

WORLD'S FAIRS

IN THE



COLD WAR

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE CULTURE OF PROGRESS

EDITED BY ARTHUR P. MOLELLA & SCOTT GABRIEL KNOWLES

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix

INTRODUCTION

The World's Fair in of the Era of the Cold War: Science, Technology, and the Culture of Progress 3

Arthur P. Molella and Scott Gabriel Knowles

PART I. Setting the Stage: The World's Fair in the Era of the Cold War

1. Expo '58: Nucleus for a New Europe 11

Stuart W. Leslie and Joris Mercelis

2. Soviet-American Rivalry at Expo '58 27

Anthony Swift

3. Atoms for Peace in Brussels and Osaka: World's Fairs and the Shaping of Japanese Attitudes to Nuclear Power 46

Morris Low

PART II. Theater of Conflict: North America and the Cold War State

4. Bringing the Fair to Town: Harrison "Buzz" Price and International Expositions in the United States after 1945 57

James D. Skee

5. "The Future Isn't What It Used to Be": Optimism and Anxiety, 1939 and 1964 66

Robert H. Kargon

6. 1964 and the State of the City 77

Katie Uva

PART III. Theater of Conflict: North America and Cold War Culture

7. Advancing an Optimistic Technological Narrative in an Age of Skepticism: General Electric and Walt Disney's Progressland at the 1964–1965 New York World's Fair 87

Michelle Demeter

8. The Human Spirit in an Age of Machines: The Pietà and the Computer at the 1964–1965 New York World's Fair 96

Arthur P. Molella

9. Cold War Food: Consumption and Technology at the New York World's Fair, 1964–1965 109

Emanuela Scarpellini

10. Billy Graham: The Fifth Dimension at the 1964–1965 New York World's Fair 118

Mary Ann Borden

11. "Massy and Classy": Dressing American Women at Expo '67 128

Daniela Sheinin

12. "The Changing Role of Women in a Changing World": Universal Womanhood at HemisFair '68 137

Abigail M. Markwyn

Color plates follow page 150

PART IV. Theater of Conflict: Asia and Australia

13. A Garden City for Progress and Harmony: Singapore at the Osaka 1970 Expo 161

Ellan F. Spero

14. Cultural Diplomacy Down Under: US Sports Diplomacy at Brisbane's Expo '88 172

Martin J. Manning

PART V. Endings and New Beginnings

15. The Cold War, a Cool Medium, and the Postmodern Death of World Expos 183

Luca Massidda

16. Does the World's Fair Still Matter? Discovering New Worlds after 1989 194

Scott Gabriel Knowles

NOTES 213

BIBLIOGRAPHY 257

CONTRIBUTORS 277

INDEX 281

The Cold War, a Cool Medium, and the Postmodern Death of World Expos

LUCA MASSIDDA

WORLD EXPOS DIED IN OSAKA, Japan, on September 13, 1970, when the universal fair dedicated to “Progress and Harmony for All Mankind” closed its doors. After 183 days from its opening, the recorded attendance for the first Asian world exposition was of 64,218,770 visitors. Never before had an expo experienced such an audience. The previous record belonged to two events, the Exposition Universelle of Paris in 1900, and the one in Montreal in 1967: both these expos “punched” more than 50 million tickets. In the three years between the late 1960s and early 1970s, world expos seduced almost 115 million people and conquered two new extraordinary territories: Canada, which seemed able to gather together the legacy of European and American fairs; and especially Japan, which for the first time opened the huge Asian market to world expo shows. Nevertheless after Osaka 1970 no other Bureau of International Expositions (BIE)-recognized universal expositions were organized for the following twenty-two years.¹

This chapter explores the reasons for this unexpected disappearance of officially sanctioned expos. It analyzes the apparent incompatibility between the logics of the postmodern age and the cultural forms of world expos, focusing on three interconnected dimensions: the features of late capitalism, the crisis

LUCA MASSIDDA

of urban space, and TV's media hegemony. The title of this chapter plays on a famous passage in Charles Jencks's *The Post-Modern Language of Architecture*, wherein the American architectural critic pinpointed the precise moment in which *modern architecture* died. It was “in St Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3.32 p.m. (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks, were given the final *coup de grâce* by dynamite. . . . Boom, boom, boom.”² A new cultural season—the postmodern age—was on the way. And, coincidentally, there was no more *space* for world expos. What are the reasons for this *strange death*? Why is it that postmodernity and world expos seem so *distant*?

