

Biological Invasions

Phytosanitary inspection of woody plants for planting at European Union entry points - a practical enquiry --Manuscript Draft--

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Abstract:	<p>Phytosanitary import inspections are important to avoid entry of harmful pests on live plants. In the European Union (EU), all consignments of live plants must be inspected at the first point of entry, and plants allowed entry can be moved without further inspection among the 28 Member States and Switzerland. It is important that inspections in EU countries adhere to the same standard to avoid introduction of harmful organisms through countries with weaker methods. We tested whether sampling intensity and confidence in the inspection results were the same across these countries. Questionnaires were sent to inspectors in all countries, asking about inspections of individual consignments of woody plants for planting. Data about 102 lots, inspected at 13 points of entry in six countries, were analyzed. We used hypergeometric and binomial statistics for small and large consignments, respectively, to calculate the probability that less than 1% of the plants were infested. The duration of the inspection increased with lot size, but the probability that the infestation level was below 1% of the plants was lower for small than for large lots. Moreover, large international differences in inspection intensity and the probability that the inspections could detect a level of infestation below 1% were found: the probability was consistently above 0.95 in one country, while the average probability was below 0.6 in the other countries. We suggest that the EU Member States adopt common maximum acceptable infestation levels and harmonized, statistics-based sampling protocols for plants for planting.</p>
Response to Reviewers:	The abstract should reflect the results more and amongst other things include the number of analysed countries (6) and different entry points.

> The abstract was improved as requested.

In line 169 and following the number of countries is confusing. Start with 'Six' and later refer to 'two other countries'.

> The text was clarified according to the suggestion.

The start of the discussion now starts with a useful discussion of the methodology. However, this should be extended more, to include that you were not able to attend the inspections for quality control. Also the fact that only 6 countries responded in a useful way should be discussed here, given the potential reasons that you list in your letter, including contacting the wrong people, and reluctance to aid shippers who want to avoid inspections by revealing policies.

> We added text describing our inability to do quality control and contacting the wrong people to the discussion as suggested. Reluctance to aid shippers probably wasn't a reason for the limited number of responding countries - it is related to the unwillingness of countries to let us see instructions for inspectors.

The FAO 2008/2009 reference is inconsistently used in the text and list.

> Done, all replaced with FAO 2009

Table 1 should include the number of entry points per country, as requested by the reviewers.

> Done. We have also indicated the number of points of entry by type.

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1 **Phytosanitary inspection of woody plants for planting at European Union**
2 **entry points - a practical enquiry**

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23 **Running title:** Phytosanitary inspections in Europe

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24 **Abstract**

25 Phytosanitary import inspections are important to avoid entry of harmful pests on live plants. In the European Union
26 (EU), all consignments of live plants must be inspected at the first point of entry, and plants allowed entry can be
27 moved without further inspection among the 28 Member States and Switzerland. It is important that inspections in
28 EU countries adhere to the same standard to avoid introduction of harmful organisms through countries with weaker
29 methods. We tested whether sampling intensity and confidence in the inspection results were the same across these
30 countries. Questionnaires were sent to inspectors in all countries, asking about inspections of individual
31 consignments of woody plants for planting. Data about 102 lots, inspected at 13 points of entry in six countries,
32 were analyzed. We used hypergeometric and binomial statistics for small and large consignments, respectively, to
33 calculate the probability that less than 1% of the plants were infested. The duration of the inspection increased with
34 lot size, but the probability that the infestation level was below 1% of the plants was lower for small than for large
35 lots. Moreover, large international differences in inspection intensity and the probability that the inspections could
36 detect a level of infestation below 1% were found: the probability was consistently above 0.95 in one country, while
37 the average probability was below 0.6 in the other countries. We suggest that the EU Member States adopt common
38 maximum acceptable infestation levels and harmonized, statistics-based sampling protocols for plants for planting.

41 **Keywords:** European Union, International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM), international trade,
42 invasive alien species, phytosanitary inspections, quarantine species.

