur-Guidance; PU Fura-The Park).

Picture 13 - Traditional house "konaki" at P.P.P. "GOURA"



As an indicator of socio-technical growth in the 1990-2000 period, Anavra was the first in Greece and the third in the European South, while during the Greek Presidency of the European Union in 2014, it was the only example of emergent growth in Greece (Papageorgiou & Tsilini, 2016; Tsoukalas, Part A). Indicative of the success of Anavra's model were the awards received by Mr. Tsoukalas and Dr. Karalis. Tsoukalas received the 2009 Social Award from the Entrepreneurship Club (Ioanna, 2009) and together with Mrs. Karali, received the "Environmental Lifetime Award" (Oikopolis, 2012).

The third period begins in 2011 and lasts until today. In 2011, Anavra was included to the "Kallikratiki" Municipality of Almyros while the country was already in the financial crisis. Due to the crisis many cuts have been made, such as the Community Doctor's office having a doctor for only two days a week. On the other hand, the central municipality, perhaps because of the distance of 40 km that separates Anavra from Almyros or because it is more developed than the other municipal districts and local communities, not only it is indifferent to the actions requested by the community but it often acting as a brake to such actions. Mr. Tsoukalas (Dourvos B' tel. interview) is categorical about the responsibilities of the administrations that followed the period from 2011 onwards in the Municipality of Almyros. Indicatively, they did not proceed: (a) to construct two more wind farms and a hydroelectric

plant to generate revenue for the local community, nor to attribute the corresponding legal revenues from the existing wind farm; (b) completion of the nursing home in the already purchased building; (c) most important of all is the construction of the biomass-based district heating plant (animal dung and tree branches), which will not only provide cheap and ecological heating for all residents but will also solve the problem from animal waste. It is remarkable that the studies of these projects were in progress or were completed, such as the study - proposal for the integration of the construction of the district heating project into the NSRF programs but was submitted under the responsibility of the Municipality. The construction of all the above would make Anavra the first and only place that would have created and operated units of all forms of Renewable Energy Sources in Greece.

The inhabitants, however, organize voluntary groups such as the Youth Club of Culture and the Association of Women of Anavra, and with the former community authority, they establish the Volos Organization of Anavra Magnesia for Sustainability, the Environment and Culture (ANAVRA-ZO). ANAVRA-ZO's action focuses on maintaining and contributing to the functioning of existing structures, as well as to the recruitment of young people, whether planned or not. The aims of the organization are: a) the protection, conservation, improvement and rehabilitation of the natural and anthropogenic environment of Anavra and the wider region according to the principles of sustainability. Particular care will be taken to develop and cultivate eco-consciousness and to raise public awareness, and in particular children, on environmental issues; preserve and develop the cultural and cultural heritage (history, monuments and sites, cultural products, institutions and events, the cultivation of behavioural and management policies, as well as the coordination of actions and mobilizations against options with adverse impact on environment and culture (ANAVRA-ZO- Aims).

Today, on the one hand, we have voluntary initiatives from ANAVRA-ZO and the associations in the direction of preserving the achievements and quality of life they have gained, as well as in the claim of young people. For example, Mr. Tsoukalas told us that: *"The reconstruction of the roof of the church of Profitis Ilias for the summer of 2016, costing 5400 €, is planned from the youth club and ANAVRA-ZO"*. Also the cultural club of young people organizes cultural events in the village, while ANAVRA-ZO organizes every year a clean-up of the settlement, as its members have assumed the function of the existing structures. For example, Dr. Karalis is responsible for the libraries and Mr. Tsoukalas hosts and guides the approximately 60 schools and other organized groups visiting Anavra and the Environmental and Cultural Park "Goura". On the other hand, despite the fact that the income of the inhabitants of the village has not diminished during the economic

crisis, they suffer from a psychological fatigue, with the consequence that their participation in the above mentioned initiatives amounts to about 50% only, whereas during the previous period of the high growth rate their participation was almost universal and reached 90% (Dourvos B' tel. interview).

During this development process the Anavra the population doubled compared to 1990¹⁰, the young people of the village do not leave or return after their studies, while unemployment and crime are zero and the income of all families is high (constantly average family income is more than 50.000 € per year). Anavra from an endangered village has become a major entity both at national and international level, as many media have dealt with the «Anavra»¹¹, phenomenon, while there are many who visit it (Georgiopolou, 2012· Dourvos B' tel. interview Fotiadi, 2012)¹².

The current state of Anavra is summarized in the following table with the SWOT¹³ analysis, and it can constitute a guideline for the further development of the community.

Table 1 - SWOT analysis for Anavra, Magnesia.