It is not a cultural issue. Quite the contrary. Since their beginnings, world expos have been a spectacularly successful instrument capable of mastering both the languages of modernism and of postmodernism, the formal rigor of the former and the unregulated bricolage of the latter, the utopianism of the one and the playful superficiality of the other. Not only are expos perfectly able to express “the cultural logic of late capitalism,”³ but “they are consistent with, and anticipate, many features of contemporary ‘post-modern’ culture that we often wrongly assume to be unique to, and characteristic of, our times.”⁴ The reasons for the crisis of this modern apparatus in the years of postmodernism are more complex. Let's begin the investigation.

1958–1970: EXPOS WORK

Borrowing an expression of Eric Hobsbawm to describe another moment in the history of capitalism, I've called the postmodern death of the world expos *strange*.⁵ Strange because in many ways during the years immediately before their disappearance expos seemed to be in excellent shape. Brussels 1958, Montreal 1967, Osaka 1970: after the Second World War expos were a booming enterprise. It seemed a banner moment for world fairs. First, in terms of audiences: Brussels registered 41,454,412 visitors, Montreal 50,306,648, Osaka, as already noted, 64,218,770. Twelve years, three events,⁶ and three continents: in the middle of the twentieth century, world expos for the first time put their shows on a truly global stage. Behind these numbers, we can see the expo as a robust cultural apparatus, keeping intact its principal functions: it seduces mass publics, it holds governments' interest (both at national and urban levels), it conquers the collective imagination, it visualizes our technological future, it restores social ties, it shapes personal and collective memory.

Restoring Social Ties

From the beginning the main function of the universal exhibitions was to heal, materially and symbolically, wounds in the social fabric. London 1851 relieved

tensions, at the political, social, and economic level generated by the Industrial Revolution, and convinced the masses, alienated from factory labor and bewildered by everyday life in the metropolis, to get on the train of modern progress with enthusiasm and hope. In Paris the most memorable pages in expos' history, like the novels of Balzac, Zola, Flaubert, helped modern society to make sense of a time distinguished by major social unrest, political conflicts, and cultural innovations: the 1848 Revolution, the Second Empire, Haussmann's renovation of Paris, the Franco-Prussian War, the Siege of Paris, the Paris Commune, the Third Republic. Even in the United States the universal exhibitions had a similar crucial *raison d'être*, thanks to their phantasmagorical ability to "turn the page" to the future. This was true for the first Chicago exhibition (1893) which, following the catastrophe of the city's Great Fire, showed the world the extraordinary American ability to build their own future. And this was even more true for the two events that tried to make America forget the disaster of the Great Depression: Chicago 1933, and, for the first time, New York 1939–1940. Here, before world war darkened the horizon again, the visitors to the New York World's Fair witnessed the amazingly hopeful "World of Tomorrow."

Nineteen years later, Brussels also used the expo to announce the beginning of a new era. "Balance for a more Humane World," the theme chosen for the event, gave the world the perfect opportunity to leave behind the traumas of the Second World War. The mythopoetic ability of world expositions was still on display: the terrible threat of the nuclear bomb was tamed in the form of a friendly energy that promised, as symbolized by the Atomium, a future of peace, prosperity, and progress. Japan would clearly need more time to free itself from the trauma of wartime defeat and to fill the void of meaning and hope left by the atomic bomb. But to be convinced that the worst was over, it again appealed to the thaumaturgical powers of the world's fair.⁷ In the studies by David Anderson and Hiroyuki Shimizu on long-term memories of expo visitors, Osaka 1970 is shown to be a great collective rite of passage that allowed Japanese society to be reborn: "There was a national self-realization of hope that Japan had emerged just 25 years after the complete devastation of World War II."⁸ Even in Montreal's Expo '67, three years earlier, the world's fair showed an ability to continue to play an effective role as a social glue and anesthetic for political tensions. In the years when the Canadian national identity was strongly and violently challenged, "The Man and His World" gave to the North American country the chance to stop, at least momentarily, the conflict between the federal government and Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) separatists, and the opportunity to affirm with enthusiasm and conviction, on national and world stages, the unity and greatness of the Canadian nation.