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4 **43 Introduction**

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6 44 Biological invasions by invasive alien species (IAS) cause significant damage to forests. Biological diversity and
7 45 ecosystem services have been affected (Vitousek et al. 1997; Mack et al. 2000; Pimentel et al. 2002; Kenis et al.
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9 46 2009), as well as the economy of the invaded areas as a result of decreases in the market value of timber, declines in
10 47 forest productivity, recreational or esthetic value or increased pest management costs (Perrings et al. 2000; Holmes
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12 48 et al. 2009; Williams et al. 2010). According to Smith et al. (2007), the live plant trade accounts for 90% of the
13 49 human-mediated introductions of non-native invertebrate species in the United Kingdom, while Santini et al. (2013)
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15 50 estimated that 57% of the alien pathogens of trees have been introduced into Europe on live plants. Similarly,
16 51 Liebhold et al. (2012) reported that 70% of the damaging insects and pathogens established in the United States
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18 52 between 1860 and 2006 had most likely entered with imported live plants. The increasingly large trade volumes and
19 53 passenger numbers have led to a mounting propagule pressure on previously isolated ecosystems (Levine &
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21 54 d'Antonio 2003). The trade volume and the numbers of air passengers correlated with the number of pests and
22 55 diseases established in a country or region (Roques 2010; Paini et al. 2010). Safe trade, international and national
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24 56 treaties and phytosanitary regulations aimed at reducing introduction of harmful organisms through international
25 57 trade in live plants are, therefore, of great importance.

27 58 In Europe, plants for planting, i.e. plants intended to remain planted, to be planted or replanted (FAO 2012),
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29 59 represent the second most important pathway where regulated organisms are intercepted during phytosanitary import
30 60 inspections (Roques & Auger-Rozenberg 2006). For example, Kenis et al. (2007) found that 52.7% of the
31 61 interceptions of insect pests in Switzerland and Austria were related to the ornamental trade, with 14.9% linked to
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33 62 plants for planting and 4.2% to bonsai, which is similar to the fraction of alien pathogens of trees that have been
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35 63 introduced into Europe on live plants (Santini et al. 2013). The import of live plants into the European Union (EU) is
36 64 regulated in the EU Plant Health Directive (Commission Directive 2000/29/EC; European Commission 2002).
37
38 65 Consignments of live plants imported into the EU must be free of the harmful organisms listed in Annexes I.A and
39 66 II.A of the Directive, must not contain the prohibited plant species listed in Annex II.A and III, and must in certain
40 67 cases (Annex IV) have been submitted to a specific treatment. All consignments of live plants must be inspected at
41
42 68 the first point of entry where the consignment enters the EU. The plants can then be moved within the 28 EU
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44 69 Member States without further inspection at country borders if the consignment has been found to be compliant with
45 70 the import regulations, i.e. the consignment was practically free of regulated pests and, where especially specified
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47 71 (FAO 2011), additional requirements were met. Some plant species can only be moved within the EU if
48 72 accompanied by a plant passport, the EU-internal equivalent of a phytosanitary certificate, and the inspector at the
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50 73 point of entry will issue such document if needed. The phytosanitary regulations of Switzerland are nearly identical
51 74 to those of the EU and within the present discussion Switzerland can, from a phytosanitary perspective, be
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53 75 considered part of the EU.

54 76 Phytosanitary inspections at the point of entry are intended as checks to verify that producers in exporting countries
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56 77 comply with the phytosanitary measures required by the importing country (FAO 2011). These inspections are not
57
58 78 usually considered as a phytosanitary measure in itself to reduce infestation of consignments or to prevent the entry
59 79 of pests and diseases (Sequeira & Griffin 2014). The import inspections are a central tool in biosecurity, but in most

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80 cases only a fraction of the plants in a consignment can be inspected and not all pests can be detected. One aim of
81 the inspections is, thus, to verify that pest infestation levels are below a level deemed acceptable by the importing
82 country.

83 The International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) No. 31 (FAO 2009) provides guidance on the
84 determination of the number of plants to be sampled in individual consignments to verify compliance with the
85 phytosanitary requirements set by an importing country. Fixed-proportion sampling results in inconsistent detection
86 levels between large and small consignments, and thus differences in confidence in the result of inspections. Hence,
87 it is preferable to adapt the proportion of plants sampled in a consignment to the number of plants in this
88 consignment (FAO 2009). Sampling without replacement, as done during phytosanitary inspections, has a larger
89 impact on the theoretical chance of finding harmful organisms on the remaining number of plants in small rather
90 than large consignments. ISPM 31 therefore recommends using a sampling protocol based on a hypergeometric
91 distribution for relatively small lots, for example when a sample of more than 5% of the lot size is taken, and a
92 binomial-based sampling protocol for larger lots. The annexes to ISPM 31 contain tables to facilitate selection of the
93 appropriate sample size for a given consignment, for different levels of confidence and maximum infestation levels
94 that a country may consider acceptable.