Possibilities • Learning structures of the ANAVRA Model. • Water and Milk bottling factory • Organic livestock farming. • Experience in participatory. • Hospitality Facility. • Zero unemployment and crime.	Weaknesses • Low level of participation. • No visitors infrastructure. • Relatively difficult access.
Chances • Cooperative Learning Center. • Promotion of cultural products with the use of cultural resources and local products. • Management Centre for Livestock Management.	Threats • Difficulty in finding funding sources. • Difficult relationships with the “Kalikratikos” Municipality of Almyros.

¹⁰ If there was a potentiality the community would be willing to receive more migrants.

¹¹ For more information, see (Anavra-Zo – e-press information).

¹² Indicatively, the number of people that used to participate in the organized visits of the area, during the 2009-2014 period was 14371. For more information see at the data 146_visits_table.doc available at (Anavra-Zo –Anavra).

¹³ The recording and presentation of the current situation is based on the SWOT analysis, i.e. the assessment of resources and the external environment, as well as competition to develop the potential, weaknesses, opportunities and risks for the community (Floros, 1993.).

Looking at Anavra itself, in relation to other communities, we can identify its strengths, which are, in particular, those that the Anavra citizens succeeded in achieving in the 1990-2000 period. More specifically, the infrastructures build have been satisfactory. The easy access, with the roads that were built in this period and connected by road, both with Almyros and with Lamia, is another basic development. The increase in traffic, as in recent years more and more want to get to know the phenomenon “Anavra”. Additionally, positive experience is the experience gained with the high level of participation by the local community. Finally, making the most of the comparative advantages of the community, such as the development of organic livestock farming and the renewable energy along with the “Goura” Environmental and Cultural Park, contributed to the reduction of unemployment, the elimination of poverty and crime, thereby improving the quality of life. The combination of all the above, provides Anavra with a cultural identity that is recognizable and distinct from other communities.

Residents seem to be content with what they have already achieved as a whole, but also with what everyone enjoys in their family, which minimizes the chances for future growth. The lack of tourist infrastructure that would allow potential visitors to fulfil their wishes but would also bring benefits to the local community at an economic, social and cultural level by giving rise to new jobs and professions is something that needs to be developed.

Studying the external environment of Anavra, we see that there are opportunities. With the achievements so far, Anavra can be seen as the leading community initiative for rural communities in Greece. The Anavra community itself can harness its cultural resources and highlight local products for better future results. Finally, as success has been based on cooperation between members, collaborations with external factors such as university departments or faculties this could be a challenging project to develop in other parts of Greece.

Difficulties and threats from the external environment are the general economic crisis and, in particular, the difficulty of finding funds, either from national resources or from European programs, to create further energy based for instance infrastructure. The poor cooperation with the Almyros Municipality, is a key point that needs to be further explored.

4. Conclusions

In today’s globalized world, it is more timely than ever, every society small ore bigger, to strive to achieve its social development. In particular,

local communities in small areas, regardless of whether initiatives are undertaken by Local Authorities or formally organized or non-social groups, should try to take advantage of the comparative advantages and peculiarities of their place, with the ultimate goal of firstly creating favourable living conditions and good quality of life for community members and secondly offering high quality experiences to its visitors.

As we have seen above, Anavra is a mountainous village that in the early 1980s was in danger of extinction. The reason for the start of the recovery effort was Dimitris Tsoukalas, who set a priority as a guide for the solution of the problem, to exploit the comparative advantages of his village. Firstly, due to its geographical location, Anavra has the advantage of the natural environment and natural beauty. The other advantage of Anavra is livestock farming, the main occupation for almost all residents.

A key point was that Anavra had a core of inhabitants, who were in productive working ages, and whom Mr Tsoukalas managed to make them part of his vision. In 2011, with the law of “Kallikrates”, Anavra is included in the Municipality of Almyros. The distance of 40 km separating the mountain Anavra from the plain of Almyros and the different characteristics and needs of the two, in connection with the economic crisis that has already begun in our country, have negative consequences for the further development of the village.

In the case of Anavra, the quality of life of the inhabitants is very high with good infrastructure, no unemployment and crime and very high per capita income.

It is noteworthy that while Anavra is a model of local development Prof. Karalis, has not received the appropriate attention from the academic community.

Regardless of the results achieved so far, it is necessary to continue the effort aiming at the preservation of the achievements so far.

The creation of a cooperative modelling and preparation for local products would further strengthen the productive structure of the village. The development of alternative forms of tourism, such as the creation of agro-tourism and ecotourism units, a forest village, would allow village visitors to live rural life in Anavra. To further enhance their cultural identity they could set an Anavra House in Volos and Lamia and Athens which should have also a restaurant using their meat products as unique culinary delights. Enhancing accessibility in the region and further development of Anavra as a National Center for Education of Rural Life and Environmental Learning.

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
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


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