Charming (the) Public

Until the oil crisis of 1973 the three main exhibition events of the second postwar period appeared to show a substantial continuity in the forms and successes of staging, compared to what happened in the early modern expos: stunning the visitor with "an immense accumulation of commodities,"⁹ surprising the viewer with technological innovations, and turning the public itself into a spectacular attraction. The three wild cards that historically have ensured the success of the great universal exhibitions were also played by the three late twentieth-century events that we are analyzing. According to Eco, Montreal Expo's special reporter, it was the phantasmagoria of the assemblage—"an enormous gathering of evidence from Stone to Space," "an accumulation of objects useless and precious," "an immense catalogue of things produced by man in all countries"—that made the Canadian event of 1967 an "unsurpassed, quintessential, classic World's Fair."¹⁰ We should not be surprised, then, if Eco, in describing the impression that such a collection of goods leaves on the visitor's exhausted sensory apparatus, resorted to virtually the same words that seventy years before Georg Simmel had used to sum up the meaning of his visit to the Berlin industrial exhibition of the 1896:¹¹ "The objects are not desired in themselves, although the show is enjoyed as a whole; every wish is gone and what remains is pure amusement and excitement."¹²

But it should also be said that in the 1950s and 1960s the postwar expos continued to be successful because it was on their stages that the new wonders of science, as well as the cutting-edge technologies of our near future, were presented in displayed objects but also in the frames in which they were presented. Thus Brussels showed the immersive and multimedia future of entertainment, through the *Poème électronique* that Le Corbusier composed on the hyperbolic paraboloids of his Philips Pavilion (designed together with Yannis Xenakis). Expo '67 restored some of the technological marvels that historically had guaranteed the success of an expo: if the Paris expositions invented the Metro, Montreal made it travel underwater; if Paxton's Crystal Palace, with its transparency, challenged the architectonic boundary between inside and outside, Buckminster Fuller, with his geodesic dome, communicated "the possibility of privacy without eliminating the rest of the world."¹³ The expos' long tradition of screen experiments,¹⁴ increasingly wide and immersive, found its ultimate technological celebration in the 360-degree projection of the Bell Pavilion.¹⁵ Osaka 1970 updated the long list of technological innovations: the magnetic levitation trains, mobile phone technology, and the first-ever IMAX film—anticipations of our mobile, visual, and ever-connected future.

A key factor in the expos' success was also their ability to showcase, at the historical level, the "elsewhere": the different, the exotic, the foreign. If Brussels

still lingers in our minds for the last anachronistic presentation of the human zoo¹⁶ in a world discovering itself as a global village, space was the new frontier that expos wanted to offer to their public: Brussels had Sputnik, Montreal an Apollo space capsule, and Osaka the moonstone brought back by the astronauts of the Apollo 11 mission just eight months earlier. In between the Seattle exhibition focused on Space.

From the beginning, however, the exhibitions' real show, its "ultimate spectacle,"¹⁷ was that of their audience¹⁸—for its size, its heterogeneous composition, and its always amazing discipline.¹⁹ Let us again borrow the stories collected by David Anderson (with Viviane Gosselin) on Expos '67 and '70. Along with the spectacle of the pavilions and their setups (first among everything, as mentioned, the wonders of technology), the image of the public was one of the main themes that recur, even after many years, in the memories of expo visitors. When you were lucky enough to have an exceptional encounter.²⁰ When you realized that an expo was yet, as Victor Hugo wrote in his *Paris 1876* guide,²¹ *le monde voisinant*.²² When you were surprised by the disciplined behavior of the crowds.²³ But the image most traditional and most significant of the expos' visitors after the Second World War is the one of the Brussels inauguration. In Expo '58 Jonathan Coe describes that moment:

On the morning of Thursday, 17 April 1958, the Brussels World's Fair was declared open by King Baudouin Albeert Charles Léopold Axel Marie Gustave de Belgique. The King entered the Exposition site by the Porte Royale, and was then driven along the Avenue de la Dynastie, accompanied by the Prime Minister and the members of the royal family. The avenue was lined with cheering crowds . . . and the royal procession was marked with a fly-past of aeroplanes which formed a letter "B" in the colors of the Belgian flag—although, as regards this last detail, Sylvia, watching at home on her black-and-white television, had to take the commentator's word for it. *She was transfixed, in any case, by the novelty of watching the event live on television.*²⁴

Cold War, Hot Shows

In Coe's description, the live audience at the event seems to coexist with the home television audience. Soon it would not be so. In 1958 the framing power of the black-and-white, low-definition, small TV screen did not yet seem capable of threatening the expo's success. If with television the media introduced a technological innovation designed, intentionally or not, to play a decisive role in the eventual postmodern delegitimization of world's fairs, in the immediate aftermath of the war the nation-states' power system created conditions still ideal for the success of the expos' apparatus. In the Cold War climate universal exhibitions offered an extraordinary opportunity for self-representation to the