95 Many countries that keep records of pest interceptions do not register the total number of inspections, which makes a
96 precise assessment of the proportion of infested shipments impossible. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection
97 Service of the United States Department of Agriculture uses the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring
98 protocol (AQIM; USDA 1998), in part to estimate the difference between the actual infestation rate and the
99 estimated number of infested consignments as captured in standard inspection practice. Standard inspection practice
100 in the USA is based on the rule-of-thumb that 2% of the items in a shipment should be inspected. By contrast,
101 AQIM uses a hypergeometric-based sampling process for some agricultural commodities, including live plants, to
102 verify with 95% confidence that less than 10% of the items in a shipment is infested. Because of the volume of live
103 plant imports, this protocol can only be implemented on a fraction of the shipments and thus does not replace the
104 standard inspections. Venette et al. (2002) discussed the theoretical basis for sampling during standard and AQIM
105 inspections, in order to optimize the chances to detect harmful organisms in the inspection units (e.g. a container)
106 given a certain level of infestation with a fixed confidence level. The comparison of the AQIM procedure and the
107 2% sampling method illustrated that the latter method fails to detect pests in small consignments and overestimates
108 sample size for larger shipments.

109 The EU Plant Health Directive stipulates that Member States must inspect consignments of live plants and their
110 packaging "meticulously" (European Commission 2000), but the Directive does not specify what is meant by
111 "meticulously". Specific sampling instructions are only stipulated for dwarfed plants, such as bonsai (a random
112 sample of at least 300 plants from a given genus where the number of plants of that genus is not more than 3,000
113 plants, or 10% of the plants if there are more than 3,000 plants from that genus) and *Dendranthema* spp. (a minimal
114 sample of 10% of the consignment; Annex IV.A.I to European Commission 2002). In addition, the Commission
115 Decision "on emergency measures to prevent the introduction and spread of *Anoplophora chinensis* (Forster)" states
116 that the recommended size of the sample shall be as such to enable at least the detection of 1% level of infestation

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4 117 with a level of confidence of 99% (European Commission 2010). Using binomial statistics, it can be calculated that
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6 118 the latter requires the sampling of all plants in consignments of up to 459 plants and the sampling of 459 plants in
7 119 larger consignments.
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9 120 Discrepancies in the sampling methods for all other live plants between member states may affect the EU's whole
10 121 biosecurity status (Brasier 2005). An importing country with no reliable sampling strategy may be a weak link and a
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12 122 point of entry for quarantine pests. Countries with stricter border controls may see their biosecurity weakened by
13 123 imports of infested goods that entered the EU through another country with less stringent procedures. This is
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15 124 especially important given the unequal distribution of imports across EU countries and the wide range of climates
16 125 and host availability. To ensure that all Member States inspect consignments in an adequate way, the Food and
17 126 Veterinary Office (FVO), which assists the European Commission in the application of phytosanitary regulations,
18 127 audits the plant inspection systems in each Member State. Their recent reports revealed differences and
19 128 shortcomings in the inspection practices in audited countries (FVO 2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b), such as a lack of
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21 129 guidelines for visual inspections, different levels of inspection of the same commodities depending on the points of
22 130 entry, non-random sampling (e.g. just the easily-accessible boxes or only the suspicious cases are inspected) and
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24 131 biased sampling, indicating that the inspected commodities were those where previously many harmful organisms
25 132 were intercepted. However, although the FVO reports provide qualitative information on how the audited
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27 133 inspections were carried out, they do not provide quantitative information that allows comparison of inspection
28 134 intensity or the level of confidence in the results of inspections.

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32 135 Here, we report the results of questionnaires that were sent to phytosanitary inspectors at points of entry in EU
33 136 Member States and Switzerland, which addressed the procedures followed during the inspection of lots of woody
34 137 plants for planting imported from non-EU countries. We tested the hypothesis that the confidence in the sampling
35 138 was equal among the EU Member States. We compared the number of inspected plants in the consignments with the
36 139 number that should have been inspected in order to detect a minimal threshold of infestation with a certain
37 140 probability given the size of the consignment, as established from either the binomial or the hypergeometric
38 141 distribution. To our knowledge, this study is the first that describes inspection practices regarding plants for planting
39 142 in the EU. The imported lots studied here represent only a tiny fraction of the total number of lots imported each
40 143 year in the European territory. However, even if not fully representative of all member states, our study includes
41 144 major importers from Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western Europe.

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48 146 **Methods**

49 147 Questionnaires

51 148 We collected information regarding inspections of consignments of woody plants for planting using questionnaires
52 149 sent to the National Plant Protection Organisation (NPPO) of each EU member state plus Switzerland from January
53 150 2012 to June 2013. The NPPOs transmitted the questionnaires to their inspectors at the different entry points. The
54 151 questionnaires were completed anonymously by the inspectors during, or immediately after the inspections had
55 152 taken place. We collected the following information: country, point of entry, type of point of entry (land crossing,
56 153 airport or harbor), point of inspection (if different from point of entry), date and approximate duration of the

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154 inspection, number of inspectors for the inspection, country and point of origin, type of point of origin (land
155 crossing, airport or harbor), country of final destination (if different from the country of entry in Europe). For each
156 lot in the consignments, the questionnaire asked inspectors to list the plant species, the approximate size of the
157 plants, the type of product (bonsais, potted plants, bare-rooted plants, cuttings, seeds, other), the quantity of plants or
158 seeds in the lot, the occurrence of an identity check of the plants, the type of inspection (visual, sample taken for
159 analysis, other), the sampling unit (entire plant, seed, branch, leaf, other) and the sample size (e.g. the number of
160 inspected units in the lot), as well as the presence or absence of pest(s) and/or symptom(s), the pest species and
161 higher taxon (arthropod, mite, nematode, bacteria, fungus, virus, other), the number of sampling units found with
162 pest(s) or symptom(s) and the decision (lot or consignment released, retained, treated or destroyed). For the
163 analyses, we only considered inspections taking place at the entry points in the EU and not those performed in
164 approved inspection place at the final destination. The results of the countries that returned questionnaires are kept
165 anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the information. The inspection effort (per plant) was calculated as the
166 number of inspectors multiplied by the time spent for an inspection, divided by the number of sampled plants.

167 168 Calculation of the maximum level of infestation

169 Six out of the 28 countries originally contacted (Belgium, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
170 Kingdom) returned questionnaires with information regarding 102 inspected lots. Two other countries that returned
171 questionnaires were excluded, because inspectors in one country provided information about one inspected lot only
172 and the information provided by inspectors in another country did not include the number of sampled plants. The
173 information about these lots was sufficient to assess the inspection effort and to calculate the maximum pest
174 infestation level and the sample size required to ascertain whether the infestation level was below a given threshold.
175 Because of insufficient information about individual consignments and in order to keep the sampling rules as simple
176 as possible, we assumed that infested plants were randomly distributed throughout the consignments. Non-random
177 distribution of pests would require larger sample sizes to achieve the same level of statistical certainty about the
178 potential maximum infestation levels.

179 We calculated the number of plants that should be sampled to ascertain a given maximum infestation level and
180 statistical certainty for large lot sizes, where less than 5% of the plants in the lot was sampled, using binomial
181 statistics (Venette et al. 2002; FAO 2011).

182 For small lots, where more than 5% of the plants were inspected, we used hypergeometric statistics to determine the
183 probability that the level of infestation was below the maximum acceptable level (FAO 2009).

184 185 Statistical analyses

186 The statistical analysis was done using R (R Development Core Team 2013) and the hypergeometric calculations
187 were performed using the function *dhyper*. The significance of the difference in confidence in the sampling of small
188 and large lots was tested with a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The duration of the inspection, the number of sampled
189 plants and the probability that the infestation rate was below 1% were used as response variables, and the data
190 analyzed with linear mixed effects models using the function *lme()*. Inspecting countries, product types (bonsai,

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6 192 factors, without their interactions, and points of entry as random factors in the analyses. The effect of inspecting
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8 193 countries and types of entry point was tested against points of entry and the product type was tested against
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10 194 residuals. The number of plants per lot, the percentage of plants sampled and inspection effort were \log_{10} -
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12 195 transformed. No suitable transformations of the probability data and inspection time were found and the ranks of
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14 196 these data were analyzed instead. Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc comparison of levels of significant factors. The
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16 197 average inspection time spent per plant per inspector (inspection effort, \log_{10} -transformed), only available for a
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18 198 single point of entry per country, was analyzed using a general linear model. We visually checked that the model
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20 199 assumptions were met using histograms and residual and QQ plots, according to Zuur et al. (2009: pp. 542-543).
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22 200 The relationship between the duration of the inspections and lot size was assessed using linear regression. The
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24 201 relationship between inspection effort and confidence in the sampling result was analyzed using Pearson's product-
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26 202 moment correlation.