Fig. 15.1. US Pavilion interior at the Universal Exposition of 1967, Montreal, Quebec. Source: Guerinf, Wikimedia Commons.

two rival superpowers.²⁵ The United States and the USSR transformed the post-Second World War expos into arenas where the two "empires" could claim the superiority of their own development models and lifestyles. The two different visions of the world challenged each other in the architectural styles chosen for their pavilions and in the narratives of their displays.²⁶ It was a battle of self-images that the first postwar expos wonderfully showcased: in Brussels the pavilions of the two superpowers faced each other in the Square of Nations²⁷ to convince the visitors²⁸ (and the world) of their superiority, offering a "condensed, powerful visualization of the Cold War."²⁹

Nine years later in Montreal, when the American involvement in the Vietnam War was about to reach its peak, the two states faced each other again on the grounds of a world's fair. Again the battle materialized in the construction and arrangement of the respective national pavilions, one just across the way from the other. On this occasion, however, Buckminster Fuller's geodesic dome got the better of the glass rectangular structure and swooping roof of the Soviet Pavilion. Before, results had been in the field of battle (the US Army was facing its most dramatic defeat in Vietnam) or in the field of scientific innovation (in 1967 the ending of the space race hung in the balance). The decisive turning point for the outcome of the Cold War was cultural: in the revolutionary structure of "Bucky's Bubble,"³⁰ capitalism demonstrated that it was capable of playing with

the rising contradictions of late modernity (the cybernetic modernism of architecture coexisted with the pop bricolage of the Creative American assemblage);³¹ in contrast, the Soviet system was frozen in the unproductive dialectics between “the formal idiom of the industrialized society” which inspired its pavilion and the heavy rigidity of the pure Stalinist-style big stone *Sickle and Hammer* in front of it (see plate 9).³²

At Expo '70 the most popular pavilions on site still belonged to the United States and the USSR. In an atmosphere of intense Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers, space science continued to be a major theme. This time the completion of the Space Race could celebrate its winner. Under the air-supported cable roof of its pavilion, America could display its trophy (a piece of moon rock) and pay tribute to its heroes (the visits of the astronauts, Charles Conrad Jr., Richard F. Gordon Jr., and Alan L. Bean, from the Apollo 12 mission).³³

Why then, after the three successes of Brussels, Montreal and Osaka, did the world seem to lose any interest in universal exhibitions? How can we explain twenty-two years of absence separating Osaka 1970 from Seville 1992?

1970–1992: THE POSTMODERN DEATH OF WORLD EXPOS

In our interpretation, the main function historically played by universal expositions in industrial modernity has been that of helping subjectivities, violently disoriented by the traumas of the Industrial Revolution, to “live” the new social system.³⁴ If we continue to adopt this perspective, the postmodern disappearance of world exhibitions must find its main justifications again in this dimension. At the level of the forms of dwelling there are two determinant discontinuities that characterize the postmodern age: the crisis of the city as privileged space of the capitalist social system and the definitive affirmation of television as the “defining technology”³⁵ of the late twentieth-century media environment. Two material revolutions in the daily life of the last quarter of the twentieth century are closely linked. The development of the suburban sprawl, the mythology of the small neighborhood community, the living ideal of the single-family terraced house wouldn't have worked if, at the height of its commercial maturity, the extraordinary capacity of television to concentrate the totality of cultural consumption in the private space of the house³⁶ had not counterbalanced this centrifugal tension of lifestyles. The escape, material and symbolic, from the big city,³⁷ from its spaces and its shows, couldn't have worked without the availability of the comfortable TV refuge, which was “not just the product of the suburbanisation of the modern world, but [was] itself suburbanising.”³⁸

In this new social environment of television and suburbia—totally privatized, fully home-oriented, and daily saturated with entertainment—there is no longer a place for world expos.