203 24 204 **Results**

25 205 The inspected lots contained a total of 680,840 plants, belonging to 46 genera from 13 exporting countries. There
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27 206 were large differences in the size of the lots. Five lots contained more than 50,000 plants each, 75 lots contained
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29 207 between 1 and 1,000 plants and 41 lots consisted of 250 or fewer plants. The lots inspected in country C were
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31 208 significantly larger than the lots in country D ($F_{5,7} = 4.81$, $P = 0.032$; Table 1). No other significant differences in lot
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33 209 size between countries were found. Lots inspected at the only land crossing in the comparison did not contain
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35 210 significantly more plants than lots inspected at harbours but not airports ($F_{2,7} = 4.65$, $P = 0.052$). Shipments with
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37 211 bare-rooted plants contained significantly more plants than shipments of potted plants ($F_{2,99} = 4.60$, $P = 0.012$), but
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39 212 the number of plants in shipments of bonsai was not different from either. The size of the plants in 75 lots was
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41 213 indicated in the questionnaire responses. The plants in 67 of these lots were up to 1m tall and the plants in one lot
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43 214 were up to 4m tall. One nematode, one arthropod, a pathogen and a virus each were found in lots of potted or bare-
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45 215 rooted plants from China, Australia, the USA and Ukraine, respectively.

44 217 Inspection intensity

45 218 Inspectors in all countries except country G provided information about the duration of the inspections of a total of
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47 219 91 lots. Thirty-six of the inspections lasted up to an hour and 35 inspections lasted between five and ten hours.
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49 220 Although the differences in inspection time were only marginally significant in the overall analysis of the ranked
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51 221 data ($F_{4,1} = 140.39$, $P = 0.063$), the average inspection time in country C was longer than that in country F (Table 1).
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53 222 Inspections lasted more than five times longer in seaports than in airports, but the difference was not significant ($F_{1,1}$
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55 223 $= 30.05$, $P = 0.115$). The inspection time was longer for bare rooted plants than for bonsai and potted plants ($F_{2,82} =$
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57 224 22.81 , $P < 0.001$). Up to five inspectors were involved in each inspection, but 90% of the lots were inspected by one,
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59 225 two or three inspectors. A positive relationship was found between the duration of the inspections and lot size ($F_{1,85}$
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61 226 $= 15.04$, $P < 0.001$, $R^2 = 0.15$).

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228 The number of plants sampled per consignment was significantly larger in country G than in all other countries, the
229 number in country C was intermediate and the number sampled in countries A, D, E and F was lower than either in
230 G or C ($F_{5,6} = 52.86$, $P < 0.001$; Table 1). The number of sampled plants was highest at land crossings and lowest at
231 airports, which was in part due to differences in the size of the lots arriving: the largest lots were inspected at land
232 crossings, and the smallest in airports ($F_{2,6} = 20.93$, $P = 0.002$). The number of sampled potted plants was larger than
233 for the two other plant types ($F_{2,86} = 3.58$, $P = 0.032$). As expected, the inspected percentage of plants in each lot
234 declined with lot size, but the sampling intensity differed between countries (Fig. 1). In country G all plants were
235 inspected up to a lot size of 300 plants and 300 plants were inspected from each larger lot. All other countries
236 inspected fewer plants in lots containing up to ca. 5000 plants.

237
238 Inspection effort, i.e. the average time spent by an inspector inspecting a plant in the lot, differed significantly
239 between countries ($F_{4,61} = 10.82$, $P < 0.001$; Fig. 2). The inspection effort was significantly greater in country C than
240 in countries D and F. The information provided by inspectors in country G was insufficient to calculate inspection
241 effort.

242 Confidence in inspection result

243 The probability that the infestation rate was below 1% of the plants in the lot increased with the number of sampled
244 plants, but only up to ca. 300 plants when the probability approaches 1 (Fig. 3). For 33 of the 102 inspected lots for
245 which it was possible to calculate it, the probability was greater than $P = 0.95$. The probability for 60 lots (58.8%)
246 was equal to or lower than $P = 0.5$. There was a large difference in confidence between small and large lots, i.e.
247 those for which more or fewer than 5% of the plants in the lot was inspected and for which we calculated confidence
248 using statistics based on binomial and hypergeometric distributions ($P = 0.39 \pm 0.05$ and $P = 0.60 \pm 0.05$, respectively;
249 $P < 0.005$).

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251
252 There was a significant difference between countries with respect to the probability that the infestation rate was
253 lower than 1% of the plants ($F_{5,6} = 20.74$, $P = 0.001$; Fig. 4). It was significantly higher in country G (always $P = 1$;
254 Fig. 1) than in the other countries, except country D. The average probability in all countries but country G was
255 below 0.6 and in country F the probability was only around 0.1. Surprisingly, a negative correlation was found
256 between the inspection effort and the confidence in the inspection result ($t = -3.27$, $P = 0.002$; $R = -0.37$).

257 **Discussion**

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259 Many goods imported from non-EU origin, including plants for planting, enter through a limited number of member
260 states and are then dispatched throughout the whole EU with no further control. With this in mind, it is clear that
261 inspection methods should be uniform across EU Member States, ensuring a common maximum acceptable
262 infestation level for the safety of the entire free trade area. The evidence reported here was derived from self-
263 completed questionnaires. We were unable to attend inspections to assess the quality of the responses, because most
264 EU countries do not know in advance what consignments will arrive when, and it was impossible to accompany

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265 inspectors on short notice when a consignment with plants for planting had arrived at the point of entry. Although
266 there is the danger that reports of inspection efforts were exaggerated, it is unlikely that there was an incentive to
267 mis-report given the assurance that all data would be anonymized. Data from only six countries were analyzed,
268 which was in part because the questionnaires were not always sent to the appropriate person in the NPPO and in part
269 because some of the countries did not provide the data required for the analyses. However, we do not believe that
270 this is too little data for the purpose of assessing whether there are international differences. Regardless of any
271 questions over the accuracies of the data presented, this work provides a first glimpse of inspection effort from
272 major importing countries and highlighted major differences in the intensity of phytosanitary inspections that reflect
273 differences in the maximum infestation level that can be detected. The probability that the level of infestation was
274 below 1% was high (i.e. >95%) in only one third of the inspections. Moreover, only one of the countries (country G)
275 that responded to our request for information appeared to follow a systematic approach to deciding on the number of
276 plants inspected in any given shipment. In this country, the probability that the infestation rate was below a set limit
277 was both consistent and high, because the inspectors followed the statistical rules, using either the hypergeometric or
278 the binomial sampling distributions according to the lots' size. In fact, there appeared to be some oversampling
279 (points above the hypergeometric curve in Fig. 1), but this is likely for ease of instructing inspectors. By contrast,
280 the probability was never as high and it varied between inspections in each of the other five countries. The
281 implication of this variability is that there is an increased likelihood of infested shipments being allowed to enter the
282 EU, and a higher risk of introduction of harmful organisms imported into the EU through those countries that have
283 the weakest inspection strategies.

284
285 With a few exceptions, the intensity of phytosanitary inspections is only vaguely defined in the Plant Health
286 Directive of the EU, where it is only stated that each shipment should be inspected "meticulously" (European
287 Commission 2002). This broad brush approach may be desirable at the legislative level and more detailed, perhaps
288 context-dependent directions may be defined in regulation or country-specific policy. However, this also leaves
289 room for individual Member States to carry out inspections to different standards, and our study revealed some of
290 these significant differences. The abundant intra-EU trade that is not subject to further phytosanitary inspections
291 (Dehnen-Schmutz et al. 2010) can result in the spread of harmful organisms that have gone undetected during less
292 efficient phytosanitary inspections in countries where there is a lack of certainty that the infestation level in the
293 shipment was below an acceptable level. The differences in inspection intensity between countries could be a result
294 of national policies, but we did not obtain insight into the guidance provided to inspectors in the countries that
295 responded to our questionnaire. Despite the FVO's regular audits of the inspection practices in Member States and
296 its suggestions for improvements, our results indicate that the inspection intensity is nevertheless not uniform.

297
298 The apparent lack of a consistent, statistics-based method to determine the number of plants to inspect in a given
299 shipment clearly leads to low statistical confidence in the outcome of inspections in many countries. On the other
300 hand, it can also result in the inspection of too many plants. While inspecting more plants than necessary increases
301 confidence in the inspection results, this may not be the best use of inspection resources, in particular in situations

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302 where such resources are limited or where the shipment must be cleared rapidly to preserve the quality of the goods.
303 An example appears to be country C, where the duration of some of the inspections was very long (up to ten hours
304 for 72 inspected plants). The negative correlation between the average time spent inspecting a plant in a
305 consignment and the probability that the infestation level was low indicates that, in our study, a longer inspection
306 time did not improve the quality of the inspection. This suggests that some of the time allotted to these longer
307 inspections may have been better spent on the inspection of additional consignments or on more detailed inspection
308 of high-risk consignments.