A New Social Geography: Television Rules, Expos Die

Marshall McLuhan was the first to understand the structurally atopic dimension of electronic communication: “Many analysts have been misled by electric media because of the seeming ability of these media to extend man's spatial powers of organization. Electric media, however, abolish the spatial dimension, rather than enlarge it.”³⁹ The city itself—which has constituted the privileged space of industrial modernity—is made obsolete by the tribal tendency of the new “media galaxy.” In the mid-1980s it was Joshua Meyrowitz, in the moment of maximum splendor of television communication, who resumed McLuhan's media theory and analyzed in detail the characteristics of the new “situational geography” of social life⁴⁰ imposed by television's hegemony. Leading to “a nearly total dissociation of physical place and social ‘place,’” the media system dominated by the small television screen had deeply restructured the situational geography of postmodern social life.⁴¹ In this new social environment, where “watching a program on television, therefore, is like stopping to watch an event in a public park,”⁴² there was no more space for the expo mega-event. This was not simply a content-related problem. Between these two different cultural forms—television and expos—there was a structural incompatibility.⁴³ The “convulsive sensuous participation”⁴⁴ required by TV as a *cool medium* seemed able to totally subsume the desire to participate which historically had moved the world expos' audiences. Making the world a *global village* and offering it on its small screen, television changed in a traumatic way the situational geography of the viewer-consumer experience and broke the “traditional relationship between physical location and access to social information.”⁴⁵

How could universal expositions survive in a context in which access to social information no longer passed through the physical setting in a specific public space? As a cultural apparatus that found its meaning and its social function in the spectacular occupation of a public space—where the gigantism of the staging and the exceptional festivity of the event served as the composition of a collective ritual capable of relaxing social tensions in the festive conviviality of a mass audience and to “tame” disoriented urban crowds to the new social order of industrial modernity—how could world expos coexist with a medium that had destroyed the specificity of time and space, dismissing the idea that there could exist “special places for special stages of life”?⁴⁶

Television and Mega-events: Olympics Rise, Expos Fall

Inside the small television screen there is instead a lot of space for the Olympics. The postmodern turn and the coming of a television-age media environment marked a significant discontinuity in the role of mega-events.⁴⁷ If the world ex-

pos withdrew, almost to disappear, in front of the television troops' advance, the Olympics—which were historically reborn as a minor show hosted on the stages of the main exhibition event—found in the new media environment the ideal conditions for their success. While expos and TV, in their respective logics and specific languages, rapidly revealed themselves as substantially incompatible cultural forms, between the small television screen and the great Olympic ceremony immediately emerged a peculiar affinity. The Olympics, in contrast to the expos, demonstrated their innate “capacity to dramatize and globalize ‘the present’ in the form of a ‘media event.’”⁴⁸ There was no way that the old world’s fairs could compete “with the capacity of sport mega-events to be transformed by television into ‘media events’ . . . and global dramas, simultaneously watched by hundreds of millions of people around the world.”⁴⁹ There seemed to be no possibility of *remediation*⁵⁰ between exhibitions and television. In contrast to almost all the other media—and most of traditional live shows—the great universal exhibitions were not able to reshape their forms to be part of the small television screen, that therefore *refused* to give them the privileged status of *media event*.⁵¹

It is enough to compare the list of the cities that during the twenty years of the postmodern season hosted Olympics and expos to understand how television’s hegemony is characterized by the triumph of the sport mega-event and the absolute downsizing of the cultural exhibition. With their regular four-year term, the 1970s and 1980s hosted five Olympic editions: Munich (1972), Montreal (1976), Moscow (1980), Los Angeles (1984), and Seoul (1988). From the European tradition to Korean innovation, the Olympic Games in this period touched five big cities, three continents, and two “empires.” In the television age Olympic Games became one of the main stages for global politics and international relations. In its cultural dimension, the Cold War was fought here too, in the rival and consecutive meetings of Moscow and Los Angeles, in their respective boycotts, in the spectacular occasions of a conflict that could “finally” burn on a sports (battle)field.⁵² To this centrality—economic, political, sociocultural—of the Olympics corresponds, if not the marginality, certainly the substantial downsizing of the expo mega-event. If the first-category world exhibitions completely disappeared from the social and cultural horizon of postmodernity, in the years that separate Osaka 1970 from Seville 1992, according to the BIE classification, eleven lower-level international or specialized exhibitions were organized. Looking at Table 15.1, we find clear signs that certify the postmodern crisis of the expos. World exhibitions disappear completely from the scene for twenty-two years. For at least fifteen years, until the Japanese appointment of Tsukuba 1985, specialized and international exhibitions substantially lost a credible global dimension in the relationship between visitors and participants, instead moving on a local or at best national horizon. The “expositive” hub of late capitalism is

Table 15.1. EXPOS IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1970–1992)