309
310 Samplings in country G almost perfectly fitted the statistics based on a hypergeometric distribution: up to a
311 consignment size of 300 plants all plants were inspected and above this size the inspectors sampled exactly 300
312 units. This sampling strategy fits with the recommendations of ISPM 31 and provides a high statistical probability
313 (95%) that the infestation level of inspected shipments was below 1%. The required sampling intensity increases as
314 the acceptable infestation levels are lowered and if we had assumed a 0.1% infestation level as the maximum
315 acceptable, this would have severely reduced the confidence in the results of the inspections in most EU countries in
316 our study. Conversely, if the acceptable maximum infestation level is increased, or the targeted level of confidence
317 in inspection results is decreased, the sampling intensity can be reduced, this being a matter of risk management.

318 Our study was based on the assumption that pests were distributed randomly in the inspected shipments. Detection
319 of a pest that is patchily distributed within a shipment theoretically requires a higher sampling intensity to obtain an
320 equal level of confidence (Venette et al. 2002 and references therein). We are unaware of any country to date that
321 has implemented sampling rules assuming clustered pest occurrence.

322 In addition to the statistical limitations outlined above, visual inspections are rarely one hundred percent efficient,
323 i.e. capable of detecting all infestations above, or equal to, the acceptable maximum pest level in the sampled goods.
324 This is especially valid for microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, microscopic fungi or phytoplasmas (Brasier
325 2008). Insects with cryptic life stages may be difficult to detect too (McCullough et al. 2006). For example, plants
326 infested with *Phytophthora* spp. may look healthy during visual inspections and this impression may be reinforced
327 by fungistatic treatments before shipment. The inspectors may thus have the false impression that the lots inspected
328 are pest free after a negative visual inspection. Liebhold et al. (2012) showed that infested material was detected in
329 3.3% of the incoming shipments in the United States using standard procedures, and in 11.9% of the shipments
330 using AQIM procedures, and estimated that 72% of the infested shipments were wrongly allowed to enter the
331 country during standard, biased and non-random inspections. In New Zealand ca. 43% of the infestations are
332 unnoticed during import inspections (Tualau & Nair 2008). No such estimate exists for Europe. Inspection
333 efficiency can and should be taken into account when designing a sampling strategy (FAO 2008). This will increase
334 the number of plants that must be inspected in each consignment to achieve the desired level of confidence in
335 inspection results.

336
337 Surkov et al. (2007) provided levels of infestation of ornamental plant genera (*Chrysanthemum*, *Dianthus*, *Impatiens*
338 and *Rosa*) imported from 1998 to 2001 from non-EU countries to the Netherlands. The fraction of infested plants in

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339 the shipments ranged from 1.05E-07 to 3.65E-04. The destructive sampling of *Acer* spp. imported from non-EU
340 countries into the Netherlands as part of the emergency measures consecutive to the *Anoplophora chinensis* Forster
341 (Coleoptera: Cerambycidae) outbreak in the Netherlands in 2008, in which 269,107 *Acer* spp. were destructively
342 sampled, revealed that 4.9% of the consignments and, on average, less than 0.005 % of the sampled plants were
343 infested (R. Eschen unpublished). These infestation levels are well below those that can reliably be detected during
344 inspections, suggesting that some quarantine organisms may have gone unnoticed during inspections. Phytosanitary
345 import inspections are not, and are not meant to be, adequate to detect these low infestation levels and alternative
346 approaches to the management of low-risk pathways with very low infestation levels may be needed to avoid the
347 establishment of associated harmful organisms.

348
349 An alternative or complementary option to the implementation of statistical approaches to sampling for rare
350 individuals described in ISPM 31 (FAO 2008) is the prioritization of high-risk pathways for intensive sampling and
351 reduced sampling of pathways that are considered to pose a lower risk. This may in particular be necessary in cases
352 where resource limitations prohibit intensive inspection of all consignments. Using an empirical model based on
353 Dutch data on imported ornamentals, Surkov et al. (2008) argued that, under capacity constraints, the inspecting
354 agencies should adapt their inspection efforts in order to equalize the marginal pest risks across importation
355 pathways by investing larger inspection efforts in pathways with larger expected risks. Our results appear to show
356 that inspectors in some countries did indeed prioritise certain consignments for more thorough inspections. In
357 particular, inspectors spent significantly more time when inspecting bonsai plants, a well-known risky commodity,
358 than bare rooted or potted plants.