Years	Host City	Category	Visitors	Participants (Countries)
1970	Osaka (JAP)	World Exhibition	64,218,770	78
1971	Budapest (HUN)	Special Exposition	1,900,000	52
1974	Spokane (US)	Special Exposition	5,600,000	10
1975	Okinawa (JAP)	Special Exposition	3,485,750	35
1981	Plovdiv (BUL)	International Specialized Expo	n.a.	n.a.
1982	Knoxville (US)	International Specialized Expo	11,127,780	16
1984	New Orleans (US)	International Specialized Expo	7,335,000	15
1985	Tsukuba (JAP)	International Specialized Expo	20,334,727	48
1985	Plovdiv (BUL)	International Specialized Expo	1,000,000	73
1986	Vancouver (CAN)	International Specialized Expo	22,111,578	55
1988	Brisbane (AUS)	International Specialized Expo	18,560,447	36
1991	Plovdiv (BUL)	International Specialized Expo	n.a.	8
1992	Seville (SPA)	World Exhibition	41,814,571	108

Note: n.a. = not available

Source: Bureau International des Expositions, www.bie-paris.org/site/en/expo-index

Plovdiv, Bulgaria, host city of three events in ten years (1981, 1985, 1991). Less than a half century before the capital of world’s fairs’ land was Paris.

Starting with Seville 1992, the universal exhibitions made a spectacular comeback. In the four events of the new millennium, more than 135 million visitors have queued in Hanover (2000), Aichi (2005), Shanghai (2010), and Milan (2015) to participate in the spectacle of an expo. How is it possible? What has changed compared to the depression of the postmodern period? Once again it is a matter of geography. After the “short” suburban season of postmodernity, the informational revolution again upsets the spatial morphology of capitalist society. “Globalization, the rise of the new information technologies, the intensifying of transnational and translocal dynamics”:⁵³ these three tendencies, structurally atopic, paradoxically replace the city at the center of the world system, “demystifying the notion of placelessness of innovation in the Information Age.”⁵⁴ This *spatial turn* again puts metropolis at the center of the social system and gives expo a new opportunity for staging its shows. Once again the spatial turn is a media revolution. To change the social geography of contemporary society, it is necessary that a new means of communication subvert the “in-slippers” hegemony of TV: “The advent of the digital age . . . clearly dislodges television from its dominant position overseeing the media industry landscape.”⁵⁵ Television certainly doesn’t disappear, but it is forced to come to terms with the strongly spatial bias of digital technologies. The new media environment—networked, mobile, and social—is thus configured, in its essence, as a “hybrid system.”⁵⁶

And so we return to Marshall McLuhan: "The hybrid or the meeting of two media is a moment of truth and revelation from which new form is born. For the parallel between two media holds us on the frontiers between forms that snap us out of the Narcissus-narcosis. The moment of the meeting of media is a moment of freedom and release from the ordinary trance and numbness imposed by them on our senses."⁵⁷ In the early 1990s, the digital alarm stops the television narcosis. It's time for awakening. Also for world expos . . .

CHAPTER 15. THE COLD WAR, A COOL MEDIUM, AND THE POSTMODERN DEATH OF WORLD EXPOS

1. Between 1970 and 1992 many international expos were organized (or "international specialized expos"), but none of them represented a first-category fair, a *world expo*.
2. Charles Jencks, *The Post-Modern Language of Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1977), 9.
3. Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991).
4. Maurice Roche, *Mega Events and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2000), 67.
5. Eric Hobsbawm uses this expression to describe the paradoxical end of the "world of bourgeois liberalism advancing towards . . . its 'strange death' as it reaches its apogee, victim of the very contradictions inherent in its advance"; *Age of Empire: 1875–1914* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 10.
6. In the middle, there was also a fourth event, Seattle 1962. While the other three world's fairs that we are analyzing are all classified as *exposition générale 1ère catégorie*, the American one is classified as a second-category universal exhibition (a distinction abrogated with the protocol signed by the BIE in 1972). This also explains the smaller size of the event dedicated to the theme "Living in the Space Age": less than 9 million visitors.
7. Sandra Wilson, "Exhibiting a New Japan: The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 and Expo'70 in Osaka," *Historical Research* 85, no. 227 (2012): 159–78.
8. David Anderson and Hiroyuki Shimizu, "Recollections of Expo 70: Visitors' Experiences and the Retention of Vivid Long-Term Memories," *Curator: The Museum Journal* 50, no. 4 (2007): 438.
9. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (London, 1859), 19.
10. Umberto Eco, "A Theory of Expositions," *Dot Zero* 4 (1967): 5–10.
11. "In the face of richness and diversity of what is offered, the only unifying and colourful factor is that of amusement"; Georg Simmel, "The Berlin Trade Exhibition," *Theory, Culture & Society* 8, no. 3 (1991): 119–23.
12. Eco, "Theory of Expositions."
13. Eco, "Theory of Expositions."
14. Monika Gagnon and Janine Marchessault, eds., *Reimagining Cinema: Film at Expo 67* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014).
15. Judith Shatnoff, "Expo 67: A Multiple Vision," *Film Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (1967): 2–13.
16. Brussels 1958 was the last universal exhibition to host a "human zoo" exhibiting for the Belgian Congo section an anachronistic *village indigène*, "where several dozen Congolese artisans demonstrated their skills to the audience and sold the products manufactured there"; Luis Ángel Sánchez Gómez, "Human Zoos or Ethnic Shows? Essence and Contingency in Living Ethnological Exhibitions," *Culture & History Digital Journal* 2, no. 2 (2013): 22. The failure of this attraction ended the popular phenomenon of "savages" exhibition: "The last exposition of the savage . . . was in Brussels in 1958, and met with

such criticism that the organisers were forced to close it down. The reasons given for the death of the savage are a bored public and the desire by colonial power to emphasise the assimilation of the savage into modernity. The savage, it seemed, had been tamed. In truth, the age of empire was over"; Ian McLean, "Reinventing the Savage," *Third Text* 26, no. 5 (2012): 599–613.

17. Tony Bennett, "The Exhibitionary Complex," in *Representing the Nation: A Reader. Histories, Heritage and Museums*, ed. David Boswell and Jessica Evans, 332–61 (London: Routledge, 1999).

18. In his account of his visit to the Parisian exhibition of 1867 Mark Twain perfectly described the sex appeal of the crowds: "Of course we visited the renowned International Exposition. All the world did that. We went there on our third day in Paris—and we stayed there nearly two hours. That was our first and last visit. To tell the truth, we saw at a glance that one would have to spend weeks—yea, even months—in that monstrous establishment to get an intelligible idea of it. It was a wonderful show, but the moving masses of people of all nations we saw there were a still more wonderful show. I discovered that if I were to stay there a month, I should still find myself looking at the people instead of the inanimate objects on exhibition"; *The Innocents Abroad, or The New Pilgrims' Progress* (New York: American Publishing Company, 1869), 62.

19. As early as 1851 Queen Victoria noted in amazement in her diary the total absence of accidents recorded during the crowded inauguration of the Great Exhibition: "It had been estimated that between 5 and 700,000 people had been assembled in the Park that day! Inside the building there were between 20 and 30,000," nevertheless "there had not been one accident on the 1st of May, nor one Police Report"; cited in Charles R. Fay, *Palace of Industry, 1851: A Study of the Great Exhibition and Its Fruits* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 51. The first mega-event in modern history. And the first mass public. More than half a million people in Hyde Park. More than twenty thousand in the Crystal Palace. Not even one accident. Not even one police report. And yet they were the years when the first metropolitan crowds terrorized the public order keepers and committed social scientists in an alarmed effort to outline their undisciplined profile.

20. "We were about to take the Metro [subway] to go to the Expo site, when suddenly a group of policemen came to us and pushed us aside saying 'Make way! Make way!' We then saw General de Gaulle walking to the metro with his entourage. The President of France was taking the Metro to go to Expo site; imagine that! It went so fast. I was so close to him, I could have touched him!"; David Anderson and Viviane Gosselin, "Private and Public Memories of Expo 67: A Case Study of Recollections of Montreal's World's Fair, 40 Years after the Event," *Museum and Society* 6, no. 1 (2008): 5.

21. Victor Hugo, *Paris 1867* (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1867).

22. "It was also the first time to see many foreigners walking about. It was the first time for me to see the entire race of humans celebrating together. The thing that I was most surprised at was the fact that there were just so many different kinds/races of people there"; Anderson and Shimizu, "Recollections of Expo 70," 444.