359
360 Conclusion

361 A better coordination between EU Member States to address biological invasions is urgently needed (Hulme et al.
362 2009) and, as part of this, the import inspection techniques should be harmonised. We suggest that a statistics-based
363 sampling methodology should be adopted by all EU Member States. In our dataset, one country provided evidence
364 that simple sampling rules can be implemented and some non-EU countries already follow similar rules (i.e.
365 Australia and New Zealand). Such simple guidelines for statistically-based sampling in the EU already exist for
366 specific regulated species, such as the Asian longhorn beetle *Anoplophora chinensis* (European Commission 2012)
367 and could be extended to the other regulated species. In this way, the confidence in inspection results would be
368 harmonised, or at least comparable if the countries would set the acceptable levels of infestation differently. ISPM
369 31 (FAO 2009) provides the theoretical background for statistical-based sampling for small and large shipments.
370 NPPOs could refer to this Standard for guidance on sample sizes for a shipment, based on the level of infestation
371 that is deemed acceptable, the desired confidence in the result and the availability of inspection resources.
372 Prioritisation of the inspection efforts depending on the risks represented by each consignment, and their integration
373 within systems approaches with wider room for mitigation measures in the exporting country would appear a
374 possible response to capacity constraints.

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
475 **Tables and Figures.**

476 Table 1. Summary of the number and size of inspected lots (n and Plants per lot) and inspection intensity (Sample size (plants) and Inspection duration (min), by
477 inspecting country, point of entry type and plant type. The values shown are means \pm SE. Different letters in any given column indicate significant differences
478 (Tukey HSD: P < 0.05)

Country	Points of entry	n	Plants per lot	Sample size (plants)	Inspection duration (min)
A	2	8	1193 \pm 861 ^{ab}	8.6 \pm 3.0 ^b	121.3 \pm 28.7 ^{ab}
C	3	56	11110 \pm 4165 ^a	131.4 \pm 38.7 ^a	394.4 \pm 17.1 ^a
D	1	7	89 \pm 50 ^b	14.0 \pm 4.2 ^b	46.4 \pm 4.8 ^{ab}
E	1	17	2072 \pm 1315 ^{ab}	12.2 \pm 1.8 ^b	56.5 \pm 2.4 ^{ab}
F	1	9	519 \pm 401 ^{ab}	6.2 \pm 1.0 ^b	32.2 \pm 3.6 ^b
G	6	23	735 \pm 146 ^{ab}	249.4 \pm 18.2 ^c	NA
Point of entry					
Airport	5	25	948 \pm 467 ^{ab}	51.7 \pm 21.9 ^a	51.4 \pm 16.4
Land crossing	1	6	75800 \pm 24354 ^a	568.3 \pm 188.6 ^b	NA
Sea port	8	97	2217 \pm 964 ^b	93.5 \pm 13.6 ^a	277.8 \pm 21.0
Plant type					
Bare rooted		81	7950 \pm 3422 ^a	126.1 \pm 31.3 ^a	250.4 \pm 28.5 ^a
Bonsai		27	1226 \pm 306 ^{ab}	35.8 \pm 5.5 ^a	224.1 \pm 23.8 ^b
Potted		20	1969 \pm 837 ^b	188.2 \pm 31.2 ^b	83.8 \pm 44.0 ^b

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
480 Figure 1. Relationship between the number of plants in the lot and the fraction of plants inspected for six
 481 countries (a) and between the number of plants in the lot and the number of sampled plants for six importing
 482 European countries (b). In the right figure, the dotted line represents the minimal sample size when using the
 483 binomial distribution, necessary to detect 1% of infested plants with a 95% probability ($f=0.01$; $p=0.95$). The
 484 dashed line represents the minimal sample size when using the hypergeometric function with the same
 485 parameters. The solid line represents the sample size corresponding to 5% of the shipment size. For data above
 486 this line, we applied the hypergeometric distribution and below this line the binomial distribution.



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
488 Figure 2. Inspection effort (average time spent per inspector on each plant) by country. Shown are mean +/- SE.

489 Different letters above the bars indicate significant differences (Tukey HSD: P < 0.05).



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491 Figure 3. Relationship between the number of inspected plants and the probability that the level of infestation
492 was below 1% of the plants in the consignment. The dotted line indicates $P = 0.95$.



494 Figure 4. The probability that the infestation level of inspected consignments was below 1% of the plants, by
1 495 country (mean \pm SE). Different letters above the bars indicate significant differences (Tukey HSD: $P < 0.05$).
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