23. "One thing surprised me. In Montreal, people when taking the bus, would push each other. They were very rude. So I thought, 'What will happen when they'll take the Metro at Expo?' Nothing had happened. People were so civilized; all in ranks; same thing on Expo Site. I remember saying to my relatives from out-of-town, 'Don't worry, people are very respectful.' Same thing when we would be waiting in line to get in the pavilions. The cleanliness was also surprising; so many people and yet nobody misbehaving"; Anderson and Gosselin, "Private and Public Memories of Expo 67," 5–6.

24. Jonathan Coe, *Expo 58* (London: Viking, 2013), 80.

25. See, for example, Jack Masey and Conway Lloyd Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations: US Exhibitions and Their Role in the Cultural Cold War* (Zurich: Lars Müller Publishers, 2008); Andrew James Wulf, *US International Exhibitions during the Cold War: Winning Hearts and Minds Through Cultural Diplomacy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015); Vladimir Paperny, "Hot and Cold War in Architecture of Soviet Pavilions," in *Architecture of Great Expositions 1937–1959: Messages of Peace, Images of War*, ed. Rika Devos, Alexander Ortenberg, and Vladimir Paperny, 81–97 (London: Routledge, 2016).

26. We have already seen how the United States and the USSR in Brussels 1958, Montreal 1967, and Osaka 1970 transferred the battle for the conquest of space to their pavilions.

27. In the history of world exhibitions, the most spectacular interstate contest was hosted by Paris in 1937, when at the foot of the Eiffel Tower, the Soviet and Nazi Pavilions faced each other in an architectural duel: from one side the *Worker and Kolkhoz Woman* sculpture realized by Vera Mukhina and on the other the eagle Albert Speer placed on the roof of his monumental building.

28. "The Square of Nations was the most-visited area of all: 92,6% of the fairgoers came to see the USA pavilion and 92,4% the USSR pavilion, the highest rates on site"; Rika Devos, "A Cold War Sketch: The Visual Antagonism of the USA vs. the USSR at Expo 58," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 87, nos. 3–4 (2009): 723–42.

29. Devos, "A Cold War Sketch."

30. Daniela Sheinin, "Kookie Thoughts: Imagining the United States Pavilion at Expo 67 (or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bubble)," *Journal of Transnational American Studies* 5, no. 1 (2013), <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6c81k3t1>.

31. See, for example: Asa McKercher, "The Art of Soft Power at Expo 67: Creative America and Cultural Diplomacy in the US Pavilion," *Journal of Curatorial Studies* 5, no. 3 (2016): 368–89; Jean-François Côté, "Andy Warhol at Expo 67: Pop In and Pop Out," in *Expo 67: Not Just a Souvenir*, ed. Rhona Richman Kenneally and Johanne Sloan, 163–75 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

32. Eco, "A Theory of Expositions."

33. Wilson, "Exhibiting a New Japan."

34. Luca Massidda, *Atlante delle grandi esposizioni universali: Storia e geografia del medium espositivo* (Roma-Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011).

35. David J. Bolter, *Turing's Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).
36. Roger Silverstone, *Television and Everyday Life* (London: Routledge, 1994).
37. Brian Berry, "Urbanization and Counter-Urbanization," *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews* 11 (1976).
38. Silverstone, *Television and Everyday Life*, 54.
39. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 255.
40. Joshua Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 6.
41. Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place*, 115.
42. Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place*, 83.
43. "The rise of television . . . in the post-war period created powerful new competition for the expo genre. Television undermined the attraction of the expos' periodic summations of 'modernity' and 'progress' in science, technology and art and their promotion of touristic consumerism through its weekly flow of informational, educational and advertising programming"; Roche, *Mega Events and Modernity*, 159.
44. McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 314.
45. Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place*, 105.
46. Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place*, 157.
47. Maurice Roche, "Mega-events, Time and Modernity: On Time Structures in Global Society," *Time & Society* 12 (2003): 99–126.
48. Roche, "Mega-events, Time and Modernity," 102.
49. Roche, "Mega-events, Time and Modernity," 107.
50. David J. Bolter and Richard Grusin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
51. According to the classification of media events' pathologies proposed by Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, a media event is *refused* when there isn't the broadcaster's endorsement, while that of the organizers and public is guaranteed. Dayan and Katz, *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 69.
52. Luca Massidda and Stefania Parisi, "Too Big, Will Fail: Megaevents and Protest Participation," *Partecipazione e Conflitto* 9, no. 3 (2017): 949–80.
53. Saskia Sassen, *A Sociology of Globalization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 250.
54. Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 134.
55. Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Social Change: Spectacle, Legacy and Public Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 70.
56. Andrew Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
57. McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 55.